SUNRISE ADELAIDE TRANSPORT PTY LTD v NATIONAL HEAVY VEHICLE REGULATOR [2026] SADC 52

Applicant: SUNRISE ADELAIDE TRANSPORT PTY LTD Counsel: MS K TEMPLE - Solicitor: KJK LEGAL Respondent: NATIONAL HEAVY VEHICLE REGULATOR Counsel: MR T RICE Hearing Date/s: 06/05/2026 File No/s: CIV-26-005557 B DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Civil) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. SUNRISE ADELAIDE TRANSPORT PTY LTD v NATIONAL HEAVY VEHICLE REGULATOR [2026] SADC 52 Judgment of Her Honour Judge Mackenzie 15 May 2026 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW — STAY — HEAVY VEHICLE NATIONAL LAW — S 642 — “PUBLIC SAFETY GROUND” — JURISDICTIONAL BAR The applicant, a heavy vehicle operator, sought a stay of a decision cancelling its heavy vehicle accreditations pending internal review of the regulator’s decision. The respondent, being the regulator, contended that the decision was made on the basis of a “public safety ground” within s 640 of the Heavy Vehicle National Law (HVNL), such that a stay application could not be entertained under s 642 of the HVNL. Held (dismissing the stay application): 1. The question whether a decision was made on the basis of a public safety ground is an anterior jurisdictional question to be determined by reference to the decision-maker’s reasons, read fairly and as a whole (Wu Shan Liang; Yusuf). 2. A decision may fall within s 640 of the HVNL notwithstanding the reasons fail to express the precise phrase “significant risk to public safety” provided the reasons disclose, in substance, that cancellation was considered necessary to prevent an unacceptable risk to public safety. 3. On a proper reading of the regulator’s reasons for cancelling the accreditations, the decision was made on the basis of a public safety ground. Section 642 was therefore not engaged and the Court lacked power to grant a stay. 4. It was unnecessary and inappropriate to consider issues of utility, or discretionary factors relevant to granting a stay, once the Court concluded it lacked jurisdiction under s 642. Those matters do not arise where the statutory pre-condition is not met. Heavy Vehicle National Law (South Australia) Act 2013 (SA); Heavy Vehicle National Law (Queensland), referred to. Milko Livestock Pty Ltd v NHVR [2026] QCAT 112; Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6; Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421; Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355, applied. -- 1 of 17 -- -- 2 of 17 -- SUNRISE ADELAIDE TRANSPORT PTY LTD v NATIONAL HEAVY VEHICLE REGULATOR [2026] SADC 52 Introduction 1 Sunrise Adelaide Transport Pty Ltd (Sunrise) seeks an urgent stay of the decision of the National Heavy Vehicle Regulator (Regulator) to cancel its heavy vehicle accreditations, which decision has been operative since 1 May 2026. Sunrise has applied to the Regulator for internal review of the decision and seeks a stay pending the outcome of that internal review.1 2 The accreditations enable Sunrise to be compliant with the regulatory regime by adopting alternative practices tailored to its business operations. Sunrise claims that the cancellation of its accreditations will cause it to incur significant financial losses (in the order of $300,000 to $350,000 per week) impacting the job security of its 55 employees, and potentially causing it to shut down its business operations. 3 Sunrise claims that without the accreditations it is unable to meet freight deliveries for its clients within required timeframes. Without basic fatigue management accreditation, which allows drivers to work 14 hours (instead of 12 hours) in every 24 hours, Sunrise submits there are particular problems for its Adelaide to Sydney (and return) route. This is because from the Renmark depot the trip to Sydney is 12.5 to 13 hours – meaning drivers will have to rest for seven hours only 30 minutes to one hour from their destination. Sunrise claims there are also flow-on impacts for transport to and from Perth. 4 The Regulator adheres to its decision to cancel the accreditations and resists the stay application. The Regulator points to the pre-condition for a stay application under section 642(1)(a) of the Heavy Vehicle National Law (HVNL) set out under the Schedule to the Heavy Vehicle National Law (South Australia) Act 2013 (SA) (HVNL Act), which provides that section 642 (the provision enabling a stay of a reviewable decision) does not apply where the decision is a decision made on the basis of a public safety ground. A “public safety ground” is defined in section 640, by reference to the Regulator being satisfied that making the decision is necessary to prevent a significant risk to public safety. 5 The Regulator contends that its written reasons for cancellation make it clear that there were two public safety grounds upon which the decision was based – being that public safety has been endangered, or is likely to be endangered, because of: (i) Sunrise’s Mass Maintenance and Maintenance Management accreditation; and (ii) its Basic Fatigue Management (BFM) accreditation. As such, the Regulator contends that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the stay application and Sunrise’s application is ultra vires and should be dismissed.2 1 Separate, but equivalent, stay provisions operate if the decision on review is appealed. 