MARCO -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2026] WASCA 103

[2026] WASCA 103 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA) CITATION : MARCO -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2026] WASCA 103 CORAM : SEAWARD JA HEARD : 16 JULY 2026 DELIVERED : 21 JULY 2026 PUBLISHED : 21 JULY 2026 FILE NO/S : CACR 134 of 2025 BETWEEN : CHRIS MARCO Appellant AND THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Respondent FILE NO/S : CACR 135 of 2025 BETWEEN : CHRIS MARCO Appellant AND THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Respondent -- 1 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 Page 2 ON APPEAL FROM: Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Coram : WHITBY J File Number : IND 41 of 2023 Catchwords: Criminal law - Application for bail pending appeal against conviction - Application for bail pending appeal against sentence - Whether exceptional circumstances exist - Strength of grounds of appeal - Intent to defraud - Turns on own facts Legislation: Bail Act 1982 (WA) Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) Result: Applications for bail dismissed Category: B Representation: CACR 134 of 2025 Counsel: Appellant : R G Wilson Respondent : E M Heenan SC & N Dubey Solicitors: Appellant : MGM O'Connor Lawyers Respondent : Director Of Public Prosecutions (Cth) -- 2 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 Page 3 CACR 135 of 2025 Counsel: Appellant : R G Wilson Respondent : E M Heenan SC & N Dubey Solicitors: Appellant : MGM O'Connor Lawyers Respondent : Director Of Public Prosecutions (Cth) Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Ali v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 90 Bolitho v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 102; (2007) 34 WAR 215 Graham-Helwig v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 127; (2005) 30 WAR 221 Greenaway v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 166 Hunter v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 184; (2014) 245 A Crim R 191 Lawson v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 137 Markarian v The Queen [2001] WASCA 393 Mathews v The Queen [2001] WASCA 264; (2001) 24 WAR 438 Sayed v The Queen [2012] WASCA 17; (2012) 220 A Crim R 236 Serukai v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 127 ZLE v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 40 -- 3 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 4 SEAWARD JA: Introduction 1 On 4 September 2025, in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, Mr Chris Marco was convicted following a trial of 37 offences of fraud and six offences of aggravated fraud, contrary to s 409(1)(a) and s 409(1)(g) of the Criminal Code (WA). 2 On 30 October 2025, Mr Marco was sentenced to a total effective term of 14 years' imprisonment, and made eligible for parole. 3 Mr Marco has appealed against both his conviction and his sentence. 4 Mr Marco has filed two applications for bail, dated 4 June 2026, one in his conviction appeal and one in his sentence appeal. However, Mr Marco only makes submissions in relation to the application for bail in his conviction appeal. Mr Marco does not separately make submissions regarding the sentencing appeal bail application. Instead, Mr Marco submits that if he is successful in the conviction appeal application, then the effect would be a grant of bail pending both appeals. 5 Mr Marco was given leave to file submissions in his appellant's case greater than 20 pages in length. His appellant's case in the conviction appeal was filed on 19 May 2026, and the submissions are 57 pages. Mr Marco has also filed a practice direction 7.4 schedule of evidence on 9 July 2026, which comprises 55 pages. 6 Mr Marco appeals on five grounds, but only grounds 2 and 3 are relevant for his bail applications. 7 By ground 2, Mr Marco claims that each of the convictions should be set aside because of a wrong decision on a question of law by the trial judge, alternatively there was a miscarriage of justice, concerning a ruling and direction given to the jury in relation to the element of 'intent to defraud'. This ground alleges that the trial judge made an error of law in directing the jury that it is irrelevant to the consideration of Mr Marco's state of mind whether he intended to make good, or did in fact make good, to a complainant. 8 By ground 3, Mr Marco claims that each of the convictions should be set aside because there was a miscarriage of justice when the jury were instructed on the law applicable to the case in a manner contrary -- 4 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 5 to s 112 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) (Criminal Procedure Act). This ground alleges that, in the context of explaining the meaning of 'intent to defraud', the trial judge referred to different states of mind which do not preclude the presence of an intent to defraud, without explaining to the jury how these different states of mind were relevant to the facts or Mr Marco's case. 9 Mr Marco has also filed an affidavit in support of his application for bail, sworn 4 June 2026, and submissions dated 6 July 2026. 10 The application for bail is opposed by the respondent. The respondent has filed submissions in opposition, on 13 July 2026. To date, the respondent has not filed its respondent's answer in the conviction appeal. That answer is due on 24 July 2026. Legal principles 11 The legal principles regarding the grant of bail are not in dispute and have been outlined by this court on numerous occasions. 12 The Bail Act 1982 (WA) (Bail Act) confers power on the Court of Appeal to grant bail after conviction and sentencing for an accused awaiting the disposal of an appeal. Clause 4A of sch 1 pt C of the Bail Act creates a rebuttable presumption against a grant of bail to an accused who is in custody waiting for the disposal of appeal proceedings. The court may only grant bail if satisfied that there are exceptional reasons why an appellant should not be kept in custody, and it is otherwise proper to do so having regard to the provisions of cl 1 and cl 3 of sch 1 pt C. 13 The use of the word 'exceptional' in cl 4A denotes something which is unusual or out of the ordinary, in some way special, or an exception to the general run of cases. What might constitute exceptional reasons will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. Exceptional reasons can, of course, be constituted by a combination of factors. 14 In the present case, Mr Marco submits that the exceptional reasons are the strength of his prospects of success on grounds 2 and 3 of his appellant's case, individually and cumulatively. This is the only basis upon which exceptional reasons are advanced in this application. 15 The test to be applied where the prospects of success in the appeal is one of the matters relied upon in support of a submission that there -- 5 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 6 are exceptional reasons why the appellant should not be kept in custody has been expressed in various ways. However, it is usually necessary for an appellant to demonstrate that his or her ground or grounds of appeal are strongly arguable, and, without detailed argument or analysis, that the appeal is most likely to succeed. Put another way, the prospects of success must be sufficiently likely so as to give rise to a real concern that the appellant would suffer injustice by being kept in custody on an unsound conviction or an unjust sentence. See, by way of example, Serukai v The State of Western Australia1 and Lawson v The State of Western Australia.2 16 As outlined by Hall JA in ZLE v The State of Western Australia:3 On a bail application, the opportunity to conduct a comprehensive consideration of the materials is relatively limited and an assessment of the grounds can only be preliminary. Thus, if it is suggested that the grounds have strong prospects of success, that will generally need to be readily apparent without the benefit of detailed argument or analysis. Background Elements of the offence of fraud 17 Section 409(1)(a) of the Criminal Code provides as follows: (1) Any person who, with intent to defraud, by deceit or any fraudulent means - (a) obtains property from any person; or is guilty of a crime ... 