DERKATCH v LYKO [2026] SADC 57

On Appeal from DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (HER HONOUR JUDGE DEUTER) Applicant: ALEXANDER DERKATCH In Person Respondent: LIDIA LYKO In Person Hearing Date/s: 02/03/2026 File No/s: CIV-25-015226 B DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Civil: Appeal Against a Master) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. DERKATCH v LYKO [2026] SADC 57 Reasons for Decision of her Honour Judge Deuter 22 May 2026 PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - INTEREST ON JUDGMENTS - GENERALLY PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS - INTEREST ON JUDGMENTS - TIME FROM WHICH INTEREST RUNS Applicant sought a review of orders made by an Associate Judge in relation to interest payable on a judgment in his favour against the respondent. The proceedings between the parties concerned issues that commenced in 2012, involving family members. Ultimately, the parties were appointed executors of the respective family members upon their death. Several judgments in 2018 determined the issues between the parties, including the costs of the action. There were then delays regarding finalisation of the proceedings and the applicant sought interest. On 30 November 2018 the primary judgment awarded damages to the applicant of $28,435.69 inclusive of interest to that date. Costs were however awarded in the respondent's favour at 20% of her costs as claimed. Neither party took any step to recover their debt until late 2024, when the applicant sought to initiate enforcement proceedings to recover the judgment sum. At that stage the respondent’s costs had not been taxed. A taxation proceeded on 13 October 2025, and the respondent’s costs were assessed at $24,107.00. This meant that the total amount payable to the applicant was $4,328.69. Determination of interest payable, and the provisions of section 40 of the District Court Act 1991. Held: 1. Offset sum of $4,328.69 remains payable by the respondent to the applicant. -- 1 of 13 -- 2. Interest is payable by the respondent in the sum of $11,869.83. 3. The total amount payable by the respondent is $16,198.52. 4. Time granted for payment is 90 days from today's date. District Court Act 1991 (SA) ss 40, 43; Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 114; Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA), referred to. Lyko v Derkatch [2018] SADC 90; Lyko v Derkatch (No 2) [2018] SADC 141, discussed. Malaugh Holdings (No 2) P/L & Anor v Seal & Anor (No 2) [2011] SADC 37; McLean v D.I.D. Piling Pty Ltd [2010] SASC 33; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; CSR Ltd v Della Maddalena (2006) 80 ALJR 458; Adelaide (SA Pools & Spa) Manufacturing and Installation Pty Ltd & Ors v Westcourt General Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd [2016] SASC 60; Leadenhall Australia Pty Ltd v Doman & Anor [2024] SASCA 77, considered. -- 2 of 13 -- DERKATCH v LYKO [2026] SADC 57 Introduction 1 On 28 November 2025 Associate Judge Blumberg made orders in relation to the interest payable by the respondent (Ms Lyko) in an earlier action (the action) between her, and the applicant (Mr Derkatch).1 2 Associate Judge Blumberg concluded that, after taking into account previous orders made, that Mr Derkatch had an entitlement to interest in the sum of $6,146.74 as the judgment creditor in the action.2 3 The order that interest of $6,146.74 was payable by Ms Lyko is appealed by Mr Derkatch on multiple grounds. His case is that the interest payable should have been a larger sum. A summary of his grounds of appeal are:3 (i) that the Associate Judge incorrectly calculated the interest amount applicable to the monetary judgment in his favour, made on 30 November 2018, in the sum of $28,435.69 (inclusive of interest to that date). (ii) that an error had occurred as the Associate Judge had incorrectly calculated the interest over a seven year period by using a backdated offset sum of $4,328.69. This offset sum was calculated applying the judgment sum, less the costs awarded to Ms Lyko after the taxation of the costs of the action were determined on 8 October 2025. (iii) that the Associate Judge should have calculated the interest applicable to the monetary judgment of $28,435.69 by using a two-step process. The first step being to calculate interest from the judgment date (30/11/2018) to the date of adjudication of costs (8/10/2025) pursuant to s 40 (2)(b) of the District Court Act 1991 (District Court Act) at the rate of 6%, as set out in the rules. The second step being to calculate the amount of interest in relation to the unpaid taxed costs awarded to Ms Lyko on 8 October 2025 pursuant to s 40(2)(a) of the District Court Act. This interest would again be at 6%. (the two-step process). 1 Derkatch v Lyko: DCCIV-12-1359. 