R v WILLS [2026] SADC 76

Prosecution: R Counsel: MS M WILKINSON WITH MR S WHITTAKER - Solicitor: DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) Defendant: CHANTELLE MARIE WILLS Counsel: MR B ARMSTRONG - Solicitor: WEBSTERS LAWYERS Hearing Date/s: 30/06/2025 to 08/07/2025, 04/08/2025, 11/08/2025, 12/08/2025, 14/08/2025, 15/08/2025, 18/08/2025 File No/s: DCCRM-22-583 B DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Criminal) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. R v WILLS [2026] SADC 76 Reasons for Decision of Her Honour Judge Dunlop 2 July 2026 CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - DRIVING OFFENCES - CULPABLE OR DANGEROUS DRIVING CAUSING DEATH OR BODILY HARM The defendant was charged with causing death by dangerous driving. At the time of the collision she was not speeding or found to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Her vehicle veered onto the wrong side of the road and into oncoming traffic, striking a car travelling in the opposite direction and causing the death of the driver of that vehicle. The prosecution ran their case on a dual basis, but the primary case was that the driving was as a result of gross inattention or distraction. The issue in the trial was whether her driving at the time of the collision was voluntary. If so, the secondary question was whether her driving was dangerous. Held: Guilty. Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 19A(1); Juries Act s 7; Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) s 45; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 34CB, referred to. R v Donovan [2025] SASCA 7; Kamleh v R (1990) 51 A Crim R 435, considered. -- 1 of 69 -- -- 2 of 69 -- R v WILLS [2026] SADC 76 Criminal Jurisdiction Introduction 1 The defendant Chantelle Marie Wills is charged with Causing Death by Dangerous Driving pursuant to section 19A(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). In the alternative, she is charged with Aggravated Careless Driving pursuant to section 45(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA). Overview The prosecution case 2 The prosecution allege that on 17 July 2020 Ms Kelly Winfield was driving her white Kia Cerato vehicle wholly in her lane travelling south on Heaslip Road. The defendant was driving her silver Holden Commodore in the north bound lane. There is no dispute that just after the defendant crossed over a railway crossing near Huxtable Road, her vehicle moved over the centre line into the south bound lane, and into the path of oncoming traffic. Her vehicle collided with the vehicle driven by Ms Winfield. The point of impact was approximately 1.2m into the south bound lane, where the defendant’s vehicle struck the front driver side of Ms Winfield’s vehicle. 3 The collision resulted in significant damage to both vehicles, and significant injuries to both drivers. 4 There was other traffic on the road that evening. Several people stopped to help. Those that went to Ms Winfield’s car found her unconscious and, despite the efforts of emergency services, she succumbed to her injuries before she could be safely removed from the vehicle. Those that went to the defendant’s vehicle found her conscious but trapped in the car by her legs. 5 Testing of the defendant’s blood taken following the collision showed no alcohol or illegal drugs in her system. There was no allegation that the defendant was travelling over the operative speed limit of 90 km/hr at the time of the collision. Major Crash Investigators did not locate any physical evidence of braking or other evasive action taken by the defendant prior to the collision. 6 Both of the vehicles involved were examined by a Senior Vehicle Examiner from the Major Crash Investigation Section of the South Australia Police. Neither vehicle was impacted by mechanical issues that could have contributed to the collision. 7 The prosecution relied on dashcam footage from a vehicle travelling behind the defendant’s vehicle which showed the movements of her car in the minutes -- 3 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 2 leading up to and including the collision. They referred to a series of ‘veers’ and ‘corrections’ by the defendant in support of their case. 8 The prosecution led evidence that the defendant was on the phone to her boyfriend at the time of the collision, and that she had been on that call for just under an hour. Further, that following the collision, the defendant told two people that she had been on the phone. The prosecution led evidence that she made a further comment to one of those people to the effect that she thought she may be at fault 9 Finally, the prosecution led records of consultations by the defendant with various medical professionals both before and after the collision. Those records detailed medical symptoms Mr Wills reported, and the investigations, treatment and any potential diagnoses that she received following the collision. Basis of liability asserted by the prosecution 10 The prosecution put their case on two alternate bases. 11 The primary case was that the defendant drove in a manner dangerous by driving onto the incorrect side of the road in circumstances where there was oncoming traffic. The prosecution alleged that the defendant was awake and conscious at the time her vehicle veered onto the wrong side of the road and struck Ms Winfield’s car, and that the inference could be drawn that Ms Wills was distracted, or that the attention she was giving to the task of driving was defective. 12 With respect to this pathway, the prosecution relied on a series of movements made during the defendant’s driving in the minutes leading up to the collision, and the comments made by the defendant to witnesses at the scene about being on the phone. 13 In the alternative, the prosecution submitted that, if the defendant’s driving was not conscious and voluntary at the time of veering onto the wrong side of the road and colliding with Ms Winfield, that Ms Wills continuing to drive leading up to that point, aware that her driving was impaired, amounted to driving in a manner dangerous to any person. They relied on the earlier driving to establish Ms Wills’ awareness of some impairment. 14 It was submitted that, on either pathway, the manner of driving was something beyond the ordinary risks of the road, and that a reasonable person in the situation of the accused would have realised their driving involved a real danger to others. The defence case 15 The defence case was that the Ms Wills’ driving at the point of the collision was not voluntary. It was submitted that it was a reasonable possibility that one of a number of potential known or unknown medical conditions or events were impacting on the defendant from the time that the vehicle started to travel onto the -- 4 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 3 wrong side of the road just prior to the point of impact. Reliance was placed on reports made by the defendant prior to the collision of fainting episodes, and of evidence from medical professionals as to a diagnosis of a transient cardiac arrythmia. Further possible explanations were also put, including an epileptic seizure, or loss of consciousness (LOC) as a side effect of the defendant’s use of the oral contraceptive pill. 16 The defence case was that the final veer, or deviation as they referred to the relevant movement, was the result of a loss of consciousness, and that the earlier deviations in Ms Wills’ driving were brought about by the nature and conditions of the road or its changing layout at those points. 17 It was submitted that Ms Wills’ comments to witnesses at the scene were ambiguous and that they could not, and should not, be treated as admissions. It was further submitted that there were matters which led to the defendant being at a significant forensic disadvantage in the running of the trial. Preliminary Directions 18 The defendant pleaded not guilty and elected for trial by judge alone pursuant to section 7(1) of the Juries Act 1927. In a trial by judge alone it is not necessary for the trial judge to replicate every direction that would be given in a summing up to a jury. However, I set out some preliminary matters which have guided my consideration of the evidence. 19 I must bring an open mind in this case. I must make my decision without sympathy or prejudice and not be influenced by public opinion. 20 I must assess each witness as to their truthfulness and reliability. I must determine whether I can rely upon the evidence given by each witness. I can reject or accept all or part of a witnesses’ evidence. 21 The defendant is presumed innocent of the charges, unless and until her guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant is not obliged to prove anything. The burden of proving the charges lies wholly upon the prosecution. Nothing short of proof beyond reasonable doubt will suffice. It is not enough for the prosecution to show a suspicion of guilt, or to show that the defendant is probably guilty. Before the defendant could be convicted of the offence, the prosecution is required to have proved each element of the charge beyond reasonable doubt. In these reasons, if I use the words ‘proved’, ‘established’, or ‘satisfied’, in each case I mean to an extent which excludes a reasonable doubt. If there is an explanation consistent with the innocence of the defendant, or there is uncertainty as to where the truth lies, then the defendant must be found not guilty. 22 At the conclusion of the prosecution case, the defendant indicated that she would not give or call evidence. It was the defendant’s right not to give evidence, and I draw no adverse inference from the exercise of her right. I have not used her silence as a make weight or to fill any gaps or deficiencies in the prosecution case. -- 5 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 4 To do otherwise would be to undermine her right to silence. Plainly enough, the fact that the defendant elected not to give evidence does not alter the burden of proof which remains fixed on the prosecution; nor does it affect the weight that must be given to the presumption of innocence. Expert Evidence 23 Expert evidence was presented at trial. Various medical doctors, general practitioners and specialists, were called by the prosecution. Further, police officers with expertise in crash reconstruction and analysis were called. There was no dispute as to the qualifications or expertise of these witnesses. 24 I bear in mind in my consideration of the evidence given by those experts that the determination of the facts remains my responsibility and it is for me to determine what evidence to accept and what weight to give it. I have taken care not to surrender this duty in favour of blindly accepting the evidence of the witnesses. 25 I have assessed the evidence of each witness, having regard to whether the facts on which their opinion is based have been proved. It has not been necessary for me to decide between competing expert opinions on the same topics. I deal with the evidence of the experts in greater detail later in these reasons. Drawing Inferences and assessment of the evidence 26 As to the process of inferring facts, the prosecution submits that it was open to infer that the collision was caused by distraction (the defendant being on the phone) or defective attention being paid to the task of driving, or by the defendant’s consciousness being impaired. With respect to the latter, it was submitted that she knew that it was impaired or that a reasonable person in the position of the defendant should have realised, and that to continue to drive was dangerous to the public, given that risk. 27 Inferences are simply conclusions of fact rationally drawn from the combination of the proved facts. However, inferences can only be properly deduced from the evidence, rather than guessing or engaging in speculation. Furthermore, before an adverse inference can be drawn as to the defendant’s guilt, there must be no rational hypothesis or explanation consistent with the defendant’s innocence. If there exists another rational hypothesis or explanation, the defendant must be found not guilty. 28 In deciding whether an offence has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, I must have regard to the whole of the relevant and admissible evidence. This will require me to evaluate any inconsistencies in the evidence that is before me, together with any other shortcomings in the prosecution evidence which bear upon the discharge of its burden. I must also take into account any matters where I am satisfied that there has been a significant forensic disadvantage to the defendant. -- 6 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 5 Pre-trial matters Defence Rule 39 notice By application dated 26 June 2025 (FDN 48), the defendant sought orders as follows pursuant to rule 39.1 of the Joint Criminal Rules 2022 (SA): 1. That the Crown be prohibited from leading evidence of an interaction between [Ms Wills] and police on 20 March 2020. 2. That the Crown be prohibited from leading evidence of the applicant’s status as the holder of a P1 drivers’ licence (as opposed to any other licence type). 29 Following the argument, I excluded the evidence of both of the above. 30 By further application dated 30 June 2025 (FDN 54) the defendant sought further orders as follows: That the Crown be put to its election as to the case that it intends to conduct against the applicant. Expressed differently, that the Crown be required to run only its primary or alternative case. 31 Following the argument, I refused the application and allowed the prosecution to proceed as it had articulated the prosecution case on the voir dire. Prosecution Rule 39 notice 32 Prior to the commencement of the trial, defence had provided notice of an intention to call expert evidence on the defence case. By application dated 27 June 2025 (FDN 49), the prosecution sought various orders that the defendant not be permitted to lead certain aspects of the evidence proposed. 33 With respect to the proposed evidence of Doctor Field, counsel for the defendant indicated that they conceded that aspect of the Rule 39 notice and no ruling was necessary. 34 With respect to the proposed evidence of Professor Naughton, he was called on the voir dire. As his evidence progressed, it was clear that any ruling on the various objections would be dependent on the foundational evidence led or elicited during the trial, including potentially on the defence case. Having heard the evidence, the ruling was deferred until the relevant point on the defence case immediately preceding any decision to call Professor Naughton. 35 Following the completion of the prosecution case, the defence called no oral evidence. There was a single fact agreed. I enquired of counsel for the defendant whether they intended to lead evidence from the expert. They indicated that they did not. As such, no ruling was delivered on the application to exclude aspects of that evidence. -- 7 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 6 36 I have put Professor Naughton’s voir dire evidence out of my mind, and I have disregarded it in my consideration of this matter. Elements of the Offence Causing Death by Dangerous Driving 37 The offence of causing death by dangerous driving has three elements: 1. The defendant drove a motor vehicle; 2. The defendant drove the motor vehicle in a dangerous manner; 3. By driving in that manner, the defendant caused the death of another. 38 There was no dispute that the defendant was the driver of the vehicle at the time of the collision. The dashcam footage and the evidence of the defendant’s removal from the vehicle following the collision establish that beyond reasonable doubt. 39 Further, that the movement of Ms Wills’ car caused the collision that resulted in fatal injuries to Ms Winfield was also not in dispute. 40 The central issues for determination were: 1. Was the defendant’s driving at the time of the collision a willed and voluntary act? 2. If so, was her driving such that it amounts to driving in a manner dangerous to the public? 3. If not a willed and voluntary act, was her driving in the lead up to the collision such that it amounts to driving in a manner dangerous to the public? CIVILIAN AND POLICE EVIDENCE Agreed facts 41 A number of matters were agreed between the parties and provided by the prosecution in a written document which was received as Exhibit P30. The agreed facts cover a variety of topics, including the chain of evidence and examination of the two vehicles, medical treatment of Ms Winfield and the defendant, toxicology results, telephone records and the timing of the 000 calls. 42 There was a single further agreed fact on the defence case, that being: Between 25 June 2025 and 8 July 2025 a law clerk from Websters Lawyers conducted numerous and thorough online searches for Dr Scott Weinstein. At the time of the current trial Dr Weinstein’s contact details and precise whereabouts are unknown to the accused. -- 8 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 7 Movement of the defendant’s car in the lead up to the collision 43 On the prosecution case, there is some limited information about the defendant’s movements earlier in the day, prior to what can be seen on the dashcam footage. Telephone records which form part of the agreed facts indicate that the defendant had travelled to the Glenelg area twice that day, returning to the north of Adelaide after each occasion. Other evidence confirms that Ms Wills reported trips of that nature to Mr Williams Cummins, her then boyfriend, and also to a Dr Chandratilleke. 44 Further, there was evidence led that Ms Wills had stopped to visit her boyfriend during the course of the afternoon prior to the collision. Ultimately, I have not relied on Mr Cummins’ evidence in relation to a visit from the defendant. I deal with that later in these reasons. 45 As to her driving in the minutes preceding the collision, the prosecution relied primarily on dashcam footage from a forward facing camera mounted at the front of the vehicle travelling directly behind Ms Wills’ car along Heaslip Road. They also relied, to a lesser extent, on the observations of other drivers present at the time of the collision. 46 Mr Eric Masters was travelling behind the defendant along Heaslip Road for about 2.9 kilometres prior to the collision. The dashcam footage came from the camera on his vehicle. The tendered footage ends with Mr Masters pulling over to the side of the road, at which point the defendant’s damaged car is visible on the roadway ahead. 47 The prosecution alleged that over those 2.9km the defendant’s car veered on multiple occasions, and then correction was made to bring the car back to the middle of the lane in which it was travelling. From that, they submitted that it can be inferred that the defendant had recognised that she was veering, and taken steps to correct her path and line of travel. 48 It is part of the defence case that there may be an explanation for the earlier movements of the defendant’s car, other than that she was veering by virtue of inattention or some impairment of her consciousness. Submissions were made about the state and features of the road at the points where these movements were seen to occur. The dashcam footage and stills 49 The dashcam footage was Exhibit P8 (vision only, not audio). In addition to the footage, the prosecution tendered some still photographs of various points on the road leading up to the collision. These were extracted from that footage by Senior Sergeant (SS) Kuchenmeister and tendered as Exhibit P14 and P15. -- 9 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 8 A warning 50 In assessing the recording, and the stills taken from the dashcam footage, I have kept the limitations of this footage at the forefront of my mind. I am mindful that the perspective in the footage may be skewed due to the positioning of the camera. I am mindful of the position of the vehicle on which the camera was fixed, and that the vehicle was in motion during the recording. I am mindful that I am viewing a two-dimensional image, and that can impact perceptions of depth and distance. In the observations that I have made, and the conclusions that I have expressed, I have taken those considerations into account. 51 I am also mindful that I have viewed that footage knowing that a collision ultimately occurred. At all times in my consideration, I have been mindful not to attach a significance to earlier events, based on what I know is to come. Eric Masters 52 At the time of the incident, Mr Masters worked in Burton and lived at Evanston Gardens. His path to and from work each day took him along Heaslip Road, including the section where the veers and the collision occurred. He was therefore very familiar with the condition of the road at that time having driven on it regularly in a range of vehicles, including a motorcycle, trucks, a Toyota Prado and a Holden Commodore. 53 On the night of the collision, he was driving his Toyota Prado vehicle home from work at about 6pm. His partner, Ms Leane MacDonald, was in the front passenger seat. He turned from Waterloo Corner Road into Heaslip Road and the car ahead of him was Ms Wills’ silver Commodore. Ahead of her car was a truck. 54 The truck later turned off Heaslip Road at Edinburgh Road, but the silver Commodore continued. 55 During the period that Mr Masters followed Ms Wills car, his evidence in chief was that her car was between about 50 and 100 metres ahead of him. He said that the silver car was about that distance ahead of him as it crossed the railway line. He said that there were cars coming in the opposite direction with their headlights on and that as he crossed the railway line, the car ahead of him veered across to the opposite side of the road and then there were no taillights. 56 Mr Masters was cross examined about how many times he had watched the dashcam footage following the collision. It was his evidence that he had seen it probably half a dozen times, not long after the collision. It was put to him that the distances on the video were different from what he could see in real life on the night, and it was suggested to him that it was more like 100 metres that the car was ahead of him throughout the drive. He disagreed with that and said that, if anything, the car was closer than what it appeared in the footage. 57 Mr Armstrong put an asserted prior inconsistent statement to Mr Masters from an affidavit given on 19 July 2020. Mr Masters agreed that he told police in -- 10 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 9 that statement that “the traffic was reasonably light at the time, and I had a vehicle approximately 100 m in front of me”, but said that he had told them that the distance between him and the car was “no more than 100m”. 