JENSEN v COMMUNITY HOUSING LIMITED [2026] SASCA 70

On Appeal from SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL (THE HONOURABLE DEPUTY PRESIDENT JOHNS) 2025/SCHR000065 Appellant: AINGIE JENSEN In Person Respondent: COMMUNITY HOUSING LIMITED Counsel: MR T WYLIE - Solicitor: HALL & WILLCOX Hearing Date/s: 04/06/2026 File No/s: CIV-26-001511 A SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Court of Appeal: Civil) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. JENSEN v COMMUNITY HOUSING LIMITED [2026] SASCA 70 Judgment of the Court of Appeal (The Honourable Justice S Doyle, the Honourable Justice Bleby and the Honourable Justice David) 25 June 2026 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS - SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS - STATUTORY APPEALS FROM ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES TO COURTS The applicant, Ms Jensen, is a tenant of the respondent landlord, Community Housing Limited (CHL). In August 2025, the applicant requested CHL review its process for setting her rent. CHL dismissed the applicant’s challenge. The applicant then sought a review of CHL’s decision in the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal). The Tribunal dismissed the applicant’s application. The applicant now seeks permission to appeal the Tribunal’s decision to the Court of Appeal, pursuant to s 71 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA). CHL contends that the applicant’s proposed appeal is incompetent because the decision sought to be reviewed was made by the Tribunal in response to an application by the applicant under cl 2 of Schedule 2 to the Community Housing Providers (National Law) (South Australia) Act 2013 (SA) (CHP Act), and is not appealable pursuant to cl 4(9) under that Schedule. CHL contends further that there is no arguable merit in the complaints sought to be pursued by the applicant. Held, (per the Court), refusing leave to appeal and dismissing the appeal: 1. The applicant’s proposed appeal is incompetent by reason of cl 4(9) of Schedule 2 to the CHP Act. 2. In any event, there is no reasonable merit in the applicant’s appeal. -- 1 of 15 -- Community Housing Providers (National Law) (South Australia) Act 2013 (SA) sch 2 cls 2, 4; National Rental Affordability Scheme Act 2008 (Cth); National Rental Affordability Regulations 2020 (Cth); Residential Tenancies Act 1995 (SA) s 79A; South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) ss 34, 71; South Australian Housing Trust Act 1995 (SA) s 32D(9), referred to. -- 2 of 15 -- JENSEN v COMMUNITY HOUSING LIMITED [2026] SASCA 70 Court of Appeal – Civil: S Doyle, Bleby and David JJA 1 THE COURT: The applicant, Ms Jensen, is a tenant of the respondent landlord, Community Housing Limited (CHL). Ms Jensen disputes the process by which CHL has sought periodically to increase her rent. 2 In August 2025, Ms Jensen requested that CHL review its process for setting rent. In September 2025, CHL dismissed Ms Jensen’s challenges to its process. Ms Jensen then sought a review of CHL’s decision by the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal). That review, under s 34 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) (SACAT Act), was heard by a Deputy President Member of the Tribunal. In January 2026, the member dismissed Ms Jensen’s application. 3 Ms Jensen now seeks permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal, pursuant to s 71 of the SACAT Act. CHL contends that the proposed appeal is incompetent because the decision sought to be reviewed was made by the Tribunal in response to an application by Ms Jensen under cl 2 of Schedule 2 to the Community Housing Providers (National Law) (South Australia) Act 2013 (SA) (CHP Act), and is thus not appellable under cl 4(9) of that Schedule. CHL further contends that there is no arguable merit in the complaints sought to be pursued by Ms Jensen, with the result that leave to appeal should be refused, or in the alternative, the appeal dismissed. 4 For the reasons which follow, we consider that the appeal is incompetent and so the application for leave to appeal, and the appeal, should be dismissed for that reason. However, in case a different view might be taken about this issue, we have also considered the merits of the matters sought to be pursued by Ms Jensen. In our view, they are not reasonably arguable and so we would have refused leave to appeal in any event. Background 5 Ms Jensen moved into a property on McLean Street, Elizabeth Park (the Property) on 5 April 2019. The lease agreement that she entered into with CHL on that date (the Lease) was expressed to be for a period of 12 months. 