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MASTON -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2026] WASCA 92

Case law · Western Australia · 2026
[2026] WASCA 92 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA) CITATION : MASTON -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2026] WASCA 92 CORAM : THOMSON P HALL JA HEARD : 24 JUNE 2026 DELIVERED : 24 JUNE 2026 PUBLISHED : 25 JUNE 2026 FILE NO/S : CACR 144 of 2025 BETWEEN : BRETT RONALD MASTON Appellant AND THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Respondent ON APPEAL FROM: Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Coram : FOX DCJ File Number : IND 1758 of 2024 Catchwords: Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Firearms offences - Possession of cash reasonably suspected of being unlawfully obtained - Whether sentencing judge -- 1 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 92 Page 2 indicated that appellant's explanation would not be accepted - Whether explanation contested by the prosecution - Whether there was a denial of procedural fairness - Whether sentence for firearms offence was manifestly excessive - Whether total effective sentence of 4 years 5 months' imprisonment breached the totality principle Legislation: Criminal Code (WA), s 417(1) Firearms Act 1973 (WA) (repealed), s 19(1ab)(ii) Result: Leave to appeal refused Appeal dismissed Category: B Representation: Counsel: Appellant : G C R Yin Respondent : No appearance Solicitors: Appellant : Hay Street Legal Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Clarke v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 190 Gaskell v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 8 Kabambi v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44 Karakuyu v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 75 Larussa v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 62 Rinaldi v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 48 -- 2 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 92 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 3 REASONS OF THE COURT: 1 Following the hearing of this application for leave to appeal against sentence, we made orders refusing leave on each of the three grounds and dismissing the appeal. These are our reasons for making those orders. 2 The appellant was convicted on his pleas of guilty of one count of possession of a firearm without being the holder of a licence while also carrying cash in greater than the prescribed amount, contrary to s 19(1)(c) and s 19(1ab)(a)(ii) of the Firearms Act 1973 (WA) (repealed) and two counts of possession of property reasonably suspected to have been unlawfully obtained, contrary to s 417(1) of the Criminal Code (WA). He was sentenced to 3 years 11 months' imprisonment on the first count, 3 months' imprisonment on the second count, and 6 months' imprisonment on the third count. The sentences on counts 1 and 3 were ordered to be served cumulatively, and that on count 2 was ordered to be served concurrently. Accordingly, the total effective sentence was 4 years 5 months' immediate imprisonment. 3 There are three grounds of appeal. The first ground, in essence, alleges that the appellant was denied procedural fairness in the sentencing proceedings. The second ground alleges that the total effective sentence breaches the first limb of the totality principle. The third ground alleges that the sentence on count 1 is manifestly excessive. 4 Leave to appeal is required for each ground of appeal. This court cannot grant leave to appeal on a ground unless it is satisfied that the ground has a reasonable prospect of succeeding. Unless leave to appeal is granted on at least one ground of appeal, the appeal is taken to have been dismissed.1 5 For the reasons that follow, none of the grounds has a reasonable prospect of succeeding. Accordingly, leave to appeal was refused and the appeal dismissed. The facts 6 At approximately 4.50 pm on Monday, 4 March 2024, police stopped a white Land Rover Discovery at the Warwick Open Space on 1 Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 27(1), s 27(2), s 27(3). -- 3 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 92 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 4 Lloyd Drive.2 The appellant was sitting in the front passenger seat of the vehicle. 7 The appellant was subject to a search and police located $9,825 in cash on his person, of which he was holding $1,165 in his hands (count 2). Police also located a Beretta handgun loaded with eight rounds of ammunition in the appellant's pants' pocket (count 1).3 8 Following the appellant's arrest, police conducted a search of premises in Westminster, where it was believed the appellant had been staying with his girlfriend. During a search of the master bedroom, a black duffle bag containing $210,250 in cash was located underneath the bed.4 Also in the bedroom was a black handbag containing $10,050 in cash. The appellant declined to participate in an electronic record of interview with police. 9 On 17 April 2025, the appellant made submissions to the State through his counsel claiming that the cash had been obtained through lawful means. He provided redacted bank account statements in support of his claim. The State then obtained unredacted copies of the bank statements. The State and the appellant ultimately came to a resolution that the unlawfully obtained cash amounted to $85,194 (count 3). The sum of $135,106 was returned to the appellant. Personal circumstances 10 The appellant was born on 17 June 1966 and was 59 years old at the time of sentencing. He was formerly married and has an adult daughter and a 14-year-old son. He also has one grandchild. 