REYNOLDS -v- BYRAM [2026] WASCA 88

[2026] WASCA 88 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA) CITATION : REYNOLDS -v- BYRAM [No 4] [2026] WASCA 88 CORAM : MITCHELL JA HALL JA ARCHER JA HEARD : 15 JUNE 2026 DELIVERED : 15 JUNE 2026 PUBLISHED : 23 JUNE 2026 FILE NO/S : CACR 23 of 2025 BETWEEN : KELLAN JOHN REYNOLDS Appellant AND WAYNE BYRAM First Respondent KRISS LOGAN Second Respondent JEFFREY OSBORNE Third Respondent KAI PANTON Fourth Respondent CHRISTOPHER PICARD Fifth Respondent -- 1 of 19 -- [2026] WASCA 88 Page 2 ON APPEAL FROM: Jurisdiction : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Coram : LEMONIS J Citation : REYNOLDS -v- WA POLICE [NO 2] [2025] WASC 10 File Number : SJA 1072 of 2023 Catchwords: Application for extension of time within which to comply with a springing order - No prejudice to appellant if extension refused Legislation: Nil Result: Application dismissed Category: B Representation: Counsel: Appellant : In person First Respondent : J D Berson Second Respondent : J D Berson Third Respondent : J D Berson Fourth Respondent : J D Berson Fifth Respondent : J D Berson Solicitors: Appellant : In person First Respondent : State Solicitor's Office (WA) Second Respondent : State Solicitor's Office (WA) Third Respondent : State Solicitor's Office (WA) -- 2 of 19 -- [2026] WASCA 88 Page 3 Fourth Respondent : State Solicitor's Office (WA) Fifth Respondent : State Solicitor's Office (WA) Case(s) referred to in decision(s): A v C [No 2] [2015] WASCA 199 Reynolds v Byram [2025] WASCA 59 Reynolds v WA Police [No 2] [2025] WASC 10 Watson v Vos [2019] WASC 327 -- 3 of 19 -- [2026] WASCA 88 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 4 REASONS OF THE COURT: Introduction 1 On 24 February 2025, the appellant filed a notice of appeal against the orders made by Lemonis J in a single judge appeal from the Magistrates Court. On 23 June 2025, this court made a self-executing (springing) order. It ordered that, unless the appellant filed an appellant's case that complied with the Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA) (Court of Appeal Rules) by 4.00 pm on 8 July 2025, the appeal would be dismissed. The appellant did not file a compliant appellant's case by that deadline (or at all). 2 The appellant seeks, among other things, an extension of time within which to comply with the springing order. At a hearing on 15 June 2026, we ordered that the application be dismissed. We said that we would publish written reasons for making that order later. These are our reasons. Primary appeal proceedings 3 The primary appeal proceedings were commenced on 7 August 2023. In those proceedings, the appellant appealed against his convictions in the Magistrates Court for three offences: two breach of bail offences (charges AL 2150/2021 and AL 682/2022) and one offence of breaching a family violence restraining order (charge AL 2097/2021).1 The learned primary judge set aside each conviction. His Honour substituted a judgment of acquittal on charge AL 2150/2021, and ordered that the other two charges be remitted to the Magistrates Court at Albany to be tried before a different magistrate. His Honour also ordered that:2 [the remittal orders were] without prejudice to the appellant's right to apply in the Magistrates Court for the trial to be held at Perth Magistrates Court, and also without prejudice to the appellant's right to apply in the Magistrates Court for recusal of a particular magistrate on the ground of apprehended or actual bias. The appellant have liberty to apply to seek an order for reimbursement of the monies forfeited in respect of the bail undertaking the subject of charge [AL] 2150/2021. 1 Reynolds v WA Police [No 2] [2025] WASC 10 [5] - [13]. 2 Orders made 4 February 2025 in SJA 1072 of 2023 (Lemonis J Orders). -- 4 of 19 -- [2026] WASCA 88 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 5 4 As will be discussed below, it is difficult to see how the appellant could have achieved a better result on appeal than he achieved before the learned primary judge. The application for an extension of time and other applications 5 The appellant's application for an extension of time is dated 14 November 2025, as is his affidavit in support of that application. Both documents were accepted for filing on 4 December 2025. 