2 Response (FDN 7). -- 3 of 17 -- [2026] SADC 52 2 6 Not forming part of its Response but raised in its oral and written submissions, the Regulator also contends that the application is inutile because the cancellation decision commenced on 1 May 2026 and the Court does not have power to retrospectively make a stay order. 7 The questions for determination of the stay application are therefore: (1) Was the cancellation decision made on the basis of a public safety ground such that the pre-condition for entertaining the stay application under section 642(1)(a) has not been met? (2) In any event, is the stay application inutile because the stay could only operate prospectively and the accreditations were cancelled with effect from 1 May 2026? (3) If the answer to both of preceding questions is no, a question remains as to whether the Court ought to exercise its discretion to grant a stay in the terms sought by Sunrise? Regulatory framework 8 The application arises in the context of the regulation of the HVNL and issues with Sunrise’s compliance with the National Heavy Vehicle Accreditation System (Accreditation System). 9 The HVNL operates within a largely national framework, which commenced in 2014. The HVNL is in force in all Australian States and Territories, other than Western Australia and the Northern Territory. Queensland is the host jurisdiction (the HVNL appears as a schedule to the Queensland Act3), and other participating jurisdictions broadly adopt it via their own application legislation. 10 The object of the HVNL is to establish a national scheme for facilitating and regulating the use of heavy vehicles on roads in a way that:4 (a) promotes public safety; and (b) manages the impact of heavy vehicles on the environment, road infrastructure and public amenity; and (c) promotes industry productivity and efficiency in the road transport of goods and passengers by heavy vehicles; and (d) encourages and promotes productive, efficient, innovative and safe business practices. 3 Heavy Vehicle National Law (Queensland). 4 HVNL, s 3. -- 4 of 17 -- [2026] SADC 52 3 11 Under the HVNL the Regulator is vested with functions to ensure that this object is achieved.5 The regulatory framework also prescribes requirements about:6 (i) the standards heavy vehicles must meet when on roads; (ii) the maximum permissible mass and dimensions of heavy vehicles used on roads; (iii) securing and restraining loads on heavy vehicles used on roads; (iv) preventing drivers of heavy vehicles exceeding speed limits; (v) preventing drivers of heavy vehicles from driving while fatigued; 12 The Accreditation System allows operators of heavy vehicles who adopt best practices directed at the object of the HVNL (set out above) to be subject to alternative requirements more suited to the operators’ business operations.7 The Regulator gave evidence that at 30 June 2025 there were 275,294 registered heavy vehicle operators, with only 8,969 (representing 3.2%) holding accreditations and only 3,303 (representing 1.19%) with accreditations for BFM and/or Advanced Fatigue Management (AFM).8 13 The Regulator has power under section 473(1) of the HVNL to amend, suspend or cancel accreditation on the Regulator’s initiative. Each of the following is a ground for amending, suspending or cancelling accreditation: (emphasis added) (a) the accreditation was granted because of a document or representation that was: (i) false or misleading; or (ii) obtained or made in an improper way; (b) the holder of the accreditation has contravened a condition of the accreditation; (c) the holder of the accreditation, or an associate of the holder, has been convicted of— (i) an offence against this Law or a previous corresponding law; or (ii) an offence involving fraud or dishonesty punishable on conviction by imprisonment of 6 months or more, whether committed in this jurisdiction or elsewhere; (d) since the accreditation was granted, there has been a change in the circumstances that were relevant to the Regulator's decision to grant the accreditation and, had the changed circumstances existed when the accreditation was granted, the Regulator would not have granted the accreditation, or would have granted the accreditation subject to conditions or different conditions; 5 HVNL, s4(a). 6 HVNL, s 4(c). 7 HVNL, s 4(e)(ii). 8 Exhibit R4 at [14]-[15]. -- 5 of 17 -- [2026] SADC 52 4 (e) for a maintenance management accreditation or mass management accreditation - (i) public safety has been endangered, or is likely to be endangered, because of the accreditation; or (ii) road infrastructure has been damaged, or is likely to be damaged, because of the accreditation; (f) for a BFM accreditation or AFM accreditation – public safety has been endangered, or is likely to be endangered, because of the accreditation; (g) the Regulator considers it necessary in the public interest. Background to the stay application 14 On 24 April 2026 the Regulator decided to cancel the accreditations previously held by Sunrise in Mass Management, Maintenance Management and BFM modules of the Accreditation System. The Regulator gave detailed written reasons for its decision. The decision took effect on 1 May 2026. 