ROBERTSON & ANOR v THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF PORT AUGUSTA [2026] SASC 98

First Applicant: TREVOR MATTHEW ROBERTSON In Person Second Applicant: KENDALL ERAINA JONES In Person Respondent: CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF PORT AUGUSTA Counsel: MR P BULLOCK SC WITH MS S DOYLE - Solicitor: WALLMANS LAWYERS First Interested Party: ANONYMOUS - Solicitor: SPENCER GULF LAW Second and Thirteenth to Fifteenth Interested Parties: GEOFF BROCK, OFFICE OF THE SURVEYOR GENERAL, OFFICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT, OFFICE OF THE REGISTRAR GENERAL Counsel: MR C PAGER - Solicitor: CROWN SOLICITOR (SA) Third to Twelfth Interested Parties: LINLEY SHINE, PHILLIP BROWN, MARK MYERS, JOHN NAISBITT, MARALYN MARSH, BALDEV SINGH, SAMUEL BATES, NORA BENNETT, MICHAEL MCKINLEY, LOUISE FOOTE Counsel: MR P BULLOCK SC WITH MS S DOYLE - Solicitor: WALLMANS LAWYERS Hearing Date/s: 30/01/2026, 15/04/2026 File No/s: CIV-24-001677 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Civil: Application) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. ROBERTSON & ANOR v THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF PORT AUGUSTA [2026] SASC 98 Judgment of the Honourable Justice Hughes 29 June 2026 PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - ENDING PROCEEDINGS EARLY - SUMMARY DISPOSAL - SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT OR RESPONDENT: STAY OR DISMISSAL OF PROCEEDINGS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE - COSTS PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS - GENERAL RULE: COSTS FOLLOW EVENT - GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND EXERCISE OF DISCRETION PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - COSTS - REGULATED COSTS: GROSS OR FIXED COSTS, LUMP SUM ORDERS OR CAPPING ORDERS AND LIKE MATTERS -- 1 of 7 -- The respondent, in a decision of this Court dated 15 December 2025, succeeded in its summary dismissal application against the applicants’ judicial review action. The respondent sought an order for costs against the applicants, which was decided on the basis of written submissions. The action is the most recent in litigation concerning a parcel of land formerly owned by the applicants. The respondent’s application for a lump sum amounting to 75% of its solicitor and counsel costs in this judicial review action was made in the context of an extensive procedural history of unsuccessful proceedings by the applicants. The applicants submitted that the respondent’s failures to follow proper Council processes, and instances of misleading the applicants and the Court, fall in favour of no order as to costs. Held, awarding the respondent costs fixed in the sum of $34,500: 1. The starting point in these proceedings is that the respondent, as the successful party, be awarded their costs from the unsuccessful party. 2. There is no good reason to depart from that starting point where the respondent’s success on summary dismissal amounts to success in the judicial review action, and there being no concerns as to the respondent’s conduct of that action. 3. The applicants’ repeated ventilation of similar issues, and distrust of the respondent, make it appropriate to award costs as a fixed sum rather than to require the parties to attempt to negotiate. 4. The respondent’s claimed solicitor and counsel costs were properly incurred. Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 40; Supreme Court Rules 2006 (SA) r 263; Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) r 194.5, referred to. Advance Resource Services Pty Ltd v Charlton [2008] SASC 118; (2008) SASR 100; Cachia v Hanes [1994] HCA 14; (1994) 179 CLR 403; Holt v Bunney (No 2) [2020] SASCFC 120; Latoudis v Casey [1990] HCA 59; (1990) 170 CLR 534; Mericka v Rathbone [2016] SASCFC 95; Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1984] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72; Rasch Nominees Pty Ltd & Anor v Bartholomaeus & Ors [2013] SASCFC 105; Ruddock v Vardalis (No 2) [2001] FCA 1865, considered. -- 2 of 7 -- ROBERTSON & ANOR v THE CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF PORT AUGUSTA [2026] SASC 98 Civil: Application 1 On 15 December 2025, this Court granted an application by the respondent for the summary dismissal of the applicants’ action in judicial review. 2 After the orders and reasons were delivered orally, the respondent applied for an order for costs in its favour. I provided the parties with an opportunity to make written submissions on the respondent’s application for costs. I informed the parties that upon making my decision, I would not require the parties to reconvene to receive delivery of my reasons, noting in particular that the applicants live in the Port Augusta region. 