6 The appellant lodged with his application the document he proposed to file as the appellant's case, if given an extension of time in which to do so. The proposed appellant's case is not compliant with the Court of Appeal Rules. Ordinarily, this court would not grant an extension of time to comply with a springing order unless and until the appellant provided a proposed appellant's case that was compliant with the Court of Appeal Rules. In some cases where this is not done, the court may indicate a preparedness to reconsider a further extension application which is accompanied by a compliant appellant's case. However, to adopt such an approach in this case would simply postpone the inevitable. Even if the appellant did ultimately produce a proposed appellant's case that was compliant with the Court of Appeal Rules, we would not grant him an extension of time, having regard to the circumstances discussed below. 7 In addition to the application for an extension of time, the appellant attempted to file a further application in an appeal dated 17 March 2026 and supporting affidavit sworn 18 March 2026 seeking case-management orders in respect of the subject proceedings and the proceedings in CACV 17 of 2026. Vaughan JA made orders on 20 March 2026 that the question of whether those documents would be accepted for filing be heard by the coram hearing the appellant's extension of time application on 15 June 2026. In addition, a corresponding application in CACV 17 of 2026 was listed for mention at the same hearing. 8 On 4 June 2026, the appellant attempted to file yet another application in an appeal and supporting affidavit in each of CACR 23 of 2025 and CACV 17 of 2026, seeking, among other things, documentation from the prosecution, police, Magistrates Court and Family Court concerning restraining order proceedings designated MC/CIV/ALB/RO/84/2021 (Restraining Order Proceedings) and related alleged breach of bail proceedings. Mitchell and Archer JJA made orders on 8 June 2026 that the question of whether those -- 5 of 19 -- [2026] WASCA 88 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 6 documents would be accepted for filing be heard by the coram hearing the appellant's extension of time application on 15 June 2026. The hearing on 15 June 2026 9 A registrar's notice to attend dated 5 March 2026, sent to the email address provided by the appellant on his filed court documents, gave the parties notice that the appellant's extension application would be heard on 15 June 2026 at 10.30 am, or as soon after then as possible. Another civil appeal instituted by the appellant, involving a different respondent, was listed at the same time. On 12 June 2026, the Court of Appeal office advised the appellant that the start time of the hearing of the civil appeal had been changed administratively, and the hearing would not commence at not before 11.00 am on 15 June 2026. The appellant was not advised of any change to the listed hearing time of his extension application in the present appeal. 10 When the hearing in the present appeal commenced shortly after 10.30 am on 15 June 2026, there was no appearance by the appellant. Satisfied that the appellant had been given notice of the hearing, the court decided to determine the extension application on the written material filed by the appellant. The court then made the orders referred to at [71] below, and said that written reasons would be published later. 11 When the civil appeal was called on at 11.00 am, the appellant was present. He indicated that he had misunderstood the email sent to him on 12 June 2026 as indicating that the hearing time for both appeals had been moved to 11.00 am on 15 June 2026. 12 By that time, the orders had been made but not extracted and counsel for the respondents had departed. We decided to recall the present appeal and hear any oral submissions which the appellant wished to advance in support of his extension application. We heard from the appellant in the absence of the respondents on the basis that, if we were of the view that we might alter the orders we had made after hearing the appellant's oral submissions, there may be a need to adjourn so the respondents could be given an opportunity to respond to them. 13 After hearing the appellant's oral submissions, we remained of the view that the orders we had previously made were appropriate for the reasons set out below. We did not make any further order in the present appeal. -- 6 of 19 -- [2026] WASCA 88 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 7 General principles in relation to extensions of time 14 The principles governing the determination of an application to extend time for compliance with a springing order were summarised by this court in A v C [No 2],3 in the following terms: It has often been pointed