15 On 29 April 2026 Sunrise sought internal review of the decision to cancel its accreditations pursuant to section 641 of the HNVL. There is no dispute that the Regulator’s decision is a “Reviewable Decision” under the HNVL. Under section 645(1) of the HVNL the Regulator must make its decision on the internal review by 27 May 2026 (being within 28 days of the application for internal review).9 16 On 30 April 2026 Sunrise filed an originating application in this Court seeking a stay of the Regulator’s cancellation decision pursuant to section 642(2) of the HVNL. Section 642 provides: (emphasis added) 642—Stay of reviewable decisions made by Regulator or authorised officer (1) This section applies to— (a) a reviewable decision made by the Regulator other than a decision made on the basis of a public safety ground; or (b) a reviewable decision made by an authorised officer. (2) If a person makes a review application for the reviewable decision, the person may immediately apply for a stay of the decision to the relevant appeal body. (3) The relevant appeal body may stay the reviewable decision to secure the effectiveness of the review and any later appeal to the body. (4) In setting the time for hearing the stay application, the relevant appeal body must allow at least 3 business days between the day the application is filed with it and the hearing day. (5) The Regulator is a party to the application. 9 Also see HVNL, s 645(6)(b) (definition of “prescribed period”). -- 6 of 17 -- [2026] SADC 52 5 (6) The person must serve a copy of the application showing the time and place of the hearing, and any document filed in the relevant appeal body with the application, on the Regulator at least 2 business days before the hearing. (7) The stay— (a) may be given on conditions the relevant appeal body considers appropriate; and (b) operates for the period specified by the relevant appeal body; and (c) may be revoked or amended by the relevant appeal body. (8) The period of a stay under this section must not extend past the time when the reviewer reviews the reviewable decision and any later period the relevant appeal body allows the applicant to enable the applicant to appeal against the decision. 17 Section 640 states that the reference to “public safety ground” requires the Regulator being satisfied that making the decision is necessary to prevent a significant risk to public safety.10 18 “Public safety” is defined under section 5 of the HVNL to mean: the safety of persons or property, including the safety of— (a) the drivers of, and passengers and other persons in, vehicles and combinations; and (b) persons or property in or in the vicinity of, or likely to be in or in the vicinity of, road infrastructure and public places; and (c) vehicles and combinations and any loads in them; Hearing of the stay application 19 It is uncontroversial that this Court is a relevant appeal body for the purposes of section 642.11 The application was heard before another judge of this Court on 6 May 2026, who for reasons unconnected to the application, was not in a position to be able to deliver this judgment. I have had the benefit of reading the transcript from the hearing.12 I also have the benefit of substantive written submissions of the parties, including submissions made following the hearing of the application.13 I have also read the originating application, the response and the affidavits tendered by the parties. 20 The following affidavits were tendered by Sunrise: an affidavit of Sharon Middleton made on 29 April 2026;14 10 NHVL, s 640. 11 HVNL Act, s 10. 12 As corrected on 12 May 2026. 13 FDN 9, FDN 11 and FDN 13. 14 Exhibit A1. -- 7 of 17 -- [2026] SADC 52 6 two affidavits of Mr Harsimranjit Singh made on 30 April and 5 May 2026 respectively.15 21 The Regulator tendered an affidavit of Mr Steven James Miller made on 6 May 2026.16 22 These affidavits were received into evidence and there was no challenge. No one was cross examined. 23 Ms Middleton’s affidavit describes the relationship between her road transport company, Whiteline Transport (Aust.) Pty. Ltd, and Sunrise, where Sunrise has been engaged as a tow haulier to Sydney since 2022 and in more recent times to Perth. She describes the impact of Sunrise losing its accreditations, stating that “Sunrise Adelaide will simply not be able to perform work for us, and we will have no choice but to terminate their services”.17 24 Mr Singh is a director of Sunrise and deposed to the operations of Sunrise, its accreditations and the significant financial and other impacts on its business operations, employees and others of the Regulator’s cancellation decision. His first affidavit also set out the compliance arrangements that Sunrise has in place and traversed the interactions with the Regulator leading to the cancellation decision. Annexures to his first affidavit included: • the Regulator’s decision to cancel the accreditations dated 24 April 2026; • the certificates of accreditation held by Sunrise prior to cancellation; • a Proposed Action Notice issued by the Regulator to Sunrise on 10 December 2025 and Sunrise’s response of 2 February 2026; • Sunrise’s application for internal review of the cancellation decision dated 29 April 2026, which enclosed numerous large annexures in support of submissions on the merits review of the decision; and • other documents and correspondence pointing to matters of compliance history and the impact of cancellation on Sunrise’s business. 