PHOEBE BUCKLEY (a pseudonym) -v- DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS [2026] WASCA 98

[2026] WASCA 98 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA) CITATION : PHOEBE BUCKLEY (a pseudonym) -v- DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS [No 2] [2026] WASCA 98 CORAM : VAUGHAN JA HALL JA SWEENEY JA HEARD : 25 JUNE 2026 DELIVERED : 15 JULY 2026 FILE NO/S : CACR 78 of 2025 BETWEEN : PHOEBE BUCKLEY (a pseudonym) Appellant AND DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS Respondent ON APPEAL FROM: Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Coram : WHITBY J File Number : SJA XXXX of 20XX Catchwords: Criminal law - Appeal against conviction - Indecent act in public - Failing to -- 1 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 Page 2 give personal details - Obstructing police - Whether verdicts were unreasonable or unsupported by evidence - Whether act was indecent - Whether police direction to provide personal details was lawful - Whether detention of appellant for purposes of ascertaining her identity was lawful - Whether failure of prosecution to call one of the police officers caused miscarriage of justice - Whether refusal of trial magistrate to admit medical records was in error - Whether there are grounds for reasonable perception that trial magistrate was biased Legislation: Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 39, s 40 Criminal Code (WA), s 172(2), s 203(1)(a) Criminal Investigation (Identifying People) Act 2002 (WA), s 16 Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA), s 11, s 27, s 31(2) Result: Extension of time to appeal refused Leave to appeal refused Appeal dismissed Category: B Representation: Counsel: Appellant : In person Respondent : B M Murray Solicitors: Appellant : In person Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Courtney (a pseudonym) v The State of Western Australia [2026] WASCA 86 Dansie v The Queen [2022] HCA 25; (2022) 274 CLR 651 Drago v The Queen (1992) 8 WAR 448 -- 2 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 Page 3 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 Jones v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 115 Mansell v State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 223 Mansell v The State of Western Australia [No 6] [2013] WASCA 120 Parfenova v Diss [2021] WASCA 50 R v Apostilides [1984] HCA 38; (1984) 154 CLR 563 R v Harkin (1989) 38 A Crim R 296 Wright v McMurchy [2012] WASCA 257 XYZ v The State of Western Australia [2025] WASCA 135 -- 3 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 4 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: 1 On the morning of Sunday, 10 December 2023, the police received a report of a woman and a man acting indecently in close proximity to a children's playground on the Rockingham foreshore. Police officers attended and located the appellant and a male companion lying on the grass. The police indicated that they would issue a move on order. When asked to provide her personal particulars, the appellant gave a false name. She then fled, despite being directed to remain, and was chased down and arrested. 2 The appellant was charged with committing an indecent act in public, failing to comply with a request by a police officer to provide her personal details and obstructing a public officer. She was convicted of those offences after a trial in the Magistrates Court. She then appealed against her conviction to a single judge of the General Division of the Supreme Court. That appeal was dismissed. She now seeks leave to appeal from the decision of the single judge. 3 The appellant is self-represented. She demonstrated limited ability to formulate proper grounds of appeal. The appellant's submissions are confused, diffuse, and frequently inconsequential. They contain misstatements of the law and misuse of legal terminology. Every possible allowance has been made in these reasons to ensure that the essential points raised by the appellant have been addressed. 4 The notice of appeal was filed 10 days out of time and an extension is required. In an affidavit in support of an application for an extension of time the appellant states, in the briefest terms, that the notice was filed late 'due to unforeseen medical circumstances, and the need for legal advice'. No details are provided. Whilst the delay is relatively short, it has not been satisfactorily explained. In these circumstances, whether an extension is granted depends on the merits of the grounds of appeal. 5 There are eight grounds of appeal. The essence of each of the grounds is as follows. Ground 1 alleges that the evidence was incapable of establishing the offences and that the primary appeal judge (who, for convenience, we will refer to as the 'primary judge') overlooked or ignored critical evidence. Ground 2 alleges that the primary judge erred by failing to find that a miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of the prosecutor not calling a witness to give evidence. Ground 3 alleges that the police officers acted unlawfully. -- 4 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 5 Ground 4 alleges that the magistrate erred in law in finding that the police officers were entitled to detain the appellant. Ground 5 alleges that the verdict of guilty of doing an indecent act was unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence. Ground 6 alleges that the verdict of guilty of obstructing a public officer was unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence. Ground 7 alleges that the trial was unfair because the magistrate interrupted the appellant and that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias. Ground 8 alleges that the appellant was denied procedural fairness by not being permitted to adduce medical reports. 6 A number of these grounds, as framed, make no allegation of error by the primary judge. Rather, they approach this appeal as if it was simply another appeal from the decision of the magistrate. Whilst this ignores the proper role of this court,1 we will deal with each of the grounds in the reasons that follow. The prosecution case 7 The prosecution case was that at about 11.00 am on Sunday, 10 December 2023, the appellant was with a male companion at a public park on the foreshore in Rockingham.2 They were lying together on the grass. They were in close proximity to a busy playground, where children and their parents were in attendance. 8 Constable Dane Crossland and Senior Constable Andrew Borlase received a job on the police radio to attend at the park. They arrived at the park and walked towards the playground. Once Constable Crossland approached the couple, he activated his body-worn camera (BWC).3 There was also a CCTV camera in the area that captured footage of the appellant and her companion as Constable Crossland and Senior Constable Borlase approached them.4 9 The CCTV footage shows that the couple were a few metres from the playground, with children and adults close by. The appellant was lying on her back with the male to her side and leaning over her slightly. The man's hand moved from the appellant's breast region down to her hip, then back up onto her breast, which he fondled over her clothing, before moving his hand towards the middle of her chest and under her outer clothing. The appellant was wearing a light, 1 See Wright v McMurchy [2012] WASCA 257 [25] - [29] (Pullin JA, with Mazza JA agreeing), [96] - [97] (Buss JA); Parfenova v Diss [2021] WASCA 50 [54]. 