AD/A320/170 - Fire Protection - Cargo Compartment Water Drain Valves

AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT allen_ri Template mod 11 Jan 05 ernst_o 9 6 2005-02-09T00:44:00Z 2005-02-09T00:28:00Z 2005-03-03T22:12:00Z 2 372 2125 casa 14848 17 4 2493 11.6360   AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following Airworthiness Directive (AD) under subregulation 39. 00 1(1) of CASR 1998.   The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section. Airbus Industrie A319, A320 and A321 Series Aeroplanes AD/A320/170 Fire P rotection - Cargo Compar tment Water Drain Valves 4/2005   Applicability: AIRBUS: - A318 aircraft all certified models and all serial numbers; and - A319 aircraft, all certified models and all serial numbers that have incorporated AIRBUS modification 25642 or 26213 in production or AIRBUS Service Bulletin (SB) A320-52-1088 in service; and - A320 and A321 aircraft, all certified models and all serial numbers that have incorporated AIRBUS modification 26213 or 26603 in production or SB A320-52-1088 in service. Except any aircraft that have incorporated AIRBUS modification 33232 in production or SB A320-52-1124 in service. Requirement: Modify the forward and aft cargo water drain valves in accordance with AIRBUS Service Bulletin A320-52-1124. Note:   DGAC AD F-2004-172 EASA Approval No. 2004-10569 dated 20 October 2004 refers. Compliance: Unless previously completed within 4 months from the effective date of this Directive.   This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 14 April 2005. Background: A fire containment capability evaluation of the cargo compartment has been performed during a flight test on an A319.   The level of the halon extinguishant decreased below the required concentration.   This was due to a too high rate of air renewal in the compartment. After investigation two leak sources were identified: - the first leak is generated by the forward and aft cargo door water drain valves, - the second leak is generated by the aft cargo compartment temperature sensor installation; which is covered by another Airworthiness Directive.     This Directive renders mandatory the modification of the forward and aft cargo door water drain valves. James Coyne Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority 3 March 2005