JACKSON v THE KING [2026] SASCA 61
On Appeal from DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (HIS HONOUR JUDGE DURRANT)
DCCRM-23-010999
Appellant: STEVEN ALLAN JACKSON Counsel: MR B ARMSTRONG - Solicitor: MANGAN EY &
ASSOCIATES
Respondent: THE KING Counsel: MS N ZUCKERMAN WITH MS R TAN - Solicitor: DIRECTOR OF
PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA);
Hearing Date/s: 21/05/2026
File No/s: SCCRM-25-028975
A
SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Court of Appeal: Criminal)
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply
to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach
any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated.
JACKSON v THE KING
[2026] SASCA 61
Judgment of the Court of Appeal
(The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice David and the Honourable Justice Stanley)
28 May 2026
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST
SENTENCE
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE
PERSON - ASSAULT - CIRCUMSTANCES OF AGGRAVATION AND
AGGRAVATED ASSAULTS
CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - PROPERTY OFFENCES -
BURGLARY, HOUSEBREAKING AND LIKE OFFENCES - ENTERING AS
TRESPASSER OR WITH INTENT OR BEING FOUND WITH INTENT
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST
SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE - JUDGE ACTED ON WRONG
PRINCIPLE
CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL AGAINST
SENTENCE - GROUNDS FOR INTERFERENCE - SENTENCE MANIFESTLY
EXCESSIVE OR INADEQUATE
This is an application for permission to appeal against a sentence imposed for domestic violence
offending against the appellant’s former domestic partner over a period exceeding 18 months.
The appellant pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated assault, contrary to s 20(3) of the Criminal
Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (the CLCA), and one count of aggravated criminal trespass in a
place of residence, contrary to s 170A of the CLCA. The subject offending occurred between
October 2020 and August 2022.
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In each case, the pleaded circumstances of aggravation were that the appellant committed the
offences knowing that the victim was his former domestic partner, and in contravention of an
intervention order from 2015 which prohibited the appellant from assaulting, threatening, harassing
or intimidating the complainant.
In June 2025, the appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for five years, 10 months and 28 days,
with a non-parole period of three years and four months, to commence from 13 June 2024.
The sentencing of the appellant was complicated by the need to take account of other offending. This
included drug offences, breaches of bond, theft, driving offences, trespass and damaging property.
Whilst he had already been sentenced for that other offending in the District Court and the
Magistrates Court, some of it occurred after the subject offending.
The appellant challenged the sentence on various grounds, including that the sentencing judge erred
in accumulating various sentences, that he erred when describing the offending as having occurred
whilst the appellant was on parole, and on the basis that the sentence is manifestly excessive.
Held (the Court), granting permission to appeal but dismissing the appeal:
1. It has not been demonstrated that it was an error for the sentencing judge to order that the
sentence for the subject offending be cumulative on the Magistrates Court sentence, or that
the three subject offending sentences be imposed cumulatively on each other. That course
was open to the sentencing judge and there was no error in the exercise of his discretion by
proceeding in that way.
2. Given the evident need for deterrence and denunciation against sustained domestic violence
offending of this type, especially when committed in defiance of an intervention order, the
Court is not satisfied that the individual sentences, or the overall sentence, imposed in this
case were outside the available range.
3. Although the finding that the subject offending occurred whilst on parole was a material error,
this Court is not required to re-sentence an offender where it concludes that no different
sentence should be imposed. Having reflected on all of the circumstances of this case, no
lesser sentence should be imposed.
Correctional Services Act 1982 (SA) s 74A; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 20(3),
170, 170A; Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) ss 20, 45, 47, 47(1)(b), referred to.
R v Delphin (2001) 79 SASR 429, discussed.
Brooks v The King [2025] SASCA 88; Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; Da Silva v The
Queen [2020] SASCFC 66; Hassan v The King [2026] SASCA 8; Kentwell v The Queen (2014) 252
CLR 601; Lane v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 82; Millwood v The King [2024] SASCA 84; R v
Calliss [2026] SASCA 25; R v Patterson (2001) 79 SASR 447; R v von Einem [2009] SASC 247;
Stachor v Police (2014) 120 SASR 292; Warner v The King (2022) 142 SASR 275; White v
Commissioner of Police [2025] SASC 66; White v The Queen (2022) 141 SASR 398, considered.