2 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 5. 3 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 6 - 7. 4 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 54 - 55. -- 5 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 6 loosely-fitting dress with a bikini underneath. The appellant appeared to be a willing participant in this activity. She took no steps to resist the man's attention, her left hand can be seen in the footage to be stroking his right shoulder and upper back and the base of his neck, and she shows no sign of distress. 10 The police officers spoke to the appellant and her companion, who both stood up. Constable Crossland told the appellant that she had committed an offence and asked for her personal details. The appellant provided a false name.5 Senior Constable Borlase told the couple that they would be issued with a move on order under s 27 of the Criminal Investigation Act 2006 (WA) (the CIA). He then returned to the police van to obtain the necessary paperwork. 11 Constable Crossland directed the appellant to remain with him whilst he ascertained her identity. The appellant did not comply with this direction and started to walk away.6 She was told not to leave or she would be arrested. She then began to run. After a short chase, Constable Crossland took the appellant to the ground, where there was a brief struggle before she was arrested. 12 The appellant was charged with one count of doing an indecent act in a public place, contrary to s 203(1)(a) of the Criminal Code (WA) (the Code); one count of failing to comply with a request to give police personal details, contrary to s 16(6) of the Criminal Investigation (Identifying People) Act 2002 (WA) (the CIIPA); and one count of obstructing a public officer in the performance of the officer's functions, contrary to s 172(2) of the Code. The evidence 13 The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges. After a number of delays, the matter went to trial in the Magistrates Court on 9 July 2024. The appellant represented herself at the trial. 14 The prosecution called one witness, Constable Crossland. 15 Constable Crossland said that on Sunday, 10 December 2023, he was on duty with Senior Constable Borlase. They were in a marked police vehicle and tasked with responding to jobs in the Rockingham area. 5 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 55. 6 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 10 - 12. -- 6 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 7 16 At approximately 11.10 am, they received a job via the police radio.7 There was a report that a male and a female were acting indecently at the Rockingham foreshore, next to a children's playground. They drove to the foreshore and parked in a car park approximately 100 m from the playground. 17 When the officers got out of their vehicle, they were directed to the location of the appellant and her companion by members of the public. As Constable Crossland approached, he activated his BWC. He described what he saw as being 'a male and a female lying on the ground hugging and kissing, with the male sort of on top of the female'.8 They were next to the playground, and there were multiple members of the public, including children, in the playground. Constable Crossland added that the couple were also fondling, and that the man 'had his hands … on the female's … stomach area'.9 18 Constable Crossland said that he saw the man put his hands down the appellant's top, as well as other places on her body. He said the man's hands were over the breast area and underneath her clothing.10 He could only see that the man's hand was under the top layer of clothing. The appellant was wearing a loose-fitting dress with a bikini underneath. 19 Constable Crossland said that, when he and Senior Constable Borlase were about 2 m from the couple, they advised them that they were from Rockingham police station, identified themselves, and asked what the couple were doing.11 Both the man and the woman stood up and spoke to the police officers. 20 Constable Crossland spoke to the appellant. He advised that she had committed an offence, and that he required her personal details. He said that the appellant initially appeared to be hesitant to provide her name but then said that it was 'Karen O'Reilly' and gave a date of birth.12 He searched the details on the police database using his police issued mobile telephone. He could not locate anyone with that name and date of birth. 7 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 6 - 7. 8 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 7. 9 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 7. 10 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 8. 11 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 8. 12 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 9. -- 7 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 8 21 Constable Crossland advised the appellant of the negative result, and she repeated the name, including by spelling the name 'O'Reilly'. A further search again produced a negative result.13 When informed of this, the appellant continued to maintain that the name she had provided was correct. Constable Crossland said he believed that he also asked the appellant to spell the first name that she had given. 22 Constable Crossland could not recall exactly what the appellant then said, though it was something to the effect that she had not committed any offences and was not required to give her personal details. Constable Crossland then advised the appellant that she was detained until he could determine her identity. 23 At this point, Senior Constable Borlase walked back to the police vehicle to obtain a move on order book. Constable Crossland told the appellant that once he could confirm her identity, they could issue a written move on order, and she would have to leave the public area.14 Constable Crossland said that the basis for issuing the move on order was that he believed that the appellant had committed an offence. 24 Constable Crossland remained with the appellant and her male companion in the spot where they had been lying, which was approximately 3 m from the playground. Constable Crossland continued to ask the appellant for her personal details. The appellant then stated that in her view she was not detained and was free to leave. He advised her that she was detained and could not go anywhere until he could confirm her identity. The appellant then began to walk away. 25 Constable Crossland told the appellant to stop multiple times, adding that if she did not she would be arrested. When she was approximately 10 m away, the appellant began to run and Constable Crossland chased her. As he did so, he said, 'Stop or you will be arrested'.15 The appellant did not stop, and Constable Crossland caught up with her after approximately 20 m to 30 m. He took her to the ground as softly as he could. She actively resisted him and refused when he directed her to place her hands behind her back. The appellant was saying, 'You can't do this I've got a sore back'.16 26 Constable Crossland took hold of the appellant's hands, and the appellant pulled away and resisted. Senior Constable Borlase then 13 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 10. 