THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- LUKIN (A PSEUDONYM) [2026] WASCA 100

[2026] WASCA 100 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CRIMINAL TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA) CITATION : THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA -v- LUKIN (A PSEUDONYM) [2026] WASCA 100 CORAM : QUINLAN CJ THOMSON P LEMONIS J HEARD : 29 JUNE 2026 DELIVERED : 29 JUNE 2026 PUBLISHED : 20 JULY 2026 FILE NO/S : CACR 54 of 2026 BETWEEN : THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Applicant AND JASPER LUKIN (A PSEUDONYM) Respondent -- 1 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 Page 2 ON APPEAL FROM: Jurisdiction : CHILDREN'S COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Coram : JUDGE W HUGHES File Number : CC PE 772 - 775 of 2026 CC PE 777 - 779 of 2026 CC PE 785 of 2026 CC PE 4066 of 2025 CC PE 4888 - 4889 of 2025 CC PE 6941 of 2025 CC PE 7726 of 2025 CC PE 7728 - 7730 of 2025 Catchwords: State appeal against the total effective sentence of detention imposed by a judge of the Children's Court - Sole ground of appeal is that the sentence breached the first limb of the totality principle - Consideration of the principles of juvenile justice - Appeal allowed - Respondent resentenced Legislation: Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA) Children’s Court of Western Australia Act 1988 (WA) Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) Criminal Code (WA) Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 (WA) Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) Weapons Act 1999 (WA) Young Offenders Act 1994 (WA) Result: Leave to appeal granted Appeal allowed Sentence set aside Respondent resentenced to 14 months' detention -- 2 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 Page 3 Category: B Representation: Counsel: Applicant : Ms K C Cook & Ms I M O'Brien Respondent : Mr S R McGrath Solicitors: Applicant : The Director of Public Prosecutions for The State of Western Australia Respondent : Legal Aid (WA) Case(s) referred to in decision(s): DBA v The State of Western Australia [2026] WASCA 3 DC v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 121; (2014) 242 A Crim R 147 Forrest v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2026] FCAFC 69 JSA v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 25 Moore v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 35 R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67 Roffey v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 246 Salkilld v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 168 Silvey v The State of Western Australia [2026] WASCA 84 The State of Western Australia v Pereira [2023] WASCA 162 Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465 Williams v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 161 -- 3 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 4 REASONS OF THE COURT: 1 This appeal is a State appeal against a sentence imposed by a judge of the Children's Court. 2 On 19 May 2026, the learned sentencing judge sentenced the respondent to a total effective sentence of 10 months' detention in respect of 16 offences. The respondent was 15 years of age at the time of sentencing. The Young Offenders Act 1994 (WA) (YOA) therefore applied to his sentencing. 3 The State does not challenge any of the individual sentences, nor does the State allege any express error by her Honour. Rather, the State contends that the total effective sentence was disproportionate to the overall criminality of the respondent's offending and thus infringed the first limb of the totality principle. 4 At the conclusion of the appeal hearing on 29 June 2026, we granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal and resentenced the respondent to a total effective sentence of 14 months' detention. These are our reasons for doing so. Relevant offending 5 The total effective sentence was imposed in respect of three tranches of offences. The respondent pleaded guilty to all offences. The respondent was either 14 or 15 years of age at the time of the offending. 6 The first tranche comprises eight offences committed over the period from 22 June 2025 to 25 November 2025. Ultimately, on 16 January 2026, the respondent was sentenced in respect of these offences to a juvenile conditional release order (JCRO) for six months under s 101 of the YOA. A concurrent sentence of detention of six months was imposed for each offence. 7 The second and third tranches of offences were committed while the respondent was subject to the JCRO. The second tranche comprises one offence committed on 3 February 2026. The third tranche comprises seven offences committed on 5 and 6 February 2026. The respondent was arrested on 6 February 2026 and refused bail the following day. He therefore could not comply with the supervision -- 4 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 5 condition of the JCRO. On 30 March 2026, an officer of Youth Justice Services issued a notice of breach under s 113 of the YOA.1 8 The sentencing judge had the power to cancel the JCRO and order the respondent to serve all or part of the six-month detention period imposed by it. This power arose from the respondent's inability to comply with the JCRO, and by reason of his further offending having been committed during its term.2 9 The respondent spent 77 days in custody in respect of the first tranche of offending3 and 103 days in custody in respect of the second and third tranches.4 The total effective sentence was backdated to take account of the 103 days. 10 The relevant offences, maximum penalty and sentence imposed are as follows: First tranche Charge Offence Maximum Penalty Sentence CC PE 4066 of 2025 Aggravated robbery: s 392(d) Criminal Code (WA) 6 months' detention: s 116(1) of the YOA 6 months' detention (concurrent) CC PE 4888 of 2025 Aggravated robbery: s 392(d) Criminal Code (WA) CC PE 4889 of 2025 Aggravated robbery: s 392(d) Criminal Code (WA) CC PE 6941 of 2025 Aggravated burglary and commit: s 401(2)(ba) Criminal Code (WA) 1 Notice to Attend Court dated 30 March 2026. 2 Young Offenders Act 1994 (WA), s 114, s 116 (YOA). 3 Youth Justice Services, Update Report dated 14 May 2026, page 1. 