2 FDN 138 of DCCIV-12-1359. 3 FDNs 1 and 3 of CIV-25-015226. -- 3 of 13 -- [2026] SADC 57 2 (iv) that if the two step process was performed, the Associate Judge should have awarded interest on the judgment and costs at $14,351.00. After changing his claim on appeal Mr Derkatch sought orders that Ms Lyko pay:4 (1) $14,351.00 as interest on the judgment sum of $28,435.69 for the period between 30/11/2018 and 8/10/2025, calculated by using a rate of 6% over seven years;5 (2) interest at a rate of 6% on $4,328.69, being the costs offset sum, for the period from 8/10/2025 until paid, this to be calculated at $5.00 per week; (3) the sum of $4,328.69, being the offset amount adjudicated by the Court on 8/10/2025 in relation to costs and general damages, and which has never been paid by Ms Lyko. 4 In his written submissions dated 12 February 2026, as amended at the appeal hearing,6 Mr Derkatch submitted that interest should have been calculated as follows: (1) On the judgment sum of $28,435.69 from 30 November 2018 to 30 September 2024, interest of $12,047.00; (2) On the offset amount being $4,328.69 after Ms Lyko’s costs were assessed at $24,107.00 and subtracted from the judgment sum of $28,435.69 for the period from 30 September 2024 to 8 October 2025, interest of $1,743.47; (3) The total interest from 30 November 2018 to 8 October 2025 was therefore $13,790.47; (4) That interest on the offset sum pursuant to UCR 185.1(1) is 6% of $4,328.69 which equates to $259.72 per annum, or $5.00 per week, from 8 October 2025 until paid.7 5 Mr Derkatch also sought a raft of other orders regarding issues that dated back over the lengthy course of the ligation between the parties. During the appeal hearing, these applications were withdrawn as they were significantly out of time, and not relevant to the appeal. I will only address those matters if relevant to the issues to be determined. 4 FDN 1 at Part 3 of CIV-25-015226. 5 Calculations on page 6 of FDN 4. 6 FDN 4. 7 FDN 4 at paragraphs 30-46. -- 4 of 13 -- [2026] SADC 57 3 Background 6 The proceedings between the parties have their genesis in a domestic partnership between Nicolas Tsiplakidis (Nicolas) and Valentia Petrenko (Valentia). In 2012, after separation, Valentia brought proceedings to determine a division of domestic assets (the action). Both parties died before the action was finalised. As a result, Ms Lyko was substituted for Valentia, as her daughter, and the executor of her estate. Mr Derkatch was Nicolas’ great nephew and the executor of his estate. Nicolas was also Ms Lyko’s father, although she was estranged from him, due to alleged domestic violence against her and Valentia. Mr Derkatch was substituted as the executor of Nicolas’ estate. 7 The parties could not resolve the dispute between them, regarding a division of the assets of Nicolas and Valentia. The action was therefore commenced by Ms Lyko. A trial was conducted before Judge Schammer in 2018. Her first decision was handed down on 30 August 2018.8 Formal orders were entered on 30 November 2018. A further decision in relation to the costs of the action, was handed down on 21 December 2018. 9 8 The action concerned a property at Alberton purchased in 1963 by Nicolas and Valentia as joint tenants (the property). There is no need to canvas the issues before Judge Schammer. Her ultimate decision, after Nicolas had died, was delivered on 30 August 2018. Judgment was entered on 30 November 2018.10 The judgment was clarified in a decision of 21 December 2018.11 Judge Schammer held that: (i) the joint tenancy in the property had not been severed by actions taken by Nicolas to leave the property, and live elsewhere, for several years; (ii) Nicolas was wrongfully excluded from the property between 1 January 2011 until his death on 19 December 2014. As a result he was entitled to ‘ouster’ damages which passed to his estate; (iii) upon Nicolas’ death, Valentia assumed sole ownership of the property as the surviving joint tenant, meaning Mr Derkatch had no claim for occupation rent after the date of Nicolas’ death; (iv) on the cross-action, regarding Mr Derkatch’s claim for damages, resulting from Nicholas not being able to re-enter the property before his death, ‘ouster’ damages of $28,435.69, inclusive of interest, were awarded as a judgment in his favour.12 8 Lyko v Derkatch [2018] SADC 90. 9 Lyko v Derkatch (No 2) [2018] SADC 141. 10 Lyko v Derkatch [2018] SADC 90. 11 Lyko v Derkatch (No 2) [2018] SADC 141. 12 FDN 109 of DCCIV-12-1359. -- 5 of 13 -- [2026] SADC 57 4 9 Although there was a clarification, and reasons delivered on 21 December 2018, I find that judgment was formally entered in Mr Derkatch’s favour on 30 November 2018. 