14 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 10 - 11. 15 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 11. 16 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 12. -- 8 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 9 arrived and assisted with putting the appellant in handcuffs. The appellant was then escorted to the police vehicle. Senior Constable Borlase advised the appellant that she was under arrest for obstructing police, failure to give personal details or providing false details, and doing an indecent act in public. 27 The appellant was conveyed to the Rockingham Police Station, where further enquiries regarding her personal details were made.17 The appellant later provided the correct personal details. That occurred approximately 30 minutes after she arrived at the Rockingham police station. 28 Constable Crossland subsequently made enquiries regarding whether there were any CCTV monitors in the area of the Rockingham foreshore where the incident occurred. Discs containing the BWC footage of Constable Crossland and two CCTV files were tendered in evidence.18 29 The BWC footage is consistent with the evidence of Constable Crossland. In particular, the appellant can be heard giving the false name 'O'Reilly', and spelling it when she is asked to do so. She can be heard saying that she intends to leave, and Constable Crossland can be heard telling her that she cannot do so and that she is being detained pending confirmation of her identity and the issuing of a move on order. 30 The CCTV footage shows the appellant and her male companion lying on grass in very close proximately to the children's playground. The appellant is lying on her back, with her male companion to her side and slightly over her. He can be seen with his left hand on her right breast, which he moves on the exposed skin and under her dress. These movements continue as the police officers approach. 31 The CCTV footage shows Constable Crossland checking his mobile telephone, and Senior Constable Borlase walking away to get the move on book. The appellant, her male companion and Constable Crossland begin to walk in the direction of the police vehicle. The appellant then suddenly turns around and walks away, followed by Constable Crossland. She breaks into a run and is pursued out of sight. 17 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 13. 18 Exhibits A and B, respectively. -- 9 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 10 32 Much of the cross-examination related to irrelevant matters. The appellant questioned Constable Crossland about his police oath,19 whether reports had been received from multiple members of the public,20 and the meaning of indecency.21 She also asked about what Constable Crossland had observed. He confirmed that he saw the man's hand move underneath the appellant's clothing, though he could not say whether the hand was also under the bikini top. 33 Constable Crossland agreed that, when the police officers first arrived, Senior Constable Borlase said, 'You need to gather up your things and leave please'.22 He could not recall whether Senior Constable Borlase had repeated that direction. However, Constable Crossland said that he then advised the appellant that she was detained until he had figured out her personal details. 34 The appellant asked where Senior Constable Borlase was at the present time (that is, the time of the trial), and Constable Crossland said that he believed Senior Constable Borlase was on annual leave.23 35 The appellant stated that she had given her real first name rather than 'Karen',24 though she moved to another question without obtaining a response from Constable Crossland to that assertion. 36 The appellant suggested that she could have been an unwilling participant and that she was being sexually assaulted by her male companion. Constable Crossland said that it appeared to him that she was a willing participant.25 In re-examination he said that the appellant did not make any complaint regarding her male companion.26 37 The appellant elected not to give evidence. The difference between making submissions and giving evidence was explained by the magistrate. His Honour told the appellant that she could not make assertions of fact in submissions that were not supported by sworn evidence.27 19 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 16. 20 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 17 - 18. 21 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 21 - 23. 22 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 23. 23 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 27. 24 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 25. 25 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 26 - 27. 26 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 50. 27 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 50 - 52. -- 10 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 11 38 The appellant mentioned that she had medical reports relating to osteoarthritis in her hands, and from a psychiatrist to the effect that she suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). She suggested that those reports were relevant to whether she had obstructed Constable Crossland when he arrested her. The magistrate pointed out that he could not receive the reports because the authors were not present.28 His Honour said that if the appellant wished to rely on those medical reports in mitigation of penalty in the event that she was convicted, she could do so. The magistrate's reasons 39 The magistrate reserved his decision and gave reasons on 12 August 2024. His Honour summarised the evidence, including the CCTV footage, on which he placed particular reliance. 40 The magistrate was satisfied that the appellant was a willing participant in the touching by her male companion and took no steps to disengage.29 His Honour found that the appellant had given a false name, at least by giving the surname 'O'Reilly'.30 He was satisfied that Constable Crossland told the appellant that she was detained while her identification was ascertained. 41 The magistrate noted that s 16 of the CIIPA empowers a police officer to require a person to provide their name, date of birth, and residential address.31 The police officers had also indicated an intention to give the appellant and her male companion a move on order under s 27 of the CIA. His Honour found that the appellant was not prepared to comply with the direction, and began to walk away. When told that she would be arrested, she commenced running. His Honour said that her running away and resisting Constable Crossland amounted to obstruction. 