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JACKSON v THE KING
[2026] SASCA 61
Court of Appeal – Criminal: Livesey P, David and Stanley JJA
THE COURT:
Introduction
1 This is an application for permission to appeal against a sentence imposed
for domestic violence offending. The appellant targeted his former domestic
partner over a period exceeding 18 months. The appellant pleaded guilty to two
counts of aggravated assault and one count of aggravated criminal trespass in a
place of residence. He was sentenced to imprisonment for five years, 10 months
and 28 days, and a non-parole period of three years and four months was fixed,
backdated to commence from 13 June 2024.1
2 The appellant challenged the sentence on various grounds, including that the
sentencing judge erred in accumulating various sentences, that he erred when
describing the offending as having occurred whilst the appellant was on parole,
and on the basis that the sentence is manifestly excessive.
3 For the following reasons, permission to appeal should be granted but the
appeal dismissed.
The circumstances of the offending and the sentences imposed
4 The appellant and his former domestic partner, the complainant, were in a
relationship for more than a decade until August 2019. They have two daughters.
5 Since 2015, an intervention order has prohibited the appellant from
assaulting, threatening, harassing or intimidating the complainant.
6 Nonetheless, on 20 October 2020, the appellant went to the complainant’s
home where she resided with their daughters and, following an argument, poured
petrol onto the complainant and threatened her in the presence of their daughters.
The appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, contrary to s 20(3) of the
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (the CLCA), for which the maximum
penalty is imprisonment for three years. The sentencing judge commenced with
imprisonment for two years and reduced that by 35 per cent on account of the
appellant’s guilty plea made on 5 March 2025.
7 On 18 June 2025, the sentencing judge imposed a term of imprisonment of
one year, three months and 19 days.
8 On 24 June 2022, the appellant was at the complainant’s home when he
punched her in the eye with his fist, causing a black eye. In the course of this
1 On 14 July 2025, the Department of Correctional Services drew to the sentencing court’s attention a
calculation error which was corrected pursuant to s 20 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) on 18 July 2025.
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assault, the appellant put his hands around the complainant’s neck. The appellant
pleaded guilty to aggravated assault, contrary to s 20(3) of the CLCA, for which
the maximum penalty is imprisonment for three years. The sentencing judge
commenced with imprisonment for 12 months and reduced this by five per cent on
account of the appellant’s guilty plea.
9 The sentencing judge imposed a term of imprisonment of 11 months and
13 days.
10 On 23 August 2022, the complainant and the two children were home in bed
asleep. After midnight, the appellant banged on the front door, rang the
complainant’s mobile and then knocked on the window. Eventually the appellant
entered through the back laundry door. In response to the children crying, the
appellant said “It’s okay. It’s daddy. Go back to sleep”. The appellant then went
into the complainant’s bedroom, turned on the light and told her that she needed
to stop messaging his new domestic partner or “I will come back to flog [you] and
beat your head in”. The complainant told the appellant to leave and he did so.
11 The appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated criminal trespass in a place of
residence, contrary to s 170A of the CLCA, for which the maximum penalty was
imprisonment for five years. The sentencing judge commenced with a sentence of
imprisonment for two years and six months and reduced that by five per cent on
account of the appellant’s guilty plea.
12 The sentencing judge imposed a term of imprisonment of two years, four
months and 16 days.
13 In each case, the pleaded circumstances of aggravation were that the
appellant committed the offences knowing that the victim was his former domestic
partner, and in contravention of an intervention order where the offending lay
within the range of conduct that the order was designed to prevent.2
The circumstances of the offender
14 The intervention order imposed during 2015 was associated with the
imposition of a 12-month good behaviour bond following an aggravated assault on
the complainant. The appellant pushed and shoved her whilst she was pregnant
with their eldest daughter.
15 The sentencing of the appellant was complicated by the need to take account
of other offending. Whilst the appellant had already been sentenced for that other
offending, some of it occurred after the subject offending.
16 On 13 September 2023, the appellant was sentenced in the District Court
following his pleas of guilty to trafficking in methylamphetamine, for two counts
of driving whilst disqualified and for dishonestly dealing with property. The
2 Information dated 4 March 2025.
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sentencing judge was also required to deal with the appellant for breaching a
suspended sentence bond. That offending had occurred between August and
September 2022. The sentencing judge on that occasion sentenced the appellant
to imprisonment for two years, 10 months and 11 days and he fixed a non-parole
period of one year and two months, backdated to commence on 2 September 2022.