11 The appellant has an extensive criminal history and has spent a significant portion of his adult life in prison. He has also had a drug problem, which he endeavoured to address by having a naltrexone implant. At the time of sentencing, it was submitted that the appellant had sought to avoid drug use, although this had been difficult (before he was remanded in custody) because his current partner was a user. 12 The appellant was released from his last sentence of imprisonment in 2022. After his release, he separated from his wife and formed a relationship with a much younger woman.5 He was in that relationship at the time of the offences. That relationship ceased sometime after he 2 ts 74. 3 ts 75. 4 ts 75. 5 ts 78. -- 4 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 92 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 5 was remanded in custody, after breaching bail conditions by cutting off a monitoring device. 13 The appellant received significant compensation and insurance payouts prior to the commission of the offences. It was on this basis that he was able to claim that the cash seized by the police was sourced from legitimate sources. His then partner assisted him in pursuing this claim by preparing redacted bank statements, which were submitted to the authorities a little over one year after the appellant was charged. The appellant did not provide any reasonable explanation for the inordinate amount of time taken to provide the bank statements, nor did he offer any reason for why the bank statements were provided in their redacted form.6 Understandably, the redacted statements were not accepted as a proper basis for the claim and the State subsequently obtained unredacted versions of the bank statements. Ultimately, the State accepted that a portion of the cash was legitimately sourced. The appellant then entered pleas of guilty to the charges. 14 The appellant was diagnosed with a melanoma in 2022 and was treated for that condition. There had also been some medical investigations conducted into whether he had prostate cancer, though there had been no diagnosis at the time of sentencing. 15 The appellant's criminal record includes offences of armed robbery, possession of prohibited drugs with intent to sell or supply, possession of a prohibited weapon, possession of stolen or unlawfully obtained property, possession of unlicensed ammunition, failure to ensure the safekeeping of a firearm or ammunition, possession of a firearm or ammunition whilst not being the holder of a licence or permit, possession of a firearm in circumstances of aggravation, assault occasioning bodily harm, failure to comply with a data access order, and carrying a prohibited weapon. He has committed 13 offences against the Firearms Act between 2009 and 2020. Sentencing submissions 16 In sentencing submissions, counsel for the appellant said that the appellant had returned to live with his wife and son after being last released from prison in 2022. At that time, he obtained a job and was well regarded by his employer. He continued on a good trajectory until 6 ts 87 - 89, 116. -- 5 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 92 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 6 receiving the diagnosis of melanoma. He then separated from his wife and formed a new relationship with the younger woman.7 17 It was submitted that the appellant became somewhat irrational and re-engaged with bad associates. It was said that 'for the most part there was no issue with substances'.8 There was an acceptance, however, that he was using drugs to 'self-medicate' but that he had been drug-free from 27 March 2024 (when he was remanded in custody).9 18 As to the circumstances of the offence, counsel said:10 And when he reflects back on that, he explains that now that he's been drug-free since 27 March 2024, he's got clarity and he's had some time, obviously, in custody, which the purpose of it is for him to reflect on what's happened, and he looks back and says that he wasn't in a great mental state. He gets contacted by someone and they explain to him, 'There's something you might be interested in.' And he explains to me, in these words, your Honour, when he looks back on it, 'Old Brett was back.' So he gets on his motorbike and he goes to meet these people, and from my understanding, this meeting took place in the place that it took place because it was somewhat secluded. Now, I understand my friend's view is different about that, but I don't propose to take that much further. FOX DCJ: Does it matter much? [COUNSEL]: So he meets them. He enters the vehicle, and that's when he's first presented with the opportunity to buy the Beretta. Old Brett's there. Yes. Your Honour, I'm not going to take this too far. I'm going to say it once because I think that it's dealt with in that sense in transcript. He's a gun enthusiast, and it's not been great for him over the course of his journey. And look, he falls on his sword in that regard. So he sees the Beretta. He makes a decision that he's going to purchase it. He took a bunch of money with him because someone tells him, 'There's something you might be interested in.' So the purchase has already taken place. He's agreed to it. He's handing money over to the other person. My understanding is that he'd given the other person $4,000. The purchase price was $12,000, and he was in the passenger seat, counting the balance of the cash out on the floor, and that's the moment when the police opened the door. Your Honour, the only thing, I think, that's important, I've asked him. He says he had no intention with the gun. He's a gun enthusiast. It was 7 ts 78. 