25 In his second affidavit, Mr Singh sought to correct some of his estimations about the number of trips and distances travelled by vehicles in Sunrise’s fleet, confirming that annual distance travelled totals approximately “12 million kilometres”, including ad hoc work, and involves about “12,500 linehaul movements”.18 15 Exhibits A2 and A3 respectively. 16 Exhibit R4. 17 Exhibit A1 at [6]. 18 Exhibit A3 at [9]. -- 8 of 17 -- [2026] SADC 52 7 26 Mr Miller’s affidavit relevantly details the experience of the Regulator in relation to this matter. Mr Miller’s evidence explains that he is a senior officer responsible for overseeing accreditation and that, although he was not the original decision‑maker, he is familiar with the decision to cancel Sunrise’s accreditations. He outlines the regulatory framework and purpose of the Accreditation System, noting that most operators lawfully operate without accreditation, and observing that Sunrise is now also subject to ordinary requirements. 27 Mr Miller specifically sought to respond to Mr Singh’s evidence by detailing repeated audit non‑conformances, failures to close corrective actions on time, inaccurate internal records, and noting a high rate of detected non‑compliance during Regulator interceptions, including numerous fatigue, maintenance and mass‑related offences. Mr Miller emphasises that accreditation gives operational concessions that increase public safety risks if systems fail, and stated that, given Sunrise’s “sustained and systemic non‑compliance” despite lesser interventions, the Regulator considers “continuation of the accreditations would pose an ongoing and unacceptable risk to public safety”. Was the cancellation decision made on the basis of a “public safety ground”? 28 The threshold question for determination is whether the Regulator’s decision to cancel Sunrise’s accreditations by its notice of 24 April 2026 was made on the basis of a public safety ground. If so, a stay cannot be entertained by operation of section 642(1)(a) of the HVNL. Sunrise’s submissions 29 On this issue, Sunrise submitted that the Regulator had not, in fact or in law, made the cancellation decision “on the basis of a public safety ground” within the meaning of sections 640 and 642 of the HVNL. As a result, Sunrise said that the exclusionary clause in section 642(1)(a) did not operate, and the Court retained power to grant a stay. 30 Sunrise emphasised that the public safety exclusion is a jurisdictional fact, and the Court must be satisfied that the Regulator actually made the decision because it was satisfied there was a significant risk to public safety, not merely because the subject matter involved safety regulation. In her oral submissions, counsel for Sunrise also stressed that the Court must look to what the Regulator actually decided, not what might be inferred after the event and once litigation has commenced.19 31 Sunrise pointed to the reasons for cancellation which did not expressly state that the Regulator was satisfied the accreditation posed a “significant risk to public safety”. Sunrise said that the Regulator did not identify or apply section 640, nor express the requisite statutory satisfaction required to engage the public‑safety bar 19 T11.6-10. -- 9 of 17 -- [2026] SADC 52 8 to a stay. Sunrise maintained that general references to safety, compliance, or regulatory objectives are insufficient to trigger the bar in section 642(1)(a). 32 Counsel for Sunrise emphasised the language used by Parliament under: (i) paragraphs (e) and (f) of section 473(1), which both adopt the words: “public safety has been endangered, or is likely to be endangered, because of the accreditation”; and (ii) the different language adopted under section 642(1)(a), which by reference to “public safety ground” incorporates the words from the definition in section 640: “being satisfied that making the decision is necessary to prevent a significant risk to public safety”. Counsel for Sunrise submitted that these were two different formulations for intentionally different threshold tests that had been deliberately chosen by Parliament, and that satisfaction of the lower one (for section 473) did not equate to the other higher one (for section 640) automatically being satisfied.20 33 Sunrise also relied upon the context of the HVNL. In particular, counsel for Sunrise noted that various provisions in Chapters 4 (Vehicle operations – mass, dimension and loading) and 6 (Vehicle operations – driver fatigue) of the HVNL adopted the express phrase “significant risk to public safety”.21 For example, section 177 provides a ground for the amending or cancelling of a mass or dimension authority if: “the use of heavy vehicles on a road under the authority has caused, or is likely to cause, a significant risk to public safety”. Relevantly, such an amendment or cancellation decision is also a “reviewable decision” for the purposes of section 642.22 This she contended was squarely within the scope of the exclusion under section 642(1)(a), and contrasts to the “endangering of public safety” formulation under paragraphs (e) and (f) of section 473(1). 34 In support of this narrow construction, and noting the special provisions for the use of extrinsic material to interpret the HNVL,23 Sunrise pointed to the second reading speech describing the proposed operation of section 642, particularly the following passage:24 Section 642 allows a person who applied for review of a reviewable decision of the Regulator … to apply to the relevant appeal body for a stay of the decision being reviewed. Reviewable decisions made on the basis of a public safety ground are excluded as it is not appropriate for decisions to amend or cancel an exemption or a mass or dimension authority for public safety reasons to be stayed. 