4 Sentencing ts 5. -- 5 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 6 Charge Offence Maximum Penalty Sentence CC PE 7726 of 2025 Aggravated armed robbery: s 392(c) & (d) Criminal Code (WA) CC PE 7728 of 2025 No authority to drive (never held): s 49(1)(a) Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) CC PE 7729 of 2025 Steal motor vehicle (as defined in section 371A Criminal Code): s 378 Criminal Code (WA) CC PE 7730 of 2025 Being the driver of a vehicle involved in an incident where property was damaged, failed to stop as required to do so: s 55(1) Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) Second tranche Charge Offence Maximum Penalty Sentence CC PE 772 of 2026 Aggravated armed robbery: s 392(c) & (d) Criminal Code (WA) Life imprisonment 4 months' detention (concurrent) -- 6 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 7 Third tranche Charge Offence Maximum Penalty Sentence CC PE 773 of 2026 Reckless driving to escape pursuit by police: s 60(1A)(b) and s 60B(4) Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) 5 years' imprisonment; 2-year licence disqualification 7 months' detention (head sentence) CC PE 774 of 2026 Criminal damage or destruction of property: s 444(1)(b) Criminal Code (WA) 10 years' imprisonment 1 month's detention (concurrent) CC PE 775 of 2026 Criminal damage or destruction of property: s 444(1)(b) Criminal Code (WA) 10 years' imprisonment 1 month's detention (concurrent) CC PE 777 of 2026 No authority to drive (never held): s 49(1)(a) Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) Subsequent offence $600 No punishment CC PE 778 of 2026 Driver of a vehicle failed to comply with a direction to stop (circumstances of aggravation): s 44 Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 (WA) 2 years' imprisonment; 2 year licence disqualification 2 months' detention (concurrent) CC PE 779 of 2026 Carried or possessed an edged weapon: s 6A(1) Weapons Act 1999 (WA) 3 years' imprisonment or a fine of $36,000 No punishment -- 7 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 8 Charge Offence Maximum Penalty Sentence CC PE 785 of 2026 Conspiracy to commit indictable (principal) offence: s 558(1)(a) Criminal Code (WA) 5 years' imprisonment 3 months' detention (cumulative) (reduced from 6 months' detention) Total effective sentence: 10 months' detention Circumstances of offending 11 The circumstances of the respondent's offending are as follows. First tranche5 CC PE 4066 of 2025 - aggravated robbery 12 This offence was committed on 22 June 2025 around 10 am in the Perth CBD. The respondent was with two co-offenders. They followed the victim and demanded his Gucci bag. The victim wanted to remove personal items before handing over the bag. One of the co-offenders forcibly took the bag, the victim pushed him and the co-offender punched the victim in the face. This caused a small cut to the inside of the victim's mouth. The respondent and the two co-offenders then fled. 13 In a subsequent police interview, the respondent explained: I wasn't the one who took his stuff or used violence. I was just there to protect my friends. 14 On 28 July 2025, the respondent was sentenced to a Youth Community Based Order (YCBO) for three months for this offence. CC PE 4888 and 4889 of 2025 - aggravated robbery 15 These two offences were both committed in the evening on 29 July 2025. 16 In respect of the first offence, the respondent was in the Perth CBD with the co-offender at around 8 pm. The co-offender approached a food delivery driver and demanded that he hand over his e-scooter. The co-offender grabbed the e-scooter and the victim tried to stop him 5 The facts of the first tranche of offending are attached to the breach report dated 7 April 2026 that was before the sentencing judge, which her Honour adopted; see Sentencing ts 3. -- 8 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 9 taking it. The co-offender struck the victim with his shoulder, causing the victim to stumble over. The co-offender assaulted the victim, and stole the e-scooter. The victim suffered a minor cut to his finger. The respondent stood and watched while this incident occurred. The respondent rode away with the co-offender on the stolen e-scooter. 17 Later that evening shortly before 10.00 pm, the respondent and the co-offender were elsewhere in the Perth CBD. The co-offender approached another victim, demanded the victim's e-scooter and initiated a physical altercation. The respondent wrestled the e-scooter from the victim and rode away on it. 18 On 25 September 2025, the respondent was sentenced for these offences. The previous YCBO was cancelled and a new YCBO for five months was imposed for all three offences. CC PE 6941 of 2025 - aggravated burglary 19 This offence occurred on 24 October 2025 in the early hours of the morning. The respondent was together with four others in a stolen vehicle. They attended a Kebab House in Carramar. The respondent and two co-offenders smashed the front door and went inside. The respondent took a calculator and one of the other accused took the cash register which contained about $500. They ran from the store and left in the stolen vehicle. CC PE 7726, 7728 - 7730 of 2025 - aggravated armed robbery, driving without authority, steal motor vehicle and failing to stop after being involved in an incident that caused damage 20 This offending all occurred in the early morning of 25 November 2025. 21 The respondent and the co-offender were in a taxi together. When they arrived at their intended location, the driver felt what he believed to be a knife placed against his neck. The respondent and the co-offender demanded the driver get out of the vehicle, which he did. The respondent and co-offender then drove off in the vehicle. The vehicle was subsequently involved in two crashes and later found abandoned. 22 The respondent drove the stolen vehicle in an erratic manner, which caused a member of the public to flash their car lights at the respondent. The respondent stopped and got out of the vehicle. The member of the public drove away, the respondent followed and drove -- 9 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 10 the stolen vehicle into the rear of the other vehicle, causing damage. The respondent then drove off in the stolen vehicle. 23 On 16 January 2026, the respondent was sentenced for these offences. The YCBO was cancelled and the respondent was sentenced to the JCRO for all eight offences comprising the first tranche. Second tranche CC PE 772 of 2026 - aggravated armed robbery 24 This offence was committed on 3 February 2026 in the mid-afternoon. The respondent attended a convenience store in Inglewood with two others. They were all wearing surgical face masks. The respondent initially remained near the store entrance as a look-out. The other two approached the female staff member at the front counter and asked her for cigarettes and vapes. She said the store did not sell them. One of the co-offenders then started searching behind the counter for vapes. The two co-offenders demanded that the victim hand over money from the cash register. One of them attempted to open the cash register using a key. The respondent moved to the counter on two occasions, however, he had returned to the store entrance by the time the attempt was made to open the cash register.6 When that attempt was unsuccessful, the co-offender behind the counter produced a large blue knife and brandished it in the presence of the victim, who stepped away from the counter in fear. The two co-offenders then opened the cash register and stole about $700 in cash. The two co-offenders and the respondent then left the store.7 Third tranche CC PE 773 - 775, 777 - 779 and 785 of 2026 - reckless driving to escape pursuit by police, two offences of criminal damage or destruction of property, no authority to drive, failed to comply with a direction to stop, carried or possessed an edged weapon and conspiracy to commit indictable offence 25 This offending occurred on 5 and 6 February 2026. 