10 On 21 December 2018 Judge Schammer made orders in relation to costs. She determined that costs should be awarded on a broad-axe assessment. After detailed consideration she concluded that Mr Derkatch was to pay Ms Lyko 20% of her costs of the entire action on a party/party basis, less the cost of one day’s trial fee. This order took into account Mr Derkatch’s success in the part of the action related to the ‘ouster’ damages. There was no order made granting Mr Derkatch his costs of the action. 11 Neither party took any further steps in relation to the action until late 2024, when Mr Derkatch sought to initiate enforcement proceedings to recover the $28,435.69 awarded to him by Judge Schammer. Mr Derkatch’s application led to a hearing before the Deputy Registrar. It was noted that the costs of the action awarded by Judge Schammer had never been taxed. An order was therefore made that Ms Lyko’s costs be taxed, as per the orders of Judge Schammer. 12 A taxation of costs came on before Auxiliary Associate Judge Forrest on 13 October 2025. After conducting the taxation, he certified Ms Lyko’s legal costs at $24,107.00, after the required 80% reduction was applied. The taxation is not appealed by Mr Derkatch, although in his materials it is clear that he did not agree with the decision. He has only appealed the decision of Associate Judge Blumberg, and not the taxation of costs. 13 After the taxation was conducted by Auxiliary Associate Judge Forrest, the matter was listed back before Associate Judge Blumberg for final orders. In determining these orders Associate Judge Blumberg noted that, taking account of the costs awarded to Ms Lyko and assessed in the sum of $24,107.00, and the damages awarded to Mr Derkatch by Judge Schammer of $28,435.69, the final net amount payable by Ms Lyko to Mr Derkatch was $4,328.69 (the offset sum). 14 He determined that, given Mr Derkatch's entitlement to damages was determined by Judge Schammer on 30 November 2018, the interest payable to him was in relation to the seven years since he was awarded $4,328.89 (taking account of the costs order in Ms Lyko’s favour). Applying the applicable District Court rate of 6% interest on $4,328.89 totalled $1,818.05. Associate Judge Blumberg concluded that the total sum owing to Mr Derkatch was therefore increased to $6,146.74.13 The action was then referred to the Registrar to undertake enforcement procedures for payment of that sum, as a debt. 13 FDN 138 of DCCIV-12-2359. -- 6 of 13 -- [2026] SADC 57 5 Notice of Appeal 15 Mr Derkatch filed a Notice of Appeal on 16 December 2025.14 By that Notice, which was amended by Mr Derkatch in writing, he sought only one order. This was to challenge Associate Judge Blumberg’s order that: Pursuant to UCR 11.2 (2) (6) I refer the enforcement process to the Registrar or her delegate to undertake the enforcement procedures in Chapter 17 of the UCR in relation to the sum of $6,146.74. 16 Mr Derkatch set out extensive grounds of appeal. I summarise those that are relevant to the appeal before me: (i) that Associate Judge Blumberg incorrectly calculated the interest applicable to the monetary judgment in his favour of 30 November 2018, ($28,435.69) by also taking into account the interest over a period of seven years, upon the costs awarded to Ms Lyko of $24,107.00. This led to him awarding interest only on the balance of the sum owing to him of $4,328.69 (the offset sum); (ii) that the correct approach was rather to apply the provisions of s 40 of the District Court Act, this section described as Interest on Judgment Debts; (iii) that the interest applicable on $28,435.69 should have been calculated using the two-step process, as set out in s 40(2) (a) and (b) of the District Court Act; (iv) that the District Court Act specifically distinguishes between the calculation of interest on judgment debts as between two categories, being, ‘adjudicated costs’ and ‘other monetary sums’. Mr Derkatch argued that this is similar to how costs are determined in the Supreme Court pursuant to s 114 of the Supreme Court Act 1935; (v) that Associate Judge Blumberg incorrectly calculated the interest amount by applying a 6% interest rate for 7 years on $4,328.69. He argued that the Associate Judge should have applied the applicable interest on $28,435.69, taking into account pre and post commencement of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (UCR). This is another reason why the two-stage process should have been used; (vi) that an offsetting procedure was appropriate in relation to the judgment sums awarded to each party, to prevent duplication of payments. However, the calculation of interest should still have been assessed as per s 40 (2) (a) of the District Court Act; 14 CIV-25-015226 (FDN 1.). -- 7 of 13 -- [2026] SADC 57 6 (vii) that he was not required to take any positive action in relation to the cost orders made by Judge Schammer. The obligation was first