AE v R [2023] NSWCCA 74

Catchwords: CRIME – SENTENCE – application for leave to appeal out of time – sole ground of appeal based upon Totaan v R [2022] NSWCCA 75 – sentencing judge did not accept hardship to family as exceptional – “ Totaan error” – evidence taken into account on sentence in general mix of subjective features Court of Criminal Appeal Supreme Court New South Wales Amendment notes Medium Neutral Citation: AE v R [2023] NSWCCA 74 Hearing dates: 15 February 2023 Decision date: 31 March 2023 Before: Button J at [1] Wilson J at [2] N Adams J at [56] Decision: (1) Extend the time in which to file the Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal to 24 October 2022; (2) Grant leave to appeal; and (3) Dismiss the appeal. Catchwords: CRIME – SENTENCE – application for leave to appeal out of time – sole ground of appeal based upon Totaan v R [2022] NSWCCA 75 – sentencing judge did not accept hardship to family as exceptional – “ Totaan error” – evidence taken into account on sentence in general mix of subjective features Legislation Cited: Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) Cases Cited: Ahmed Mohamed v The Queen [2022] VSCA 136 ; 367 FLR 482 House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40 Hutchison v The King [2022] VSCA 217 Kaveh v R [2017] NSWCCA 52 Kentwell v The Queen (2014) 252 CLR 601; [2014] HCA 37 R v Girard [2004] NSWCCA 170 R v Hinton (2002) 134 A Crim R 286; [2002] NSWCCA 405 R v Nguyen (2006) 166 A Crim R 124; [2006] NSWCCA 369 R v Togias (2001) 127 A Crim R 23; [2001] NSWCCA 522 R v Zerafa (2013) 235 A Crim R 265; [2013] NSWCCA 222 Rodgerson v The Queen [No 2] [2022] VSCA 154 Totaan v R (2022) 108 NSWLR 17; [2022] NSWCCA 75 Xiao v R (2018) 96 NSWLR 1; [2018] NSWCCA 4 Category: Principal judgment Parties: AE (Applicant) Rex (Respondent) Representation: Counsel: C Parkin / J Lang (Applicant) A Chhabra / J Fennel (Respondent) Solicitors: Miers Legal (Applicant) Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent) File Number(s): 2017/00341164 Publication restriction: None. Note that applicant may not be identified. Decision under appeal Court or tribunal: District Court of NSW Jurisdiction: Criminal Date of Decision: 15 May 2019 Before: Hunt DCJ File Number(s): 2017/00341164 JUDGMENT BUTTON J: I agree with Wilson J, and with the additional observations of N Adams J . WILSON J: On 15 May 2019 the applicant, anonymised as “ AE ” , was sentenced by Hunt DCJ to a term of 10 years and 6 months imprisonment, with a non-parole period ( “ NPP ” ) of 6 years and 6 months, for an offence contrary to s 307.1 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995 ( “ the Code ” ) of importing a commercial quantity of a border controlled drug. An offence of that nature carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and a substantial fine . On 24 October 2022, well out of time, the applicant filed a Notice of Appeal accompanied by an application for leave to appeal after the expiry of the appeal period. There is one issue raised by the proposed appeal, being error following the change to the law brought about by the judgment of this Court in Totaan v R (2022) 108 NSWLR 17 ; [2022] NSWCCA 75 ( “ Totaan ” ) . The Crown concedes that the proposed ground can be made out and does not oppose an extension of time or a grant of leave to bring the appeal. Those concessions are both fair and appropriate, and the necessary orders should be made. For the reasons that follow I would , however, dismiss the appeal. The Proceedings in the District Court The Crown Case on Sentence The re was no dispute about the facts of the offence which, in summary form, are as follows. In October 2016 the applicant opened a business account for a business, [company name] , of which he was the sole Director and Secretary. The stated nature of the business was an import and export agent wholesaler. On 24 April 2017 the applicant travelled to Spain, declaring to the Australian Border Force ( “ ABF ” ) that the purpose of the journey was to secure bathroom hardware and tiles for his business. On 9 October 2017 two shipping containers arrived at Port Botany from Valencia. The containers held 29 tonnes of granite tile blocks , between 11 pallets in the first container and 10 pallets in the second . The ABF inspected the containers on their entry to Australia and found that some of the granite blocks o n 7 of the 11 pallets in the first container had been hollow ed out and packed with blocks of cocaine . A total of 40 blocks of cocaine were concealed inside the shipment. The cocaine was removed by the authorities and analysed. Some 20 , 091.5 grams of cocaine with an average purity of 76.43% was seized . The pure weight of cocaine amounted to 15,355.93 grams. T he shipment was reconstructed , although without the drug or any substitute, before being cleared for delivery. The offender arranged for a logistics company