18 The elements of the offence of fraud that the prosecution was required to prove beyond reasonable doubt were therefore as follows: 1. Mr Marco obtained property from any person; 2. Mr Marco used deceit or fraudulent means; 3. Mr Marco obtained the property by the use of that deceit or fraudulent means; and 4. Mr Marco did so with an intention to defraud. 1 Serukai v The State of Western Australia [2020] WASCA 127 [12] - [14]. 2 Lawson v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 137 [11]. 3 ZLE v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 40 [9]. -- 6 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 7 19 Six of the offences were for aggravated fraud, the circumstances of aggravation being that the victim was aged 60 years or over (s 409(1)(g)). 20 Also relevant to the appeal is s 409(3), which provides that: It is immaterial that the accused person intended to give value for the property obtained or delivered, or the benefit gained, or the detriment caused. Prosecution case 21 By way of broad overview, the case for the prosecution was that Mr Marco told investors that he was a successful private investor with over 20 years' experience of investing in lucrative and complicated overseas 'private placement programs'. Mr Marco did not advertise his services, and instead relied solely on word-of-mouth referrals from existing investors. 22 The prosecution case was that Mr Marco offered three different types of investments to his clients: (1) private placement programs; (2) monetisation; and (3) warehousing. 23 The prosecution case was that Mr Marco represented that the investments were external to him and in most instances consisted of purchasing short-term debt instruments through overseas banks, European pension funds and superannuation funds. The prosecution's case was that Mr Marco stated he had access to these investments from his decades of experience and building relationships with brokers and promoters who offered him access to programs. 24 The 43 counts of fraud related to nine individual complainants. The prosecution case in relation to each count was broadly the same, being that each complainant was introduced to Mr Marco via another client, and Mr Marco engaged in written and oral communications with the complainants. Those written communications included emails, and a document called a declaration of trust. Each declaration of trust was a four-page document which stipulated the terms of the investment. 25 The prosecution case for each count was that Mr Marco obtained property, in the form of money, from each of the complainants. -- 7 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 8 26 In relation to the element of deceit and fraudulent means, the prosecution case was that Mr Marco, by his conduct, conveyed the false representation to each complainant that if they provided him money, he would invest it in an investment program straight away or within a few days, and that he would not use it for any other purpose. The prosecution case was that this representation was false, and Mr Marco knew it to be false, as there were no such programs at the time of the alleged representations. 27 The prosecution case in relation to this element relied upon the evidence of each complainant; what Mr Marco said to them; what he did not say to them; the declaration of trust document or updated declaration of trust schedule for each investment; the evidence of Mr Marco's bank statements; and the evidence of the prosecution's expert forensic accountant, Mr Martin Langridge. 28 The prosecution's case was that, based on Mr Langridge's evidence, Mr Marco was not investing the complainants' monies in any programs, and that the money deposited into Mr Marco's Westpac bank accounts was spent on operational activities, repaying other investors and personal expenses, and was therefore also not being held by way of 'proof of funds'. 29 The prosecution's case on causation, was that each of the complainants relied on Mr Marco's representations, including the deed of trust documents, as a substantial or significant reason for providing Mr Marco with their money. 30 In terms of fraudulent intent, the prosecution case was that Mr Marco made these representations and obtained the money from the complainants with an intent to defraud each complainant. The prosecution invited the jury to infer this was Mr Marco's intention, based on all the circumstances, including the various subterfuges, lies, omissions and deceptions engaged in by Mr Marco, undertaken with the dishonest intention of causing each complainant to believe that there was in fact a real investment opportunity and to transfer funds to Mr Marco. Defence case 31 There was no dispute that Mr Marco obtained property, in the form of money, from the various complainants. However, the remaining elements were disputed. -- 8 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 9 32 By way of broad overview, Mr Marco denied that he used deceit or fraudulent means. Mr Marco's case was that he believed in and represented to the complainants that their money would be used as proof of funds and that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not, in fact, do this. Mr Marco's case was that every complainant gave evidence that they understood that if they provided Mr Marco with money, he would invest in proof of funds programs, and that is exactly what he did. 33 Mr Marco's case was also that the prosecution could not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Mr Marco did not invest the complainant's money in proof of funds programs, as Mr Langridge did not consider this at all when preparing his report and giving his evidence. Rather, Mr Langridge only considered whether money was going out of Mr Marco's accounts, and did not consider various other documents. Mr Marco also pointed to the $11 million in funds sent overseas. Other aspects of the prosecution case in relation to this element were also disputed. 34 In terms of fraudulent intent, Mr Marco's case was that the prosecution could not prove this element beyond reasonable doubt and Mr Marco invited the jury to infer that he genuinely believed that he was using the complainants' money for private placement programs, proof of funds arrangements and monetisation, and that as a result, he would be able to perform his obligations to his clients, including under the deed of trust documents. 