35 Counsel for Sunrise pointed to this passage being consistent with the types of decision-making under Chapters 4 and 6 of the HVNL, and not to decision- making under Chapter 8 (Accreditation). 20 T12.2-16. 21 T8.15-16 and T8.30-35: HNVL, ss 118, 124, 139, 145, 154, 156A, 163, 173, 174, 177, 178, 358 and 362. 22 HVNL, Sch. 3. 23 HVNL, Sch. 1, s 8(2). 24 South Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Assembly, 2 May 2013 (Hon. A Koutsantonis, Minister for Transport and Infrastructure). -- 10 of 17 -- [2026] SADC 52 9 Regulator’s submissions 36 The Regulator relies upon the written reasons for the cancellation decision.25 The Regulator contends that because those reasons expressly rely upon sections 473(1)(e)(i) and (f) of the HVNL,26 which each provide stand-alone grounds for cancellation where public safety “has been or is likely to be endangered”; those grounds represent central grounds, and not just incidental grounds, to the Regulator’s decision. 37 The Regulator submitted in reading the reasons for the cancellation decision fairly, and as a whole, and adopting the orthodox “beneficial construction” of administrative reasons, the Regulator was plainly satisfied that cancellation was necessary to prevent a significant risk to public safety within the meaning of section 640 of the HVNL, even though the precise statutory phrase is not expressly repeated in those reasons. 38 Further, the Regulator maintained that the reasons for cancellation identify sustained, systemic, and recurring non-compliance across fatigue, maintenance and mass management, including multiple major defects, numerous fatigue offences, ineffective safety management systems, failure of internal controls, and an inability or unwillingness to recognise the seriousness of that offending. The Regulator submitted that, together, those findings establish that the accreditations themselves were posing an unacceptable safety risk, and that cancellation was required in the interest of public safety. 39 The Regulator relies on Milko Livestock Pty Ltd v NHVR27 as directly on point. That decision, made by the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal, is not binding on this Court. In that case the Tribunal determined that where public safety is a fundamental element of the decision-maker’s reasoning, the decision must be characterised as having been “made on the basis of a public safety ground” for the purposes of the relevant pre-condition,28 even if other grounds are also present. The Tribunal gave particular emphasis to the word “basis”, as used in the pre-condition, as suggesting a “wider net cast capturing decisions identifying as a fundamental constituent or principal element a public safety ground”.29 40 In Milko the Regulator had included precise wording in its reasons for decision reflective of a “public safety ground”, being: “At this stage, I am unable to be satisfied that Milko Livestock’s accreditation will not pose a significant risk to public safety such that it will not endanger or likely to endanger public safety”. Though expressed as a double-negative, the statement clearly articulates a basis for the Regulator’s decision being grounded upon the continuing accreditation 25 Exhibit A2 at HS-1 (letter from NHVR to Mr Fragnito of KJK Legal dated 24 April 2026). 26 Exhibit A2 at HS-1 pages 16, 21 to 23 of 341. 27 [2026] QCAT 112. 28 In that case the relevant provision was section 648(1)(a) relating to a stay following an appeal of a review decision, which is in equivalent terms to section 642(1)(a) relating to the stay of a reviewable decision pending the outcome of an internal review. 29 Milko at [31]. -- 11 of 17 -- [2026] SADC 52 10 posing a significant risk to public safety. Sunrise emphasised that there is not similar mirror language in the reasons for decision of the Regulator here. 41 The Regulator submits that to accept Sunrise’s contrary construction would undermine the statutory scheme, permit form to prevail over substance, and circumvent the clear intention of Parliament that decisions taken to protect public safety should not be suspended pending review. On that basis alone, the Regulator contends the stay application is ultra vires and must be dismissed, without the Court reaching the discretionary stay factors. 42 The Regulator rejected Sunrise’s contention that absence of the express words “significant risk” in the reasons for cancellation was determinative, relying on Wu Shan Liang principles that administrative decision-maker reasons are to be read fairly and as a whole, not with “fine-tooth comb” scrutiny.30 43 The Regulator submitted that Sunrise’s attempt to confine “public safety grounds” to decisions under other parts of the HVNL (notably Chapters 6 and 8) is misconceived and inconsistent with the statutory text and scheme. The Regulator argued that this comparative, structural approach impermissibly treats different regulatory mechanisms as reflecting different levels of public safety concern, when in fact they address different functions in managing safety risk. The Regulator categorised Chapters 6 and 8 as dealing with immediate, frontline enforcement to control acute risks (such as unsafe vehicles or operations at a point in time), whereas the accreditation regime is directed to systemic and ongoing public safety risk arising from granting operators regulatory privileges and concessions. The Regulator said that section 473 expressly incorporates public safety as a cancellation ground, using language that public safety “has been, or is likely to be, endangered”, and the contended that it would be incoherent if decisions taken on that very basis were nevertheless excluded from being characterised as made on a public safety ground for the purposes of sections 640 and 642. 