17 For that offending, on 2 November 2023, the appellant was released on
parole.
18 Whilst on parole, on 15 November 2023, the appellant was given home
detention bail for the subject offending. The appellant spent four months and seven
days on home detention bail before he was dealt with for a number of breaches of
the conditions of his bail. These included twice cutting off his ankle bracelet,
having warned his domestic partner (not the complainant) that he was going to do
so on at least one occasion. The appellant was remanded in custody between
7 March and 28 May 2024 and then released, but taken back into custody for a
further cancellation of parole on 13 June 2024.
19 On 2 September 2024, the appellant was convicted for these failures to
comply with his bail agreement and sentenced in the Magistrates Court to
imprisonment for one year, two months and 41 days. A non-parole period of six
months was fixed, ordered to commence from 13 June 2024.
20 Before the sentencing judge, both counsel agreed that it was necessary to
impose any sentence for the subject offending cumulatively on the sentence
imposed in the Magistrates Court in September 2024, and that the six-month
non-parole period then fixed would need to be reviewed and extended by the new
non-parole period fixed for the subject offending.
21 At the time of sentencing for the subject offending on 18 June 2025, the
appellant remained in custody. On that day, the appellant was 29 years, having
been born in South Australia of indigenous heritage.
22 The appellant described the relationship between his parents as
dysfunctional. Both used amphetamines and heroin. The appellant’s father was
violent and his mother neglectful. Neither had stable employment.
23 The appellant’s childhood was marked by instability. His family moved
between Mount Gambier and Adelaide. From the age of 10 until his mid-teens,
the appellant was frequently removed from the family home by the Department for
Child Protection. Placements with foster families broke down.
24 In his early teens, the appellant was detained and later moved in with one of
his brothers in Adelaide before returning to Mount Gambier. Since, the appellant’s
life has been marked by periods of transience; he has been homeless, slept on the
streets or been “couch surfing” in the homes of friends. For a time, he lived in
rental accommodation with his former domestic partner, the complainant.
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25 The appellant left school after year 10 when he moved away from Mount
Gambier. Although the appellant has completed education modules whilst in
custody, he has not obtained any vocational certificates, but plans to do so in the
future.
26 The appellant’s employment has been sporadic and included work as a
paver/landscaper. The appellant intends to work again as a labourer after release
from custody.
27 The sentencing judge was told that the appellant’s new domestic partner is a
positive influence. She and the appellant share a son.
28 The appellant has used drugs for most of his life. He commenced using
cannabis at eight or nine years but stopped after his eldest daughter was born. The
appellant has been heavily reliant on methylamphetamine in order to function. The
appellant first tried that drug when 13. He has been addicted since. At the time of
the subject offending between October 2020 and August 2022, the appellant was
smoking up to an ‘eight ball’ each day.
29 The appellant has also been a heavy drinker of alcohol, which also
commenced at an early age. The appellant has a history before incarceration of
consuming between a six-pack and a carton of 24 cans of beer each day. As well,
the appellant has intermittently used MDMA and opioids since his teens.
30 The appellant has been diagnosed with depression and anxiety and prescribed
medication. Dr Lim, psychologist, reported to the sentencing judge that the
appellant would benefit from a multifaceted approach to rehabilitation. She
diagnosed the appellant with an antisocial personality disorder, an alcohol use
disorder and a stimulant use disorder related to amphetamine use.
31 Whilst on parole in May 2024, the appellant completed counselling and two
days of community service each week. The appellant was reported to be hard
working, polite and well engaged. The appellant was also attending a domestic
and family violence prevention program. He obtained a mediation certificate
through the Family Court to facilitate the potential for future access with his
children.
32 The appellant told Dr Lim that his lengthy list of criminal antecedents was
generally related to his substance abuse and the need to support an addiction. His
offending included breaches of bond, theft, driving offences, trespass and
damaging property.
The approach of the sentencing judge
33 The sentencing judge explained the considerations he took into account:3
3 Sentencing remarks, p 6.
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The paramount consideration in sentencing is the protection of the safety of the community.
Personal and general deterrence are also significant considerations when sentencing. You
and others must be deterred from this type of offending. A strong message must be sent to
the community that the courts will not tolerate this behaviour. This type of offending must
also be condemned.