8 26 The respondent was contacted by the co-offender on social media. The co-offender requested that the respondent use a vehicle to 'ram-raid' the storefront of an illicit tobacco store. He was to be paid 6 Extracts from the CCTV footage (WAB 145 - 151). 7 Sentencing ts 22 - 23. 8 Sentencing ts 23 - 24. -- 10 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 11 for doing so. The respondent agreed. The messages between the two set out details of the plan, which included that the respondent reverse the vehicle into the store, wear gloves and a mask, and set fire to the car afterwards.9 27 The co-offender directed the respondent to take a Toyota Hi-Lux from its owner's house, which he did. The respondent was driving the vehicle on Kwinana Freeway on the way to the store. He did not have any authority to drive a vehicle. 28 Police officers in a patrol car observed the vehicle. They were concerned about the manner of driving. The police officers activated their lights and sirens, requesting the respondent to stop. He did not do so. The respondent accelerated away and was the subject of a high-speed police chase for about 12 minutes. He did not give way to other vehicles including police vehicles, drove through three red lights, he drove on the wrong side of the road forcing oncoming drivers to take evasive action, he drove at 150 kms per hour in a 70 km zone and swerved and brake checked the chasing police vehicle in an effort to cause a collision and avoid being caught. 29 During the chase, the respondent deliberately swerved into a police vehicle causing approximately $5,000 worth of damage. The respondent deliberately accelerated into the rear of another police vehicle causing approximately $10,000 worth of damage. As a result of the second collision, the respondent lost control of the vehicle and it rolled several times, before landing in an upright position. 30 The attending police officers searched the respondent's backpack and found a 12-inch edged machete. Ground of appeal 31 The sole ground of appeal is: The learned sentencing judge erred in law by imposing a total effective sentence of 10 months' detention, which infringed the first limb of the totality principle in that it was disproportionate to the overall criminality of the offending, having regard to: a. The serious nature and circumstances of the offences; 9 WAB 157 - 168. -- 11 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 12 b. The need for the sentence to adequately reflect general deterrence, community protection and appropriate punishment for offending of this nature; c. The order that the sentences imposed for the breach of the JCRO offences (CC PE 4066 of 2025, CC PE 4888 - 4889 of 2025, CC PE 6941 of 2025, CC PE 7726 of 2025, and CC PE 7728 - 7730 of 2025) be served wholly concurrent with the sentences imposed for the offences committed in breach of the JCRO (CC PE 772 - 775 of 2026, CC PE 777 - 779 of 2026, and CC PE 785 of 2026); d. The offender's limited attempts to engage with previous community-based dispositions; e. The order that the sentence imposed for charge CC PE 772 of 2026 be served wholly concurrently, when that offence was a serious offence of its type and committed separately to the rest of the offending; f. The general principles of juvenile justice; and g. The personal circumstances of the offender. Sentencing and appeals against sentence: general principles 32 This appeal is made under, and is subject to, Part 3 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) (CAA), it being an appeal from a sentence imposed by a judge of the Children's Court.10 Section 24(1)(a) of the CAA gives the State, as the prosecutor, the right to appeal against the sentence. Leave to appeal is still required for the ground of appeal.11 33 Sentencing is a discretionary exercise. Often, the exercise of that discretion is not straightforward. In Veen v The Queen [No. 2], Mason CJ, Brennan, Dawson and Toohey JJ, observed:12 … sentencing is not a purely logical exercise, and the troublesome nature of the sentencing discretion arises in large measure from unavoidable difficulty in giving weight to each of the purposes of punishment. The purposes of criminal punishment are various: protection of society, deterrence of the offender and of others who might be tempted to offend, retribution and reform. The purposes overlap and none of them can be considered in isolation from the others when determining what is an appropriate sentence in a particular case. They are guideposts to the appropriate sentence but sometimes they point in different directions. 10 Children's Court of Western Australia Act 1988 (WA), s 42A. 11 Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 27(1). 12 Veen v The Queen [No 2] (1988) 164 CLR 465, 476. -- 12 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 13 34 In a similar vein, in R v Engert, Gleeson CJ observed:13 A moment's consideration will show that the interplay of the considerations relevant to sentencing may be complex and on occasion even intricate. 35 An appellate court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the sentencing court merely because the appellate court would have exercised the sentencing discretion differently.14 An appellate court can intervene only if the appellant demonstrates either an express or implied material error. 36 This appeal concerns the application of the totality principle. This court has repeatedly said that the totality principle comprises two limbs. The principle is summarised in the frequently cited passage from the judgment of McLure JA in Roffey v The State of Western Australia:15 The first limb is that the total effective sentence must bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved in all the offences, viewed in their entirety and having regard to the circumstances of the case, including those referable to the offender personally: Woods v The Queen (1994) 14 WAR 341. The second limb is that the court should not impose a 'crushing' sentence. The word crushing in this context connotes the destruction of any reasonable expectation of a useful life after release: Martino v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 78 [16]. An aggregate sentence may be inappropriately long under the first limb even if it cannot be described as crushing: Jarvis v The Queen (1998) 20 WAR 201, 216 (Anderson J). The practical effect of the totality principle is ordinarily to arrive at an aggregate sentence that is less than that which would be arrived at by simply adding up all the terms appropriate for the individual offences: R v Holder [1983] 3 NSWLR 245, 260 (Street CJ). A rationale for the totality principle is that there is assumed rehabilitation and reduced demand for retribution after the initial sentences have been served. Where the principle of totality comes into effect, it is of little importance how the ultimate aggregate is made up: R v Holder (260). 