35 Mr Marco also relied upon approximately $11 million being transferred overseas on 31 separate occasions for investments, as well as the fact that he never missed an interest payment to any complainant investor, or provided the capital by way of return if requested at the maturity of the purported investment. Mr Marco submitted that these matters were evidence that, at all times, he did not have an intention to defraud any of his clients. The learned trial judge's directions to the jury and ruling 36 Consideration of grounds 2 and 3 involves consideration of the trial judge's directions to the jury, and ground 2 also involves consideration of a ruling made by her Honour. -- 9 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 10 37 Relevantly, the trial judge directed the jury as to the elements of the offence of fraud contrary to s 409(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.4 38 In relation to the element of 'intent to defraud', the trial judge directed as follows:5 Now, the fourth element the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt is that Mr Marco obtained money with intent to defraud. This element is in issue in this trial in relation to each count. In order to make out the offence charged, the State has to not only prove that Mr Marco knowingly deceived or used fraudulent means, and in so doing, caused the complainant to pay money to him, but also that he used that deceit or fraudulent means with an intent to defraud. An intent to defraud is an intention to dishonestly deprive someone of their property or put their property - in this case, their money - at risk by dishonest means. In this case, an intent to defraud would be an intent on the part of Mr Marco to dishonestly deprive the complainants of their money or put their money at risk by dishonest means. Now, there is some overlap between this element and the second element that I have directed you on. The second element focuses on the use of deceit or fraudulent means, which involves deliberately dishonest behaviour. But the fourth element focuses on the intention behind the deceit or fraudulent means which involves a dishonest intention. Although there is overlap between these elements, an intention to defraud is a distinct and separate element which must be proved beyond reasonable doubt by the State. It's not sufficient for the State to prove that Mr Marco was careless or that he did not have a reasonable basis for what he did. The State must prove that Mr Marco actually knew what he was doing was dishonest. An accused person can act dishonestly without having an intention to defraud. An intention to defraud can exist, even where the accused person genuinely believes that there will be no loss because the transaction will ultimately be to the advantage of all concerned. The law provides that it is immaterial that an accused person intends to give value for any detriment caused. It is also no defence to a charge of fraud that an accused person later may pay the money back to the person they defrauded. Now, intention is a state of mind. It can only be inferred from what the person said or did in all of the circumstances in which he said or did those things. And hence, you need to determine, as I've already outlined to you, what inference you can draw from what Mr Marco said and did in the circumstances in which he said and did those things. You draw an inference from facts which you find proved. So you draw an inference about a person's intention from proved facts about what they did, what they said, how they acted. And of course, you can also take into account 4 Commencing at ts 1682. 5 ts 1691 - 1693. -- 10 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 11 what Mr Marco said to Ben Harvey in his interview, what he said to ASIC investigators on 1 November 2018 and what he wrote in his email to Mr Wright in considering what Mr Marco's intention was. I've already told you about the drawing of inferences, and you must apply those directions when you are considering this element. But I'll remind you that, before you draw any inference against Mr Marco that he did have an intention to defraud, you would have to be satisfied it was the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the whole of the evidence. Decisions that you make about the second element will be significant in your consideration of the fourth element. That is because, if you find Mr Marco did in fact use deceit or fraudulent means, then that is something you will take into account in deciding whether you're prepared to draw an inference against him that he did so with an intention to defraud, but as I have said, although there maybe overlap, an intention to defraud is a distinct element which the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt. Now, the State says that the fraudulent intent of Mr Marco for each count is established by various subterfuges, lies, omissions and deceptions engaged in by Mr Marco, undertaken with the dishonest intention if causing each complainant to believe that there was in fact a real investment opportunity and to transfer funds to Mr Marco. Mr Margaretic, on behalf of Mr Marco, says that Mr Marco did not have a dishonest intention and did not have an intent to defraud. I'll summarise each case for you shortly. (emphasis added) 39 The third paragraph of this direction is relevant for the purposes of grounds 2 and 3. That part of the third paragraph that is underlined, is particularly relied upon by Mr Marco in relation to ground 2. 40 The trial judge then provided a general summary of the respective cases of the prosecution and Mr Marco in relation to the elements.6 41 The trial judge then went through each individual count, outlining the prosecution case and the evidence relied on in relation to that individual count.7 The trial judge also outlined Mr Marco's case in relation to each individual count, although her Honour also explained to the jury that part of Mr Marco's defence, including that relating to the element of 'intent to defraud', was the same for each count and that she would not repeat this each time.8 6 Commencing at ts 1693. 7 Commencing at ts 1718. 8 Eg. ts 1722. -- 11 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 12 42 The trial judge commenced her directions to the jury on 27 August 2025, and they concluded on 28 August 2025. 43 At the afternoon break on 27 August 2025, and in the absence of the jury, trial counsel for Mr Marco raised a number of matters regarding the trial judge's directions to date. Relevantly for ground 2, trial counsel referred the trial judge to the decision of Markarian v The Queen9 and submitted that this case was authority for the proposition that:10 it is a consideration for the jury if the accused intended to make good and, in fact, did, on occasions, make good, that that is something that the jury could assess in relation to the honesty of the belief of the accused as to whether or not there was that element satisfied with intention to defraud. 44 An exchange then took place between the trial judge and trial counsel for Mr Marco about how this proposition interacted with s 409(3) of the Criminal Code and the trial judge's directions to that point. Relevantly, that exchange provided:11 MARGARETIC, MR: Well, it's not a defence, but it's a consideration that they must take into account in assessing the subjective intent of Mr Marco at the relevant time. So paying the money back isn't a defence in relation to the fraudulent misrepresentation made, if there was one such made - it's a matter for them - and the obtaining, which is not in dispute, but it certainly goes towards the subjective state of mind of Mr Marco to demonstrate whether or not the intention to defraud was, in fact, held. WHITBY J: All right. MARGARETIC, MR: And the way that it's been left I think is dangerous because - - - WHITBY J: In what way has it been left? In what - - - MARGARETIC, MR: Your Honour has just simply said 'Look, even if he wanted to pay the money back and if he did pay the' - - - WHITBY J: I didn't say that. MARGARETIC, MR: You said it's not a defence. WHITBY J: I said that paying the money back is not a defence. 9 Markarian v The Queen [2001] WASCA 393 [17] (Markarian). 10 ts 1736 - 1737. 