3 The respondent filed submissions dated 30 January 2026, in which it advanced as its primary position that the Court should award it the costs of the whole of the action, on a standard basis, because the effect of its successful application was to bring the action to an end. Its alternative position was that the applicants should meet the costs of the respondent in relation to the respondent’s successful application for summary dismissal, and also the applicants’ failed application that the respondent’s solicitors be restrained from acting on behalf of the respondent. 4 The respondent also sought an order that specified a lump sum award of costs in the amount of $34,500. It submitted that such an order is appropriate where the litigation between the parties has already consumed excessive resources and doubt attends the prospect of the successful party’s ability to recover costs from the unsuccessful party, or there is reason to believe that agreement as to the quantum of costs may not be reached. 5 The applicants filed submissions dated 15 April 2026. The applicants submitted that: a. The respondent provided false information in breach of the rules of the Local Government Association’s mutual liability scheme. The Council essentially brought the excessive cost upon itself. b. Further or in the alternative, the proceedings would not have been required if various statutory officers and their staff had followed proper road-naming processes. c. Further or in the alternative, the respondent and the Local Government Association should not have engaged lawyers and should have used its own staff to conduct the proceedings. -- 3 of 7 -- [2026] SASC 98 Hughes J 2 d. Further or in alternative, the respondent and Local Government Association are public authorities and bound by Treasurer’s Instruction 10, which requires them to adhere to model litigant principles. The liability for the proceedings lies with the Crown. e. Further or in the alternative, the Court has been defrauded by the respondent and the Local Government Association which ought not benefit from such conduct. The law 6 The legal provisions and principles relating to awards of costs following the outcome of civil proceedings in which one party is wholly successful are well- established. 7 The starting point is that s 40 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) provides the Court with “full power to determine by whom and to what extent such costs are to be paid”. 8 The discretion is to be exercised judicially and “not by reference to irrelevant or extraneous considerations, but upon facts connected with or leading up to the litigation”.1 9 The broad discretion conferred by s 40 is not constrained by the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (“UCR”). Rather, parties and the Court are assisted by the articulation of various general principles guiding the exercise of the discretion. 10 As Stanley J, with whom Gray and Sulan JJ agreed, said in Rasch Nominees Pty Ltd & Anor v Bartholomaeus & Ors,2 r 263 of the Supreme Court Rules 2006 should not be construed as fettering the discretion conferred by s 40 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA). Rather, r 263:3 ... is to be construed as identifying the general approach to awarding costs and identifying specific exceptions to the general approach, but it is not to be construed as defining the exceptions to the general rule exhaustively. (citation omitted). 11 The transition from the Supreme Court Rules 2006 to the UCR has not effected any change to the South Australian position such that the authorities in relation to the former rules are still apt.4 1 Advance Resource Services Pty Ltd v Charlton [2008] SASC 118; (2008) SASR 100 per Doyle CJ, referring to the judgement of Gaudron and Gummow JJ in Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72. 2 [2013] SASCFC 105 at [58]. 3 At [58]. 4 Holt v Bunney (No 2) [2020] SASCFC 120 at [9]. -- 4 of 7 -- [2026] SASC 98 Hughes J 3 12 A key principle is that costs “follow the event”.5 In other words, the usual approach is that a Court will make an order that the unsuccessful party must pay the costs of the successful party. This reflects the principle that costs are compensatory in purpose, not punitive.6 13 As the codification of rules concerning the manner in which the discretion is to be exercised has been relatively uniform across Australia, including in the UCR, so too has the judicial analysis of the matters relevant to making such orders created a relatively homogenous jurisprudence. 