ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v LIDDY [2026] SASC 76

Applicant: ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA Counsel: MS A DOECKE KC WITH MS P WHITE - Solicitor: CROWN SOLICITOR (SA) Respondent: PETER LIDDY Counsel: MR J POWELL SC WITH MR O GREEVES - Solicitor: LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSION (SA) Hearing Date/s: 13/05/2026 File No/s: SCCRM-26-008309, SCCRM-26-008312 A SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Criminal: Application) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v LIDDY [2026] SASC 76 Judgment of the Honourable Justice Gray 20 May 2026 CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - OTHER TYPES OF POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS The Attorney-General (SA) seeks that the respondent remain in custody pending determination by the Court as to whether the respondent be indefinitely detained custody pursuant to an extended detention order. In the alternative, the Attorney-General seeks that the respondent be subject to an interim supervision order (‘ISO’). The Attorney-General inter alia contends that, if an ISO is made, it should include a condition requiring home detention with intensive supervision. The respondent was sentenced on 7 September 2001 to 25 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years, backdated to commence on 5 June 2001, for three counts of indecent assault, six counts of unlawful sexual intercourse, and one count of offering a benefit to a witness. The offending occurred while the respondent, then a serving magistrate, was working in a voluntary capacity as a coach at the Brighton Surf Life Saving Club, with the victims being children involved in the Nippers program. On 31 January 2002, the Court of Criminal Appeal substituted a verdict of guilty of indecent assault for one of the unlawful sexual intercourse convictions, but otherwise dismissed the appeal. The respondent’s head sentence is due to expire on 4 June 2026. The respondent is currently 81 years of age. Parole has been refused on each application. The respondent submits that the extended detention order proceedings should be permanently stayed as an abuse of process, on the basis that the material filed does not disclose any matters which could lead the Court to conclude that the respondent is incapable of controlling, or unwilling to control, his sexual instincts. The respondent also contends that there is no reasonable prospect of anything arising from a further medical report that could call the currently available assessment into question. The respondent does not oppose the making of an ISO. Held, refusing the application for a permanent stay, declining to make an interim detention order, and making an interim supervision order: (1) The power to order a permanent stay of proceedings for an abuse of process will only be exercised in the most exceptional circumstances. The respondent has failed to discharge the burden of demonstrating the prejudice or unfairness necessary to establish an abuse of process. The application for a stay is dismissed. [6]-[8], [45]-[46] -- 1 of 19 -- (2) Having regard to the respondent’s personal circumstances, his history of offending, the risk assessments conducted during his time in custody, the reports of the Parole Board, the treatment undertaken, and his continued refusal to accept responsibility for his offending, there is a real question to be tried as to whether the respondent is unwilling to control his sexual instincts. The material currently before the Court, whilst it suggests that there is a possibility of a failure to exercise appropriate control of sexual instincts, does not establish a significant risk or a good chance of re-offending such that detention is required. Any risk the respondent poses can be adequately addressed by an ISO with a period of six months intensive supervision on home detention and limitations on internet usage. [60]-[63] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 49, 56, 244; Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) ss 4, 7(3)(a), 7(6), 9, 10(2); Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 2; Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) ss 57, 57(1), 57(3), 57(4), 57(5), 57(6), 57(7), 57(8), 59(1a)(a), referred to. Attorney-General (SA) v Colangelo [2025] SASC 2; Attorney-General (SA) v AWL [2026] SASC 58, applied. Anders v NACS Nominees Pty Ltd [2013] SASC 152; Attorney-General v Anderson [2026] SASC 29; Attorney-General (SA) v AWL [2026] SASC 58; Attorney-General (SA) v Colangelo [2025] SASC 2; Attorney-General (SA) v Dobson [2026] SASC 35; Attorney-General v Grosser [2016] SASC 49; Attorney-General (SA) v GS [2025] SASC 29; Attorney-General (SA) v Karpany [2020] SASC 219; Attorney-General v Kelly [2017] SASC 164; Attorney-General (SA) v RM [2022] SASC 160; Attorney-General (SA) v Symonds [2021] SASC 145; Barton v The Queen [1980] HCA 48; (1980) 147 CLR 75; Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336; Driver v Attorney-General (SA) [2022] SASCA 13; (2022) 140 SASR 282; GLJ v Roman Catholic Church (2023) 280 CLR 442; Gray v Police [2003] SASC 15; (2003) 85 SASR 1; Hore v The Queen; Wichen v The Queen (2022) 273 CLR 153; [2022] HCA 22; Jago v District Court (NSW) [1989] HCA 46; (1989) 168 CLR 23; McGarry v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 121; R v Ainsworth [2008] SASC 67; (2008) 100 SASR 238; R v B, P [2016] SASCFC 30; R v Edwards (2009) 83 ALJR 717; R v England [2004] SASC 20; (2004) 87 SASR 411; R v Hoare [2017] SASC 7; R v Liddy [2010] SADC 80; R v Stevens [2015] SASC 79; R v Whyte [2006] SASC 56; Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19; Strickland (a pseudonym) v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2018] HCA 53; (2018) 266 CLR 325; Thomas v Attorney-General (SA) (2019) 133 SASR 302; [2019] SASCFC 21; Thompkins v Medical Board [2018] SASC 72; Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378; Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509, considered. -- 2 of 19 -- ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v LIDDY [2026] SASC 76 Criminal: GRAY J: 1 This matter concerns an application by the Attorney-General (SA) (‘the applicant’) that Peter Liddy (‘the respondent’) remain in custody pending determination by the Court as to whether the respondent be detained in custody until further order.1 An alternative order is sought that the respondent be subject to an interim supervision order (‘ISO’).2 The alternative application for an ISO is not opposed. However, there is an issue joined between the parties in relation to the terms of that order. 2 The respondent has filed an amended interlocutory application. The application seeks a permanent stay of the Attorney-General’s application for the indefinite detention of the respondent.3 The respondent advances the following reasons:4 1. The material filed by the Attorney-General is said not to disclose any matters which could lead a medical practitioner or the Court to conclude that the respondent is incapable of controlling or unwilling to control his sexual instincts. 