11 ts 1737. -- 12 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 13 MARGARETIC, MR: That's correct, paying the money back's not a defence, but it goes further than that; the paying the money back is something that the jury, as a matter of law, can use to determine Mr Marco's subjective intention at the relevant time. WHITBY J: And you say that that case establishes that? MARGARETIC, MR: Yes, I do. 45 Trial counsel for the prosecution was then heard on the issue and submitted that the trial judge's direction was consistent with Markarian. 46 The trial judge indicated that she had not read the decision of Markarian, but would do so overnight.12 Trial counsel for Mr Marco also indicated that he would provide further written submissions on the issue 'in writing overnight'.13 47 After the afternoon break, her Honour continued to summarise the respective cases and evidence in relation to the individual counts. 48 Later that evening, counsel for Mr Marco provided written submissions, in the form of an email, to the court (MFI K). Those submissions addressed a number of topics, but relevantly for present purposes, the submissions addressed aspects of her Honour's direction outlined in the third paragraph of the direction at [38] above and the decision of Markarian. By way of summary, Mr Marco submitted that: (a) the trial judge had failed to direct that if Mr Marco genuinely intended to use the funds for investment purposes (including proof of funds arrangements) and genuinely believed this would enable him to honour his deed of trust obligations, this would lead to a finding of intent contrary to fraudulent intent as a matter of law, and the jury should find Mr Marco not guilty; (b) whilst he did not 'cavil with' the legal propositions contained in trial judge's directions to date, the directions inadequately explain the defence to fraudulent intent, or more properly put, the failure to prove fraudulent intent, as 'borne out' from Markarian (and various paragraphs of the decision were referred to in the submissions); 12 ts 1738 - 1739. 13 ts 1736. -- 13 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 14 (c) in particular, Mr Marco submitted that where the transactions were ultimately to the advantage of the complainant investor, the jury can use this evidence to draw an inference as to Mr Marco's intent with regard to the transactions; (d) Markarian states that if the jury were to find that Mr Marco genuinely believed at the time he obtained each investment that his intended use of those funds, whether through proof of funds arrangements, private placement programs, or monetisation, in a manner that would enable him to honour his obligations under the relevant declaration of trust document, then he did not have the requisite intent to defraud. This is so even if his method differed from what was represented regarding timing or process, which would instead amount to a fraudulent representation rather than go to his specific intent. This is so even if Mr Marco's belief was ultimately mistaken or unreasonable. The test was whether the belief was genuinely held, not whether it was reasonable; (e) the trial judge's direction as to the State's assertion that the investment is made 'straight away or within a few days' thus far suggests that the jury must find Mr Marco intended to invest exactly as represented (timing and method). Mr Marco submitted that Markarian establishes that Mr Marco only needs to genuinely believe his investment method would allow him to meet his obligations to negate an intention to defraud. If the jury can reasonably draw that inference, they should therefore find Mr Marco, not guilty; and (f) in those circumstances, Mr Marco submitted that a further direction in the following terms should be given: If you can reasonably infer that Mr Marco genuinely believed he was using investor funds for private placement programs, proof of funds arrangements, or monetisation, and the manner in which he did so would enable him to honour his obligations under the Declarations of Trust for a relevant count on the indictment, then you would find that Mr Marco did not have the requisite intent to defraud, even if his method differed from what was specifically represented regarding timing or process, and you would therefore find him not guilty of that count. 49 When court resumed the following day on 28 August 2025, the trial judge commenced by making the following ruling (in the absence -- 14 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 15 of the jury) in relation to the issue raised in relation to the decision of Markarian:14 I've heard submissions from you both yesterday and read your further email that I received last night, Mr Margaretic. So counsel for Mr Marco submits that in relation to the element of the intention to defraud contained in section 409, a relevant matter that goes to Mr Marco's intention to defraud or lack thereof, is whether Mr Marco intended to make good or did, in fact, make good to a complainant. Counsel for Mr Marco relied on the case of Markarian v The Queen [2001] WASCA 393 in support of that submission. And in support of the submission that this is something that the jury could assess in relation to the honesty, the belief of Mr Marco as to whether or not the element of intention to defraud is satisfied. Markarian was concerned with the loan and the effect of section 24 of the Criminal Code on the element of intent to defraud. In my view, the case of Markarian is not authority for the proposition advanced by counsel for Mr Marco and, in my view, it would be extraordinary if there were any such authority for that proposition. What the State must prove on an offence of fraud is that an accused knowingly made a false representation with the intent of inducing someone to part with money. Whether or not an accused person intended to make good or did make good is not relevant to whether he had an intention dishonestly to deprive someone of their money. 50 After dealing with another matter, the trial judge then continued with her directions to the jury. Her Honour first commenced by reminding the jury of the elements of the offence of fraud, and provided a general overview summary of the prosecution and defence cases in relation to those elements.15 Her Honour then returned to directing in relation to the individual counts.16 51 For completeness, I observe that trial counsel for Mr Marco also raised the decision of Markarian in the context of the element of intent to defraud during a break in the prosecution's opening submissions.17 Ground 2 52 By ground 2, Mr Marco asserts a material error of law was made by the trial judge, or alternatively there was a miscarriage of justice in 14 ts 1758. 15 Commencing at ts 1764. 16 Commencing at ts 1768. 17 ts 153 - 154. -- 15 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 16 relation to each of the convictions. Mr Marco particularises ground 2 as follows: (a) he honestly and genuinely intended to make good (financially), or did in fact make good, to each complainant; (b) the trial judge made a ruling (ts 1758), and direction to the jury (ts 1692), regarding the element of 'intent to defraud' that it was irrelevant to the consideration of Mr Marco's state of mind whether he intended to make good or did in fact make good to a complainant; (c) evidence that Mr Marco intended to make good or did in fact make good to a complainant was relevant as a matter of law to whether the prosecution had negatived that Mr Marco's intention was honest or genuine as opposed to having an intent to defraud; and (d) in those circumstances, the ruling resulted in the jury being directed contrary to law in relation to both the element of intent to defraud and the defence case. The ruling also meant that the direction, the subject of ground 2 in this appeal, remained with the jury. 53 Mr Marco submits that his appellant's case on ground 2 is more than strongly arguable, is not a question of degree and it is readily apparent that the ground will succeed. Further, that ground 2 has the potential to affect all counts before the jury. 54 Mr Marco relied on both his appellant's case and his oral submissions in support of ground 2. For present purposes, I will summarise the key aspects of those submissions as a whole. 