37 The application of the first limb is not undertaken in isolation from the applicable sentencing principles. Rather, in applying the first limb, the sentencing court must have regard to all relevant sentencing 13 R v Engert (1995) 84 A Crim R 67, 68. 14 Salkilld v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 168 [48], and most recently Silvey v The State of Western Australia [2026] WASCA 84 [50]. 15 Roffey v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 246 [24] - [26] (McLure JA; Steytler P & Miller JA agreeing). -- 13 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 14 factors.16 Thus, in sentencing under the YOA, the application of the first limb requires that regard be had to the principles of juvenile justice enunciated by that Act. 38 A ground of appeal which contends that the first limb of the totality principle has been infringed is an allegation of implied error. The real question is whether the total effective sentence is unreasonable or plainly unjust such that the court must conclude that a substantial wrong has occurred.17 39 In assessing whether the first limb of the totality principle has been infringed, the court has regard to comparable cases. If there are no such cases:18 … this court is not precluded from deciding that a total effective sentence does infringe the first limb of the totality principle. It merely has the consequence that this court has no directly comparable cases to provide a yardstick against which to judge the adequacy of the total effective sentence imposed at first instance. 40 The severity or leniency of an individual sentence (which is not manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate) is relevant in evaluating whether the total effective sentence infringes the first limb of the totality principle.19 Sentencing under the YOA 41 The YOA applies to the sentencing of a 'young person' for a criminal offence. A 'young person' is defined as a person who has not reached the age of 18 years, or who committed the offence before they reached the age of 18 years.20 The respondent is a young person. 42 Section 6 of the YOA sets out the main objectives of the Act. One of those objectives is to integrate young persons who have committed offences into the community. 43 Section 7 sets out the general principles of juvenile justice. Relevantly to this appeal, the general principles include: 16 See Salkilld [48]. 17 Salkilld [48]; Silvey [51]. 18 Moore v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 35 [51]. 19 Silvey [48]. 20 YOA, s 3 (definition of 'young person'), s 4. -- 14 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 15 (a) there should be special provision to ensure the fair treatment of young persons who have, or are alleged to have, committed offences; and (b) a young person who commits an offence is to be dealt with, either formally or informally, in a way that encourages the young person to accept responsibility for his or her conduct; and (c) a young person who commits an offence is not to be treated more severely because of the offence than the person would have been treated if an adult; and (d) the community must be protected from illegal behaviour; and … (h) detaining a young person in custody for an offence, whether before or after the person is found to have committed the offence, should only be used as a last resort and, if required, is only to be for as short a time as is necessary; and … (j) punishment of a young person for an offence should be designed so as to give the offender an opportunity to develop a sense of social responsibility and otherwise to develop in beneficial and socially acceptable ways; and … (l) in dealing with a young person for an offence, the age, maturity, and cultural background of the offender are to be considered [.] 44 Section 46 of the YOA sets out the principles and considerations to be applied in sentencing a young person for an offence. Section 46(1)(b) provides that the Court is to apply the general principles of juvenile justice. 45 Section 46(2) and (3) provide: (2) The court is to consider any information about the offender or the offence that may assist the court to decide how to dispose of the matter, and in particular - (a) the nature and seriousness of the offence; and (b) any history of offences previously committed by the offender; and (c) the cultural background of the offender; and -- 15 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 16 … (d) any order previously made by a court when disposing of a charge of an offence that still applies to the offender, and any further order that is liable to be imposed if the offender does not comply with the terms of any such order; and (e) the extent, if any, to which any person was affected as a victim of the offence. (3) The court is to dispose of the matter in a way that is in proportion to the seriousness of the offence and is consistent with the treatment of other young persons who commit offences. 46 Section 120(1) provides that: The court cannot impose any custodial sentence unless it is satisfied that there is no other appropriate way for it to dispose of the matter. 47 In DC v The State of Western Australia, Mazza JA (Buss and Newnes JJA agreeing) set out the following non-exhaustive propositions in respect of the sentencing of young persons:21 1. The ultimate aim in sentencing a young offender is the protection of the community by the imposition of a sentence proportionate to the gravity of the offence, having regard to the circumstances of its commission and the circumstances personal to the offender: AM (a child) v The Queen. 2. Youth is normally a powerful mitigating factor and the rehabilitation of the young offender is generally a dominant sentencing consideration: Ainsworth v D (a child). 3. A young offender must not be treated more severely than an adult for the same offence: s 7(c) and s 118(1)(b) of the YOA. 4. Deterrence, both personal and general, punishment, retribution and public protection are accommodated in the YOA and are relevant to the sentencing of young offenders, although their role will generally be tempered. However, when in a particular case the rehabilitation of an offender appears unlikely, the offending is serious and the character and personal circumstances of the offender justify it, these factors may become significant: JSA v The State of Western Australia. 