42 As to the charge of doing an indecent act in public, the magistrate referred to Drago v The Queen.32 He noted that the prosecution was required to prove that the appellant was a party to an indecent act done in a public place. His Honour noted that the time, place and 28 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 53. 29 Magistrates Court transcript, 12 August 2024, 3. 30 Magistrates Court transcript, 12 August 2024, 3 - 4. 31 The magistrate mistakenly gave the section number as s 23, but nothing turns on that error. 32 Drago v The Queen [1992] WASC 489; (1992) 8 WAR 448. -- 11 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 12 circumstances were relevant in considering whether the act was indecent. His Honour then said:33 This was a summer's day at 11 o'clock, lots of people around, close to a playground. The act with the male was clearly [of] a sexual nature, which I find the accused was willing to participate [in]. I find beyond reasonable doubt the behaviour was indecent at the time, place and [in the] circumstances. 43 The magistrate noted that the original intention of the police officers was merely to move the appellant and her companion on, but that the giving by the appellant of a false name had 'put paid to that'.34 His Honour also noted that the male companion avoided repercussions, apparently because he was more cooperative. 44 Having found the appellant guilty on all three charges, the magistrate imposed a global fine of $1,000, suspended for a period of 12 months, and made spent conviction orders in respect of all three offences. Having regard to the spent conviction orders the name of the appellant has been anonymised to protect her identity. As the primary judge's reasons were not anonymised we will refer to those reasons as the 'primary reasons' and omit any reference to the medium neutral citation of those reasons. The primary judge's reasons 45 The appellant appealed her convictions to the primary judge on 63 grounds. The primary judge considered that the grounds of appeal could appropriately be addressed in their relevant categories or themes. Her Honour identified the following six themes:35 1. The Magistrates Court does not have jurisdiction. 2. The West Australian police are not an entity known at law. 3. The prosecution notice was invalid. 4. The learned magistrate was biased. 5. The verdicts were unsupported by the evidence. 6. The appellant's deprivation of an opportunity to cross-examine Senior Constable Borlase gave rise to a miscarriage of justice. 33 Magistrates Court transcript, 12 August 2024, 5. 34 Magistrates Court transcript, 12 August 2024, 5. 35 Primary reasons [30]. -- 12 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 13 Only themes 4, 5 and 6 are relevant to the present appeal. The primary judge found that none of the grounds had any reasonable prospect of success. 46 As regards whether the magistrate was biased, the primary judge said:36 Having reviewed the transcript of the hearing before the learned magistrate, I am not satisfied that the learned magistrate's conduct would cause a fair-minded lay observer to apprehend that he might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the proceeding. The learned magistrate intervened during the trial only to the extent that it was necessary to do so to assist the self-represented appellant and ensure the efficiency of the trial. 47 As regards whether the verdicts were unsupported by the evidence, the primary judge conducted a detailed review of the trial transcript and the exhibits tendered. Her Honour noted that the trial did not substantially rely upon evidence in the form of witness testimony; rather, the case was determined on objective camera footage from the BWC of Constable Crossland and the CCTV footage of the incident. Her Honour said:37 The CCTV footage of the incident clearly shows that the appellant was laying on her back with her knees bent and a man laying by her side. They are kissing. The man puts his left hand on the appellant's waist. The appellant's left hand appears to be on the back of the man's neck and the man's left hand is on the appellant's right breast and then slides to centre of the appellant's chest and then down the appellant's top. This is when the appellant appears to see the police approaching, pulls her dress down and stands up. This occurred in a playground in close proximity to children and their parents. The incident is captured on Constable Crossland's [BWC]. The first 30 seconds of that footage, as is standard practice, has no audio. When the audio commences, Constable Crossland can be heard telling the appellant his camera is on and asking her for her full name and date of birth. Senior Constable Borlase can be seen talking to the man in the background. The appellant can be clearly heard to give her name as Karen O'Reilly and her date of birth as 1 July 1972. The appellant spells that name for Constable Crossland. Constable Crossland and Senior Constable Borlase tell the appellant and the man that they will be issued with a move on notice and that they need to provide their details for this purpose. The appellant can be seen and heard to argue with Constable Crossland before walking away. Constable Crossland can be 36 Primary reasons [54]. 37 Primary reasons [63]. -- 13 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 14 seen to follow the appellant and say to her 'stop or you'll get arrested', and then the appellant begins to run. The appellant's identity was not in issue at the trial. It was also not in issue that the act took place in a public place. The learned magistrate correctly identified the legal principles governing when an indecent act would take place and that the circumstances in which the act took place are relevant to whether the act is indecent. In my view, the act was indecent because the appellant and the man were engaging in overtly sexual behaviour in daylight and in a family environment, being a large and busy playground. It was open to the learned magistrate to find that the appellant was guilty of committing an indecent act in public. I am also satisfied, on the basis of the evidence of Constable Crossland's [BWC] footage, that the appellant failed to comply with Constable Crossland's request for her personal details in circumstances where he was authorised by the [CIIPA] s 16(2) to make such a request. On the evidence before the learned magistrate, it was open for him to find that the appellant was guilty of the offence of failure to comply with a request to give personal details. 