KARUDALE PTY LTD v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2026] SASCA 66

On Appeal from SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (HER HONOUR JUSTICE MCINTYRE) SCCRM-25-031264 Appellant: KARUDALE PTY LTD Counsel: MR D GARDNER - Solicitor: N/A Respondent: COMMISSIONER OF POLICE Counsel: MR B GARNAUT - Solicitor: CROWN SOLICITOR’S OFFICE Hearing Date/s: 11/06/2026 File No/s: SCCRM-26-014020 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Court of Appeal: Criminal) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. KARUDALE PTY LTD v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2026] SASCA 66 Judgment of the Court of Appeal (ex tempore) (The Honourable Justice S Doyle and the Honourable Justice Stanley) 11 June 2026 TRAFFIC LAW - OFFENCES - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - EXCEEDING PRESCRIBED SPEED LIMITS - GENERALLY The appellant company was found guilty of being the owner of a vehicle that exceeded the speed limit by 10 to 19km/h, contrary to r 20 of the Australia Road Rules and s 79B of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA). The appellant appealed that conviction to a single Judge of the Supreme Court. That appeal was dismissed. The appellant sought leave to bring a further appeal to the Court of Appeal. Held: 1. Leave to appeal is dismissed. 2. The appeal is dismissed. Australian Road Rules; Motor Vehicles Act 1969 (SA) 1969; Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) s 79B, referred to. -- 1 of 4 -- -- 2 of 4 -- KARUDALE PTY LTD v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2026] SASCA 66 Court of Appeal – Criminal: S Doyle and Stanley JJA 1 THE COURT (ex tempore): The applicant company was found guilty by a magistrate of being the owner of a vehicle that exceeded the speed limit by 10 to 19 km/h, contrary to r 20 of the Australian Road Rules and s 79B of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA). 2 The applicant’s appeal to a single judge of this Court was dismissed. The applicant now seeks leave to bring a further appeal to the Court of Appeal. 3 At trial, the prosecution relied solely upon documentary evidence, invoking several statutory aids to proof contained in the Road Traffic Act and the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA). The applicant sought to meet the prosecution case by relying upon some purported expert reports, which the magistrate held were not admissible but able to be relied upon as submissions. The applicant also relied upon some oral evidence from its director, Mr Gardner. 4 The applicant’s appeal to a single judge of this Court raised a number of complaints challenging, in various ways, the adequacy of the prosecution evidence and the magistrate’s reasons. Those complaints were all dismissed as lacking in merit. 5 The applicant’s proposed ground of appeal before this Court involves a similar rolled-up complaint about the adequacy of the prosecution evidence. It is supported by 10 particulars which are somewhat discursive and difficult to understand, but which appear to consist largely of illustrations of the overarching complaint about the adequacy of the prosecution evidence. 6 As an appeal to this Court would be a second appeal from a decision of a magistrate, the applicant requires leave to appeal. This requires consideration of whether it is in the interests of justice that there be a grant of leave to appeal, having regard to whether the decision below is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration, whether the proposed appeal raises an issue of principle or importance, and whether allowing the decision to stand would work a substantial injustice to the applicant. 7 In our view, none of the complaints sought to be raised have reasonable prospects of success. The matters sought to be raised on appeal were addressed by the magistrate and single judge. For the reasons explained by the magistrate and single judge, they are generally predicated upon a misconception as to the operation of the statutory aids to proof upon which the prosecution relied. To the extent the applicant seeks to raise some additional matters, we are not satisfied that they are reasonably arguable. No clear basis for impugning the reasoning of the magistrate or single judge has been identified. -- 3 of 4 -- [2026] SASCA 66 The Court 2 8 Nor does the proposed appeal raise any issue of principle or importance. Whilst the appeal involves a challenge to a finding of guilty in respect of which the magistrate imposed a fine, the decision below is not one which, if left to stand, would work a substantial injustice to the applicant. 9 We are not satisfied that the interests of justice favour a grant of leave to appeal. We refuse leave to appeal and dismiss the appeal. -- 4 of 4 --