6 After the expiry of this period of 12 months, the tenancy became periodic, under cl 15 of the Lease and s 79A of the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 (SA) (RT Act). 7 The landlord under the Lease, CHL, is a registered community housing provider (CHP) under the CHP Act. 8 At the time of entry into the Lease, the Property was part of a rental assistance scheme established by the Commonwealth government called the National Rental -- 3 of 15 -- [2026] SASCA 70 The Court 2 Affordability Scheme (NRAS). The NRAS was established under the National Rental Affordability Scheme Act 2008 (Cth) and National Rental Affordability Regulations 2020 (Cth). In essence, it was a scheme that allowed for the Commonwealth and State governments to provide funding for rental properties of which approved bodies were the landlord, and where the tenant met certain criteria. It allowed those tenants to pay rent at 20 per cent below market rent. 9 The NRAS provided for a property to be a part of the scheme for up to 10 years. It applied to the Property from 17 May 2010 through to 16 May 2020. 10 At the commencement of the Lease, the market rent for the Property was determined to be $520 per fortnight, with the rent payable by Ms Jenson being 80 per cent of this, namely $416 per fortnight. 11 In January 2020, CHL wrote to Ms Jensen, informing her that NRAS funding would cease on 16 May 2020 because at that point the maximum 10-year period for which a property could be in the scheme would expire. The letter stated that the cessation of NRAS funding would not automatically result in a change in rent, that Ms Jensen continued to have all of her rights under residential tenancy laws, and that she would be required to complete a lease renewal upon the expiration of her Lease. 12 When the initial 12-month Lease expired on 4 April 2020, Ms Jensen did not vacate the Property, and it is apparent that a periodic tenancy came into effect. She was not required to complete any lease renewal or to otherwise enter into any new lease agreement. 13 CHL wrote to Ms Jenson on 15 November 2019, informing her that as a result of a review of her household income, her rent had been reduced from $416 per fortnight to $389.90 per fortnight. The rent remained at this level following the commencement of the periodic tenancy on 5 April 2020 and the cessation of NRAS funding on 16 May 2020. 14 By letter from CHL dated 30 November 2020, Ms Jensen was informed that, following a review of her household income, her rent had been increased to $404.90 per fortnight. 15 CHL subsequently wrote to Ms Jensen on a number of occasions – at approximately six-monthly intervals – about her rent, on each occasion advising her of her updated rent as a result of an income-based calculation. The most recent of these letters, in the material before this Court, was dated May 2025, advising Ms Jensen that her rent had risen to $694.40 per fortnight. The review process 16 After some correspondence with CHL raising queries about her rent, Ms Jensen sought to challenge the rent that she was being charged. In what she -- 4 of 15 -- [2026] SASCA 70 The Court 3 described as an ‘appeal’ challenging the ‘calculation of [her] rent from May 2020 to the present’, Ms Jensen made various complaints. 17 Ms Jensen’s complaint noted that the NRAS allocation for the Property had ended in May 2020, but said that she was not advised of this at the time, and that the forms she had been completing after that date in connection with her rent reviews had continued to make reference to ‘NRAS/CHL’ until the end of 2023. She queried how her rent had been calculated, and requested that it be recalculated according to the NRAS formula in cl 26 of her Lease (of essentially 80 per cent of market rent, with CPI and valuation adjustments). 18 CHL responded by letter dated 10 September 2025, stating that it had reviewed the rent for Ms Jensen’s Property between May 2020 and December 2023 and that it had been correctly calculated. CHL referred in this regard to its Rent Setting Policy, which permitted an assessment of rent of up to 30 per cent of gross income, plus 100 per cent of the Commonwealth Rent Assistance (CRA) for which the tenant was eligible. 