to pick up and deliver the containers to an industrial premises at Oak Flats operated by an associate. He told the associate to take delivery, and to leave the first container outside the unit, with the second taken inside. The second of the containers was delivered to the industrial unit on 18 October 2017. The applicant was present to take delivery. The granite tiles were unloaded inside the unit and the empty container placed outside the premises. Later that evening the applicant and a co-offender began breaking up the granite tiles, searching for the cocaine believed to be within. Later still, the applicant drove the tile detritus to a location at his place of employment , where he disposed of it, stating that the rubbish was from a friend ’ s renovation. He then returned to the industrial unit and , still hunting for the cocaine, broke up more of the tiles. The following day the first of the containers was delivered to Oak Flats. The co-offender set to work with a sledge hammer breaking up the granite tiles. As he worked, the applicant spoke on the telephone with a person referred to as “ Uncle ” , asking about the whereabouts of the “ stuff ” in the tiles. He was instructed to look in the pallets located in the position of those from which the cocaine had been removed by the ABF. The applicant was further instructed to use an ultra-violet light to reveal the presence of the glue used to hold the hollow tiles together. The search was unsuccessful. On 23 October 2017 the applicant, his co-offender, and an unidentified male continued with the search of the pallets of tiles. The applicant took photographs of the cargo. On 10 November 2017 the applicant was arrested. He had in his possession three plastic bags containing cocaine . Also in his possession was a granite tile, a log splitter, a mallet, a crowbar, and three mobile phones . During a search conducted at the applicant ’ s home police located importation documentation for the containers of granite tiles. Found at the Oak Flats unit were granite tiles, broken and whole, and the consignment labels from the shipment. In addition to the factual outline of the offence the Crown tendered a document stating that the applicant had no criminal history , and a confidential exhibit which outlined some assistance given by the applicant to authorities. The assistance was assessed as being of limited value. The Subjective Case The applicant gave evidence and tendered a large quantity of documentary evidence. In his evidence in chief, given before the sentencing court on 15 May 2019, the applicant said that he had been truthful when speaking with a psychologist, Dr Paul Pu sey , and in a letter that he had written to the court. In the latter document the applicant outlined his background, stating that he arrived in Australia [from Colombia] at the age of 15 years seeking a better life , away from violence and – ironically – crime. He secured a place at a private college and subsequently did well in his Higher School Certificate, gaining a place at university w h ere he studied engineering, with the benefit of a scholarship. He was awarded his degree with First Class Honours and began to work in the steel and then energy sectors. The applicant married in 2004 when he completed his degree, and there was a son to the marriage. In 2010 his relationship with his wife, which he described as “ mentally and physically abusive ” , broke down . He became depressed and began to use cocaine , associating exclusively with others connec ted with drugs. Later, a t around the time of the commission of the offence the applicant said that his drug friends “ took advantage of [his] good nature and vulnerability ” and asked him “ for a favour ” . The applicant blamed his friends, and his “ blind loyalty ” to them, for the destruction of his life. He described his fear on entering custody [following arrest] and his efforts to work and study, becoming a “ sweeper ” in prison and trying to maintain his professional knowledge. He said that he missed the birth of his second child, and his wife had abandoned her training towards becoming a General Practitioner to look after the couple ’ s children. His parents had been saddened by his incarceration , with an adverse impact upon their health and, in that they assisted him with legal expenses, finances. The whole family had been adversely affected. The applicant said he was sorry for the impact his offending had on his family, and sorry for his crime. In cross-examination the applicant clarified his marital situation, deposing that his first marriage ended in divorce in 2012 and h e married for a second time in 20 13. His second child, the first to his second marriage, was born in 2016 , and there was a second child to that union , the applicant ’ s third child . In that same year the applicant passed an exam that meant he could obtain admission to study for a degree in