FRANKLIN AUTO PARK PTY LTD & ORS v THE OFFICE OF THE VALUER-GENERAL [2026] SASC 56

On Appeal from SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL (SENIOR MEMBER K MCEVOY) 2025/SA001310, 2025/SA001311, 2025/SA001314 First Appellant: FRANKLIN AUTO PARK PTY LTD Counsel: MR B JENNER - Solicitor: ADCO LEGAL Second Appellant: FROME AUTO PARK PTY LTD Counsel: MR B JENNER - Solicitor: ADCO LEGAL Third Appellant: FRANKLIN INVEST PTY LTD Counsel: MR B JENNER - Solicitor: ADCO LEGAL Respondent: THE OFFICER OF THE VALUER-GENERAL Counsel: MR S RANIERI - Solicitor: CROWN SOLICITOR’S OFFICE Hearing Date/s: 26/11/2025 File No/s: CIV-25-009498 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Appeal to a Single Judge) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. FRANKLIN AUTO PARK PTY LTD & ORS v THE OFFICE OF THE VALUER-GENERAL [2026] SASC 56 Judgment of the Honourable Justice McIntyre 24 April 2026 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS - SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL REAL PROPERTY - VALUATION OF LAND - NOTICE OF VALUATION REAL PROPERTY - VALUATION OF LAND - OBJECTIONS AND APPEALS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA REAL PROPERTY - VALUATION OF LAND - VALUERS-GENERAL This is an application for permission to appeal a decision of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘SACAT’). The appeal concerns three properties in Adelaide, each owned separately by one of the appellants. Notices of valuation were deemed to be served by the Valuer-General in respect of the three properties on 20 November 2024. The appellants lodged objections to those valuations on 20 January 2025; one day outside the timeframe prescribed by s 24(1a) of the Valuation of Land Act 1971 (SA) (‘Valuation Act’). Subsequently, the appellants sought an extension of time to lodge the objections which was declined by the Valuer-General. The appellants sought review of that decision by SACAT. The Tribunal determined that the Valuer- General’s refusal to grant an extension of time was not a reviewable decision and dismissed the proceedings for want of jurisdiction. The appellants seek to appeal that decision. -- 1 of 10 -- The appellants appeal on two grounds: 1. The Tribunal erred in law in finding that it does not have jurisdiction to hear an application for the review of a decision made under s 24(1e) of the Valuation Act. 2. The Tribunal erred in law in finding that a decision refusing an application under s 24(1e) of the Valuation Act was not a reviewable decision under s 25C of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA). The respondent contends that leave should be refused on the ground that the Tribunal’s decision is not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal and that the appellant’s contended construction of the Valuation Act is not reasonably arguable. Held, dismissing the application for leave to appeal: 1. The Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to review the Valuer-General’s exercise of discretion under s 24(1e) of the Valuation Act to grant or refuse an extension of time to lodge an objection. 2. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is confined to review of decisions under s 25 of the Valuation Act made upon a valid objection. An objection made outside the time limit prescribed by s 24(1a) of the Valuation Act, or without the Valuer-General granting an extension of time, is not a valid objection. South Australian Civil and Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) ss 8, 31, 32, 34, 71; Valuation of Land Act 1971 (SA) ss 11(2), 14, 24(1a), 24(1d)(a), 24(1e), 25, 25C; Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 5; Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) ss 47, 48; Legislation Interpretation Act 2021 (SA) s 19(1), referred to. Varrichio v Wentzel (2016) 125 SASR 191; Jackson v Lepp Investments Pty Ltd (2016) 125 SASR 1; Pix v South Australian Housing Trust (2016) 125 SASR 10; Zollo v The Commissioner of Consumer Affairs (2023) SASCA 72; Aldridge v The Registrar of Firearms [2022] SASC 5; Brisbane City Council v Amos (2019) 266 CLR 593; R v Police Appeal Board; Ex parte McGee (1984) 36 SASR 455; Taylor v Public Service Board (NSW) (1976) 137 CLR 208; Project Blue Sky Inc & Others v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, considered. -- 2 of 10 -- FRANKLIN AUTO PARK PTY LTD & ORS v THE OFFICE OF THE VALUER-GENERAL [2026] SASC 56 Single Judge Appeal: Civil McIntyre J 1 This is an application for permission to appeal under s 71 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) (‘SACAT Act’) against a decision by a Senior Member of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (‘SACAT’) dismissing applications for the review of decisions made under s 24(1e) of the Valuation of Land Act 1971 (SA) (‘Valuation Act’) for want of jurisdiction. 