58 Mr Masters was challenged about his memory of the defendant’s car veering immediately before the collision. It was put to him that all he could see was the taillights disappearing. He disagreed. It was put to him that in the same statement referred to earlier, he said: (T378-379) As I was approaching the railway crossing near Nash Road, I noticed cars travelling towards me because I could see their headlights. There was nothing unusual about that because they were on the correct side of their road for their direction of travel. Then all of a sudden the headlights and tail-lights in front of me disappeared. I could not tell what was happening, it was too dark.' 59 Mr Masters agreed that is what he said to the police. It was put to him that he did not, in fact, remember a veer. He disagreed with that. He did agree that his memory would have been better at the time of giving his statement than it was at the time of his evidence, but he maintained that he saw the (silver) car go across the road. 60 Mr Masters described what happened following the collision. He said that a car went past him on the opposite side and that he put his lights up to high beam and he could see what had happened. He pulled over and got out of his vehicle while his partner was calling 000. I will deal with her evidence later, but I note at this point that she was looking at her phone at the time the collision occurred. 61 Fitted to the front windscreen of Mr Masters’ car was an aftermarket dash camera system which automatically started recording when he started driving. He checked the footage after the incident and downloaded the footage from the SD card to a USB which he then provided to the police. It was his evidence that the time and date stamp on the footage was accurate, as was the speed indicated. Consideration 62 Mr Masters was 59 years of age when he gave evidence. He was a man of few words, but he struck me as a confident, competent person. He was doing nothing more than driving home when he happened to witness a sudden, unexpected and tragic collision and its aftermath. In giving his evidence, it was my view that he was doing nothing but his best to remember and recount what he saw and what he did on that night, albeit that it had occurred five years earlier. 63 With respect to the asserted inconsistencies in his evidence, in my experience distances between moving vehicles on the road are difficult to judge. In as much as there is any inconsistency between his evidence (50 to 100 metres) and his statement to police (approximately 100 metres), I note that he was travelling behind the defendant’s vehicle for nearly three kilometres. It is clear from the footage that the distance between the two vehicles varied over that time. I do not find that there is any significant inconsistency between his evidence and his -- 11 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 10 account. I accept his oral evidence, and the difference in phrasing does not cause me to doubt the accuracy and reliability of the balance of his evidence. 64 In any event, the dashcam footage shows what it shows. The reliability of what is captured in that evidence is not impacted by Mr Masters’ estimates of distance. 65 As to the suggested inconsistency that he did not use the word “veer” in his statement to the police, and that he had not described a veer prior to watching the dashcam footage, I accept that there are differences in the accounts given. Again, the dashcam shows what it shows. There may have been an element of reconstruction in his account of a veer. However, I do not consider that this has any impact on his credibility, and minimal impact on his reliability with respect to evidence he gave on other topics. 66 In any event, in as much as his evidence has importance, both defence and prosecution rely on him as an accurate and reliable witness with respect to the conditions of the road prior to the railway crossing. I turn to deal with that topic now. Condition of Heaslip Road from Waterloo Corner Road leading up to the railway crossing Senior Constable Peters 67 Senior Constable (SC) Peters was the Investigating Officer from Major Crash Investigation Section who had overall responsibility for the investigation of this collision. I deal with her experience shortly in relation to the examination she conducted of the collision scene. 68 In cross examination SC Peters agreed that she had concentrated her attention on documenting and photographing the scene in the area north of the railway crossing where the collision occurred. As such, at the time of her attendance at the scene, there were no photographs taken of the condition of the road between the Heaslip Road/Waterloo Corner Road intersection up to the railway crossing. Mr Masters 69 Given his familiarity with Heaslip Road, Mr Masters was asked in cross examination about the condition of the road between the Waterloo Corner Road intersection and the railway line, before the collision site. He indicated that that road had been “done up” but he was not certain as to when that had happened. 70 He was shown some photographs, Exhibit D10, taken in daylight at about the point of the 70 km/hr sign, just after the roundabout. He agreed that the condition of the road, as visible in those images, was consistent with the road at a point prior to it being resurfaced. He agreed that there was some “cracking” and that there was a ‘divot’ in that area. He agreed that by divot he meant uneven road surface due to widening of the road. -- 12 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 11 71 Mr Masters later clarified his evidence about the “divot” in re-examination by marking the area he was talking about on the maps (Exhibit P9) and the photographs (Exhibit D10) that were placed before him. He said that he was referring to a crack on the road which ran along Heaslip Road, in the same direction as the road, next to the outer white line. It was his evidence that the difference in road height at that point was so bad that you could not ride a motor bike on that part of the road. However, he said that the “divot” did not impact him when he was driving trucks, his Prado or the Holden Commodore that he had at that time. Senior Sergeant Kuchenmeister 72 SS Kuchenmeister (SS) was called as an expert as to speed reconstruction on the prosecution case. However, he was asked questions beyond just that topic, including as to the condition of the early part of Heaslip Road, close to Waterloo Corner Road. I deal with his experience and expertise later in these reasons, but for now I simply say that he was an experienced Major Crash Investigation Section Crime Scene Officer with training in crash reconstruction. 73 Relevant to the condition of this portion of the road, he was asked specific questions about a divot by reference to Exhibits P9 and D10. He said that there are no studies or research regarding how the surface of the outer lane of a road would influence driver behaviour where that surface is uneven. 74 Finally, although caution must be exercised given the limitations of Exhibit P8, some observations can be made about the road condition from the dashcam footage and the stills produced from it. Condition of the road at the collision site 75 As previously mentioned, SC Peters is the Investigating Officer for the matter and was the crash scene investigator for the collision. At the time of the incident, she had been at the Major Crash Investigation Section (MCIS) of police for about 15 years. I do not repeat the detail of her training and qualifications, which were not challenged in the trial. She was clearly a thorough and diligent officer. I accept her expertise as a crash scene investigator and have relied on her evidence with respect to her observations, measurements, examination and analysis of the scene of the collision, starting on the night in question and continuing over the days that followed. 76 When SC Peters attended the collision scene at about 7.20pm, emergency service vehicles and personnel were present. The road had been closed. Ms Winfield had been pronounced deceased and was still in her vehicle. The defendant had been removed from her vehicle and taken to the Royal Adelaide Hospital. 77 It was SC Peter’s evidence that the road where the collision occurred was level and straight with one lane of traffic in each direction. The lanes were divided by a solid line for the south bound traffic and a dotted line for the north bound traffic. On the eastern side of the road was the RAAF Base, and on the western -- 13 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 12 side of the road was agricultural land. The speed limit at the point of the collision was 90km/h. 78 It was SC Peter’s evidence that section of road where the collision occurred was, to her knowledge, the same as at the time of the crash and that it did not appear to have been resurfaced. The line markings were repainted after the time of the collision. These matters were confirmed in Exhibit P30, agreed fact 66. 79 SC Peters indicated the weather was fine and dry. Mr Masters gave the same evidence. 80 The sun had set at 5.24pm. Mr Masters said that the sun was setting, and that it seemed lighter on the night than what is captured in the dashcam footage. Another road user present at the time of the collision, Mr Armfield, said that it was dusk, but that there was no difficulty caused to his driving by the sun setting. 81 There was no overhead street lighting in proximity to the collision location. 82 Again, although caution must be exercised, some observations can be made about the weather, lighting and road condition from the dashcam footage. Photographs and plans 83 Photographs taken at the scene, and later of the vehicles, were tendered as Exhibit P1 and a USB containing digital versions of the same photographs was Exhibit P2. A scale plan of the scene was produced and tendered as Exhibit P3 in the trial. Two aerial maps were tendered showing the area leading up to the collision site, and a closer view of the site. These were Exhibits P4 and P5. View 84 On the application of the prosecution, the Court travelled to various sites on Heaslip Road. Counsel requested that particular note be taken of the view up and down the road at a number of relevant points, the line markings, the lighting, the median strip and various other features of the road. Cones were also placed at the positions calculated to be the resting points of the two vehicles, and at the approximate point of impact. This exercise was very helpful in understanding and assessing the evidence of the various witnesses in the trial, although I direct myself that the view is not itself evidence in the trial. Dashcam footage and stills 85 The dashcam captured continuous footage in 60 second intervals. The prosecution tendered 5 video clips, each of approximately 1 minute in length. When viewed in conjunction with Mr Masters’ evidence, the evidence of the police officers, and the assistance provided by the view, the footage shows the following: -- 14 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 13 Video Clip 1 - REC_2020_07_17_18_00_32_F 86 Mr Masters’ vehicle leaves his work car park. He turns onto various streets before his vehicle can be seen approaching Waterloo Corner Road. Video Clip 2 - REC_2020_07_17_18_01_33_F 87 As Mr Masters’ vehicle turns right onto Waterloo Corner Road, ahead you see a truck turning into Heaslip Road and the defendant’s car indicating and then turning in behind it. Mr Masters then takes the same path and turns onto Heaslip Road. The truck and the defendant’s car are seen ahead of him on that road. 88 During this clip, the movement of the defendant’s car (described by the prosecution as “the first veer” and the defence as a “deviation”) can be seen. It occurs at about the location that a 70 km/hr speed sign can be seen on the left-hand side of the road, after Mumford Road. At about that point, the lane widens slightly. 89 The defendant’s car moves from slightly right of centre in her lane, to a position where her car is straddling the white line on the left-hand side of the road. The movement to that position is gradual over about 6 seconds. The car remains in that position for a short time. The correction back to the centre of her lane is undertaken over about 3 seconds. 90 This movement of the defendant’s vehicle occurs about 2 minutes before the collision. 91 The balance of the clip shows the vehicle travelling on a fairly consistent path in the centre of the lane behind the truck. Evidence of Senior Sergeant Kuchenmeister 92 SS Kuchenmeister was asked to view the portion of the footage in which the defendant’s tyres cross over the white line on the left hand side of the road. A daytime aerial image and street view (from 2025), and screen shots of the footage were produced through him and tendered as Exhibit P14. On the screen shots he marked as a red line the approximate position of the continuous edge line to give me some assistance in understanding how far the vehicle crossed over that line. 93 SS Kuchenmeister said that the red lines in Exhibits P14 (and later P15 with respect to a subsequent movement of Ms Wills’ car) are only guides, as opposed to a precise analytical tool. I have treated them as such. Video Clip 3 - REC_2020_07_17_18_02_34_F 94 The next clip has the defendant continuing her path behind the truck. 95 The defendant navigates a bend in the road and activates her brake lights just prior to the truck activating its brakes as it pulls into a right hand turning lane at Edinburgh Road. The defendant continues around the bend, tending to be more on one side of the lane that the other, but coming back to the centre of the road once -- 15 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 14 back on the straight road. Although there is some side to side movement, it is well within the lane of travel. 96 The defendant appears to increase her speed after the truck has turned off, and the distance from Mr Masters car increases. 97 This clip concludes with the defendant’s car approaching the intersection of Heaslip Road with Pilatus Drive at which time she is more to the left hand side of her lane. 98 At this point the road changes its layout. Although still one lane in each direction, there is a median strip area painted in the middle of the road. The lane in which the defendant and Mr Masters are driving carries on straight. Video Clip 4 - REC_2020_07_17_18_03_35_F This clip starts with the defendant’s car moving sideways in its lane. First to the left, then to the right, and then back to the left again. It appears that Ms Wills’ left hand tyres are at least on the left white line, if not slightly over, before she again seems to correct and come back to the centre of the lane. This was described by the prosecution as the “second veer” and defence as a deviation. 99 Just prior to the intersection and railway crossing, the defendant’s car then moves towards the centre of the road. At about the point of the train track crossing, she corrects her line, repositioning herself more towards the middle of the lane. This is what the prosecution referred to as the “third veer”. 100 Mr Armstrong addressed these two asserted veers as a combined course of driving referable to road conditions. Evidence of Senior Sergeant Kuchenmeister 101 SS Kuchenmeister produced a similar document to P14 but for this point in the video, Exhibit P15. At this point in time, the dashcam footage shows the area just north of Pilatus Drive on Heaslip Road, approximately 2.2km from the Waterloo Corner Roundabout. 102 The second page of P15 contains two images taken from the dashcam footage, and the same red line was inserted to depict the approximate position of the continuous edge line. Once again, the officer acknowledged the limitations as to the accuracy of the red line in the exhibit. The final veer 103 I now come to what the prosecution described as ‘the final veer’. 104 The prosecution submitted that at 18:04:05, about 6 seconds before the collision, the defendant’s vehicle is in the centre of its lane. From that point, her -- 16 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 15 vehicle veers towards the oncoming traffic lane. They submit that the veering is about 5 seconds, give or take a second either side. 105 In the seconds prior to impact, you see Ms Wills’ taillights move to the right in her lane and cross into the oncoming lane of traffic. Her taillights are lost in the glare of the oncoming traffic. The 4WD travelling in front of Ms Winfield swerves away from Ms Wills. You can faintly see the impact at collision, and the subsequent movement of Ms Wills’ car back into the north bound lane, coming to rest facing back towards Mr Masters’ vehicle. 106 The prosecution submitted that in the second prior to the collision, a “more definite, sharper movement” to the right was visible, taking the defendant’s vehicle further into Ms Winfield’s path. I have watched the footage repeatedly, both in its original format and a zoomed version. I simply cannot discern any such movement. 107 Following the collision Mr Masters can be seen slowing his vehicle, activating his high beam and pulling over to the left hand side of the road. 108 The single headlight of a motorbike ridden by a Mr Armfield can be seen slowly moving towards the RAAF side of the road and coming to a stop. 109 The defendant can be briefly seen seated in the driver’s seat of her vehicle. Exhibit P28 110 I have watched original footage, but I have also carefully watched Exhibit P28, a zoomed version of this clip. I have seen the same movements of the defendant’s car in that footage as in P8. 111 Despite repeated viewing, and focussed attention on the moments prior to collision, I am still not able to make out the prosecution’s asserted sharper movement towards the right hand side of the road. Evidence of Nathan Armfield 112 At the time of giving evidence Mr Armfield was 40 years of age and was working as an underground driver at Olympic Dam. Mr Armfield told the Court that he rides a motorcycle, and he often travelled along Heaslip Road. At the time of the collision, he would have been driving along that road twice a day for about 3 or 4 years. 113 Mr Armfield was heading home from work southbound along Heaslip Road just after 6:00pm. He said the road was clean and clear and it was around dusk. He had no visibility issue with the sun setting. His motorbike headlight was on, as were the headlights of other drivers. He was wearing a motorbike helmet, but it did not affect his field of vision. 114 Mr Armfield was riding his motor bike behind the deceased’s Kia vehicle. It was his evidence that ahead of the Kia was a four-wheel drive. He said that those -- 17 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 16 two cars were quite close to each other. Everyone seemed to be travelling at about the speed limit of 90km/hr. 115 Mr Armfield would have been to the centre-right of the lane. On the other side of the road were a “bunch” of cars which seemed to be travelling in a line, all appropriately spaced, until one car came out of line. He knew it was a Holden by the grille. It was his evidence that it was about 5 or 6 seconds that it took from when the car started to come out of its lane, to when it collided with the Kia in front of him. In cross examination he was challenged about that estimate of time. He did not concede that it might have been 4 or 5 seconds. 116 He said that the four-wheel drive vehicle ahead of the Kia swerved off the road to avoid the oncoming car, throwing up dirt from the side of the road. He said that the Kia braked for a split second before impact. He said that the Holden passenger side of the car was in line with the centre of the road at the time of impact. 117 Mr Armfield said he started braking when he observed the Holden having veered into the lane with about half of the car. He braked and navigated a path between the two cars after the collision. Consideration 118 Mr Armfield was a careful witness. Even if only a few moments before the collision, he saw that there was an issue and took evasive action. His detailed account of his position in the lane, his observations of the swerving of the 4WD ahead of Ms Winfield’s vehicle, and of the nature and positioning of the impact between the two vehicles. I accept that the defendant’s vehicle was straddling the centre white line and that the collision occurred driver to driver. That is consistent with the reconstruction evidence of SC Peters, and consistent with what can be seen in the dashcam footage. 119 I consider that Mr Armfield was doing his best to speak about the time period over which the defendant’s car was veering across the road. However, this all happened very quickly and at a time when he was noting many things and taking evasive action to protect himself. While I accept his evidence that the defendant’s car veered across the road for some seconds, I don’t accept his evidence as precise evidence as to the length of time. In any event, little turns on his evidence on that point, given other evidence. Video Clip 5 - REC_2020_07_17_18_04_35_F 120 Mr Masters slows to a stop and turns off the high beams. The lighting is such that the bottom half of the defendant’s car can be seen, including the damage to the car. However, the area above that is dark and the defendant cannot be seen within her vehicle. 121 Other cars slow in the southbound lane to avoid debris on the road. -- 18 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 17 122 People can be seen running down the north bound lane towards the defendant’s vehicle and then standing at the driver’s side door of her car. The video ends at that point. Circumstances and dynamics of collision 123 There was little dispute about the circumstances and dynamics of the collision itself. 124 The collision occurred about 170 metres past the intersection of Heaslip and Huxtable Roads, the intersection just prior to the railway crossing. SC Peters identified the approximate point of impact as marked on the plan Exhibits P3 and P6 at point A, approximately 1.2 metres into the south bound lane in which Ms Winfield was travelling. The lanes in both directions were 3.8m wide, and the width of the cars was 1.8 metres (Ms Wills) and 1.9 metres (Ms Winfield). 125 There was no physical evidence of any attempt by the defendant to brake ahead of the impact. 126 Consistent with the observations of Mr Armfield and Mr Masters, SC Peters gave evidence of her assessment of the collision dynamics. She concluded that the defendant’s Holden Commodore had moved to the incorrect side of the road and collided driver to driver with the Kia Cerato driven by Ms Winfield. Speed of the defendant’s vehicle at the time of the collision 127 Although it is not alleged that the defendant was travelling above the stated speed limit at the time of the collision, the prosecution led evidence from SS Kuchenmeister of the estimated speed of the defendant’s vehicle at the point of collision. 