55 Mr Marco submits that the learned trial judge's ruling, combined with the direction that was given (and which remained before the jury unamended), resulted in the jury being directed contrary to law in relation to both the element of intent to defraud and the defence case. 56 First, Mr Marco submits that his case, with respect to his state of mind and the element of intent to defraud, was that he had a genuine intent to invest the complainants' funds exactly in accordance with what he told the complainants, and he did so. Mr Marco's case is that he had a genuine, but maybe mistaken belief, that the programs would succeed, -- 16 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 17 and he may have just had poor judgment, or been over-optimistic about the success of these investments. 57 Secondly, Mr Marco submitted that during the trial exchanges and submissions referred to above, he emphasised that his genuine intent was relevant to the element of intent to defraud, and it was an error to consider only the question of whether that genuine intent fell within the defence referred to in s 409(3). That is, the issue at all times was one of relevance as opposed to a defence.18 58 Thirdly, that the prosecutor conceded this genuine intent in his closing address as follows: 19 I would probably have a lot of trouble convincing you all beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not genuinely and honestly believe in these [private placements]. That's not the prosecution's case. Mr Marco is on trial because he's a liar and a fraud. He may well believe every single thing he is telling people about the legitimacy of private placement programs and that there was this unknown hidden way of making vast sums of money. The problem is, on the prosecution case, he lied ... 59 Fourthly, the type of direction sought by Mr Marco is consistent with a form of direction endorsed by this court in the decision of Ali v The State of Western Australia,20 and is consistent with the decisions of this court in Graham-Helwig v The State of Western Australia,21 Markarian and Sayed v The Queen22. Mr Marco submits that these decisions reveal that a genuine and honest intent to make good is relevant to the question of intent to defraud. Accordingly, Mr Marco submits that the direction sought was required as a matter of law. 60 Fifthly, Mr Marco submits that s 409(3) of the Criminal Code is about liability, not relevance, and it would be novel if the effect of s 409(3) was to limit the content of the subjective element of intent to defraud. Mr Marco submits that it is not sufficient to simply read s 409(3) to the jury, as the law is not completely stated by s 409(3). 61 Sixthly, Mr Marco submits that the ruling and direction overlook, and are inconsistent with, the principle explained in the decisions of 18 See, by way of example, ts 153, 1736 and 1737. 19 ts 1454. 20 Ali v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 90 [1], [2], [36], [40] (Ali). 21 Graham-Helwig v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 127; (2005) 30 WAR 221 [9] - [10], [17], [19] (Graham-Helwig). 22 Sayed v The Queen [2012] WASCA 17; (2012) 220 A Crim R 236 [39] - [40] (Sayed). -- 17 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 18 Bolitho v The State of Western Australia23 and Hunter v the State of Western Australia,24 that the element of intent to defraud confines the scope of s 409(1) of the Criminal Code. This is because although a person may have deceived someone, and obtained property by that deceit, that is not sufficient to constitute the offence of fraud. Rather, it is also necessary to establish the additional element of an intent to defraud. That is, a person may obtain property by deceit or fraudulent means but not have an intent to defraud. Mr Marco submits that the jury was not directed as to how Mr Marco's genuine belief may have confined the jury's finding about deceit or fraudulent means. 62 In these circumstances, Mr Marco submits that the ruling constituted an error by the learned trial judge which resulted in: (a) the direction in the third paragraph of the direction at [38] above being left to the jury; and (b) the learned trial judge failing to give the required accompanying re-direction, or clarifying direction. 63 This left a real risk that the jury may have reasoned that, whatever else Mr Marco may have thought or believed, any genuine intent or belief that he would make good, or did in fact make good, to each complainant was irrelevant to consideration of the element of intent to defraud. Mr Marco submits that the possibility that such an erroneous reasoning process may have intruded into the jury deliberations, which undermined a significant part of the defence case, cannot be excluded and the ruling and remaining direction had the effect of removing Mr Marco's case from consideration and undercut the defence case. Mr Marco submits that such an error is material. Consideration 64 I have carefully considered the matters raised by Mr Marco in the context of ground 2. In all the circumstances, I am unable to conclude, at this point, that the ground has such strong prospects of success as to amount to exceptional reasons for a grant of bail pending appeal. 65 The fact that I have reached this conclusion at a relatively early stage in the appeal should not be understood to mean that the ground is without prospects of success. The ground raises an issue regarding the interaction between an element of the offence of fraud, being intent to defraud, and s 409(3) of the Criminal Code. That particular issue does 23 Bolitho v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 102; (2007) 34 WAR 215 [152], [173] (Bolitho). 24 Hunter v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 184; (2014) 245 A Crim R 191 [39] - [40] (Hunter). -- 18 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 19 not appear to have been the subject of judicial consideration in this State in the context raised by Mr Marco in this ground of appeal. 66 After full argument before a coram of three judges, with the benefit of a respondent's answer and fulsome oral submissions by the parties, it may be that the ground is made out. However, on the basis of the arguments and analysis so far put to the court, I am unable to conclude that ground 2 has sufficient merit to justify a grant of bail pending appeal. 67 I have reached this conclusion for the following reasons. 68 First, ground 2 raises a legal question regarding the interaction between the element of intent to defraud, and the requirements of s 409(3) of the Criminal Code. 69 On its face, the third paragraph of the impugned direction at [38] above does not contain any clear error of law. There is no dispute that her Honour's direction was correct in so far as it referred to carelessness and reasonableness, and that the State was required to prove that Mr Marco actually knew what he was doing was dishonest. The underlined words also simply outline the law as contained in s 409(3) of the Criminal Code. 70 The legal question raised by Mr Marco is how the element of an intent to defraud interacts with s 409(3), and whether a genuine belief that an accused would 'make good' may not be a defence to a charge of fraud, but may nonetheless be a relevant consideration for the element of intent to defraud, and whether a further direction clarifying this interaction was required. 