medicine . He agreed that in 2017, at the time he committed t his offence, “ life was good ” . When asked about his knowledge of the quantity of the drug hidden in the tile shipment, the applicant responded in a somewhat combative way: “ What do you mean by substantial ” ; “ Define significant ” . He conceded only that he was aware that more than 2kg of cocaine was involved , that being the minimum state of knowledge relevant to guilt of an offence involving a commercial quantity . He claimed that his “ circumstances ” affected his decision to participate in the importation , with the following evidence given: “Q: Initially, when you first became involved at least, you were a willing participant? A: It’s hard to tell, because the circumstances were fluid.” A lthough he conceded that he expected a “ sweetener ” in return for his involvement he denied any expectation of a substantial reward , notwithstanding the size of the shipment . Despite the support of his family, the applicant claimed to have been “ isolated ” when he took the decision to involve himself in importing cocaine. The 17 page report of Dr Pusey, a clinical and forensic psychologist, was before the court. Dr Pusey was provided with a quantity of documentation by the applicant ’ s legal representatives . He also obtained a history from the applicant over a three hour interview and conducted some psychometric testing. The applicant told Dr Pusey that, at the time of the offence, he was stressed and anxious as his wife was pregnant with his third child, and there was a prospect of redundancies at his place of employment. He said his cocaine use increased at about this time. When he was a sked to participate in the importation , he said he agreed due to “ misplaced loyalty ” , “ peer pressure ” and “ indirect threats ” . The latter was clarified in cross-examination, with the applicant referring only to “ mannerisms ” that he interpreted as threats. Since his arrest his family had “ come together ” to support him and his wife and children. He had not sought treatment for his drug use since entering custody but claimed to be abstinent. O n the basis of the history obtained, Dr Pusey suggested that the applicant may have met diagnostic criteria for a disorder, given the description of “ prominent mood, anxiety and substance use pathology ” . On psychometric screening the applicant reported depressive symptoms, whilst other symptoms reported by him were “ suggest ive ” of multiple disorders including depression and post-traumatic stress. The diagnoses cited were referred to as “ temporary conditions ” based upon stressors at the relevant time, which wou l d only persist if the stress factors continued. The applicant ’ s risk of re-offending was rated as low. The authors of the large number of testimonials – family , friends, and colleagues – all spoke very highly of the applicant . Most also described the impact of his family of the criminal proceedings. The Islamic Chaplain with NSW Corrective Services ( “ NSWCS ” ) described the applicant as “ an exceptional person ” . Case notes from NSWCS recorded positive comments as to the applicant ’ s helpfulness, courtesy, and work ethic. Copies of receipts evidenced the applicant ’ s past charitable donations. Remarks on Sentence In his ex tempore sentencing remarks his Honour set out the facts of the offence and noted the applicant ’ s early plea of guilty, the utilitarian value of which attracted a 25% discount on the sentence that would otherwise have be en imposed . The applicant ’ s role in the importation was “ essential ” and “ fundamental ” although there was no evidence to establish that the applicant was the financier or w as to have been the distributor. His Honour concluded that the applicant was more than “ a mere warehouse man ” but less than a principal. As to the quantity, whilst large, the applicant could only be said to have known that more than 2kg of cocaine was involved. The sentencing judge inferred that the applicant expected a financial reward that was “ not insignificant ” . The guilty plea and assistance were regarded by the sentencing judge as evidence of contrition . The applicant ’ s prospects for the future were held to be very good. The sentencing judge set out the applicant ’ s personal circumstances , including his former good character , and the responsible and well-paid engineering positions he had held prior to arrest . His Honour noted the “ big effect ” on the applicant ’ s elderly parents of his arrest and incarceration, and the “ devastating ” effect on his children . The Application to this Court The applicant advances the following ground: “The sentencing judge acted on a wrong principle, namely, that: (a) evidence of hardship to family and dependents coul d not “justify any substantial reduction in sentence” unless the hardship was exceptional and / or, (b) that the weight to be given to the