ALL IS 1 PTY LTD (t/as Banga Legal) v Townsend [2026] NSWSC 224

Catchwords: PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS — Defendant in August 2022 commenced work at the practice of the first plaintiff, a legal firm of which the second plaintiff is the principal and eventually was employed in or about December 2024 which employment was terminated in January 2025 — The parties are at odds regarding the reasons for termination of employment — E ach commenced separate proceedings , the plaintiffs in this Court seeking various equitable relief in part based on alleged obligations of confidentiality and the defendant (as applicant) in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (Division 2 Court) seeking relief under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) — Both proceedings have been on foot for approximately a year without the other party filing respectively a defence/response — Defendant brings motion regarding pleading issue — Held ‘real issue’ c ase management re quired a more pressing priorit y (than pleadings) be addressed, namely the fragmentation of proceedings CASE MANAGEMENT — Active case management — F ocus of parties on pleading issues yet failure of the parties to address a more fundamental issue of fragmented litigation — The Court is not a silent or idle participant in the effective case management — Progression of proceedings is actively overseen by the Court and not merely or predominantly left to forensic decisions of the parties — Power of Court to intervene where parties fail to engage with one another regarding the conduct of litigation and direct steps to facilitate parties to confront and address real issues previously ignored by them — Held parties directed to co-operate to address the question of fragmented litigation in different courts and orders made for parties to report to the Court regarding this LEGAL PRACTITIONERS — O bligations of practitioners facilitating the overriding civil litigation purpose JURISDICTION — Jurisdiction of Supreme Court — Court has no jurisdiction to determine any claims of alleged breaches of s 340(1) of the Fair Work Act , including claims for compensation JURISDICTION — Jurisdiction of Division 2 Court CROSS-VESTING — There are no statutory provisions permitting conferral of jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of the Division 2 Court ’s jurisdiction , nor for transfer of proceedings from this Court to the Division 2 Court directly WORDS & PHRASES — Pr oper understanding of the inapt term ‘accrued jurisdiction’ WORDS & PHRASES — ‘associated jurisdiction’, ‘matter’ Supreme Court New South Wales Amendment notes Medium Neutral Citation: ALL IS 1 PTY LTD (t/as Banga Legal) v Townsend [2026] NSWSC 224 Hearing dates: 13 March 2026 Date of orders: 13 March 2026 Decision date: 13 March 2026 Jurisdiction: Equity Before: Meek J Decision: Parties directed to co-operate to address the question of fragmented litigation in different courts and orders made for parties to report to the Court regarding this. Catchwords: PROFESSIONAL RELATIONSHIPS — Defendant in August 2022 commenced work at the practice of the first plaintiff, a legal firm of which the second plaintiff is the principal and eventually was employed in or about December 2024 which employment was terminated in January 2025 — The parties are at odds regarding the reasons for termination of employment — E ach commenced separate proceedings , the plaintiffs in this Court seeking various equitable relief in part based on alleged obligations of confidentiality and the defendant (as applicant) in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (Division 2 Court) seeking relief under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) — Both proceedings have been on foot for approximately a year without the other party filing respectively a defence/response — Defendant brings motion regarding pleading issue — Held ‘real issue’ c ase management re quired a more pressing priorit y (than pleadings) be addressed, namely the fragmentation of proceedings CASE MANAGEMENT — Active case management — F ocus of parties on pleading issues yet failure of the parties to address a more fundamental issue of fragmented litigation — The Court is not a silent or idle participant in the effective case management — Progression of proceedings is actively overseen by the Court and not merely or predominantly left to forensic decisions of the parties — Power of Court to intervene where parties fail to engage with one another regarding the conduct of litigation and direct steps to facilitate parties to confront and address real issues previously ignored by them — Held parties directed to co-operate to address the question of fragmented litigation in different courts and orders made for parties to report to the Court regarding this LEGAL PRACTITIONERS — O bligations of practitioners facilitating the overriding civil litigation purpose JURISDICTION — Jurisdiction of Supreme Court — Court has no jurisdiction