AB v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2026] NSWSC 767

Catchwords: EQUITY — equitable remedies — interlocutory injunctions — principles — where the plaintiffs play professional sport for two different sporting clubs, have very close and longstanding relationships with each other and message each other in a private group chat service — where the first plaintiff was in a romantic relationship with the second defendant for four years — where the second defendant access ed the first plaintiff’s old mobile phone on multiple occasions, took photographs of messages from the group chat between the defendants and allow ed the third defendant journalist to access those messages to investigate and research story to be published by the first defendant — risk of reputational and financial harm to the plaintiffs from disclosure and publication of text messages — HELD — serious question to be tried with very strong prospects of success that the defendants have used, disclosed and threatened to further use and disclose confidential information of the plaintiffs — balance of convenience favours granting the interlocutory injunction EQUITY — breach of confidence — principles — equitable obligation of confidence — identification of the confidential information — whether the information had the necessary quality of confidence — whether the information was imparted in circumstances which import an obligation of confidence — “trivial tittle-tattle” — iniquity — HELD — the elements of a breach of confidence satisfied, the confidential information is not “trivial tittle-tattle” and does not disclose any iniquity of the plaintiffs CIVIL PROCEDURE — s uppression and non-publication orders — principles — whether suppression orders and non-publication orders are necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice — where very essence of claim in breach of confidence would be lost if the confidential information was disclosed — where it would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice if the victims o f “stolen” confidential information were dissuaded from bringing proceedings because of the harm that the publicity and speculation of the proceedings would cause — HELD — suppression and non-publication orders made Supreme Court New South Wales Medium Neutral Citation: AB v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2026] NSWSC 767 Hearing dates: 23 June 2026 Date of orders: 1 July 2026 Decision date: 01 July 2026 Jurisdiction: Equity - Duty List Before: McGrath J Decision: Interlocutory injunction granted and suppression and non-publication orders made Catchwords: EQUITY — equitable remedies — interlocutory injunctions — principles — where the plaintiffs play professional sport for two different sporting clubs, have very close and longstanding relationships with each other and message each other in a private group chat service — where the first plaintiff was in a romantic relationship with the second defendant for four years — where the second defendant access ed the first plaintiff’s old mobile phone on multiple occasions, took photographs of messages from the group chat between the defendants and allow ed the third defendant journalist to access those messages to investigate and research story to be published by the first defendant — risk of reputational and financial harm to the plaintiffs from disclosure and publication of text messages — HELD — serious question to be tried with very strong prospects of success that the defendants have used, disclosed and threatened to further use and disclose confidential information of the plaintiffs — balance of convenience favours granting the interlocutory injunction EQUITY — breach of confidence — principles — equitable obligation of confidence — identification of the confidential information — whether the information had the necessary quality of confidence — whether the information was imparted in circumstances which import an obligation of confidence — “trivial tittle-tattle” — iniquity — HELD — the elements of a breach of confidence satisfied, the confidential information is not “trivial tittle-tattle” and does not disclose any iniquity of the plaintiffs CIVIL PROCEDURE — s uppression and non-publication orders — principles — whether suppression orders and non-publication orders are necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice — where very essence of claim in breach of confidence would be lost if the confidential information was disclosed — where it would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice if the victims o f “stolen” confidential information were dissuaded from bringing proceedings because of the harm that the publicity and speculation of the proceedings would cause — HELD — suppression and non-publication orders made Legislation Cited: Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act 1983 (Cth) Court Suppression and Non-p ublication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) , ss 3, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12 Cases Cited: AMI Australia Holdings Pty Ltd v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1395 Amit Matalia v Warwickshire CC [2017] EWCA Civ 991 Argyll v Argyll [1967] 1 Ch 302 Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd v Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 430; (2012) 295 ALR 348 Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199; [2001] HCA 63 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; [2006] HCA 46 Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618; [1968] HCA 1 BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster (2019) 269 CLR 574; [2019] HCA 45 Bond v Gray [2013] NSWSC 1793 British Industrial Plastics Ltd v Ferguson (1930) 58 RCP 1 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457; [2004] UKHL 22 Caravelle Investments Ltd v Martaban Ltd (1999) 95 FCR 85; [1999] FCA 1505 Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148; [1986] HCA 58 Coco v AN Clark ( Engineers) Ltd [1969] 65 RPC 41 Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 39 Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (Vic) (1987) 14 FCR 434 Crown Resorts Ltd v Zantran Pty Ltd (2020) 276 FCR 477 Exchange Telegraph Co Ltd v Central News Ltd [1897] 2 Ch 48 Exchange Telegraph Co Ltd v Howard & London & Manchester Press Agency Ltd (1906) 22 TLR 375 Fairfax Digital Australia & New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim (2012) 83 NSWLR 52; [2012] NSWCCA 125 First Netcom Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd (2000) 101 FCR 77; [2000] FCA 1269 Gartside v Outram (1856) 26 LJ Ch 113 Gilbert v Star Newspaper Co Ltd (1894) 11 TLR 4 Goater v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2014] NSWCA 265 Hitchcock v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 198 Hitchcock v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd ( No 2) [2000] NSWCA 82 Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651; [2010] HCA 21 Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506; [2011] HCA 4 John Fairfax Group v Local Court of New South Wales (1991) 26 NSWLR 131 Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408; [1993] HCA 56 Karas v LK Law Pty Ltd (2023) 296 FCR 39; [2023] FCAFC 15 Liquid Veneer Co v Scott (1912) 29 RPC 639 London & Provincial Sporting News Agency Ltd v Levy ( 1928) Mac G Cop Cas (1923-28) 340 Lord Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch 469 Maritime Union of Australia (No 3) (1998) 195 CLR 1; [1998] HCA 30 Marshall v Prescott [2015] NSWCA 110 Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd ( No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 414; [1984] HCA 73 Morison v Moat (1851) 9 Hare 241; 68 ER 492 National Education Advancement Programs ( NEAP) Pty Ltd v Ashton (1995) 128 FLR 334 O’Dell v The King [2023] NSWCCA 46 Optus Networks Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2010] FCAFC 21 Organic Marketing Australia Pty Ltd v Woolworths Ltd [2011] FCA 279 Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 1 Mac & G 25; 41 ER 1171 R v Legal Aid Board; ex parte Kaim Todner ( a firm) [1999] QB 966 Richards ( a pseudonym) v Jones ( a pseudonym) (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 27 Rinehart v Welker (2011) 93 NSWLR 311; [2011] NSWCA 403 Saltman Engineering Company Ltd v Campbell Engineering Company Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203 Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238; [2011] FCAFC 156 Stephens v Avery [1988] 2 All ER 477 Streetscape Projects ( Australia) Ltd v City of Sydney (2013) 295 ALR 760; [2013] NSWCA 2 Sullivan v Sclanders & Goldwell International Pty Ltd (2000) 77 SASR 419; [2000] SASC 273 The Country Care Group Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions ( No 2) (2020) 275 FCR 377; [2020] FCAFC 44 Trevorrow v State of South Australia ( No 4) [2006] SASC 42; (2006) 94 SASR 64 Warner-Lambert Company LLC v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 106 IPR 218; [2014] FCAFC 59 West Australian Newspapers v Bond (2009) 40 WAR 164; [2009] WASCA 127 Texts Cited: C M Phipps, Simon Teasdale, W illiam Harman, Toulson & Phipps on Confidentiality (Sweet & Maxwell, 4 th ed, 2020) Category: Principal judgment Parties: AB (First Plaintiff) CD (Second Plaintiff) EF (Third Plaintiff) Australian Broadcasting Corporation (First Defendant) GH (Second Defendant) Marnie Vinall (Third Defendant) Representation: Counsel: S Chrysanthou SC with N Olson (Plaintiffs) R Enbom KC with H Jager (Defendants) Solicitors: Giles George (Plaintiffs) Thomsons (Defendants) File Number(s): 2026/00253776 Publication restriction: Nil Judgment INTRODUCTION The plaintiffs , AB, CD and EF, have very close and longstanding relationships with each other . They have each play ed professional sport for over a decade and continue to do so for two different s porting c lub s , AB at one sporting club ( AB’s Sporting Club ) and CD and EF together at another sporting club ( CD/EF’s Sporting Club ) . For many years th ey have messaged each other in a private iMessage group chat service to which only they are parties ( Group Chat ) , in which hundreds ( and perhaps thousands ) of messages have been exchanged between them . AB and the second defendant, GH, were in a romantic relationship for about four years, including living together, which finished at the end of 2025 . Unbeknownst to AB, during their relationship, GH accessed the Group Chat on AB ’ s old mobile phone ( GH says AB had given the password to her to open the phone ; however AB denies giving her th at password ) , took a photograph of a screen image of a portion of the Group Chat and, following the acrimonious end of the relationship between AB and GH, retained AB ’ s old mobile phone , which enabled GH to access the Group Chat after they had ceased living together . The third defendant, Marnie Vinall, is employed as a journalist by the first defendant, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation ( ABC ). In April 2026, GH provided Ms Vinall with photographs of the Group Chat and access to the Group Chat through AB ’ s old mobile phone , which led to further photographs of portions of the Group Chat being taken. Ms Vinall has been using the information contained in the photographs of the portions of the Group Chat to investigate a proposed story to be published by the ABC. AB, CD and EF have brought these proceedings against the defendants (the ABC, GH and Ms Vinall ) for breach of confidence , and seek an interlocutory injunction pending the final determination of the proceedings to restrain the use and disclosure of the information contained in the Group Chat. The circumstances of this case demonstrate that the plaintiffs have a very strong claim to restrain the defendants from breaching the confidence in their personal information which has been taken from them without their permission. The strength of the ir claim and the potential harm that the plaintiffs are likely to suffer if their confidential information is disclosed or published cause the balance of convenience to lie in favour of equity intervening to provide interlocutory relief. I have determined that the plaintiffs should succeed in their application for an interlocutory injunction. I also consider that it is necessary for suppression and non-publication orders to be granted to protect the confidentiality of the plaintiffs ’ private information and protect the identities of the plaintiffs and GH to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice . RELEVANT FACTS Evidence The affidavit evidence for the plaintiffs was provided by Rebekah Giles of Giles George, the solicitors for the plaintiffs. The affidavit evidence for the defendants was provided by Marlia Saunders of Thomsons, the solicitors for the defendants. The crucial matters contained in the affidavits relevant to the matters I must