8 ts 78. 9 ts 79. 10 ts 79 - 80. -- 6 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 92 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 7 a Beretta. Apparently, they're difficult to find. Well, I said, 'Well, you must have had some plan to shoot it.' And he said, 'Well, look, I've got some friends who have a property.' FOX DCJ: No, no. $12,000 for a pistol? [COUNSEL]: Well, your Honour, look, I don't know much about that. I thought it was quite high as well. FOX DCJ: That's a bit of an understatement, I think. $12,000 for a single pistol. What's special about it? [COUNSEL]: Your Honour, I don't know. I'm not going to speculate. I actually don't know. But I think we can all accept that the laws in relation to firearms have certainly tightened up. FOX DCJ: Of course. [COUNSEL]: And rightfully so, and there's a reason for that, and that potentially, the result in the black market is that the price goes up. I mean, I can't take it much further than that, your Honour. I was a bit shocked as well when I heard the price, but they're the instructions. But ultimately, he's come to the court and he's plead guilty to the cash that the State allege, and he's plead guilty to being in possession of the firearm. So the only reason I provide some context as to the circumstances of the offending is because, well, I think - which I'll come to momentarily - it goes to the criminality of the funds, and if the court was to accept that he had only just come into possession of it and he hadn't had it for that long, on his instructions, hadn't really formed an intention what it was about. So your Honour, this is the background where he finds himself back in custody. 19 Counsel turned to the circumstances in which the appellant came to be remanded in custody. There was then the following exchange with the sentencing judge:11 FOX DCJ: Just before you move on - - - [COUNSEL]: Of course. FOX DCJ: - - - to that, so he's purchased this gun for $12,000, give or take. Pre-loaded? [COUNSEL]: Yes. He got the ammunition with it. FOX DCJ: Okay. 11 ts 81 - 82. Contrary to the appellant's counsel's submissions, there does not appear to be any indication in the prosecution brief of any loose ammunition being located by police. -- 7 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 92 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 8 [COUNSEL]: I understand the question. Sorry, your Honour. Because as I understand, there was bullets in the magazine or - - - FOX DCJ: Yes. [COUNSEL]: - - - bullets in the chamber. FOX DCJ: I haven't said anything to say it was in the chamber, because that would lead to a - - - [COUNSEL]: If your Honour's - - - FOX DCJ: - - - very different inference. [COUNSEL]: - - - minded, I'll take an instruction, because I think that's important. FOX DCJ: I'm pretty sure it was in the magazine. I certainly - - - [COUNSEL]: Yes. FOX DCJ: - - - didn't read anything about it being a round in the chamber. [COUNSEL]: Could I seek leave to - - - FOX DCJ: Of course. [COUNSEL]: Thank you, your Honour. Thank you, your Honour. My instructions are that it came in the state that he had it. He'd looked at it, handed the cash over. FOX DCJ: Can probably sense - the transcript won't pick it up - there was some degree of scepticism in the way I framed that question. [COUNSEL]: I'll clarify it for your Honour. When Mr Maston purchased the weapon, on his instructions, the status was that it had some of the ammunition in the magazines, and my understanding is there was some handed over as well. 20 There were then lengthy submissions as to the timing of the pleas of guilty and the appropriate discount. It is unnecessary to refer to those submissions as there is no challenge to the discount that the sentencing judge allowed. 21 The prosecutor made submissions regarding the seriousness of the firearms offence in the following terms:12 In relation to the offender's own submissions that he fell back in with bad associates a year before the offending, that certainly is concerning 12 ts 109. -- 8 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 92 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 9 as [to] the seriousness of this offending. The offender is in a public place in possession of a loaded and concealed handgun. Handguns are always particularly serious, due to the capacity of them being able to be concealed, and are dangerous within themselves. Concerningly, it was loaded. Loaded with eight rounds of ammunition. Warwick Open Space is, by its name, suggesting an open area, which is utilised by the public, likely families. And that's of significant concern for the safety of the public. It presents a danger to the public, and would no doubt terrify people if they were aware of that. This is the concern about concealability of such a weapon, and the State do say that a loaded handgun is a significant aggravating factor. The combination of that with the quantity of cash, in the absence of a lawful explanation, does make this offending particularly serious. 