to determine any claims of alleged breaches of s 340(1) of the Fair Work Act , including claims for compensation JURISDICTION — Jurisdiction of Division 2 Court CROSS-VESTING — There are no statutory provisions permitting conferral of jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of the Division 2 Court ’s jurisdiction , nor for transfer of proceedings from this Court to the Division 2 Court directly WORDS & PHRASES — Pr oper understanding of the inapt term ‘accrued jurisdiction’ WORDS & PHRASES — ‘associated jurisdiction’, ‘matter’ Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act (NSW) Commonwealth Constitution Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) Cases Cited: Ah Yick v Lehmert (1905) 2 CLR 593 All is 1 Pty Ltd t/as Banga Legal v Townsend [2025] NSWSC 953 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 204 CLR 559; [2001] HCA 1 Aviani v Loh (No 2) [2022] NSWSC 1148; (2022) 405 ALR 337 Baxter v Commissioners of Taxation (NSW) (1907) 4 CLR 1087 Carlton & United Breweries Ltd v Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 543 CGU Insurance Ltd v Blakely (2016) 259 CLR 339 Felton v Mulligan (1971) 124 CLR 367 at 392 Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570 Grigor v Stock; Stock v Stock [2025] NSWSC 232 Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 Macteldir v Dimovski (2005) 226 ALR 773 at 791; [2005] FCA 1528 Palmer v Ayres (2017) 259 CLR 478 Patial v Kailash Lawyers Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 219 Philip Morris Inc v Adam P Brown Male Fashions (1981) 148 CLR 457 Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511 Rizeq v Western Australia (2017) 262 CLR 1; [2017] HCA 23 Seven Network (Operations) Limited et al v Amber Harrison [2017] NSWSC 405 Yu v Wang [2021] NSWSC 1280 Texts Cited: Burnet, John, Early Greek Philosophy (A. & C. Black, Ltd, 3rd ed, 1920) (See endnotes for accessible link) Creyke, et al, Control of Government: Text, Cases & Commentary (Lexis Nexis, 5 th ed, 2019) Creyke, Robin et al, Control of Government Action: Text Cases and Commentary (LexisNexis, 7 th ed, 2024) LexisNexis, Australian Family Law (online at 16 March 2026) Lindell, G Cowen and Zine’s Federal Jurisdiction in Australia (Federation Press, 4 th ed, 2016) Huxley, Aldous quoting Eckhart, Meister in The Perennial Philosophy (Harper Collins New York, 1947) 90 (see endnotes for accessible link) Leeming, M, Authority to Decide: The Law of Jurisdiction in Australia (Federation Press, 2 nd ed, 2020) Lindsley, Arthur, ‘The Problem of Evil’ C.S. Lewis Institute (Web Page, 5 December 2003) (see endnotes for accessible link) Category: Procedural rulings Parties: First Plaintiff: ALL IS 1 PTY LTD trading as Banga Legal ABN 13643201389 Second Plaintiff: Samir Banga First Defendant: Jessica Townsend Representation: Counsel: Plaintiffs: D Thomas Defendant: N Li Solicitors: Plaintiffs: Azadi Lawyers Defendant: Magna Carta Lawyers File Number(s): 2025/00119763 EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT (REVISED) Introduction HIS HONOUR: The precise origins of the phrase " all is one " are somewhat elusive. It appears in Greek [1] , and other [2] philosophy . Generally, its meaning takes its colour from its milieu. Unadorned by context, broadly it may suggest or convey a type of unified purpose of persons operating or engaged in an endeavour, as well as those who are drawn into it. The professional relationships of the parties, initially connected through All Is 1 Pty Ltd, the first plaintiff ( a company through which a legal practice is operated and trading under the name, Banga Legal ( BL ) , at Oran Park ) have disintegrated. Unlike the company namesake, they have had no collective unity. Parties and court claims Samir Banga is a solicitor who is the sole director and shareholder of All Is 1 ( Mr Banga ) . He is married to Ms Gill. In late January 2025, the defendant ( Ms Townsend ) who had involvement in the endeavour at Banga Legal parted ways with the plaintiff. Ramifications from that cessation, including strong dispute about the reasons for it, persist, and are the subject of proceedings in two courts, namely the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) ( Division 2 Court ) and this C ourt. The particular listing before me this morning is the plaintiffs' notice of motion filed on 23 January 2026 seeking to amend their claim in this C ourt. However, for reasons which follow, there is a more fundamental question which arises regarding the parties ’ disparate claims, which, in my estimation, ought to be addressed prior to pleading or other case management questions. The divergent paths that the parties have taken have resulted in each seeking separate relief (equitable relief in the case of All Is 1 and Mr Banga) and (relief under the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) [3] ( Fair Work Act ) in the case of Ms Towsend) arising out of what appears to be the same set of substratum of facts in two courts that do