upon Ms Lyko to provide her costs in relation to those orders, so that the 20% owed by him could be determined. This did not occur until October 2025, some seven years after Judge Schammer had awarded Ms Lyko 20% of her costs of the action. As a result, he claimed that any interest relevant to costs should only run from when Ms Lyko presented her costs to Mr Derkatch, and to the court, for adjudication. This however did not impact the interest on the judgment in his favour sum being accrued from when the order were made on 30 November 2018; (viii) that the court should take into account what he described as the ‘exceptional misconduct, unreasonableness, and fraudulent allegations of (Ms Lyko) throughout the taxation of costs’.15 17 There is no doubt that there was a significant delay in Ms Lyko presenting her claim for costs. I find that there are a number of issues that are relevant to Ms Lyko’s delay and failure in providing her costs claim to Mr Derkatch’s solicitors. These are her failure to appear before Judge Schammer on 3 September 2024 and 29 November 2024; the filing of a costs claim of $179,163.22 with no supporting evidence so that Mr Derkatch could not verify those costs; her failure to submit a Form 145 questionnaire as ordered; and the making of a significant claim for costs from entities such as Justice Net ($44,000.00) and Westside Lawyers ($4,654.00), when there was no evidence of Justice Net claiming any fees, and that Ms Lyko had only paid $500 to Westside Lawyers. These issues impact the interest to be awarded upon the costs judgment. 18 Mr Derkatch described Ms Lyko’s actions as being fraudulent misconduct. He was also critical of Auxiliary Associate Judge Forest who conducted the assessment of Ms Lyko’s costs, and Associate Judge Blumberg in his approach to assessing costs. He argued that they: … should have given more consideration to the Judgment Debtor’s (Ms Lyko’s) demonstrably false submissions, verbal and written, attesting to her bad character, serious irregularities, unreliability, and ongoing lack of co-operation.16 19 Whilst I acknowledge Mr Derkatch’s frustration, these issues are not part of the appeal. He did not appeal the result of the taxation of costs conducted by Auxiliary Associate Judge Forest. I also reject Mr Derkatch’s application (contained in paragraph 43 of his appeal grounds) whereby he sought to overturn the original costs order made by Judge Schammer on 21 August 2018, that Ms Lyko be awarded 20% of her costs. 17 Any appeal of that decision was seven 15 Paragraph 18 of Grounds of Appeal (FDN 1). 16 FDN 1 at paragraph 47 of Grounds of Appeal. 17 FDN 1 at paragraph 43. -- 8 of 13 -- [2026] SADC 57 7 years out of time. There was no application seeking an extension of time to appeal Judge Schammer’s ruling. In any event, on the material before me, I find that no special reasons exist to extend the time for an appeal of Judge Schammer’s decision. Nature of the Appeal 20 The right of appeal pursued by Mr Derkatch in these proceedings arises from s 43 of the District Court Act. This provides that: (1) A party to an action may, in accordance with the rules of the appellate court appeal against any judgment given in the action. (2) The appeal lies – … (a) in the case of a judgment given by an Associate Judge or the Court constituted of an Associate Judge—to the Court constituted of a Judge; … (3) The appeal lies as of right, or by permission, according to the rules of the appellate court but, in the case of an appeal against a final judgment of the Court in its Administrative and Disciplinary Division, permission is required to appeal on a question of fact. 21 The term ‘judgment’ for this purpose is defined in s 3 of the Act as ‘a judgment, order or decision and includes an interlocutory judgment or order’. 22 The jurisdiction of the District Court to hear and determine an appeal is to be exercised by a Judge pursuant to UCR 212.7. The appeal is to be by way of a re-hearing. UCR 217.10 provides that: (1) Subject to any statute to the contrary— (a) an appeal or review is to be by way of rehearing; (b) the Court may draw inferences from evidence adduced in the proceeding at first instance; and (c) the Court may hear further evidence in its discretion. (2) The Court may, if it considers that it is in the interests of justice to do so, determine an appeal on the merits notwithstanding a failure of a party to raise or state properly a ground of appeal or alternative contention in the notice of appeal, notice of review or a notice of alternative contention. -- 9 of 13 -- [2026] SADC 57 8 23 The nature of this type of appeal was discussed by Layton J in McLean v D.I.D. Piling Pty Ltd,18 where she said: [18] Accordingly, the appeal is to be by way of a rehearing. This Court is therefore obliged to conduct a