2 For the reasons that follow I dismiss the application for permission to appeal. Background 3 The appellants own property in Adelaide as follows: • Franklin Auto Park Pty Ltd (‘the first appellant’) owns property at 42 Franklin Street Adelaide; • Frome Auto Park Pty Ltd (‘the second appellant’) owns property at 5 - 17 Frome Street Adelaide; and • Franklin Invest Pty Ltd (‘the third appellant’) owns property at 50 Franklin Street Adelaide. 4 On 20 November 2024, the respondent was deemed to have served notices of valuation on the appellants in respect of those three properties under s 24(1d)(a) of the Valuation Act. Section 24(1a) of the Valuation Act requires an objection to be made within 60 days of the date of service of the valuation. The appellants ought therefore to have lodged their objections on or before 20 January 2025. The appellants lodged their objections on 21 January 2025. 5 On 7 February 2025, the respondent wrote to the appellants and informed them that their objections had not been made within time. On 24 February 2025, the appellants’ solicitor wrote a letter to the respondent seeking an extension of time for each of the three objections under s 24(1a) of the Valuation Act. On 26 March 2025, the respondent wrote to the appellants’ solicitor and informed them that the respondent had decided not to grant an extension of time. 6 Each of the appellants lodged a review application with SACAT on 18 April 2025 seeking extensions of time of one day to lodge the objections under s 25C of the Valuation Act. -- 3 of 10 -- [2026] SASC 56 McIntyre J 2 The decision 7 The SACAT Member determined that the Valuer-General’s decision not to extend the time in which the appellants’ objections to valuation could be made was not a decision reviewable by SACAT. The reasons for that determination are set out in the Tribunal’s findings and order dated 8 July 2025. The SACAT Member dismissed the three proceedings for want of jurisdiction. The appeal grounds 8 The appellants challenge the orders of the Tribunal dismissing the three proceedings for want of jurisdiction contending that:1 1. The Tribunal erred in law in finding that it does not have the jurisdiction to hear an application for the review of a decision made under s 24(1e) of the Valuation Act. The Tribunal should have found that it has jurisdiction pursuant to s 25C of the Valuation Act and s 34 of the SACAT Act. 2. The Tribunal erred in law in finding that a decision refusing an application made under Division 1, s 24(1e) of the Valuation Act to extend the period within which an objection may be made was not a reviewable decision under s 25C of the SACAT Act. The Tribunal should have found that a decision made under Division 1 is a reviewable decision that falls within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under ss 31 and 34 of the SACAT Act. 9 The appellants seek orders granting leave to appeal, allowing the appeal and granting an extension of time for the lodgement of the objections or, alternatively, remitting the matter back to the Tribunal for determination in accordance with the law. Legislation Valuation Act 10 The Valuer-General has the power to value land under Part 3 of the Valuation Act. Under s 11(1) the Valuer-General must make, or cause to be made, general valuations of land within the State to determine the annual value, capital value, site value and unimproved value of the land.2 These general valuations are used for the purpose of various rating and taxation statutes within South Australia. 11 Section 14(1) provides that a general valuation must be made within each area of the State at least once during each successive period of five years. However, the respondent says that it is the Valuer-General’s practice to maintain a valuation roll that is updated annually. 1 Notice of Appeal (FDN 1). 2 Valuation of Land Act 1971 (SA) s 11(2). -- 4 of 10 -- [2026] SASC 56 McIntyre J 3 12 Part 4, Division 1 of the Valuation Act concerns notice of, and objections to, valuations. If a person is dissatisfied with a valuation of land, objection rights are conferred by s 24 of the Valuation Act, which relevantly provides as follows: 24—Objection to valuation (1) Subject to this section, a person who is dissatisfied with a valuation of land in force under this Act may, by notice in writing served personally or by post on the Valuer- General, object to the valuation. (1a) After notice of a valuation (whenever made) is first served after the commencement of this subsection on the owner or occupier of the land, an objection to the valuation may only be made by the owner or occupier so served within 60 days after the date of service of the notice. … (1e) Despite any other provision of this section, the Valuer-General may, for reasonable cause shown by a person entitled to make an objection to a valuation, extend the period within which the objection may be made (whether or not the period for objection to the valuation that would otherwise apply under this section has already expired). 