2. The material filed by the Attorney-General is said to disclose expert opinions that the respondent is not incapable of controlling, nor unwilling to control, his sexual instincts. 3. There is said to be no reasonable prospect of anything arising from an evaluation of the respondent that could call the expert opinions, disclosed by the Attorney-General’s file material, into question. 4. Accordingly, the application is foredoomed to fail or brought without reasonable grounds, is unjustifiably oppressive, and is contrary to the proper administration of justice and is therefore an abuse of the processes of the Court. 3 The second contention advanced by the respondent is that the Court should not make an interim detention order (‘IDO’) pending the determination of the 1 Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 57(3); Attorney-General (SA), ‘Originating Application – Uncontrolled Sexual Instincts – Extended Detention Order’, SCCRM-26-008309, 26 February 2026 (FDN 1). 2 Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) s 9 (‘HRO Act’); Attorney-General (SA), ‘Originating Application – High Risk Offenders – Extended Supervision Order’, SCCRM-26-008312, 26 February 2026 (FDN 1). 3 Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 57: See ‘Interlocutory Application for Stay – Revision 1’, SCCRM-26- 008309, 23 April 2026 (FDN 13). 4 Respondent, ‘Written Submissions of Respondent’, SCCRM-26-008309, 24 April 2026 (FDN 14) at [1.1]-[1.4] (‘Written Submissions of Respondent’). -- 3 of 19 -- [2026] SASC 76 Gray J 2 extended detention order (‘EDO’) proceedings. Thirdly, the respondent, whilst not opposing the making of an ISO pursuant to s 9 of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (‘HRO Act’), contends that the draft order prepared by the applicant is unjustifiably restrictive on the respondent’s liberty and counterproductive to the respondent’s reintegration into society. 4 The applicant contends that the respondent has failed to discharge his burden of demonstrating the prejudice or unfairness necessary to establish an abuse of process. The applicant contends that the respondent’s ongoing denials of the offending of which he was found guilty and convicted mean that, notwithstanding the rehabilitation treatment afforded to him in prison, there is uncertainty as to whether he is presently willing to control his sexual instincts such that there is a significant risk to the community from further sexual offending unless the respondent is properly assessed.5 The applicant contends that the nature of the risk that the respondent poses is such that it is appropriate for the protection of the safety of the community that he be detained until further order under s 57(7) of the Sentencing Act. The applicant further contends that the paramount consideration is the safety of the community and if the ISO is made it should include a condition requiring home detention with intensive supervision conditions. 5 It follows that the issues that I must determine are as follows: 1. Whether the EDO proceedings should be permanently stayed on the basis that the proceedings are an abuse of process. 2. If not, whether an IDO should be made and the respondent detained in custody pending determination of the EDO proceedings. 3. If not, and having regard to the respondent’s concession in relation to the making of an ISO, what conditions are appropriate (in particular, whether inclusion of a home detention condition is appropriate). Background and legal principles Application for a permanent stay 6 The power to order a permanent stay of proceedings for an abuse of process will only be exercised in the most exceptional circumstances.6 The plurality in GLJ v Roman Catholic Church held:7 …[T]he grant of a permanent stay to prevent an abuse of process involves an ultimate decision that permitting a matter to go to trial and the rendering of a verdict following trial 5 Attorney-General (SA), ‘Written Submissions of the Applicant’, SCCRM-26-008309, 6 May 2026 (FDN 16) at [1] (‘Written Submissions of the Applicant’). 6 R v B, P [2016] SASCFC 30 at [38] (Kourakis CJ, Kelly and Bampton JJ agreeing); Barton v The Queen [1980] HCA 48; (1980) 147 CLR 75, 11(Wilson J); Jago v District Court (NSW) [1989] HCA 46; (1989) 168 CLR 23, 34 (Mason CJ) and 76 (Gaudron J); Strickland (a pseudonym) v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [2018] HCA 53; (2018) 266 CLR 325, [106] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Nettle JJ). 7 GLJ v Roman Catholic Church (2023) 280 CLR 442 at [3] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Jagot JJ, and Gleeson J relevantly agreeing as to principle at [162]). -- 4 of 19 -- [2026] SASC 76 Gray J 3 would be irreconcilable with the administration of justice through the operation of the adversarial system. That ultimate decision must be one of last resort on the basis that no other option is available. This is why only an exceptional case justifies the exercise of the power of a court to permanently stay proceedings. 7 In this case, the respondent bears the onus of demonstrating the existence of facts which enliven the Court’s discretion to order a stay. For a stay to be granted, it is typically necessary that a stay is the only remedy available to prevent the abuse.8 8 As a permanent stay amounts to a refusal to exercise jurisdiction and operates to defeat the public interest or purpose to which the relevant proceeding is directed, a stay is generally considered to be an exceptional remedy to be exercised only in the clearest of cases.9 Matters which may constitute an abuse of process include proceedings which are frivolous, vexatious or oppressive,10 foredoomed to fail,11 or brought without reasonable grounds, and proceedings brought for an improper purpose.12 Every court has a duty to protect itself against an abuse of process.13 The power to grant a permanent stay extends to the prevention of an abuse of process resulting in oppression.14 Section 57 of the Sentencing Act 9 The application for an EDO is brought pursuant to s 57 of the Sentencing Act. Section 57(3) provides to the effect that, if a person is convicted of a relevant offence, the Attorney-General may, whilst the person remains in prison serving a sentence of imprisonment, apply to the Court for their continuing detention. 10 A relevant offence is defined in s 57(1) of the Sentencing Act. There is no dispute between the parties that the respondent has been convicted of relevant offences within the meaning of s 57(1). 11 On 7 September 2001, the Supreme Court sentenced the respondent to 25 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years, backdated to commence on 5 June 2001, for the following offences:15 8 Jago v District Court (NSW) [1989] HCA 46; (1989) 168 CLR 23 at 34 (Mason CJ); Gray v Police [2003] SASC 15; (2003) 85 SASR 1 at [21] (T Gray J). 