JONES v POLICE [2026] SASC 50

On Appeal from MAGISTRATES COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (MAGISTRATE CLOVER) MCCRM-25-035027 Appellant: CRAIG LYNTON JONES Counsel: MS M BARNES - Solicitor: DANNI STEPHENS LEGAL Respondent: COMMISSIONER OF POLICE Counsel: MS A ZIMMERMAN - Solicitor: DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) Hearing Date/s: 15/12/2025 File No/s: SCCRM-25-038181 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Magistrates Appeal: Criminal) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. JONES v POLICE [2026] SASC 50 Judgment of the Honourable Justice Bampton 24 April 2026 MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE - SENTENCE MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - RELEVANT FACTORS - TOTALITY - OFFENCES COMMITTED IN DIFFERENT JURISDICTIONS Appeal against sentence imposed by Magistrate – where appellant plead guilty to 11 offences – where offending also breached a suspended sentence bond – where appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment eight days earlier in District Court for drug trafficking offending – where the effect of the sentence imposed by the Magistrate was to increase the appellant’s term of imprisonment by 11 months and 16 days and to extend the non-parole period by eight months – whether the sentence was manifestly excessive – whether the Magistrate erred in not applying the maximum discount permitted – whether the Magistrate failed to apply the principle of totality – whether the Magistrate erred in finding that there was a “real risk” of relapse into drug use by the appellant. Held: Appeal dismissed. Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) ss 26, 39, referred to. Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59; Kentwell v The Queen (2014) 252 CLR 601; Catanzariti v The King [2025] SASCA 136; Police v Nissen (2014) 120 SASR 50; Power v The Queen (1974) 132 CLR 623; R v Bahrami (2020) 137 SASR 327; R v Bennett [2015] SASCFC 164; R v Smoker (2016) 126 SASR 201, discussed. -- 1 of 14 -- -- 2 of 14 -- JONES v POLICE [2026] SASC 50 Magistrates Appeal: Criminal BAMPTON J. Mr Jones is sentenced by the District Court 1 On 21 August 2025, Craig Jones (“Mr Jones”) was sentenced in the District Court for the offence of trafficking in a controlled drug. A sentence of two years, 11 months, and 13 days’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of one year and eight months, commencing 21 August 2025 was imposed (“the District Court sentence”). Mr Jones is sentenced by the Magistrates Court 2 On 29 August 2025, following his guilty pleas in the Magistrates Court, Mr Jones was sentenced for 11 offences. Mr Jones also acknowledged the commission of the 11 offences breached a suspended sentence bond he had entered into in the Magistrates Court on 8 September 2022 (“the suspended sentence bond”). 3 Mr Jones was sentenced to 10 months’ imprisonment, two months of which was ordered to be served concurrently with the District Court sentence (“the Magistrates Court sentence”) to commence on 3 August 2028. The sentence underlying the suspended sentence bond of three months, two weeks, and two days was revoked, ordered to be carried into effect and served cumulatively on the District Court sentence and the Magistrates Court sentence. The sentencing Magistrate explained that the total effective head sentence of three years, 10 months, and 29 days was to commence on 21 August 2025. The Magistrate reviewed and extended the non-parole period to two years and four months. 4 The effect of the sentence imposed by the Magistrate was to increase Mr Jones’ term of imprisonment by 11 months and 16 days and to extend the non-parole period by eight months. 5 The following table, extracted from the respondent’s submissions, summarises Mr Jones’ offending dealt with by the Magistrates Court, time in custody, hearings before pleas were entered, the maximum penalties, maximum discounts, notional sentences, and penalties imposed by the Magistrate. -- 3 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 50 Bampton J 2 Offence Factual summary, Time in custody, Court hearings prior to guilty plea Maximum penalty and discount Notional sentence Penalty imposed Application to enforce breached bond1 The suspended sentence bond dated 8 September 2022 was revoked. The bond was imposed for a basic offence of dishonestly dealing with property without consent (MCPAD-22-2453). N/A N/A 3 months and 16 days imprisonment to be served cumulatively Dishonestly deal with property without consent (basic)2 On 10/1/23 a $149 shaver was stolen from The Shaver Shop. The appellant was identifiable on the CCTV. Home detention monitoring GPS data placed the appellant at the relevant shopping centre at the time of the theft. On 27/4/23, he was interviewed at his home address, nil arrest. Hearing dates: 15/11/23, 21/6/24, 22/7/24, 4/9/24, 4/10/24, 16/12/24 (plea entered) 10 years 30% 20 days, reduced to 15 days 25% discount applied) 10 months imprisonment, with 2 months of this sentence concurrent on the District Court sentence dated 21/8/25 Dishonestly deal with property without consent (basic)3 On 19/12/23 the appellant attended a furniture store and used a false name to collect a $3429 sofa. He was identifiable on CCTV. On 1/5/[24] he was arrested for unrelated offences (trafficking offences later sentenced for by the District Court, time in custody was deducted on that file for 1/5/24-9/7/24) and he was noted as wanted for this matter. He was arrested and charged. There is no referrable time in custody for this matter. Hearing dates: 2/5/24, 8/5/24, 21/6/24, 22/7/24, 4/9/24, 4/10/24 (plea entered) 10 years 30% 6 weeks, reduced to 31 days (26.19% discount applied) 1 MCCRM-25-035027. 