Domestic violence of any kind is to be abhorred. That is particularly so when it occurs in
breach of an intervention order intended to protect against all forms of abuse.
Intervention orders comprise one aspect of Parliament’s response to domestic violence. In
enacting that regime, Parliament has intended to send a message that the use of violence to
control or intimidate another person, particularly in a domestic setting, will not be tolerated.
The Parliament has also recognised the psychological damage to children from being
exposed to such behaviour and the paramount consideration of protecting the safety of such
children and victims.
34 The sentencing judge recognised that the complainant must have been
terrified by the offending involving the pouring of petrol on her in front of her
children. This was rightly regarded as a very serious example of domestic
violence.
35 The sentencing judge accepted that the appellant had demonstrated remorse
and he expressly took into account the appellant’s difficult upbringing and efforts
to rehabilitate. The sentencing judge said, however, that:4
This … is serious domestic violence offending and this is not the first time you have
offended against this victim.
The offending occurred when both an intervention order was in place and while you were
on parole.
Given that and your past offending and other breaches of court orders and parole, I am
guardedly pessimistic about your prospects of rehabilitation.
36 The sentencing judge found that as each of the subject offences occurred on
separate occasions, they represented “separate incursions into criminality” and the
sentences were ordered to be served cumulatively.5
37 Finally, the sentencing judge recorded that the sentence imposed for the
subject offending “must be served as cumulative” on the sentence imposed in the
Magistrates Court and he was required to “review and extend and fix a non-parole
period”.6
The appellant’s appeal grounds
38 The appellant distilled his appeal grounds to three propositions. These were:
4 Sentencing remarks, p 7.
5 Sentencing remarks, p 7.
6 Sentencing remarks, p 1.
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1. The strict accumulation of the sentences imposed for the three subject
offences involved an error;
2. The sentencing judge erred in finding that the subject offending occurred in
breach of parole, and this was a material error;7 and
3. Having regard to the circumstances of the offending and the offender, the
sentences, whether individually or as a whole, lay outside the range of
permissible dispositions.8
The determination of the appellant’s appeal against sentence
39 Before this Court, the appellant contended that there were two aspects to the
error associated with “a strict accumulation” of sentences. The first concerned the
accumulation of the sentences on the earlier Magistrates Court sentence. The
second concerned the accumulation of the sentences imposed for the subject
offending. By the time of sentencing for the subject offending, the head sentence
imposed in the Magistrates Court, backdated to commence on 13 June 2024, of
one year, two months and 41 days had not yet expired. Whilst the non-parole
period of six months backdated to commence on 13 June 2024 had expired, the
appellant had remained in custody.
40 This then led to some debate about the operation of the Sentencing Act 2017
(SA) (the Sentencing Act) and the Correctional Services Act 1982 (SA) (the
Correctional Services Act). The relevant Sentencing Act provisions are ss 45 and
47:
45—Cumulative sentences
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the court by which a sentence of imprisonment is imposed
may direct that the sentence be cumulative on any other sentence, or sentences, of
imprisonment or detention in a training centre then being served, or to be served, by
the defendant.
(2) If a sentence of imprisonment is imposed for an offence committed by the
defendant—
(a) during a period of release on parole or conditional release; or
(b) while serving a period of imprisonment under an order of the Parole Board for
breach of parole conditions,
the sentence will (except where 1 of the sentences to which the defendant is subject
is life imprisonment) be cumulative on the sentence, or sentences, in respect of which
the defendant was on parole.
7 Citing Hassan v The King [2026] SASCA 8, [26] (Livesey P and Bleby JA).
8 Citing Kentwell v The Queen (2014) 252 CLR 601, [35] (French CJ, Hayne, Bell and Keane JJ).
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(3) A direction may be given under subsection (1) irrespective of the number of
cumulative sentences that the defendant is already serving or will, in consequence of
the direction, be liable to serve.
(4) This section does not apply in relation to a youth unless the youth is sentenced as an
adult.