19 On 29 September 2025, Ms Jensen brought an application to SACAT challenging CHL’s decision that her rent had been calculated correctly. In the application form, she expressed her complaint as follows: CHL have unlawfully inflated my rent by using unlawful practices and misrepresentation along with multiple systemic breaches – suspected to apply across CHL rental portfolio. My lease signed April 2019 required CPI-only increases except in specified valuation years, CHL has instead: Pegged rent at 80% of market rent, ignoring CPI obligations. Continued to classify my tenancy as ‘NRAS/CHL’ in rent reviews up to Dec 2023, but upon raising concern that NRAS methodology was not being followed CHL have claimed NRAS ended in 2020. Failed to provide proper notice of NRAS exit in 2020. Applied 25% to each income stream individually, rather than 30% of total household income. Used Valuer-General figures instead of independent licensed valuations, inflating the rent ceiling. Applied own methodology which appears to be a hybrid of other rent setting principles – which has no basis from my original lease terms. Omitted key documents from appeal providing a decision formed from incomplete and inaccurate information. As a result, my rent has been set well above what my lease and the Affordable Tenancy framework allow. I am seeking a recalculation of rent from April 2020 to the present, and a refund of all overpaid rent. -- 5 of 15 -- [2026] SASCA 70 The Court 4 As well as auditing CHL to investigate the rent setting practices as I know this is not an isolated issue. 20 Ms Jensen attached a further six-page document (which itself had further attachments) in which she elaborated upon her various complaints. 21 After receiving written submissions and other materials from the parties, and an oral hearing on 3 December 2025, Deputy President Johns dismissed Ms Jensen’s application. 22 In reasons dated 14 January 2026, Johns DP characterised Ms Jensen’s application as an application for the review under s 34 of the SACAT Act of a decision made by CHL about her rent, or the ‘rent setting’ under her tenancy. Noting that CHL was a registered provider of community housing under the CP Act, and that the decision related to the occupancy of a premises of which CHL was the landlord, Johns DP described the decision as a reviewable decision made under cl 2(1)(a) of Schedule 2 of the CHP Act. 23 Having dealt with what she described with as Question 1 in this way, Johns DP then proceeded to address three further questions in relation to the decision under review: (2) whether it complied with the law; (3) whether it had been made according to applicable policies; and (4) whether it had been made in a manner which was fair and took account of all relevant considerations. 24 In addressing Question 2, Johns DP summarised Ms Jensen’s complaints about the failure to comply with the terms of the Lease upon the cessation of the NRAS by applying a different method of assessing rent without providing her with a new tenancy agreement. Johns DP rejected this complaint. She explained that upon the fixed term of the tenancy coming to an end, in the absence of the parties entering into a fresh agreement, a periodic tenancy came into effect on the same terms and conditions under s 79A of the RTA. However, as Johns DP also explained, this did not mean that the NRAS, or any method for calculating rent under that scheme, continued to apply notwithstanding the termination of that scheme under its enabling legislation. Rather, CHL had correctly proceeded on the basis that that scheme had ceased to apply. 25 In addressing Question 3, Johns DP considered Ms Jensen’s further complaints that, in reviewing her rent, CHL did not comply with its policies in that it changed the type of her tenancy without reference to her, made inaccurate calculations and failed to rely upon independent market valuations. As Johns DP explained, CHL was required to apply both the rent setting framework for ‘affordable tenancies’ in the guidelines issued by the SA Housing Authority,1 and CHL’s own Rent Setting Policy. Johns DP accepted the evidence of the representatives of CHL that the property had been allocated an affordable tenancy when CHL became its owner, thus rejecting Ms Jensen’s complaint that there had 1 ‘Community housing rent procedure for affordable tenancies’, being Addendum 3 to the Community Housing Rent Policy. -- 6 of 15 -- [2026] SASCA 70 The Court 5 been a change in the type of the tenancy without her consent. Johns DP also found no error in the calculations of rent, noting that CHL had (favourably to Ms Jensen) calculated rent at only 25 per cent of her income (other than CRA) rather than the permissible 30 per cent. Johns DP also noted that CHL’s reliance upon valuations undertaken by the Valuer-General was in conformity with the relevant policies. Finally, Johns DP noted that even though the relevant policies did not require that CHL apply the 80 per cent of market value cap on rent, CHL had continued to do so. Johns DP was satisfied that rent had been calculated in accordance with the relevant guidelines and policy. 