out that the failure by a party to comply with a springing order is an egregious breach. A springing order is intended to be the last opportunity afforded to the party to put its case in order. The proper administration of justice, and the quality of justice for the other party, generally requires that it be just that, its last opportunity. … There is, however, a discretion to extend the time for compliance with a springing order and while no hard and fast rules can be laid down as to the matters to which the Court should have regard in the exercise of that discretion, the Court will normally have regard to at least the following matters: (1) the circumstances in which the springing order came to be made; (2) the reason for non-compliance with the springing order; (3) the prejudice to the defaulting party if the time were not extended; and (4) the prejudice to the other party if the time were extended. It will also normally be a relevant consideration whether or not the defaulting party has a reasonably arguable case on the merits, there being no point in resuscitating a case that is devoid of merit. However, the fact that a party has an apparently meritorious case cannot be permitted effectively to insulate it from the consequences of a failure to comply with a peremptory order of the Court[.] (citations omitted) Relevant factors The circumstances in which the springing order came to be made 15 Following the filing of the notice of appeal, the Court of Appeal Rules required that the appellant's case be filed by 21 April 2025. It was not filed by that date. The court then ordered the appellant to file his appellant's case on 7 May 2025 and, by later order, by 14 May 2025. On each occasion the appellant failed to comply. 3 A v C [No 2] [2015] WASCA 199 [2] - [4]. -- 7 of 19 -- [2026] WASCA 88 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 8 16 On 16 May 2025, the appellant attempted to file a document purporting to be an appellant's case. It was not accepted for filing as it failed to comply with the Court of Appeal Rules. 17 On 27 May 2025, 13 days after the extended time by which the appellant was required to file his appellant's case, he filed an application and supporting affidavit seeking a further 60-day extension of time. The court granted the appellant a two-week extension of time, such that he was required to file the appellant's case by 4.00 pm on 13 June 2025. 18 On 17 June 2025, the appellant attempted to file, by way of eight separate emails and attachments, a bundle of documents comprising 1,892 pages, which purported be the appellant's case. The documents were not accepted for filing as they again did not comply with the Court of Appeal Rules. On 23 June 2025, the court made the springing order. 19 On 3 July 2025, the appellant attempted to file several documents with the court as an appellant's case, but again the documents did not comply with the Court of Appeal Rules. 20 As the appellant did not file an appellant's case that was compliant with the Court of Appeal Rules by 4.00 pm on 8 July 2025, the Acting Registrar issued a Certificate of Conclusion of Criminal Appeal on 8 July 2025. The reason for non-compliance with the springing order 21 From the appellant's affidavit in support of the application for an extension of time (Supporting Affidavit), the appellant's explanation for the delay in filing a compliant appellant's case appears to be that: (a) he is self-represented, and the requirements are technical and difficult for a lay person to perfect without legal assistance, and he misunderstood aspects of the form and the formatting required by the springing order; (b) notwithstanding (a), he has proceeded in good faith, acted promptly and diligently; and (c) he filed an appellant's case on 8 July 2025 at 4.28 pm, 28 minutes after the deadline. 22 The appellant's explanation for the delay is inadequate. -- 8 of 19 -- [2026] WASCA 88 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 9 23 While we accept that it may be difficult for a self-represented litigant to understand what the Court of Appeal Rules require, the appellant was given repeated, considerable, and targeted assistance. 24 Further, while the appellant did seek to file an appellant's case on 8 July 2025 shortly after the deadline, it was not compliant with the Court of Appeal Rules. 25 Each of these matters is discussed below. The appellant was told how to create a compliant appellant's case 26 Upon the institution of the appeal, the appellant was sent correspondence directing him to the relevant Court of Appeal Rules stipulating what constitutes a compliant appellant's case, and was provided with a copy of the court's self-represented litigants' information kit (Self-Representation Kit). 