not obviously have jurisdiction to deal with and grant relief sought in the other court. So at odds are the parties in engaging with one another that despite them having commenced separate proceedings the best part of a year ago , neither of the opposing parties have filed a defence or response to the other's respective court claims. Authority to adjudicate – so called ‘accrued jurisdiction ’ and ‘associated jurisdiction’ Laws made by the Parliament of the Commonwealth and laws made by the Parliaments of the States form “ a single though composite body of law ” [4] and Chapter III of the Commonwealth Constitution makes provision for an “ integrated national court system ” [5] . ‘ Jurisdiction ’ is a generic term but relevantly signifies authority to adjudicate [6] . The authority to adjudicate comprised in the conferral of federal jurisdiction is authority to exercise, within the limits permitted by or under s 75, s 76 or s 77, the judicial power of the Commonwealth, by s 71 vested in the High Court, in such other federal courts as the Parliament creates and in such other courts as it invests with federal jurisdiction [7] . Further, “ the character of judicial power, as distinct from the source of the authority of a particular court to adjudicate a particular justiciable controversy, is unaffected by the source of the law that is to be applied to determine the legal rights and legal obligations in controversy ” [8] . Courts have authority to decide when the exercise of judicial power resolves a justiciable controversy of a kind which falls within the court ’ s limits ( subject matter jurisdiction), and when the persons bound by the exercise of judicial power are amenable to its exercise ( personal jurisdiction) [9] . Commonly, resolution of a matter within federal jurisdiction may involve application both of Commonwealth law and of State law and can even be resolved entirely through the application of State law [10] . The inapt term ‘ accrued jurisdiction ’ has been said to refer to the inherent power of a superior court such as the Federal Court to settle the controversy before it , provided there are federal issues which the court has jurisdiction to entertain [11] , and where the non-federal part of the claim (e.g. under State law or common law, and concern ing other parties) arises ‘ out of common transactions and facts ’ or ‘ a common substratum of facts ’ [12] and relates to the same ‘ matter ’ [13] . The label ‘ accrued ’ is inapt where jurisdiction turns on parties - as for example identity of a party as the Commonwealth, within the sense of s 75(iii) of the Constitution may be a sufficient animating circumstance without any federal law supplying the substantive rights and liabilities which are tendered for adjudication [14] . The ‘ associated jurisdiction ’ of a Court refers to “ matters not otherwise within its jurisdiction that are associated with matters (the core matters ) in which the jurisdiction of the Court is invoked ” [15] . In the case of the Federal Court , it extends to but is also confined by the areas of federal jurisdiction mentioned in ss 75 and 76 Constitution [16] . It is the conferral of jurisdiction in another, different, federal matter in respect of which jurisdiction could be, but has not been, conferred [17] . There may be overlap between associated and accrued jurisdiction, but differences remain [18] . However, the relevance of associated jurisdiction compared to accrued jurisdiction has significantly diminished [19] . Cre yk e observes that [20] While the independent importance of the associated jurisdiction has declined since the enactment of s 39B(1A) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), the accrued jurisdiction became comparatively more important following the decision of the High Court in Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511. The extent of a court ’ s jurisdiction is answered by the nature of the ‘ matter ’ before it. For example, if the Federal Court is properly seized of a ‘ matter ’ in the exercise of federal jurisdiction, it has jurisdiction to adjudicate all issues comprising the ‘ matter ’ . A ‘ matter ’ is a justiciable controversy, being the subject matter for determination in legal proceedings brought for its determination and encompasses all claims made within the scope of the controversy [21] . “ What is and what is not part of the one controversy depends on what the parties have done, the relationships between or among them and the laws which attach rights or liabilities to their conduct and relationships ” [22] . A ‘matter’ and c ommon factual substratum Despite the fact that the parties have different perspectives and reasons as to why Ms Townsend ’ s employment at BL was terminated , in discussion with counsel this morning, I explored with the parties the extent to which the circumstances of Ms Townsend ’ s termination of employment, arises out of a ‘ matter ’ and a common set of facts. L est one thinks that the parties' claims in the