real review of the decision and of the Master’s reasons.19 As Kirby J (with whom Gleeson CJ agreed) said in CSR Ltd v Della Maddalena:20 [T]he appellate court is obliged to conduct a thorough examination of the record and a real rehearing. It is not confined to reconsideration of the record in order to correct errors of law, although that will certainly be encompassed in such an appeal. It is required to consider suggested errors of fact-finding. Experience teaches that many errors of this kind arise at first instance, more perhaps than errors of law. Having concluded a rehearing as so described, the appellate court is obliged to “give the judgment which in its opinion ought to have been given in the first instance”. This involves, where, as here, there is no jury, conducting a thorough review of the primary judge's reasons and engaging in the tasks of “weighing conflicting evidence and drawing ... inferences and conclusions”. [Footnotes omitted.] 24 In relation to an appeal from an exercise of discretion, Layton J went on to state: [22] … it is appropriate to follow the well known rules in House v The King, which case sets out the circumstances in which an appellate court would disturb an exercise of discretion. In that case the High Court said (at 504-5): The manner in which an appeal against an exercise of discretion should be determined is governed by established principles. It is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course. It must appear that some error has been made in exercising the discretion. If the judge acts upon a wrong principle, if he allows extraneous or irrelevant matters to guide or affect him, if he mistakes the facts, if he does not take into account some material consideration, then his determination should be reviewed and the appellate court may exercise its own discretion in substitution for his if it has the materials for doing so. It may not appear how the primary judge has reached the result embodied in his order, but, if upon the facts it is unreasonable or plainly unjust, the appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance. In such a case, although the nature of the error may not be discoverable, the exercise of the discretion is reviewed on the ground that a substantial wrong has in fact occurred. [23] Accordingly, it is necessary that the appellant identify an error by the Master of the kind described in House v The King before any appeal should be allowed. [Citations omitted] 18 [2010] SASC 33. 19 Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118, 126-7[25]. 20 (2006) 80 ALJR 458, 465 [16]. -- 10 of 13 -- [2026] SADC 57 9 25 These principles were restated by Doyle J in Adelaide (SA Pools & Spa) Manufacturing and Installation Pty Ltd & Ors v Westcourt General Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd,21 and I will apply them in determining this appeal. Leave to Appeal 26 It is not clear if Mr Derkatch sought leave to appeal the decision of Associate Judge Blumberg. However, it was clearly his intention, and to ensure there is no confusion, I grant leave to him to appeal. Consideration 27 The manner in which interest on judgment debts is to be applied is set out in s 40 of the District Court Act. This provides: (1) A judgment debt bears interest at a rate prescribed by the rules. (2) Subject to any direction by the Court to the contrary, the interest runs— (a) in the case of adjudicated costs—from the date the costs are adjudicated or an earlier date fixed by the adjudicating officer; (b) in the case of any other monetary sum—from the date of the judgment. 28 Judge Smith in Malaugh Holdings (No 2) P/L & Anor v Seal & Anor (No 2)22 noted that the term ‘judgment debt’ in s 40(1) was not defined in the District Court Act.23 As a result he determined that the use of the term in s 40(1) meant: … any money owed pursuant to a judgment of the Court. In this respect I agree with the learned author of Note 1 under s 40 in Lunn’s Civil Procedure South Australia Volume I.24 Judge Smith went on to state: Further, a consideration of the provision as a whole indicates also that the legislature intended that “judgment debt” also include “taxed costs”. In particular: Section 40(1) provides generally that a judgment debt will carry interest; and Section 40(2) deals with from when interest is to run on the judgment debt, and in doing so divides judgment debt into two component parts, namely taxed costs and any other monetary sum. Accordingly, it is clear that the judgment debt (in s 40(1)) is made up of taxed costs (in s 40(2)(a)), and any other monetary sum in s 40(2)(b). The evident intent of the draftsman in dividing judgment sum into those two component parts is, inter alia, to flag to the Court that in the exercise of its discretion as to the running of interest, the Court could, in the appropriate case, order that interest run on costs from a date earlier than taxation. 