evidence of hardship in the sentencing process was limited unless the hardship demonstrated was exceptional”. As noted previously, the Crown accepts that ground one can be made out , because of the decision in Totaan . It is convenient to briefly consider that judgment. The decision in Totaan was handed down by this Court, constituted by B ell CJ, Gleeson JA, Harrison , Adamson and Dhanji JJ, on 11 April 2022. It considered a line of authority that had , consistently with the common law of this and other S tate s , held that a court determining a sentence to be imposed upon a f ederal offender could not take into account the impact of the sentence upon the offender ’ s family and dependents unless “ exceptional hardship ” to such persons could be demonstrated. See for example R v Togias (2001) 127 A Crim R 23; [2001] NSWCCA 522; R v Hinton (2002) 134 A Crim R 286; [2002] NSWCCA 405, and (by majority) R v Zerafa (2013) 235 A Crim R 265; [2013] NSWCCA 222 , which all refer to the principle of exceptional hardship , the latter with a helpful discussion of its inapplicability in the dissenting judgment of Beech-Jones J (as his Honour then was) . The question of the impact of a sentence upon a f ederal offender ’ s family was one raised by s 16A of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) , which relevantly provides: 16A Matters to which court to have regard when passing sentence etc.—federal offences “(1) In determining the sentence to be passed, or the order to be made, in respect of any person for a federal offence, a court must impose a sentence or make an order that is of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances of the offence. (2) In addition to any other matters, the court must take into account such of the following matters as are relevant and known to the court: … (p) the probable effect that any sentence or order under consideration would have on any of the person's family or dependants”. The argument in Totaan was that s16A(2)(p) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) did not require there to be exceptional hardship to family and dependents before the probable effect on them of a sentence imposed on a f ederal offender could be taken into account as a feature relevant to the exercise of the sentencing discretion. Th is Court accepted that argument, holding that the earlier line of authority was plainly wrong and should not be followed: at [77] and [93] per Bell CJ with whom the other members of the Court agreed. The Chief Justice observed , at [82]: “Not only is there no textual support in s 16A for the requirement that exceptional circumstances be shown or established, the “requirement” to demonstrate “exceptional hardship”, as grafted on to s 16A(2)(p) by the series of cases under challenge, in fact runs contrary to the language of the subsection, which provides that the probable effect of the sentence on family members and dependants “must” be taken into account. The gloss defeats this clear statutory direction in all cases other than those which satisfy the somewhat elusive epithet of being “exceptional”.” Thus, t he interpretation of s 16A(2)(b) as given in Totaan is that which must apply to all f ederal sentencing decisions. It has since been considered or referred to elsewhere: Ahmed Mohamed v The Queen [2022] VSCA 136 at [91] ; Hutchison v The King [2022] VSCA 217; Rodgerson v The Queen [No 2] [2022] VSCA 154 . The applicant was sentenced well before Totaan was handed down, and at a time whe n courts in this State followed the previously understood principle of exceptional hardship. Those who appeared in the matter before the sentencing court proceeded on the understanding that the court could not have regard to the likely impact of the sentence on the applicant ’ s family as there was no evidence that exceptional hardship would be occasioned. Mr Walke r SC , appearing with Mr Djemal for the applicant at first instance said, in writ ten submissions: “ It is conceded that there will almost inevitably be hardship to any offender’s family and the hardship needs to extend beyond the usual and be sufficiently extreme to operate as a mitigating factor. It is submitted on behalf of the Offender that the hardship to the Offender’s children, mother and father would be taken into account as part of the mix of features in the sentencing discretion.” The Crown Prosecutor, in her written submissions, said: “It is well established that the reference to “the probable effect that any sentence … will have upon the offender’s family or dependents” in s 16A(2)(p) should be read as if it is preceded by the words “in an exceptional case”. Accordingly, hardship to an offender’s family or dependents will only operate as a mitigating factor where it is sufficiently extreme, beyond the sort of hardship which inevitably results to a family when a parent is incarcerated, to warrant a non-custodial sentence. The