9 Jago v District Court (NSW) [1989] HCA 46; (1989) 168 CLR 23 at 31 (Mason CJ), 49-50 (Brennan J), 76 (Gaudron J); Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 at 393; R v Edwards (2009) 83 ALJR 717 at [23]-[24], [34]; Thompkins v Medical Board [2018] SASC 72 at [32]. 10 Ridgeway v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 19 at 74-75 (Gaudron J). 11 Anders v NACS Nominees Pty Ltd [2013] SASC 152 at [39] (Peek J), referring to Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378 at 392-3 (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ). 12 Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 at 529 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 13 Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 at 520 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 14 Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 at 522 (Mason CJ, Dawson, Toohey and McHugh JJ). 15 See Sentencing Remarks in R v Liddy (Supreme Court of South Australia, Nyland J, 07 September 2001) (‘Sentencing Remarks’); Attorney-General (SA), ‘Affidavit of Peta White’, SCCRM-26-008309, 25 February 2026, at 7 (FDN 3) (Exhibit PLW-1) (‘First Affidavit of Peta White’). -- 5 of 19 -- [2026] SASC 76 Gray J 4 1. Three counts of indecent assault contrary to s 56 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (‘CLCA’). 2. Six counts of unlawful sexual intercourse, contrary to s 49 of the CLCA; and 3. One count of offering a benefit to a witness, contrary to s 244 of the CLCA. 12 On 31 January 2002, the Court of Criminal Appeal substituted a verdict of guilty of indecent assault for one of the guilty verdicts returned by the jury for unlawful sexual intercourse but otherwise dismissed the appeal against conviction. The appeal against sentence was dismissed.16 13 The respondent has been convicted of two relevant offences within the meaning of s 57(1), namely: 1. Four counts of indecent assault contrary to s 56 of the CLCA; and 2. Five counts of unlawful sexual intercourse contrary to s 49 of the CLCA. 14 The respondent is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment for those offences and will be in custody until 4 June 2026. The application for an IDO was filed on 26 February 2026, whilst the respondent was in prison. It follows that the respondent is a person to whom s 57 of the Sentencing Act applies, and the jurisdiction to make a supervision or detention order is enlivened.17 15 Section 57(5) of the Sentencing Act confers upon the Court a broad discretion as to whether to make an IDO. The section provides: (5) The Supreme Court may, if the Attorney-General has made an application under subsection (3) in respect of a person who is in prison serving a sentence of imprisonment, make an interim order that the person is to remain in custody pending determination by the Supreme Court as to whether to make an order under this section that the person be detained in custody until further order. 16 In Attorney-General (SA) v Colangelo,18 McDonald J held that the discretion conferred by s 57(5) is broad and should be exercised having regard to the purpose of s 57 of the Sentencing Act.19 The paramount consideration in exercising the discretion is to protect the safety of the community.20 The purpose and object of an order under s 57(7) of the Sentencing Act, which concerns the indefinite detention 16 Attorney-General (SA), ‘Affidavit of Peta White’, SCCRM-26-008309, 25 March 2026, at 7 (FDN 6) (Exhibit PLW-21); SAPOL Antecedent Report dated 05 March 2026) (‘Second Affidavit of Peta White’). 17 Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 57(1); Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA), s 9. 18 [2025] SASC 2. 19 [2025] SASC 2 at 15 [94]. 20 Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 57(8). -- 6 of 19 -- [2026] SASC 76 Gray J 5 of a person, is protective and not punitive. As Hinton J held in R v Hoare,21 the purpose of such an order is:22 …to protect the community from sexual offenders where the risk posed by such a person is such that it is inappropriate that they be released, even when they have completed what would otherwise be their period of imprisonment for the offences that they have committed. 17 The making of an IDO denies a person’s right to liberty and will only be made where there is cogent and acceptable evidence justifying an order.23 18 The paramount consideration is the protection of the safety of the community. In the circumstances of this case, I must consider whether the protection of the community requires the detention of the respondent or whether any risk that the respondent poses can be adequately addressed by the making of an ISO. 19 The central submission of the Attorney-General is that the respondent is unwilling to control his sexual instincts. The Attorney-General contends, to use the language of s 57(1), that there is a significant risk that the respondent would, given an opportunity, commit a relevant offence and fail to exercise appropriate control of his sexual instincts.24 I have considered this matter by reference to the decision in Hore v The Queen, Wichen v The Queen in which the High Court held:25 … a person’s willingness to control his or her sexual instincts may fall somewhere on a spectrum of states of volition, at some point on which the community is at “significant risk” of harm for reasons other than a want of capability on behalf of the person to control his or her sexual instincts. 20 In this context, it is said that a mere possibility of a failure to exercise appropriate control of sexual instincts is not sufficient; rather, the Court must be satisfied that there is a “good chance” that the risk will eventuate.26 The assessment that is relevant is an assessment of whether the person is likely to have a reliable commitment to control the person’s sexual instincts at a time when any occasion for the exercise of control arises.27 21 [2017] SASC 7. 22 [2017] SASC 7 at 14 [64], cited in Driver v Attorney-General (SA) [2022] SASCA 13; (2022) 140 SASR 282 at 290 [28]; (Kourakis CJ, Doyle and Bleby JJA). 23 Attorney-General (SA) v GS [2025] SASC 29 at [28] (Stein J); R v Stevens [2015] SASC 79 at 2 [11] (Bampton J); R v England [2004] SASC 20; (2004) 87 SASR 411 at 423–4 (Bleby J); R v Ainsworth [2008] SASC 67; (2008) 100 SASR 238 at 253-4 [56] (White J), referring to the previous, but equivalent, provisions under the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) (as it then stood). 24 Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 57(1) (definition of ‘unwilling’). 25 (2022) 273 CLR 153; [2022] HCA 22 at [49] (Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ). 26 R v Whyte [2006] SASC 56 at 9 [30] (White J); Attorney-General v Kelly [2017] SASC 164 at 6-8 [21] (Nicholson J) (considering former s 23 of the Sentencing Act). See also Hore v The Queen, Wichen v The Queen (2022) 273 CLR 153; [2022] HCA 22 at [49] (Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson JJ). 