71 Mr Marco submits that the question is one of relevance, and not a defence. 72 Mr Marco submits that his case is supported by a number of authorities of this court each of which, Mr Marco submits, endorse a direction in similar terms to that sought by Mr Marco at trial, and in so doing are consistent with Mr Marco's submissions on the relevance of an intention to 'make good'. Those authorities are Ali, Graham-Helwig, Markarian and Sayed. 73 I have real difficulty with Mr Marco's submissions regarding the above authorities. None of these authorities consider in any detail the interaction between the element of an intent to defraud and s 409(3) of -- 19 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 20 the Criminal Code and none consider the respective directions from this perspective. 74 By way of example, in Ali, the relevant ground of appeal (being ground 2) was directed to the learned trial judge's refusal to redirect the jury about whether carelessness could amount to an intention to defraud. The present ground does not concern the question of carelessness. 75 The direction in question in Ali was as follows:25 What you have to consider is Mr Ali's intention, not what you might think from the circumstances; what was in his mind at the time. A reasonable man in his – you don't have to worry about what you or any reasonable man in his circumstances might have thought or done. You have to look at what his state of mind was at the time. When you consider when he took each of the deposits, have the prosecution proved to you that he did not genuinely believe he could obtain finance. If they haven't proved to you that, then he's entitled to be acquitted of the offences. You can only convict him of these offences if you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that he did have an intention when he took each of the men's deposits that he was going to defraud them, knowing that when he deposited the money it would be deducted and that he had no ability to obtain finance in order for them to purchase the properties they wanted to purchase. Mr Ali was obviously inexperienced in business. He didn't have much capital and he had no formal qualifications. If you believe that he believed he had a feasible business scheme to help these people, you may think that he was stupid, as he admits that he was naive and stupid when he was talked to by the police, but that doesn't mean that he's guilty of fraud. Fraud is a criminal offence. He has to have a criminal intention to defraud these men before you can find him to be guilty. Naivety or stupidity don't amount to criminal offences otherwise most of us would be at some times guilty of crime, because we all do things which are stupid and which we regret later on but that doesn't make us criminals. (emphasis added) 76 This court concluded that the above direction was consistent with the decisions of Matthews v The Queen26 and Markarian.27 25 Ali [36]. 26 Mathews v The Queen [2001] WASCA 264; (2001) 24 WAR 438 (Mathews). -- 20 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 21 77 Mr Marco relies on the above underlined references in support of a submission that in endorsing this direction, this court was accepting that the question of genuine belief to make good is relevant to the element of intent to defraud, notwithstanding s 409(3) of the Criminal Code. 78 However, this aspect of the direction was not the subject of any consideration in the reasons for decision in Ali and does not appear to have been the subject of any submissions before the court. In these circumstances, I do not consider it can be said that Ali expressly supports Mr Marco's propositions. It may be that, if Mr Marco's submissions are ultimately successful, it can be said that there is nothing in Ali which is inconsistent with the proposition as advanced. 79 Similar observations can be made about each of the other authorities relied upon. Both Markarian, and the decision of Matthews referred to therein, concerned the question of whether s 24 of the Criminal Code was applicable in the case of the offence of fraud under s 409(1), and whether an accused's subjective intention must also be reasonable. The court concluded in each case that s 24 was not applicable, and a genuine intention not to defraud was sufficient. Again, the ground of appeal does not concern this issue. 80 Sayed also concerned the application of s 24 of the Criminal Code to a charge under s 409(1)(c) of the Criminal Code (and their Commonwealth analogues). This court referred to the decisions of Markarian, Matthews and Ali with approval by describing the element of intent to defraud, and concluded that the defences did not apply, and that it was not necessary for the trial judge to direct the jury on the defences.28 Again, this court did not expressly consider the precise issue raised by Mr Marco in ground 2 of the present appeal. 81 Graham-Helwig concerned a number of charges of obtaining a benefit by deceit or fraudulent means contrary to s 409(1)(c) of the Criminal Code. The case involved the manager of a jewellery shop arranging a courier service/van. The manager arranged for invoices to be issued for that service to his employer in the name of a fictitious company and arranged for those invoices to be paid to that fictitious company, when it was in fact the manager who was behind the service and receiving the payments. The prosecution case was centred around the concealment from his employers of the fact that he was the person behind the courier service/van. 27 Ali [40]. 28 Sayed [39] - [40], [56] - [57] -- 21 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 22 82 In the course of directing the jury on the element of intent to defraud, the trial judge outlined the manager's evidence as to his intentions in operating the courier service/van and that when he provided the invoices, he 'believed that he was well able to do so on the basis that he provided the van and/or the courier services'.29 83 An appeal regarding the direction was dismissed. Mr Marco submits that Graham-Helwig is therefore consistent with his submission that his intention to make good is relevant to the element of intent to defraud. Mr Marco also submits that this court in Graham-Helwig referred to s 409(3) and therefore was alive to this subsection when considering the appeal. 84 Again, there is nothing in Graham-Helwig which directly considers and discusses the interaction between s 409(3) and the element of intent to defraud. The court does refer to s 409(3), and then goes on to state, '[t]he defence as I understand it then was directed at the question of whether there was an intent to defraud, and to a lesser extent it seems the question of whether there was a deceit'.30 The precise questions raised by Mr Marco in this appeal are not the subject of detailed consideration. Again, it may be that, if Mr Marco's submissions on ground 2 are ultimately successful, it can be said that there is nothing in Graham-Helwig which is inconsistent with the proposition as advanced. 85 Finally, it must also be borne in mind that in each of the above cases the appropriateness (or otherwise) of the particular direction to the jury fell to be considered and understood in the context of the relevant factual scenario, which differs from the present facts. 