…
47—Duty of court to fix or extend non parole periods
(1) Subject to this section, when a court, on convicting a person of an offence, sentences
the person to imprisonment, the court must—
(a) if the person is not subject to an existing non parole period—fix a non parole
period; or
(b) if the person is subject to an existing non parole period—review the non parole
period and extend it by such period as the court thinks fit (but not so that the
period of extension exceeds the period of imprisonment that the person
becomes liable to serve by virtue of the sentence, or sentences, imposed by
the court); or
(c) if the person is serving a minimum term imposed in respect of an offence
under a law of the Commonwealth or is liable to serve such a term on the
expiry of an existing non parole period—fix a non parole period in respect of
the sentence, or sentences, to be served on the expiry of that minimum term.
(2) If the sentence of imprisonment is imposed for an offence committed during a period
of release on parole or conditional release from a previous sentence of imprisonment
or detention, the court, in fixing a non parole period under subsection (1)(a), must
have regard to the total period of imprisonment (or detention and imprisonment) that
the person is, by virtue of the new sentence and the balance of the previous sentence,
liable to serve.
…
41 The relevant Correctional Services Act provision is s 74A:
74A—Suspension of parole while serving imprisonment for offence committed before
release on parole
Where a person who has been released on parole is sentenced to imprisonment for an
offence committed before release on parole or for non-payment of a pecuniary sum—
(a) the parole is suspended for the duration of the imprisonment actually served in prison
in pursuance of the subsequent sentence; and
(b) on release from prison—
(i) the person will continue on parole in respect of the sentence that was first
imposed for the balance of the period of parole remaining as at the date of the
commencement of the subsequent sentence; and
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(ii) if released on parole from the subsequent sentence, the person will on release
also be on parole in respect of that sentence for the period of that parole.
42 The appellant submitted that s 45 of the Sentencing Act permitted, but did not
require, that the subject sentences be cumulative on the sentence imposed in the
Magistrates Court. In addition, both parties submitted that, because the appellant
was subject to an existing non-parole period fixed by the Magistrates Court, it was
necessary for it to be reviewed and extended having regard to the subject sentence
pursuant to s 47(1)(b) of the Sentencing Act.
43 In support of this approach, the appellant relied on the proposition that the
non-parole period set in the Magistrates Court had expired but not been
extinguished, and therefore needed to be taken into account unless and until it was
revoked by order of the court.9
44 Because the appellant had not been released on parole at the time of
sentencing for the subject offending,10 the parole period fixed by the Magistrates
Court was not “suspended” pursuant to s 74A of the Correctional Services Act.
45 Whilst these submissions should be accepted, they did not support the further
submission that it was, in the circumstances, an error for the sentencing judge to
order that the sentence imposed for the subject offending be cumulative on the
Magistrates Court sentence. It was necessary for the sentencing judge to address
distinct periods of criminal offending and the course he took reflected the joint
submission of the parties during sentencing submissions. Whilst the sentencing
judge was not required to direct that the sentence for the subject offending be
cumulative on the Magistrates Court sentence, there was no error made in the
exercise of sentencing discretion by proceeding in that way.
46 As for the finding that the three subject offences committed between October
2020 and August 2022 represented “separate incursions into criminality” and
should be “served cumulatively”, the position is even clearer. Though the
sentencing judge was not required to exercise his sentencing discretion by ordering
that the three sentences be imposed cumulatively on each other, that course was
open and there was no error made in the exercise of discretion by proceeding in
that way.
47 The sentencing judge was required to exercise a broad discretion when
fashioning a sentence that was proportionate to the circumstances of the offending
and the offender. In so doing, the tools available to the judge included totality and
9 R v von Einem [2009] SASC 247, [13] (Sulan J), “Once a non-parole period has been ordered, it remains
in force unless revoked by order of the court”, cited in Stachor v Police (2014) 120 SASR 292, [23]
(Gray J).
10 Port Augusta Community Corrections Progress Report dated 22 April 2025, p 5; appellant’s written
submissions dated 27 April 2025 (FDN 9), [7]-[8].
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concurrency, particularly partial concurrency.11 However, whether or to what
extent these were employed remained a matter within the discretion of the
sentencing judge and ordering that the sentences be served cumulatively revealed
no error.