128 Officer Kuchenmeister has been a police officer for more than three decades and stationed at Major Crash Investigation Section for 21 years. He is an experienced crash reconstructionist. Understandably, his expertise was not challenged. I accept his expertise as a crash scene investigator and have relied on his evidence with respect to the speed calculations he undertook. 129 The mathematical equations that SS Kuchenmeister used to determine the estimated speeds of the Holden vehicle were tendered as Exhibit P13. The equations and the method of calculation are accepted in the crash reconstruction field and are utilised worldwide. 130 The calculations indicated that the defendant was travelling at between approximately 82 and 88km/hr at the time of the collision. Officer Kuchenmeister was confident that the true speed of the vehicle lay somewhere in that range. 131 Once the kilometres per hour were calculated it was then possible to calculate how many metres per second the defendant’s vehicle was travelling. At 89 km/h, her vehicle would be travelling at approximately 24 and a half metres a second. At -- 19 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 18 85km/h her vehicle would be travelling at approximately 23 and a half metres per second. At 81 km/h the vehicle would be travelling at approximately 22 and a half metres per second. 132 Based on the above calculations, the prosecution submitted that it would have taken about 7 seconds for the defendant’s car to travel the distance from the railway crossing to the point of impact. That is consistent with what can be seen on the dashcam footage. Length of time of the veer 133 Although I have considered the evidence of Mr Masters, Mr Armfield and SS Kuchenmeister, primarily I have relied on what can be seen in the dashcam footage as to the time over which the defendant’s car moved into the oncoming lane of traffic. I am satisfied that the prosecution’s estimate of 5 seconds is correct, although I allow for it to be as little as 4 seconds and as much as 6 seconds. Defendant’s use of her mobile phone during the time of the collision Fact of a call 134 On the prosecution case, the defendant was on a mobile phone call to her boyfriend at the time of the collision. Relevant to this topic was the evidence from Mr Masters, Ms MacDonald, SC Worden, together with the agreed facts with respect the defendant’s phone records, and the evidence of the defendant’s then boyfriend, Mr Cummins. 135 Exhibit P30, agreed facts 62 to 65 establish that the defendant called her partner at 5.08pm (connecting to a tower in the Glenelg area) and further, that call continued for an hour and 29 seconds before it was terminated. The end of the call was, therefore, shortly after 6.08pm. 136 It was Mr Masters’ evidence that the time and date recorded on the dashcam footage was accurate. That indication placed the collision at about 6.04pm. 137 The collision obviously occurred before the 000 call from Ms MacDonald which was placed at 6.05pm. 138 Ms Wills told both Ms MacDonald and SC Worden that she had been on the phone with her boyfriend, or had just been talking to her boyfriend. The detail of her comments to them will be dealt with later in these reasons, but I accept that she made comment to each of these witnesses about being on the phone with her boyfriend. 139 Although I will address the balance of Mr Cummins’ evidence later, for now, his evidence as to the call was: 1 1 T530. -- 20 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 19 All I remember is there was a phone call and the line went dead and I called back wondering 'what's going on here' and someone picked up the phone and said Chantelle had been in an accident. Mr Cummins could not recall any other details of that call.2 It was his evidence in chief, and when pressed in cross examination, that he had not remembered the call until the police mentioned it to him when he was spoken to shortly prior to the commencement of the trial. He repeatedly observed that it had been five years. 140 The accumulation of this evidence satisfies me that a call was connected between the defendant and Mr Cummins at the time of the collision, and that it had been connected for approximately 56 minutes by that time. Bluetooth system 141 SC Peters confirmed that there was an aftermarket blue tooth system fitted to the car, but her investigations could not assist with determining whether the relevant phone call was connected through bluetooth or not. 142 There is no evidence before the court from which any conclusion could be drawn that the defendant was holding her phone as opposed to using the blue tooth system that was installed. As such, the prosecution made no submission that I could be satisfied that the defendant was physically interacting with her phone while driving. Aftermath of the collision 143 The prosecution led evidence from civilians and police as to their observations of the condition of the defendant in the aftermath of the collision. In addition to that evidence, there are the agreed facts with respect to the defendant’s medical treatment. Evidence of observations and interactions with Ms Wills after the collision Leane MacDonald 144 Ms Leane MacDonald was in the Toyota Prado with Mr Masters. She was looking at her phone at the time of the collision. She looked up and saw two cars and debris on the road. She called 000 at 18:05:06. She saw Mr Masters go to the white car. When she got out of the car, she went over to the silver car. 145 Ms MacDonald said that there was another lady already there by the car who had the driver’s phone. Ms MacDonald understood that the lady was calling the driver’s mother for her. 146 Ms MacDonald spoke to the driver. It was her evidence in chief that the driver told her that she was “on the phone to her boyfriend and she thought she was in 2 T531. -- 21 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 20 the wrong”.3 Ms MacDonald said that, to the best of her memory, those were the words that the driver used. Ms MacDonald also said that the driver said something about her legs being sore, and later in the conversation about being late for dinner.4 Ms MacDonald reassured Ms Wills that help was on the way. 147 Ms MacDonald was cross examined about the exact words spoken by the driver. She said that the comment of the driver was “I think I’m in the wrong, I was on the phone to my boyfriend”.5 148 It was put to Ms MacDonald that she had told police something different in a statement given on 20 July 2025, although it was later agreed to have actually been given on 23 July 2025 (P30: 60). It was put to her that she told a police officer: The female driver in the silver car told me she couldn’t feel her legs and also said something similar to “I was on the phone to my boyfriend, I think I’m in the wrong”. 149 Having been taken to that statement, and indicating that she had not refreshed her memory about that statement since giving it, Ms MacDonald agreed that was how she had described it to the police officer. She also agreed that her memory would have been better when she gave that statement, however, she went on to say that it was something that she had certainly not forgotten.6 150 She was asked “are you certain that those were the precise words spoken” and she answered, “If not precise, very similar to”. She said that she was sure about the “I was on the phone to my boyfriend” part, but when pressed with respect to the latter, and asked if she allowed for the possibility that the words were similar, but not identical to those words, she said:7 From my recollection, that was what was said. If it was a word or two different, I can’t say a hundred percent. But definitely ‘I was on the phone to my boyfriend’. Whether it was ‘I may be in the wrong’ or ‘I think I’m in the wrong’, or ‘I could have been in the wrong’ may have been the different words in that, the first part of the sentence. 151 Ms MacDonald indicated that she was “definite” about the first part. I took this to mean that she (the witness) was definite about what was said, as opposed to meaning that the driver was definite in her tone. There was some confusion about this, and I am of the view that the witness and the cross examiner were at cross purposes during this portion of the evidence. In any event, I took it that the witness was sure about the first aspect of what was said, but, as she had already explained, she couldn’t be 100% sure about the exact words used in the second part. She said 3 T392. 4 T391-392. 5 T397. 6 T398-400. 7 T400. -- 22 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 21 that the words were all “spoken at once, so there was no difference in the way it was spoken”.8 She went on to say:9 I still, from my recollection, would say it was “I think I’m in the wrong, I think I was in the wrong” is the way I still recollect it. But to quote it a hundred percent, I probably can’t say that. 152 In re-examination on this topic, she was taken to a notebook statement she signed on 20 July 2020 and agreed that she told police that the driver said, “I was on my phone to my boyfriend, I think I’m in the wrong.”10 153 With respect to her observations of the defendant during their interactions, in cross examination she was asked if she saw that the driver was pale or appeared to be in shock. She indicated that the driver was not pale, and that she did not see any signs of shock during her interactions with the driver.11 Senior Constable Mark Worden 154 Senior Constable (SC) Mark Worden was on duty near St Kilda when he received the radio call about the collision. He and his partner travelled to the scene, arriving at about 6.18pm. It was his evidence that while SAAS and MFS were already present, they were the first police on scene. 155 He made observations of the driver of the silver Holden car being pale, trapped in the car by her leg or legs, but able to have a conversation with him. He indicated that the initial discussion was about her general wellbeing and level of pain. However, during the conversation, the driver said to him that she had just been talking to her boyfriend. She repeated that twice during their interaction. 156 In cross examination he was asked about his observations of the defendant. He said that he recalled having general conversation with her about her wellbeing but couldn’t specifically remember the details of what was said. As to what she said when asked about her condition, he could not remember if she said that she ‘felt okay and not in too much pain’.12 He agreed that she conveyed the impression to him that she was OK. There was nothing else about her condition that gave him the impression that she was in shock. She was responsive to the questions that he was asking of her.13 157 He stepped away once SAAS were engaged. 8 T399-401. 9 T400. 10 T402. 11 T401. 12 T419. 13 T420. -- 23 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 22 Stacey Perkins 158 A potential witness by the name of Stacey Perkins came to the attention of SC Peters during her investigations in the lead up to trial. SC Peters acknowledged that, had she been aware of Ms Perkins prior to that point, she would have taken steps to speak to her at an earlier time. 159 Mr Masters had contacted police in the days following the collision and advised them of the registration plate of the vehicle that was stopped behind him at the scene. Police (not SC Peters) made enquiries about that car on 20 July 2020 and were able to locate Ms Perkins and speak with her at 12:55pm. Notes of that conversation were before the court as part of Exhibit P30, Agreed Fact 59 as follows: - everyone arriving @ the same time - m/c rider - approached both vehicles - brief conversation with driver of silver car o mention on her phone o ‘on the phone to her boyfriend’ o I took it as she driving @ the time o repeated a few times o ‘on her way to have dinner’ + ‘staying with her boyfriend the night’ o she had a headache. 160 In the lead up to the trial Ms Perkins was approached and asked to provide a statement. She declined to do so. She also declined to refresh her memory from the notes of her conversation with police on 20 July 2020. Eric Masters 161 Mr Masters said that he spent most of his time by the white car but went to the silver car long enough to know that the lady in that car was trapped by her feet. He said that he did not recall her being pale or seeing anything that made him think that she was in shock. Medical treatment of the defendant at the scene 162 Treatment given to the defendant at the scene and other relevant medical examination and information was set out in Exhibit P30, Agreed Facts 29 to 42. 163 The medical retrieval specialist doctor attended the scene at about 6:40pm. Her examination of the defendant showed that Ms Wills was breathing without assistance and that her oxygen saturation was within the normal range. She was assessed as having a Glascow Coma Score of 15, indicative that her eyes were open, she was oriented to place, time and person, and that she was able to obey commands given to her. At the time of that examination, there was no indication of any neurological deficit. -- 24 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 23 164 Ms Wills was given anaesthetic so that she could be removed from the vehicle. She had extensive soft tissue injuries to the sole of her right foot, injuries to her right thigh and ankle, and possible further injury to her other ankle. After removal from the vehicle, it was noted that her blood pressure was low and that she was cold to the touch. Dashcam footage 165 The immediate aftermath of the collision is captured on the dashcam footage. For a moment at the end of the fourth clip, the headlights of Mr Masters’ vehicle illuminate the driver’s door area of the defendant’s vehicle. Ms Wills can be seen in the car through the driver’s side window. She appears to be looking towards Mr Masters’ vehicle (where the lights are coming from) and she is moving her arms in a manner consistent with trying to lift herself up. 166 In terms of an assessment of her physical state or mental functioning, I place no weight on what can be seen in this video. Given the lighting in particular, the quality of the recording is poor at this point, and it is only for a very short time that observations can be made of the defendant. Further, as Mr Armstrong rightly submitted, there is no evidence about what impact a collision may have on a person, including one who may have been suffering a medical episode of some sort as he suggested. Reports of the defendant 167 Although this is addressed in more detail later in these reasons, I mention that in the defendant’s medical notes, doctors recorded that the defendant told them that she had no memory of the collision. 168 Mr Cummins’ evidence was that he had spoken with the defendant after the collision about what happened, and that she had always told him that she did not know.14 Asserted admissions 169 The prosecution relied on Ms Wills’ comments to Ms MacDonald and SC Worden as admissions by the defendant as to being on the phone, and that she was awake and aware of her actions at the time of the collision. They further relied on the comments to Ms MacDonald as an admission as to why the collision had occurred, namely that she was on her phone. The prosecution also submitted that it was significant that, shortly after the collision, the defendant was not expressing confusion about what had happened, or speaking of symptoms that would be indicative of, or consistent with, some kind of medical episode. 170 Mr Armstrong submitted that there is a marked difference between “I may be”, “I could be” and “I think I am”. It was his submission that there had never been a definitive statement of the words used by Ms MacDonald and that, consequently, 14 T557. -- 25 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 24 it was not clear that any statement made was, in fact, an admission. He further submitted that that statement was one that could simply be her last memory, prior to a loss of consciousness, as opposed to her memory of the moment of or before the collision. What was said by the defendant? Ms MacDonald 171 Ms MacDonald was a no-nonsense kind of lady. She obviously listened to what was asked of her, and she answered in a most forthright and direct manner. Although she was giving evidence five years after the incident, Ms MacDonald was very clear about what she remembered, what she did not know, and about where there was any doubt in her mind about her evidence. She was a very careful and impressive witness. 172 I accept that she was an honest and a reliable witness, in particular about the critical aspect of her evidence, that being her conversation with the defendant shortly after the collision. 173 I accept Ms MacDonald’s evidence that the defendant said that she was on the phone to her boyfriend. It was certainly Ms MacDonald’s understanding, as the person present for the conversation, that the defendant was talking about the time of the collision. I am satisfied that in the context and circumstances the defendant found herself, the defendant was referring to the time of the collision when making that comment. 174 I accept that, tied to that first comment, was a further comment which included the words “in the wrong”. Although Ms MacDonald could not say with absolute certainty at the time of her evidence, five years after the conversation took place, it was her best recollection that the defendant said something similar to, “I think I’m in the wrong”. The initial account that she gave to the police on 20 July 2020 was consistent with that best memory. 175 I am satisfied that Ms Wills words were consistent with Ms MacDonald’s initial account to police on 20 July 2020, and consistent with her best memory at trial. 176 Even if I was wrong about those precise words, I am satisfied that shortly after the collision, Ms Wills expressed a concern about being in the wrong, and that expression of concern made by her was linked to her being on the phone to her boyfriend at the time of the collision. I am satisfied that Ms MacDonald was in the best position to understand the tenor and implication of the words, and that was her clear impression from her interaction with the defendant. 177 In reaching this conclusion, I have considered whether there are any other potential explanations for Ms Wills saying those words, at that time. In assessing that, I have considered what was not said by the defendant. For example, she did not express any confusion or concern about what had happened to lead to her then present -- 26 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 25 situation. She did not say that she had no idea what had happened. She did not say that she had experienced any symptom consistent with loss of consciousness or a precursor sensation to a LOC. In my view, it would be consistent with common human experience that, were there any such confusion or symptoms, the defendant was likely to have mentioned them during these conversations. 178 In reaching these conclusions, I have also considered the state and the situation that Ms Wills was in at the time the comments were made. I have dealt with that issue below in my reasons, but it has formed part of my consideration of this issue. 179 Although the absence of any complaint of confusion, memory disturbance, or symptoms suggestive of a loss of consciousness does not exclude the possibility of such an event, it is a factor which tends to support the view that Ms Wills was not then experiencing obvious confusion and did not perceive herself as having suffered such symptoms. Senior Constable Worden 180 There was no substantive challenge to the officer’s evidence. He presented as someone doing his best to recall and recount the relevant, but dated, events. The interaction with SC Worden must have taken place between when he arrived at 6.18pm, and when SAAS arrived at 6.26pm and the officer said that he backed away to let them do their work. 181 I accept that during the conversation with SC Worden the defendant twice said that she had just been talking to her boyfriend. 182 I am satisfied that, given the context of the conversation and his role as a police officer, that Ms Wills was referring to her actions at the time of the collision when she made those comments. Stacey Perkins Even if I were to accept the police officer’s notes as an accurate and reliable record of what Ms Perkins said to them in the days following the collision, namely that Ms Wills told Ms Perkins she was ‘on the phone to her boyfriend’, having accepted the evidence of Ms MacDonald and SC Worden, Ms Perkins comments add little to my consideration of this issue. State of the defendant at the time the words were spoken 183 The defendant had just been involved in a significant collision. She was injured and remained trapped in her vehicle at the time that these conversations took place. Although I do not use the term in the strict medical sense, I have no difficulty concluding that the defendant would have been in a shocked state following the collision and during the conversations that followed. However, both Ms MacDonald and SC Worden’s accounts of their interactions were that they were able to carry out an apparently coherent conversation with Ms Wills about -- 27 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 26 her circumstances. Clearly Ms Wills’ comments and meaning were readily understandable by them. 184 At the time that the relevant conversations were taking place, the defendant did not know the consequences of the collision. Although clearly she knew she was trapped and she was in pain, she did not know the extent of her own injuries, or that Ms Winfield had suffered fatal injuries. 185 Shortly after these conversations Ms Wills was medically assessed and showed no neurological deficits. She was oriented to time, place and person, and able to follow commands. I have taken into account the delay between the conversations and that assessment. 186 In assessing the state of Ms Wills at the time of the conversations, I have considered that she was, in fact, on the phone at the time of the collision. I refer to my earlier findings in this regard. In that respect, what she said to Ms MacDonald and SC Worden was an accurate representation of her circumstances. 187 I have further considered other things that were said by Ms Wills at or around the time of the comments relied on by the prosecution. Specifically, comments to Ms MacDonald and Ms Perkins that she was late for dinner, or on her way to dinner. Mr Armstrong submitted such comments were out of place and were inconsistent with Ms Wills being coherent and lucid. 188 I remind myself that Ms MacDonald said that the comment about being late for dinner came later in their conversation. There is no context to Ms Perkins account, other than the order in which things are recorded in the note, which may not be accurate. 