48 As regards the lack of opportunity to cross-examine Senior Constable Borlase, the primary judge said:38 In my view, the prosecutor's decision not to call Senior Constable Borlase does not amount to misconduct, nor is does it result in unsatisfactory verdicts being reached by the learned magistrate. Constable Crossland gave uncontradicted evidence that he observed the appellant and the male engaging in the indecent act, that he asked the appellant for her details to which she gave false answers and that he chased after her and brought the appellant to the ground. The objective camera evidence tendered at trial is consistent with his evidence. I am satisfied that there are no adverse consequences to the appellant arising from the prosecutor's decision not to call Senior Constable Borlase to give evidence. There has been no miscarriage of justice. Grounds of appeal 49 The appellant's grounds of appeal are discursive and argumentative. They do not comply with the rules, which require a succinct statement of each ground with concise particulars. The rules 38 Primary reasons [74]. -- 14 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 15 also require the identification of any alleged errors of the primary judge or the basis on which any miscarriage of justice is alleged.39 50 In essence, the grounds of appeal assert as follows: 1. The verdicts were unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence. 2. There was a miscarriage of justice due to the prosecution's failure to call Senior Constable Borlase. 3. The actions of the police officers were unlawful because they failed to identify themselves and failed to comply with the requirements of the CIA. 4. The magistrate made an error of law in finding that Constable Crossland was entitled to detain the appellant pursuant to the CIA. 5. The act established by the evidence was not indecent. 6. The obstruction charge was not open on the evidence because the police officers were not acting in the lawful performance of their duties. 7. There was a miscarriage of justice because the magistrate acted in a manner which raised a reasonable apprehension of bias and denied the appellant procedural fairness. 8. The appellant was denied procedural fairness in not being permitted to adduce evidence of her PTSD. Ground 1 51 There is some overlap in the appellant's submissions on this ground and ground 5. To the extent that the submissions on ground 1 relate to the issue of whether the act was indecent, that issue will be dealt with in the reasons on ground 5. 52 The principles applicable to a ground alleging that a verdict is unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence are well-established. The function to be performed by an appeal court when determining an appeal on an unreasonable verdict ground is not to determine whether there was error in the factual findings on which the primary judge or magistrate relied in ultimately finding the accused guilty. The function 39 Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA), r 32(4). -- 15 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 16 to be performed by the appeal court is to determine for itself whether the evidence was sufficient in nature and quality to eliminate any reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty of that offence.40 53 We have viewed the CCTV and BWC footage and reviewed the evidence of Constable Crossland. The CCTV footage clearly shows the appellant laying on her back whilst her male companion is laying by her side and slightly over her. The description of the primary judge of what can then be seen is entirely accurate. The touching appears to be consensual and of a sexual nature. At one point the man slides his hand under the appellant's dress near her breast. There is no serious dispute that this is what occurred or that it happened in a public place. 54 The BWC footage clearly records Constable Crossland asking the appellant to provide her personal details. This was a lawful request pursuant to s 16(2) of the CIIPA. A failure to comply with such a request, without a reasonable excuse, is an offence pursuant to s 16(6). The appellant can be heard giving the name Karen O'Reilly and then spelling the name O'Reilly. There is no dispute that this was a false name (whether or not the appellant in fact gave her real first name). The giving of a false name is a failure to comply with a request for personal details. 55 The BWC footage clearly records Constable Crossland directing the appellant to remain where she is until her identity can be ascertained. That was a lawful direction pursuant to s 16(4C) of the CIIPA. The fact that the couple had initially been told by Senior Constable Borlase to leave the area must be understood in the context that it was immediately followed by a statement that they would be issued with a move on order. In any event, that statement was made before the false name was given and before Constable Crossland told the appellant that she was detained for the purposes of ascertaining her identity. 56 The appellant could have been under no misapprehension as to what Constable Crossland had said. She simply decided that she would not comply. The BWC footage shows that the appellant walked away and then ran, despite being told to stop. When apprehended she struggled and refused to comply with a direction to place her hands behind her back. By running away and resisting arrest the appellant 40 Dansie v The Queen [2022] HCA 25; (2022) 274 CLR 651 [7], cited in XYZ v The State of Western Australia [2025] WASCA 135 [54]. -- 16 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 17 obstructed Constable Crossland in the performance of his functions as a police officer. 57 It was well open on the evidence for the magistrate to conclude that the appellant was guilty of each of the charges. On our independent assessment of the evidence, we are not left with any doubt as to the guilt of the appellant. The primary judge was not in error in coming to the same conclusion. Ground 2 58 The following propositions in relation to a convicted person's complaint on appeal about the failure of the prosecutor to call a particular person as a witness are well established:41 (a) The prosecutor alone bears the responsibility of deciding whether a person will be called as a witness for the State. (b) The prosecutor's decision not to call a particular person as a witness will only constitute a ground for setting aside a conviction if, when viewed against the conduct of the trial as a whole, the decision gives rise to a miscarriage of justice. (c) It is necessary, in determining whether a miscarriage of justice has occurred, to focus directly on the consequences, viewed objectively, that the failure to call the witness has had on the course of the trial and its outcome. (d) The critical question is not whether the prosecutor's decision constitutes misconduct, but whether in all the circumstances the verdict of guilty is unsafe or unsatisfactory. 59 The appellant submits that Senior Constable Borlase should have been called as a witness because he told her and the man to leave the park when he first approached them.42 The appellant suggests that BWC footage from Senior Constable Borlase could be produced by him to confirm this. The implication is that had the appellant and the man been permitted to leave immediately none of what followed would have occurred. There is an element of wishful thinking by the appellant in this submission because it ignores the fact that she did not immediately leave, and then gave a false name and was directed to remain. 