27 The Self-Representation Kit provides detailed information about the 'Steps in an Appeal', including that an appellant must file and serve an appellant's case which is compliant with Court of Appeal Rule 32 within 8 weeks of filing an appeal notice. The Kit provides an excerpt of the Court of Appeal Rules, including setting out all of r 32 (other than r 32(4)(g), which is not material to this appeal). 28 Rule 32 details what an appellant's case is, what documents it is comprised of, and what each of those documents must address. 29 Further, by letter dated 4 July 2025, the Acting Registrar gave a comprehensive explanation to the appellant as to why the documents he had sought to lodge on 3 July 2025 were not compliant with the Court of Appeal Rules, and provided detailed directions to assist the appellant in addressing the documents' defects and in preparing a compliant appellant's case, including stating as follows: The Appellant's Case must be prepared in accordance with Rule 32 of the [Court of Appeal] Rules consisting of a Form 7 to which you must attach the following six documents titled: i. Appellant's grounds of appeal; ii. Appellant' submissions; iii. Appellant's legal authorities; iv. Orders wanted; -- 9 of 19 -- [2026] WASCA 88 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 10 v. Draft chronology; and vi. Draft appeal book indexes. … The grounds of appeal document must state the grounds of appeal, and concise particulars of them, succinctly in numbered paragraphs. The grounds must not contain submissions and must be contained in one document. … A document titled 'Appellant's submissions' must be included which contains your written submissions (or argument) for each ground of appeal in separately numbered paragraphs. The submissions must: (i) contain headings which identify (by number) the grounds of appeal to which they relate; (ii) be no more than 20 pages long; and (iii) include your signature and below it your printed name. … To assist you in preparing a compliant appellant's case, an additional copy of the Court's [Self-Representation Kit] is attached. 30 Notwithstanding this assistance, the appellant failed to file an appellant's case which complied with the Court of Appeal Rules by the deadline specified in the springing order. The document sought to be filed at 4.28 pm on 8 July 2025 was not compliant 31 The document the appellant sought to file on 8 July 2025 at 4.28 pm, 28 minutes after the springing order deadline (8 July document), was not compliant with the Court of Appeal Rules. 32 Rule 32(4) relevantly provides that the 'Appellant's grounds of appeal': (b) must state the grounds, and concise particulars of them, succinctly in numbered paragraphs; and (c) must, for any ground that alleges an error by the primary court, state whether it is - (i) an error of fact; or (ii) an error of law; or (iii) an error of mixed fact and law; -- 10 of 19 -- [2026] WASCA 88 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 11 and (d) must, for any ground that alleges an error by the primary court, identify by reference to the paragraph number or page number of the reasons for the primary court's decision, each passage where each such error is alleged to occur[.] 33 The grounds set out in the 8 July document do not meet these requirements. By way of example, 'ground 1' of the 8 July document is: (1) APPELLANTS GROUNDS OF APPEAL - ERRORS OF LAW AND MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE (1.1) The Appellant relies [on] these identified grounds of appeal, each disclosing serious error of law and jurisdiction by the trial judge, Justice Lemonis. These grounds are supported by constitutional authority, statute, affidavit evidence, and transcript material. The appeal challenges both the legality and legitimacy of the original Family Violence Restraining Order (FVRO), and the cascade of judicial and administrative decisions that followed. (1.2) The categories of error are as follows: Constitutional Breaches: The trial judge - Justice lemoins [sic] failed to determine constitutional issues properly raised under ss 80, 92, 116 and 117 of the Constitution (Annexure Tl) HEARING 15 August 2024 page 61 - 76, lines 19 - 711. The Appellant was denied trial by jury, extract of proceedings dated 4 February 2025 (Annexure T3), Page 3 Line 36 - 40 an error of law nd [sic] of fact by Justice Lemonis