26 In addressing Question 4, Johns DP considered CHL’s communications with Ms Jensen, including its regular letters setting out the reviewed rent, and was satisfied that CHL had been fair in its dealings with Ms Jensen. 27 Johns DP ultimately concluded that it was appropriate to affirm the decision under review. The proposed appeal 28 Ms Jensen now seeks leave to appeal SACAT’s decision against her. She relies upon a single ground of appeal, namely that: The Tribunal erred in law in construing and applying the tenancy agreement and s 79A of the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 (SA) by concluding that expiry of [NRAS] entitled [CHL] to abandon the contractual rent-variation mechanism and apply an income-based ‘Affordable Tenancy’ methodology. 29 In the particulars provided in support of this ground, Ms Jensen advances several contentions in support of her argument that CHL contravened rent provisions under her tenancy agreement by departing from the NRAS methodology for setting rent, or in the event that it was permissible to move to an income-based methodology, in doing so without a proper valuation report or evidence. 30 As indicated at the commencement of these reasons, CHL not only opposes leave to appeal, but also contends that the appeal is incompetent by reason that the decision of SACAT is not appellable under cl 4(9) of Schedule 2 to the CHP Act. 31 In order to address CHL’s contentions, it is first necessary to set out the relevant provisions from the Lease between the parties, and from Schedule 2 to the CHP Act. The Lease 32 Clause 1 of the Lease provides that the parties are bound by the provisions of the RT Act. Clause 2 addresses rent, including both the amount of the rent and the provision for it to be varied. It relevantly provides: -- 7 of 15 -- [2026] SASCA 70 The Court 6 2. Rent (a) Amount of Rent Rent is subject to review in accordance with the terms of the South Australian Housing Trust Funding Agreement and/or the Not for Profit Housing Master Deed between the South Australian Housing Trust and Community Housing Limited and the Housing SA community housing rent policy and procedures. Market Rent for the property is $520.00 per fortnight. The mount of rent the tenant(s) pay will be $416 per fortnight and is income based. … (b) Variation of Rent Determination for Tenant(s) Pursuant to section 55.2.C(ii) and (iii) of the Retail Tenancies Act 1995 and Regulations rent will vary if: (i) If the income of the tenant(s) changes during the term of this agreement or any extensions of this agreement. Rent will vary (increase or decrease) in accordance with Housing SA and community housing rent policy and procedures. Notice of any increase or decrease in the rent payable will be given in compliance with the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 and Regulations. (ii) … 33 The Lease then sets out a number of standard terms and conditions, including provision in cl 15 for the Lease to continue after the expiration of its fixed term as a period tenancy.2 34 The Lease concludes with some provisions in cl 26 addressing the NRAS: 26 National Rent Affordability Scheme (a) The Landlord and the tenant agree that the premises are provided and let pursuant to the requirements of the National Rental Affordability Scheme (NRAS) operated by the Federal and State Governments. Certain criteria must be met and adhered to by the Landlord and the TENANT to enable the premises to remain a part of the NRAS and for both the Landlord and the tenant to received the benefit of the NRAS. … (h) The tenant acknowledges that as part of the NRAS, the Landlord has let the premises to the tenant at no more than 80% of the Market Rent for the premises. (i) The Landlord must, as long as the premises is part of the NRAS, always rent the premises to the tenant at no more than 80% of the Market Rent as determined under the NRAS. 2 Clause 21 also provides for the continuation of the Lease as a