48 By contrast, the finding that the subject offending occurred whilst the
appellant was on parole was an error. As has been seen, the subject offending
occurred in defiance of the 2015 intervention order, but the only relevant periods
of parole appear to have commenced during 2023. The respondent dismissed the
error as a mere “slip”. Whilst that may be so, the passages earlier set out show
that the sentencing judge regarded this as an aggravating circumstance, and that it
was also a reason for pessimism “about [the appellant’s] prospects of
rehabilitation”.12
49 It cannot be said that this error was not material to the exercise of sentencing
discretion. An error of this kind clearly “had the capacity to affect the exercise of
sentencing discretion or the sentence which was imposed”.13
50 Finally, the appellant challenged his sentence on the ground that it was
manifestly excessive.
51 During argument, the Court drew the parties’ attention to the decisions of the
Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Delphin,14 and R v Patterson,15 where appeals
against sentence were considered for the much more serious offences of serious
criminal trespass and aggravated serious criminal trespass, contrary to s 170 of the
CLCA, for which the maximum penalties are imprisonment for 15 years and
imprisonment for life, respectively.
52 In R v Delphin, the Court indicated that the penalty for a first offender for the
lesser offence should lie in the range 20 to 24 months (with serious consideration
given to suspension) and it hesitated to indicate a range for the more serious
offence given “the wide variety of aggravating circumstances that may apply”.16
In that particular case the Court found error in the imposition of a five-year
sentence for aggravated serious criminal trespass and imposed a sentence of three
years’ imprisonment – reduced to two years and six months after allowance for the
appellant’s guilty plea – for a forced entry into an unoccupied house through a
flyscreen over an open window, and the theft of a backgammon set.17 The appellant
and his co-offender were disturbed by observant neighbours.
11 Lane v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 82, [5]-[7] (Livesey J, with whom Kelly J agreed); White v The
Queen (2022) 141 SASR 398; Warner v The King (2022) 142 SASR 275, [24]-[31] (Kourakis CJ),
[96]-[104] (Livesey P), [125]-[132] (S Doyle JA).
12 Sentencing remarks, p 7.
13 Hassan v The King [2026] SASCA 8, [26] (Livesey P and Bleby JA), and the cases there cited including
White v Commissioner of Police [2025] SASC 66, [8]-[10] (B Doyle J).
14 R v Delphin (2001) 79 SASR 429.
15 R v Patterson (2001) 79 SASR 447.
16 R v Delphin (2001) 79 SASR 429, [47]-[49] (Debelle, Bleby and Wicks JJ).
17 R v Delphin (2001) 79 SASR 429, [67]-[70] (Debelle, Bleby and Wicks JJ).
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53 On one view of it, the starting point of imprisonment for two years and six
months for the aggravated criminal trespass in a place of residence in this case
– where the maximum penalty is imprisonment for five years – seems harsh.
54 However, we have reflected on the circumstances of the offending and the
offender, particularly the appellant’s profound childhood disadvantage,18 and his
lengthy criminal antecedents.
55 Perhaps most importantly, it is necessary to recognise that this was sustained
domestic violence offending committed against a woman in defiance of an
intervention order,19 at times in front of young children. Given the evident need
for deterrence and denunciation, we are not satisfied that the individual sentences,
or the overall sentence, imposed in this case were outside the available range.
Re-sentencing the appellant?
56 Because there has been a material error, it is necessary to consider
re-sentencing the appellant. Whilst this Court is duty bound to consider the
independent exercise of its sentencing discretion, it may nonetheless decline to
re-sentence or adopt aspects of the approach taken by the sentencing judge.20
57 Indeed, this Court is not required to re-sentence an offender where it
concludes that no different sentence should be imposed.21 In that event, the
appropriate order is that the appeal be dismissed.
58 Having reflected on all of the circumstances of this case, we conclude that no
lesser sentence should be imposed.
Conclusion
59 The appellant will be granted permission to appeal, but the appeal against
sentence should be dismissed.
18 Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; R v Calliss [2026] SASCA 25, [52] (Livesey P, Bleby and
B Doyle JJA). This is a factor which cuts both ways in a case such as the present.
19 Millwood v The King [2024] SASCA 84, [30]-[33] (Livesey ACJ and Bleby JA); Brooks v The King
[2025] SASCA 88, [62]-[66] (Livesey P and David JA); Hassan v The King [2026] SASCA 8, [34]
(Livesey P and Bleby JA).
20 Da Silva v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 66, [38], [57] (Livesey J, with whom Kourakis CJ and Stanley J
agreed).
21 Kentwell v The Queen (2014) 252 CLR 601, [35] (French CJ, Hayne, Bell and Keane JJ).
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