two courts are discre te and unconnected , the basic facts that I will recount suggest otherwise. It appears to be common ground that Ms Townsend commenced attendance at Banga Legal in or about August 2022. Whether she commenced work on some form of volunteer basis, which transitioned into some form of contract work or employment, is yet to be determined. Nonetheless, during the period of time that she was there, in particular up to December 2024, it is clear enough that Mr Banga asked her to undertake certain tasks ( he says at least ) on a confidential basis . For her part, Ms Townsend intimates that in January 2025, she was admonished inappropriately for seeking alternative employment and belittled for her declining work and health burnout. It is evident, and Mr Thomas has confirmed this, that despite the fact that no response has been filed to Ms Townsend's claim in the Division 2 Court, that the plaintiff s will say that her employment was terminated because ( at least in part ) of alleged breaches of confidential information imparted to her. It is clear from the nature of the relief sought in each of the courts that there will need to be an examination of the circumstances in which Ms Townsend was engaged at BL; what tasks she was given to do; what information was disclosed to her; what duties, obligations and rights arose from those tasks; her performance of those tasks, and particularly whether they were carried out appropriately or in a manner giving rise to breach of any such duties and obligations. The facts that I have outlined above are suggestive of a single ‘ matter ’ controversy despite differing claims for relief in both courts. I will return to this below . Risk s associated with separate proceedings V arious risks arise where parties litigate issues between them in separate proceedings . Inconsistent findings The risk of inconsistent findings in different Courts arises. To test that, it may be posed that if these proceedings continue, it is possible that the Court might find that confidential information was imparted to her, which gave rise to certain duties, including fiduciary duties, and that she breached those duties. However, t he possibility also arises that in the Division 2 Court, if her claim for impermissible termination is progressed, there may be findings that no confidential information was imparted to her, and whatever duties she had , she did not breach them . Inefficiency and increased costs Further risks arise regarding inefficient use of resources in having fragmented litigation in separate Court administrations and separate judges deal ing with claims between the same parties [23] as well as two sets of legal costs for each of the parties. Confronting ‘real issues’ This Court has no jurisdiction to determine any claims of alleged breaches of s 340(1) of the Fair Work Act , including claims for compensation [24] . T he Division 2 Court has directly conferred original jurisdiction [25] and associated jurisdiction [26] . It is mandated to determine matters completely and finally and to “ grant all remedies to which any of the parties appears to be entitled in respect of a legal or equitable claim properly brought forward by a party in the matter ” [27] . However, such a provision does not confer jurisdiction, but empowers the Court to grant appropriate relief in a case which is properly within jurisdiction [28] . Other than any jurisdiction conferred on it in respect of a ‘ matter ’ arising under the Constitution or a federal statute , which enables it to determin e a whole ‘ matter ’ , it has no directly conferred equitable jurisdiction. The extent of its whole ‘ matter ’ jurisdiction was not the subject of submiss ions and at this point there is no need for me to decide that. It suffices to note that there is some commentary on it [29] and the question of the existence and scope of any ‘ accrued ’ jurisdiction may depend upon its status as a superior court of record [30] . In light of the above, it seems to me that unless action is taken to address the disparate litigation, both proceedings may progress with a risk of inconsistent findings , complication and increased costs . The proceedings in this Court have thus far not advanced in terms of defences but have been hard-fought. The parties have, to a large degree, engaged in what might be described as ancillary disputes, including matters relating to representation for Ms Townsend [31] . Notwithstanding that both sets of proceedings were commenced some 10 to 12 months ago, neither of the parties thus far has seemingly been willing to grasp the nettle and to take steps to address whether a single Court is able to resolve their claims and to seek to have the proceedings joined, if it is indeed possible, by means of cross-vesting application or other steps. Unless that real issue is addressed, there is a risk that the proceedings, with concomitant time, effort, and expense, will be continued in two courts and, as I have mentioned, with