14 In Ruddock v Vardalis (No 2),7 Black CJ and French J summarised the principles relating to costs as follows: Within the general discretion of the courts to award costs it is accepted by decisions in both Australian and English jurisdictions that: • Ordinarily costs follow the event and a successful litigant receives costs in the absence of special circumstances justifying some other order. • Where a litigant has succeeded only upon a portion of the claim, the circumstances may make it reasonable that the litigant bear the expense of litigating that portion upon which he or she has failed. • A successful party who has failed on certain issues may not only be deprived of the costs of those issues but may be ordered as well to pay the other parties' costs of them. In this sense “issue” does not mean a precise issue in the technical pleading sense but any disputed question of fact or law. 15 In addition to the situation in which the outcome is not wholly in favour of one party, there are various other circumstances in which an order may not be made in favour of a successful party. They arise where the nature of the proceedings demands a different approach, or a successful party’s conduct is such as to justify a departure from the compensatory approach.8 Consideration 16 None of those issues arises in this case. The applicants did not prove the allegations that they advanced against the respondents and a slew of other public authorities, statutory officers and individuals in these proceedings. Further, they have not proven any allegations against the respondent in a number of other proceedings including: a. In the Council’s recovery action for outstanding rates (ELCCI-18-9327); 5 Uniform Civil Rules 2020 r 194.5(2). 6 Latoudis v Casey [1990] HCA 59; (1990) 170 CLR 534 at 543 (Mason CJ), 563 (Toohey J), 566-7 (McHugh J); Cachia v Hanes [1994] HCA 14; (1994) 179 CLR 403 at 410 (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and McHugh JJ); Oshlack v Richmond River Council [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72 at [67] (McHugh J). 7 [2001] FCA 1865 at [11]. 8 Mericka v Rathbone [2016] SASCFC 95 at [173] (Doyle J, Bampton J agreeing). -- 5 of 7 -- [2026] SASC 98 Hughes J 4 b. In the judicial review proceedings brought by the applicants in CIV-23- 003052 in which the applicants unsuccessfully attempted to set aside their settlement with the respondent in respect of the dispute over the road-naming; and c. The private prosecution brought by the applicants against the respondent’s chief executive officer and others in MCCRM-24-006834 that was dismissed.9 17 There is no basis for the Court to conclude that the respondent has conducted itself in a manner that would justify its success in these proceedings not attracting an award of costs. 18 There is no “good reason” to depart from the usual starting point that the respondent, as the wholly successful applicant for a summary dismissal, should be compensated for the expense it has incurred in bringing the application for summary dismissal to the Court to bring an end to the applicants’ unmeritorious action. 19 The success of the summary dismissal application entailed a rejection of the judicial review action as a whole. It cannot be said that the applicants were only put on notice of the respondent’s arguments when the summary dismissal application was made. This action is one of several by which the applicants have attempted to ventilate the same issues repeatedly. For that reason, it is appropriate that the respondent be awarded its costs in respect of the action from the outset and not simply its costs of the summary dismissal application. To make any other order would be to fail to compensate the respondent for having to defend an action, the substance of which it has already successfully addressed in other proceedings. Fixed or to be agreed or taxed? 20 I have given consideration to the respondent’s proposition that this is a case in which it would be appropriate not to leave the matter of costs to be agreed or taxed, but to make an order for a lump sum award. On the basis of the respondent’s instructing solicitor’s affidavit of 30 January 202610 setting out a table of solicitor costs, calculated by reference to the Higher Courts costs scale, amounting to $16,570.24, and counsel fees paid in the amount of $29,570.75, the respondent seeks approximately 75% of its costs in the sum of $34,500. 21 The respondent submitted that the history of the applicants’ repeated attempts to reagitate matters that had been the subject of previous Court decisions, and their distrust of the respondent, indicate that the prospect of an agreement on costs being reached is low. I agree. I have reviewed the respondent’s claims, which are documented. I accept that the costs were, on their face, properly incurred. In the 9 Affidavits of Alexander Jonathon Bubner sworn on 19 March 2024, 24 October 2025, and 30 January 2026. 10 Affidavit of Alexander Jonathon Bubner sworn on 30 January 2026 at [5]-[8]. -- 6 of 7 -- [2026] SASC 98 Hughes J 5 circumstances of this litigation, and in order to advance the prospect of finality, I will make the order sought by the respondent. Order 22 The applicants are to pay the costs of the respondent fixed in the sum of $34,500. -- 7 of 7 --