189 Ms Wilkinson submitted that these comments indicated that Ms Wills may not be aware of the seriousness of her condition, or of the collision, but did not lead to a conclusion that Ms Wills was not making sense during her discussions with people at the scene. Neither Ms MacDonald nor SC Worden spoke of her appearing confused. 190 In my view, there is nothing illogical or concerning about the fact that there was a discussion between Ms Wills and people talking and reassuring her at the scene following her involvement in an obviously serious collision. It is natural that Ms Wills might speak about what had just happened, or where she had been, or where she was going in her circumstances. Although reflective that she likely did not understand the severity of her situation, comments about being late for dinner do not indicate to me that her state of mind was affected during these conversations such that I could not rely on the comments that she made as an accurate and reliable contemporaneous indication of her state of mind about the collision after it had occurred. 191 I have also considered the record in the notes of an officer’s conversation with Perkins about a “headache”. There are any number of reasons why she may -- 28 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 27 have had a headache at that point, but it does not impact on my assessment of her coherent state at the time of the conversations. Later statements of the defendant 192 I turn to address the notes of Dr Weinstein (P24, p24) and Dr Chandratilleke (P24, p390) which record that they were told by Ms Wills that she could not recall the events around the collision, as well as her comments to Mr Cummins that she did not know what had happened. 193 Without making any finding as to the truthfulness or otherwise of those statements, and accepting them at face value for the sake of my consideration at this point, there are explanations as to why Ms Wills may have no memory at a later point, but was lucid, accurate and reliable about what had happened in the immediate aftermath. Such explanations may include that she did not yet know the consequences of the collision. I infer that distress would follow learning about that. Further explanations might include that she had suffered a serious injury herself and required medical treatment, including surgeries, for her injuries. 194 There are a number of possible explanations for that position. I do not need to determine which, if any, of those explanations is correct. It is sufficient to conclude that the later reports of a lack of memory do not necessarily undermine the reliability of her contemporaneous statements. Conclusion 195 I am satisfied that when the words were spoken to Ms MacDonald and SC Worden, the defendant was sufficiently aware of her circumstances to understand the conversations in which she was engaged, and to communicate deliberately. I am satisfied that her references to being on the phone to her boyfriend related to the time of the collision and reflected her contemporaneous understanding of events. I am satisfied that they were not merely speculation or recollection of earlier events. I further infer from the manner in which those comments were expressed that she considered that circumstance may have contributed to, or placed her in the wrong with respect to, the collision. Although she had just been involved in a serious collision and was injured, I am satisfied that her statements constituted a reliable indication of her understanding at the time they were made. The later reports that she had no memory of the collision do not cause me to reject or doubt the reliability of those contemporaneous statements. 196 I will return to the use that I make of this evidence later. Further evidence relevant to the defendant’s movements on the day of the collision William Cummins 197 Mr Cummins was 28 years of age at the time of his evidence. He had completed year 12 and after high school did some further learning by undertaking some construction courses. Although he has worked in the past, he was -- 29 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 28 unemployed at the time of the collision, and at the time he gave evidence at the trial. 198 At the time of the collision, he was the partner of the defendant. It was his evidence that they were initially friends in high school, and that at some point after that, their relationship progressed to being boyfriend/girlfriend. Mr Cummins believed that their relationship lasted for about 3 years and that the collision was in about the middle of that period. They are no longer in a relationship but have had amicable contact after the end of their relationship, including in the months prior to the trial. 199 During their relationship Mr Cummins lived in Smithfield Plains with his parents. Ms Wills would spend time at his house, including staying the night, usually over the weekends. The defendant lived at Angle Vale with her parents. Although the witness knew her family, he did not stay over at her home. 200 In addition to the evidence that I have referred to earlier, Mr Cummins gave evidence in chief that he saw Ms Wills on the day of the collision when she visited his home in the afternoon. Contact with the defendant on the day of the collision 201 Mr Cummins’ evidence about the events of the day is of narrow compass. Beyond his contact with the defendant when she visited his house, he does not remember what he, himself, was doing that day. What he was doing that day is not relevant to the issues in the trial, however his inability to remember any other detail of the day gives context to the reliability of his memory generally. 202 Although he did not remember it when he first spoke with the police, by the time he came to give evidence at the trial, more than a month later, it was his evidence that the defendant came to his house in the early afternoon on the day of the collision. She came for a general catch up, and it was his understanding (from her) that she had driven her friends to Glenelg and that she was going back to get them later. 203 It was his evidence that she had looked ‘looked quite tired, like very tired’ and he later used the word “exhausted”. He went on to say that “she looked like she hadn’t slept, if… Like she had a long day at work or something…or a really long shift or something and she’s just finished and she’s tired…”.15 It was his evidence that she did not normally look that way in the early afternoons.16 204 Although he could not remember exactly when she left, he thought that it was probably daylight. 205 In cross examination it was put to Mr Cummins that he was wrong about the defendant having come to his house on the day of the collision. There were various 15 T528-529. 16 T529. -- 30 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 29 suggestions put to him about his poor memory, including that he was a drinker at the time. Mr Cummins readily conceded that his memory was not the best given the time that had passed. 206 He acknowledged that he had not told police about the defendant’s visit to his house when he gave his first statement. He explained that he was being asked about the day in question without notice, years after the event. He acknowledged that the officer asked about the events of the day, but he said that she did not ask whether he had seen Ms Wills on that day. He answered the questions that he was asked, but also, he did not remember her visit at that time.17 He said that he continued to think after he first spoke to police, that things came back to him, and he then provided further information. That further information included various recollections about the fact and circumstances of her visit. 207 During this part of his evidence, Mr Cummins said that after the initial enquiry, but before he provided his further statements, he sat down with his parents in an attempt to try and “figure out what happened that day”.18 To be clear, I make no criticism of him for doing that. It is exactly what I would expect someone might do after being confronted with such an enquiry after such a lengthy delay. He said that this discussion helped him remember that Ms Wills was tired that day. He said that he noticed it, he asked his father because he had a vague memory and he wasn’t sure, but his father saying that he remembered that helped him confirm that memory.19 He also said that he had a “very vague” memory about her being at his house, but that after he thought it, he spoke to his father and he said what he said. 208 When challenged again on this topic, and asked if he might be wrong about her having visited, he said, “I’m pretty sure I saw her” and “I’m pretty confident about it”. 209 It was put to him that she had not talked to him about going to Glenelg to get her friends on that day, but rather on a later occasion after the collision had occurred. Mr Cummins seemed to disagree with that proposition. 210 He was also asked about having seen an article in the Advertiser Newspaper relating to Ms Wills matter. He said that he saw and read it online. He remembered the photos attached to the article and agreed that the article had an overview of the circumstances of the collision. He was asked about particular things in the article and said he just briefly read it. He acknowledged that, as a result of reading that article, he understood sleep might be an issue in the trial. He also said that he assumed it might be because she looked tired that day. He agreed that it was after he had seen this article that he provided a further statement to police about her visit and her appearance that day. 17 T552-553. 18 T542. 19 T542-543. -- 31 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 30 211 Mr Cummins acknowledged that he had told several police officers, at various stages, that he did not want to give statements, that his memory was poor, and that he did not remember anything. He accepted that it was after he had been subpoenaed to attend court, and after he had spoken to his father, that he provided some additional information, but not all. He provided more information following his meeting with the prosecution. When asked about what enabled him to do that, given his previous poor memory, he said that the prosecution “asked all the right questions, very thorough and very helpful”. Assessment of Mr Cummins 212 Mr Cummins was obviously very anxious about giving evidence. It was also clear that he would very much have preferred not to have to do so. However, having been subpoenaed, he came to court and, in my view, did his best to answer the questions that were put to him over the two days of his evidence. I did not form the view that he had any agenda in the giving of his evidence, either for or against the defendant. 213 During his evidence there were times that he did not seem to understand the questions that were being asked of him. That was particularly so in cross- examination where, oftentimes, the questions were framed as double negatives or the questions had multiple propositions. I formed the view that there were times that he answered questions, usually agreeing with propositions put, that he did not entirely understand. He seemed reluctant to say that he did not understand. He was easily confused. He often needed some time to process a question before he would answer it. However, I formed the view that he was an honest witness. The only concerns that I have about his evidence relate to reliability. 214 Although I was of the view that he may not have understood all the questions that he was asked, I am confident that I understand the effect of his evidence, and particularly his responses to the various propositions put in cross examination. 215 Much criticism was made of the witness’s evidence because of things that he did not initially say to the police. Those criticisms must be viewed in the context of the history of police contact. After a complete absence of contact by police following the collision, he is spoken to, out of the blue, years after the event. It is hardly surprising that, in those circumstances, he had little memory of the day in question. However, it is not surprising to me that, given time and thought, he would be able to remember aspects of the events of that day. And it is not surprising that, asked specific questions, he may remember more. 216 I have considered Mr Cummins’ account of a visit is seemingly consistent with the agreed facts with respect to Ms Wills mobile phone location. However, given his discussions with the defendant during the call, and the continuation of the relationship after the collision, I am unable to determine whether that consistency comes from an independent recollection of the day itself, or information acquired later. -- 32 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 31 217 While I have accepted him as a truthful witness, I have doubts about the reliability of his evidence. Having listened to him, watched him, and carefully considered the chronology and evolution of his account, I am not able to be sure if his account of the day of the collision is a result of his genuine memory, or what he has been told by his father. 218 At the end of the day, I have not relied on his evidence about her visiting on the day in question, or his evidence about her “looking tired”. MEDICAL EVIDENCE Defendant’s medical records 219 The tendered medical records come from two medical practices referred to as Unihealth Playford and Playford Family Medical Centre.20 Basis on which the notes were tendered 220 There was an objection raised at the point of tender, and discussion then followed as to the basis on which the records were received.21 The prosecution stated the limited basis of the tender as follows: They are tendered on the basis as a record of the matters that have been reported to a doctor at the Unihealth Playford clinic. Not for the truth of the matters of themselves, but that they were reported to a doctor. On that basis, they were tendered without further objection. Although counsel limited their submissions to the doctors at the Unihealth Playford Clinic, I have proceeded on the basis that they rely on reporting to other medical practitioners in the same way. 221 Mr Armstrong took me to Spence v Demasi (1988) 48 SASR 538, from 540, referring to comments about the use of tendered records. He returned to that topic and later asked me to rely on some of the reported comments of the defendant for the truth of what was said.22 I will deal with those submissions as I consider the relevant records. 222 In any event, portions of the records were relied on by both prosecution and defence in their closing addresses. What is recorded in the notes 223 Various medical practitioners who spoke with the defendant during consultations recorded what they were told. Given the purpose of such notes, I infer that care would have been taken in the questioning by the doctors, and in the recording of the information that they received. Medical practitioners necessarily rely on what they are told by patients in the course of investigations, diagnosis and 20 Exhibits P17, P18, P19, P20, P21, P22 and P24, hardcopy records: Exhibit P27, electronic copy. 21 T479-480. 22 T825-826, 873-874. -- 33 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 32 treatment. Other medical practitioners also act upon what other medical practitioners have been told. 224 I am in no way meaning to sound critical. It is not the job of medical practitioners to question or challenge the information that they are given as part of their consultations. These records are created for diagnostic and treatment purposes, not for testing the truth of the patient’s account. However, the fact that information was recorded for medical purposes does not establish the truth of what was reported. I must therefore be careful about the use I make of the material contained within those notes. Proposed use of the records 225 Ms Wilkinson submitted that the records were important in that they reflect matters reported by Ms Wills, but equally were important because of what was not reported by her. She made clear that the presence of a report by the defendant that is recorded in the notes did not establish the credibility or the reliability of the report made. She particularly made that submission given that some of the reports now relied on by counsel for Ms Wills were made more than three years after the collision, and in the context of criminal proceedings. On that basis, she submitted that the matters first reported more than three years after the collision were not sufficiently credible or reliable to support a contention that a medical condition or conditions caused an impairment of consciousness at the time of the collision in July 2020. 226 Mr Armstrong submitted that there were a number of symptoms raised by the defendant which gave rise to the reasonable possibility that a medical condition or conditions were present at the time of the collision, and impacted on the defendant’s driving. The pre-collision records 227 The earliest records of Ms Wills’ visits date back to 2013. Those records carry through until the last recorded visit in early 2024. She is seen by various General Practitioners throughout that time, though it appears that between 2016 and 2021, her usual and preferred treating GP was Dr Scott Weinstein. 228 The records establish that the defendant was someone who attended for medical treatment for a variety of complaints in the years leading up to the collision. Her common health complaints or concerns are recorded as including coughs, colds and stomach aches, pain to various parts of her body, concerns about family relationship dynamics, and enquiries about obtaining a mental health care plan. The natural inference from a consideration of the defendant’s records, including the number, the nature and timing of her visits, and what she is reported to have said, is that if she was suffering from concerns or symptoms, she was likely to raise them with a medical practitioner. -- 34 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 33 Specific medical issues recorded in the notes Chest pain and transient arrythmia 229 The defendant reported pain at the bottom of her left breast to a GP in 2014. Following examination of the painful area, the doctor recorded ‘Patient to monitor’ and ‘to come back for review if no improvement’. The next attendance is more than 6 months later for an unrelated complaint. 230 In February 2016, the defendant presented to her general practitioner with a two month history of “episodic mid-thorax CP/discomfort”. The defendant was referred for a cardiologist review. The letter of Dr Wheaton (Paediatrician and Cardiologist) sent to the GP following that review reports that the defendant’s chest pain was not cardiac in nature. Dr Wheaton reported a normal cardiovascular examination, although noted that her electrocardiogram (ECG – diagnostic tool used to extract electrical information from the heart) showed “multiple atrial ectopics”, or abnormalities in the heartbeat. 231 The notes of the GP from the follow up appointment document his confirmation of the diagnosis of costochondritis, a skeletal condition involving inflammation of the rib cage, along with transient arrhythmia (abnormality in the heartbeat). The advice to the defendant from both Dr Wheaton and Dr Weinstein was that no follow up was required with respect to either condition. I infer from the advice provided, and the absence of any recommendation for further investigation or treatment, that neither condition was regarded as requiring ongoing medical management. 232 There is no further record of arrythmia in the GP documentation prior to the collision. 233 The GP records that follow reflect that symptoms of chest pain were recurrent in July 2018 but resolved without the need for significant intervention. The defendant was referred for ECG on that occasion with the resultant findings being unremarkable. By her follow up appointment on 1 August 2018, there had been no further episodes recorded in the notes. 234 The notes reflect reporting of at least two further recurrences in January 2020. Once again, the notes seem to reflect an ECG was recommended and completed without any apparent abnormality detected or recorded. 235 Finally with respect to any mention of chest pain or arrythmia issues, a report of a visit to an exercise physiologist on 4 March 2020 records that the defendant seems to have been asked a series of health questions. The records reflect: Cardiovascular Chest Pain: N. -- 35 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 34 Dizziness 236 Dr Wheaton’s letter (P24, p258) includes that the defendant reported “dizziness” on the occasions that she experienced pain in her chest, and that she felt like her heart was racing. 237 There is no other mention of “dizziness” in the medical reports in the four years that followed prior to the collision. Fainting 238 Dr Wheaton’s letter further recorded that the defendant had said that she had “a few episodes of fainting when she has her period but not associated with chest pains”. 239 I firstly note, assuming the accuracy as to what was reported, the complaint of fainting is separate to any complaint about pain in the chest. There is no link drawn between what Dr Wheaton sees on an ECG (multiple atrial ectopics) and the symptoms Ms Wills was apparently experiencing. 240 Once again, this consultation was 4 years prior to the date of the collision. There is no other reference in the medical notes prior to the collision about episodes of fainting. Sleep 241 On 7 June 2017, in the context of arranging a mental health care plan (MHCP), it seems the defendant answered a series of questions relevant to an assessment of her mental health. The records reflect that she has reported “Normal sleep. No early morning wakening.” 242 There are the same notations, in the same context, following numerous other GP consultations, but not every occasion that there was a consult. The recording of her answers to these standard questions seems to be reflected in the notes on occasions that her mental health is recorded as the subject of discussion, as distinct from some physical ailment. I conclude, therefore, that it is recorded in that way by the GP after he asked her those questions during appointments on 10 January 2018, 28 February 2018 and 9 May 2018. 243 In the Patient Assessment section of the GP Mental Health Treatment Plan dated 21 June 2017, Dr Weinstein records the following: Sleep Loses sleep after family arguments, but is able to place events into changed perspective on the following day. Cognition [Nothing recorded in this section] 244 The only other reference to sleep in the notes prior to the collision comes from 5 February 2020. In the context of a discussion about weight and nutrition, -- 36 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 35 the records reflect answers on a number of topics. Relevantly, they include “Sleep: 6-7 hours a night”. Diet/weight and Iron deficiency 245 For completeness, I mention that the defendant’s records prior to the collision contain numerous notations about her weight and diet, and the attempts to manage both. The notes record medical practitioners counselling Ms Wills about her weight and the consequences to her general health, and various attempts to address her eating and exercise habits. 