decide were provided on information and belief and much of it by assertion . No objections were taken to any of the evidence. The Plaintiffs AB, CD and EF are highly credentialed in their sport . CD is married with children. EF is also married with children. EF holds many high - profile ambassador roles, commercial sponsorship arrangements and media roles. The Defendants The ABC is Australia ’ s national broadcaster. The ABC operates primarily under the Australian Broadcasting Corporation Act 1983 (Cth) which establishes the ABC Charter. The ABC has editorial policies that apply to all content produced, commissioned, acquired or otherwise obtained by the ABC for broadcast or publication by the ABC on platforms and through services operated by the ABC or by third parties. GH is a personality with a considerable following on social media. Ms Vinall is a n award - winning sports journalist employed by the ABC since October 2024, and has previously worked as a sport journalist for The Age newspaper , amongst other media organisations . GH and Ms Vinall are known to each other. The Group Chat AB, CD and EF have had a close relationship with each other for over 10 years , in which they have engaged in regular conversations over text message and telephone calls and have used the Group Chat for the past 8 years. AB, CD and EF have not disclosed, disseminated or copied the contents of the G roup C hat to any third parties. The images of the portion of the Group Chat which are in evidence demonstrate the Group Chat to principally contain shared jokes, insults of named other people known to AB, CD and EF in their sport and crude descriptions of sexual acts and domestic violence. Relationship between AB and GH and GH’s access to AB’s old mobile phone During the course of the relationship between GH and AB, AB ’ s mobile phone screen broke. AB then replaced his mobile phone and stored the old mobile phone at his residence for safekeeping. GH says that during her relationship with AB, AB gave GH the password to his mobile phone and AB also knew the password to GH ’ s mobile phone. GH says that she and AB used the passwords to access each other ’ s mobile phones from time to time. AB says that he did not give GH the password to his mobile phone, never gave her permission to access his messages and never gave her access to his mobile phone or his password at any point during their relationship. In September 2025, during a period when AB was away from his residence, GH used the password to access the old mobile phone of AB and the text messages in the Group Chat. GH took a photograph of certain text messages in the Group Chat appearing on the screen of the old mobile phone. AB says that he is unaware of the manner in which GH obtained information from or copies of information from his devices. AB says that he believes that any information obtained from his mobile phone was obtained by GH without his knowledge or permission. The evidence from AB suggests that he did not authorise or permit GH to access his mobile phone or take a photograph of the messages from the Group Chat. Available inferences are that AB did not know that GH had accessed his mobile phone and had taken the photograph as he was away from his residence at the time and that GH did not take a screenshot of those messages and then text those screenshots to herself using the old mobile phone as she did not want to leave a trail of what she had done. In around late October 2025 or early November 2025, GH moved out of AB ’ s residence and into her own residence. AB understood that GH would take her belongings with her and his belongings would remain at his residence ( except for a television belonging to AB , which he agreed GH could take ) . AB had no knowledge of GH taking his old mobile phone to her residence and never gave her permission to do so. AB was horrified to learn that GH has possession of his old mobile phone. On 31 December 2025, the relationship between GH and AB ended via a text message sent by GH to AB in which she stated that she would arrange for an Uber courier to collect his belongings (suit, jacket, vinyl and toothbrush) and deliver them to him. Several personal items were then returned to AB by GH. GH says that she still has some of AB ’ s belongings, including a box containing his old mobile phone, phone covers, phone charger, cords and power plugs. AB says that if he knew that GH had possession of his old mobile phone he would have immediately demanded it be returned to him. There is obviously a serious contest to be resolved at the trial between these competing versions of events from AB and GH where they are in conflict. Conduct of GH and contact with Ms Vinall On 4 January 2026, GH was scrolling through her camera roll on her mobile phone and saw the photograph she had taken of the messages from the Group Chat, which upset her. In March 2026, GH met one of the people referred to in the text messages in the G roup C hat and spoke to them about the messages, with GH saying that she felt a “ strong moral obligation ” to speak about them but was not sure of the most appropriate route. The person referred to in the text messages suggested that Ms Vinall would be the most appropriate reporter to deal with . On 29 March 2026, GH and two of the people referred to in the text messages i n the Group Chat met Ms Vinall. GH showed Ms Vinall the photograph she had taken o f AB ’ s old mobile phone which depicted the Group Chat text messages . S hortly after this meeting, Ms Vinall told GH that she needed time stamps on the text messages. The two people referred to in the text messages in the Group Chat have informed Ms Vinall that they do not object to the publication of the contents of those messages. In mid to late April 2026 , GH said she found AB ’ s old mobile phone amongst his belongings in a moving box and she used the password to open the text messages in the Group Chat to show Ms Vinall. Ms Vinall was then able to see the dates of the text messages and , on 26 April 2026, she took photographs of th ose messages in the ABC ’ s Melbourne offices . GH subsequently showed the text messages on the old mobile phone to Sam Clark, managing editor national news at the ABC, who also took photographs of those messages. On 27 April 2026, Ms Vinall sent an email to G H in which she asked her for responses on questions regarding why she gave the text messages to the ABC and wanted them revealed publicly, how she came in to possession of “ the private conversation ” and why she was giving the conversation now to the ABC given it was from 2024. On 27 April 2026, GH sent an email in response to Ms Vinall, confirming that she had received the questions and would get back to her. GH’s contact with AB’s Sporting Club On 15 May 2026, GH contacted an executive at AB ’ s Sporting Club by text message and they exchanged text messages about arranging for GH to speak to the executive. GH and th e executive then spoke to each other for approximately half an hour. On the evening of 15 May 2026, GH received a text message from a different executive at AB ’ s Sporting Club asking her to meet two executives of AB ’ s Sporting Club the following day . T hey then exchanged text messages to make the arrangements to do so . On 16 May 2026, GH met the two executives from AB ’ s Sporting Club to discuss her concerns and her view that AB should not play for AB ’ s Sporting Club in particular future games. In the meeting, GH said she felt a moral duty to raise an issue about AB and she discussed details of what she had witnessed about th at issue . Following the meeting, GH sent a text message to one of the executives with whom she had met , raising further matters of concern to her and suggesting that another executive from AB ’ s Sporting Club also become involved. The executive responded by text message that members of the board of AB ’ s Sporting Club would be contacted the following day to discuss the next steps and stat ed that the other executive had already been briefed. On 17 May 2026, the executive of AB ’ s Sporting Club sent a further text message to GH stating that an update on the following Tuesday (19 May 2026) appeared to be the only option that would work for board members of AB ’ s Sporting Club and that he would confirm the position. In May 2026, AB ’ s Sporting Club told AB that GH had approached AB ’ s Sporting Club threatening that if AB ’ s Sporting Club permitted him to play, she would release damaging information about AB (in the form of a text exchange between AB and a friend , and direct messages between AB and a number of friends on social media) that she had obtained from his mobile phone. AB ’ s Sporting Club told AB that they intended to confidentially investigate GH ’ s allegations. AB then played for AB ’ s Sporting Club . On 18 May 2026, GH and the executive from AB ’ s Sporting Club exchanged text messages regarding GH ’ s further concerns and to arrange the meeting proposed for the following day. On 19 May 2026, GH attended a Teams meeting with a board member and a further executive of AB ’ s Sporting Club . In the meeting, GH expressed her view about AB not playing in the next game for AB ’ s Sporting Club . On 19 May 2026, GH sent an email to the board member and the further executive of AB ’ s Sporting Club , with whom she had earlier met that day, providing links to particular social media posts made by AB. The board member and the executive each sent an email in response to GH acknowledging receipt of her email. GH says that at no time did she threaten to go to the media about this issue. On 20 May 2026, GH had another Teams meeting with the board member and an other executive from AB ’ s Sporting Club in which they gave her an update regarding the club ’ s process and said that they aimed to provide another update the following Monday. On 22 May 2026, GH saw an announcement by AB ’ s Sporting Club that AB had been selected to play in a further game. GH then sent a text message that day to the board member of AB ’ s Sporting Club advising that she did not want to receive any further updates about the investigation , that she understood AB ’ s Sporting Club would follow its processes with the investigation and express ed her appreciation for the time of the board and executives of AB ’ s Sporting Club and for the clarity around the process . On 26 May 2026, the chief executive officer of AB ’ s Sporting Club sent an email to GH thanking her for the time she gave to the process and stating that it was now concluded. The email also stated that AB ’ s Sporting Club would not provide any further updates to GH regarding the matter, which they considered formally closed. The email also requested that the matter remain confidential and not discussed by GH with anyone other than GH ’ s professional advisers or immediate support persons. U se of text messages in the Group Chat At 8:21am on 17 June 2026, Ms Vinall telephoned EF and identified herself as a journalist , saying that she wanted to speak to EF about “ some vile text messages ” in which EF was alleged to be involved. Ms Vinall told EF that she would send the messages to him and would wait to hear back from him. On 17 June 2026, each of AB, CD and EF received a text message from Ms Vinall which contained extracts of text messages between the plaintiffs in the Group Chat, described other text messages in the Group Chat and sought a response from each of them to questions regarding the text messages by 10am on 19 June 2026. On 17 June 2026, Ms Vinall telephoned the media executive at CD/ EF ’ s Sporting Club to inform him that she had obtained copies of text messages from the Group Chat and that she wanted to give AB ’ s Sporting Club and CD/ EF ’ s Sporting Club a chance to respond. Ms Vinall informed the official that she had been working on the story for months, she was going to publish it on Sunday, 21 June 2026 and, while she knew that the messages from the Group Chat were old and that the views of the plaintiffs may have changed, she thought that there was public interest in the story. Ms Vinall also said that she had received permission from two of the individuals referred to in the Group Chat (not the plaintiffs) to name and refer to them in her story. At 12 : 16pm o n 17 June 2026, the media executive of CD/ EF ’ s Sporting Club received an email from Ms Vinall setting out the content of “ verified private text messages ” in the Group Chat sent in January 2024 which had been obtained by the ABC , describing the content of other text messages in the Group Chat and seeking the response of CD/ EF ’ s Sporting Club to questions regarding the text messages. On 1 7 June 2026, the communications executive of AB ’ s Sporting Club received an email from Ms Vinall setting out the content of “ verified private text messages ” in the Group Chat sent in January 2024 