41 R v Apostilides [1984] HCA 38; (1984) 154 CLR 563, 575, 577 - 578; Jones v The State of Western Australia [2024] WASCA 115 [121]. 42 WAB 14 [2] - [3]. -- 17 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 18 60 It was not in issue at the trial that Senior Constable Borlase told the appellant and the man to leave the park when he first approached them. This was put to Constable Crossland in cross-examination and accepted by him. The fact remains that this was only part of the exchange, which included a reference to the issuing of a move on order. The appellant remained in the location providing personal details to Constable Crossland. She was then directed to remain whilst her identity was ascertained. That direction was valid and not affected by anything that Senior Constable Borlase had said earlier. The appellant did not have the option of refusing to comply with the direction. The fact that Senior Constable Borlase was the senior officer is of no relevance. There was no inconsistency between what Senior Constable Borlase said, and the direction given by Constable Crossland (at a later point and in changed circumstances). 61 The appellant also submitted that the prosecution was obliged to call Senior Constable Borlase because he was the issuing officer of the prosecution notices.43 There is no such obligation. The issuing of the prosecution notices is an administrative task. There is no doubt that as a police officer he was authorised to commence the prosecution. 62 The appellant has failed to show that the failure of the prosecution to call Senior Constable Borlase had any material impact on the outcome of the trial. It has not been established that a miscarriage of justice resulted from the failure to call Senior Constable Borlase. Ground 3 63 The appellant submits that the actions of the police officers were unlawful because they failed to identify themselves.44 She also submits that any direction by Constable Crossland was ineffective because it was in conflict with the initial order of Senior Constable Borlase that the couple leave the park. 64 The unchallenged evidence of Constable Crossland was that the officers did identify themselves. There was no evidence to the contrary. Further, both officers were wearing police uniform and there was no room for any misunderstanding that they were police officers acting in accordance with their duties. 43 WAB 14 [1]. 44 WAB 15 - 16 [1] - [4]. -- 18 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 19 65 A person requested by a police officer to provide personal details may request the officer to identify himself or herself.45 An officer who receives such a request must identify himself or herself.46 In this context that means providing the person with the officer's surname and rank.47 The failure to do so as soon as is practicable is a reasonable excuse for not complying with the officer's request to provide personal details.48 There is no evidence in this case that the appellant made a request for the officers to formally identify themselves. 66 The appellant sought to rely on s 11 of the CIA as requiring police officers to formally identify themselves by providing their official details. That section only imposes an obligation on an officer in uniform to provide their official details in circumstances where the CIA requires them to do so. An example of this is where a police officer intends to exercise the power of entry to premises under s 20.49 There is no requirement in s 27, the section empowering the police to issue a move on order, for an officer to formally identify themselves, other than that arising under s 16 of the CIIPA.50 Accordingly, in this case, whether the police were exercising the power under s 16 of the CIIPA or the power under s 27 of the CIA, the police officers were not required to provide their official details unless they were requested to do so. 67 As noted earlier, the initial statement by Senior Constable Borlase for the appellant and her companion to leave the park, when seen in context, formed part of an exchange in which they were told that they would be issued with a move on order. In any event, that statement was superseded once the appellant gave a false name and was directed by Constable Crossland to stay whilst he ascertained her identity.51 That direction was lawful in the circumstances established by the evidence. Ground 4 68 Constable Crossland gave evidence that he had a reasonable suspicion that the appellant had committed the offence of doing an indecent act in a public place. It was on that basis that he requested the appellant to provide her personal details. 45 CIIPA, s 16(4). 46 CIIPA, s 16(5). 47 CIIPA, s 6(1)(a). See also s 3(1), definition of 'official details'. 48 CIIPA, s 16(7). 49 See CIA, s 31(2). 50 See CIA, s 27(5). 51 See CIIPA, s 16(4C). -- 19 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 20 69 A police officer who reasonably suspects that a person whose personal details are unknown to the officer has committed an offence may request the person to give the officer any or all of the person's personal details: s 16(2) CIIPA. For this purpose, 'personal details' means the person's full name, date of birth and residential address: s 16(1) CIIPA. If an officer makes a request to a person for their personal details the officer may detain the person for a reasonable period for the purpose of the person's compliance with the request or to verify the correctness of any personal detail given by the person: s 16(4C) CIIPA. 70 Constable Crossland had the power to detain the appellant under s 16(4C) of the CIIPA. The circumstances for exercising that power were established by the evidence. The magistrate was not in error in finding that Constable Crossland had the power to detain the appellant. Ground 5 71 The appellant submits that there was no indecent act because there was 'no skin to skin contact and no exposure of genitalia'.52 The implication is that an indecent act within the meaning of s 203 of the Code must be of such a nature. The appellant references a non-existent case in her written submissions in support of that proposition. 72 An act is indecent if it is unbecoming or offensive to common propriety.53 Another way of putting it is that indecent means contrary to the ordinary standards of morality of respectable people within the community.54 Unlike the phrase 'indecent dealing' used elsewhere in the Code, an indecent act does not need to involve bodily contact.55 The circumstances and the place where the act occurred are relevant in determining whether it is indecent. 73 The primary judge concluded that the conduct of the man in touching the appellant's breast, then sliding his hand to the centre of her chest and under her dress, was overtly sexual behaviour that occurred in public and in a family environment, namely in close proximity to a children's playground. The appellant was a willing participant in this conduct. Her Honour found that it was open to the magistrate to find that the appellant had engaged in an indecent act. 52 WAB 10, ground 5 [1]. 53 Drago 497 - 498 (Nicholson J, with Wallwork J agreeing), 502 (Murray J). 