AB BY NEXT FRIEND CD -v- THE HOUSING AUTHORITY [2026] WASC 274

[2026] WASC 274 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CHAMBERS CITATION : AB BY NEXT FRIEND CD -v- THE HOUSING AUTHORITY [2026] WASC 274 CORAM : STRK J HEARD : ON THE PAPERS DELIVERED : 7 JULY 2026 FILE NO/S : CIV 1127 of 2021 BETWEEN : AB BY NEXT FRIEND CD Plaintiff AND THE HOUSING AUTHORITY First Defendant ELECTRICITY NETWORKS CORPORATION T/AS WESTERN POWER Second Defendant WEST COAST ENERGY PTY LTD ACN 094 966 935 Fourth Defendant SPOTLESS FACILITY SERVICES PTY LTD Fifth Defendant FRONTON AUSTRALIA PTY LTD Sixth Defendant KGR ELECTRICAL SERVICES PTY LTD Seventh Defendant -- 1 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 274 Page 2 Catchwords: Application for approval of an agreement pursuant to O 70 r 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) - Person under disability - Application to approve proposed compromise of action - Whether the terms of the proposed agreement are for the benefit of the person under a disability Legislation: Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 70 r 10 Result: Application granted Category: B Representation: Counsel: Plaintiff : No appearance First Defendant : No appearance Second Defendant : No appearance Fourth Defendant : No appearance Fifth Defendant : No appearance Sixth Defendant : No appearance Seventh Defendant : No appearance Solicitors: Plaintiff : Levitt Robinson Solicitors First Defendant : State Solicitor's Office Second Defendant : Barry Nilsson Lawyers (WA) Fourth Defendant : Hall & Wilcox (Perth) Fifth Defendant : Wotton + Kearney Lawyers (Perth) Sixth Defendant : DWF (Australia) Seventh Defendant : Wotton + Kearney Lawyers (Perth) -- 2 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 274 Page 3 Cases referred to in decision: Duffell v Duffell [2015] ACTSC 123 Morris v Zanki (1997) 18 WAR 260 Scaffidi v Perpetual Trustees Victoria [2011] WASCA 159; (2011) 42 WAR 159 Secure Funding Pty Ltd v AB [No 3] [2025] WASC 239 Sosa v Carter [1978] WAR 123 Wood v Public Trustee (WA) (1995) 16 WAR 58 -- 3 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 274 STRK J Page 4 STRK J: Introduction 1 These reasons concern the application made on behalf of the plaintiff by motion dated 8 May 2026 pursuant to O 70 r 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA). The defendants support the application for approval but do not seek to be heard in relation to it. The application has been determined on the papers. Background 2 This proceeding has been on foot since February 2021. Set out below is a high level overview so as to give context to the application. It is not a comprehensive account of the procedural history. 3 Eight separate proceedings were commenced by writs of summons filed on 26 February 2021. The plaintiffs in the eight proceedings are members of the same family and are commonly represented by Levitt Robinson Solicitors. While the proceedings were all commenced on the same day, they have not progressed at the same speed, and the orders made in each proceeding were not made in lock-step. 4 This proceeding, known as CIV 1127 of 2021, was commenced in the name of the plaintiff by a writ of summons indorsed with a statement of claim. 5 The plaintiff was born on 23 December 2006. It was pleaded that on 3 March 2018 the plaintiff (who was then 11 years of age) received an electric shock and suffered damage when she touched a garden tap in the front yard of a property leased by the Housing Authority to her mother. The plaintiff is non-verbal, permanently wheelchair-bound and relies on 24-hour care. She is dependent on carers for all activities of daily living. By the proceeding, relief in the form of damages, interest and cost was sought. 6 The proceeding was not commenced by a next friend. By orders made by Kenneth Martin J on 11 May 2021, the plaintiff's mother was appointed as next friend of the plaintiff, with retrospective effect to 26 February 2021. 7 The proceeding was admitted to the Commercial and Managed Cases List in August 2021, and since December 2022 the proceeding has been prosecuted by the plaintiff by her maternal grandmother as her next friend (who was appointed next friend in substitution for the -- 4 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 274 STRK J Page 5 plaintiff's mother). Leave was granted to further amend the amended writ of summons to record that change. 8 On 1 December 2022 this proceeding was declared as one of catastrophic personal injury for the purposes of items 19 and 22 of the Legal Profession (Supreme and District Courts) (Contentious Business) Determination 2022. 