21 DC v The State of Western Australia [2014] WASCA 121; (2014) 242 A Crim R 147 [50] (DC). See also in respect of deterrence JSA v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 25 [35] (Buss JA; Hall J agreeing). -- 16 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 17 5. Young offenders, even those with good antecedents, may, having regard to the circumstances of the case, be sentenced to detention or imprisonment: F (a child) v The State of Western Australia. 6. The age and maturity of a young offender are relevant factors. Thus, a very young offender who is immature may be dealt with differently to an older child who, while still young, has a greater awareness and responsibility. (citations omitted) 48 Mazza JA also said that the essence of the principles embodied in the YOA:22 … recognises the substantial mitigation to be given to youth and rehabilitation. Where the detention of a young person is required, the length of that detention must be for the shortest possible time. 49 Youth can be mitigatory for many reasons. The ability of a young offender to make reasoned decisions is less well-developed. A young offender may be impressionable, impulsive, and less cognisant of the seriousness of their offending. A young offender usually has better prospects of rehabilitation. A custodial term will ordinarily be a heavy burden on a young offender.23 50 The weight to be attached to youth needs to be assessed by reference to the circumstances of the offender, and of the offending. As this court said in DBA v The State of Western Australia:24 The effect of an offender's youth as a mitigating factor on the severity of a sentence will be informed by both the offender's chronological age and his or her level of maturity, as well as the seriousness of the offending. The respondent's personal circumstances 51 The respondent was born on 26 October 2010 in New Zealand. His parents were both around 14 years of age at the time. When the respondent was around four years of age, he was removed from his mother's care by the authorities. He then moved to Perth to live with his maternal grandparents.25 22 DC [67]. 23 See the observations of this court in respect of young adult offenders in Williams v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 161 [48]. 24 DBA v The State of Western Australia [2026] WASCA 3 [41]. 25 Youth Justice Services, Court Report dated 24 July 2025, page 2; Sentencing ts 27. -- 17 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 18 52 He remained estranged from his mother until 2023, when he returned to New Zealand to live with her. While in New Zealand, the respondent was exposed to violence, drug use and gang culture. He met his father for the first time and has not had contact with him since.26 53 Ultimately, living with his mother was unsuccessful and the respondent returned to Perth to live with his grandparents in February 2024. His relationship with his mother is strained,27 however he is in telephone and social media contact with her.28 54 There were difficulties living with his grandparents and by mid-October 2025, the respondent's grandparents were no longer prepared to provide him with care.29 The Department of Communities (Department) could not identify an alternative suitable caregiver and applied for a protection order in respect of him under the Children and Community Services Act 2004 (WA). Initially, the Department was not able to source a long-term placement for the respondent and for a period was seeking emergency placements for him each night.30 55 By May 2026, the Department had obtained a long-term stable placement that in its view provided a supportive environment for the respondent.31 56 The respondent attended primary and secondary school up until his move to New Zealand in 2023. He recommenced secondary school in February 2024, and was excluded in September 2024 due to assaulting a teacher.32 57 The respondent started using cannabis when he was 11, which increased to daily use in 2025. He reported doing so to cope with feelings of sadness, anger and abandonment which he attributed to his childhood. The respondent started smoking methylamphetamine in May 2025, doing so about twice a month.33 The respondent reported 26 Youth Justice Services, Court Report dated 24 July 2025, page 2; Sentencing ts 27. 27 Youth Justice Services, Court Report dated 24 July 2025, page 2. 28 Sentencing ts 15, 27. 29 Department of Communities, Report for the President / Magistrate of the Children's Court completed 14 May 2026, page 2. 30 Department of Communities Report for the President / Magistrate of the Children's Court completed 14 May 2026, page 4; Sentencing ts 28. 31 Department of Communities, Report for the President / Magistrate of the Children's Court completed 14 May 2026, page 4. 32 Youth Justice Services, Court Report dated 24 July 2025, page 3. 33 Youth Justice Services, Court Report dated 24 July 2025, page 4. -- 18 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 19 that his use escalated in its frequency and severity when he was with people who are negative influences.34 58 The respondent's grandmother reported that the respondent was diagnosed with a language developmental delay at six years of age.35 The respondent undertook a neuropsychological assessment while at Banksia Hill Detention Centre. This indicated Attention- Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder. Also, the assessment reported that he appeared to have 'vulnerable language, attention and self-regulation skills' and it was recommended that he have further testing of possible underlying language disorder and trauma.36 59 The respondent's grandparents visit him regularly in detention.37 60 The respondent's case worker who attended the sentencing hearing told her Honour that the respondent:38 … is very engaging. If I ring him he answers, or if I don't, he will message and say, 'I will ring you back', or he's very easy to engage with. If I message him he's pretty quick at responding. Her Honour's sentencing remarks 61 In addressing the seriousness of the respondent's offending, her Honour remarked that if the respondent committed the offences for which he was being sentenced when he was an adult, he would be sentenced to a significant term of imprisonment. 62 In respect of the offence of aggravated armed robbery, while her Honour accepted the respondent was a lookout, she also found that he played an important role and that the victim was left scared and probably too afraid to go to work.39 63 In respect of the third tranche of offending, her Honour found the reckless driving offence was a very serious incident. Her Honour accepted that the respondent panicked in driving like he did.40 Her Honour also remarked that the respondent could have died, or killed someone, in the high-speed chase. 