86 Accordingly, I am not satisfied that any of the decisions of this court relied upon by Mr Marco directly address the issue raised by ground 2 of the appeal, or address the interaction between s 409(3) and the element of intent to defraud in any detail. 87 Secondly, Mr Marco also submits that the direction and ruling are contrary to the decisions of this court in Bolitho and Hunter, in so far as they fail to give weight to the principle that the element of intent to defraud confines the scope of s 409(1) of the Criminal Code. 29 Graham-Helwig [17]. 30 Graham-Helwig [10]. -- 22 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 23 88 Each of Bolitho and Hunter engage in an explanation of the elements of the offence of fraud under s 409(1) of the Criminal Code. However, even accepting that the element of an intent to defraud does confine the offence under s 409(1), neither case directly considers or addresses the precise issue raised by Mr Marco in ground 2. 89 Thirdly, in the course of the directions to the jury, the learned trial judge did put Mr Marco's case in relation to his genuine belief in his investments, and the fact that he did always make good (prior to the accounts being frozen by ASIC) to the jury. 90 This occurred on a number of occasions. First, in the context of providing an overview of Mr Marco's case:31 Now, counsel for Mr Marco says that you cannot be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that either Mr Marco used deceit or fraudulent means to obtain money from any of the complainants, and/or that he had an intention to defraud the complainants, and/or that the complainants provided money to him on the basis of any deceit or fraudulent means. So all of those elements are in issue. Counsel for Mr Marco says that there is clear evidence of Mr Marco's overwhelming genuine intent to invest the complainants' funds exactly in accordance with what he told the complainants. The evidence establishes, he says, that Mr Marco was, in fact, doing exactly what he told the complainants he was going to do. That is, investing in private placement programs, warehousing programs and hedge funds, and that he had no intention to defraud the complainants. 91 The learned trial judge then told the jury that:32 Counsel for Mr Marco says that this evidence comprises the following. 92 Her Honour then went on to summarise that evidence, including the documents contained in exhibit 28; the documents described as the proof of funds documents in exhibit 128; the extent of money in a HSBC account; the overseas transfers of approximately $11 million; Mr Marco's case in relation to the evidence given by Mr Langridge and Mr Iriks; that the complainants knew that their money would be pooled; and a number of other matters which are not necessary to repeat here.33 31 ts 1710. 32 ts 1710. 33 ts 1710 - 1712. -- 23 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 24 93 The learned trial judge then went on to say:34 He says that there is no evidence before you that these are not genuine investment attempts. Next, Mr Margaretic says that if Mr Marco intended to defraud the complainants, he would not have transferred $15 million back from the HSBC account in the Channel Islands to his Westpac account in Australia. He says that this is just not behaviour that is consistent with someone who has an intention to defraud the complainants. It is, instead, consistent with behaviour of someone who intended to honour his obligations to the complainants. This is consistent, counsel for Mr Marco says, with the accepted evidence that Mr Marco had a perfect payment record. He paid the complainants' returns on time, every time. And if a complainant requested their principal to be paid back, he did so upon their request. There was complete performance, counsel submits, of the majority of the declarations of trust. It was only when ASIC intervened that Mr Marco's performance of the obligations under the declaration of trust ceased. Counsel for Mr Marco says that this demonstrates Mr Marco's intention, at all times, to perform his obligations under the declarations of trust. 94 The learned trial judge also provided a shorter summary of Mr Marco's case, including in relation to the relation to the element of intent to defraud, at the beginning of the second day of jury directions, after making the impugned ruling.35 95 Finally, when summarising the individual counts, the learned trial judge made reference to Mr Marco's case as her Honour had previously outlined to the jury, including that Mr Marco submitted that he had no intention to defraud the respective complainant.36 96 Mr Marco accepts that these summaries took place, but submits that they were undercut by the learned trial judge's direction at [38] and would at least have left the jury confused as to the application of Mr Marco's defence. 97 In circumstances where the learned trial judge has put Mr Marco's substantive case in relation to the element of intent to defraud to the jury, a real question arises as to whether any error of the type alleged by Mr Marco occurred, or if it is an error, whether it is material. This is not a case where the trial judge, in addition to the ruling and the direction, declined to put a defence to the jury. The resolution of this 34 ts 1711. 35 ts 1765 - 1767. 36 See, by of examples, ts 1722, 1727 - 1728. -- 24 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 25 aspect of ground 2 will, in part, depend on resolution of the legal question underpinning the ground. 98 Fourthly, the direction sought by Mr Marco in his submissions sent on 27 August 2025, went beyond simply putting his case to the jury, and sought a direction about the circumstances in which the jury must acquit. That direction, and the submissions made generally by Mr Marco at trial, reveal an issue regarding the scope and nature of the prosecution case, and the extent to which Mr Marco's genuine and honest belief corresponded to that case, or was a more general genuine and honest belief. 99 The prosecution case in relation to the element of deceit and fraudulent means, was particularised as being that Mr Marco, by his conduct, conveyed the false representation to each complainant that if they provided him money, he would invest it in an investment program straight away or within a few days, and that he would not use it for any other purpose. 100 What is revealed from the transcript of the trial, and the submissions made by Mr Marco during the trial, is that Mr Marco's case in relation to his genuine belief was put at a higher level of generality, being that Mr Marco, at all times, genuinely believed that he was using the complainant's money for private placement programs, proof of funds arrangements and monetisation, and that as a result, he would be able to perform his obligations to his clients, including under the deed of trust documents. The prosecution's trial counsel, and the respondent's senior counsel in this application, each identified an issue regarding the extent to which Mr Marco's genuine belief corresponded with the prosecution case as particularised and run at trial. 101 I accept this is an issue arising in the appeal, and that it raises a further question as to whether there was any error by the learned trial judge, and, if there was an error, whether it was material. 