54 R v Harkin (1989) 38 A Crim R 296, 300 (Lee CJ at CL, with Wood & Matthews JJ agreeing). 55 Drago 498 (Nicholson J, with Wallwork J agreeing). -- 20 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 21 74 We have viewed the CCTV footage and reviewed the evidence of Constable Crossland. We are satisfied that the primary judge's description of the relevant conduct is accurate. That conduct, having regard to the fact that it occurred in very close proximity to a children's playground, fell within the meaning of an indecent act. Ground 6 75 The appellant submits that the obstruction charge depended on the lawfulness of the appellant's initial detention.56 She argues that she was not lawfully detained and therefore could not be guilty of obstruction by running away and then resisting arrest. 76 For the reasons given in respect of ground 4, Constable Crossland had the power to detain the appellant for the purposes of ascertaining her identity. He gave clear evidence that he exercised that power. The BWC footage also confirms that he gave the appellant a direction to stay. By walking and running away, and resisting the attempt to arrest her, the appellant obstructed Constable Crossland. Ground 7 77 The appellant submits that the learned magistrate repeatedly interrupted her, insulted her and restricted her cross-examination.57 She further complains that the magistrate refused to admit the medical records. She says that the magistrate expressed impatience and was dismissive of the appellant's attempts to present her case. She says that these actions resulted in a reasonable apprehension that the magistrate was biased. 78 This court recently considered the issue of interruptions by a judicial officer and in what circumstances that can result in an unfair trial in Courtney (a pseudonym) v The State of Western Australia.58 It is unnecessary to repeat the principles there outlined. It is sufficient to say the task of ensuring a fair trial requires the judicial officer not only to ensure that the trial is conducted fairly and impartially, but that the trial is seen to be so conducted.59 For this reason, in a case in which it is contended that the judicial officer impermissibly intervened or interfered in the presentation of the case, there is a close connection between the assessment of whether the accused has received a fair trial 56 WAB 11, ground 6 [1]. 57 WAB 18 - 19, ground 7 [1] - [3]. 58 Courtney (a pseudonym) v The State of Western Australia [2026] WASCA 86. 59 Courtney [64]. -- 21 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 22 and whether the conduct of the judicial officer gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the judicial officer. The test in relation to the latter is whether a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judicial officer might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide.60 79 The primary judge stated that she had reviewed the transcript and was satisfied that the magistrate intervened during the trial only to the extent necessary to do so to assist the self-represented appellant and ensure the efficiency of the trial. Her Honour concluded that the learned magistrate's conduct was not such as would cause a fair-minded lay observer to apprehend that he might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the proceeding.61 80 We have also reviewed the trial transcript. The magistrate dealt with the appellant with fairness and equanimity. He did so despite frequent provocative and disrespectful conduct by the appellant. He explained the trial process where necessary, including by explaining to the appellant her right to give evidence and to make submissions. He interrupted the appellant where her questions strayed into irrelevant areas, as they often did. He did not make dismissive or insulting remarks. 81 The primary judge was correct to conclude that the conduct of the magistrate was not such as to cause a fair-minded lay observer to apprehend that he might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the proceeding. Ground 8 82 The appellant claims that she was denied procedural fairness in that she was prevented from tendering medical reports regarding her osteoarthritis and PTSD.62 The relevance of these reports is said to be that they would provide an explanation for why the appellant acted as she did in giving a false name, running away from the police, and not complying with directions to place her hands behind her back when apprehended. 60 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; (2000) 205 CLR 337 [6] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow & Hayne JJ). 61 Primary reasons [54]. 62 WAB 11, ground 8 [1]. -- 22 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 23 83 The appellant stated at the trial that she wanted to tender medical reports. The magistrate declined to receive them because they appeared not to be relevant and because the makers of those reports were not present as witnesses. He did, however, suggest that the appellant may like to rely on the reports in mitigation in the event of conviction (though she did not seek to do so). 84 The magistrate's approach was unimpeachable. The reports were of marginal relevance at best. They might provide some explanation for the appellant's conduct in running away and resisting arrest, but they could not possibly excuse it. In any event, the reports were not admissible in the absence of the authors (other than with the consent of the prosecutor, which was not given). Other issues 85 The appellant raised other issues in her submissions which do not fit neatly within the grounds of appeal. We will deal with those issues, even though this court generally confines itself to matters raised in the grounds of appeal. 86 The appellant submitted that the respondent to this appeal should be Senior Constable Borlase, as he was the issuing officer of the prosecution notices. She claimed that to name the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) as the respondent is a fundamental flaw that invalidates the appeal proceedings. It is not clear how this assists the appellant since she is the person seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of this court. 87 In any event, s 13(b) of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 (WA) provides that where a prosecution is brought by another person and an appeal or further appeal relating to that prosecution has been brought, it is a function of the Director to take over the appeal from that person whether as appellant or respondent. This was effected by way of a letter filed by the respondent in the primary proceedings in accordance with s 19(1)(b) Director of Public Prosecutions Act. Accordingly, the DPP was properly named as the respondent. 88 The appellant submitted that the CCTV footage was inadmissible hearsay and should not have been received in evidence at the trial. The evidence of Constable Crossland was that he had made inquiries and obtained the CCTV footage.63 That footage was disclosed to the 63 Magistrates Court transcript, 9 July 2024, 13. -- 23 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 24 appellant before the trial. She made no objection to it and made no suggestion that it was inaccurate. The production of CCTV recordings by police officers is a routine occurrence in criminal courts. In the absence of any objection at trial, it cannot now be asserted that the evidence was inadmissible. In any event, Constable Crossland was shown in the footage and therefore able to speak to what the footage showed. 