2 MCCRM-23-038243. 3 MCCRM-24-016037. -- 4 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 50 Bampton J 3 Offence Factual summary, Time in custody, Court hearings prior to guilty plea Maximum penalty and discount Notional sentence Penalty imposed Possess prohibited material (identity theft)4 On 6/1/24 the appellant was searched and found in possession of four driver’s licences. Two had his photo and another person’s name. He was arrested and spent 37 minutes in custody. Hearing dates: 14/5/24, 21/6/24, 22/7/24, 4/9/24, 4/10/24 (plea entered) 5 years 30% 4 weeks, reduced to 3 weeks (25% discount applied) Possess controlled drug (GHB)5 On 11/2/24 the appellant was found [in] possession of a small amount of GHB. He was issued a drug diversion and failed to attend. He was reported for this matter on 19/4/24. There is no referrable time in custody for this matter. Hearing dates: 14/5/24, 21/6/24, 22/7/24, 4/9/24 (plea entered) $2000 or 2 years 30% 10 days, reduced to 7 days (30% discount applied) Count 1 – making off without payment6 On 22/2/24 the appellant filled $95.85 of fuel and took $167,21 of consumables from an OTR and drove off. He was disqualified from driving for 3 years on 17 August 2023. He was identified from CCTV. On 1/5/[24] he was arrested for unrelated offences (trafficking offences later sentenced for by the District Court, time in custody was deducted on that file for 1/5/24-9/7/24). There is no referrable time in custody for this matter. Hearings: 2/5/24, 8/5/24, 21/6/24, 22/7/24, 4/9/24, 4/10/24 (pleas entered) 2 years 30% 30 days, reduced to 22 days (26.66% discount applied) Count 2 – dishonestly deal with property without consent (basic)7 10 years 30% Count 3 – drive disqualified8 3 years 30% 4 months, reduced to 3 months (25% discount applied) 4 MCCRM-24-016712 (count 2 only, count 1 withdrawn). 5 MCCRM-24-016713. 6 MCCRM-24-016018. 7 MCCRM-24-016018. 8 MCCRM-24-016018. -- 5 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 50 Bampton J 4 Offence Factual summary, Time in custody, Court hearings prior to guilty plea Maximum penalty and discount Notional sentence Penalty imposed Count 1 – dishonestly deal with property without consent (basic)9 On 13/3/24 the appellant drove disqualified to a menswear store in Stepney. He stole $3,500 worth of clothing. CCTV captures the driving, offending and identifies the appellant. 10 years 30% 6 weeks, reduced to 31 days (26.19% discount applied) Count 2 – drive disqualified10 On 1/5/[24] he was arrested for unrelated offences (trafficking offences later sentenced for by the District Court, time in custody was deducted on that file for 1/5/24-9/7/24). There is no referrable time in custody for this matter. Hearings: 2/5/24, 8/5/24, 21/6/24, 22/7/24, 4/9/24, 4/10/24 (pleas entered) 3 years 30% 4 months, reduced to 3 months (25% discount applied) Dishonestly deal with property without consent (basic)11 On 25/3/24 the appellant stole $6,000 of speaker equipment. He was identified by an eyewitness through a photo ID procedure. On 3/8/24 he was arrested, charged, and bailed and spent 55 minutes in custody. Hearings: 4/9/24, 4/10/24 (guilty plea entered) 10 years 40% 10 weeks, reduced to 6 weeks (40% discount applied) Possess prohibited material (identity theft)12 On 1/5/[24] the appellant was in possession of driver’s licence and bank cards in other person’s names. On 1/5/24 he was arrested for unrelated offences (trafficking offences later sentenced for by the District Court, time in custody was deducted on that file for 1/5/24-9/7/24). There is no referrable time in custody for this matter. Hearing dates: 2/5/24, 8/5/24, 21/6/24, 22/7/24, 4/10/24, 17/3/25, 15/4/25 (plea entered) 5 years 30% 4 weeks, reduced to 3 weeks (25% discount applied) 9 MCCRM-24-016029. 10 MCCRM-24-016029. 11 MCCRM-24-030998. 12 MCCRM-24-016021. -- 6 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 50 Bampton J 5 Mr Jones appeals 6 Mr Jones now appeals the Magistrates Court sentence on grounds that it is manifestly excessive, that the Magistrate erred in not applying the maximum discount permitted by s 39(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) (“the Sentencing Act”) in relation to eight notional sentences, failed to apply the principle of totality, and erred in finding that there was “a real risk of relapse” into drug use by Mr Jones. Mr Jones’ personal circumstances 7 Mr Jones’ parents separated when he was 15 years old and, when he was 16 years old, his father died suddenly. It was submitted that following the death of his father, his family struggled financially and he left school during year 9. 