9 When the proceeding commenced, the named defendants were the Housing Authority as the first defendant; Electricity Networks Corporation trading as Western Power as the second defendant; Electricity Retail Corporation trading as Synergy as the third defendant; and Downer EDI Engineering Pty Ltd as the fourth defendant. 10 There have been a number of changes to the defendants in the course of the proceeding. 11 On 3 May 2021, the proceeding was dismissed against Downer EDI Engineering. Further, by an order made in March 2024 by the learned Master pursuant to O 70 r 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, the Court approved the compromise of the plaintiff's claim against the third defendant on the terms of a proposed deed of settlement and release annexed to a confidential affidavit made by the plaintiff's maternal grandmother. Further, the plaintiff, by her next friend, was granted leave to compromise her claim against the third defendant on the terms set out in the proposed deed of settlement and release; and the plaintiff, by her next friend, was granted leave to discontinue her claim against the third defendant. 12 The remaining defendants are the Housing Authority (the first defendant); Electricity Networks Corporation trading as Western Power (the second defendant); West Coast Energy Pty Ltd (the fourth defendant); Spotless Facility Services Pty Ltd (the fifth defendant); Fronton Australia Pty Ltd (the sixth defendant); and KGR Electrical Services Pty Ltd (the seventh defendant). The defendants deny that they are liable to the plaintiff in respect of this proceeding. 13 In May 2024 in the other proceedings commenced by members of the plaintiff's family, it was ordered that until the determination of the issue of liability to pay damages in the action which concerned the -- 5 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 274 STRK J Page 6 plaintiff (the primary action) or further order, the other proceedings would be stayed. In this proceeding, the following orders were made:1 1. Discovery and inspection of documents given in this action shall be discovery and inspection, and the documents so discovered shall be available for use, in Supreme Court of Western Australia actions CIV 1128, 1130, 1131, 1132, 1134, 1137 and 1138 of 2021. 2. Witness outlines and evidence exchanged in this action shall be witness outlines and evidence exchanged, and available for use, by the parties in Supreme Court of Western Australia actions CIV 1128, 1130, 1131, 1132, 1134, 1137 and 1138 of 2021. 3. The parties in Supreme Court of Western Australia actions CIV 1128, 1130, 1131, 1132, 1134, 1137 and 1138 of 2021, have liberty to attend and participate in any mediation in this action to the extent permitted by the court in this action. 4. The parties in Supreme Court of Western Australia actions CIV 1128, 1130, 1131, 1132, 1134, 1137 and 1138 of 2021, have liberty to appear at the trial of, or at the trial of particular issues in, this action and may take such part in the trial as the trial judge may direct and shall be bound by findings of fact or law made by the trial judge. 14 A total of 21 subpoenas have been issued in the course of this proceeding for the production of documents. The parties have also given discovery. 15 By an order made in February 2025, the primary action was referred to mediation pursuant to the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) pt VI. The plaintiff's next friend attended the mediation which took place in the Supreme Court at Perth between 18 and 21 November 2025. Prior to the mediation conference, updated particulars of the plaintiff's damages were filed in this proceeding together with expert evidence. 16 Following the mediation, the parties continued their without prejudice negotiations as to the terms of a deed of settlement and release. 17 On 8 May 2026 an application was made on behalf of the plaintiff by motion pursuant to O 70 r 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, seeking orders in the following terms: 1 Orders 1 to 4 of the orders made on 28 May 2024. -- 6 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 274 STRK J Page 7 1. The plaintiff has leave to compromise her claim against the defendants as alleged in the Substituted Statement of Claim on the terms set out in the confidential Deed of Settlement and Release ('Deed') annexed to the affidavit of Stewart Levitt sworn 6 May 2026 and otherwise on the terms of this order. 2. Within 7 days after the date of service of this order, the parties execute the Deed. 3. There is liberty to apply with respect to the defendants' payment obligations under the Deed. 4. Upon payment of all monies as set out in the Deed, the defendants are discharged from any further liability to the plaintiff in relation to the Claim and the parties must file a Memorandum of Consent Orders dismissing the action with an order that the defendants pay the plaintiff's costs of the action to be taxed if not agreed. 