246 During repeated consultations over the years preceding the crash, there is reference in the notes blood testing with respect to iron level. There are also numerous records reflecting recommendations and prescriptions for supplementation, and indications recorded in the notes that the defendant had indicated that she was taking that supplementation. Submissions and consideration as to the pre-collision medical records 247 Prosecution submitted that, merely because a medical condition may be referred to in the notes, absent any suggestion that it could be causative of a medical episode at the relevant time, there is no evidence that it may have impacted on the defendant in that way. 248 Mr Armstrong submitted that fainting had been reported to medical practitioners prior to the collision, and that Ms Wills had been diagnosed with transient arrythmia. While maintaining the submission that other known or unknown medical conditions could have been present and impacted on Ms Wills’ driving, he highlighted those matters as being of particular significance in my assessment of whether it such conditions were a reasonably possible cause of a loss of consciousness by the defendant at the point of the final veer. 249 Mr Armstrong noted that transient arrythmia is just that: transient. Although not reported again within the notes, that is explicable by the very nature of the condition. 250 A consideration of Ms Wills records pre-dating the collision shows a lack of recorded reporting of symptoms such as those that might give rise to a concern about a sudden or unexpected loss of consciousness, or symptoms of a sleep related disorder. The record of fainting and dizziness is in a very particular context, and at a time significantly before the collision. She has clearly had ongoing, consistent and thorough medical attention between that report and the time of the collision. Those issues were not raised again in the notes and, as such, I infer not raised by the defendant with a medical practitioner. 251 Acknowledging that different doctors may have different practices as to the level of detail recorded in their notes, in my view, it is nonetheless inherently unlikely that the defendant had reported symptoms such as sleep issues or fatigue, dizziness, fainting or loss of consciousness, seizures or anything of that nature with -- 37 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 36 general practitioners, without a record of those matters appearing in the contemporaneous notes. 252 I have considered each potential issue above individually. I have also considered whether, collectively, that causes me to view that any or all or a combination of these medical conditions are such as to be a reasonably possible explanation for a loss of consciousness or impairment to the defendant’s driving at the time of the collision. 253 Considering only the pre-collision medical records, I do not regard any of the matters identified above, whether individually or collectively, as providing a reasonably possible explanation for the defendant’s driving at the time of the collision. 254 That said, the above is not the only evidence that was heard about Ms Wills’ medical condition/s. I turn now to consider her use of the oral contraceptive pill. I will then turn to the evidence of her medical condition/s and symptoms as reported after the time of the collision. I will reconsider the pre-condition medical records afresh in the context of these further matters at a later point. Use of the Levlen ED contraceptive pill before and after the collision 255 The records reflect that the defendant was prescribed the oral contraceptive pill (OCP) in February 2018 after being counselled by Dr Weinstein as to potential side effects. Having been prescribed that medication, the same doctor undertook regular check-ups in the following weeks and months. Those check-ups included blood pressure and heart checks, as well as ongoing counselling about weight management. The prescription for that medication was renewed by the GP prior to the collision. 256 There is no record of any report of negative side effect prior to the collision. 257 After the issue of a repeat prescription, there was no mention in the notes of the OCP until post collision, in September 2020. Dr Weinstein documented that the defendant’s taking of that medication was discontinued while she was in the hospital following the collision. Due to ongoing medical treatment, including anticipated surgery, and risks attendant the use of the OCP in those circumstances, discussion of resumption of the OCP was reported as being delayed at that time. 258 Counsel for Ms Wills tendered the Consumer Medicine Information summary for Levlen ED as Exhibit D26. That document lists side effects of that medication as: Common side effects: acne; nausea; stomach pain; changes in weight; headache, including migraines; mood changes, including depression; breast tenderness or pain; hair loss or hair growth. Serious side effects: Blood clots. Jaundice, you cough up blood, unexplained vaginal bleeding and breasts lumps. -- 38 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 37 259 Later in the document, under the heading “What should I know while using LEVLEN ED?” the document recommends having regular check-ups and speaks about cervical screening. Under the same heading, the Information summary recommends that the user stop taking the medicine and call their doctor if they notice any of a long list of symptoms. That list includes rapid or irregular heartbeat, sudden trouble walking, dizziness, loss of balance or coordination, loss of consciousness or fainting with or without seizure. 260 Mr Armstrong confirmed with Dr Choudhury that these were all possible side effects of taking this medication. 261 The notes record that discussion of resumption of the OCP with Dr Weinstein in December 2020, but the decision was made to await surgery given that the OCP increases the risk of post operative DVT. No prescription is recorded as having been issued at that time. There is a further record from March 2021 in which Dr Weinstein records that the defendant requests the resumption of the pill. Issue of prescription for Levlen ED is recorded and I infer that the defendant resumed use of that medication after that point. 262 Records reflect Dr Weinstein raising concerns about elevated blood pressure readings in June 2021. The notes record Ms Wills reporting that she had recommenced use of the pill after the BP measurements were taken. The notes record that Levlen ED was discontinued at this point. There is no indication in the notes that Ms Wills had experienced or reported any adverse symptoms with respect to taking the pill. Post collision records Assessment and treatment at the scene and in hospital 263 In the immediate aftermath of the collision, the defendant is treated by ambulance officers and later taken to hospital. That evidence, extracted from the agreed facts, has been mentioned earlier in these reasons. Ongoing consultations with medical practitioners at Unihealth Playford 264 Returning to the medical records of the defendant, her next attendance with the GP is with Dr Weinstein on 16 September 2020. The notes record discussion about the injuries she suffered in the collision, discontinuation of the OCP while in hospital following the collision, and a review of her mental health, particularly alive to the possibility of PTSD given the serious nature of the accident. He ordered various blood testing be undertaken. A follow up appointment was arranged and a referral made to SONDER. 265 A follow up appointment occurred on 14 October 2020. Dr Weinstein made detailed notes about the defendant’s improved mobility, ongoing wound care and risks, and increased iron supplementation in the context of reviewing the blood test results from the earlier appointment. His notes reflect “Extensive discussion about mood (stable)…” and he arranges another follow up appointment. -- 39 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 38 266 On 4 November 2020 the notes reflect an indication from the defendant that her rehabilitation is continuing and that her mood remains stable. Given the psychiatric history is again noted, I infer that Dr Weinstein checks Ms Wills’ mental health using the questionnaire that has previously been used. Consistent with pre-collision reporting by the defendant, her recorded answers include “Normal sleep. No early morning wakening.”. 267 On 16 December 2020 there is a further checkup at which her physical recovery and mental state is recorded as being discussed. There is a recommendation recorded that she does not recommence the OCP until after a planned surgery. 268 Although there are further appointments, I mention only those of relevance. 269 On 27 January 2021 the defendant saw Lisa MacGregor at the Playford Family Centre. A document called a “New Care Plan and Team Care Arrangement” was completed on that occasion. It recorded various information, presumably obtained from Ms Wills. That included her diet, her level of exercise, weight, BP and alcohol consumption. Under the heading of “Sleep” the form asks, “Any sleep conditions, e.g. sleep apnoea, insomnia…”. The form records a response of “Average hours Slept: 8-12 hrs”. 270 On 3 February 2021, Dr Weinstein sees Ms Wills again. He notes that “Care plan reviewed and discussed at length; approved and signed”. On the CP document itself, the initials “SW” appear at the bottom of each page, and a full signature appears at the end of the document in a box containing the typed words “Signature. Doctor. Dr Scott Weinstein”. Further, Dr Weinstein again records her answers to the standard mental health questions. Again, her answers are recorded as “Normal sleep. No early morning wakening…”. 271 Over the years that follow, the defendant attends at the clinic regularly for a variety of ailments, including foot swelling, immunisations (Flu), repeated appointments for treatment and then wound checks for an infected toe/nail, coughs/cold, COVID-19, gastro, a care plan review including discussion of her weight/diet on several occasions, review post collision with respect to her injuries, and for routine follow ups given the recommencement of the OCP. 272 Through the notes of these consultations to this point, there is no record of a report by the defendant of symptoms of fainting, cardiac concerns, sleep issues, or seizures. Requests for investigations Request for a MHCP and Initial Sleep Study 273 It is on 24 July 2023 that the defendant attends the GP clinic and sees Doctor Muhammad Hafizei Muhammad Nasir. Dr Nasir has worked as a GP since 2018 and became a Fellow of the Royal College of Australian General Practitioners -- 40 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 39 (RACGP) in November 2023. Ms Wills had several appointments with him prior to this appointment, mostly relating to a sore toe. 274 During the July appointment the notes reflect that the defendant requested a referral for a sleep study and MHCP. Dr Nasir recorded the reason for attendance as being “referral letter” and noted: need MHCP and sleep study referrals having court for driving matters/MVA soon, occurred in 2020 275 It was his evidence that she requested the referrals mentioned in his notes. 276 Prior to that appointment, there is no mention in Ms Wills’ medical notes of her reporting any issues with respect to sleep. There is no notation of any reporting on this occasion of fainting, blackouts, chest pain or palpitations. 277 With respect to her request for a MHCP, the defendant indicated that her court matter was causing her “anxiety and depression” and he diagnosed that it was a reactive condition given that it was, in his view, a result of the court proceedings. Given her appearance, and the information that she provided in requesting the MHCP, he did not consider it necessary to do a more thorough investigation of her mental state during that appointment. 278 Prior to that appointment, the defendant had never raised any concerns with him about her mental health. Dr Nasir made brief notes in the Mental Health Treatment Plan document but did not conduct a full mental health assessment on that occasion due to the time constraints of a regular GP appointment and his understanding of her condition. He referred her to a counsellor at the clinic. 279 A handwritten form “Focussed Psychological Strategies” apparently completed by that counsellor and dated August 2023 is on file. (Exhibit P24, p378.) There is a tick a box checklist of the form in which two specific indications are made. The notes record “stress/anxious” re mood, and “poor” re sleep. There is a further note that reads: 2020 – MVA – other person in car deceased. Charged with • aggravated driving – undue car (sic) • death by dangerous driving • trial set 23/8/23 280 With respect to the request for a sleep study, it was Dr Nasir’s evidence that Ms Wills did not speak of a medical reason why she wanted that investigation. She did not speak to him about any issues with her sleep during earlier appointments, or during this appointment, up until she was asked as part of him completing the sleep study referral. (Exhibit P24, p169) -- 41 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 40 281 Dr Nasir said his usual practice was to explain the purpose of completing the form was to assess whether someone was eligible for a home sleep study. He usually explained that there was a threshold for Medicare to cover that cost. He completed the STOP-BANG questionnaire23 and the Epworth Sleepiness Scale as part of his consultation with Ms Wills on that day. He had little recollection of his actual interaction with Ms Wills but said that she met the criteria for a study. He wrote the referral for that to occur. 282 Ms Wills scored 4 on the STOP-BANG assessment, recording a positive response to the question about snoring loudly and often feeling “tired, fatigued or sleep (sic) during daytime”. Her BMI was greater than 35 (at 42) and her neck circumference was greater than 16 inches. 283 According to the form, a score of 4 on this assessment is the minimum score required to qualify for the sleep study. 284 I reproduce the Epworth Sleepiness Scale portion of the referral with completed results: Epworth Sleepiness Scale Questionnaire For the 8 situations in the table below, how likely is the patient to doze off or fall asleep, in contrast to just feeling tired? Even if the patient has not done some of these things recently, ask them how the situations would have affected them. Use the following scale to choose the most appropriate number for each situation. (Underlining added) 0 = would never doze, 1 = slight chance of dozing, 2 = moderate chance of dozing, 3 = high chance of dozing Scenario Sitting and reading 2 Watching television 3 Sitting inactive in a public place 0 As a passenger in a car for an hour without a break 2 Lying down in the afternoon when circumstances permit 3 Sitting and talking to someone 1 Sitting quietly after lunch without alcohol 0 In a car while stopped for a few minutes at traffic 2 TOTAL SCORE (add up total responses) 13 23 STOP-BANG is the abbreviation name of the question which covers the following topics: Snore – Tired – Observed – Pressure – BMI – Age – Neck – Male. -- 42 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 41 285 Dr Nasir confirmed that he would explain the scale first before asking the patient for their numerical response. He did not explain the underlined portion to Ms Wills. He said that if asked what was meant by dozing, it was his practice to say, “are you sleepy in these scenarios”. Further, the questions are asked generally, not with reference to any particular time frame. 286 The minimum score to qualify for a sleep study is 8. 287 On 27 July 2023 Dr Nasir was sent a confirmation letter from About Sleep with respect to the planned sleep study. A document headed “Sleep Report” appears in the medical notes indicating that the study was undertaken on 6 August 2023. The reason for the study has 6 sections including witnessed apnoea’s, hypertension, diabetes, heart disease/cardiac irregularities. A ‘no’ indication was made with respect to each of these. A ‘yes’ indication was made with respect to the prompt regular loud snoring and regular fatigue and sleepiness. I make the assumption that such indications would come from the questions asked of the defendant by the person undertaking the study. Diagnosis of mild OSA 288 On 8 August 2023 a copy of the Sleep Report was received by the GP clinic which documented the results. That document (P24, p379) records “Regular fatigue or sleepiness: Yes”. That is the first mention of such symptoms before or after the collision to this point. The report further documents findings, recommendations and two conclusions, namely “mild OSA only” and “Normal sleep efficiency and architecture”. Although the document carries a generic warning as to driving at the bottom of the page, the recommendations specific to Ms Wills do not include anything with respect to driving. 289 Although a number of consultations with GPs for various other conditions follow, the records next mention a sleep issue when Ms Wills has a telehealth appointment with Dr Nasir on 18 October 2023. The notes of that appointment record discussion about a cough in the week before. Dr Nasir gave evidence that there is no note of mental health concerns, nor did the defendant raise any concern with respect to sleep at that appointment. The record of the consultation records the reason for visit as “Mild Obstructive sleep apnoea”, but Dr Nasir’s evidence was that the computer system would input that if there was a new medical diagnosis entered into the system. He took that diagnosis from the Sleep Report document. Request for further sleep study 290 Ms Wills next visit to the clinic is 26 November 2023 when she consults with Dr Rajib Chaudhuri. Dr Chaudhuri had been at the clinic as a GP since 2019, having worked as a GP since 2012. Dr Chaudhuri held qualifications from India -- 43 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 42 gained in 1997 and became a fellow of the RACGP in 2014. He had not treated Ms Wills prior to the November appointment. 291 The notes of that consultation record include: Attended with mum – requesting a Sleep apnoea study from the Hospital. Got a letter from Webster Lawyers - stating they have instructed her to have a doctor’s appointment on 19th Nov 2023. The lawyers advised to have arrange a sleep study from a govt hospital. Recent bloods done on 20/07/2023 -- Stable 292 Dr Chaudhuri’s evidence was that Ms Wills did not speak of any symptoms in relation to sleep apnoea or give any medical reason why she wanted the sleep study. His understanding was that Ms Wills was making the request given the advice of her lawyers, and that the lawyers had specified that the study should be done at a government hospital. He tried to explore symptoms but was met with a “brick wall”. He was not told about the previous study. He indicated that if he was aware of that, he would have tried to establish why another study was being sought. Dr Chaudhuri sent a referral to Respiratory Outpatient Department at the Lyell McEwin Hospital requesting the sleep study (Exhibit P20). 293 Diverting from the chronology for a moment to complete Dr Chaudhuri’s involvement with Ms Wills, the next occasion on which Dr Chaudhuri saw Ms Wills as a patient was on 1 February 2024. Ms Wills indicated that she had poor sleep due to the sleep study and was seeking a sick certificate for work. The doctor raised that she had a previous sleep study and questioned the need for him to have ordered another. He recorded that Ms Wills told him it was requested by the lawyers. Request for referrals for further investigation 294 Back to the chronological account of her appointments, she saw Dr Mohammad Imtiaz Bahar Choudhury on 13 December 2023. Dr Choudhury obtained his qualifications from Bangladesh in 2001 and became a fellow of the RACGP in September 2019. It was his evidence that the purpose of the appointment was for Ms Wills to obtain requested referrals as documented in the notes. The referral letter (P24, p188) asks a neurologist, Dr Ravindran, to see Ms Wills for: Black out and LOC . Epilepsy? 295 The referral requests specialist review and then lists current medications and past medical history, as taken from the clinic computer records. Recent pathology was also included at Dr Choudhury’s discretion. 296 Dr Choudhury did not physically examine the defendant. He prepared the referrals based on what he was told by Ms Wills. It was his evidence that he could -- 44 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 43 not remember her mentioning occasions of loss of consciousness, but that she said that “she might be losing consciousness from time to time or altered consciousness”. She gave no further detail. The defendant told him that she was suspicious that she might have epilepsy. 297 This record is the first mention of anything relating to blackout or loss of consciousness since May 2016, more than 7 years earlier when the defendant saw Dr Wheaton. This is also the first mention of epilepsy in her medical notes. 298 A further referral was made to Dr Chandratilleke, a sleep physician within the public health system. (P24, p210). Although initially indicating this was based on information provided by the defendant, in cross examination the doctor corrected that as a mistake. He said that he had no discussion about symptoms with Ms Wills. Dr Chandratilleke – Respiratory and Sleep Specialist 299 In January 2024 Dr Chandratilleke was employed by NALHN and worked at the Lyell McEwin and Modbury Hospitals. She obtained her qualifications from the University of Colombo in 2000. She became a fellow of the Royal Australian College of Physicians in 2011 and has worked since that time as a respiratory and sleep specialist, including staff specialist and consultant at the time of giving evidence. 300 She saw Ms Wills on 30 January 2024 and provided a report to the GP typed and dated the following day. (Exhibit P24, p390) She said that she asked Ms Wills about the day of the collision: (T599) Basically, she stated that she could not recall the - what happened immediately before the event, but she did indicate that she was driving. I cannot recall exactly from which location to where she was driving but she said it was not a long distance driving, she was not feeling tired or she did not recall having any concerning symptoms, but she could not recall exactly what happened just prior to the event and she only realised it after it had happened. She could not recall or give me any detail as to what happened just prior to the event. The doctor went on to confirm Ms Wills had told her that she was travelling from Glenelg on that day. Ms Wills did not remember at what point her memory stopped, but she had denied feeling unwell or sleepy. She told Dr Chandratilleke that she was driving and then was found “in a major event/collision”, but she could not remember the in between. 