34 Youth Justice Services, Court Report dated 14 May 2026, page 3. 35 Youth Justice Services, Court Report dated 24 July 2025, page 4. 36 Department of Communities, Report for the President / Magistrate of the Children's Court completed 14 May 2026, page 3. 37 Sentencing ts 16. 38 Sentencing ts 16. 39 Sentencing ts 24. 40 Sentencing ts 25 - 26. -- 19 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 20 64 Her Honour said that she was required to impose a minimum penalty for the reckless driving offence of six months' detention that could not be served in the community.41 However, the parties accept that is not correct. Pursuant to s 46(5a) of the YOA, subject to certain exceptions, the court dealing with a young person for an offence is not obliged to impose a minimum penalty of imprisonment stipulated for that offence. The reckless driving offence is not one of the exceptions. 65 Her Honour found that the conspiracy to commit an indictable offence was a serious offence, with the conduct being all planned out. She explained to the respondent that 'they picked you because they think that you're foolish enough to accept the deal'.42 66 Her Honour found that the offending the subject of the second and third tranches was aggravated because the respondent was on the JCRO at the time.43 67 Her Honour referred to the respondent's personal circumstances. In terms of his accommodation, her Honour said that her understanding was that before the respondent was placed on the JCRO, his available accommodation was emergency accommodation. Her Honour found that the respondent's lack of stable accommodation contributed to why the JCRO did not work and why the respondent re-offended.44 68 Her Honour found that the respondent's childhood was unstable and unhappy, and that played a role in why he chose to use methylamphetamine and cannabis.45 69 Her Honour summarised the causes of the respondent's offending as:46 … first and foremost, your lack of stable accommodation, it's then your drug use, it's the people you spend time with, and we're a little bit worried that you're, now, becoming anti-social with your attitudes. So what that means is that we're worried that you're a young person that, sort of, feels like, well, I'm just going to do it anyway because my needs are more important than others. Other aspects or causes to your offending is, obviously, your poor judgment and lack of consequential thinking, likely complicated by your, likely, diagnosis of ADHD which, really, is consistent with your young age. 41 Sentencing ts 24. 42 Sentencing ts 25. 43 Sentencing ts 26. 44 Sentencing ts 28. 45 Sentencing ts 28. 46 Sentencing ts 29. -- 20 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 21 70 Her Honour allowed a discount of 20% for the respondent's pleas of guilty pursuant to s 9AA of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA).47 71 Her Honour said that general deterrence was a dominant sentencing consideration, especially in respect of the high-speed police chase.48 Her Honour also had regard to the need to deter the respondent from further offending, saying that if 'this pattern keeps on going, then the worry is that there will just be [more and more victims]'.49 72 Her Honour was positively satisfied it was not appropriate to impose a term of detention to be served in the community, saying that 'the offending before me is so serious that to impose anything other than an immediate term would not reflect the overall seriousness of what you've done.'50 73 In assessing totality, her Honour referred to the respondent being over 15 years of age and said that in her view a sentence greater than 10 months would be crushing upon the respondent. Her Honour said that she should have made the six months' detention the subject of the JCRO cumulative, however did not do so:51 … because I'm of the view that you're only 15 years of age, you were 15 years and three months of age at the time of committing these offences, for you to get a sentence greater than 12 months, in my view, would be crushing upon you because, then, that would be a 16 month sentence which is a, really, long time. One of the other reasons why I've ordered you leniency, or I've considered things from your perspective, is the fact that you do work with the Department, so you don't run away from them, you answer their phone calls, you're prepared to work with them. If it had been the case that [the respondent's case worker] had come to court and told me today that you don't engage, then, in my view, your risk would have been more significant, and then I would have had to have looked at locking you up for longer. So it is to your credit, and you are receiving a discount for your continued engagement in the Department. (emphasis added) 74 We do not understand her Honour to have been applying the second limb of the totality principle when her Honour used the word 47 Sentencing ts 29. 48 Sentencing ts 29. 49 Sentencing ts 30. 50 Sentencing ts 30. 51 Sentencing ts 31. -- 21 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 22 'crushing'. Rather, we understand her Honour to be using that word in a more colloquial sense to convey her Honour's concern that a sentence of 16 months would crush the respondent's resolve to positively engage in rehabilitation. Her Honour's reference to the respondent being over 15 years of age needs to be looked at in the context of the respondent's circumstances overall, in particular, that he was under the Department's care. Her Honour was concerned to ensure the sentence imposed would allow a meaningful amount of time for the respondent to be supervised in the community before he turned 18. Overall, her Honour was satisfied that the respondent had positive prospects of rehabilitation. 75 Her Honour backdated the total effective sentence of 10 months' detention to 6 February 2026 to take account of the 103 days that the respondent had spent in custody for the offending the subject of the second and third tranches.52 Summary of the parties' respective positions 76 The State presented its position on the appeal in an appropriately nuanced manner. The State recognised the mitigating factors available to the respondent, including his youth and unstable upbringing, and that the absence of consistent accommodation contributed to the respondent's offending. The State also recognised that the respondent had engaged with the Department and had support available. 