27 Hore v The Queen, Wichen v The Queen (2022) 273 CLR 153; [2022] HCA 22 at [50] (Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson JJ) (discussing s 59(1a)(a) of the Sentencing Act). -- 7 of 19 -- [2026] SASC 76 Gray J 6 Interim supervision order 21 Section 9 of the HRO Act concerns the making of an interim supervision order. An interim supervision order may be made if an application for an extended supervision order has been made in respect of a high-risk offender and the Court is satisfied of two criteria. The two criteria are: 1. The Court must be satisfied that the relevant expiry date for the respondent is likely to occur before the application for the extended supervision order is determined.28 2. The Court must be satisfied that the matters alleged in the material supporting the application for the extended supervision order would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order. 22 The making of an extended supervision order depends upon satisfaction that the respondent is a high-risk offender and that he poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if not supervised under such an order.29 An appreciable risk is one that is capable of being estimated, perceptible and sensible.30 A risk that is speculative to the point of being hypothetical will not generally be considered to be an appreciable risk.31 In making this assessment, a realistic and pragmatic approach to assessing the circumstances of the individual under consideration should be made.32 23 An interim supervision order takes effect on the making of the order until the application for the extended supervision order is determined. It is not in dispute that the first criterion is made out, nor is the second criterion in dispute. What is in dispute between the parties, in respect to the ISO, is the appropriate terms of the ISO if such an order is made. In considering the appropriate terms of an ISO the paramount consideration is the protection of the safety of the community. The respondent’s personal circumstances and offending history 24 The respondent is currently 81 years of age. As I have indicated earlier in these reasons, the respondent was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 years backdated to commence on 5 June 2001. The respondent has not been granted parole and the respondent’s head sentence is due to expire on 4 June 2026. 28 See s 4 of the HRO Act, as the Respondent is serving a sentence of imprisonment, the relevant expiry date is the date of expiry of his sentence, which is 4 June 2026. 29 See further Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) s 7(6). 30 Attorney-General v Grosser [2016] SASC 49 at [29]. 31 Attorney-General (SA) v RM [2022] SASC 160 at [45] (McDonald J). 32 Ibid. -- 8 of 19 -- [2026] SASC 76 Gray J 7 25 As I have indicated above, the relevant sentence was imposed in respect of the offences of indecent assault,33 unlawful sexual intercourse,34 and offering a benefit to a witness.35 In sentencing, Nyland J held:36 At the time of the commission of these crimes you were working in a voluntary capacity at the Brighton Surf Life Saving Club as a coach. All of the victims were involved in the Nippers program at the club, three of them having joined as a result of promotion carried out by you in their schools. You were also at that time a serving magistrate, and as such, you occupied a high position of trust. This makes your offending particularly serious. The community is entitled to expect the holder of such a responsible position to be vigilant in the care and protection of their children. Instead, you chose to exploit this important and in many ways privileged position to gain the trust of these families, which enabled you to take these children away on trips. Many of those trips took place overnight and it was in the course of such excursions that most of these offences were committed. I should also mention that five of the offences of which you have been convicted in fact occurred in or about the precincts of Glenelg Courthouse where you were a sitting magistrate. 26 The sentencing remarks go on to make clear that there was, in respect of two of the victims of this offending, evidence of other uncharged acts which reflected a course of conduct over a lengthy period of time.37 The offending in respect of another victim was pre-meditated and involved grooming and, as such, the respondent’s offending could not be seen as an isolated uncharacteristic act reflecting a sudden inexplicable loss of control.38 In respect of a fourth victim, the conduct of the respondent was described as involving two very violent acts against a child who was aged about 8 years. The sentencing remarks record the significant and long-term impact of the respondent’s conduct upon each of the victims and their families.39 27 The applicant also makes reference to further allegations of sexual conduct made by seven separate victims dating from 1969 and onwards, which are the subject of a permanent stay.40 The applicant also refers to yet further allegations involving sexual offending against young children and refers to six separate victims who allege various offending over a period of twelve years, between 1969 and 1981. The applicant also refers to further allegations in 1997, which involved sexual offending against a child.41 Both parties accepted in submissions that uncharged acts are relevant to the risk assessment that I must conduct in 33 Contrary to s 56 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). 34 Contrary to s 49 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). 35 Contrary to s 244 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). 36 Sentencing Remarks (n 15) at 2. 37 Sentencing Remarks (n 15) at 2. 38 Sentencing Remarks (n 15) at 2-3. 39 Sentencing Remarks (n 15) at 3. 40 R v Liddy [2010] SADC 80. 41 Written Submissions of the Applicant (n 5) at [18]–[21]. -- 9 of 19 -- [2026] SASC 76 Gray J 8 determining the appropriate form of any interim order, and I have had regard to these matters in that context.42 Risk assessments, treatment and insight into offending 28 The respondent refers to his excellent record of custodial behaviour during his 25-year head sentence. 29 The respondent refers to there being no evidence tending to support the contention that the respondent is incapable of controlling or unwilling to control his sexual instincts and no expert opinions recommending an extended detention order. The respondent places particular reliance upon a report of forensic psychiatrist, Dr Craig Raeside.43 Dr Raeside is said to have found no indication that the respondent was incapable of controlling his sexual conduct. The Attorney-General does not suggest that there is an unwillingness of the respondent to control his sexual instincts but rather submits that there is uncertainty as to whether the respondent is presently willing to control his sexual instincts.44 30 The respondent states that there is evidence to suggest that the respondent is willing to control his sexual instincts, notwithstanding his ongoing denials of any sexual wrongdoing.45 Dr Raeside in his report refers to there being an extended period of time in which there was no apparent offending.46 Dr Raeside also refers to there being no indication of any inappropriate sexual behaviour since the respondent’s incarceration. Dr Raeside states:47 …I would not support a finding that Mr Liddy is unwilling to control his sexual behaviour, notwithstanding his ongoing denials of any sexual wrongdoing previously. I believe the passage of time, his advancing years, and other circumstances suggest otherwise. Further, I think that any ongoing risk, low-moderate or whatever it may be, could be adequately managed with appropriate supervision requirements, whether on parole, or subsequently on an Extended Supervision Order. 