102 Fifthly, this potential discrepancy between the prosecution case and Mr Marco's genuine belief, means that a real question arises as to whether the prosecution's 'concession' contained in [58] above, has the significance that Mr Marco's counsel submits that it does. The respondent submits that the concession went on to Mr Marco's belief in private placement programs in general terms, and not to a belief in the truth of the particular representations made to each complainant. I accept that this is also an issue in the appeal. -- 25 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 26 103 In light of the above matters, I am unable to conclude that ground 2 reaches the required threshold to justify a grant of bail pending appeal. Ground 3 104 By ground 3, Mr Marco asserts that there was a miscarriage of justice in relation to each conviction when the jury was instructed on the law in a manner contrary to the requirements of s 112 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Mr Marco particularises ground 3 as follows: (a) Mr Marco's case at trial was, in part, that he honestly and genuinely intended to make good or did in fact make good to each complainant; (b) the learned trial judge directed the jury about the definition of 'intent to defraud'. This included reference to different states of mind, the presence of which do not preclude the presence of an intent to defraud (ts 1692); and (c) the learned trial judge did not explain to the jury how these different states of mind were relevant to the facts or to the defence case. 105 Again, Mr Marco submits that his appellant's case on ground 3 is more than strongly arguable, is not a question of degree and it is readily apparent that the ground will succeed. Further, that ground 3 has the potential to affect all counts before the jury. 106 Ground 3 also concerns the third paragraph of the direction referred to in [38] above. Ground 3 proceeds on the basis that the direction is otherwise not a misdirection as contended for in ground 2. 107 In those circumstances, Mr Marco does not dispute that the direction was legally correct. However, Mr Marco's case is that the direction identified, merely in a general way, the law relating to the element of 'intent to defraud', and the wording of s 409(3). Mr Marco submits that the learned trial judge did not explain to the jury how the aspects of the element referred to in the direction, including carelessness and unreasonableness, as well as the reference to 'immaterial' within s 409(3), related to the factual issues and to the defence case. Mr Marco submits that this was required by s 112 of the Criminal Procedure Act. -- 26 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 27 108 Mr Marco's case in relation to ground 3 is related to, but conceptually different, from his case in relation to ground 2. Consideration 109 Section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that: After addresses have been made in accordance with section 145 and before the jury retires to consider its verdict, the judge must instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case and may make any observations about the evidence that the judge thinks necessary in the interests of justice. 110 The decision of this court in Greenaway v The State of Western Australia, concerned (amongst other charges) one count of gaining a benefit for another by fraud, contrary to s 409(1)(c) of the Criminal Code. In the course of upholding a ground of appeal challenging the adequacy of the trial judge's directions in relation to the charge, this court said as follows:37 169 In our view, the appellant's submissions should be accepted. The trial judge's directions identified, in a generic way, the elements of the fraud offence. However, his Honour did not explain to the jury how that law was to be applied to the facts of this particular case. Given the nature of the charge and the way in which the trial was run, it was incumbent upon the trial judge to do so in order to ensure a fair trial. 170 Section 112 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) required the trial judge to 'instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case'. The requirement to 'instruct' the jury is not discharged by an explanation of the law given in general terms, which leaves it to the jury to apply that law to the case before them. Rather, the requirement is for the judge to identify the real issues in the case and the facts that are relevant to those issues and provide an explanation of how the law applies to those facts. 171 In the present case, it was necessary for the trial judge to identify the factual issues to which his Honour's general statement of the law was to be applied. That included identifying the act that the State relied on as constituting deceit or fraudulent means and the aspect of his Honour's general directions which related to that act. 172 The act that the prosecutor identified as the offending conduct was the signing of the 26 June 2013 loan agreement, which was said to constitute fraudulent means but not deceit. The judge 37 Greenaway v The State of Western Australia [2022] WASCA 166. -- 27 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 28 should have identified that act and directed the jury that the question they needed to address in considering the second element of the fraud offence was whether the act of the appellant signing the 26 June 2013 loan agreement was dishonest, so as to constitute fraudulent means. … 174 The judge should also have directed that the question the jury needed to address in considering the third element of the offence was whether the appellant's act of signing the 26 June 2013 loan agreement caused Fawrkt to gain the pleaded benefit of the loan agreement. This would require the jury to ask whether the signing of the agreement was a necessary condition for Fawrkt to have gained the benefit, and whether the signing of the agreement substantially or significantly contributed to Fawrkt gaining the benefit. … 176 Further directions were required, particularly given the way the prosecutor put the State's case … (citations omitted) 111 In light of the various passages of her Honour's directions, I have outlined above in the context of ground 2 I am not satisfied that ground 3 can be described as 'strongly arguable' or that the ground can be characterised, without detailed argument, as being most likely to succeed. 112 Her Honour's directions to the jury must be understood as a whole. 113 Her Honour not only gave the direction referred to at [38] above, but also summarised both the prosecution case and the defence case. This included identifying the deceit or fraudulent means alleged by the prosecution, as well as Mr Marco's case in relation to intent to defraud, including details regarding Mr Marco's genuine belief. 114 The nature and extent of the learned trial judge's direction therefore appears to be very different to that given in Greenaway. 115 In these circumstances, on the basis of the arguments and analysis so far put to the court, I am unable to conclude that ground 3 has such strong prospects of success as to amount to exceptional reasons for a grant of bail pending appeal. -- 28 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 103 SEAWARD JA Page 29 Conclusion 116 For these reasons, I am not satisfied that grounds of appeal 2 and 3, either individually or cumulatively, can be described as being 'strongly arguable', or that the appeal can be characterised, without detailed argument, as being most likely to succeed. I am also not satisfied that the prospects of success for the appeal are sufficiently likely so as to give rise to a real concern that Mr Marco would suffer injustice by being kept in custody on an unsound conviction or an unjust sentence. 117 I am therefore not satisfied that Mr Marco has demonstrated exceptional reasons why he should not be kept in custody, and his applications for bail pending his appeal are dismissed. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. MA Associate to the Hon Justice Seaward 21 JULY 2026 -- 29 of 29 --