which had been obtained by the ABC, describing the content of other text messages in the Group Chat and seeking the response of AB ’ s Sporting Club to questions regarding the text messages. On 1 8 June 2026, two executives at the governing body of the sport played by the plaintiffs ( Governing Body ) received an email from Ms Vinall setting out the content of “ verified private text messages ” in the Group Chat sent in January 2024 which had been obtained by the ABC, describing the content of other text messages in the Group Chat and seeking the response of the Governing Body to questions regarding the text messages . Potential consequences for the plaintiffs if the Group Chat messages are published The evidence from the plaintiffs is that the rules and regulations governing the sport that they play are subject to strict interpretation regardless of fault, intention or explanation of context, particularly in relation to bringing the sport into disrepute by private conduct or communications which become publicly known when it was never intended that occur. The plaintiffs fear that the text messages in the Group Chat have been significantly decontextualised and are likely to be misconstrued. EF in particular is concerned that publication would likely cause the text messages in the Group Chat to be sensationally decontextualised and will be devastating to the important work that he performs as an advocate within and outside his sport . The evidence from the plaintiffs is that they are highly distressed about the threatened publication or disclosure of the text messages between them in the Group Chat and that the publication of the text messages in the Group Chat is likely to lead to serious harm to their reputations and standing as well as their financial interests. Procedural history and solicitor correspondence On 18 June 2026, the solicitors acting for the plaintiffs (Giles George) sent letter s to GH and the ABC raising their concerns that the use and disclosure of the private text messages of the plaintiffs without their consent constitut ed breach es of confidence and that urgent interlocutory relief would be sought from the court against the ABC, GH and Ms Vinall to restrain further breaches of confidence, as well as suppression and non-publication orders. On 18 June 2026 , the plaintiffs commenced the proceedings by filing the summons in court before the Duty Judge in Equity , Lindsay J. On 18 June 2026, Lindsay J made an interlocutory restraining order against GH until the end of 23 June 2026 in respect of identified confidential information and made suppression and non-publication order s until the end of 23 June 2026 in relation to : the summons and the supporting affidavit; the name and identit ies of the plaintiffs and GH ; the occupation, workplace or employer of any of the plaintiffs; information which would tend to reveal (2) or (3); and the identified confidential information. No interlocutory restraining orders were made against the ABC and Ms Vinall on their undertaking not to publish the identified confidential information prior to 26 June 2026. On 21 June 2026, Giles George sent a letter to the defendants stating that significant costs had been incurred by the plaintiffs, there would be further costs if the proceedings were defended and requesting the defendants to agree to a form of interlocutory orders. On 22 June 2026, the solicitors for the defendants (Thomsons) sent a letter to Giles George stating that they acted for the defendants , who opposed the interlocutory orders sought. On 23 June 2026, I heard the plaintiffs ’ application to continue the interlocutory restraining order and the suppression and non-publication orders. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved judgment and extended the interlocutory restraining order and the suppression and non-publication orders until further order . I also extended the suppression and non-publication order to include the further affidavits relied upon , the exhibits, the submissions and the transcript of the hearing. LEGAL PRINCIPLES FOR INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS The task of a court determining whether to exercise the power to grant an interlocutory injunction is to do so in a manner which achieves justice between the parties pending the final hearing of the proceedings. This was expressed in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199; [2001] HCA 63, Gleeson CJ at [12] stating: … The justice and convenience of imposing interim restraint, pending the hearing of the final action, if it exists, lies in the need to prevent the practical destruction of that right before there has been an opportunity to have its existence finally established. The principal inquiries to be made in deciding whether to grant an interlocutory injunction have been expressed in slightly different terms , but to the same effect. In Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd v South Australia (1986) 161 CLR 148; [1986] HCA 58, Mason ACJ at [11] said: … In order to secure such an injunction the plaintiff must show (1) that there is a serious question to be tried or that the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief; (2) that he will suffer irreparable injury for which damages will not be an adequate compensation unless an injunction is granted; and (3) that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction. In Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; [2006] HCA 46, Gleeson CJ and Crennan J at [19], after repeating these inquiries, described them as: … the organising principles, to be applied having regard to the nature and circumstances of the case, under which issues of justice and convenience are addressed. … In O’Neill , Gummow and Hayne JJ (with whose reasoning Gleeson CJ and Crennan J agreed : see [19] ) at [65] expressed the first inquiry in this manner (footnotes omitted): The relevant principles in Australia are those explained in Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd . This Court (Kitto, Taylor, Menzies and Owen JJ) said that on such applications the court addresses itself to two main inquiries and continued: The first is whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief ... The second inquiry is ... whether the inconvenience or injury which the plaintiff would be likely to suffer if an injunction were refused outweighs or is outweighed by the injury which the defendant would suffer if an injunction were granted. By using the phrase “prima facie case”, their Honours did not mean that the plaintiff must show that it is more probable than not that at trial the plaintiff will succeed; it is sufficient that the plaintiff show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial. That this was the sense in which the Court was referring [sic] to the notion of a prima facie case is apparent from an observation to that effect made by Kitto J in the course of argument. With reference to the first inquiry, the Court continued, in a statement of central importance for this appeal: How strong the probability needs to be depends, no doubt, upon the nature of the rights [the plaintiff] asserts and the practical consequences likely to flow from the order he seeks. The inquiry involving the balance of convenience is determined by whether the inconvenience or injury the plaintiff is likely to suffer if an injunction were refused outweighs , or is outweighed by , the injury the defendant is likely to suffer if an injunction were granted: Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618; [1968] HCA 1, Kitto, Taylor, Menzies and Owen JJ at 622 – 623. The plaintiff bears the onus of establishing that the balance of convenience lies in favour of granting the interlocutory injunction: O’Neill , Gummow and Hayne JJ at [65], [71]. While the factors to be taken into account in determining where the balance of convenience lies will vary with the circumstances of each case, they most often includ e the strength of the plaintiff ’ s case, the hardship to the parties and third parties, delay, the utility of the proposed orders and the sufficiency of the plaintiff ’ s undertaking as to damages. The strength of the party ’ s case for final relief is an important consideration in determining where the balance of convenience lies, there being a connection between the inquiry about the serious question to be tried and the balance of convenience. In Warner-Lambert Company LLC v Apotex Pty Ltd (2014) 106 IPR 218; [2014] FCAFC 59, Allsop CJ, Jagot and Nicholas JJ at [70] said: Whether an applicant for an interlocutory injunction has made out a prima facie case and whether the balance of convenience favours the grant of such relief are related questions. It will often be necessary to give close attention to the strength of a party’s case when assessing the risk of doing an injustice to either party by the granting or withholding of interlocutory relief especially if the outcome of the interlocutory application is likely to have the practical effect of determining the substance of the matter in issue or if other remedies, including an award of damages, or an award of compensation pursuant to the usual undertaking, are likely to be inadequate. The stronger the prima facie case for final relief and therefore the likelihood of success, the less is needed for the balance of convenience in favour of the grant of the interlocutory injunction: BMW Australia Ltd v Brewster (2019) 269 CLR 574; [2019] HCA 45, Edelman J at [216]. The hardship to the parties , and the nature of that hardship, is a central feature in the discretionary considerations to be addressed in the balance of convenience . I t requires the court to assess the harm to the plaintiff if there is no injunction and the prejudice or harm to the defendant if the injunction is granted: Samsung Electronics Co Ltd v Apple Inc (2011) 217 FCR 238; [2011] FCAFC 156, Dowsett, Foster and Yates JJ at [62]. The question of whether damages would be an adequate remedy for the plaintiff must always be considered as part of this inquiry, which “ involves an assessment by the court as to whether the plaintiff would, in all material respects, be in as good a position if he were confined to his damages remedy, as he would be in if an injunction were granted ” : Samsung at [62]. The interests of third parties are also relevant to the balance of convenience, including any disadvantage or hardship caused to them if an injunction were refused, and whilst the weight of those matters depends on the circumstances of the case, they will rarely be decisive: Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (No 3) (1998) 195 CLR 1; [1998] HCA 30, Brennan CJ and McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ at [65] – [66]. The giving of an undertaking as to damages by the plaintiff is an essential condition to the grant of an interlocutory injunction, unless there are exceptional circumstances: First Netcom Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd (2000) 101 FCR 77; [2000] FCA 1269, Beaumont, Burchett and Emmett JJ at [22]; Goater v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2014] NSWCA 265, Ward JA at [92]. If it is demonstrated that the plaintiff has no assets, the undertaking offered may be of no assistance, although there is no inflexible rule that the plaintiff should be denied interlocutory relief if a meaningful undertaking cannot be given: Organic Marketing Australia Pty Ltd v Woolworths Ltd [2011] FCA 279, Katzmann J at [69], citing Caravelle Investments Ltd v Martaban Ltd (1999) 95 FCR 85; [1999] FCA 1505, Finkelstein J at [25]. If it is known that a plaintiff does not have sufficient resources to satisfy an undertaking as to damages, that may provide a basis on which to refuse an interlocutory injunction: Bond v Gray [2013] NSWSC 1793, Lindsay J at [29] – [30]. ISSUE 1: BREACH OF CONFIDENCE The plaintiffs seek interlocutory and final injunctive relief in respect of a claim for breach of confidence to restrain the defendants from using, disclosing or publishing, or causing to be disclosed or published, certain confidential information of the plaintiffs. Legal principles The elements The usual elements for an equitable remedy in breach of confidence are: the information in question has the necessary quality of confidence; that information was imparted in circumstances which imported an obligation of confidence; and there is threatened or actual unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the party communicating it. Coco v AN Clark (Engineers) Ltd [1969] 65 RPC 41, Megarry J at 47 ; Lenah Game Meats , Gleeson CJ at [30]; Optus Networks Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation Ltd [2010] FCAFC 21, Finn, Sundberg and Jacobson JJ at [39]; Marshall v Prescott [2015] NSWCA 110, Beazley P (with whom Macfarlan and Emmett JJA agreed) at [53] (and citations) . The