31 The applicant relies upon and refers to a number of Department for Correctional Services and expert reports obtained through the course of the respondent’s incarceration which address the respondent’s risk of re-offending. The applicant contends that the evidence currently before the Court reveals an ongoing concern that the respondent’s assessed level of risk does not accurately reflect the true risk of re-offending because of the limitations in the assessment techniques utilised, combined with the respondent’s continual denial of the 42 Transcript of Proceedings, Attorney-General (SA) v Liddy (Supreme Court of South Australia, SCCRM-26-008302 & SCCRM-26-008312, Gray J, 13 May 2026) Applicant at T 34.10-35.19 and Respondent at T 51.23-52.17 (‘Transcript’). 43 First Affidavit of Peta White (n 15) at 96 (PLW-16); Report of Dr Craig Raeside, Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, dated 10 September 2019. 44 Written Submissions of the Applicant (n 5) at [1]. 45 See, in particular, Written Submissions of Respondent (n 4) at [32]. 46 First Affidavit of Peta White (n 15) at 113 (PLW-16); Report of Dr Craig Raeside, Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, dated 10 September 2019 at 18. 47 First Affidavit of Peta White (n 15) at 113-114 (PLW-16); Report of Dr Craig Raeside, Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, dated 10 September 2019 at 18-19. -- 10 of 19 -- [2026] SASC 76 Gray J 9 offending.48 The applicant refers to the 2013 pre-treatment assessment summary.49 Reference is made in that report to the 2003 assessment and the 2007 assessment of the respondent which referred to a low to moderate risk of re-offending. Particular reference is made to the following comments made in 2013:50 Considering the number of people who made allegations of which Mr Liddy has been convicted, as well as further allegations that have resulted in a permanent stay of proceedings, and the decades over which the allegations span, this risk level may underestimate Mr Liddy’s level of risk of sexual recidivism. However, research suggests that the number of years he was in the community “offence free” (the time since his last alleged offending) would actually suggest his risk would be lower. 32 The applicant also refers to a 2019 report of a consultant forensic psychiatrist, Dr Haeney, concerning the respondent’s ongoing denial despite conviction remaining a concern with respect to the respondent’s future risk of sexual re-offending. 51 In addition, the applicant refers to the report of Katharine Short, the Acting Director of Offender Rehabilitation Services at the Department for Correctional Services dated 13 June 2018, which estimates the respondent to be at the “high end of average risk of sexual reoffending, with several areas of need…”.52 33 The applicant also refers to the respondent’s participation between 15 July 2019 and 12 December 2019 in the sexual behaviours clinic moderate intensity program. Upon completion of that program the respondent’s risk of sexual re-offending was re-assessed and the respondent remained at average risk of re-offending, which is said to be the equivalent to moderate-low risk of sexual re-offending should he not receive further treatment. That risk was said not to change following treatment. As is recorded in a report dated 20 January 2020,53 there is uncertainty regarding the respondent’s willingness or ability to control some aspects of his sexual instincts in the community, particularly having regard to the continual denial by the respondent of his sexual offences.54 34 The respondent applied for parole on 23 July 2019 and 8 March 2023. The Parole Board refused both applications. On 2 January 2024, the respondent re-applied for parole and was interviewed on 23 July 2024. The Parole Board again refused to grant parole. In reasons given in 2022, the Parole Board stated that the respondent was not suitable for parole and noted that the respondent showed no insight into his offending and as such it was difficult to assess whether 48 Written Submissions of the Applicant (n 5) at [23]. 49 First Affidavit of Peta White (n 15) at 59 (PLW-11); Pre-Treatment Assessment Summary of Leyna Bruggemann dated 22 January 2013 at 2. 50 First Affidavit of Peta White (n 15) at 59 (PLW-11); Pre-Treatment Assessment Summary of Leyna Bruggemann dated 22 January 2013 at 2; Written Submissions of the Applicant (n 5) at [23.1]; Written Submissions of Respondent (n 4) at [11]. 51 First Affidavit of Peta White (n 15) at 95 (PLW-15); Report of Dr Owen Haeney, Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist at James Nash House, dated 29 October 2019. 52 First Affidavit of Peta White (n 15) at 64 (PLW-12); Pre-Treatment Assessment Summary of Katharine Short dated 13 June 2018 at 1. 53 See further Written Submissions of the Applicant (n 5) at [23.5.2]. 54 Written Submissions of the Applicant (n 5) at [23.5.3]. -- 11 of 19 -- [2026] SASC 76 Gray J 10 or not the respondent’s motivation for offending had been dealt with by intervention to a point where he could be safely managed in the community.55 35 In 2025, the Parole Board found there had been no change in the respondent’s presentation and the Parole Board could not be confident that the respondent would not present a risk of re-offending if released on parole. Parole was refused.56 The applicant points to the Parole Board supporting the making of an indefinite detention order.57 The applicant further notes that the Parole Board has had the benefit of interviewing the respondent on multiple occasions over an extended period of time. Consideration 36 In considering the three issues that I must determine, I have had regard to all of the submissions advanced by the parties both in the written submissions and at the hearing of this matter. I have also had regard to the material filed by the parties. Whilst I have had regard to all these matters, I set out below the central matters relevant to my findings. Issue 1 – Whether EDO proceedings should be permanently stayed 37 The first issue that I must consider is whether the EDO proceedings should be permanently stayed on the basis that the proceedings are an abuse of process. The respondent contends that the material filed by the Attorney-General does not disclose any matters which could lead a medical practitioner or the Court to conclude that the respondent is incapable of controlling or unwilling to control his sexual instincts. The respondent contends that to be successful in the application for an EDO, the applicant would need to establish, in accordance with the Briginshaw principles;58 firstly, that the respondent was incapable of controlling or unwilling to control his sexual instincts; and secondly, that ordering an EDO is an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion, having regard to the principles in Thomas v Attorney-General (SA).59 The respondent contends that an EDO deprives a person of their most fundamental right, being the right of liberty and, as such, an EDO, which provides for indefinite detention, places upon the applicant a heavy onus to establish that no degree of supervision in the community is sufficient to protect against any risk that the respondent may pose.60 38 The respondent contends that the expert evidence presently available in support of the application establishes a low to moderate risk and suggests that the 55 First Affidavit of Peta White (n 15) at 117 (PLW-17); Reasons for Refusal of Parole Board dated 08 April 2022 at 3. 