22 A little later, the prosecutor specifically addressed the appellant's explanation:13 As to the offender's explanation, the State submit he must be an incredibly unlucky man to have received a call from an acquaintance to purchase something, to go there and have handed over $4,000, and having another $9,000 on his person to purchase a firearm because he's a gun enthusiast. It's a significant amount of money, and your Honour, the State's submission is being a gun enthusiast isn't a reason to be in possession of a loaded firearm. People who are gun enthusiasts can join a gun club or engage in those activities in a lawful manner. This is a concerning behaviour. He's more than aware that he shouldn't be in possession of guns, and particularly handguns. 23 The prosecutor pointed out that only a year earlier, on 11 November 2022, when being sentenced for other offences, there was reference to the appellant being in possession of loaded firearms and the danger of such weapons.14 At that time, the sentencing judge had warned the appellant, 'You ought not to have had them, and having them is a serious matter.' The prosecutor noted that despite such a frank warning, the appellant had reoffended in an almost identical manner. Sentencing remarks 24 The sentencing judge summarised the facts and then said:15 13 ts 110. 14 ts 110. 15 ts 113. -- 9 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 92 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 10 An explanation has been advanced as to why it was you were in possession of that handgun, namely you'd just purchased it at the time that the police apprehended you. With respect, I have considerable doubts about that explanation. You said that you're a firearms enthusiast, but there's nothing that strikes me as being particularly interesting about that gun. It strikes me as a common pistol. While there is no valuation evidence, I don't accept, at face value from the Bar table, that a gun like that would be worth anywhere near $12,000 as alleged. There was also a clandestine element to the transaction. In fact, that's what it was. It was already loaded when it was found in your possession. For these reasons, I cannot possibly accept the explanation advanced as to the origin of that gun from the Bar table. I simply propose to sentence you on the basic facts with respect to count 1. You possessed a firearm while also possessing the associated cash, and I make no finding as to the circumstances how this came to be, other than the fact I don't accept the explanation that's been put forth from the Bar table. 25 The sentencing judge noted that he needed to avoid double punishment in respect to counts 1 and 2, because count 1 related to the possession of the firearm in circumstances where the appellant also was in possession of a prescribed quantity of cash. The second count related to the same quantity of cash. For this reason, his Honour said that he would impose a heavily reduced sentence for count 2. 26 The sentencing judge set out the circumstances in which the pleas of guilty had been entered and concluded that the pleas had been entered at a relatively late stage and that a discount of 10% on each of the charges was justified pursuant to s 9AA of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA).16 27 The sentencing judge referred to the appellant's criminal history and acknowledged that it did not aggravate the seriousness of the offending. However, his Honour said that it demonstrated that the appellant was not entitled to leniency on the ground of being a first offender or that committing offences of this nature was an uncharacteristic aberration.17 The criminal record also meant that it was necessary to impose a sentence which would deter the appellant from offending in a similar way in the future and protect the public from such possible future offending. His Honour said that the evidence in support of the appellant being remorseful or having a desire to rehabilitate was relatively slim. 16 ts 116. 17 ts 117. -- 10 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 92 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 11 28 Another factor which informed consideration of personal deterrence was the appellant's risk of reoffending. The sentencing judge said that given the appellant's criminal history and lack of remorse or any meaningful insight, he considered that the appellant was at a relatively high risk of reoffending.18 29 Whilst there was no detail before the sentencing judge as to the circumstances which had resulted in the compensation payments to the appellant, his Honour said that he was prepared to infer from the size of those payments that the appellant had suffered adverse events in his past that warranted some discount from his sentence. However, his Honour said that because he was drawing an inference solely from the size of the payment, the weight that could be attributed to this was limited. 