13 Once an objection is made under s 24 of the Valuation Act, the Valuer- General must decide upon the objection in accordance with s 25 of the Valuation Act, which provides as follows: 25—Valuer-General to consider and decide upon objection (1) The Valuer-General must, as soon as practicable, consider any objection made under this Act and may either allow or disallow the objection. (2) On the determination of any such objection, the Valuer-General must serve upon the person by whom the objection was made notice in writing of his or her decision on the objection and, if the Valuer-General decides to allow an objection, either wholly or in part, he or she must alter the valuation and valuation roll to conform with his or her decision. 14 The Valuation Act provides review rights to SACAT as follows: 25C—Review by SACAT (1) A person who is dissatisfied with— (a) the decision of the Valuer-General upon an objection under Division 1; or (b) the decision of a land valuer upon a review under Division 2, may apply to SACAT for a review of the decision SACAT Act 15 The main objectives of SACAT “in dealing with matters within its jurisdiction” are set out in s 8 of the SACAT Act. Section 31 of the SACAT Act -- 5 of 10 -- [2026] SASC 56 McIntyre J 4 provides that the Tribunal will have the jurisdiction conferred on it under the SACAT Act or any other Act. Section 25C of the Valuation Act is one such conferral of jurisdiction. It is, as set out in s 32 of the SACAT Act, a matter in which the Tribunal has jurisdiction within its review jurisdiction as opposed to its original jurisdiction. 16 Section 34 of the SACAT Act sets out the Tribunal’s review jurisdiction as follows: 34—Decisions within review jurisdiction (1) If the matter that a relevant Act gives the Tribunal jurisdiction to deal with is a matter that expressly or necessarily involves a review of a decision (a reviewable decision), the matter comes within the Tribunal’s review jurisdiction. Leave to appeal 17 Section 71 of the SACAT Act provides for appeals from SACAT to this Court. The appellant requires leave to appeal.3 The appellants submit that their grounds of appeal are reasonably arguable and that the subject matter of the appeals is of sufficient substance to justify the grant of leave. It is said that the grounds raise important matters clarifying the jurisdiction exercisable by SACAT in the context of applications brought under Part 4 of the Valuation Act. In particular, the appeal relates to the issue of what constitutes an objection and therefore a reviewable decision under the Valuation Act. Further, it is said that the consequences for the appellants of not having an opportunity to have this matter dealt with are significant. The respondent on the other hand says that leave should be refused contending that the Tribunal’s decision is not attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal and that the appellants’ contended construction of the Valuation Act is not reasonably arguable. 18 The SACAT Act provides processes and procedures for the timely and cost effective disposition of such reviews. Accordingly, consistent with the authorities I ought not readily grant leave to appeal.4 The overarching principle is what is in the interests of justice. Ordinarily the Court will only grant leave where an appeal is reasonably arguable, and the subject matter is of sufficient substance to justify consideration.5 In determining the issue of whether the subject matter is of sufficient substance to justify a grant of permission, I have had regard to the authorities to which I was referred. Justice Parker reiterated the principle that leave to appeal will not readily be granted in Aldridge v The Registrar of Firearms6 and said:7 3 South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) s 71(2). 4 Varrichio v Wentzel (2016) 125 SASR 191 (‘Varrichio’). 5 Jackson v Lepp Investments Pty Ltd (2016) 125 SASR 1; Pix v South Australian Housing Trust (2016) 125 SASR 10; Zollo v The Commissioner of Consumer Affairs (2023) SASCA 72 at [29]. 6 [2022] SASC 5. 7 Ibid at [33]. -- 6 of 10 -- [2026] SASC 56 McIntyre J 5 That principle is intended to screen out cases where the disputed question has little or no practical or legal significance and there is no issue of principle nor a potential miscarriage of justice. 