56 First Affidavit of Peta White (n 15) at 140 (PLW-20); Reasons for Refusal of Parole Board dated 15 December 2025 at 2. 57 See letter from Presiding Member of Parole Board dated 15 December 2025, PLW-19, Affidavit of Peta White affirmed 25 February 2026 at 138. 58 Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336. 59 Thomas v Attorney-General (SA) (2019) 133 SASR 302; [2019] SASCFC 21. 60 Thomas v Attorney-General (SA) (2019) 133 SASR 302; [2019] SASCFC 21; R v Stevens [2015] SASC 79 (Bampton J), citing McGarry v The Queen (2001) 207 CLR 121 at [61] (Kirby J). -- 12 of 19 -- [2026] SASC 76 Gray J 11 respondent has both the capacity and willingness to control his sexual instincts. On that basis, it is submitted that the Court should find that the application was brought without reasonable grounds and/or is foredoomed to fail.61 39 The respondent contends that there is no reasonable prospect of anything arising from an evaluation of the respondent that could call the expert opinions disclosed in the Attorney-General’s file material into question.62 40 I find that there are at least two fundamental difficulties with the respondent’s contention that the application is foredoomed to fail or brought without reasonable grounds and is so unjustifiably oppressive that it is contrary to the proper administration of justice and therefore an abuse of the processes of this Court.63 41 Firstly, there is no dispute in this case that the Attorney-General has brought an application in compliance with the requirements of s 57, such that this Court has jurisdiction to consider whether or not to make an EDO.64 Section 57(6) provides to the effect that the Supreme Court must, before determining whether to make an EDO, direct that at least two legally qualified medical practitioners, nominated by the prescribed authority, enquire into the mental condition of the person to whom the section applies and report to the Court on whether the person is incapable of controlling or unwilling to control their sexual instincts. 42 Orders have not yet been made for those reports, and the respondent submits that the application for the stay should be made prior to those reports being ordered and available to the Court. The respondent advances this submission on the basis that the respondent contends that there is no reasonable prospect of anything arising from an evaluation of the respondent that could call the expert opinions disclosed in the Attorney-General’s file material into question. I consider, having regard to the evidential material before this Court at this stage of the proceedings, that it is not possible to say that there is no reasonable prospect of anything arising from an evaluation of the respondent that could call the expert opinion already disclosed into question. 43 It is, for example, difficult to see how it could be said that the application is foredoomed to fail or brought without reasonable grounds in circumstances where the Parole Board, having interviewed the respondent on a number of occasions, is supportive of the application for an EDO. I accept that the report of Dr Raeside most directly addresses the question that will be the subject of the two further reports to be ordered, and Dr Raeside does not support the making of an EDO. That said, there is other material before this Court which does indicate a basis for further assessment. 61 See Written Submissions of Respondent (n 4) at [33]. 62 Written Submissions of Respondent (n 4) at [1.3]. 63 Written Submissions of Respondent (n 4) at [1.4]. 64 See Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 57(4). -- 13 of 19 -- [2026] SASC 76 Gray J 12 44 I find that it is uncertain what the two medical reports, if ordered pursuant to s 57(6) of the Sentencing Act, would disclose. It follows that it is not possible to say that there is no reasonable prospect of anything arising from a further evaluation conducted pursuant to s 57(6). 45 A second and further difficulty with the position taken by the respondent in respect of the stay application is that the respondent does not oppose the making of an ISO order. An ISO will only be made if the material supporting the application for an ESO, if proved, would justify the making of an ESO. That means that the material must demonstrate that there is an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if the respondent is not supervised under a supervision order, in the sense that there is risk that is capable of being estimated, perceptible and sensible. The acceptance that an ISO order is appropriate, means that an assessment of an appreciable risk may be made on the currently available material.65 Given the respondent’s acceptance that the material supporting the application for an ESO would, if proved, demonstrate an appreciable risk to the safety of the community, it is difficult to see how it could be said that there is no reasonable prospect of anything arising from an evaluation of the respondent which may be relevant to consider in assessing the expert opinions already disclosed, and in determining the applications before this Court. 46 It follows that I consider that the respondent has failed to discharge the burden of demonstrating the prejudice or unfairness necessary to establish an abuse of process. I consider that it would be speculative to make a finding as to the possible outcome of a future expert report. On the evidentiary material before me, I do not consider it is open for me to find that there is no possible evidence, upon which an expert may opine, that would support a future finding that the respondent is unwilling to control his sexual instincts. 