periodic tenancy. -- 8 of 15 -- [2026] SASCA 70 The Court 7 (j) The Landlord must obtain a market valuation of the rent from a licensed Valuer at the time of the premises becoming part of the NRAS, and in the fourth (4th) and seventh (7th) years that the premises is part of the NRAS. (k) On those dates, the rent is varied to 80% of the Market Rent fixed by the licensed Valuer. (l) On 30 April in the second (2nd), third (3rd), fifth (5th), sixth (6th), eighth (8th), ninth (9th) and tenth (10th) years that the premises are part of the NRAS, the rent is varied by the movement in the rental component of the Consumer Prices Index (CPI) for the City of Adelaide, for the previous calendar year. (m) If the Landlord withdraws from the NRAS, or the Landlord has been in the NRAS for ten (10) years, then the Landlord must notify the tenant in writing of either occurrence. The Landlord must then specify what Market Rent is being sought for the premises, and the Landlord and tenant may either enter into a new Residential Tenancy Agreement at that Market Rent, or the tenant may vacate the premises within 14 days after receiving the Landlord’s notice. 35 In summary, it is apparent from the provisions we have set out that the Lease contemplated that, under cl 2(b)(i), the initial rent of $416 per fortnight would be varied upon changes in the tenant’s income in accordance with the applicable Housing SA and community housing policy and procedures. However, under the NRAS provisions in cl 26, this was subject to the additional requirement that the rent must be less than 80 per cent of the Market Rent (cl 26(h) and (i)), with rent to be reviewed to 80 per cent of a market valuation in the fourth and seventh years that the Property is part of the NRAS (cl 26(j) and (k)), and by reference to movements in CPI in other years (cl 26(l)). 36 Clause 26(m) provided for a new tenancy agreement upon the expiration of the NRAS. The CHP Act 37 The CHP Act implements the National Law governing the registration, monitoring and regulation of community housing providers, as well as containing some additional provisions relevant only to South Australian community housing. It is only necessary for present purposes to refer to Schedule 2 to the National Law, which governs internal disputes. It provides: Schedule 2—Internal disputes 1—Interpretation In this Schedule— Appeal Tribunal means the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal established under the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013. 2—Application to Appeal Tribunal (1) Subject to subclause (2), an application for relief under this Schedule may be made by— -- 9 of 15 -- [2026] SASCA 70 The Court 8 (a) a tenant occupying community housing owned or managed by a registered community housing provider in relation to any of the following decisions of the community housing provider: (i) a decision that relates to an assessment of the financial or other circumstances of the tenant (including as to any question of eligibility or to terminate a benefit or concession); (ii) a decision that relates to the allocation (or reallocation) of any premises (including in relation to the transfer (or potential transfer) of the tenant to other premises); (iii) a decision that relates to the state, condition, modification or improvement of premises; (iv) a decision that relates to the calculation or imposition of any rent, levy, charge or subsidy (other than where the rent, levy, charge or subsidy arises under a tenancy agreement); (v) a decision to terminate the tenant's membership of the community housing provider (if the community housing provider has members who are tenants); (vi) any other decision that affects the person's occupation or use of premises; and (b) … (c) … (2) An application under this Schedule may not relate to a matter— (a) that may be the subject of proceedings under, or is otherwise regulated by, the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 (whether or not proceedings have been brought under that Act); or (b) that does not relate to the occupation (or potential occupation) of community housing; or (c) that is within a class of matters excluded from the operation of this clause by the regulations. (3) In addition— (a) the Appeal Tribunal may— (ii) decline to proceed (or further proceed) with an application under this Schedule if proceedings related to the subject matter of the application have been commenced in a court or tribunal constituted by law; and (b) the Appeal Tribunal may decline to hear a matter, or may suspend any hearing or consideration of a matter, under this Schedule if the Appeal Tribunal considers or is satisfied— -- 10 of 15 -- [2026] SASCA 70 The Court 9 (i) that the applicant should have sought to resolve the matter through a mediation or conciliation process; or (ii) that the applicant in the proceedings has failed to take a step relevant to the conduct or subject matter of the proceedings within a reasonable time; or (iii) that the matter is not suitable for consideration, or further consideration, by the Appeal Tribunal for some other reason. 