21 [2016] SASC 60 at [22]. 22 [2011] SADC 37. 23 Ibid at [59]. 24 Ibid at [60]. -- 11 of 13 -- [2026] SADC 57 10 29 In a recent judgment of the Court of Appeal, Leadenhall Australia Pty Ltd v Doman and Anor25 (Leadenhall), it was determined that a proper construction of s 40(2) of the District Court Act, in combination with the Enforcement of Judgments Act 1991 meant that interest begins to accrue on any District Court judgment debt automatically, from the date of the judgment. Justice Blue wrote the leading judgment. He found that ‘… s 40 does not create a statutory cause of action to recover post-judgment interest but directly augments the judgment debt.’26 30 He found that this position was consistent with the plain meaning of the words in s 40 that the judgment debt ‘bears’ interest,27 and meant that ‘interest accrues on, and augments, a judgment debt automatically’.28 31 In relation to interest generally, Justice Blue stated that s 40 provides that, in each case, (the date of judgment and the date of fixing costs respectively) interest runs from the fixing of the monetary sum. However, … this is subject only to exercise of discretion by the Court (including the adjudicating officer in the case of costs) to order otherwise.29 32 Upon reviewing Justice Blue’s judgment in Leadenhall, I find that the Associate Judge made an error in determining the interest upon the judgment debt, by applying the debt owed to Ms Lyko for her legal costs, for the period before those costs were adjudicated. In my view this was not a case where an offset sum was applicable given, Ms Lyko’s delay in providing her legal costs to Mr Derkatch, and therefore the significant delay in taxing costs. This was not something Mr Derkatch should be responsible for. 33 The judgments awarded to each party in the action, were handed down over 7 years apart. No explanation at all was provided as to why, during that period, Ms Lyko did not pay the damages awarded to Mr Derkatch on 30 November 2018, nor take action to have her costs taxed. In fact, she took no action until the Deputy Registrar indicated the costs had not been taxed in late 2024. 34 I find that the fact scenario is one to which s 40 of the District Court Act applies. Interest on the judgment began to run from 30 November 2018. The orders in relation to costs were not made until 28 November 2025. I find that interest on the judgment, in Mr Derkatch’s favour accrued from when the judgment sum was finalized on 30 November 2018, until 28 November 2025. 35 In these proceedings, if interest was automatically applied at 6% per annum on the primary judgment of Judge Schammer, of $28,435.69, from 30 November 2018 to 8 October 2025 the interest payable by Ms Lyko was $11,704.83. Interest 25 [2024] SASCA 77 (26 June 2024). 26 Ibid at [62]. 27 Ibid at [63]. 28 Ibid at [68]. 29 Ibid at [5a]. -- 12 of 13 -- [2026] SADC 57 11 has continued to run, and is enforceable. However since 13 October 2025 Ms Lyko has had a determination of her legal costs. 36 In relation to interest payable on Ms Lyko’s legal costs, while I find that s 40(2) of the District Court Act applies, and that interest runs from the date that the costs were adjudicated, the costs in Ms Lyko’s favour were not adjudicated until 13 October 2025 in the sum of $24,107.00. This was a result of her delay, and not the fault of Mr Derkatch. 37 On 13 October 2025 costs were awarded in Ms Lyko’s favour of $24,107.00. I find that this award of costs determined the monetary judgments between the two parties. As at 13 October 2025, there was a judgment in favour of Mr Derkatch of $28,435.89; and a costs order in favour of Ms Lyko of $24,107.00. I agree with Associate Judge Blumberg that this leads to an offset sum payable by Ms Lyko of $4,328.69. 38 I find that interest on that sum is $165.00 at today’s date. Judgment 1. I find that the judgment sum in Mr Derkatch’s favour, after offsetting the award of costs payable to Ms Lyko is $4,328.69. 2. I find that interest is payable by Ms Lyko as follows: (i) on the primary judgment until 8 October 2025 at $11,704.83 (ii) on the offset sum from 8 October 2025 at $165.00 Total: $11,869.83 3. In addition the offset sum of $4,328.69 remains unpaid. 4. The total sum owing to Mr Derkatch by Ms Lyko is therefore $16,198.52 (the judgment sum). 5. As a result of the significant delay in the parties addressing the issues regarding the property and costs, I provide Ms Lyko with 90 days to pay the judgment sum. 6. If the judgment sum is not paid by Ms Lyko within 90 days, these proceedings are to be referred to the Registrar, or her delegate, to undertake the enforcement procedures in Chapter 17 of the UCR in relation to the sum of $16,198.52. -- 13 of 13 --