47 It follows that I would not grant the application for a stay. 48 Accordingly, I will order a report pursuant to s 7(3)(a) of the HRO Act. I would also make orders for medical reports pursuant to s 57(6) of the Sentencing Act. I will hear further from the parties as to the appropriate terms of those orders, noting that both parties have indicated in submissions that it would be appropriate that Dr Raeside, if available, assess the respondent, given his expertise and familiarity with the respondent.66 Issue 2 – The making of an interim detention order pending the determination of the EDO proceedings 49 The question that I must consider in determining whether to make an interim detention order under s 57(5) of the Sentencing Act is whether, on the evidence before this Court, it is appropriate to make an order that the respondent be detained 65 Attorney-General (SA) v Dobson [2026] SASC 35 at [51]: See further Attorney-General (SA) v Grosser [2016] SASC 49 at [29]; Attorney-General (SA) v RM [2022] SASC 160 at [45]. 66 Transcript (n 42) at 30.27-31.03. -- 14 of 19 -- [2026] SASC 76 Gray J 13 until determination of the application for an extended detention order. As McDonald J held in Attorney-General (SA) v Colangelo:67 The Act does not provide a threshold test or criteria for the making of such an interim order. It follows that the discretion is broad and should be exercised having regard to the purposes of s 57, which is that the paramount consideration is to protect the safety of the community. It is a further relevant consideration that the order is only an interim order which must necessarily be made when the Court has not yet received all of the information needed to make a final determination. 50 As I set out in Attorney-General (SA) v AWL:68 The question of whether it is appropriate to make an IDO pursuant to s 57(5) detaining the respondent in custody pending determination of the application for a continuing detention order, involves the consideration of: 1. whether there is, or will be, a real question to be tried as to the making of an extended detention order. This includes consideration of whether the respondent is incapable of controlling, or unwilling to control, his sexual instincts, and whether the nature of the risk the respondent poses is such that it is appropriate for the protection of the safety of the community that he be detained until further order; and 2. whether the discretion to be exercised pursuant to s 57(5) indicates that it would be appropriate to make an interim detention order. Matters relevant to the evaluative exercise to be undertaken include the apparent strength of the case, the practical consequences of interim relief; and the interests of justice. These matters direct attention to the question of whether the protection of the community requires the detention of the respondent or whether any risk the respondent poses can be adequately addressed by the making of an interim supervision order. Having regard to the scheme of the Act, the paramount consideration in determining the question of whether the IDO should be made is the protection of the safety of the community. 51 In determining whether an IDO under s 57(5) is required to protect the safety of the community, consideration must be given to the gravity of the risk, the likelihood of the risk manifesting, and whether other mechanisms with less impact on the respondent’s liberty, such as an ISO, can adequately protect the community from any risk. 52 Having regard to all of the matters before me, including the respondent’s personal circumstances, his history of offending, the risk assessments conducted during his time in custody, the report of the Parole Board, the treatment undertaken and his refusal to accept responsibility for his offending, I find there is a real question to be tried as to whether the respondent is unwilling to control his sexual instincts. 67 [2025] SASC 2 at 15 [94]. 68 [2026] SASC 58 at [32]; Attorney-General v Anderson [2026] SASC 29 at [38] (B Doyle J); Attorney- General (SA) v Colangelo [2025] SASC 2 at 15 [94] (McDonald J) -- 15 of 19 -- [2026] SASC 76 Gray J 14 53 I accept that there is limited evidence before me by which to consider whether any risk posed by the respondent means that it is appropriate for the protection of the safety of the community that he be detained until determination of the extended detention order.69 This question is relevant both to the determination of the making of the extended detention order and the discretion concerning the making of an interim detention order. There is however, in this case, significantly more material than will often be available on an application such as this, given Dr Raeside has conducted an assessment. I have had regard in assessing whether any risk requires detention to Dr Raeside’s 2019 report which was prepared at the request of the applicant. Dr Raeside addressed the respondent’s continual denial of his offending and the impact this had on the risk of re-offending. Dr Raeside went on to opine:70 … on the basis of my assessment, combined with the material that I have reviewed, I would concur that prior to commencing the SBC-mod program Mr Liddy was a low-moderate risk of reoffending sexually. Whilst I think he is likely to benefit from the program I do not think that it will significantly further reduce his risk and he would likely still remain in that same range, primarily based on static factors, namely his prior offending. 54 When this Court comes to determine whether to make an extended detention order or an extended supervision order, there will be further information before the Court including more recent reports of the two legally qualified medical practitioners. Two legally qualified medical practitioners will have enquired into the mental condition of the respondent and reported to the Court on whether the respondent is incapable of controlling or unwilling to control his sexual instincts.71 That material is not currently available to me, given the time at which this application is brought. 55 Assessing this matter, as I must, on the material currently before me, whilst I am satisfied that there is a possibility of failure to exercise appropriate control of sexual instincts, the material does not establish that there is a significant risk. I am not satisfied, on the material before me, that there is a good chance or a substantial risk of re-offending such that detention is required. 56 I note that if the respondent is placed on an ISO, there will be opportunities for him to engage with community-based services to address any outstanding criminogenic treatment needs. These include:72 1. That the respondent and his community corrections officer would develop a plan to ensure that he has a structured week and/ or routine that includes opportunities for socialisation. 69 Attorney-General (SA) v GS [2025] SASC 29 at [40] (Stein J). 70 First Affidavit of Peta White (n 15) at 113-114 (PLW-16); Report of Dr Craig Raeside, Consultant Forensic Psychiatrist, dated 10 September 2019. 71 See Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 57(6). 72 First Affidavit of Peta White (n 15) at 82 (PLW-14); Post-Treatment Assessment Summary of Kim Pfitzner and Katharine Short dated 20 January 2020 at 9. -- 16 of 19 -- [2026] SASC 76 Gray J 15 2. That the respondent would be encouraged to explore any relevant thoughts he had around media attention and/or police through the use of a thought diary or other method of challenging his thinking patterns. 