5. Perpetual Trustee Company Limited ('Trustee') is appointed the trustee of all money payable to the plaintiff pursuant to the Deed ('Trust'), to be invested and administered on the plaintiff's behalf. 6. The Trustee is empowered at its discretion to apply, from time to time, the whole or any part of the income of the Trust and, if considered necessary the capital thereof, for the maintenance, welfare and advancement of the plaintiff, or otherwise for the benefit of the plaintiff. 7. There is liberty to apply in respect of the Trust. 8. Unless otherwise ordered, access to the following documents on the court record is restricted to the plaintiff and her legal representatives: a) opinion of plaintiff's counsel; b) affidavit of plaintiff's solicitor; c) affidavit of plaintiff's next friend; d) affidavit of representative of private trustee. 9. Pursuant to s. 141(3) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2022 (WA): a) The limits on costs that are fixed by the following items of the Legal Profession (Supreme and District Courts) (Contentious Business) Determination 2016 and subsequent iterations (the Determinations) are -- 7 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 274 STRK J Page 8 removed, and the plaintiff's costs are to be taxed without regard to those limits: i. Item 1(a) – writ; ii. Item 1(c) – statement of claim; iii. Item 6(b) – giving particulars of a pleading; iv. Item 17(a) – application for compromise; and v. Item 18(a) – entry for trial. b) The plaintiff's costs are to be taxed without regard to the hourly rates for Counsel fixed by the Determinations, such that: i. Neil Morrissey's rate be allowed at $550 per hour inclusive of GST. ii. Richard Royle's rate be allowed at $880 per hour inclusive of GST. iii. David Higgs SC's rate be allowed at $1,210 per hour inclusive of GST. 18 The Court understands that following conferral the parties agreed to make an amendment to the proposed deed of settlement and release. They have also agreed that the second order promoted ought be amended so as to allow the parties 14 days (in place of 7) after the date of service of the order, to execute the proposed amended deed of settlement and release. 19 These reasons only concern proposed orders 1 to 8 (inclusive) of the motion, amended to refer to the proposed amended deed of settlement and release and to allow additional time for the execution of the deed. As is recorded above, the defendants support the application for approval but do not seek to be heard in relation to it. I understand that (subject to further conferral as between the parties) the defendants intend to be heard with respect to that part of the application concerning the plaintiff's costs (proposed order 9 of the motion).2 2 ts 83, 87 (21 May 2026). -- 8 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 274 STRK J Page 9 Evidence filed in support of the application 20 Six affidavits were filed in support of the application. The first was the affidavit of the plaintiff's maternal grandmother and next friend sworn on 7 May 2026 and filed on 22 May 2026. 21 Among other things, the next friend deposed that she had attended the mediation; that she was advised at each stage of the mediation by the plaintiff's legal team in relation to all issues, including the exchange of offers; that she had the assistance of additional support at mediation; that the proposed deed of settlement and release was explained to her in person by Tom Maclaurin, a solicitor who had attended the mediation; that Mr Maclaurin also went through with her the opinion of independent counsel; that she had read the advice of independent counsel and believed the factual content as described in the advice to be correct; and that she had had the opportunity to ask Levitt Robinson questions in relation to the negotiations and settlement, and wished to take their advice to resolve this matter in the sum that had been provisionally agreed. She also deposed that she was supportive of the appointment of Perpetual Trustee Company Limited. 22 Attached to the next friend's affidavit was a copy of the proposed deed of settlement and release (before the proposed amendment), and a copy of a proposal received from Perpetual Trustee Company Limited. 