8 In 2012, Mr Jones was sentenced for manslaughter, having pleaded guilty to the unlawful killing of a friend. It was agreed that the basis of his guilt was that the death of the friend was due to his criminal negligence. Mr Jones was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment, reduced to four years on account of his guilty plea and contrition. The manslaughter sentence was ordered to be cumulative on a sentence of one year’s imprisonment imposed for offences underlying a bond Mr Jones acknowledged he had breached by committing the manslaughter. A non-parole period of two years and six months was fixed, and the sentence was ordered to commence on 6 October 2011. 9 It was contended that Mr Jones has never properly grieved the death of the friend who died because of his criminal negligence. 10 It was acknowledged that Mr Jones has a significant antecedent history, including for similar offending. 11 It was submitted that at the time of the offending the subject of this appeal Mr Jones had been struggling with drug addiction and homelessness. It was contended that all his offending was committed whilst he was under the influence of drugs and, mainly, to fund his drug use. After being released on home detention bail on 9 July 2024, Mr Jones consulted his general practitioner and began the suboxone program. It was submitted that at the time of the sentencing hearing in the Magistrates Court, Mr Jones, who was then aged 41, had been on suboxone for 12 months and was regularly seeing medical practitioners and a counsellor for treatment for both his drug abuse and mental health issues. He was also participating in the OARS Smart Recovery drug and alcohol program. He returned negative drug tests during the 13 months he was on home detention bail which was his longest period of abstinence from drugs, having not previously undergone any periods of sustained treatment for drug abuse. 12 It was also submitted that Mr Jones had removed himself from negative peer groups and had stable accommodation with his mother and brother. -- 7 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 50 Bampton J 6 The sentence 13 The Magistrate detailed in his sentencing remarks that, in imposing one global sentence, he had determined 10 starting notional sentences for Mr Jones’ offending. His Honour explained that in arriving at the notional sentences he would impose one penalty for the offences of making off without payment and theft committed on 22 February 2024. 14 The total of the 10 starting notional sentences was just under 17 months’ imprisonment. His Honour also detailed the percentage discount he would apply to each starting notional sentence to reflect the relative strength of the prosecution cases and the timing of Mr Jones’ pleas. 15 Other than the sentences for offence of possess controlled drug committed on 11 February 2024 (which he indicated he would have reduced by 30 percent), and the offence of dishonestly dealing with property committed on 25 March 202413 (which he indicated he would have reduced by 40 percent), the Magistrate indicated he would have discounted the other eight starting notional sentences by 25 percent. 16 As detailed above, his Honour ultimately imposed one sentence of 10 months’ imprisonment for the 11 offences and revoked the suspended sentence bond. He ordered that the sentence of three months, two weeks, and two days underlying the suspended sentence bond be carried into effect and made wholly cumulative upon the 10-month sentence he imposed. His Honour also ordered that two months of the 10-month sentence be served concurrently with the District Court sentence to reflect totality. Mr Jones’ submissions 17 Mr Jones complained that the Magistrate made a process error in failing to apply the totality principle in the manner required by Mill v The Queen14 in cases where a defendant being sentenced is serving a sentence for other offending. Further, it was contended that when regard is had to the combined effect of the District Court and Magistrates Court sentences, the new non-parole period imposed by the Magistrate is manifestly excessive, and, accordingly, an outcome error. 18 In respect of the eight starting notional sentences, the Magistrate indicated he would have reduced by 25 percent, Mr Jones argued that none of the offences were listed for trial and, pursuant to s 39(2)(b) of the Sentencing Act, the maximum discount available was 30 percent. 13 The Magistrate indicated his view that other than the offence of dishonestly dealing with property committed 25 March 2024, there was a high likelihood of convictions. 