probable effect of the sentence upon the offender’s family and dependents remains a relevant factor to be taken into account as part of the offender’s “general mix” of subjective features. However, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, potential hardship to the offender’s family must not be taken into account as a specific and particular matter resulting in a substantial reduction or elimination of sentence of imprisonment ” (footnotes omitted). The sentencing judge adopted the approach the parties urged upon him, consistent with the law as it was then understood. In his remarks on sentence his Honour said: “It is clear that his i ncarceration has had a big effect on his elderly parents and I am sure quite a devastating effect on each of his children, but most particularly his elde r son whose care he shared until he went into custody. The effect on the family and the effect on the offender of having denied himself those most important relationships because of his offending does not reach the level of exceptional hardship but it is part of the range of matters that I need to take into account in arriving at the appropriate penalty in relation to the matter . ” That observation was based upon the evidence placed before the sentencing court concerning the wider impact of the applicant ’ s situation upon his family. Although it is clear that the sentencing judge in fact took into account the evidence relating to the effect of the proceedings and the likely sentence up on the applicant ’ s family, he did so acting upon a “ wrong principle ” , one of the errors referred to in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40 , at 505. On that basis, the exercise of the sentencing judge ’ s discretion miscarried, and the ground of appeal is made out . Error having been established this Court must set aside the sentence under challenge and proceed to re-sentence the applicant “ if it is of opinion that some other sentence, whether more or less severe is warranted in law and should have been passed : s 6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW). On re-sentence , and additional to the evidence that was before the sentencing court, the applicant relied upon his a ffidavit of 18 January 2023, and an affidavit from his solicitor, Ms Miers , of the same date. In his 64 paragraph affidavit the applicant deposed largely to matters that post-date his sentencing on 15 May 2019. That evidence is relevant to consideration of whether some other sentence should be passed upon him. To the extent that the applicant has referred to matters that pre-date his sentencing , he argued before this Court that, because he had felt constrained by the exceptional hardship principle in tendering evidence relevant to the impact of sentence upon family members , the evidence at first instance was not as extensive as it might have been . He submitted that the Court should admit and consider evidence that cou l d have been, but was not, placed before the sentencing court . I do not accept that argument and would reject such evidence. The evidence that was placed before t he sentencing court describing or touch ing upon the impact of the proceedings on family was extensive and does not suggest that the appl icant was affected by any feelings of constraint. The applicant described in his oral evidence the impact of his imprisonment on family , referring to his letter to the sentencing court of over two closely typed pages. In that letter the applicant said his wife had been forced to give up the specialist training in medicine that she had been undertaking to care for the couple’s children. He said their marriage was at breaking point. He described the death of a grandparent whilst he was on remand, and the adverse effect on h is parents’ health, finances, and well-being . He referred to the diminishment of his relationship with his children . The matters referred to by the applicant were amplified and given further detail by individual letters to the sentencing court from the applicant’s mother, his father, his younger sister, his sister, his younger brother, his neighbour, his friend Mr Achaechi , his colleague Mr Armitage, his colleague Mr Escamilla, a business associate Mr Salem, the family tutor Ms Meeth , and the family pharmacist Mr Mohamad. Given the detail in this large volume of correspondence it is difficult to see what more there could have been to be placed before the sentencing court . Much of the questio nable evidence sought to be tendered to this Court concerns the applicant ’ s work and educational background, provided as annexure AE-1 to his affidavit. That evidence is entirely unconnected with the probable impact of sentence upon family , and feelings of constraint relating to that aspect of the matter could have had no bearing on the decision to tender evidence of educational and vocational history to the sentencing