23 The second was the affidavit of Stewart Alan Levitt sworn on 6 May 2026 and filed on 22 May 2026. Attached to that affidavit was a bundle of documents which included the sixteen medical expert reports and three non-medical expert reports filed on behalf of the plaintiff in the proceeding; and the ten medical expert reports and five non-medical liability expert reports filed on behalf of various defendants.3 Also included in the bundle was the proposed deed of settlement and release, and the opinion of independent counsel, Richard Royle and Neil Morrissey, in relation to the proposed compromise of the plaintiff's claim dated 5 January 2025. Inclusive of attachments, Mr Levitt's affidavit exceeded 3,400 pages. 24 The third was the affidavit of Tjay Thanoj Ratnawardana sworn on 21 May 2026 and filed on 22 May 2026. Mr Ratnawardana is a Senior Financial Advisor in the Perpetual Private Division of Perpetual Limited. He deposed to his own qualifications. Among other things, Mr Ratnawardana deposed that Perpetual Limited is a public company 3 Affidavit of SA Levitt sworn on 6 May 2026, SAL-1 (pages 18 - 3067). -- 9 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 274 STRK J Page 10 listed on the Australian Stock Exchange and it controls and owns all the companies in the Perpetual Group of companies including Perpetual Trustee Company Limited; that Perpetual Group maintains professional indemnity and other insurances that are appropriate for the provision of trustee and administrator services; to the financial status of the Perpetual Group; to the nature of the services it provides; and to its fees. Attached to that affidavit was Perpetual Trustee Company Limited's current Financial Services Guide. 25 After considering the papers then filed, on 25 May 2026, a communication was sent by the Court to the plaintiff's legal representative to request that further information be provided. 26 In response to that request, a fourth affidavit was filed in support of the application. That was the second affidavit made by Mr Levitt, which was sworn on 9 June 2026 and filed on the same day. Attached to that affidavit was a bundle of documents which concerned the engagement of Levitt Robinson; the legal costs and disbursements of the proceeding; and a copy of orders made by the State Administrative Tribunal on 16 December 2024 concerning the plaintiff. Inclusive of attachments, Mr Levitt's second affidavit exceeded 100 pages. 27 As to the orders made by the State Administrative Tribunal on 16 December 2024 concerning the plaintiff, among other things, the Tribunal had declared that the plaintiff was unable by reason of mental disability to make reasonable judgments in respect of the matters relating to all of her estate and was in need of an administrator of her estate. The Public Trustee was appointed plenary administrator of the plaintiff's estate with all the powers and duties conferred by the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), save for the part of the plaintiff's estate that relates to CIV 1127 of 2021 (that is, this proceeding). For completeness I note that the orders attached to Mr Levitt's second affidavit also recorded that the Tribunal had appointed the Public Advocate as plenary guardian of the plaintiff with all of the powers and duties conferred by the Guardianship and Administration Act. 28 The fifth was the affidavit of Mr Levitt sworn on 26 June 2026 and filed on the same day. Attached to that affidavit was a notice dated 6 May 2026 from Medicare and a copy of the proposed amended deed of settlement and release. Among other things, Mr Levitt deposed to the circumstances which gave rise to the amendment to the deed; that (subject to this Court's approval) the amendment is agreed between the -- 10 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 274 STRK J Page 11 parties the parties having agreed to seek an order in terms of order 2 of the application, amended to allow additional time to execute the proposed amended deed of settlement and release; and to the amendment having been explained to the next friend of the plaintiff and that the plaintiff's next friend had agreed to the same. 29 The sixth was the affidavit of Mr Levitt sworn on 1 July 2026 and filed on the same day. He deposed to independent counsel, Mr Royle, having considered the proposed amended deed of settlement and to independent counsel having confirmed that the advice in his and Mr Morrissey's confidential advice (which was attached to Mr Levitt's affidavit sworn on 6 May 2026 and filed on 22 May 2026) remained unchanged. Attached to Mr Levitt's affidavit was a copy of the written confirmation provided by Mr Royle to the effect that the amendment did not alter the opinion he had expressed in the confidential advice. Restriction orders 30 On 22 May 2026, on the application made on behalf of the plaintiff pursuant to O 67B r 5(1)(b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, and upon the Court being satisfied that the first three affidavits described above contained confidential information, an order was made restricting access to them. Access to the affidavits is limited to the Court, the plaintiff and the plaintiff's legal representatives until further order. 