14 Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59. -- 8 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 50 Bampton J 7 19 Mr Jones complained that the Magistrate gave a discount less than the statutory maximum and did not provide proper explanation for doing so. 20 Whilst Mr Jones accepted there is no entitlement to receive the maximum discount, he submitted that in his circumstances he ought to have been given the full discount available for all offences. He complained that the Magistrate did not appear to have considered the specific factors detailed in s 39(4) of the Sentencing Act, apart from s 39(4)(h) regarding the strength of the prosecution case. 21 Mr Jones relied on the decision of R v Bennett:15 If a sentencing judge considers it necessary or desirable to depart from the maximum discount, this Court has indicated that it is desirable for reasons for the departure to be provided … 22 Mr Jones contended the Magistrate appeared to consider the timing of the pleas in a global fashion. He submitted that his pleas were entered later either because he was waiting for outstanding disclosure, legal advice, or for the prosecution to consider negotiations. He submitted that none of those matters were considered by the Magistrate in arriving at his decision to reduce the discounts available by five percent. 23 In relation to the complaint that the Magistrate failed to apply the totality principle, Mr Jones submitted that his offending was of a similar nature, involving theft, dishonesty offences, and driving offences. He stated that apart from the theft committed on 10 January 2023, his offending occurred over a period of approximately three months when he was struggling with substance abuse addiction. 24 It was submitted there was substantial overlap in the criminogenic factors such that the sentencing objectives relevant to the offences before the Magistrate were equally relevant to the sentencing in the District Court and called for a level of concurrency. 25 It was contended that the length of the non-parole period depends on the circumstances of the case and the offender. 26 It was further submitted that all of the considerations relevant to fixing the head sentence are relevant to fixing the non-parole period, including the totality principle, but greater weight is to be given to rehabilitation.16 It was argued that the Magistrate failed to give sufficient weight to Mr Jones’ demonstrated rehabilitation since the offending and his commitment to addressing his drug abuse issues. It was contended that when Mr Jones’ overall offending is considered, as well as his demonstrated rehabilitation and steps to address his drug abuse problem, greater concurrency ought to have been applied by the Magistrate, 15 [2015] SASCFC 164 at [25]. 16 Power v The Queen (1974) 132 CLR 623 at 629. -- 9 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 50 Bampton J 8 resulting in both a shorter head sentence and shorter extension to the non-parole period. 27 Finally, Mr Jones complained that there was nothing in the material before the Magistrate which provided him any basis for finding that there was a “real risk” of his relapse into drug abuse. It was contended that there had been a significant change in his personal circumstances relating to his drug use. For the first time, he was receiving treatment for his drug abuse and had been successfully abstaining from drug use for over 12 months. The respondent’s submissions 28 The respondent contended there was no error in respect of the discounts identified by the Magistrate and that the discount identified for each offence was within the Magistrate’s discretion. In respect of the complaint that the Magistrate failed to apply the principle of totality in applying partial concurrency with the District Court sentence and when reviewing and extending the non-parole period, the respondent submitted there was no error in extending the non-parole period by eight months. 29 In respect of the complaint regarding the Magistrate finding there was a “real risk” of relapse, the respondent stated that there was an appropriate basis for this comment, namely Mr Jones’ history of offending. 30 The respondent pointed out that the Magistrate expressly noted the appropriate maximum discounts applicable and stated that the strength of the prosecution case and the timing of the pleas were reflective of the discounts he afforded. It was submitted that adequate reasons do not require a magistrate to go through each file in detail to identify why they consider there to be a strong prosecution case and the specific timing of each plea. 31 Further, it was submitted that the discounts afforded in the impugned eight sentences were close to the maximum available discounts and were never less than five percent below the maximum available discount. 32 It was submitted that adequate reasons as to why the full discount was not applied were provided and, accordingly, no process error can be established. 