4—Related matters (2) An application must be made within— (a) the prescribed period; or (b) such longer period as the Appeal Tribunal may allow. (3) The operation of a decision that is the subject of an application under this Schedule will be stayed pending the outcome of the proceedings unless— (a) the Appeal Tribunal, on its own initiative or on application by the registered community housing provider, determines that the decision may take effect and apply despite the application (and related proceedings) under this Schedule; or (b) the decision is within the ambit of a regulation that prescribes a class or classes of decisions that will take effect or apply despite an application (and related proceedings) under this Schedule. (8) Nothing in this Schedule derogates from the right of a person to take proceedings in a court or tribunal in relation to a matter that may be the subject of an application under this Schedule. (9) Section 71 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 does not apply to or in relation to a decision of the Appeal Tribunal under this Schedule. 38 Relevantly for present purposes, it can be seen that under cl 2(1)(a) of this Schedule, a tenant occupying community housing may bring an application to SACAT challenging a landlord’s decision in relation to the various categories of matter set out in subparagraphs (i) to (vi) of that clause. However, under cl 4(9), s 71 of the SACAT Act does not apply to a decision of SACAT under this Schedule. As will be seen, s 71 is the provision of the SACAT Act that provides a right of appeal to the Supreme Court from a decision of the Tribunal. The SACAT Act 39 Under s 34(1) of the SACAT Act, the Tribunal may be conferred with jurisdiction to review decisions by any other relevant Act. However, under s 34(6), the Tribunal must, when exercising its review jurisdiction, deal with a matter in accordance with such other Act. Further, under s 34(7), that Act may also modify -- 11 of 15 -- [2026] SASCA 70 The Court 10 the operation of the SACAT Act in relation to a matter within the Tribunal’s review jurisdiction. 40 This potential for another jurisdiction-conferring Act to modify the operation of the SACAT Act is further reflected in the appeal provision in s 71 of that Act. Section 71(1) provides for an appeal from a decision of the Tribunal to the Supreme Court or Court of Appeal (depending upon the decision maker in the Tribunal), but that is made expressly subject to ‘this section’,3 and to ‘any provision of a relevant Act as to the review of, or an appeal against, a decision of a Tribunal’. 41 Read together, it can thus be seen that cl 4 of Schedule 2 to the CHP Act operates to render inapplicable the right of appeal under s 71 of the SACAT Act in the case of any decision of the Tribunal under that Schedule. 42 This conclusion is consistent with the relevant legislative history. In particular, prior to the introduction of the SACAT Act, appeals from a decision of a community housing provider under Schedule 2 of the CHP Act lay to the Housing Appeal Panel, and there was no right of further appeal to the Supreme Court from a decision of that Panel.4 Competence of the appeal 43 Against this background, CHL’s contention that Ms Jensen’s proposed appeal is incompetent can be put quite simply. Its contention is that, as Johns DP recognised, her review was of a decision by CHL under cl 2(1)(a) of Schedule 2 to the CHP Act, such that there was no right of appeal from her decision to the Court of Appeal. 44 In our view, this contention should be accepted. It is to be acknowledged that Johns DP did not specify the subparagraph of cl 2(1)(a) within which the decision under review fell. However, as CHL argued, it fell comfortably within the category of decision contemplated by subparagraph (iv): (iv) a decision that relates to the calculation or imposition of any rent, levy, charge or subsidy (other than where the rent, levy, charge or subsidy arises under a tenancy agreement) 45 As outlined earlier, the complaints raised by Ms Jensen all go to the ‘calculation or imposition’ of the rent she has been charged. 