301 Dr Chandratilleke also asked Ms Wills about her sleep and rest prior to that day. Ms Wills did not report any concerns. There was discussion where the doctor explored excessive sleepiness and daytime tiredness. Ms Wills reported some tiredness for a prolonged period, but denied excessive sleepiness, particularly while driving. Further, there were questions asked about potential cardiac issues and no reported symptoms of such. -- 45 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 44 302 During the consultation Ms Wills reported that she had experienced intermittent episodes “where she suddenly went blank or blacked out for unclear reasons, without any warning signs”. There was one described as happening in the shower. It was Dr Chandratilleke’s understanding that these episodes had occurred prior to the collision, as well as after. Ms Wills denied having warning signs such as light-headedness, blurry vision, sweating, palpitations and chest tightness. 303 In order to establish if there was an underlying medical condition which might explain her symptoms, the doctor referred Ms Wills for an overnight sleep study and to a neurologist. The referral to a neurologist was to address the possibility of a condition such as epilepsy. Although not an expert herself, the doctor asked questions about commonly recognisable symptoms, including seizures/convulsions, incontinence or tongue bites. None were reported. It was her intention to then have a follow up appointment. Ms Wills cancelled that further appointment. 304 In cross examination, Mr Armstrong explored the topic of cardiac arrythmia (transient episode of an irregular heart rhythm). Dr Chandratilleke made clear that she was not a cardiac expert, but she considered that could be an explanation for an episode of LOC and, as such, she requested a referral to an expert. 305 Mr Armstrong sought to clarify the doctor’s recollection about the episodes of LOC over time. Dr Chandratilleke recollected more than one episode, scattered through a long period of time. 306 Mr Armstrong explored lengthy waiting times for public hospital non-urgent sleep studies at around the time of her appointments with the defendant. Dr Ravindran – Neurologist 307 Dr Ravdinran is a specialist neurologist who obtained his qualification in 1991 from the University of Adelaide and became a Fellow of the Royal Australasian College of Physicians in Neurology in 2001. 308 Ms Wills saw Dr Ravindran at his private practice on 14 February 2024. He had the information in the referral from Dr Choudhury dated 13 December 2023. (P24, p188) Following the appointment he reported back to the GP surgery by letter (P24, p392). 309 Given the passage of time, Dr Ravindran had little independent memory of the appointment itself, however he had documented in his report relevant information that the defendant provided. That included: It appears that Chantelle has experienced blackouts since her teenage years when going to high school. These all occur when she is standing and has never occurred except for the occasion of the motor vehicle accident when sitting or lying down. She will feel at other times, dizzy and lightheaded and will have to sit down and it passes. With the episodes where she loses consciousness, she will have a sense of blurred vision, things going grey and she will drop. She tells me her partner had seen this and she just simply collapses and -- 46 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 45 is not rigid or have a period of starting blankly and there is no convulsion seen. These have occurred, for instance, in a shower where she has bruised herself. He then talked about a background of daytime sleepiness. He then reported: With respect to the motor vehicle accident, this occurred in 2020 and apparently, the partner at that time with whom she was speaking on the blue tooth, remember she suddenly stopped talking and he then heard the crash. I understand the car went across the median strip and the driver of the other car passed away. Chantelle had some leg injuries following this accident. The car was written off. This is the only episode over three years ago and is only episode where she had no recollection and of any prior symptoms and she was sitting down. 310 In his evidence he spoke of “vasovagal episodes”, a fainting spell arising from low blood pressure that is a common issue in teenage women. He said that people generally can feel that it is happening, and it can be stopped by laying down to equalise the blood pressure. He went on to speak about the symptoms that Ms Wills described (blurry vision, dizziness and light headedness) as being consistent with this kind of condition. He also talked about how the body can react by an arrythmia to try and compensate with the low blood pressure. 311 In cross examination, Dr Ravindran was asked further questions about vasovagal episodes, and he confirmed that they are more common in teenage women and women in their early 20s, though normally in thinner women. He confirmed that sometimes there were warning signs before such an episode, and sometimes not. He confirmed that such episodes occur when people are standing up but rarely occurred when people are seated. He explained that is because people who are seated are more protected in terms of the pooling of blood, reiterating that it is a lot less likely to occur when seated, and most of the time only occurs when standing. 312 He talked about receiving a copy of the sleep study and making enquiries with Ms Wills about that to try and establish if sleep apnoea or narcolepsy were a possibility as a cause of LOC. 313 He was asked about the referral he suggested to a cardiologist and explained that he considered testing that a cardiologist could provide might assist with understanding the cause of Ms Wills stated issues. 314 Dr Ravindran was asked in cross examination about the possibility of an epileptic seizure on the day of the collision. He said that he could not exclude that possibility, but that he hasn’t seen it. In re-examination he was asked about the basis of that answer, and he, of course, had based it on the history from Ms Wills that she had lost consciousness previously. He said that there are three explanations for losing awareness: not enough blood to the brain, electrical activity or falling asleep. He said that he did not think that she had epilepsy, but he could not be 100% certain. However, he thought that it was “extremely unlikely”. -- 47 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 46 315 In cross examination he was asked about the frequency and timing of the LOC episodes and he could not remember what he was told, beyond what was recorded in his letter. 316 He confirmed a distinction between the partner who was said to have witnessed the “fainting” episode and the partner to whom Ms Wills was on the phone when the collision occurred. However, he said that he assumed that there were two partners. He did not ask about the timing of the shower incident. Back to the chronology of GP appointments 317 Within Exhibit P24, Ms Wills last recorded consultation with a GP dates to 28 February 2024 when she saw Dr Abdulla Al Jobair. Dr Jobair has worked as a GP for more than 30 years. He treated Ms Wills in 2019 for a wrist sprain, and then in 2022 for a cough. Request for a referral for further investigation 318 In February 2024, Ms Wills saw him for a referral to a cardiologist. He wrote a referral as requested (P24, p239), mostly based on information from the file, including a letter from Dr Ravindran (P24, 392). Dr Jobair said that he would have asked some questions to confirm information that he could see in Dr Ravindran’s letter, however he did not recall anything Ms Wills said being contrary to that letter. 319 He was further requested for a referral to a sleep physician and, again, he relied on information that he was told in preparing that referral. He had little memory of the actual consultation and what was discussed. Dr Crowhurst – Sleep specialist 320 The last document within the medical records is a letter to Dr Jobair from that sleep specialist, Dr Thomas Crowhurst, apparently following a consultation with Ms Wills on 5 March 2024. Dr Crowhurst refers to a diagnosis of Moderate OSA relating to an OASIS sleep study undertaken on 31 January 2024. There is no other record of that study within the notes. It appears that the was told by the defendant that she always felt tired since she was a teenage and feels unrefreshed in the mornings. She denied sleep attacks and said that she did not require a nap. She denies cataplexy. 321 He records that she has had two “faints” in the past few years where she became unconscious for 1 to 2 minutes after a preceding vague feeling of “funniness” in her words. 322 He indicates that he is suspicious of narcolepsy and that cardiac arrythmia requires exclusion. He requests to see her again and further asks for any correspondence from the neurologist and cardiologist. -- 48 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 47 Potential explanations for a sudden loss of consciousness at the time of the collision 323 Counsel for Ms Wills suggested several medical conditions as reasonably possible explanations for Ms Wills’ driving being involuntary at the time of the collision. It was his submission that I did not even need to be satisfied that the defendant had any of those conditions, merely that such conditions exist in the general population given the other evidence that he relied on to support a conclusion that she was unconscious at the time of the final veer. 324 The prosecution addressed on anticipated suggested possible causes of impairment with respect to epilepsy, sleep apnoea or sleepiness generally, cardiac arrythmia, fainting/vasovagal episodes, and use of the OCP. OCP 325 The prosecution submitted that it is not a reasonable possibility that taking Levlen ED led to a side effect that was causative of the collision, noting that there were no reported side effects prior to the collision, and that the lack of any such recorded report was in the context of ongoing review by the GP. 326 The medical notes indicate repeated discussions and warnings given by Dr Weinstein about potential side effects over the time from when the medication was prescribed and during discussion of re-prescription. Given that, Mr Armstrong submitted that I can infer that such side effects are not limited to the time of commencement of the medication, but could emerge at any point during its use. It was his submission that I could not discount, as a reasonable possibility, that such a side effect was impacting on the defendant, and consequently on her ability to drive, at the time of the collision. 327 I am prepared to draw the inference that the defendant was taking Levlen ED at the time of the collision. I accept that taking that medication carries a risk of known side effects, and unexpected or rare side effects, such as those listed in the Consumer Medical Information Summary, Exhibit D26. 328 As at the time of the collision, I infer from the notes that Ms Wills had been taking Levlen ED for about 2 years with no record of any reported side effect. I note that some of her medical appointments were specially following up on her health after the commencement of this medication. 329 I infer that, had Ms Wills suffered any common or serious side effect, or experienced any of the significant health incidents mentioned in the pamphlet, that she would have spoken to a doctor as per the recommendations in the Information summary, or in light of the counselling that Dr Weinstein noted that he provided over the time that the OCP was prescribed and re-prescribed to her. However, in the absence of any record of side effects reported to her GP, I conclude that there were no such effects prior to the time of the collision. -- 49 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 48 330 I note the medical records reflect that the defendant discontinued use of the OCP, on medical advice, after an elevated blood pressure result. The notes also reflect that the blood pressure reading was taken prior to the recommencement of the OCP following the collision. 331 Of course, there is a first time for everything and, as Mr Armstrong submitted, unlikely things do happen. However, even taking that into consideration, I find it inherently unlikely that any side effect affecting the defendant’s functioning would manifest only once, on the occasion of the collision, with no symptoms before or after, and despite years of usage. 332 I am satisfied that it is not a reasonable possibility that taking this medication led to any physical symptom that could have borne on the defendant and consequently her driving at the time of the collision. Epilepsy 333 As the prosecution expressed it: An epileptic seizure being causative can rise no higher than the possibility of an ordinary member of the population suffering a random loss of consciousness caused by epilepsy and that…is a possibility so remote that the evidence is intractably neutral. 334 Mr Armstrong submitted that, although an epileptic seizure may be unlikely, the possibility of one having occurred remains. He suggested that the possibility of it having occurred immediately prior to the collision was a reasonable one. 335 Ms Wills first raised the possibility of epilepsy with Dr Choudhury more than 3 years after the collision. Nothing in her medical notes to that point had raised that concern on the part of any of her treating medical practitioners. There was no indication in the notes that she had reported symptoms consistent with that condition. 336 The defendant denied any symptoms consistent with epilepsy in her consultations with Dr Chandratilleke, although the doctor said that there were people who experienced seizures in which those commonly known and understood symptoms did not manifest, hence her referral to a neurologist. 337 Dr Ravindran explored the possibility of epilepsy, but even accepting Ms Wills account of her symptoms as truthful and accurate, it was his opinion that her symptoms were more readily explicable by a vasovagal episode or an arrythmia event than epilepsy. While he could not absolutely rule out a one off epileptic seizure, it was his evidence that he considered it to be unlikely. 338 Given the lack of any reported symptom consistent with epilepsy, prior or post the collision, even allowing for the possibility of a one off seizure, I find that it is not reasonably possible that Ms Wills suffered a one off epileptic seizure at the time of the collision or immediately before. I find that it is not a reasonable possibility that such an episode was causative of, or a contributor to the collision. -- 50 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 49 Fainting/Vasovagal episode or event 339 Dr Ravindran first spoke of vasovagal episodes in his evidence. He explained that it was commonly called a fainting spell, although more accurately it was a loss of blood pressure which leads to loss of consciousness if the pressure is not equalised. His evidence was that such episodes were generally more common in young, thinner women. His evidence was that they commonly occur when the person is standing, and that it was rare that such episode would occur when a person was in a seated position. 340 It was also his evidence that cardiac arrhythmia could cause a vasovagal event. If the heart goes into an unusual rhythm and the heart doesn’t pump, insufficient blood can go to the brain and that can lead to collapse. 341 Dr Ravindran spoke of common symptoms of a vasovagal event or episode, such as dizziness, light headedness and blurred vision as being characteristic warning signs of such an episode. However, it was his evidence that such episodes can come on quickly, and as such, there may not always be recognisable warning signs. That can occur even if such warning signs had been present during earlier episodes. The records of the defendant’s accounts to Doctors Chandratilleke and Ravindran 342 The prosecution submitted that there was inconsistency in the defendant’s reporting of her symptoms. They submitted that I should find that I cannot rely on the underlying reports of symptoms by the defendant as support for the suggestion of a potential explanation for a sudden loss of consciousness being caused by a vasovagal episode or event. 343 Ms Wilkinson submitted that there were significant differences in symptoms reported to Drs Chandratilleke and Ravindran, despite the defendant’s appointments with those doctors being within weeks of each other. She also drew attention to apparent discrepancies in the account Ms Wills gave to Dr Crowhurst. She asked that the inference be drawn that Ms Wills’ reports of medical issues relating to loss of consciousness and sleepiness evolved over time, potentially informed by information obtained during earlier consultations with other practitioners. In any event, Ms Wilkinson submitted that the differences in the reported histories were such that they could not be relied on as an accurate or reliable account of the defendant’s reported symptoms. 344 Even making allowance for the brevity of the reports provided by these doctors, topics raised with the defendant at those appointments were similar. Each doctor was exploring potential causes for her reported LOC, and investigating sleepiness. While the histories recorded are not identical, the differences go beyond mere omissions of detail. There are differences in Ms Wills accounts as to the frequency of the reported LOC episodes, the timing and circumstances in which they are said to have occurred, and whether warning signs preceded them. There were also differences in what she is reported to have said about her -- 51 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 50 experience of sleepiness. These differences are significant in assessing the reliability of the history reported by the defendant. Conclusion 345 Again, I have paid careful attention to the medical records of the defendant’s reported history over the years leading up to the collision, and the years that followed to the point when investigation of potential medical explanations for the collision were raised. Ms Wills is a person who attended the doctor regularly and reported a variety of health concerns of varying types and severity. It is implausible to me that she was experiencing symptoms of blackouts or fainting in the way that she has reported after the collision, but did not mention those episodes to treating doctors at a time proximate to their occurrence. 346 For reasons that I have set out earlier as to the importance of accurate and thorough keeping of medical records for investigation, diagnostic and treatment purposes, I find that it is also implausible to think that she did report such symptoms, and that they were not recorded. 347 I further take into account that her partner of three years gave evidence about the time that they spent together during their relationship. He said that in all that time, he had never seen her pass out or faint at any stage, or heard about such an event happening. 348 Other than what is recorded in 2016, four years prior to the collision and in the specific context set out in the letter of Dr Wheaton, I simply do not accept that Ms Wills suffered the LOC events that she has subsequently reported. 349 Having reached that conclusion, I am further fortified in that view in that her recounting of symptoms has been inconsistent as between the doctors that she has spoken to during the investigations ordered since July 2023. I do not consider the differences in what she reported are likely to be explained by miscommunication or misunderstanding by the doctor, given the circumstances in which the history was being taken, the experience of the doctors, and the similarity of the enquiries that was being made by Dr Chandratilleke, Dr Ravindran and Dr Crowhurst in particular. 350 While I have found that Ms Wills’ reporting of symptoms was not consistent, and therefore not reliable as to its accuracy, I make clear that I do not reason from that finding that Ms Wills has deliberately lied, and that such lies should factor into any other aspect of my consideration of this matter. There are other potential explanations for why she may have been inconsistent in her reporting. But, for whatever reason, deliberate or otherwise, I find that her reporting of symptoms is not accurate and therefore I do not accept her account of these events as having occurred. 351 I have not been asked to engage in consciousness of guilt reasoning, and I do not do so. -- 52 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 51 Even if I did accept the defendant’s account of her symptoms 352 For the sake of the argument, even assuming the accuracy of the histories reported to the various specialists, there remained significant differences in the description of the symptoms said to precede any loss of consciousness. Even accepting the histories in the manner most favourable to the defendant, the reported episodes overwhelmingly occurred while standing with pre-warning and were of a different character to the circumstances of the collision where she was seated and said that she had no warning. 353 Even assuming her recount of symptoms to the doctors was correct, I find that it is not a reasonable possibility that a without warning vasovagal episode occurred on the evening of the collision. 354 I find the possibility of such an unexpected episode at the time of the collision to be so remote as to not be reasonably possible in all the circumstances. Cardiac issues 355 I turn to consider whether it is a reasonable possibility that the defendant suffered some other kind of cardiac event, separate to a vasovagal type of event. 356 I remind myself of the evidence of complaints of chest pain that pre-date the collision, and the diagnosis of costochondritis. I remind myself of the diagnosis of transient arrythmia prior to the collisions. Neither of those conditions were such as to warrant further treatment or investigation at the time they were symptomatic or following investigations. At the time that they were diagnosed, I note that the transient arrythmia was not considered to be related to, or causative of, any episode of fainting. 357 There is no further mention in the notes of any condition which would be indicative of a separate cardiac issue until the 2023/2024 investigations commence. Even then, that is something that is being investigated and there is no conclusive diagnosis. I have kept in mind that, by its nature, transient arrythmia is transient. 