33 The respondent contended that the Magistrate afforded appropriate weight to the consideration of totality. The respondent referred to the recent decision of Catanzariti v The King,17 which involved a review by the Court of Appeal of a sentence for drug trafficking and an attempted serious criminal trespass which was committed around the same time but for which the sentence had already been served. The Court noted that while the offending was committed at a similar time, 17 [2025] SASCA 136. -- 10 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 50 Bampton J 9 given the offending was of a totally different character, there would have been little scope for partial concurrency. 34 It was submitted that the Magistrate imposed a notional sentence for each of the offences as required by s 26 of the Sentencing Act. In arriving at the 10-month sentence for all offending, the Magistrate explicitly considered proportionality and afforded concurrency for the notional sentences, noting the total of the cumulative final notional sentences was 12 months and 10 days. It was submitted that, in doing so, it was plain that the Magistrate applied the principle of totality at the first step of the sentencing process. 35 It was contended that after arriving at the 10-month sentence, the Magistrate took a step back to consider the sentence having regard to the District Court sentence, stating: I have then considered what a proportionate total effective sentence is by reference to both Judge Press’ and my sentences. To reflect such totality considerations, I make two months of the sentence I have imposed concurrent with the District Court sentence … While your counsel has submitted I should increase the non-parole period by only one day, respectfully the basis for doing so has not been articulated. I again have regard to the purposes of sentencing, with a particular focus on your rehabilitation. I consider it is necessary to extend your non-parole period to reflect the minimum period justice requires to be served on the sentence I have imposed, having been reassessed by reference to the total period that includes Judge Press’ sentence. I also have to take into account the activated suspended sentence. 36 It was submitted that as noted by the Magistrate, the extension of the non-parole period by eight months was what he considered the minimum period necessary for justice to be served. It was argued given the overall criminal conduct for which Mr Jones was to be sentenced, the sentence was appropriate and within the Magistrate’s discretion. 37 It was pointed out that Mr Jones’ offending demonstrated separate incursions of crime committed over a 17-month period that were in breach of the suspended sentence bond. The offending was committed on discrete occasions, some of the offences involved a level of sophistication and planning and the possession of false identification documents. Further, the offending involved three types of offences: drug offences; dishonesty offences; and driving offences. 38 The respondent submitted that a significant portion of the sentence must have been reflective of the two offences of driving while disqualified given they attracted notional penalties of three months respectively. The respondent pointed out that when sentencing for driving while disqualified, “general deterrence will demand relatively greater weight than the offender’s personal circumstances”.18 18 Police v Nissen (2014) 120 SASR 50 at [27]. -- 11 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 50 Bampton J 10 39 It was submitted that when assessing the overall criminality of the offending, the length of the period over which the offending was committed, the need to give effect to the activated suspended sentence bond, and Mr Jones’ antecedents, a substantial increase in the non-parole period was required. 40 It was submitted that Mr Jones’ progress toward rehabilitation needed to be balanced with the other sentencing purposes, including protecting the safety of the community, punishment, public denunciation, and deterrence. It was pointed out that a resulting head sentence of three years, 10 months, and 29 days and a non-parole period of two years and four months equates to a non-parole period of approximately 59 percent of the head sentence. The respondent submitted that whilst the authorities do not suggest a benchmark for a non-parole period, it was noted by Nicholson J in R v Smoker19 that a non-parole period of 68 percent of the head sentence was not particularly uncommon. 41 In relation to the complaint regarding the Magistrate’s remark of the “real risk” of relapse into drug and there being no basis for that finding, the respondent pointed out that the Magistrate was obliged to consider the need for personal deterrence on the background of Mr Jones’ antecedents. It was pointed out that his history demonstrated his drug use was a significant criminogenic risk factor as to his offending. 