31 On 10 June 2026, on the application made on behalf of the plaintiff pursuant to O 67B r 5(1)(b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, and upon the Court being satisfied that the fourth affidavit described above contained confidential information, an order was made restricting access to it. Access to the affidavit is limited to the Court, the plaintiff and the plaintiff's legal representatives until further order. 32 On 29 June 2026, on the application made on behalf of the plaintiff pursuant to O 67B r 5(1)(b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, and upon the Court being satisfied that the fifth affidavit described above contained confidential information, an order was made restricting access to it. Access to the affidavit is limited to the Court, the parties and the parties' legal representatives until further order. 33 On 1 July 2026, on the application made on behalf of the plaintiff pursuant to O 67B r 5(1)(b) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, and upon the Court being satisfied that the sixth affidavit described above contained confidential information, an order was made restricting -- 11 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 274 STRK J Page 12 access to it. Access to the affidavit is limited to the Court, the parties and the parties' legal representatives until further order. 34 These reasons have been prepared so as to not disclose the confidential information contained in the affidavits. Disability 35 Order 70 of the Rules of the Supreme Court concerns disability, and O 70 r 10 concerns the compromise of actions by persons under disability and provides as follows: 10. Settlement etc. of action by person under disability (1) No settlement or compromise, and no acceptance of money paid into court, whenever entered into or made, in any cause or matter (other than an appeal to the Court of Appeal) in which there is a claim by or on behalf of or against a person under disability, is valid unless it is approved by the Court. (2) An application for approval under subrule (1) - (a) if made before the hearing of a cause or matter, must be by summons in chambers; (b) if made during the trial of an action or issue, must be to the trial judge on motion, and must be supported by affidavit and by the opinion of an independent counsel; but the Court may dispense with the necessity of obtaining counsel's opinion. (3) In this rule settlement includes an acceptance of an offer to consent to judgment. 36 As was noted by Solomon J in Secure Funding Pty Ltd v AB [No 3] [2025] WASC 239 at [18], the Court has inherent power to approve an agreement to compromise an action brought on behalf of the person under a disability if it is satisfied that it is for the benefit of the person to do so. Order 70 r 10 merely provides a framework to enable the court to exercise its power.4 37 The principles to be applied in applications under O 70 r 10 of the Rules of the Supreme Court were stated by Burt CJ in Sosa v Carter [1978] WAR 123, which concerned the settlement of an infant's appeal 4 Wood v Public Trustee (WA) (1995) 16 WAR 58 [62]; Scaffidi v Perpetual Trustees Victoria [2011] WASCA 159; (2011) 42 WAR 159 [50]. -- 12 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 274 STRK J Page 13 as to an assessment of damages. I have regard to and apply the following in the disposition of this application:5 Expressed in general terms this court ought not and indeed cannot approve the proposed settlement unless it be of the opinion that it will be for the benefit of the infant plaintiff. But that cannot, I think, mean that the court is in effect to hear the application as if it were itself the appeal and then to give or to withhold its approval by comparing the offer with the judgment which it would have given on appeal. In my view what the court is called upon to do is to satisfy itself that all the facts relevant to the plaintiff's claim have been brought together and considered by her legal advisers and, unless the requirement be dispensed with, that the settlement is supported by the opinion of independent counsel. It should itself consider the opinion given and the reasons for it. If having done that it appears that all aspects of the case have received proper consideration it should be slow to disagree with the opinion particularly upon such a matter as the assessment of damages for personal injuries. The court should be aware of the risks of litigation in an area in which reasonable men can reasonably reach different conclusions and hence slow to force the infant to take a risk which the court is unable to underwrite. It should, too, satisfy itself that the opinion of counsel has been considered and understood by the infant's guardian and it should give proper weight to the fact that the guardian, as is necessarily the case, wishes to accept the settlement. See generally the remarks of Megarry J in Re Barbour's Settlement [1974] 1 All ER 1188 at 1191. 