77 That all being said, the State emphasised that the respondent's offending behaviour had escalated, both in terms of his involvement in the offending, and the seriousness of that offending. The State said there was 'a rapid and quite significant escalation' in the respondent's offending,53 and the three community-based dispositions had not deterred him from offending. The State also emphasised the importance of general deterrence in the sentencing exercise. 78 Bringing these matters together, the State said that notwithstanding the mitigating factors and the respondent's prospects of rehabilitation, the seriousness of his offending and the need for general and specific deterrence called for a significant period of detention. The State says that the total effective sentence of 10 months was not commensurate with the overall criminality of his offending, having regard to his personal circumstances, and the relevant sentencing factors. 52 Sentencing ts 22, 30. 53 Appeal ts 7. -- 22 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 23 79 The respondent's counsel says that the total effective sentence of 10 months is a significant period of detention for a young person. He says the sentence was structured to facilitate the respondent's rehabilitation and that doing so accords with the principles of juvenile justice. 80 He described the respondent's role in the offending as not that of the 'instigator' or 'ring leader' and accordingly the respondent's criminal culpability was lower. 81 The respondent's counsel said it was open to the sentencing judge to find that the respondent had significant prospects of rehabilitation. He pointed to the respondent's relatively short criminal history, his level of criminal culpability, young age, positive engagement with the Department and the available support. 82 The respondent's counsel said that when regard is had to the respondent's criminal culpability and to the mitigating factors, the State has not established that the total effective sentence infringed the first limb of the totality principle. Disposition 83 It is useful to restate the assessment required by the first limb of the totality principle. The first limb requires that the total effective sentence must bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved in all the offences, viewed in their entirety and having regard to the circumstances of the case, including those referable to the offender personally. This assessment is undertaken having regard to all relevant sentencing factors. 84 The overall criminality involved in the offences is serious, especially when regard is had to the two offences of armed robbery, the offence of conspiracy to commit an indictable offence and the offence of reckless driving to escape pursuit by police. 85 A common feature of the respondent's more serious offending is that it carried a substantial risk of harm to others. The use of a knife in the armed robbery offences carried a real risk of injury and also caused significant fear to the victims. The respondent's driving during the police chase risked serious injury and even death to civilians, to police officers and to himself. It is only through good fortune that the respondent's offending did not cause any serious injury or death. -- 23 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 24 86 The three non-custodial dispositions did not deter the respondent from engaging in the offending the subject of the second and third tranches of offending. Nor did the time he had spent in detention for the first tranche. 87 There are no comparable cases which are of assistance. The respondent's overall circumstances are quite distinctive. The respondent has lived in Perth for most of his life. He returned to New Zealand to reunite with his mother when he was around 13 years of age. The attempt at reunification was unsuccessful, and the respondent was also exposed to criminal activity while in New Zealand. The respondent returned to Perth. His living and family arrangements deteriorated and by mid-October 2025, when he was still 14 years of age, the respondent did not have stable accommodation. It was around this point in time that his offending significantly escalated, the aggravated burglary offence being committed on 24 October 2025. Her Honour found that the respondent's lack of stable accommodation was a contributing factor to his offending. 88 In respect of many of the offences, the respondent was drawn into the criminal behaviour by others. His behaviour reflects that of an impressionable and impulsive young person, who did not have the protective factors of stable accommodation, a positive childhood and strong family support. 89 He was placed in the care of the Department shortly before he turned 15. He has positively engaged with the Departmental officers responsible for his care. 90 In these circumstances, the respondent's youth, background and prospects of rehabilitation were significant factors in mitigation. The enhancement of his rehabilitation was an important sentencing consideration. 91 On the other hand, his offending had escalated in its severity and had put the community at great risk. General and specific deterrence were significant sentencing considerations, notwithstanding his youth. Less weight was therefore to be accorded to the available mitigating factors.54 92 In sentencing the respondent, her Honour placed particular emphasis on the importance of the respondent's rehabilitation, while 54 See Forrest v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2026] FCAFC 69 [164]. -- 24 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 25 also recognising the significance of general and specific deterrence. The individual sentences that her Honour imposed were not severe. 93 In relation to totality, the learned sentencing judge recognised that the total effective sentence imposed by her was 'lenient'. Her Honour explained that leniency by reference to the respondent's personal circumstances, and in particular the importance of the respondent's positive and meaningful engagement with the Department upon his release. We agree that a measure of leniency was justified in light of the long-term importance of that engagement for the respondent's rehabilitation. 94 Nevertheless, with respect to her Honour, we are of the view that the total effective sentence did not take sufficient account of the overall seriousness of the respondent's offending, and of the need for general and specific deterrence. While some leniency was appropriate, it remained necessary for the total effective sentence to bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality of the respondent's offending in all of the circumstances. In our respectful view, the total effective sentence of 10 months did not do so and therefore infringed the first limb of the totality principle. 