42 Mr Jones’ antecedents previously involved a lengthy prison sentence and periods of significant times of absence from illicit substance. It was submitted he returned to drug use after resuming association with other drug users in the community. It was submitted that in that context there is clearly a risk that he may relapse into drug use, which may lead to further offending. It was contended that the use of the word “real” in describing the risk does not elevate the remark to a conclusive finding that Mr Jones would return to drug use. It was further contended that it is clearly not the finding given the Magistrate acknowledged Mr Jones’ improved prospects of rehabilitation. Consideration 43 Sentencing is a discretionary exercise, and this Court will only interfere upon being satisfied a sentencing magistrate has: (a) acted upon wrong principle; (b) considered an irrelevant consideration; (c) failed to have regard to relevant a consideration; or (d) the sentence is so obviously unreasonable or unjust that there must have been a failure to exercise the discretion properly. 19 (2016) 126 SASR 201 at [14]. -- 12 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 50 Bampton J 11 44 It is not sufficient for this Court, in considering a complaint of manifest excess, to conclude that it would have come to a different decision or that the sentence imposed is markedly different from sentences imposed in like matters. It must be established that the Magistrate arrived at a decision that was unreasonable or plainly unjust. That is, the sentence must be “outside the permissible range of sentences for the offender and the offence”20 for this Court to intervene. 45 As acknowledged by Mr Jones, there is no entitlement to the maximum available reduction prescribed by s 39 of the Sentencing Act and the strength of the prosecution case is a relevant consideration when assessing the sentencing discount to be afforded.21 46 Upon reviewing the number of hearings prior to Mr Jones’ pleas being entered, together with the strength of the prosecution case, the Magistrate’s remarks make clear why the maximum discounts were departed from for eight notional sentences. For example, in relation to the theft committed on 10 January 2023, there was an overwhelming prosecution case given both the CCTV and home detention monitoring equipment identifying Mr Jones as the perpetrator of the offending. Mr Jones pleaded guilty on the sixth court hearing for that matter. I note the respondent’s submission that whilst some of the adjournments were for the purpose of disclosure sought of the CCTV, disclosure of that footage positively identifying him was not necessary for the purposes of him acknowledging his guilt of the offence. I also note that Mr Jones was, in certain matters, shown still images taken from the CCTV when interviewed by police. 47 I agree with the respondent’s submission that the timing of Mr Jones’ pleas and the strength of the prosecution cases where full discount was not afforded demonstrated the Magistrate’s assessment that there was a slightly reduced utilitarian benefit in those pleas. 48 The Magistrate appropriately ordered that the sentence underlying the suspended sentence bond be called into effect and served cumulatively on the sentence he imposed. 49 Having regard to all relevant matters, the non-parole period in this matter cannot be described as unreasonable or plainly unjust. The principle of totality was considered and reflected in the resulting sentence. 50 Mr Jones’ criminal antecedents reflect a pattern of offending linked to his drug use. To his credit he was able to abstain from drug use whilst on home detention bail prior to being sentenced. However, as with any former drug user, there remains a risk that they may relapse into drug use upon release into the community. The adjective “real” used by the Magistrate to describe the risk of relapse was unnecessary. It would have been sufficient to refer to “a risk of 20 Kentwell v The Queen (2014) 252 CLR 601 at [35]. 21 R v Bahrami (2020) 137 SASR 327 at [53]. -- 13 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 50 Bampton J 12 relapse”. Having said that, I am satisfied the Magistrate sentenced Mr Jones considering his improved prospects of rehabilitation and did not consider any irrelevant factor. 51 The non-parole period reviewed and extended by the Magistrate is just under 60 percent of the final head sentence. Should Mr Jones be granted parole at his earliest eligibility, he would be under the supervision of, and have the assistance available to parolees provided by, the Parole Board for approximately one and a half years. To review and extend the non-parole period of one year and eight months by eight months to two years and four months, with reference to a head sentence of three years, 10 months, and 29 days, was within the discretion available to the Magistrate. 52 The resulting sentence reflects the Magistrate’s application of the totality principle and is not manifestly excessive. The discounts identified in the notional sentences were within the Magistrate’s discretion and the use of the adjective “real” was not in error. I dismiss the appeal. -- 14 of 14 --