89 The appellant submitted that in leaving the area she was taking reasonable steps to comply with a move on order and that this was a defence under s 27(7) of the CIA. A move on order must be in writing in the approved form: s 27(6) CIA. No move order was issued in this case. The appellant was not charged with failing to comply with a move on order. She was charged with obstruction as result of running away when she was told that she had been detained under s 16 of the CIIPA. Applications 90 Prior to the appeal hearing the appellant filed three applications. At the commencement of the appeal hearing, we heard submissions on those applications. The applications were dismissed with reasons to follow. These are our reasons for dismissing those applications. 91 The three applications were as follows: 1. An application in an appeal dated 12 May 2026 seeking leave to adduce additional evidence. That additional evidence was summarised in the application itself. The application was supported by the appellant's affidavit sworn 12 May 2026. The affidavit of 12 May 2026 was received as evidence on the application; but was not, subject to the outcome of the application, received as additional evidence on the appeal. 2. An application in an appeal dated 19 May 2026 seeking leave to issue a summons to Senior Constable Borlase to produce specific records or things as identified in the application itself. The appellant sought to adduce those records or things as additional evidence on the appeal. The application was supported by the appellant's affidavit sworn 19 May 2026 (this is the 17-page affidavit at folio 26 of the court file). The affidavit was received as evidence on the application; but, again, was not received as additional evidence on the appeal. -- 24 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 25 3. An application in an appeal dated 19 May 2026 seeking leave to issue a summons to Senior Constable Borlase to give oral evidence at the appeal hearing. The appellant sought to adduce that oral evidence as additional evidence on the appeal. The application was supported by the appellant's further affidavit sworn 19 May 2026 (this is the 43-page affidavit at folio 28 of the court file). The affidavit was received as evidence on the application; but, as with the other affidavits, it was not received as additional evidence on the appeal. 92 An appeal court must decide an appeal on the evidence and material that were before the lower court.64 In some circumstances it is open to an appeal court to admit additional evidence and to summons witnesses for this purpose.65 That power must be exercised having regard to the nature of an appeal. An appeal is not an opportunity to conduct a second trial.66 There must be some proper basis admitting the additional evidence, having regard to the grounds of appeal. 93 In this case there is no ground alleging that there was a miscarriage of justice arising from fresh or new evidence. Rather, the appellant seeks to adduce additional evidence to support her grounds of appeal, in particular the contention that the failure of the prosecutor to call Senior Constable Borlase resulted in a miscarriage of justice. In respect of Senior Constable Borlase, the appellant refers to him being able to produce his own BWC footage. 94 The appellant submits that Senior Constable Borlase's BWC footage would be relevant, principally, because it would confirm that when he first approached the appellant and her companion, he told them to pack up their things and leave the park. However, it was not in dispute at the trial that this was said. Constable Crossland accepted in cross-examination that this was said by Senior Constable Borlase. For the reasons already given, this does not assist the appellant because that direction was superseded by the direction of Constable Crossland to remain after the false name was provided. 95 The appellant suggested that she should have an opportunity to cross-examine Senior Constable Borlase generally. The implication was that this may produce inconsistencies that would undermine the 64 Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 39 (CAA). 65 CAA, s 40. 66 See Mansell v State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 223 [17]; Mansell v The State of Western Australia [No 6] [2013] WASCA 120 [15] (McLure P, with Buss & Mazza JJA agreeing). -- 25 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 26 prosecution case. This is merely speculative. Witnesses cannot be called in appeal proceedings in order to find out what they can say; to do so would be merely a fishing exercise. 96 It is not necessary to detail the other material referred to in the applications. Much of it is in the form of further submissions or quasi-legal documents prepared by the appellant. There are some medical records relating to an assault on 5 August 2022, which appear to have nothing to do with the present matter. There is copy of the WA Police Code of Conduct and the Statement of Material Facts. None of this material is admissible evidence in the appeal. 97 The appellant was given an opportunity to make oral submissions in support of the applications. She failed to advance any cogent reason why the applications should be granted. None of the material supports the grounds of appeal or establishes the existence of a miscarriage of justice. 98 For those reasons the applications to adduce additional evidence and issue a witness summons were dismissed. Conclusion 99 Each ground of appeal requires leave. Leave can only be granted if the court is satisfied that the ground has a reasonable prospect of succeeding. If no ground is granted leave, the appeal is deemed to be dismissed. 100 None of the appellant's grounds has a reasonable prospect of succeeding for the reasons given. The appellant has failed to establish any error on the part of the primary judge. Leave to appeal on each of the grounds should be refused and the appeal dismissed. As the appeal does not have merit the extension of time should be refused. Orders 101 We would make the following orders: 1. Extension of time to appeal is refused. 2. Leave to appeal on all grounds is refused. 3. Appeal dismissed. -- 26 of 27 -- [2026] WASCA 98 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 27 102 Counsel for the respondent informed the court that the respondent did not seek a costs order against the appellant in relation to the further appeal to this court. In light of that concession it is not necessary to hear from the parties as to the costs of the appeal. We would simply order that there be no order as to the costs of the appeal. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. RD Associate to the Honourable Justice Hall 15 JULY 2026 -- 27 of 27 --