46 In arguing against the incompetence of her appeal, Ms Jensen makes two submissions. The first is that because her dispute relates to a periodic tenancy under s 79A of the RTA, and involves a dispute as to the construction and terms of her tenancy agreement more generally, it is not (or is not confined to) a dispute about the calculation or imposition of rent for the purposes of cl 2(1)(a)(iv) of Schedule 2 to the CHP Act. This argument must be rejected. It involves an 3 And hence, subject to leave being granted under s 71(2). 4 South Australian Housing Trust Act 1995 (SA), s 32D(9). -- 12 of 15 -- [2026] SASCA 70 The Court 11 artificially broad characterisation of the complaints made by Ms Jensen. Even though she seeks to draw upon some broader principles governing the construction and operation of her tenancy agreement, there is no avoiding the proper characterisation of her complaints, both as a matter of substance and form, as complaints about the calculation or imposition of her rent and hence a complaint within the meaning of cl 2(1)(a)(iv). Her complaints do not raise any broader complaint or application under the RTA, as contemplated, for example, by cl 2(2)(a). Being confined to complaints about the applicability, construction and operation of the various rent-related provisions in her Lease, Ms Jensen’s complaints fall squarely within the cl 2(a)(iv) category of complaints related to ‘the calculation and imposition’ of her rent. 47 The second submission advanced by Ms Jensen relies upon cl 4(8) of Schedule 2. As set out earlier, this provides that nothing in the Schedule derogates from the right of a person to take proceedings in a court in relation to a matter that may be the subject of an application under that Schedule. Ms Jensen relies upon this to argue that cl 4(9) should not be read as defeating her right of appeal under s 71, because to do so would be to derogate from her right to bring proceedings in relation to her application under the Schedule. This argument must also be rejected. In circumstances where the express wording of cl 4(9) makes plain an intention to render inapplicable the appeal rights under s 71 of the SACAT Act, it cannot be that the cl 4(8) reference to proceedings was intended to include appeal proceedings under s 71 of the SACAT Act. That would be to negate entirely the express effect of cl 4(9). 48 In the circumstances, we are satisfied that Ms Jensen’s appeal is incompetent. 49 It may be that Ms Jensen could have sought judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. Indeed, it may be that cl 4(8) of Schedule 2 to the CHP Act is intended to preserve this potential avenue of relief. However, it is not necessary to dwell on this issue because, despite being provided with an opportunity to consider whether she wished to pursue this avenue, Ms Jensen declined to do so and chose to persist with her appeal, and application for permission to appeal. The proposed appeal 50 Having concluded that Ms Jensen’s proposed appeal is incompetent, it would not ordinarily be necessary for this Court to express any view about the merits of the matter. 51 However, having heard submissions about the merits of the matter, and in case there might be thought to be some doubt about the view we have taken about the competence of the appeal, it is convenient to explain why, even if the proposed appeal had been competent, we would have refused permission to appeal. Not only does the appeal not raise any issue of general principle or importance, but also, for the reasons set out below, none of Ms Jensen’s complaints are reasonably arguable. -- 13 of 15 -- [2026] SASCA 70 The Court 12 Complaints not reasonably arguable 52 At the heart of Ms Jensen’s complaints is her contention that, despite having provided her with notice of the impending cessation of NRAS funding on 16 May 2020 by letter dated January 2020, CHL never followed through, as it indicated it would in that letter, by providing her with a lease renewal upon the expiration of her Lease. She argues that, in these circumstances, the rent review provisions in cl 26 of the Lease continued to govern her Lease. In so arguing, Ms Jensen essentially challenges Johns DP’s reasoning in relation to what she referred to as Question 2. 