as Fraud on the record changes the matter from a simple offence to a significant criminal matter, and therefor [sic] subjected the Appellant to interstate discrimination, and denied procedural rights protected under the federal compact. Notices under section 78B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) were filed and ignored. (1.3) Jurisdictional Failure: Justice Lemonis proceedings proceeded without proof of jurisdictional fact. The FVRO was issued without evidence of violence or risk, contrary to section 10D of the Restraining Orders Act 1997 (WA) (Affidavit filed 16 April 2024, paras 8 and 35, Tl transcript p.80), and was used to support arrest, prosecution, and detention without lawful authority the extract of proceedings dated 4 February 2025 (Annexure T3) all pages fail to address such issued raised and the raising of the Constitutional matter. (1.4) Denial of Procedural Fairness: Justice Lemonis errored [sic] in law and fact by failing to recognise the Appellant was excluded from the first hearing of the FVRO, falsely recorded as absent, denied access to evidence, and summarily convicted despite appearances and objections on the record. Constitutional and statutory arguments were raised and disregarded without reasons, a miscarriage of justice. (1.5) Constructive Fraud and Abuse of Process: Justice Lemonis erred in law and fact by [making] Orders based on unsigned, unsealed, or falsified -- 11 of 19 -- [2026] WASCA 88 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 12 documents (Five witness affidavits, Tl transcript p.71, annexure pages 43 - 54) hearing on the 15 August 2024 (Annexure Tl) page 71, lines 469 - 474, amounts to fraud on the record (Reynolds v Nonkovic [2023] WASC 326 at [34] - [42]), undermining procedural fairness. (l.6) Registry interference: Justice Lemonis errored [sic] in law and fact by denial of executor status (Conditional appearance dated 10 January 2025) further undermined the legality of the proceedings. Property was seized and bail forfeited through processes tainted by fraud and deception, in breach of sections 409, 540 and 558 of the Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 (WA). (1.7) Failure to Determine Status and Standing: The Respondents' legal standing and authority were challenged and not proven. Justice Lemonis failed to make findings on the lawfulness of appearances, contrary to settled High Court authority that legal status must be lawfully established and not assumed (Re Culleton (No 2) (2017) 263 CLR 196 at [21]). (1.8) The Magistrate issued the FVRO absent jurisdictional fact, Justice Lominis [sic] erred in law and fact by relying on ideological grounds rather than statutory criteria, in breach of Kelly v Fiander (1987) WAR 169, Pirrie v McFarlane (1925) 36 CLR 170, and the fundamental constitutional principle in the Communist Party Case (1951) 83 CLR 1 that legal limits are determined by law, not mere assertion of power. (1.9) The cumulative impact of these errors constitutes a miscarriage of justice of the highest order. The proceedings below were void ab initio and all resulting orders must be set aside. The Appellant seeks final relief as set out in this volume. (1.8) Moral Code and Constitutional Foundations (Error of Law and Miscarriage of Justice) The Preamble to the Commonwealth Constitution recognises that the people are 'humbly relying on the blessing of Almighty God.' This forms the moral foundation upon which judicial power must operate (Pell v The Queen (2020) 268 CLR 123 at [50]). (1.10) The King James Bible 1611 (Authorised Version) is the foundational moral code of the Commonwealth, undergirding common law, judicial oaths, and constitutional integrity. Its exclusion from judicial consideration constitutes constructive fraud, denying the Appellant's inherent rights derived from divine and constitutional authority. 34 Rule 32(5) relevantly requires that the 'Appellant's submissions': (a) must, for each ground of appeal, contain the appellant's written submissions (or argument) expressed so as to convey the substance of them clearly and as succinctly as possible[.] -- 12 of 19 -- [2026] WASCA 88 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 13 35 The submissions set out in the 8 July document do not meet those requirements. By way of example, the submissions on the alleged 'constitutional breaches' in ground 1 of the 8 July document state: (4) 1 - CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR: DENIAL OF RIGHTS AND ABUSE OF PROCESS Sedition and Executive Override of Judicial Independence (Error of Law and Fact) Permitting acts amounting to sedition by facilitating the undermining of constitutional order and the Appellant's allegiance to the rule of law under s 44 Criminal Code WA constitutes an error of law (Kable v DPP (NSW) (1996) 189 CLR 51). (4.l) The Appellant's constitutional rights were denied throughout the proceedings. These included: • Section 80: Right to trial by jury for indictable offences; • Section 92 [Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360 at 393 - 394]: Freedom of intercourse, interstate movement, and trade; • Section 116: Freedom of religious conscience; 116), and • Section 117: Protection against discrimination based on State residence. (4.2) Justice Lemonis erred in law by failing to determine or make findings on these constitutional objections, despite clear notice (Annexure Tl) page 61 - 76, lines 19 - 711 and supporting affidavit material (Annexure A3, A4, A5). The Appellant was excluded from proceedings (Annexure T7, T8), labelled as absent when present, denied procedural fairness, and subjected to coercive orders without lawful trial. [Reynolds v Nonkovic [2023] WASC 326 at [34] - [42]]. (4.3) Further, prosecution based on an invalid FVRO issued without jurisdictional fact constituted an abuse of process, rendering the proceedings oppressive and unjust. As held in Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 at [526] - [529], where proceedings are brought for an improper purpose, or based on invalid foundations, they warrant permanent stay or dismissal to protect the integrity of judicial process. (4.4) These constitutional breaches and the abuse of process vitiate the proceedings as a whole and amount to jurisdictional error. References: Notice of Constitutional Matter (Annexure Tl); Affidavit filed in support of Appeal SJA 1072 of [2023] (Annexure A3, A4, A5); Transcript 15 August 2024, pp. 2 - 5; Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 at [526] - [529]. -- 13 of 19 -- [2026] WASCA 88 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 14 Prejudice to the appellant? 36 It is difficult to see how the appellant would be prejudiced if an extension of time is refused. 37 If an extension of time is refused, the appellant will lose the opportunity to challenge the orders of the learned primary judge. However, the appellant was successful in his appeal to the primary judge. The convictions on all three charges were set aside. An acquittal was entered in respect of one of the breach of bail charges. The other charges were remitted to the Magistrates Court to be dealt with in the ordinary course. 38 As we have observed, the appellant seemed to have achieved all that he could have reasonably expected to achieve in bringing the single judge appeal. The only better outcome that could have been achieved would have been orders for acquittal in respect of the two remitted charges, but, as the learned primary judge pointed out, the merits of those matters had not yet been determined. The appropriate forum for those merits to be dealt with was the Magistrates Court. The appellant would have had the opportunity to raise a defence to the charges in that court, if he had one.4 39 Further, since the learned primary judge's decision, both charge AL 682/2022 and charge AL 2097/2021 have been dismissed. 40 In his Supporting Affidavit,5 the appellant says that he faces 'parallel exposure', being 'ongoing exposure in related files on the same predicate'. He refers to a breach of bail trial allocation date of 12 December 2025 and a breach of a family violence restraining order trial in March 2026. Assuming these relate to the two charges remitted by the learned primary judge, both of those charges have, as already mentioned, since been dismissed. 41 The appellant further refers to 'consequential administrative effect (context only)'.6 He refers to administrative steps that followed his conviction on the family violence restraining order charge in relation to firearms seizure and licensing, and bail money.7 As that conviction was set aside by the learned primary judge, dismissing his application for an extension of time will not have any impact on those matters. 4 Reynolds v Byram [2025] WASCA 59 [5], [13] and [16]. 5 Supporting Affidavit [10]. 6 Supporting Affidavit [11]. 7 Supporting Affidavit [11]. -- 14 of 19 -- [2026] WASCA 88 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 15 42 Finally, the appellant refers to having served s 78B notices under the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and receiving acknowledgement from the recipients that the notices had been received.8 This does not establish that he would suffer any prejudice if an extension of time is refused. Prejudice to the respondents? 