19 This is not a situation where SACAT has acted as a specialist tribunal given the subject matter of the appeal. It is a jurisdictional issue that raises the proper construction of the relevant legislation. Specifically, s 25C of the Valuation Act and Part 3 of the SACAT Act. It is necessary to consider the merits of the appellants’ position as to the correct interpretation of these provisions in order to determine the question of leave. The parties’ contentions 20 The appellants contend that the exercise of the power by the respondent under s 24(1e) of the Valuation Act to either extend time or refuse to exercise that power involves the respondent making a decision upon an objection. The three appellants submitted objections to the respondent and, in the ordinary meaning of the words in the Valuation Act, objections have been made albeit not within the time stipulated. Accordingly, it is submitted that the decision not to extend time in this case should be characterised as a decision upon an objection for the purposes of s 25C of the Valuation Act. 21 The respondent on the other hand contends that s 25C should not be read as also embracing a challenge to the Valuer-General’s discretion under s 24(1e) to extend the time within which an objection can be made. It is said that there was no error in the Tribunal’s reasoning process in that regard. It is the ordinary and natural construction of s 24(1e) that if an objection is lodged outside of time the objection has yet to exist. Accordingly, with no objection having been made, the Valuer-General has not made any decision upon an objection amenable to SACAT review under s 25C(1) of the Valuation Act. 22 The appellants rely on the decision of the High Court in Brisbane City Council v Amos8 (‘Amos’) for the proposition that, whilst section 24(1a) is an expression of a time limit, the section does not bar a right to commence or bring an action. It is said that the principles and concepts addressed by the High Court in Amos are of general application when considering the nature of rights created by statue and how those rights are affected by legislative time bars. The appellants further rely on Amos to contend that s 24(1a) is to be understood as conferring a right on the part of the respondent to rely upon the expiration of the time limit as providing a defence by barring the appellants’ right to the remedies sought.9 Accordingly, it is said that SACAT should have found that each of the appellants had made an objection and that the respondent had made a decision upon those objections by exercising the right to rely upon the expiration of the time limit and not to deal with the merits of the objection. In those circumstances, the appellants 8 (2019) 266 CLR 593. 9 Brisbane City Council v Amos [2019] 266 CLR 593 at [7], [40], [49] (Kiefel CJ, Gaegler and Keane JJ). -- 7 of 10 -- [2026] SASC 56 McIntyre J 6 say that the decisions of the respondent not to grant extensions of time on each of the objections were decisions amenable to review by SACAT. 23 The respondent on the other hand says that Amos is fundamentally different to the matters arising on this appeal and that Amos does not assist with the proper construction of s 25C of the Valuation Act. Amos involved an action for recovery of debts which were statute barred by the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) (‘LAA’). It did not deal with the exercise of a statutory administrative power to refuse or grant an extension of time. The respondents refer to R v Police Appeal Board; Ex parte McGee10 which held that ss 47 and 48 of the Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) were not applicable to proceedings before the Police Appeal Board. In that decision, the Court discussed the difference between curial and non-curial proceedings. Justice White said:11 The distinction between courts and other tribunals are clear cut and the line should not be blurred. There is a “forest of authorities” which shows that boards like the Police Appeal Board do not exercise the judicial function or the judicial power. Consideration 24 I do not consider that Amos is of more than general assistance in this matter. There is a significant difference between a statutory bar to proceedings and an administrative process. The provisions of the LAA considered by the High Court dealt with proceedings in a court of law.12 SACAT is not a court of law and it does not exercise the judicial function; its jurisdiction is founded in the relevant legislative provisions. 25 The primary object of statutory construction is to construe the relevant provision so that it is consistent with the language and purpose of the statute.13 A court is to give the words of a statutory provision the meaning that the legislature intended them to have. Accordingly, the process of construction requires an examination of the context of the provision. The legal meaning of a provision will ordinarily, but not always, correspond with the grammatical meaning of the provision. As McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ said in Project Blue Sky Inc & Others v Australian Broadcasting Authority:14 10 (1984) 36 SASR 455. 