3. That his community corrections officer could assist the respondent to utilise emotion management strategies to help him manage his initial feelings of being anxious, stressed and overwhelmed on parole and the ongoing management of negative emotional states. 4. That the respondent could be encouraged to seek psychological intervention with a psychologist experienced in working with sexual offenders to continue to further develop insights into past patterns of behaviours and the continued impact that they have on his life and relationships. 57 I accept that the safety of the community is the paramount consideration. However, I consider that any risk the respondent poses can be appropriately addressed by the imposition of conditions. It follows that I would exercise my discretion not to make an interim detention order. The terms of the ISO 58 There is a further dispute between the parties as to the appropriate terms of an ISO. 59 Proposed condition 6 of the ISO order would result in the respondent being detained at his residence and only being permitted to leave the residence in specified emergencies or where directed or approved by his supervising officer or the Parole Board. The proposed condition provides as follows: Until the Parole Board orders otherwise, the Respondent must be subject to an intensive supervision regime of Home Detention. The Respondent must comply with the rules of the Department for Correctional Services in respect of intensive electronic monitoring and will not leave their residence at any time, except for the purpose of approved remunerated employment, urgent medical or dental treatment, to minimize the risk of serious injury or death to themselves or to any other person, or for any purpose as directed by and with the prior approval of their Supervising Officer or the Parole Board. 60 The respondent contends that the onus is on the Attorney-General to satisfy the Court that any proposed discretionary condition is required or appropriate.73 The respondent contends that the incursion into the respondent’s freedom of movement which is consequent upon the imposition of an intensive supervision regime of home detention is not sufficiently justified in the circumstances of this case, having regard to the evidentiary material before the Court. In considering the 73 Attorney-General (SA) v Karpany [2020] SASC 219 at [26], [29] (Livesey J); Attorney-General (SA) v Symonds [2021] SASC 145 at [56]; Anders v NACS Nominees Pty Ltd [2013] SASC 152 at [39] (Peek J), referring to Walton v Gardiner (1992) 177 CLR 378 at 392-3 (Mason CJ, Deane and Dawson JJ). -- 17 of 19 -- [2026] SASC 76 Gray J 16 appropriateness of the disputed condition, I remind myself that the paramount consideration is the protection of the safety of the community. 61 I have carefully considered all of the affidavit material before this Court relevant to the appropriate nature of the conditions to be imposed. However, in considering that intensive supervision on home detention should be imposed for an initial period of six months, matters of particular relevance to my consideration include: 1. the fact that the respondent has demonstrated the prior ability to offend and to conceal that offending for a significant period of time; and 2. the respondent has been in custody for such an extended period of time that I consider the first six months following his release are likely to be challenging for the respondent and therefore be a time of increased risk of re-offending. 62 I reject the contention of the respondent that the proposed ISO conditions are an unwarranted and severe curtailment of his liberty. Having regard to the paramount consideration, being the protection of the safety of the community, I do not consider that a properly implemented intensive supervision regime of home detention would be contrary to the respondent’s treatment needs as an intensive supervision regime can permit engagement in a structured weekly routine that provides appropriate opportunities for socialisation and for community-based treatment including the engagement with a psychiatrist.74 In addition to the proposed conditions, I also propose to impose additional restrictions on internet usage. 63 I find that the additional protection to the safety of the community of having a period of intensive supervision, on a regime of home detention during the first six months following the respondent’s release, is warranted to appropriately address any risk of re-offending and to properly protect the community. Conclusion 64 I make the following orders: 1. The respondent’s application for a stay dated 23 April 2026 is refused, and the application is dismissed.75 2. The respondent is subject to an Interim Supervision Order pursuant to sections 9 and 10(2) of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA), which will take effect on the making of this order following service by the respondent of his sentence and will apply until both the 74 First Affidavit of Peta White (n 15) (PLW-14); SBC Post-Treatment Assessment Report at pg 9 recommends "psychological intervention with a psychologist experienced in working with sexual offenders. 75 Interlocutory Application dated 23 April 2026 (FDN 13) in file SCCRM-26-008309. -- 18 of 19 -- [2026] SASC 76 Gray J 17 application for the EDO and the application for the ESO are determined. The ISO order shall include a condition which imposes an intensive supervision regime of home detention for an initial period of six months and limitations on internet usage. 3. A prescribed health professional (to be nominated by the Clinical Director, Forensic Mental Health Service of South Australia) shall examine the respondent and report to the Court on the results of the examination, including an assessment of the likelihood of the respondent committing a further serious sexual offence pursuant to section 7(3)(a) of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA). 4. Pursuant to section 57(6) of the Sentencing Act, two legally qualified medical practitioners (to be nominated by the Clinical Director, Forensic Mental Health Service of South Australia) shall inquire into the mental condition of the respondent and report to the Court on whether the respondent is incapable of controlling, or unwilling to control, his sexual instincts. It is noted that both parties to this application consider Dr Raeside, if available, to be an appropriate person to conduct an assessment. The evidence before this Court supports that view. 5. The applicant is granted leave to provide a copy of any report ordered by the Court to the Parole Board, the Department for Correctional Services and any other agency or service provider engaged with the respondent from time to time. 6. The application for an interim detention order is refused. 65 I will hear from the parties as to any further orders and as to the appropriate terms of the ISO to be imposed in accordance with the reasons. I will read and explain the terms of the ISO to the respondent. -- 19 of 19 --