existence of an action for breach of confidence reflects the fact that there is such a public interest in the maintenance of confidences that the law will provide remedies for their protection: Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 ( Spycatcher Case ), Lord Goff at 281. To meet the first element, the plaintiff must specifically identify the information which is said to be confidential and establish the basis for the confidential nature of that information ; the test is otherwise “ fairly undemanding ” : Streetscape Projects (Australia) Ltd v City of Sydney (2013) 295 ALR 760; [2013] NSWCA 2, Barrett JA at [158] – [160] (and citations). The principles stated in Streetscape were approved in Marshall , Beazley P at [54] – [55]. Information will have the necessary quality of confidence only if it is not public property or public knowledge: Saltman Engineering Company Ltd v Campbell Engineering Company Ltd (1948) 65 RPC 203, Lord Greene MR at 215, cited with approval in Coco at 47 . The defendants referred to the decision in Argyll v Argyll [1967] 1 Ch 302, which involved an application for an interlocutory injunction by the wife based on breach of confidence to restrain the husband from communicating to newspapers the secrets of the wife “ relating to her private life, personal affairs or private conduct ” communicated to the husband in confidence during the subsistence of their marriage. The interlocutory injunction was granted in Argyll . The defendants ’ submission with respect to Argyll was that it demonstrates that it is necessary for a plaintiff to identify the particular secrets that were the subject of the breach of confidence claim (T26) . However, I do not consider that Argyll stands for that proposition. In Argyll , Ungoed-Thomas J at 322 held that an obligation of confidence can be express or implied, the confidential nature of the relationship of husband and wife is of “ its very essence and so obviously and necessarily implicit in it that there is no need for it to be expressed ” and “ confidences between husband and wife during marriage are not excluded from the court's protection ” . It was not held to be necessary for the wife to identify the particular secrets which were the subject of the claim. As to the second element, a duty of confidence will arise whenever a person receives information he or she knows or ought to know is fairly and reasonably to be regarded as confidential: West Australian Newspapers v Bond (2009) 40 WAR 164; [2009] WASCA 127, Owen, Wheeler and Buss JJA at [42], citing Spycatcher Case , Lord Goff at 281 and Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457; [2004] UKHL 22, Lord Nicholls at [14]. An obligation of confidence will also arise where the defendant is not the original recipient of the confidential information, but a third-party in possession of information which it knows was obtained by or communicated to it in breach of confidence: AMI Australia Holdings Pty Ltd v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 1395, Brereton J at [27] citing Liquid Veneer Co v Scott (1912) 29 RPC 639 at 6 44. Whether a third-party recipient knows that the information has been obtained by or communicated to it in breach of confidence can be inferred from the nature of the information and/or the circumstances in which it was communicated: AMI Australia Holdings at [27] citing Exchange Telegraph Co Ltd v Howard & London & Manchester Press Agency Ltd (1906) 22 TLR 375 ; Exchange Telegraph Co Ltd v Central News Ltd [1897] 2 Ch 48 ; Gilbert v Star Newspaper Co Ltd (1894) 11 TLR 4 ; Morison v Moat (1851) 9 Hare 241 ; 68 ER 49 2 ; Prince Albert v Strange (1849) 1 Mac & G 25 ; 41 ER 1171 ; London & Provincial Sporting News Agency Ltd v Levy (1928) Mac G Cop Cas (1923-28) 340 ; National Education Advancement Programs (NEAP) Pty Ltd v Ashton (1995) 128 FLR 334 at 344. Further, constructive knowledge that the information has been obtained by or communicated to it in breach of confidence may be imputed to the third-party where he or she suspects that the information received was confidential: AMI Australia Holdings at [27] citing British Industrial Plastics Ltd v Ferguson (1930) 58 RCP 1 at 7. Equity may impose obligations of confidentiality even though there is no imparting of information in circumstances of trust and confidence , and will restrain the publication of confidential information improperly or surreptitiously obtained: Lenah Game Meats , Gleeson CJ at [34] citing Commonwealth v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1980) 147 CLR 39, Mason J at 50, which in turn cited Lord Ashburton v Pape [1913] 2 Ch 469, Swinfen Eady LJ at 475. The “ maintenance of confidences ” to which the Spycatcher Case refers extends to any matter “ which a reasonable person would understand to be intended to be secret , or to be available to a limited group to which that person does not belong ” : Lenah Game Meats at [36]. Furthermore, an obligation of confidence will also arise where a third-party innocently comes into possession of confidential information through the inadvertence of another. For example, in Trevorrow v State of South Australia (No 4) [2006] SASC 42; (2006) 94 SASR 64, Debelle J at [80] provides the example of a person finding confidential information in a satchel inadvertently abandoned on a bus as giving rise to a duty of confidence . H is Honour not ed at [80] that “ the court would be enforcing the obligation of conscience arising from the fact that the finder came into possession of the information in circumstances in which it was not intended that the confidential information could be used by the finder ” . Trivial “tittle-tattle” The defendants submitted that the contents of the Group Chat, which it said could only be characterised as “ trivial tittle-tattle ” , was not the sort of information which equity would intervene to protect (T22) . According to the defendants, I should use a definition of “ tittle-tattle ” to mean talking about people ’ s lives in an unkind and disapproving way (T25) . In particular, counsel for the defendants likened the Group Chat messages to phrases such as “ I like blue ” and “ I prefer purple ” to suggest that the information conveyed did not have the requisite quality of confidence , nor was the confidential quality specifically identified, so as to ground an action for breach of confidence (T33) . The defendants placed particular reliance for their “ trivial tittle-tattle ” submissions on the following passage from Megarry J in Coco at 48 (emphasis added in bold): … In particular, where information of commercial or industrial value is given on a business-like basis and with some avowed common object in mind, such as a joint venture or the manufacture of articles by one party for the other, I would regard the recipient as carrying a heavy burden if he seeks to repel a contention that he was bound by an obligation of confidence: see the Saltman case at 216. On that footing, for reasons that will appear, I do not think I need explore this head further. I merely add that I doubt whether equity would intervene unless the circumstances are of sufficient gravity; equity ought not to be invoked merely to protect trivial tittle-tattle, however confidential. It should be noted that in this passage his Honour was addressing the second element of a claim in breach of confidence, opening the paragraph with (at 47 – 48) : The second requirement is that the information must have been communicated in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence. However secret and confidential the information, there can be no binding obligation of confidence if that information is blurted out in public or is communicated in other circumstances which negative any duty of holding it confidential. … The defendants also directed my attention to the decision of Gaudron J in Johns v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408; [1993] HCA 56, in which her Honour observed at 461 (citations omitted and emphasis added in bold): The primary significance of the notion of “public domain” lies in the fact that no obligation of confidence and, hence, no right to confidence can come into existence unless the information involved has “the necessary quality of confidence”. Thus, it has been said that no obligation attached to “trivial tittle-tattle” or to information “which is public property and public knowledge”. Information which lacks “the necessary quality of confidence” because it is “public property and public knowledge” or “common knowledge” is often said to be in the public domain. In that context, the question whether information is in the public domain is largely one of fact. That is not to say that questions of law may not arise because, for example, the material has been used in a particular way or in a particular forum. In arguing that “ trivial tittle-tattle ” is not protected by equity, the defendants relied further on Hitchcock v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd [2000] NSWSC 198 (Austin J) , and its appeal in Hitchcock v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] NSWCA 82 (Heydon JA, Spigelman CJ and Mason P agreeing) ( Hitchcock Appeal ). In Hitchcock , Austin J granted a limited ex parte injunction to prevent TCN Channel Nine from broadcasting a television interview with a nanny hired by Ms Hitchcock which concerned Ms Hitchcock ’ s relationship with a third party, Mr Pratt. The injunction was not granted pursuant to the equitable principles for breach of confidence, but rather in respect of a contractual provision that bound the parties. It was on this basis that Austin J concluded that an order restraining TCN Channel Nine from televising or permitting to be televised any of the confidential material was unnecessary. In any case, I agree with the plaintiffs that the reasoning in Hitchcock does not support the submissions advanced by the defendants (T55 -56 ) . Austin J did not refuse to grant the injunction on the basis that the private domestic confidences were trivial . Rather, his Honour observed at [59] – [60] that the defendant in that case did not submit that the information was “ tittle-tattle ” : [59] Thus, there is an equitable doctrine potentially available to the plaintiff to restrain wrongful disclosure of private domestic confidences. Megarry J’s first condition is satisfied, subject to two potential restrictions on the availability of the doctrine, to which I shall now turn. [60] The first arises from a proposition enunciated by Megarry J in the Coco case (at 48) that equity will not intervene unless the circumstances are of sufficient gravity, and that the equity ought not to be invoked merely to protect ‘trivial tittle-tattle, however confidential’. However, having viewed Exhibit PX 4, I believe it would be wrong to regard the confidences in the present case as ‘tittle-tattle’, and I do not understand the defendant to have submitted otherwise. Although at one stage counsel for the plaintiff described the defendant as attempting to ‘gratify public curiosity for commercial gain by regaling viewers with what was once called ‘below-stairs’ tittle-tattle about the private lives of people’, I do not understand him to have conceded that the subject matter of Exhibit PX 4 is not of sufficient gravity to warrant equitable intervention. Further, the Hitchcock Appeal , Heydon JA (with whom Spigelman CJ and Mason P agreed) at [12] and [19] said that there was a serious question to be tried regarding whether it would be expected that a person in the position of the nanny would keep secret what she heard, saw or observed in her employer ’ s life in consequence of her employment and is liable to be protected. The defendants relied on these authorities to submit that equity will not intervene to protect the contents of the Group Chat because those messages amount to mere “ trivial tittle-tattle ” insofar as they did not have the necessary quality of confidence (T33) . That is, on the defendants ’ submission, an inquiry relevant only to the first element of a cause of action for breach of confidence. Conversely, it was advanced by the plaintiffs that these passages are concerned only with the second limb, namely , the method by which the communication is made and whether the person who received the communication understood that the information was imparted in circumstances which imported an obligation of confidence (T49) . On this, the plaintiffs sought to distinguish what it called the “ principle of triviality ” from the “ tittle-tattle principle ” (T51) . It was submitted by the plaintiffs that the “ principle of triviality ” will be engaged in circumstances where it is “ useless information ” ( see also Spycatcher Case , Scott J at 149) and the “ tittle-tattle principle ” will be engaged where it cannot be said that a person of ordinary honesty