30 The sentencing judge noted that whilst it had been originally submitted that the appellant was diagnosed with prostate cancer and that, because of this, he would suffer greater hardship in prison, that submission had not been pursued. That was because the medical evidence before the court indicated that investigations were being pursued but that no diagnosis had yet been made. 31 The sentencing judge noted that the appellant had spent his time in custody on remand at Hakea Prison, and that due to overcrowding, lack of staff and resources, time spent in that prison was harder than normal. His Honour said that he had taken that into account in determining the length of the sentences imposed. 32 The sentencing judge concluded by imposing a sentence of 3 years 11 months in respect of count 1, 3 months in respect of count 2 and 6 months in respect of count 3. The sentence on count 3 was reduced from 17 months on account of totality. The sentence on count 3 of 6 months' imprisonment was ordered to be served cumulatively on count 1. Accordingly, the total effective sentence was 4 years 5 months' immediate imprisonment. That sentence was backdated to 12 September 2024, to take into account time spent in custody. An order was made that the appellant be eligible for parole. Grounds of appeal 33 The grounds of appeal are as follows: 1. The learned sentencing Judge erred in law by rejecting the appellant's explanation for the offending on count 1, which was 18 ts 118. -- 11 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 92 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 12 put forward as a mitigating factor without first giving him the opportunity to give or call evidence to prove this on the balance of probabilities. 2. The sentencing Judge erred by imposing an aggregate sentence that did not bear a proper relationship to the overall criminality of the appellant's conduct, having regard to all relevant circumstances including those referrable to the offender personally. 3. The learned sentencing Judge erred by imposing an individual sentence on count 1 that was manifestly excessive in all the circumstances of the case. Appellant's submissions 34 The appellant submits that the appellant's explanation for the firearms offence, namely that he was seeking to purchase it because he was a gun enthusiast, was mitigating. It explains why the appellant had simultaneous possession of the weapon and cash, and excludes any intent to use the firearm for a criminal purpose. It is said that whilst the sentencing judge expressed scepticism at the purchase price and the fact that the gun was loaded, the appellant was not notified that his explanation was rejected.19 35 The appellant submits that he was deprived of the opportunity to adduce evidence to support his explanation. It is said that in failing to advise the appellant that his explanation was not accepted, the sentencing judge made an express error.20 36 As to grounds 2 and 3, the appellant submits that the circumstances of the offending and the appellant's pleas of guilty should have resulted in a lesser sentence.21 There was nothing to infer that the appellant possessed or obtained the gun to protect a drug business or to advance any criminal purpose. In these circumstances, the offending did not exhibit the aggravating features found in some other cases. 37 The appellant submits that truly comparable cases are rare as firearms and cash possession are usually linked to underlying criminal conduct. The appellant refers to Clarke v The State of Western Australia22 as such a case. 19 Appellant's case, filed 2 April 2026, par 15. 20 Appellant's case, filed 2 April 2026, par 22. 21 Appellant's case, filed 2 April 2026, pars 39 - 44, 48. 22 Clarke v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 190. -- 12 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 92 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 13 Merits 38 A sentencing judge is obliged to give notice to an offender if the judge is not prepared to act on an alleged mitigating circumstance which is asserted by the offender and not controverted by the prosecution. The giving of notice enables the offender to adduce evidence, for the purpose of establishing the mitigating circumstance, before sentence is imposed.23 39 In the present case, the sentencing judge put the appellant on notice that he was not prepared to accept the appellant's explanation. There is no set formula for putting an offender on notice and it may be done by expressing an unwillingness to accept what has been advanced on the offender's behalf. In any event, the prosecution made it clear that the explanation was controverted. 40 The scepticism of the sentencing judge in regard to the appellant's explanation was very clearly expressed. His Honour's scepticism was well placed. The suggestion that the appellant had agreed to meet an unidentified person without knowing that he was to be offered a gun until he arrived yet had nonetheless taken with him a large quantity of cash, and then had agreed to purchase that gun, loaded with ammunition, and at a seemingly very high price, merely because he was a 'gun enthusiast', was inherently lacking in credibility. The appellant could have been under no misapprehension that his explanation would be accepted by the sentencing judge. 41 In any event, the prosecutor made it clear that the explanation was contested. It was open to the appellant in these circumstances to seek to prove his explanation by sworn evidence. He chose not to do so. It is hard to imagine that his explanation could have been improved upon by oral evidence. 