the risk of inconsistent findings and increased costs . Because the parties to this point have not turned their minds to that issue (or hav e not at least expressly address ed it) , on the hearing of the application this morning, I raised it directly with the parties' legal representatives. The Court is not a silent or idle participant in the effective case management of civil litigation. Progression of proceedings is actively overseen by the Court and not merely or predominantly left to forensic decisions of the parties [32] . P articularly where parties fail to engage with one another regarding the conduct of litigation , the C ourt may intervene and direct steps to facilitate parties to confront and address real issues previously ignored by them. Civil litigation in e ach of this Court and t he Division 2 Court is conducted by reference to an overriding or overarching purpose of legislative process rules. Terminology slightly differs in the expression of those purposes. However, th e intent is the same . In this Court , the overriding purpose of the statut e and rule provisions is to facilitate the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings [33] . In the Division 2 Court , the overarching purpose of the provisions is to facilitate the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible [34] . Parties i n this Court have a duty to assist the Court to further th at overriding purpose [35] and in the Division 2 Court parties must act in a way that that is consistent with the overarching purpose [36] . Practitioners in this Court must not, by their conduct, cause a party to the proceedings to be put in breach of that duty [37] and practitioners in the Division 2 Court must not only take account of the duty imposed on the party but assist the party to comply with the duty [38] . In essence, practitioners are expected to appropriately lift their gaze purely from objectives of clients so that the overriding /overarching purpose informs their actions in managing their responsibilities both to clients and to the Court and to co-operatively communicate and act with one another to that end . Commendably, having raised the above-mentioned issues and risks associated with fragmented litigation with them, both counsel readily acknowledged that this is a matter that needed to be grappled with. In those circumstances, I have proposed that the parties confer and come up with a reasonable plan to address the issue of disparate proceedings and jurisdiction with a view to reporting back to the Court to see whether a more just, quick, and cheap means of resolving their disputes is possible by reference to litigation, in one of the Courts or the other, whether that be cross-vested proceedings or proceedings commenced in a new single court , such as the Federal Court, that may be able to deal with the matter. That task is not necessarily straight-forward, at least as the matter presently stands. There are no statutory provisions permitting conferral of jurisdiction on the Supreme Court of the Division 2 Court ’ s jur isdiction , nor for transfer of proceedings from this Court to the Division 2 Court directly [39] . Clearly, the Federal Court has jurisdiction under the Fair Work Act , and in circumstances where a federal matter is properly raised in that Court, it would also very arguably have jurisdiction to deal with issues arising out of a common substratum of facts [40] . Conclusion To conclude, I will return to where I started. Notwithstanding the disintegration of the parties' relationship, there is both statutory mandate [41] and good common sense for the parties and their legal representatives to embrace the type of unity befitting the “ All is 1 ” ( a ll-is-one ) nomenclature , that since January 2025 has eluded them, and to see whether they can co - operatively work to simplify the mechanism and structure of resolution of their disputes in the manner in which I will now order . I have not ignored or forgotten t he particular relief sought in the plaintiffs ’ notice of motion. Instead, I have re -ordered priorities . However, it seems to me that as a matter of case management, that can be deferred until the above, more pressing issue is addressed. The orders of the Court are as follows . The Court : Directs the parties and legal representatives on or before 4pm on Thursday, 2 April 2026 to confer with a view to establishing a just quick and cheap means of resolving the disputes between them currently in this Court and in the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) ( Division 2 Court ) including establishing whether there is a single court which is able to address all the existing claims for relief having regard to the factual substratum of the disputes. Directs the parties by their legal representatives to provide a report to Meek J by email to his Associate on or before 4pm on 2 April 2026 as either an agreed plan to address Order 1 above or alternatives or options available to address the objectives of