95 Notwithstanding this finding, there is a residual discretion under s 31(4)(a) of the CAA not to allow the appeal. On a State appeal against sentence, that discretion is usually exercised where the guidance this court might otherwise provide to sentencing courts is limited, and allowing the appeal would result in injustice to the offender.55 96 The appeal was brought promptly after the respondent was sentenced and has been heard expeditiously. The respondent's counsel does not suggest that the respondent will suffer any injustice if the appeal is allowed. The respondent's circumstances have not changed significantly since the sentence was imposed. We are of the view that the appeal should be allowed to maintain adequate standards of sentencing. 97 It was for these reasons that we allowed the appeal. Resentencing 98 During the hearing, we were provided with a Supervised Release Review Board Report dated 24 June 2026 (Supervised Release Report). It had been prepared for the purposes of a hearing by the 55 The State of Western Australia v Pereira [2023] WASCA 162 [62]. -- 25 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 26 Board on 30 June 2026 to consider the respondent's release on supervision. The Supervised Release Report, together with the material before her Honour, provided us with the necessary material to resentence the respondent. 99 We adopt what we have said regarding the respondent's personal circumstances, and the circumstances and seriousness of his offending. We would allow the same discount of 20% as her Honour for the pleas of guilty to the second and third tranches of offending. 100 There is no challenge to the individual sentences. They are appropriate and we would impose the same sentences. The critical issue on resentencing is the application of the first limb of the totality principle. 101 Prior to the respondent's arrest on 6 February 2026, he had spent 77 days in detention in respect of the first tranche of offending. He has been in detention since his arrest. 102 In addition to the respondent's pleas of guilty, the principal mitigating factors are the respondent's youth, background and positive prospects of rehabilitation. The Supervised Release Report reveals that in detention the respondent has engaged in education,56 engaged in substance abuse counselling,57 and 'appears to have made significant strides in his personal development, seemingly due to the structure and intensive supports provided to him in detention'.58 These matters suggest that the respondent is positively engaging in rehabilitation while in detention. 103 There is an elevated need for general and specific deterrence. That reduces the weight to be attached to the respondent's mitigating factors, however those mitigating factors are still of significance. 104 Having regard to these matters, we were of the view that the appropriate total effective sentence was 14 months' detention. We ordered that this sentence commence on 6 February 2026 to take account of the 103 days the respondent had previously spent in detention for the second and third tranches of offending. 56 Department of Communities, Supervised Release Review Board Report dated 24 June 2026, 'Educational Needs'. 57 Department of Communities, Supervised Release Review Board Report dated 24 June 2026, 'Counselling/Personal Support Services'. 58 Department of Communities, Supervised Release Review Board Report dated 24 June 2026, 'Action Plan'. -- 26 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 27 105 Where a term of detention exceeds 12 months, s 121(2) of the YOA provides that the court may set a minimum period before the respondent can be released under a supervised release order. In light of the respondent's ongoing engagement with the Department, we considered it was appropriate to do so and set the minimum period as six and two-thirds of a month from 6 February 2026 in accordance with the formula in s 121(3). That order will enable the Supervised Release Review Board to consider making a supervised release order in relation to the respondent earlier than might otherwise be the case, so that his positive engagement with the Department can continue. 106 For these reasons, we made the following orders at the conclusion of the appeal hearing: 1. Leave to appeal is granted. 2. The appeal is allowed. 3. The sentences imposed by Judge Hughes on 19 May 2026 in respect of CC PE 4066/2025, CC PE 4888/2025, CC PE 4889/2025, CC PE 6941/2025, CC PE 7726/2025, CC PE 7728/2025, CC PE 7729/2025, CC PE 7730/2025, CC PE 772/2026, CC PE 773/2026, CC PE 774/2026, CC PE 775/2026, CC PE 777/2026, CC PE 778/2026, CC PE 779/2026 and CC PE 785/2026 are set aside. 4. The respondent is resentenced as follows: (a) On CC PE 4066/2025 (aggravated robbery) 6 months' detention. (b) On CC PE 4888/2025 (aggravated robbery) 6 months' detention. (c) On CC PE 4889/2025 (aggravated robbery) 6 months' detention. (d) On CC PE 6941/2025 (aggravated burglary and commit) 6 months' detention. (e) On CC PE 7726/2025 (aggravated armed robbery) 6 months' detention. (f) On CC PE 7728/2025 (no authority to drive (never held)) 6 months' detention. (g) On CC PE 7729/2025 (steal motor vehicle (as defined in section 371A Criminal Code)) 6 months' detention. -- 27 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 28 (h) On CC PE 7730/2025 (being the driver of a vehicle involved in an incident where property was damaged, failed to stop as required to do so) 6 months' detention. (i) On CC PE 772/2026 (aggravated armed robbery) 4 months' detention. (j) On CC PE 773/2026 (reckless driving to escape pursuit by police) 7 months' detention. (k) On CC PE 774/2026 (criminal damage or destruction of property) 1 month's detention. (l) On CC PE 775/2026 (criminal damage or destruction of property) 1 month's detention. (m) On CC PE 777/2026 (no authority to drive (never held)) no punishment. (n) On CC PE 778/2026 (driver of a vehicle failed to comply with a direction to stop (circumstances of aggravation)) 2 months' detention. (o) On CC PE 779/2026 (carried or possessed an edged weapon) no punishment. (p) On CC PE 785/2026 (conspiracy to commit indictable offence) 3 months' detention. 5. The sentences of detention on: (a) CC PE 772/2026, CC PE 773/2026 and CC PE 785/2026 are to be served cumulatively on each other (with the sentence on CC PE 773/2026 to be the head sentence). (b) The remaining sentences are to be served concurrently with the head sentence and with each other. 6. The total effective sentence is therefore 14 months' detention and the sentence is backdated to 6 February 2026. 7. The orders made by Judge Hughes in relation to disqualification from holding or obtaining a Driver's Licence are otherwise unaffected. 8. The minimum period before release from detention be six and two-thirds of a month from 6 February 2026. -- 28 of 29 -- [2026] WASCA 100 REASONS OF THE COURT: Page 29 I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. CP Associate to the Hon Justice Lemonis 20 JULY 2026 -- 29 of 29 --