42 There was no denial of procedural fairness. Ground 1 is without merit and leave in respect of it was refused. 43 As to grounds 2 and 3, the principles applicable to a claim that an individual sentence is manifestly excessive or that there has been a breach of the totality principle, are well known. Those principles were summarised in Kabambi v The State of Western Australia24 and it is unnecessary to repeat them. 23 Law v The State of Western Australia [2009] WASCA 193 [32] (Buss JA, with McLure & Pullin JJA agreeing). 24 Kabambi v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44 [21]. -- 13 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 92 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 14 44 The maximum penalty for count 1 is 14 years' imprisonment.25 The maximum penalty for counts 2 and 3 is 7 years' imprisonment.26 45 The firearms offence was plainly serious. The firearm concerned was a semi-automatic pistol that could be easily concealed. The gun was loaded with eight rounds of ammunition. The purchase occurred in a clandestine manner and for cash. The potential for the use of unlicensed firearms in other serious offending justifies significant penalties being imposed for trading in such weapons. Whether or not the appellant had any intention of using the gun in such a manner, his extensive and recent record of firearms offences means that he must have been aware of the serious nature of the conduct in which he was engaging. 46 The appellant's personal circumstances provide little by way of mitigation. The only factor of significance was his pleas of guilty, which were deserving of only a 10% discount. Personal deterrence was clearly a significant factor given the appellant's record of previous similar offending. That factor was only heightened by the finding that the appellant was at a high risk of reoffending in a similar manner. 47 The sole comparator referred to in any detail by the appellant is Clarke. That decision appears to be the only appeal decision which considered the now repealed s 19(1ab)(a)(ii) of the Firearms Act. The offender in that case was convicted of 11 offences, including six firearms offences, three offences of possession of unlawfully obtained property, and two offences of possession of prohibited drugs. One of the firearms offences was an offence under s 19(1ab)(a)(ii) of the Firearms Act. The individual sentence for the relevant identical offence was 2 years 6 months, however, the total effective sentence was 10 years' imprisonment. The appeal, which was dismissed, only challenged the total effective sentence. Plainly, Clarke was a very different case and given that there was no challenge to the individual sentence on the relevant count, it provides no guidance as to the appropriate sentence for such an offence. 48 We have also had regard to other cases involving firearms offences, though none are truly comparable. Those cases include Gaskell v The State of Western Australia;27 Rinaldi v The State of Western Australia;28 Karakuyu v The State of Western Australia;29 25 Firearms Act, s 19(1ab)(ii). 26 Criminal Code, s 417(1). 27 Gaskell v The State of Western Australia [2018] WASCA 8. 28 Rinaldi v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 48. 29 Karakuyu v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 75. -- 14 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 92 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 15 and Larussa v The State of Western Australia.30 Whilst those cases are not factually similar to the present case, they do confirm that personal and general deterrence are important sentencing factors in respect of offences of this type. In Larussa, this court noted that sentences of 2 years or more had been imposed in cases without suggestion of error (in the context of the particular firearms offences in that case having maximum penalties of 5 years', 7 years' and 10 years' imprisonment, respectively).31 49 Having regard to the maximum penalty of 14 years' imprisonment, the seriousness of the offence, the personal circumstances of the appellant, and the limited assistance to be derived from comparable cases, there is no merit in the claim that the sentence on count 1 is manifestly excessive and leave to appeal in respect of ground 3 was refused. 50 As to totality (ground 2), the sentence on count 2 was made wholly concurrent and the sentence on count 3 reduced to 6 months' imprisonment. A cumulative sentence for count 3 was justified given that it related to separate and distinct offending. That sentence was heavily reduced for totality reasons. Given that there is no merit in the suggestion that the individual sentence on count 1 is manifestly excessive, the addition of 6 months to the total effective sentence for count 3 does not even arguably create a total effective sentence which is disproportionate to the overall offending. There is no merit in ground 2 and leave in respect of it was refused. 51 The following orders were made: 1. Leave to appeal is refused on each of grounds 1, 2 and 3. 2. The appeal is dismissed. 30 Larussa v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 62. 31 Larussa [103]. -- 15 of 16 -- [2026] WASCA 92 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 16 I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. RD Associate to the Honourable Justice Hall 25 JUNE 2026 -- 16 of 16 --