court , or not . Of the evidence that is admissible on the question of re-sentence, the applicant deposed that he has actively pursued all opportunities for education , having completed numerous certificate level courses, as well as a G raduate Diploma in Energy and Carbon Studies through Murdoch University, completed with very good academic results in February 2022. He has applied for admission as a d octoral student to the University of Sydney and is awaiting the outcome of his application. The applicant has also maintained employment whilst in custody, working in the trusted position of sweeper on occasion, as well undertaking clerical , assembly , and machine o peration positions. Some of his duties are undertaken outside the prison and, since November 20 22, the applicant has worked full-time at a private company located in the community, leaving the prison at which he is housed six days a week for this purpose. This evidence bears out the conclusions of the sentencing judge that the applicant had the benefit of “very good prospects for rehabilitation ”. As with all prisoners, the applicant has been adversely affected by the impact of the COVID-19 virus upon the conditions of his custody. His access to contact visits was suspended between May and June 2022 ; t here have been “lock-downs” ; the applicant has been quarantined on occasion ; and he contracted the virus and was ill. He has been anxious about his health and that of family. He has felt isolated and depressed. He has had cause to complain to the Ombudsman about the conditions in which he has been held. The applicant has been concerned for his family since his incarceration, particularly for the effect of his limited contact with them upon his children. Prior to entering custody , the applicant lived with and cared for his (then) two children with his second wife, and had regular access to his eldest child, from his first marriage. Since entering custody his access to his eldest son has been very limited, and the applicant is distressed by the complete absence of contact between his family and the child. His contact with his two children to his second wife, and a third child born to the marriage after the applicant was incarcerated, has also been distressingly limited. The applicant’s youngest child was born with health issues affecting his ability to take food, and this imposed an additional burden on the child and on the child’s mother that the applicant was unable to share or relieve . The home t he applicant shared with his second wife was under threat when the mortgage holder called in the debt following his imprisonment , but the applicant’s brother was able to step in and discharge the mortgage, with that debt now owed by the applicant to his brother. The applicant’s sister has taken over the role the applicant formerly played in taking his parents to medical and other appointments. The applicant says that this is exhausting for his sister. She has been further exhausted by the assistance she gives to the applicant, and has become depressed. The applicant says he has behaved well in custody, with records kept by NSWCS bearing that assertion out. The applicant provided some additional information relevant to the three institutional charges he has faced, for offences of “Fight or other physical combat” ( two separate charges ), and “Possess Drug”. The affidavit of M s Miers goes largely to the applicant’s security classifications in custody , the applicant having progressed well, reflecting his good behaviour. Conclusion Having considered the evidence that was before the sentencing court, and the further evidence filed in this Court , the sentence that I would impose upon the applicant is not one which is less severe than that imposed at first instance. Despite the terms of s 6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) it is not the practice of this Court to impose a sentence which is more severe. The sentence the applicant received in the District Court was one which, having regard to the seriousness of the offence and the maximum penalty that applies, might be regarded as lenient. Every conclusion favourable to the applicant that could have been reached was reached and, whilst the sentencing judge did not regard the evidence concerning the impact of the probable sentence upon the applicant’s family as sufficient to constitute exceptional hardship, his Honour did not ignore it or fail to take it into account . The sentencing judge gave full weight to the “big” and “devastating” effect of the legal proceedings and the applicant’s inevitable incarceration upon his parents and children and took it into account when determining the sentence to be imposed. The evidence before this Court as to the impact on family of the sentence imposed on the applicant bears out his Honour’s conclusion in that regard. The applicant’s family have been adversely affected as the