358 I find that it is not a reasonable possibility that the defendant suffered a previously undiagnosed cardiac event at the time of the collision, or that the transient arrhythmia diagnosed at 16 was impairing the defendant, and therefore her driving, at the time of the collision. 359 I have considered the reports made by the defendant to the doctors in 2023 that thereafter resulted in a referral to a cardiologist for further investigation. However, these referrals occurred in the context of an ongoing investigation into medical issues which may have impacted at the time of the collision. Those referrals were based on the descriptions of the defendant of symptoms or medical history which is inconsistent with what is recorded in her medical history. -- 53 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 52 360 For reasons I have already set out, I do not accept the reports of the medical history provided by the defendant to those doctors, as an accurate account of her symptoms and experiences. Those doctors necessarily relied on the history they were given when forming their medical opinions and recommendations. However, their diagnosis and opinions are only as good as the history that is given. To the extent that those recommendations depend upon the accuracy of that history, I do not accept them as providing support for the proposition that a cardiac event could have been causative of the collision. Sleep apnoea or falling asleep 361 Dr Chandratilleke’s evidence was that sleep apnoea is a condition where sleep is frequently interrupted at night due to upper airway obstruction, and consequently the sufferer would feel tired which could affect driving ability. 362 It is apparent that the defendant told doctors that the request for exploration of whether she suffered from this condition (or something sleep related) came from her lawyers on 24 July 2023 when the request for a sleep study was first made to Dr Nasir. The testing that followed resulted in the diagnosis of mild obstructive sleep apnoea. This was followed up, again reported to be at the request of her lawyers, with a further request for another study to Dr Chaudhuri. There is reference to a diagnosis of moderate OSA from testing in January 2024 in correspondence from Dr Crowhurst. Conclusion 363 I accept that the defendant was diagnosed with mild obstructive sleep apnoea in 2023, and moderate OSA in January 2024. However, there was no recorded mention of symptoms of that condition in the notes prior to the collision, and no recorded mention prior to the request for a sleep study in July 2023. Even then, there was no report of symptoms, just a bare request for a sleep study. 364 I accept that such request may have been prompted by the lawyers to be thorough, but equally it may have resulted from something said by the defendant. It does not help me to speculate about why they asked that the study be done. What I return to is the fact that the defendant was a person who regularly attended at the doctor for a variety of complaints, and that prior to the collision, there was no mention of any issue or concern about sleep. In fact, to the contrary, when asked about that topic she reported no issues. 365 As against that, I have the records made by a variety of doctors about what the defendant self reported at various points after July 2023. Even accepting that the defendant said those things, and that they were accurately recorded by the various medical practitioners to whom she spoke, I find that what she is later reporting does not accord with her documented history and medical complaints prior to the collision. 366 I have considered the evidence of Dr Chandratilleke that she asked Ms Wills about the day of the collision. Although Ms Wills reported that she could not -- 54 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 53 remember the collision itself, she told Dr Chandratilleke that she remembered that she had been driving and that she was not feeling tired on that day. She told her that she did not recall having any concerning symptoms prior to the collision. 367 Further, I have considered the evidence of Mr Cummins as to the defendant’s sleep and health during the period of their relationship. It was his evidence that she did snore on occasion, when in deeper sleep. Prior to the collision, the defendant had never raised having any sleeping problems with him. In the last 6 months prior to the trial, he said that she had mentioned sleep in the context of having appointments about it. 368 During the course of their relationship, he did not ever see her fall asleep unexpectedly or suddenly, though he said that she would sometimes doze off while they were playing a video game or watching a movie. He said that it would generally be after they had eaten and when they were seated or laying down, and if they were watching a boring movie. 369 In cross examination, Mr Cummins acknowledged that he had seen an article in the newspaper which referenced sleep issues and, as such, he was aware that sleep may be an issue in the trial. However, I accept that his evidence on this subject was truthful and reliable, despite having read that article. My concerns as to the reliability of his memory about whether he saw her on the day of the collision do not cause me to alter my assessment of his evidence on this topic. 370 I reject as a reasonable possibility that Ms Wills fell asleep, due to OSA or just tiredness on the day. I find that it is not a reasonable possibility that the defendant, suffering from the effects of sleep apnoea or otherwise, fell asleep unexpectedly in the moments prior to the collision. Narcolepsy 371 Although counsel for Ms Wills made no submission about narcolepsy as a potential cause of impairment at the time of the collision, I address it for completeness as it is mentioned by Dr Crowhurst at the end of the medical notes (P24, p395). 372 Dr Chandratilleke’s evidence was that narcolepsy is a condition where you are pathologically sleepy during the day and can have transient episodes of loss of muscles tone, leading to near falls or “drop attacks” known as cataplexy. Those attacks are not usually coupled with a loss of consciousness. 373 There is no evidence that Ms Wills has a diagnosis of narcolepsy. Even if I were to accept that the symptoms that she reported to Dr Chandratilleke were accurate, those symptoms are not consistent with narcolepsy. I find that there is no evidence that raises narcolepsy as a reasonably possible explanation for the cause of the collision. -- 55 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 54 Unlikely things happen 374 Mr Armstrong referred me to the authority of R v Murphy [2011] SASC 138, in particular the comments of Peek J at [40] as follows: …one must be careful where, as in the present case, the claim being made by a defendant is of an admittedly unusual nature. One must ensure that the assessment of the defendant’s evidence is not infected with an a priori assumption that the rare, and therefore “unlikely”, nature of the claim is of itself a reason to disbelieve the defendant’s claim. As an obvious example, it is well to remember that a man who asserts on oath that he had won a rich lottery may be making a claim that is statistically extremely unlikely, but he may well be telling the truth. To put it simply, unlikely things happen. 375 I have thought very carefully about that in the context of this case, and particularly in relation to the medical evidence. In line with the submissions made, I have been careful to consider reasonably possibilities, not reasonable probabilities. No medical or sleep issues impacting on the defendant at the time of the collision 376 Despite my earlier findings with respect to the pre-collision medical records, I have re-considered the totality of the records afresh. 377 I have closely considered the information recorded in the medical records of the defendant, and the chronology of the evolution of her complaints about her sleep, about blackouts, fainting or loss of consciousness, about potential epilepsy, sleep apnoea or some kind of cardiac event more than three years post collision. I have reached the conclusion that it is not a reasonable possibility that any such medical condition or resultant random medical event was impacting on the defendant at the time of the collision in July of 2020. 378 I have considered each suggested possible cause in isolation. I have also considered them collectively. Having done so, I reach the same conclusion. Forensic Disadvantage 379 Section 34CB of the Evidence Act requires directions to be given to a jury as to a forensic disadvantage suffered by the defendant where the time that has elapsed between the alleged offending and the trial has resulted in a significant forensic disadvantage. Whilst section 34CB of the Evidence Act does not require such directions in trials before a judge sitting without a jury,24 part of the provision of adequate reasons may require such directions where a significant forensic disadvantage is found to have arisen. The principles enshrined in section 34CB emanate from the common law’s recognition of the impact of delay on a defendant’s ability to test and to challenge a prosecution case, and to marshal evidence relevant to his or her defence of a criminal charge. 24 R v Bakhuis (2012) 112 SASR 536 at [57]. -- 56 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 55 380 Ms Wilkinson made the point that the trial had been listed earlier, and vacated on the application of defence twice prior to the trial running. She submitted that while the forensic decisions of defence were not known, that delay could have impacted on whether a significant forensic disadvantage has been occasioned. 381 In any event, the prosecution submitted that there had been no significant disadvantage occasioned by the delay, and that no direction was necessary. She went on to submit that the critical evidence, including the dashcam footage and the evidence of the comments made at the scene, had not been affected by the effluxion of time. 382 Counsel for the defendant argued that a number of matters were relevant to a forensic disadvantage in the circumstances of this case. I deal with the individual matters below, but Mr Armstrong urged me not to make assessments based on the mere fact that the defendant had vacated the trial on previous occasions. Absent evidence of those occasions, and evidence of what was happening in the course of the litigation at those times, I could not, and should not, draw inferences about the adjournments. 383 I agree with the submission of Mr Armstrong. To rely on the defendant’s applications to vacate, absent the context, would be unhelpful and potentially unfair. I do not do so. Doctor Scott Weinstein 384 It was an agreed fact that Dr Weinstein was not able to be located at the time of the trial. 385 It is clear from what is recorded in the medical records that Dr Weinstein was Ms Wills’ preferred GP during the period from 2016 to about February 2022. His treatment of her covered the period before and after the collision, but before any request for sleep study or other medical investigation into matters potentially impacting on the defendant at the time of the collision was made. 386 The prosecution tendered the medical records which included practice notes of his consultations with Ms Wills over that period, and were, on their face, thorough and detailed. Both parties relied on the content of those notes, and his notes in particular, in the presentation of their case. 387 Ms Wilkinson argued that while he was someone who repeatedly and regularly saw Ms Wills, it was unlikely that he would have memory of a specific consultation, or memory beyond the notes that he recorded with respect to those consultations. On the basis of the notes alone, she submitted that I could reach the conclusion that he was a diligent, careful and thorough medical practitioner who had documented matters relevant to Ms Wills’ health, and that he was careful in conducting testing to explore any potential issues. She submitted that it was speculative to consider what else he may have been able to say at trial. -- 57 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 56 388 Mr Armstrong suggested that continuity of care from a GP is an important matter, and that there could be working knowledge by Dr Weinstein that travels with the regular doctor. Having said that, Mr Armstrong then conceded that there was no evidence of things missing from the notes, but that full interpretation of the notes would be a matter assisted by his evidence. 389 Based on his notes and what they reveal of his practice of medicine, he was clearly a very diligent general practitioner who took a thorough and careful approach to following up on any symptoms of concern to Ms Wills. However, in considering all of the evidence, I have carefully borne in mind that defence have not had the ability to test what is recorded in his notes, or to have assistance in the interpretation of those notes. William Cummins 390 Mr Armstrong highlighted that Mr Cummins was not spoken to for years (nearly 5 years) until immediately prior to this trial. As such, Mr Cummins’ own evidence was that his memory was poor in relation to the events of the day, particularly with respect to his phone interaction with the defendant, and with respect to potential in person contact on or around that day. 391 Although I accept that there is oftentimes a delay of years prior to a trial, and that such delay does not necessarily equate to a significant forensic disadvantage as contemplated by the section, I have borne in mind that the delay between the time around the collision and when he was first spoken to by police has had an impact on what he was able to remember now about that time. As such, defence were not able to explore or test his evidence about the call in progress at the time of the collision, and his contact or interactions with Ms Wills around that time. Stacey Perkins 392 That Ms Perkins was not followed up by police at a time proximate to the collision was clearly an oversight. She was a potentially relevant witness. I do not speculate about what she may have said, but due to the oversight by police, she was a witness who was not prepared to co-operate by the time of the trial and was therefore not available to defence to ask about her interactions with the defendant in the immediate aftermath of the collision. I take that into account in assessing the evidence, and in assessing whether the prosecution have proved the elements of an offence beyond reasonable doubt. Officer Warren 393 Officer Warren, who attended with SC Worden, passed away between the incident and the trial. However, the state of the evidence at trial is that, although he attended the scene with SC Worden, he went to the deceased’s car while SC Worden went to the defendant’s vehicle. It would be speculative to consider that, in those circumstances, he had evidence relevant to the issues in this trial. I do not consider that his absence in the trial has caused a significant forensic disadvantage to Ms Wills. -- 58 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 57 Other potential witnesses at the scene 394 It is always the case that there may be other people present at the scene of an incident that becomes the subject of a trial, or are witness to some aspect of what happened, but who are not identified by police as part of an investigation. A fair trial is not a perfect trial. 395 It would be speculation to engage in a process of considering what other people at the scene may have seen of the collision or relevant events, let alone what they may have said about it in evidence. It would be speculative to consider that it may have assisted the defendant in the resolution of the issues in this trial. I do not consider that the inability to produce every potential person who was at the scene has caused a significant forensic disadvantage to Ms Wills. That is particularly the case given that the dashcam footage was in evidence. Road Surface on Heaslip Road 396 There were no contemporaneous photographs taken of the portion of Heaslip Road from Waterloo Corner Road to the railway crossing prior to the collision. There was evidence that parts of that road, particularly the portion proximate to the first veer, have been altered since the time of the collision. 397 Evidence was led from Mr Masters about the surface of the road at points relevant to the defence case. Photos produced of the road at that time, and defence were able to test and explore the road surface. I do not consider that the lack of crime scene photos has led to a significant forensic disadvantage. Investigation of the defendant’s phone 398 Mr Armstrong made a brief submission that there was a disadvantage to the defendant in that her phone was not seized, and that photographs taken of the phone were lost. No issue ultimately arising in the trial turned on any information that could only have been obtained from a forensic examination of the phone. Final 399 The investigation following police attendance was not perfect. Potentially significant witnesses were not spoken to proximate to the event, and the failure to conduct further investigations at the time has caused forensic disadvantage. I cannot speculate about what the results of investigations may have been, or what a witness may have been able to say. I must decide the case on the evidence that was called at trial, recognising that some of the enquiries were not made in a timely fashion, thoroughly, or at all. 400 However, in my consideration of the evidence, and whether the prosecution have proved the charge beyond reasonable doubt, I have firmly kept in mind the disadvantage to the defendant that has resulted from these matters individually, and by accumulation. -- 59 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 58 MOVEMENTS OF THE DEFENDANT’S CAR Why did the defendant veer across the road? Submissions 401 Ms Wilkinson submitted that the earlier veers show that the defendant was in control of her car throughout the drive up toward the site of the collision. She suggested that the veering, on multiple occasions, indicated that Ms Wills’ ability to drive was in some way impaired, but that the defendant actioned deliberate corrections to her course of travel which was evidence that she was alert to her impaired driving, and in a state to correct it. 402 She further suggested that there were clear indications that, whatever was impacting on her driving was such that she knew, or at least ought to have known, that it was dangerous for her to continue driving. 403 Mr Armstrong submitted that the deviations and movements of the defendant’s car were explicable by the road conditions at the points at which they occurred. First veer or deviation 404 It was Ms Wilkinson’s submission that any suggestion of the road surface being responsible for the first veer could be readily rejected. She relied on Mr Masters’ evidence that he drove along that road in a Holden vehicle at the time of the collision, and that he did so without any difficulty. She pointed out that the divot was a feature of the road prior to the veer, and that it continued after it, and that the divot had not caused Ms Wills to alter her course of driving in those sections of Heaslip Road. 405 Ms Wilkinson further submitted that the nature of the veer itself indicated that it was not caused by the divot in that the veer was not purposeful, but the correction was. And finally, she argued that, had the defendant carried on her exiting line of travel, given the position of the divot, the divot would not have impacted on Ms Wills’ vehicle. 406 Mr Armstrong submitted that it was apparent from the dashcam footage that the road became appreciably more uneven and undulating at the point at which the defendant’s car first deviated across the lane. He also referred to the divot as being present at that point. He submitted that the deviation was controlled, and that I could conclude it was deliberate driving by Ms Wills to avoid her tyres travelling over that particular section of the road. It was his submission that I could infer that Ms Wills may be familiar with the road given that she lived in the area. Period of driving between the first and second veer or deviation 407 The defendant then drove in an unremarkable manner until the point of the next veer. I note that during that period she continued to follow the truck, she navigated a bend in the road, and she applied her brakes appropriately and in -- 60 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 59 anticipation of the truck’s move to turn left off Heaslip Road. After the truck turned, Heaslip Road is then a long, straight road to the point of the collision, interrupted only by the railway crossing. From the point that the truck turned, there was minimal driver steering input required to navigate the road. 408 It was Ms Wilkinson’s submission that, given the input necessary to navigate the bend and the presence of the truck in front of her, that Ms Wills was paying more attention while driving this section of the road. 409 Mr Armstrong submitted that the defendant was clearly paying attention to the road given that she took anticipatory action by braking prior to the truck activating its own brakes. He also asked me to note that Ms Wills’ brake lights were clearly working. Second and third veer or deviation 410 Ms Wilkinson drew attention to a second veer, although less pronounced than the earlier veer, in the first six seconds of the _34F video clip. She then identified that what she called the third veer was the driving from about 30 seconds prior to the collision and extending for about 14 seconds. During that veer, the defendant’s vehicle moved completely across its lane, back and forth across the road between the middle edge and the outer edge of the road. 411 It was Ms Wilkinson’s submission that there were no road conditions to which the movement of the car could be attributed on this section of the road, specifically noting that the divot did not continue to this point. 412 She submitted that this veering in the 30 seconds or so prior to the collision was indicative of distraction or inattention on the part of Ms Wills, but again that she recognised and corrected her driving. She submitted that adding this driving to the first veer strengthened that conclusion of distraction or inattention over the entire period of driving. She submitted that as Ms Wills had deviated and corrected over several minutes prior to the collision, which made clear that she recognised her distraction or inattention but did not take steps to ameliorate it. 413 Mr Armstrong submitted that nothing should be made of the second veer in front of the petrol station. He suggested that was a minor deviation within the lane that took matters nowhere. 