53 Whilst it would have assisted Ms Jensen’s understanding had CHL communicated further upon the cessation of the NRAS funding, the legal position is nevertheless clear. Upon the cessation of the initial fixed term of 12 months, concluding 4 April 2020, a periodic tenancy came into effect. Whether this occurred pursuant to the terms of the lease or under s 79A of the RTA does not matter. The effect is the same. 54 Indeed, Ms Jensen appears to accept that this is what occurred. However, she argues that because the periodic tenancy must be on the same terms and conditions as her initial Lease, it follows that the NRAS provisions in cl 26 of the Lease continue to apply. 55 In our view, this involves a strained, and ultimately untenable, construction of the Lease. Clause 26 is headed ‘National Rental Affordability Scheme’, and it is apparent from the nature and terms of the provisions in that clause that they are only intended to apply for so long as the lease is subject to the NRAS. 56 It is true that cl 26(m) contemplates that upon the cessation of the NRAS, the tenant will either enter into a new agreement or vacate the premises. It may be that the concept of a new agreement is broad enough to encompass the periodic tenancy that came into effect. But even assuming, in Ms Jensen’s favour, that it is not, it does not follow from the failure to follow the procedure contemplated by cl 26(m) that the periodic tenancy somehow operates as though the NRAS was still in place. In our view, that would be to work a nonsense in circumstances where the reality is that the NRAS ceased to apply to the property from 16 May 2020. Indeed, cl 26(i), which is one of the NRAS rental provisions upon which Ms Jensen relies, is expressed as applying only ‘as long as the premises is part of the NRAS’. Further, even the rent review provisions are expressed by reference to the number of years that the premises have been part of the NRAS. It would follow that once the 10-year period of the NRAS expired, the work to be done by these provisions was also spent. 57 For these reasons, there is no reasonable merit in the matters that Ms Jensen seeks to raise by way of challenge to Johns DP’s answer to Question 2. The NRAS provisions in cl 26 have no application to Ms Jensen’s Property, and so have no role in the review or calculation of her rent. The mere fact that some of the rent review forms completed by Ms Jensen made passing reference to the Property as -- 14 of 15 -- [2026] SASCA 70 The Court 13 a “NRAS/CHL’ is of no consequence. As explained by CHL, this was just a reference to an internal classification of the Property as one to which NRAS funding had (previously) attached. It was not intended to, nor could it, change the reality that NRAS funding no longer attached to that Property. 58 In circumstances where cl 26 ceased to have application, the ongoing review of rent under Ms Jensen’s periodic tenancy was governed by cl 2(b)(i). In other words, rent fell to be reviewed in accordance with the SA Housing Authority guidelines and the CHL Rent Setting Policy identified by Johns DP. Further, having considered the matters addressed by Johns DP in the context of her answer to Question 3, there does not appear to be any reasonable basis for concluding that the rent charged by CHL from time to time was not in accordance with the guidelines and policy. As Johns DP explained, there is no reason to doubt CHL’s assurances that the Property was classified as affordable housing, and that this classification remained applicable upon the cessation of the application of the NRAS to the Property. Nor is there any reason to doubt the income-based calculations that were carried out in accordance with the guidelines and Rent Setting Policy. 59 Indeed, as Johns DP pointed out, the approach taken by CHL was in any event favourable to Ms Jensen in two respects. First, it was favourable in that was based on 25 per cent of her income, rather than the maximum 30 per cent permitted by the guidelines and Policy. Secondly, it was favourable in that CHL continued to apply a cap on the rent at 80 per cent of market valuation. Although Ms Jensen complained that the valuations used were Registrar-General valuations rather than independent market valuations, the guidelines expressly contemplated market value being determined by reference to Valuer-General estimates. Conclusion 60 For the reasons given, Ms Jensen’s application for leave to appeal and appeal must be dismissed. -- 15 of 15 --