43 There is no evidence of specific prejudice that would be suffered by the respondents if an extension is granted. There is, however, a strong public interest in the timely disposition of criminal appeals. Is there any merit in the proposed grounds? 44 There is no merit in any of the proposed grounds of appeal. 45 It is not entirely clear what the appellant seeks to contend in proposed ground 1. Proposed ground 1 is titled 'Inadequate reasons/failure to determine material grounds (error of law)' and states:9 The court below did not adequately engage with, or determine, the appellant's material grounds (including the s 11/s 12 threshold point, record-integrity, and procedural fairness), amounting to error. 46 The submissions in support of this ground state only:10 The court below did not determine the appellant's material grounds (threshold under s 11; s 12 sequencing; record-integrity; procedural fairness), constituting appealable error. 47 Having reviewed the appellant's submissions in the primary proceedings, the appellant appears to challenge the approach taken, and the findings made, by a magistrate in a hearing on 29 October 2021.11 Charge AL 2097/2021, which is the only charge that related to a restraining order, alleged a breach on 6 October 202112 of an interim restraining order made in the Restraining Order Proceedings on 9 April 2021 and served on the appellant on 10 April 2021.13 The hearing on 29 October 2021 was to determine whether a final restraining order should be made. Any errors made by the magistrate in that hearing 8 Supporting Affidavit [12]. 9 See the final annexure to the Supporting Affidavit titled 'Appellant's Case (Draft - for Springing-Order Compliance)' (Proposed Appellant's Case). 10 Proposed Appellant's Case, Part E, E1. 11 See, for example, Written Submissions on Behalf of the Appellant filed 30 May 2024 [12] - [16], [19] - [20]. See also Proposed Appellant's Case ground 5(a), the submissions in support of that ground, the Appellant's Supporting Affidavit [7], and the Primary Reasons [82]. 12 See Prosecution Notice for charge AL 2097 of 2021. 13 See Reynolds v WA Police [No 2] [82]. See also Albany Magistrates Court Hearing ts, 5 May 2021, 8. -- 15 of 19 -- [2026] WASCA 88 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 16 could not have any bearing on AL 2097/2021. There is therefore no merit in this ground. 48 Proposed grounds 2 and 3 allege that the primary judge erred in ordering charges AL 2097/2021 and AL 682/2022 be remitted to the Magistrates Court for trial and that his Honour ought to have entered judgments of acquittal on those charges instead. Given the reasons why his Honour set aside the convictions, there is no merit in these grounds. 49 The learned primary judge set aside the appellant's conviction of charge AL 2097/2021 because the magistrate had erred in using the procedure in s 55 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) to convict the appellant, not because the evidence led at a trial did not prove the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.14 50 Similarly, the learned primary judge set aside the conviction on charge AL 682/2022 because his Honour considered that the learned magistrate improperly fettered the appellant's right to participate in the trial process,15 not because the evidence did not prove the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 51 Proposed ground 4 asserts that the question of 'bias/venue' should have been determined by the primary judge, rather than by the Magistrates Court. The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in referring the two remitted charges to Albany Magistrates Court. 52 This was not an error. Where it is found on appeal that a Magistrates Court conviction should be set aside, the usual orders are that the appeal is allowed, the conviction is set aside, and the matter is remitted to the Magistrates Court to be determined according to law.16 The prosecution of those charges had been commenced in the Albany Registry of the Magistrates Court, being the registry provided for in the rules as the nearest place to where the offences were allegedly committed.17 The learned primary judge expressly ordered that the trials be before a different magistrate. His Honour further expressly ordered the remittals were 'without prejudice' to the appellant's right to apply for the trial to be heard in the Perth Registry of that Court, and 14 See Reynolds v WA Police [No 2] [110] - [116]. 