44 Further, the Regulator submitted that nothing in the HVNL suggests Parliament intended a narrow or hierarchical conception of public safety confined to emergency-style powers, and that Sunrise’s construction would substantially hollow out section 642 in the accreditation context, allowing decisions taken to prevent ongoing safety risk to be stayed simply because they arise under a different Chapter of the HVNL. That outcome, the Regulator said, is inconsistent with the express language of section 473, the integrated operation of the regulatory framework, and authority (in Milko) recognising that accreditation cancellations grounded in systemic safety failures may properly be characterised as public safety decisions. Consideration 45 Whether the Court has power to grant a stay turns on whether the impugned decision was “made on the basis of a public safety ground” within the meaning of 30 Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6. -- 12 of 17 -- [2026] SADC 52 11 sections 640 and 642 of the HVNL. That question is anterior to, and discrete from, the discretionary considerations ordinarily governing applications for a stay. It is also discrete from the question as to whether the stay application has utility. 46 Whether a decision was made on the basis of a public safety ground is a jurisdictional fact to be determined by the Court. It does not depend on how the parties characterise the decision in submissions, but on what the Regulator in fact decided and why.31 47 The appropriate inquiry directs the Court’s attention to the actual basis of the Regulator’s reasoning, not to what might have justified the same outcome, nor to after the event rationalisations advanced in litigation. The real question is whether public safety (within the meaning of that term in section 640) constituted an actual, substantive and operative reason for the decision.32 To this end it is necessary to construe the whole of the written reasons for the Regulator’s decision on 24 April 2026. 48 The construction exercise must have regard to administrative reasons being read fairly, beneficially and as a whole, without an eye keenly attuned to error, and without insisting on mechanical recitation of statutory language.33 The Court must be careful not to supply an unexpressed statutory satisfaction, or reconstruct a reasoning path, not disclosed by the reasons.34 Put simply, this entails the Court determining whether that satisfaction is disclosed by the reasons as expressed. 49 To my mind, a decision may be “made on the basis of a public safety ground” even though the words: “significant risk to public safety” are not precisely expressed in the written reasons. What is required is that the reasons, read as a whole, disclose that the Regulator was satisfied that continuation of the accreditations posed a risk to public safety of a kind that warranted cancellation in order to prevent its occurrence; that is, a risk properly characterised as significant within the meaning of section 640. In contrast, I accept that the mere presence of safety‑related language in the reasons, or the fact that the object of the HVNL is directed to public safety, does not of itself engage the exclusion. 50 The Regulator could not be expected to use the precise words “significant risk to public safety” in its reasons for decision to cancel the accreditations pursuant to section 473, when that is not the language of the test for cancellation under section 473. To my mind, it could be problematic to insert those words in a cancellation decision when that is not the issue in contention at that time. The deliberate use of that language in those circumstances could be construed as mischievous; a mechanism to forestall a later stay application. 31 Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 123 at [24]–[25], [27]; 32 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at [69]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421 at [45]–[47], [106]. 33 Wu Shan Liang at 271–272. 34 Yusuf at [69]. -- 13 of 17 -- [2026] SADC 52 12 51 Further, I do not consider that public safety need be the sole basis of the decision. It is sufficient if the significant risk to public safety was a fundamental or determinative element of the reasoning process. A decision may rest on multiple grounds and still be one made “on the basis of” public safety for the purposes of the statutory exclusion,35 as long as public safety was fundamental or determinative to the decision. 