sentencing judge predicted, a matter already given weight in mitigation by him when determining the sentence to be imposed. The additional evidence of the impact of the sentence upon family members is not such as to attract an even greater mitigatory benefit than that allowed at first instance. The situations respectively of the applicant’s youngest child and his sister cannot result in a sentence that breaches the statutory requirement that the sentence imposed is of a severity appropriate in all the circumstances. Those circumstances include the very serious nature of the offence, committed by an intelligent individual who was in a financially and socially privileged position in society and who, in blaming others for his crime, appears to have limited insight into his offending, and its potential consequences, which go well beyond the impact upon him and his family. The drug the applicant imported into Australia could, if distributed, have done the sort of harm to the community that he fled his native Colombia to escape. Having concluded that the sentence I would pass upon the applicant is not one that is less severe than that imposed in the District Court, the appeal cannot succeed. I propose the following orders: Extend the time in which to file the Notice of Application for Leave to Appeal to 24 October 2022; Grant leave to appeal; and Dismiss the appeal. N ADAMS J: I agree with the orders proposed by Wilson J for the reasons provided but would like to make some additional observations. There is potential for offenders sentenced for f ederal offences prior to the decision in Totaan to seek leave to appeal against that sentence out of time if their incarceration led to hardship to their families which was not “ extreme ” . A similar situation arose following the decision in Xiao v R (2018) 96 NSWLR 1; [2018] NSWCCA 4. It should not be presumed that in every such application, error having been conceded, a less severe sentence will inevitably be warranted. As the decision in Kentwell v The Queen (2014) 252 CLR 601; [2014] HCA 37 makes clear, the duty of this C ourt in each case where error is established is to exercise the sentencing discretion afresh. It is not the duty of this C ourt to adopt the sentence imposed at first instance as a starting point and consider whether a reduction ought to be made to it. It is inevitable that in some cases this C ourt, having put the original sentence to one side and proceeded to exercise the sentencing discretion afresh, will arrive at a higher sentence. Thus, even allowing for some amelioration of the sentence to account for the error below, a longer sentence is still arrived at. As Wilson J has observed at [5 4 ], despite the terms of s 6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) it is not the practice of this C ourt in such cases to impose a sentence which is more severe; rather, this C ourt would dismiss such an appeal on the basis that no “ less severe ” sentence is warranted. The question of whether a “ less severe ” sentence is imposed by this C ourt (by way of comparison) will depend on the severity of the sentence imposed at first instance. As for the question of what “ new ” evidence can be adduced in post Totaan appeals, each case will turn on its own facts. In some cases, the offender may well have felt precluded from adducing any evidence as to hardship to family before the sentencing judge on the basis that such hardship was not “ extreme ” . Clearly, such an applicant will be permitted to adduce evidence of any hardship in this C ourt. But in other cases, such as the present, evidence of hardship will have already been adduced before the sentencing judge and taken into account as part of the offender ’ s subjective case, consistent with the approach taken in R v Girard [2004] NSWCCA 170 at [21]; R v Nguyen (2006) 166 A Crim R 124; [2006] NSWCCA 369 at [27] and Kaveh v R [2017] NSWCCA 52 at [40]. In such cases it may be difficult for an applicant to establish that he or she was somehow prevented from putting material establishing such hardship before the sentencing judge. In the present case, the applicant was a well-educated intelligent man who, motivated by greed, arranged for the importation of a significant amount of cocaine into this country. He was sentenced for an offence carrying life imprisonment. He received a sentence of 10 years and 6 months imprisonment, with a non - parole period of 6 years and 6 months. There is no doubt that his incarceration has caused hardship to his family. Having regard to all of the objective and subjective factors in this applicant ’ s case, including the hardship to his family, I have not arrived at a less severe sentence on re-sentence. ********** Amendments 21 September 2023 - Coversheet - corrected representation. 28 March 2024 - Coversheet - corrected representation. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 28 March 2024