and intelligence would consider the information to be of substantial concern to the plaintiff. In Moorgate Tobacco Co Ltd v Philip Morris Ltd (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 414; [1984] HCA 73, Deane J observed at 438 (citations omitted): … Like most heads of exclusive equitable jurisdiction, its rational basis does not lie in proprietary right. It lies in the notion of an obligation of conscience arising from the circumstances in or through which the information was communicated or obtained. Relief under the jurisdiction is not available, however, unless it appears that the information has ‘the necessary quality of confidence about it’ ( per Lord Greene M.R., Saltman ) and that it is significant, not necessarily in the sense of commercially valuable (see Argyll v Argyll ) but in the sense that the preservation of its confidentiality or secrecy is of substantial concern to the plaintiff. … In Stephens v Avery [1988] 2 All ER 477, Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC refused to strike out a claim against a third-party recipient of confidential information and the newspaper to whom the recipient divulged the information for damages for breach of confidence. The newspaper was unsuccessful in its submission that the information was mere gossip or “ trivial tittle-tattle ” and therefore outside the protection of the law (at 480 ). In rejecting this argument, in Stephens , at 481 Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC made the following observations about the relevant passage from Megarry J ’ s decision in Coco at 48 : As to the submission that there is no confidentiality in tittle-tattle and gossip, counsel for the defendants relied on a passage in the Coco case [1969] RPC 41 at 48, where Megarry J said: ‘… I doubt whether equity would intervene unless the circumstances are of sufficient gravity; equity ought not to be invoked merely to protect trivial tittle-tattle, however confidential.’ Since the Coco case was exclusively concerned with information which was of industrial value, those remarks were plainly obiter dicta. Moreover, I have the greatest doubt whether wholesale revelation of the sexual conduct of an individual can properly be described as 'trivial' tittle-tattle. Again, although it is true that the passage I have quoted occurs in that part of the judgment which deals with the nature of information which can be protected, it is to be noted that the judge appeared to be considering when equity would give a remedy, not dealing with the fundamental nature of the legal right. If, as I think he was, Megarry J was saying that the discretion to grant an injunction or to award damages would not be exercised in a case which was merely trivial, I agree. But the exercise of such a discretion can only be decided in the light of all the circumstances. Those cannot be known until there has been a trial. The doctrinal relevance of the triviality of a piece of information has been observed by C M Phipps, S imon Teasdale, W illiam Harman in Toulson & Phipps on Confidentiality ( Sweet & Maxwell , 4 th ed, 2020 ) at [4-017] – [4-019] as follows (citations omitted): … [Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson VC] saw the question of triviality as a factor going to the exercise of the court’s discretion, rather than to the principle whether a duty of confidence was owed, but in Spycatcher , Lord Goff recognised it as a “limiting principle … that the duty of confidence applies neither to useless information, nor to trivia”. In McKennitt v Ash , Eady J refused to grant an injunction in respect of certain items of information because he considered them too anodyne to merit protection. In Matalia v Warwickshire CC , the Court of Appeal rejected on the facts Mr Matalia’s assertion that the information, which he had published about 11-plus tests, as trivial, but did not question the relevance of that assertion to his defence. In Various 3rd Wave Claimants v MGN Ltd , Mann J warned that a triviality test had to be applied with caution, and that the apparent triviality of an item considered in isolation might not always be conclusive. If a matter is not such that the preservation of its confidentiality would be thought by a person of ordinary honesty and intelligence to be of any substantial concern to the plaintiff, there is sense in not attaching to it any duty of confidence. Accordingly, it appears that the relevance of the triviality of a piece of information within the applicable principles is ambiguous, with at least three explanations available: Triviality is relevant to the proper characterisation of the information and whether it has the necessary quality of confidence: see Amit Matalia v Warwickshire CC [2017] EWCA Civ 991; [2017] ECC 25 at [51] – [54]; Moorgate Tobacco at 348; Johns at 461. Triviality is relevant to the court ’ s discretion whether to grant equitable remedies to protect the disclosure of the information: see Stephens at 481. Triviality is a “ limiting principle ” which otherwise excludes the availability of a remedy for breach of confidence where the confidential information is useless or trivial: see Spycatcher at 149; Hitchcock at [59]. I do not consider there to be a meaningful difference between each of these respective approaches. Rather, it suffices to say, as the authors of Toulson & Phipps on Confidentiality do, that there is sense in not attaching a duty of confidence to any matter which a person of ordinary honesty and intelligence would not consider to be of substantial concern to the plaintiff. Iniquity It has been recognised that information will lack the necessary attribute of confidence if the subject matter is the existence or real likelihood of the existence of an iniquity in the sense of a crime, civil wrong or serious misdeed of public importance and the confidence is relied upon to prevent disclosure to a third party with a real and direct interest in redressing such crime, wrong or misdeed: Corrs Pavey Whiting & Byrne v Collector of Customs (Vic) (1987) 14 FCR 434, Gummow J at 456, approved in Crown Resorts Ltd v Zantran Pty Ltd (2020) 276 FCR 477, Allsop CJ at [30] – [33] and Karas v LK Law Pty Ltd ( 2023 ) 296 FCR 39; [2023] FCAFC 15, O ’ Callaghan and Colvin JJ at [61] – [62]. In Karas , it was also recognised by Charlesworth J at [33] that the principle is often traced back to Gartside v Outram (1856) 26 LJ Ch 113 , in which Wood V-C said at 114: … The true doctrine is, that there is no confidence as to the disclosure of iniquity. You cannot make me the confidant of a crime or a fraud, and be entitled to close up my lips upon any secret which you have the audacity to disclose to me relating to any fraudulent intention on your part: such a confidence cannot exist. The role of equity in restraining breaches of confidence In Sullivan v Sclanders & Goldwell International Pty Ltd (2000) 77 SASR 419; [2000] SASC 273 , the Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia dealt with circumstances in which confidential documents of the plaintiffs were contained in an unlocked suitcase, which a wrongdoer removed, copied, replaced in the suitcase in a way to ensure that it was not noticed and then sent the copies of the documents to the defendants. Gray J (with whom Prior and Williams JJ agreed) at [48] – [58] analysed the basis on which equity intervenes in circumstances where there has been “ deliberate abuse of confidential information ” (at [50]) so as to “ protect confidential information obtained in reprehensible circumstances ” (at [51]), to provide the remedy of an injunction to “ restrain the publication of confidential information, not only by the person who is a party to the confidence, or who has obtained it by reprehensible means, but by other persons into whose possession that information has been received improperly ” (at [54]) . In Sullivan , Gray J at [55] – [57] explained that the relief available in equity is the response to the unconscionable conduct involved in the circumstances in which the information was obtained , saying (citations omitted and emphasis added in bold ): [55] In Lord Ashburton v Pape Swinfen Eady LJ said at (475): The principle upon which the court of Chancery has acted for many years has been to restrain the publication of confidential information improperly or surreptitiously obtained or of information imparted in confidence which ought not to be divulged. Injunctions have been granted to give effectual relief, that is not only to restrain the disclosure of confidential information, but to prevent copies being made of any record of that information, and, if copies have already been made, to restrain them from being further copied, and to restrain persons into whose possession that confidential information has come from themselves in turn divulging or propagating it. [56] In The Commonwealth of Australia v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd Mason J said at (50): The plaintiff says that this case falls neatly within a fundamental principle of Equity. The principle is that the court will ‘restrain the publication of confidential information improperly or surreptitiously obtained or of information imparted in confidence which ought not to be divulged’ (Lord Ashburton v Pape , per Swinfen Eady LJ). In conformity with this principle, employees who had access to confidential information in the possession of their employers have been restrained from divulging information to third parties in breach of duty and, if they have already divulged the information, the third parties themselves have been restrained from making disclosure or making use of the information ( Tipping v Clarke ; Lamb v Evans ). [57] Equity responds to unconscionable conduct. The fundamental notion is that a relationship of trust and confidence has been breached or that the information has been obtained by reprehensible means. The dictum cited from Lord Ashburton v Pape also emphasises that information which is not obtained consensually, cannot be freely used. Equity will intervene by reason of the circumstances in which the defendant obtained the information, rather than by any intrinsic value or importance in the information itself or by any apprehended damage which might result from its misuse . The statements in Sullivan at [50] – [51] were approved in Armstrong Strategic Management and Marketing Pty Ltd v Expense Reduction Analysts Group Pty Ltd [2012] NSWCA 430; (2012) 295 ALR 348 , Campbell JA (with whom Macfarlan JA agreed) at [100] as providing the basis for the principle that: Even if there is no entrusting of confidential information by A to B in circumstances of confidence, there can sometimes be an obligation of confidence that attaches to information that is inherently confidential or private if that information is illegally or surreptitiously obtained, or is come across in the street, or is received unsolicited. Consideration Serious question to be tried The defendants assert that the proper characterisation of the plaintiffs ’ claim is one in defamation for loss of reputation from unfair reporting , but that the plaintiffs have strategically characterised it as a breach of confidence so as to avoid the difficult task associated with obtaining an interlocutory injunction in defamation proceedings where the courts proceed with caution (T1 6 – 20) : see O'Neill , Gleeson CJ and Crennan J at [18] – [19], Gummow and Hayne JJ at [73] – [83]. I reject this assertion. I am not assisted by it. The plaintiffs ’ summons seeks interlocutory and final relief to restrain breach es of confidence, their submissions were targeted at the elements relevant to an action in breach of confidence and no reference was made in either their oral or written submissions to a claim in defamation. In determining whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted , I will treat the plaintiffs ’ claim exactly as it is – a claim for breach of confidence. I consider that there is a serious question to be tried that each of the three usual elements for an action in breach of confidence as described in Coco and Lenah Game Meats are satisfied in the present case. As to the first element in an action for breach of confidence that the information in question has the necessary quality of confidence , the Group Chat was established many years ago between three people in very close and longstanding relationships with each other to enable them to send private personal messages to each other. Those messages are information. The plaintiffs have not disclosed or disseminated the contents of the text messages sent to each other using the Group Chat to any other people. The information in the text messages is confidential to the plaintiffs. Ms Vinall describes the text messages from the Group Chat as “ the private conversation ” (email of 27 April 2026 to GH) and “ private text messages ” (emails of 17 and 18 June 2026 to CD/EF ’ s Sporting Club , AB ’ s Sporting Club and the Governing Body) . In the “ undemanding way ” as described in Streetscape , the plaintiffs have specifically identif ied the information which is said to be confidential (the text messages in the Group Chat) and have establish ed the basis for the confidential nature of that information by reason of the information only being shared between them and no one else. I agree with the plaintiffs that the defendants cannot rely on their use and dissemination of the text messages in the Group Chat to suggest that the text messages have lost their confidential nature (T52-53) . T here has been limited revelation of those text messages to the plaintiffs, AB's Sporting Club , CD/ EF's Sporting Club and the Governing Body . In my view, this very limited disclosure at the hands of the defendants in a seriously arguable unauthorised way has not caused the text messages to have lost their confidentiality , because there is no evidence that they have entered the public domain and become public knowledge : see eg Australian Football League (AFL) v Age Co Ltd (2006) 15 VR 419 , Kellam J at [ 52] – [56 ] . The defendants argued that it is necessary for the plaintiffs to demonstrate , in isolation, that each of the text messages in the Group Chat has the necessary quality of confidence because it contains confidential information and has sufficient gravity for equity to intervene ( T21 – 22, T35) . I reject this suggested approach. The necessary quality of confidence is attracted to the text messages because they are private exchanges between the plaintiffs on a private Group Chat which they have not disclosed to any other person. The available material suggests that it is probable that at trial , the text messages in the Group Chat will be found to be information which has the necessary quality of confidence . As to the second element in an action for breach of confidence that the information was imparted in circumstances which imported an obligation of confidence , I also consider that on the evidence there is a serious question to be tried that all of the text messages in the Group Chat were imparted in circumstances which imported an obligation of confidence. These were private statements between people in very close and longstanding relationship s with each other . The obligation of confidence can be implied from the nature of the relationship s between the plaintiffs, who were expressing themselves privately. I have no doubt that in the sense described in Moorgate the preservation of the confidentiality or secrecy of the text messages in the Group Chat is of substantial concern to each of the plaintiff s, as they have expressed in their evidence. To the extent that it is expected that I am to resolve any dispute as to the appropriate legal principles to be applied regarding “ trivial tittle-tattle ” , I do not regard the confidential information that is the subject of this interlocutory application as trivial. Instead, I accept the plaintiffs ’ submission that in light of the nature of the information and its potential consequences if disseminated out of context , it cannot properly be described as either “ trivial ” or “ tittle-tattle ” (T51) . I note that the submissions of the plaintiff s and the defendant s on whether the confidential information is “ trivial ” or “ tittle-tattle ” was at odds with both of their submissions at other points of their case. On the plaintiffs ’ case, their attempt to characterise the Group Chat messages as merely “ sarcastic and somewhat of a joke ” (T15) appear s to be at odds with their characterisation of the information as being not trivial (T51) . On the defendants ’ case, their evidence that the information was so significant that GH felt a “ strong moral obligation ” to raise the matter with AB's Sporting Club contradicts the suggestion that it was “ trivial tittle-tattle ” . In any event, I am satisfied that the information contained in the Group Chat messages are not so trivial to constitute “ tittle-tattle ” . Regardless, I have little doubt that there is a serious question to be tried on whether this confidential information falls within the remit of equity's protection and suspect that this will be a live issue at the final hearing in these proceedings. As to the third element in an action for breach of confidence that there is threatened or actual unauthorised use of that confidential information to the detriment of the party communicating it , there is clearly a serious question to be tried regarding the circumstances in which: GH came to know the password to AB ’ s old mobile phone; GH gained access to AB ’ s old mobile phone to take the photograph of the messages in the Group Chat in September 2025 when AB was absent from their shared residence; GH had possession of AB ’ s old mobile phone after the termination of their relationship on 31 December 2025; and GH continued to access AB ’ s old mobile phone and showed text messages in the Group Chat to Ms Vinall and Mr Clark of the ABC in March and April 2026 and discussed the text messages in the Group Chat in communications with representatives of AB ’ s Sporting Club in May 2026. The evidence from AB is that none of those steps were permitted or authorised by him. There is evidence of the threatened and actual use of the text messages in the Group Chat by GH. Applying the test from Lenah Game Meats for third party recipients of confidential information, the circumstances in which Ms Vinall and Mr Clark of the ABC were shown images and/or received photographs of the text messages in the Group Chat are ones in which a reasonable person in their position would understand the messages to be intended to be secret or to be available to a limited group ( comprising only AB, CD and EF ) to which none of GH, Ms Vinall or Mr Clark belong s. Ms Vinall ’ s description s of the messages being from “ the private conversation ” and comprising “ private text messages ” in her email s are tantamount to an acknowledgment that she actually regarded those text messages in the Group Chat to be confidential. The text messages in the Group Chat have already actually been used by GH and Ms Vinall . T hey access ed them on AB ’ s old mobile phone, took photographs of them and used them for their various communications with the plaintiffs, AB ’ s Sporting Club and CD/ EF ’ s Sporting Club. Ms Vinall has used the text messages to research her proposed story , prepar e questions and obtain legal advice about them. All of that use is unauthorised by the plaintiffs on a serious question to be tried basis. The defendants submit that applying the principles in Corrs Pavey , the text messages in the Group Chat lack the necessary attribute of confidence because the subject matter of the text messages in the Group Chat demonstrates the existence or real likelihood of the existence of an iniquity in the sense o f a prima facie “ civil wrong ” by the plaintiffs because they might be in breach of their contracts and the rules and regulations of their sport for bringing it into disrepute (T38) . I reject that characterisation. The evidence suggests that the text messages in the Group Chat are the private thoughts of the plaintiffs (in some instances expressed in vulgar and offensive terms), shared with each other and not beyond , and were never intended by the plaintiffs to be made public. I agree with the plaintiffs ’ argument (T52) that the sport will not be brought into disrepute if the private messages are kept private , and it is only if the messages are made public that the plaintiffs may face allegations for bringing the sport into disrepute with a strict liability sanction to follow. The fact that the seriously arguable unauthorised disclosure and publication of the text messages by the defendants might give rise to civil repercussions for the plaintiffs does not mean that those text messages are evidence of a civil wrong , no matter how repugnant, distasteful and objection able I might find the content and language of them . The evidence suggests that i t is the conduct of the defendants i n disclosing and publishing the private text messages into the public domain that might give rise to the contractual and regulatory issues for the plaintiffs with AB ’ s Sporting Club, CD/EF ’ s Sporting Club and the Governing Body. As submitted by the plaintiffs, I note that there is no evidence that th ose bodies are likely to act against the plaintiffs about their private conduct without such public disclosure , given that they have not done so to date despite Ms Vinall having communicated certain of those text messages to them on 17 and 18 June 2026 (T53) . The defendants ’ submission about the seriousness of the conduct contained in the text messages is also in direct conflict with the ir proposition that the text messages are “ trivial tittle-tattle ” . As I have stated, while I do not regard the text messages are “ trivial tittle-tattle ” , I do not consider that the defendants can rely on their own conduct to have generated the consequences that they now characterise as a “ civil wrong ” by the plaintiffs. Ultimately, the evidence as it stands demonstrates that there is a serious question to be tried that the circumstances in which the text messages in the Group Chat were obtained and then shared with the ABC and Ms Vinall were “ improper ” and “ reprehensible ” , calling for equitable intervention to restrain the use and disclosure of them for the reasons described in Sullivan . Balance of convenience The plaintiffs rely on the potential outcome of breaches of contract with AB ’ s Sporting Club and CD/EF ’ s Sporting Club and potential disciplinary punishment from the Governing Body for strict liability offences of bringing the sport into disrepute from the disclosure and publication of the text messages as the likely damage to their reputation and commercial interests. M uch of this evidence was provided by assertion rather th a n proved in a proper and fulsome way . F or example, I was not provided with copies of the plaintiffs ’ playing contracts, any contracts recording their commercial interests o r the Governing Body ’ s rules and regulations . I recognise , however, that in circumstances where urgent injunctive relief is sought , the court should not expect that the evidence will be in a state that the luxury of time would enhance. The defendants argue that there is no evidence that the Governing Body ’ s process is that upon reading an article about text messages in the paper a player will be convicted of bringing the sport into disrepute and I should infer that the plaintiffs will be granted procedural fairnes s to explain and defend themselves at a hearing (T18) . The defendants also contend that the Governing Body, AB ’ s Sporting Club and CD/EF ’ s Sporting Club are already aware of the text messages so any damage to the plaintiffs from the publication of the text messages will be for damage to reputation (T18) . In any event, I consider that t he plaintiffs have a very strong case for final relief . Applying the principle from BMW Australia , t his must be factor ed into the balance of convenience such that there is less needed for the balance of convenience to be in favour of the grant of the interlocutory injunction . The plaintiffs argued that the defendants have engaged in misconduct in obtaining the text messages by GH stealing AB ’ s old mobile phone, accessing the text messages in the Group Chat on AB ’ s old mobile phone without AB ’ s permission, taking photographs of the text messages in the Group Chat, providing access to the text messages to Ms Vinall and allowing Ms Vinall to take photographs of them (T14 and T 53 -54 ) . I consider that those matters become a heavy weight as part of the balance of convenience because they demonstrate the strength of the serious question to be tried for the reasons described in Sullivan , rather than as a stand - alone “ misconduct ” matter. The defendants argue d that Lenah Game Meats is an example of a case where the trespass of the ABC onto private property to video without permission was not taken into account in the exercise of the discretion whether to grant an interlocutory injunction (T27, T29 – 30) . The plaintiffs countered that Lenah Game Meats is a case in which there was a distinction drawn as to confidential information of a company , and confidential information going to the dignity of a person, where the hidden video of the possums on the company ’ s property was not held to be confidential , nor does it say anything about the relevance of misconduct to the balance of convenience (T53) . In my view, Lenah Game Meats does not support the argument made by the defendants , which concentrated on the issue of whether there was a cause of action for which there was a serious