52 The purpose of the HVNL, including the evident legislative intention that decisions taken to protect public safety should not be readily suspended, may inform construction. That purpose or legislative intention cannot, however, displace the statutory requirement that the decision be made on the expressed basis set out in the text of the pre-condition provision.36 53 The second reading speech to the HVNL Bill does not advance the construction of sections 640 and 642. While there can be recourse to extrinsic materials, such materials cannot be used to displace the statutory text or introduce limitations not otherwise supported by it. This is particularly so where I do not accept the provision is ambiguous or obscure, or on its ordinary meaning would lead to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.37 The passage relied upon by Sunrise in the second reading speech identifies particular examples of decisions taken for public safety reasons, but I do not accept that passage operates to define or confine the expression “public safety ground”. That concept is instead defined in section 640 in general terms by reference to the Regulator’s state of satisfaction as to significant risk and is not conditioned by reference to the category of decision in which it arises. To read the second reading speech as limiting the operation of section 642 to particular classes of decisions would be to introduce an unexpressed restriction on the statutory language. 54 Further, I note the submissions of Sunrise that, having regard to the whole of the HVNL, the express adoption of the phrase “significant risk to public safety” in Chapters 4 and 6 might point to a legislative intention that the only decisions caught by the statutory exclusion of a stay application are those where correlative statutory grounds pick up that precise language; and that there are deliberately different threshold tests. However, I do not think sections 640 and 642(1)(a) are designed to operate in that confined way. 55 The text of section 640 does not itself dictate a narrow compass by reference only to those legislated grounds which pick up that precise language; to do so would mean that, even where the Regulator is satisfied that ongoing accreditation endangers public safety, accreditation cancellations would then almost never fall within the stay exclusion under section 642(1)(a). This would significantly undermine the legislative choice to exclude stays where public safety is engaged, particularly in relation to operators enjoying regulatory concessions. 35 Milko at [31]. 36 Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 at [69]–[71]. 37 HVML, Sch. 1, ss 8(2)(a) and (b). -- 14 of 17 -- [2026] SADC 52 13 56 Further, there would not seem to be any rational basis to suppose Parliament intended accreditation-based decisions posing significant risk to the public to be more readily stayed than other safety-protective decisions. The narrow approach to construction urged by Sunrise is flawed because it rests on an unduly semantic comparison between different statutory expressions and purports to introduce an unexpressed hierarchy of safety risk across the HVNL. There is no indication in the text or structure of the HVNL that Parliament intended to create a graded scheme whereby findings that public safety “has been, or is likely to be, endangered” fall short, as a matter of principle, of the kind of public safety concerns capable of engaging section 640. 57 On the contrary, the language of “endangerment” is inherently serious and, in an accreditation context, where operators are entrusted with systemic, ongoing responsibilities affecting road safety, a finding of repeated non-compliance, major defects, and ineffective safety systems exposing road users to danger is naturally understood as describing a state of affairs involving significant and continuing risk to public safety. It is implicit in a finding that public safety has been endangered or is likely to be endangered that the risk posed by the impugned activity is real and present and is significant and not hypothetical. The question that arises is not whether different words have been used in the decision, but whether the Regulator’s reasons disclose, in substance, a decision made because the continuation of accreditation posed an unacceptable risk to public safety - and therefore came within the description of being a significant risk to public safety. 58 That said, I accept that in applying these principles, it is necessary to distinguish between: (i) decisions cancelling or suspending accreditations because of non‑compliance, audit failure or regulatory discipline, even where those matters touch on safety; and (ii) decisions cancelling or suspending approvals because continued operation under the accreditation itself poses an unacceptable risk to public safety. Only the latter engage the public safety exclusion under section 642(1)(a). 59 Accordingly, turning to the present matter, the Court must determine: (i) whether the Regulator made findings that continuation of the accreditations for Sunrise created, or were likely to create, a significant risk to public safety; and (ii) whether those findings formed a substantive reason for the decision to cancel the accreditations. 60 If so, the exclusion in section 642 is engaged and the Court lacks power to grant a stay. If not, the Court retains jurisdiction to consider the stay on its merits. 