11 Ibid at 469; see also at 458 (Zelling J). 12 Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) s 5. 13 Taylor v Public Service Board (NSW) (1976) 137 CLR 208. 14 (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [78]. -- 8 of 10 -- [2026] SASC 56 McIntyre J 7 The context of the words, the consequences of a literal or grammatical construction, the purpose of the statute or the canons of construction may require the words of a legislative provision to be read in a way that does not correspond with the literal or grammatical meaning. [Citations omitted] 26 The purpose of both the Valuation Act and SACAT Act is found in the text and structure of each. Section 25C of the Valuation Act is the relevant conferral of jurisdiction upon SACAT. Under that section, SACAT’s review jurisdiction is confined to a decision of the Valuer-General upon an objection under Division 1. The question is what constitutes an objection under Division 1. 27 Section 25 of the Valuation Act is headed “Valuer-General to consider and decide upon on objection”. Headings form part of the Valuation Act.15 Section 24 sets out the process for making an objection and, in s 24(1a), provides that an objection may only be made within 60 days of the date of service of the notice of valuation. Section 24(1e) permits the Valuer-General to extend the period of time within which the objection may be made if the person entitled to make an objection shows reasonable cause. I do not accept the argument put by the appellants that s 24(1a) is an expression of a time limit but does not bar a right to commence or bring an action. An objection is not “an action” in the sense of proceedings in a court of law. 28 The appellants’ further argument that the time limit in s 24(1e) does not bar the right to make an objection, rather it confers a right on the respondent to rely upon the expiration of the time limit and not to deal with the merits of an objection, takes an unduly broad approach to the interpretation of the words “upon an objection”. The plain wording of s 24, when read in the context of Division 1 as a whole, provides that, in order to constitute an objection under that section, it must be made within the 60 day time limit or, alternatively, the Valuer-General must have exercised the discretion in s 24(1e) to extend the time for the making of an objection. If the time limit has not been met, nor the discretion exercised, there is no valid objection. 29 Moreover, there is no basis in the legislation to characterise the refusal to exercise the discretion to extend time for an objection under s 24(1e) as an objection in itself. The appellants rely upon the intent of Parliament, contending that there is no reason to suppose that Parliament would have intended that a complaint about an extension of time decision could only be challenged by prerogative writ in the Supreme Court. Rather, it is asserted that Parliament’s intent was to confer the entirety of the review jurisdiction of the Land and Valuation division of the Supreme Court, including decisions on objections made by the respondent, on SACAT. I do not accept this. There is no ambiguity in the legislation. The wording is plain. If Parliament had intended to confer the entirety of the review jurisdiction of the Land and Valuation division of the Supreme Court 15 Legislation Interpretation Act 2021 (SA) s 19(1). -- 9 of 10 -- [2026] SASC 56 McIntyre J 8 on SACAT, it would have said so. It did not. There is no indication that Parliament intended the exercise of the Valuer-General’s discretion on the question of an extension of time to be subject to review by SACAT. If that was the intention, it would have said so. Further, any order granting an extension of time would inevitably require the matter to be referred back to the Valuer-General for the ultimate issue of the objection to be resolved on the merits. This cuts across the main objectives of the Tribunal, as set out in s 8 of the SACAT Act, which include ensuring that applications are processed and resolved as quickly as possible. Similarly, it would cut across the need for the valuations to be made under the Valuation Act for the purpose of levying or imposing any rate, tax or impost under a range of rating and taxation statutes in the State. 30 SACAT was correct to conclude that its jurisdiction is confined to reviews of decisions under s 25 of the Valuation Act made upon an objection and to conclude that it lacks jurisdiction to review the exercise of the Valuer-General’s discretion under s 24(1e) of the Valuation Act. This does not deprive the appellants of a remedy. As they have conceded, the decision of the Valuer-General was amenable to judicial review via prerogative writ. I decline to grant leave to appeal. -- 10 of 10 --