38 The Court has also issued a practice direction concerning applications for leave to compromise under O 70 r 10 and r 10A, which was published with the concurrence of the Chief Judge of the District Court so as to apply to the practice in that court as well as in the Supreme Court.6 Consistent with the principles stated by Burt CJ, practice direction 4.2.2 relevantly provides:7 2. Where counsel's opinion is not dispensed with, it must be obtained, filed and identified, and the court will normally be required to be satisfied: (a) that the next friend, (or guardian appointed by a court to be the representative in a particular lawsuit as the case may be) has perused counsel's opinion, has discussed it with the solicitor and approved of or consents to the proposed compromise; 5 Sosa v Carter (124) (Burt CJ), (124) (Wallace & Brinsden JJ). 6 Supreme Court of Western Australia's Consolidated Practice Directions PD 4.2.2 par 1. 7 Supreme Court of Western Australia's Consolidated Practice Directions PD 4.2.2 par 2. -- 13 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 274 STRK J Page 14 (b) that the facts on which counsel's opinion is based are correct and complete so far as can be ascertained; (c) that sufficient facts are identified to enable the court to form an opinion in respect of the matter to be approved, and that grounds for any apportionment of liability are stated; and (d) that in the opinion of both counsel and solicitor, the proposed compromise would be beneficial to the person under disability. 39 By the motion, it is proposed that Perpetual Trustee Company Limited be appointed the trustee of all money payable to the plaintiff pursuant to the deed of settlement and release, to be invested and administered on the plaintiff's behalf. That order is pressed in circumstances where, in the absence of such an order, the money payable to the plaintiff would be required to be paid to the Public Trustee pursuant to O 70 r 12 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, which provides as follows: 12. Control of money recovered for person under disability (1) Where — (a) in any proceedings money is recovered by or on behalf of or is adjudged or ordered or agreed to be paid to or for the benefit of a person under disability; or (b) in any proceedings money paid into court is accepted by or on behalf of a plaintiff who is a person under disability; or (c) in an application under rule 11(1) the Court has ordered the payment into court or investment of any moneys relating to a settlement or compromise, the money must, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, be paid to the Public Trustee for investment on behalf of the person under disability, and if the Court so orders may be invested by the Public Trustee in investments outside the Common Account established under the Public Trustee Act 1941. (2) The Court may at any time, and from time to time, give directions for the application of the income or of the capital and income of the investment for the maintenance, welfare, advancement, or otherwise for the benefit of the person under disability. -- 14 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 274 STRK J Page 15 40 The Court has a duty to consider the future management of money recovered for a person under disability, and in fulfilling that duty exercises a judicial discretion, the governing consideration being what is best to be done for the person under the disability. It is appropriate to start with a predisposition towards investment with the Public Trustee, the onus being on the person who seeks investment with a private trustee to establish a good reason for such an order.8 Disposition 41 This application is supported by affidavit (the affidavits of the plaintiff's next friend, legal representative and representative of the private trustee) and by the opinion of independent counsel, Mr Royle and Mr Morrissey, which advice was confirmed by Mr Royle. 