issue to be tried . In Lenah Game Meats , Gaudron J concluded at [6 1 ] that the plaintiff pointed to “ no equitable or legal right which is or will be infringed by, nor to any equitable or legal wrong involved in, the publication of that material by the ABC ” because it was not alleged that the ABC was implicate d in, privy to or knowingly involved in the trespass on the premises to obtain the video . The defendants did not point to prejudice to any of them which would arise if the interlocutory injunction w ere granted. As the plaintiffs submitted, the evidence demonstrates that Ms Vinall and the ABC have known of the text messages from the Group Chat for around three months , following their disclos ure to Ms Vinall on 29 March 2026 (T13) . Further, the portion of the text messages which have been disclosed to Ms Vinall and the ABC are from January 2024. There is no urgent news need in the public interest for the ABC to publish any story about the text messages. Undertaking as to damages At the conclusion of the hearing, the plaintiffs gave the usual undertaking as to damages (T61) . Conclusion I consider that the plaintiffs have demonstrated an entitlement to an interlocutory injunction to restrain the defendants from using, disclosing, attempting to use or disclose to any person or copying or recording any of the text messages in the Group Chat until further order. Accordingly, upon the plaintiffs giving the usual undertaking as to damages, I will grant such an interlocutory injunction. ISSUE 2: SUPPRESSION ORDERS On 18 June 2026, as indicated above, Lindsay J made orders on an interim basis pursuant to s 10 of the Court Suppression and Non- p ublication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) ( CSNPO Act ). Under s 10(2) of the CSNPO Act, it is necessary that the application be resolved “ as a matter of urgency ” . Accordingly, I must determine whether the orders made on 18 June 2026 are necessary for one of the grounds enumerated in s 8(1) of the CSNPO Act. Relevantly, the plaintiffs rely on s 8(1)(a) of the CSNPO Act as the grounds for the making of such an order, namely that “ the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice ” . Legal principles Statutory provisions The terms “ non-publication order ” and “ suppression order ” are defined in s 3 of the CSNPO Act. A “ non-publication order ” means “ an order that prohibits or restricts the publication of information (but that does not otherwise prohibit or restrict the disclosure of information) ” . “ Publish ” is defined to mean: disseminate or provide access to the public or a section of the public by any means, including by- (a) publication in a book, newspaper, magazine or other written publication, or (b) broadcast by radio or television, or (c) public exhibition, or (d) broadcast or publication by means of the Internet. Suppression order is defined to mean “ an order that prohibits or restricts the disclosure of information (by publication or otherwise) ” . Section 6 of the CSNPO Act provides: 6 Safeguarding public interest in open justice In deciding whether to make a suppression order or non-publication order, a court must take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice. Section 7 of the CSNPO Act provides the power for the court to make a suppression or non-publication order, in the following terms: 7 Power to make orders A court may, by making a suppression order or non-publication order on grounds permitted by this Act, prohibit or restrict the publication or other disclosure of— (a) information tending to reveal the identity of or otherwise concerning any party to or witness in proceedings before the court or any person who is related to or otherwise associated with any party to or witness in proceedings before the court, or (b) information that comprises evidence, or information about evidence, given in proceedings before the court. Section 8 of the CSNPO Act outlines the grounds on which the court may make a suppression or non-publication order: 8 Grounds for making an order (1) A court may make a suppression order or non-publication order on one or more of the following grounds— (a) the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, (b) the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the interests of the Commonwealth or a State or Territory in relation to national or international security, (c) the order is necessary to protect the safety of any person, (d) the order is necessary to avoid causing undue distress or embarrassment to a party to or witness in criminal proceedings involving an offence of a sexual nature (including sexual touching or a sexual act within the meaning of Division 10 of Part 3 of the Crimes Act 1900 ), (e) it is otherwise necessary in the public interest for the order to be made and that public interest significantly outweighs the public interest in open justice. (2) A suppression order or non-publication order must specify the ground or grounds on which the order is made. (3) Despite subsection (1) (d), a court may make a suppression order or non-publication order on the grounds that the order is necessary to avoid causing undue distress or embarrassment to a defendant in criminal proceedings involving an offence of a sexual nature only if there are exceptional circumstances. Section 10 of the CSNPO Act provides: 10 Interim orders (1) If an application is made to a court for a suppression order or non-publication order, the court may, without determining the merits of the application, make the order as an interim order to have effect, subject to revocation by the court, until the application is determined. (2) If an order is made as an interim order, the court must determine the application as a matter of urgency. Section 12 of the CSNPO Act states: 12 Duration of orders (1) A suppression order or non-publication order operates for the period decided by the court and specified in the order. (2) In deciding the period for which an order is to operate, the court is to ensure that the order operates for no longer than is reasonably necessary to achieve the purpose for which it is made. (3) The period for which an order operates may be specified by reference to a fixed or ascertainable period or by reference to the occurrence of a specified future event. Authorities The test of being “ necess ary ” in s 8(1)(a) of the CSNPO Act is a demanding test because it is a “ strong word ” and does not concern itself with “ trivialities ” : Hogan v Australian Crime Commission (2010) 240 CLR 651; [2010] HCA 21, French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ at [30] (which dealt with a similar power to forbid or restrict publication of evidence and names in the now repealed s 50 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)) ; see further Rinehart v Welker (2011) 93 NSWLR 311; [2011] NSWCA 403, Bathurst CJ and McColl JA at [27] – [ 28] . What is “ necessary ” should not be given an unduly narrow construction and will depend on the particular circumstances of the case, including the particular grounds in s   8 of the CSNPO Act relied upon and the factual circumstances said to give rise to the order: Fairfax Digital Australia & New Zealand Pty Ltd v Ibrahim (2012) 83 NSWLR 52; [2012] NSWCCA 125, Basten JA (with whom Bathurst CJ agreed : see [8] ) at [46] as follows: The meaning of “necessary” depends on the context in which it is used. In s   8(1), it is used in relation to an order of the court, or, in practical terms, a proposed order, because it identifies a standard as to which the court must be satisfied before making an order. In each paragraph of that provision, the word “necessary” is used to describe the connection between the proposed order and an identified purpose. It may not take the same place on the variable scale of meaning in each case. In par (a), the purpose of the order will be “to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice”. That language will, in its turn, have a colour which will depend upon the circumstances. The prejudice may be a possibility or a certainty; its effect, if it eventuates, may be minor or it may cause a trial to miscarry. Similarly, prevention will involve matters of degree: the proposed order may diminish a risk of prejudice or it may obviate the risk entirely. All of these variables may affect what is considered “necessary” in particular circumstances. The notion of what is necessary to secure the proper administration in the context of making pseudonym orders was explained in John Fairfax Group Pty Ltd v Local Court of New South Wales (1991) 26 NSWLR 131 by Mahoney JA at 161 in the following terms: This leads to the consideration of what is meant by “necessary to secure the proper administration of justice” in this context. The phrase does not mean that if the relevant order is not made, the proceedings will not be able to continue. Plainly they can. If the name of an informer is not hidden under a pseudonym, the proceeding will go on: at least, the instant proceeding will. And if the name of a security officer is revealed, the administration of justice or of the country will not collapse. The basis of the implication is that if the kind of order proposed is not made, the result will be — or at least will be assumed to be — that particular consequences will flow, that those consequences are unacceptable, and that therefore the power to make orders which will prevent them is to be implied as necessary to the proper function of the court. The kinds of consequences that, in this sense, will be seen as unacceptable may be gauged by those involved in the cases in which statutory courts have been accepted as having restrictive powers. Thus, there will be hardship on the informer or the security officer or the blackmail victim; the future supply of information from such persons will end or will be impeded; and it will be more difficult to obtain from such persons the evidence necessary to bring offenders before the courts and deal with them. It is not necessary to attempt to state exhaustively the considerations relevant in this regard… D etermining whether an order under the CSNPO Act is “ necessary ” does not invo lv e reasoning that an order might be convenient, reasonable, sensible or that it would serve some notion of the public interest , so once the court is satisfied that the order is necessary , there is no discretion or balancing exercise involved in the making of the order: Hogan at [31] – [33]; Rinehart , Bathurst CJ and McColl JA at [31] , [48] ; The Country Care Group Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) (2020) 275 FCR 377 ; [202 0 ] FCAFC 44, Allsop CJ, Wigney and Abraham JJ at [9] (and citations) . The meaning of “ necessary ” does not mean that it must be established on the balance of probabilities that, absent the order sought, the person would suffer harm . Instead, it requires satisfaction on the balance of probabilities that the order is necessary to protect the person from harm , a conclusion informed by the nature, imminence and degree of likelihood of apprehended harm : AB (a pseudonym) v CD (a pseudonym) (2019) 93 ALJR 321; [2019] HCA 6 , Nettle J at [14] . The mere fact that a party or a witness might suffer embarrassment, annoyance, inconvenience or reputational damage and possible consequential loss due to being involved in litigation if the proceedings were conduc t ed in public or the evidence was made public is insufficient to meet this test of necessity: John Fairfax Group , Kirby P at 142 – 143; R v Legal Aid Board; ex parte Kaim Todner (a firm) [1999] QB 966 , Lord Woolf MR at 978 , cited with approval in Rinehart at [54] , where Bathurst CJ and McColl JA said that “ [i]t is the price of open justice that allegations about individuals are aired in open court ” . Pursuant to s 6 of the CSNPO A ct, this court is mandated to take into account that “ a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice ” . This reinforces the legislative intention that orders under the CSNPO Act should only be made in exceptional circumstances: Rinehart , Bathurst CJ and McColl JA at [27]; see also O’Dell v The King [2023] NSWCCA 46 , Leeming and Adamson JJA and Garling J at [6] citing Rinehart at [27] . On the importance of safeguarding the public interest in open justice, in Rinehart , Bathurst CJ and McColl JA at [32] stated: … s 6 of the CSN PO Act requires the court when considering whether to make an order under the Act to “take into account that a primary objective of the administration of justice is to safeguard the public interest in open justice” . The principle of open justice is one of the most fundamental aspects of the system of justice in Australia: John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v District Court of NSW [2004] NSWCA 324; (2004) 61 NSWLR 344 (at [18]) per Spigelman CJ (Handley JA and Campbell AJA agreeing). Open