414 He further submitted that the movements of the defendant’s car after that point were clearly referable to a change in the road layout, namely the addition of the painted median strip in the middle of the road, and the consequent widening of the road. He suggested that such change would necessarily mean that the driver would tend towards the left hand side of the lane (away from the traffic), and that a driver would do the same as the median strip discontinued, and it would have appeared to the driver that the oncoming traffic was closer. He played the footage at the relevant points and directed my attention to various aspects of the footage relevant to this submission. -- 61 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 60 415 Ultimately, it was his submission that the movements of the defendant’s car were explicable by road conditions and changes, and that Ms Wills’ driving was in fact consistent with someone paying attention and being responsive to the road. Final veer 416 Mr Armstrong submitted that Ms Wills’ driving was impaired, other than by distraction or inattention, from the point of the railway crossing. He submitted that she had to navigate between the signs and over the crossing which indicates that she must have been paying attention to the act of driving at that point, and that the railway crossing would have caused a commonly experienced and noticeable brief change in road surface. 417 He highlighted that there were no streetlights in this section of road, and as such, the waxing and waning lights of the oncoming vehicles would have been shining towards Ms Wills, again, making it unlikely that she was distracted at that point. 418 He submitted that a movement of her car for somewhere between 4 to 6 seconds in those circumstances was such as to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that Ms Wills’ driving was not voluntary. He highlighted that Ms Winfield had time to react, as did the drivers immediately ahead and behind her. He further highlighted the lack of tyre marks consistent with pre-impact braking, and no brake light evident on the footage. He suggested that also supported a lack of consciousness on the part of Ms Wills and was not consistent with distraction or inattention. Consideration 419 I have closely considered the dashcam footage, keeping at the forefront of my mind the limitations I have mentioned earlier. However, I conclude that the veering that can be seen is not a product of some anomaly of perspective. The movement of the vehicle in the lane is clear, and I keep in mind that where perspective would be in play is in how far the car may have moved. First veer 420 I can see what Mr Armstrong is referring to on the road surface at about the point of the 70km/hr sign, and there is a superficial attraction to his submission about the cause of the first veer. However, I reject his submission that the movement of the defendant’s car at this point is as a result of her taking deliberate avoidant action. 421 Ms Wills was travelling behind the truck such that her capacity to see and react to oncoming road conditions would be limited. I note that the truck travelling immediately ahead of her did not adjust its course in any significant or noticeable way. -- 62 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 61 422 Even if she was familiar with the road such that her movement was anticipatory, when you watch the balance of the video showing the next sections of the road, the road condition does not improve. There are other areas of similar appearance (uneven and undulating) where the defendant takes no action to avoid parts of the road. 423 As to the divot, that ran along a lengthy area both before and after the area where the defendant’s car moved off out of her lane. I accept Mr Masters’ evidence that the divot may have impacted on someone driving a motorbike, but that it had no impact when driving a Holden Commodore on that road. 424 I find that the veer to the left was not a deliberate and purposeful movement by the defendant to avoid something or some part of the road. 425 Having regard to my findings concerning the defendant’s use of her phone, the pattern of subsequent veering and correction, and her comments in the aftermath of the collision, I infer that the first veer was a product of distraction or inattention occasioned by her use of the phone. The correction was a deliberate action taken after she recognised that she had drifted from her intended path of travel. Second/third veers 426 I have carefully considered the submissions made by Mr Armstrong about the movements of the defendant’s car at these points. I have carefully watched the footage, taking its limitations (particularly with respect to perspective) into account. 427 I do not accept Mr Armstrong’s submission about the layout of the road being the reason for the defendant’s adjustment of her line. While she does move to the left at the commencement of the painted median line, she veers back to the right, closer to ongoing traffic before then veering back over the right during a break in the traffic. I exclude as a reasonable possibility that the defendant was adjusting her line of travel around the median strip in the road. 428 I find that her movements were not deliberate actions on her part, but rather a product of distraction or inattention during driving on what was a long, straight stretch of road with minimal driver input required. I find that the corrections were a recognition by her that she had drifted, and a deliberate action on her part to correct her path back to the centre of her lane. 429 I have considered the movements in this section of the road described by the prosecution in isolation and I reach that conclusion. 430 I have considered these movements in the context of her whole course of driving up to the point of the collision. I reach the same conclusions. 431 Having regard to my findings concerning the defendant's use of her phone, the pattern of repeated drifting and correction, and her comments in the immediate -- 63 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 62 aftermath of the collision, I find that the veering at this point was a product of distraction or inattention resulting from her use of her mobile phone. Final veer 432 I have carefully considered the evidence, particularly the evidence of Mr Masters, Mr Armfield, Ms MacDonald, SC Worden and SC Peters, along with close analysis of the dashcam footage. 433 I have considered the final veer in the context of the earlier veers, and my earlier findings. I consider it highly unlikely that the earlier veers and the final veer were the product of separate and unrelated causes. It is improbable that the final veer was unrelated to her earlier driving in the circumstances. 434 I find that the veering and correcting prior to the fatal veer is informative as to the final veer. I find that the defendant was deviating from her course of travel along Heaslip Road because she was distracted or paying insufficient attention to the task of driving. I find that the veering at this point was a product of distraction or inattention resulting from her use of her mobile phone. 435 I find that she was aware that the distraction was impacting on her driving because she repeatedly corrected her course of travel in the lead up to the railway intersection. She took repeated, deliberate and controlled action to correct her course of travel prior to the collision, but did not take steps to address her inattention or distraction. 436 Further, I have considered the final veer in isolation from the other veers but in conjunction with the other evidence that I have accepted on the prosecution case. Having done so, I reach the conclusion that the defendant’s concentration on her driving was impaired because of distraction or inattention occasioned by the use of her phone. 437 For the reasons set out above, I have excluded any medical explanation as being a reasonably possible cause of impairment to the defendant and her driving at the time of the collision. Even had I not reached that view, having regard to my findings concerning the defendant’s use of her phone, the pattern of veering and correction, and her comments in the aftermath of the collision, I am able to exclude, as a reasonable possibility, any other explanation than distraction or inattention occasioned by use of her phone. Was the defendant’s driving at the time of the collision voluntary? Legal Principles Voluntariness 438 A presumption or inference of voluntary driving generally exists in relation to offences of this type. As King CJ observed in R v Radford (1985) 42 SASR 266 at 272: -- 64 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 63 It is a basic principle of the criminal law that a person “is not guilty of a crime if the deed which would constitute it was not done in exercise of his will to act”: Ryan v The Queen, per Barwick CJ. at p. 216. If the actions which would otherwise amount to a crime are performed automatically and are not subject to the control and direction of the will, no crime is committed. The general onus which rests upon the prosecution in a criminal case extends, of course, to establishing that the acts said to constitute the crime were performed in consequence of the exercise of the will. The law recognises a presumption of mental capacity which is efficient to establish that an accused person acted pursuant to an exercise of his will unless the presumption is displaced by evidence which leave the jury in doubt as to whether or not the actions were voluntary. The presumption does not affect the legal burden of proof which remains on the prosecution; it supplies, however, the place of evidence as to voluntariness unless displaced by actual evidence raising a reasonable doubt as to voluntariness: Bratty v. Attorney-General for Northern Ireland, per Viscount Kilmuir L.C. at p.407 and Lord Denning at p.413. (citations omitted). 439 It may be that evidence called by the defendant may have the effect of displacing such a presumption. In that event, it is for the prosecution to prove that the charged offence was a willed act, or, at common law, was done voluntarily: R v Falconer (1990) 171 CLR 30 at 40-41. The law on the area of voluntariness in offences of this kind is well settled: R v Kroon (1990) 55 SASR 476 at 477-478 (Kroon). It is well established that the question whether a vehicle is driven in a manner dangerous to the public for the purpose of the offences created by s 19a of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 must be answered by reference to an objective standard and irrespective of whether the accused intended to drive dangerously or appreciated that he was doing so: see R v Coventry(1938) 59 CLR 633 AT 637-638, 639; McBride v The Queen (1966) 115 CLR 44 at 49-50, 55; Giorgianni v The Queen (1985) 156 CLR 473 at 479, 490, 499; Cornish v The Queen (1988) 48 SASR 520. The character of the driving is tested not by reference to whether the danger to the public involved in the driving was appreciated by the accused but to whether he ought to have appreciated the danger ; or, to put it another way, whether a reasonable person in the situation of the accused would have appreciated the danger: see R v Mayne (1975) 11 SASR 583, per Bray CJ at 585; R v Duncan (1953) 11 SASR 592 at 594. Although the standard to be applied is objective in the sense defined above, it is applicable only to a voluntary act of driving. It is clear on the authorities, and on principle, that to constitute the offence, there must be a voluntary act of driving: see Coventry (supra) (at 638); R v Thompson (1975) 11 SASR 217 at 220, per Bray CJ; Giorgianni (supra) (at 499). Where the driving or apparent driving is deprived of its voluntary character by, for example, automatism or unconsciousness, the offence is not committed: see Hill v Baxter [1958] 1QB 277; Cooper v McKenna; Ex parte Cooper [1960] Qd R 406 at 415-419; R v Carter [1959] VR 105 at 112-113. 440 The cases which are concerned with the requirement of a voluntary act of driving in proof of a dangerous driving offence treat the act of dangerous driving -- 65 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 64 as indivisible; it is the voluntariness of the dangerous driving which is essential to liability. That is not to say that the accused must intend to drive dangerously, but that the accused must intend the act of driving which is assessed objectively to be dangerous. In other words, although the quality (dangerousness) of the driving is to be evaluated objectively, that driving must be intended. 441 As to the requirement of a voluntary act of driving, in Kroon at 478, King CJ elaborated that where the driving or apparent driving is deprived of its voluntary character by, for example, automatism or unconsciousness, the offence is not committed. The court held that a person who drives a vehicle while asleep is not acting in consequence of an exercise of the will and is, therefore, driving involuntary. In his analysis of this issue, King CJ, with whom Mohr J agreed, concluded that offences of causing death or harm by dangerous driving ‘clearly imply some fault on the part of the driver’: at 479. 442 In separate reasons, White J cast the requirement for proof of a voluntary act of driving as follows at 487: The word "voluntariness" correctly recognised that the Crown had to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the act of dangerous driving which was alleged to be in breach of s 19a(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 had to be a voluntary act, an act of which the driver was aware and for which he could properly be held criminally responsible. White J explicitly linked the voluntariness requirement to ‘the act of dangerous driving which was alleged to be in breach of s 19A(1)’. 443 White J provided examples of objectively dangerous driving for which a driver would not be criminally culpable for want of voluntariness or awareness: at 490. Objectively assessed dangerous driving may have resulted from a driver's sudden and unexpected loss of consciousness or from some illness of which he or she had no prior warning whatsoever; or he or she might have lost control through some structural defect in the steering or brakes of a well-kept well-serviced car. These instances of apparent dangerous driving due to circumstances beyond the control or awareness of a driver are not acts of dangerous driving within the meaning of s 19a. In my opinion, s 19a must be construed so as to include an element of personal responsibility on the part of the accused for what happened. 444 In Jiminez v The Queen (1992) 173 CLR 572 (‘Jiminez’), the High Court approved the decision in Kroon, inclusive of King CJ’s determination that dangerous driving requires a voluntary act of driving. The majority of Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ referred to and endorsed King CJ’s observation that ‘an offence such as culpable driving requires the relevant driving to have been voluntary’: at 578. The reference to ‘relevant driving’ is plain and instructive; it relates the requirement for voluntariness to the driving under consideration. 445 There is no express or implied suggestion in Kroon or Jiminez that a voluntary act of driving which is interrupted or superseded by some state of -- 66 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 65 involuntariness on the part of the driver continues to be a voluntary act. Kroon and Jiminez hold to the contrary in so far as sleep operates to deprive an act of driving of its voluntary quality. Was the defendant’s act of driving a willed and voluntary act? 446 I have considered and set out what aspects of the evidence I am prepared to rely on. I have assessed all of the evidence, including the evidence of what the defendant has said to others at various times. 447 I am satisfied that the statements made by the defendant in the immediate aftermath of the collision reflected her contemporaneous understanding of what had occurred, namely that she was on the phone to her boyfriend and considered that circumstance may have placed her in the wrong with respect to the collision. 448 I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that while she was driving on Heaslip Road, the defendant was conscious and aware, but at some points her concentration on the task of driving was impaired due to distraction or inadequate attention being paid to the task of driving. For the reasons I have set out, I am satisfied the distraction or inattention was as a result of her use of her mobile phone. 449 I am satisfied that the prosecution have proven beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant’s driving at the time of the collision was voluntary. 450 To put another way, I have excluded, as even a reasonable possibility, that the defendant suffered from a medical condition or event that caused a loss of consciousness or impairment of her cognitive functioning such as to render her driving at the time of the collision involuntary. Having found that her driving was voluntary, was her driving dangerous? Legal Principles Driving in a manner dangerous 451 I have carefully considered the helpful summary of the law set out in R v Donovon [2025] SASCA 7 at [88]-[94] to which I was taken by counsel for Ms Wills. 452 Driving is dangerous if it involves a risk of injury to other road users which exceeds the ordinary risks of the road, or the risks ordinarily associated with driving a motor vehicle and which amounts to a real danger to others Jiminez v The Queen [1992] HCA 14; (1992) 173 CLR 572 at 579; see also R v Donovan [2025] SASCA 7 at [88]- [89]. 453 Ordinary risks of the road include the risks that arise from faulty driving or a lack of care which is to be expected from time to time from the ordinary driver: Kamleh v R (1990) 51 A Crim R 435 at 437. The prosecution must show more than a lack of care and attention. The ordinary risks of driving may include a failure to exhibit due care and attention: R v Donovan [2025] SASCA 7 at [102]. -- 67 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 66 454 The relevant test has been articulated in the following way: Kamleh at 436- 7: The question is not whether the accused intended to drive, or appreciated that he was driving, in a matter dangerous to the public but whether, in the judgment of the jury, a reasonable person in the situation of the driver would have appreciated that he was driving in a matter dangerous to the public. The crime is committed by the act of driving in a manner which any reasonable person in the situation of the driver would recognise as dangerous in the sense that it involves a risk of injury to others which exceeds the ordinary risks of the road and amounts to a real danger to the public. Ordinary risks of the road include those arising from the sort of faulty driving and lack of care which must be expected, due to human frailty, from time to time, from the ordinary driver. The sort of driving which constitutes this crime is more serious than that. It is driving which a reasonable person in the situation of the driver would understand to be such as would give rise to a serious risk of injury to members of the public going beyond the ordinary risks of the road. It is driving which is therefore fit to be regarded as a serious crime. If the driving, although negligent, does not go beyond what might fairly be regarded as an ordinary risk of the road, a crime of causing death or bodily injury by dangerous driving is not committed but the driver is guilty of driving without due care or attention contrary to s 45 of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA)… 455 In considering the situation of Ms Wills, it is necessary to consider circumstances of the driving such as the time of day, the nature of the road surface, the amount of traffic on the road, the speed at which the cars were travelling, the weather conditions and the general area in which the vehicle was being driven. However, the objective test requires that I ignore the personal characteristics of Ms Wills, such as age, driving experience, eyesight or reaction times. 456 The test remains an objective one, namely, whether a reasonable person in the situation of Ms Wills would have realised that their driving involved a real danger to others. Was the defendant’s driving such that it amounts to driving in a manner dangerous? 457 I take into account the conditions in which the defendant was driving at the time of the final veer leading to the collision. She was driving on a road where the speed limit was 90km/hr and I have found that Ms Wills was travelling at between 82 and 88km/hr on that road. She was driving on a road where there was other traffic, subject to the same legal speed limit, travelling in a single lane in both directions. She was driving at a time coming into evening when there was reduced natural lighting, and no overhead street lights in the area of the collision. She was distracted or paying insufficient attention to the task of driving for a minimum of 4 seconds which led to her car travelling onto the wrong side of the road and colliding with Ms Winfield’s oncoming vehicle. 458 I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, in those circumstances, the defendant’s act of driving amounts to driving in a manner dangerous to the public, as opposed to driving without due care. -- 68 of 69 -- [2026] SADC 76 67 459 That conclusion becomes even stronger given that I have found that the earlier veers were a result of the same inattention or distraction as that impacting on the defendant at the time of the collision. And further, that she was aware of the impairment to her driving as she had earlier taken steps to correct her path of travel. 460 A reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have appreciated that to drive when so distracted or inattentive was a danger to the public. That driving posed a risk to the public over and above that ordinarily associated with the driving of a motor vehicle, acknowledging that those risks including driving that may, on occasion, include a failure to exhibit due care and attention. In my view, the defendant’s driving goes beyond that. 461 I emphasise that in reaching this conclusion, I have not had regard to the devastating consequences of the collision. Serious consequences can follow acts of driving which do not meet the high standards expected of drivers, but which are not in the legal sense, dangerous. Alternative charge 462 Having found Ms Wills guilty of the charged offence, and in doing so having considered the differences between the driving which may amount to careless driving, as opposed to dangerous driving, I do not need to consider the alternative charge. Prosecution and defence addresses 463 I have carefully considered the matters put by counsel in their closing addresses. I have dealt with their submissions throughout these reasons, and do not repeat a summary of their addresses. Conclusion 464 I find the defendant guilty of causing death by dangerous driving. -- 69 of 69 --