Order 1, such report to address: w hether there is a single court available to address the entirety of the disputes; w hether the parties are prepared or not to litigate in such court; and w hat options are available to effect transfer of proceedings from either Division 2 or this Court to facilitate the objectives in Order 1 above. Orders subject to further order that these proceedings be temporarily stayed up to and including 16 April 2026 to enable the parties to undertake the work involved or associated with Orders 1 and 2 above. Stands the Plaintiff ’ s Notice of Motion filed on 23 January 2026 and the matter generally over to before Meek J on 16 April 2026 at 9am for further mention. Grants liberty to the parties to restore the matte r on 2 days ’ notice by email correspondence to the Associate to Meek J. Orders that costs be reserved. ********** Endnotes 1. Herakleitos in John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy (A. & C. Black, Ltd, 3rd ed, 1920) https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015037355578&seq=11&q1="all+things+are+one" accessed 13 March 2026. 2. For example, regarding Pantheism see: Arthur Lindsley, ‘The Problem of Evil’ C.S. Lewis Institute (Web Page, 5 December 2003) https://www.cslewisinstitute.org/resources/the-problem-of-evil/ accessed 16 March 2026; Meister Eckhart quoted in Aldous Huxley, The Perennial Philosophy (Harper Collins New York, 1947) 90 chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://s3.us-west-1.wasabisys.com/luminist/EB/H/Huxley - The Perennial Philosophy.pdf accessed 13 March 2026. 3. Including ss 340, 351, 772. 4. Rizeq v Western Australia (2017) 262 CLR 1; [2017] HCA 23 (Rizeq) at [48] (Bell, Gageler, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ) citing Felton v Mulligan (1971) 124 CLR 367 at 392 and Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 564. 5. Rizeq at [49] citing Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51 at 138. 6. Rizeq at [49]-[50] citing Baxter v Commissioners of Taxation (NSW) (1907) 4 CLR 1087 at 1142 (Isaacs J). 7. Rizeq at [52] citing Ah Yick v Lehmert (1905) 2 CLR 593 at 603 and CGU Insurance Ltd v Blakely (2016) 259 CLR 339 at 349-350 [24]. 8. Rizeq at [53]. 9. See e.g. M Leeming, Authority to Decide: The Law of Jurisdiction in Australia (Federation Press, 2nd ed, 2020) (Leeming) at 2-3. 10. Rizeq at [55]. 11. Robin Creyke et al, Control of Government Action: Text Cases and Commentary (LexisNexis, 7th ed, 2024 (Creyke 7th ed) at [8.3.11] citing Carlton & United Breweries Ltd v Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 543 at 553 (Gibbs CJ, Mason, Wilson, Brenna, Deane and Dawson JJ). 12. Creyke 7th ed at [8.3.11] citing Philip Morris Inc v Adam P Brown Male Fashions (1981) 148 CLR 457 (Philip Morris) at 512 (Mason J). 13. Creyke 7th ed at [8.3.11] citing Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd (2001) 204 CLR 559; [2001] HCA 1 (Edensor) at [52]-[53] 585–6 (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron and Gummow JJ),[218] 638–9 (Hayne and Callinan J). 14. Edensor ibid; Leeming at 118. 15. Creyke 7th ed at [8.3.10] citing Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA) s32. 16. Creyke 7th ed at [8.3.10]. 17. Macteldir v Dimovski (2005) 226 ALR 773 at 791; [2005] FCA 1528 (Macteldir) at [67] (Allsop J) citing FCA s32. 18. Robin Creyke et al, Control of Government Action: Text Cases and Commentary (LexisNexis, 5th ed, 2019) (Creyke 5th ed) at [2.2.21]; Macteldir at [67] citing Philip Morris at 476 (Barwick CJ). 19. Leeming at 118. 20. Creyke 5th ed at [2.2.21]. 21. Palmer v Ayres (2017) 259 CLR 478 , 490–1 [26] (Kiefel CJ, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ). 22. Palmer at [26] citing Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570 at 608 (Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane JJ). 23. Philip Morris at 519 (Murphy J). 24. Seven Network (Operations) Limited et al v Amber Harrison [2017] NSWSC 405 at [56] (Sackar J). 25. Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) (FCFCOA Act) ss 131-133. 26. FCCFOA Act s 134. 27. FCCFOA Act s 139. 28. G Lindell, Cowen and Zine’s Federal Jurisdiction in Australia (Federation Press, 4th ed, 2016) at 189, citing Philip Morris. 29. See e.g. LexisNexis, Australian Family Law (online at 16 March 2026) [FCFCA s 139.1]. 30. Yu v Wang [2021] NSWSC 1280 at [16] (Beech‑Jones CJ at CL). 31. All is 1 Pty Ltd t/as Banga Legal v Townsend [2025] NSWSC 953 (McGrath J). 32. Grigor v Stock; Stock v Stock [2025] NSWSC 232 at [6]. 33. Civil Procedure Act (NSW) (CPA) s 56(1). 34. FCFCOA Act s 190(1). 35. CPA s 56(3). 36. FCFCOA Act s 191(1). 37. CPA s 56(4). 38. FCFCOA Act s 191(2). 39. See Aviani v Loh (No 2) [2022] NSWSC 1148; (2022) 405 ALR 337. 40. See e.g. Patial v Kailash Lawyers Pty Ltd [2025] NSWSC 219 per Schmidt AJ at [101]-[102] and [107]. 41. CPA s 56 (see above). Amendments 18 March 2026 - Coversheet amended DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 18 March 2026