justice ensures public confidence in the administration of justice: see Moti v R [2011] HCA 50 (at [100]) per Heydon J; Hogan v Hinch (at [20]) per French CJ; R v Tait (1979) 46 FLR 386 (at 401 - 403) per Brennan, Deane and Gallop JJ . It is unnecessary to add to the large body of judicial opinions discussing the concept. It is sufficient, in our view, to illustrate the proposition embedded in s 6 by referring to Lord Atkinson's statement in Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 (at 463), that “in public trial is [to be] found, on the whole, the best security for the pure, impartial, and efficient administration of justice, the best means of winning for it public confidence and respect.” It is well-established that the principle of open justice may be limited to secure the proper administration of justice , both with respect to the subject matter of the proceedings and the identity of the parties involved . This was emphasised in Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506; [2011] HCA 4 by French CJ at [21] in the following terms (citations omitted and emphasis added in bold): It has long been accepted at common law that the application of the open justice principle may be limited in the exercise of a superior court's inherent jurisdiction or an inferior court's implied powers. This may be done where it is necessary to secure the proper administration of justice . In a proceeding involving a secret technical process, a public hearing of evidence of the secret process could “cause an entire destruction of the whole matter in dispute”. Similar considerations inform restrictions on the disclosure in open court of evidence in an action for injunctive relief against an anticipated breach of confidence . In the prosecution of a blackmailer, the name of the blackmailer's victim, called as a prosecution witness, may be suppressed because of the “keen public interest in getting blackmailers convicted and sentenced” and the difficulties that may be encountered in getting complainants to come forward “unless they are given this kind of protection”. So too, in particular circumstances, may the name of a police informant or the identity of an undercover police officer. The categories of case are not closed, although they will not lightly be extended . Where “exceptional and compelling considerations going to national security” require that the confidentiality of certain materials be preserved, a departure from the ordinary open justice principle may be justified. The character of the proceedings and the nature of the function conferred upon the court may also qualify the application of the open-court principle. The jurisdiction of courts in relation to wards of the State and mentally ill people was historically an exception to the general rule that proceedings should be held in public because the jurisdiction exercised in such cases was “parental and administrative, and the disposal of controverted questions … an incident only in the jurisdiction”. Proceedings not “in the ordinary course of litigation”, such as applications for leave to appeal, can also be determined without a public hearing. These exceptions to the principle of open justice were also recognised in Rinehart at [3 2 ] – [37]. The exceptions include blackmail cases. The rationale for blackmail cases is that in the event that a suppression order is not made , a question may arise as to the ability or willingness of the courts to protect victims of extortion or blackmail, such that persons in the position of the plaintiffs may be more willing to succumb to the threats made than to seek protection from the courts . This would seriously undermine public confidence in the administration of justice by failing to protect persons who would otherwise be entitled to the protection of the law: see Richards (a pseudonym) v Jones (a pseudonym) (No 2) [2025] NSWSC 27, Dhanji J at [23]. It has also been recognised that under the CSNPO Act , a suppression order is significantly more restrictive than a non-publication order . Consideration I have found that an interlocutory injunction should be granted to prevent the use , disclosur e and copying of the text messages in the Group Chat as confidential information . I have no doubt that on an interim basis until the final determination of the proceedings , suppression and non-publication orders are necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice by protecting the confidentiality of the text messages in the Group Chat as evidence and information about evidence in these proceedings. Contrary to the submission of the defendants, I have not found that the serious question to be tried for the breach of confidence claim only extends to specific text messages. Instead, I consider that the serious question to be tried covers all of the text messages contained in the Group Chat. On that basis, I reject the defendants ’ suggestion that the suppression and non-publication orders should only be made over a selection of the text messages (T43) . In my view, and consistent with my opinion that the serious question s to be tried cover all of the information contained in the text messages in the Group Chat, I also consider that the suppression and non-publication orders should be made in respect of the whole of the text messages in the Group Chat . If no such orders were made, then the very essence of the claim in breach of confidence brought by the plaintiffs would be lost because the confidential information would be disclosed into the public domain, destroying the reason for the claim which is to protect the information from such disclosure . Such circumstances were recognised in Hogan v Hinch and Rinehart as an exception to the principle of open justice. The proper administration of justice would be prejudiced if the court w ere to allow such disclosure before the final determination of the plaintiffs ’ claim. Turning to the suppression and non-publication orders sought in relation to the identities of the plaintiffs and GH, the occupation, workplace or employer of the plaintiffs and any information which would tend to reveal those details , the defendants argued that the names of parties are important when publishing a fair and accurate report of court proceedings and the fact that e mbarrassing, uncomfortable, damaging or private material may come to light is not a reason to suppress the identities of high profile people involved in court proceedings because the basis of the order is that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, which is a high bar and indicates that such an order is only made in exceptional circumstances (T43 – 44) . The plaintiffs argued that if the plaintiffs ’ names are made public, even if the text messages in the Group Chat are not pub lished , because of who they are and how high profile they are, the speculation associated with these proceedings and the content of the text messages would be potentially worse than the public knowing the confidential information . The plaintiffs say that this would bring the administration of justice into disrepute because it would defeat the entire purpose for which the plaintiffs have approach ed th e c ourt for relief against persons who have engaged in unlawful conduct (T15) . The plaintiffs argue d that I should treat the current circumstances as akin to the suppression of identities in blackmail cases such as Richards because the evidence demonstrates that in May 2026 , GH approached AB ’ s Sporting Club in an effort for them not to permit AB to play for them and if they did she would release damaging information about AB to the public (T57 – 58 ) . Although the document ed email exchange in May 2026 between GH and AB ’ s Sporting Club does not corroborate a threat in those terms, I recognise that the evidence demonstrates that AB was told by AB ’ s Sporting Club that such a threat had been made by GH and many of her communications with AB ’ s Sporting Club were in the form of lengthy conversations. No doubt the position might be clarified at the trial , but at the present time there is sufficient evidence for me to proceed on the basis that such a threat was made by GH. When I am considering what is “ necessary ” , I am not focus ed on what might be embarrassing or damaging to the reputation of the plaintiffs. But having said that, I consider that the revelation of the identities of the plaintiffs will harm the plaintiffs in such a way that will impact on the proper administration of justice. In circumstances where the plaintiffs have seriously arguably had their confidential information taken from them by GH without their permission , had it disseminated to the ABC for the purpose of publishing a news story about it and used by GH as the basis for a threat against AB ’ s interests , I need to ensure that as victims of that conduct they receive protection from the court rather than have harm caused to them by revealing their identities. It would undermine the public confide n ce in the administration of justice i f persons like the plaintiffs , who appear to be the victims of having their confidential information “ stolen ” from them , were dissuaded from bringing proceedings because of the harm that the publicity and speculation surrounding the proceedings would bring to them. For these reasons , I will make suppression and non-publication orders covering the text messages in the Group Chat , the names and identities of the plaintiffs and GH, as well as the occupation, workplace and employer of any of the plaintiffs , and the various documents which have been created relevant to these proceedings . ORDERS In addition to the granting of the interlocutory injunction and the making of the suppression and non-publication orders, I will also make orders for the further progress of the proceedings. Subject to any contrary submission, I propose to make the following orders: Upon the plaintiffs by their counsel giving the usual undertaking as to damages, o rder that the d efendants be restrained until the final determination of the se proceedings from: using, attempting to use or disclosing to any person the existence of, or any information contained in, the iMessage Group Chat existing between the plaintiffs ( Confidential Information ); or copying, reducing to writing or otherwise recording any of the Confidential Information. Except to the extent that they are published in the judgment of McGrath J delivered on 1 July 2026 in these proceedings and subject to orders (3) and (4) below , order pursuant to s 7 and s 8(1)(a) of the Court Suppression and Non- p ublication Orders Act 2010 (NSW) that until the final determination of the se proceedings, the publication or other disclosure of the following material is prohibited : the name and identity of any of the plaintiffs and the second defendant; the occupation, workplace and employer of any of the plaintiffs; any information which would tend to reveal (a) or (b); the Confidential Information; the s ummons filed 18 June 2026 ; the affidavit of Rebekah Ruth Giles sworn 18 June 2026; the first affidavit of Rebekah Ruth Giles sworn 22 June 2026; the second affidavit of Rebekah Ruth Giles sworn 22 June 2026; the affidavit of Rebekah Ruth Giles sworn 23 June 2026; the affidavit of Marlia Ruth Saunders affirmed 23 June 2026; all of the documents that were marked as exhibits in the hearing of these proceedings on 23 June 2026; all of the submissions made in writing by the parties for the hearing of these proceedings on 23 June 2026; the transcript of the hearing of these proceedings on 18 June 2026 ; the transcript of the hearing of these proceedings on 23 June 2026; the transcript of the hearing of these proceedings on 1 July 2026; the orders made on 18 June 2026 by Lindsay J in these proceedings ; and the orders made on 23 June 2026 by McGrath J in these proceedings , on the grounds that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. Order, pursuant to s 11 of the Court Suppression and Non- p ublication Orders Act 2010 (NSW), that order ( 2 ) above is to apply throughout the Commonwealth. Order that o rders (2) and (3) do not prohibit the parties from publishing or disclosing the matters in order ( 2 ) (a) – ( q ) above to their own legal advisors for the purposes of obtaining legal advice and/or representation in these proceedings. Order that the plaintiffs file and serve a statement of claim by 4pm on 21 July 2026. Order that the defendants file and serve a defence by 4pm on 18 August 2026. The proceedings are listed for further directions before the Registrar in Equity on 25 August 2026. The parties have liberty to apply on 24 hours ’ notice, specifying the nature of the relief sought. The plaintiffs ’ costs of the interlocutory application are its costs in the cause. ********** DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 03 July 2026