42 On the papers filed, I am satisfied that the plaintiff's next friend had perused counsels' opinion, and had discussed it with the solicitor. I am also satisfied that the next friend had approved of the proposed compromise and the amendment to it. I am satisfied that the facts on which counsels' opinion was based were correct and complete so far as could be ascertained; that the amendment to the proposed deed of settlement and release was brought to Mr Royle's attention, was considered by Mr Royle, and the amendment did not alter the opinion he had expressed. I am satisfied that sufficient facts had been identified to enable the Court to form an opinion in respect of the matter to be approved (that is, the compromise of the plaintiff's claim against the defendants on the terms set out in the confidential amended deed of settlement and release); and that in the opinion of counsel and the plaintiff's solicitor, the proposed compromise would be beneficial to the plaintiff, being the person under disability. 43 In considering the application I have noted that there remains uncertainty as to the extent to which: (a) the plaintiff's costs of and incidental to this proceeding will be recovered from the defendants, including the basis upon which those costs will be taxed if not agreed. (As is recorded above, conferral as between the parties continues in relation to proposed order 9 of the motion); and (b) the extent to which Levitt Robinson may seek to recover additional costs against the plaintiff over and above the party 8 Lexis Nexis, Civil Procedure Western Australia (at 15 June 2026) at [70.12.1], citing Morris v Zanki (1997) 18 WAR 260, 286. -- 15 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 274 STRK J Page 16 and party costs payable to the plaintiff, as ascertained by taxation or the agreement of the defendants. 44 While this uncertainty remains, I note that: (a) the compromise is favourable to the plaintiff in so far as it contemplates recovery by the plaintiff of her legal costs from the defendants on a party and party basis; (b) the ambit of O 70 r 10 would appear to be such that the Court will have oversight in relation to any agreement to compromise (rather than have assessed by taxation) the costs payable to the plaintiff by operation of O 70 r 10; and (c) by operation of O 66 r 24, unless Levitt Robinson does not claim additional costs against the plaintiff over and above the party and party costs, as ascertained by taxation or the agreement of the defendants payable to the plaintiff in the proceeding, the costs payable to Levitt Robinson on behalf of the plaintiff from the money recovered on her behalf in this proceeding must be taxed, and no costs may be charged or retained by Levitt Robinson in respect of this proceeding except the amount of such taxed costs. 45 Having regard to all of the circumstances, including the proposal with respect to the plaintiff's costs of the proceedings, I am satisfied that the proposed amended deed of settlement and release represents a compromise that is beneficial to the plaintiff. 46 The reasons set out above are sufficient for the Court to explain its approval of the compromise. It is neither necessary nor appropriate for the Court to set out in detail its reasons for approval of the compromise.9 47 As is recorded above, an order is sought that Perpetual Trustee Company Limited be appointed the trustee of all money payable to the plaintiff pursuant to the deed of settlement and release, to be invested and administered on the plaintiff's behalf. Perpetual Trustee Company Limited consents to act as trustee of a trust established for the benefit of the plaintiff. The order is supported by the plaintiff's next friend, not opposed by the defendants, was considered by independent counsel, and in light of the evidence filed and the basis upon which the costs of 9 See Duffell v Duffell [2015] ACTSC 123 [48] - [50] cited in Secure Funding Pty Ltd v AB [No 3] [21]. -- 16 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 274 STRK J Page 17 the trustee will be met, I am satisfied that it is sensible and appropriate in the circumstances. Having considered the proposed arrangements in light of the governing consideration, being what is best to be done for the plaintiff, I am satisfied that there is a good reason for the exercise of discretion in the manner promoted, and that there is cogent evidence that the proposed trustee is structurally and financially secure. Conclusion and orders 48 For these reasons, orders concerning the compromise of this proceeding will be made in terms substantively as promoted on behalf of the plaintiff in the notice of motion, amended so as to refer to the amended deed of settlement and release and to make the requested amendment to the proposed second order. 49 That part of the motion which concerns the plaintiff's application for a special costs order has been listed for directions only at 9.30 am on 23 July 2026. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. DS Associate to the Honourable Justice Strk 7 JULY 2026 -- 17 of 17 --