61 To this end, I have carefully considered the Regulator’s reasons for its decision to cancel Sunrise’s accreditations set out in the Regulator’s letter to -- 15 of 17 -- [2026] SADC 52 14 Sunrise’s lawyers dated 24 April 2026.38 I find that there is a sufficient foundation provided by those reasons to determine that the Regulator held serious concerns about the dangers posed to public safety if Sunrise were to be permitted to maintain its accreditations. This is particularly evident in the reasons expressed for findings related to the grounds at paragraphs (e) and (f) of section 473(1). For its findings on each of those grounds the Regulator concludes: • as to the Maintenance Management and Mass Management Accreditation (s 473(1)(e)):39 The fundamental failures of Sunrise Adelaide’s safety management systems and operational practices, combined with the repeated attempts to justify or normalise defects as an inevitable consequence of the scale of operations, creates a foreseeable risk that public safety is likely to be endangered if Sunrise Adelaide continues to hold Maintenance Management and Mass Management accreditation. • as to the BFM accreditation (s 473(1)(f)):40 I am satisfied that the Fatigue Offences, when considered in their totality, demonstrate that Sunrise Adelaide’s fatigue management systems are not operating effectively and are incapable of reliably controlling fatigue risk. Further, the repeated attempts to minimise offending suggests a culture of non-compliance or a lack of appreciation for the safety risks arising from non-compliance with fatigue requirement under the NHVAS. I find that, if Sunrise Adelaide were to continue to hold BFM accreditation, public safety is likely to be endangered. Therefore, cancellation is necessary. 62 These matters are fortified by the Regulator’s reasons at section 5 of the letter relating to the “public interest” ground (s 473(1)(g)), where the Regulator states:41 Your submission that cancellation of accreditation “could not realistically expect to deliver any reduction in the alleged risk to public safety” is, in my view, another attempt to minimise the significance of the offending. I find that, the failure to appreciate the public safety risks that flow from ineffective systems and internal controls, along with the attempts to excuse or deflect responsibility, undermines confidence that Sunrise Adelaide’s culture, systems or attitude will improve. In the interest of public safety, cancellation is justified. 63 To my mind, the reasons of the Regulator for cancelling Sunrise’s accreditations make it abundantly clear that the Regulator held serious concerns for the risks to public safety if Sunrise continued to hold its accreditations. On a review of the reasons, these concerns cannot be characterised as cursory or merely touching on safety; they were core concerns of the Regulator which formed a basis for its decision to cancel Sunrise’s accreditations. 38 Exhibit A2 (HS-1). 39 Ibid at page 8 of the letter (p 22 of 341). 40 Ibid at page 9 of the letter (p 23 of 341). 41 Ibid. -- 16 of 17 -- [2026] SADC 52 15 64 Therefore, I find that the Regulator’s decision to cancel Sunrise’s accreditations was made on the basis of a public safety ground and Sunrise’s application for a stay of the decision must be dismissed. Other matters 65 Given my conclusion on the statutory exclusion under section 642(1)(a), it is neither necessary nor appropriate for me to now engage in a hypothetical exercise of determining whether the Court would have power to grant a retrospective stay or to consider the usual discretionary factors for determination of a stay application. This is particularly so because the issue of public safety would also be central to determination of those other questions and to embark upon that analysis might invite hypothetical and contradictory findings on public safety aspects of the Regulator’s decision. As such, I have declined to record those alternative findings that would necessarily traverse an uncertain hypothetical foundation. 66 For the avoidance of doubt, I also note that this determination has been strictly confined to the anterior question of jurisdiction under section 642, which turns on the proper characterisation of the basis upon which the Regulator made its decision; without any evaluation of its correctness. As such, the Court has not engaged in any merits review, weighed the evidentiary foundation for the decision, or determined whether the conclusions reached by the Regulator were justified. Nothing in these reasons should be taken as endorsing, or rejecting, the substance of the Regulator’s findings, which remain the subject of the ongoing internal review process established by the HVNL. For the same reason, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to address Sunrise’s allegations of procedural unfairness or other asserted grounds of challenge. Those matters concern the validity or propriety of the decision and are reserved for determination within the statutory review framework. The present task has been limited to whether, on a fair reading of the reasons, the Regulator’s decision was made on the basis of a public safety ground, such that the statutory condition for the exercise of the Court’s power to grant a stay is not satisfied. Orders 67 The Applicant’s application for a stay of the Respondent’s decision is dismissed. 68 Having dismissed the application, the usual position is that costs follow the event. I will hear the parties as to any different order, but prima facie Sunrise should pay the Regulator’s costs of the application on the standard basis. -- 17 of 17 --