15 Reynolds v WA Police [No 2] [68] - [79]. 16 See Watson v Vos [2019] WASC 327 [31]. 17 Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 22(2) - (3), read with Magistrates Court (General) Rules 2005 (WA), r 44(1). -- 16 of 19 -- [2026] WASCA 88 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 17 'without prejudice' to the appellant's right to apply for the recusal of a particular magistrate on the ground of bias.18 53 Proposed ground 5 raises two issues. 54 First, like proposed ground 1, it appears to challenge the approach taken, and the findings made, by the magistrate in the hearing on 29 October 2021.19 For the same reasons as we gave in relation to proposed ground 1, this has no merit. 55 Second, it alleges that the Magistrates Court erroneously relied on a false entry of 'no appearance' in finding the appellant guilty of the breach of bail. This appears to relate to charge AL 2150/2021.20 In relation to that charge, the learned primary judge allowed the appeal and entered a judgment of acquittal. Accordingly, the alleged error could not be an error of the learned primary judge. Delay in seeking an extension of time 56 In our view, another relevant factor in this case is the appellant's delay in bringing an application for an extension of time. The appellant was told four times in July 2025 that, if he wished to have the appeal reinstated, he would need to file and serve an application for an extension of time together with a supporting affidavit attaching a compliant appellant's case. 57 At 4.28 pm on 8 July 2025, the appellant attempted to file a document entitled 'Appellant's Case CACR 23 of 2025', after the springing order was executed. The document was not accepted for filing. On 9 July 2025, the Associate to the Acting Court of Appeal Registrar wrote to the appellant advising that, as he had not filed the appellant's case by 4.00 pm on 8 July 2025, the appeal stood dismissed. The Associate's letter further advised the appellant that, if he considered that he was entitled to an extension of time to comply with the springing order, he must file and serve an application for an extension of time together with a supporting affidavit attaching a compliant appellant's case. 58 The appellant continued to attempt to file documents with the court but, until November 2025, none of these were an application for 18 Lemonis J Orders, Order 6. 19 See Proposed Appellant's Case grounds 1 and 5(a), the submissions in support of those grounds and the Appellant's Supporting Affidavit [7]. 20 See Reynolds v WA Police [No 2] [20] - [30]. -- 17 of 19 -- [2026] WASCA 88 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 18 an extension of time. The documents were repeatedly refused to be accepted for filing. The advice set out in the Associate's letter of 9 July 2025 in relation to seeking an extension of time was repeated to the appellant in letters dated 11 July 2025, 21 July 2025, and 28 July 2025. 59 Despite this, it was not until 18 November 2025 that the appellant attempted to file an application for an extension of time. An extension of time should be refused 60 The springing order in this case was made three months after the appeal was instituted, in a context where the appellant had repeatedly failed to comply with his obligation under the Court of Appeal Rules to file a compliant appellant's case. 61 This was so notwithstanding that the appellant had been expressly directed to the relevant requirements, and to the Self-Representation Kit, not only at the institution of the appeal, but in subsequent correspondence. 62 The springing order gave the appellant a further extension of time to file a compliant appellant's case, in circumstances where several previous extensions of time had already been granted, and where it was clear that the appellant was being given a final opportunity to file a compliant appellant's case. 63 The appellant failed to take advantage of that final opportunity and has not given any adequate explanation for his failure to do so. 64 It took the appellant a further four months after the appeal proceedings were dismissed before he sought an extension of time. The explanation for that further delay is inadequate. 65 It is now more than a year since the appeal was commenced. Further, the subject matter of the appeal is two Magistrates Court charges laid against the appellant in 2021 and 2022, being some four years ago. 66 In addition, we are not satisfied that the appellant will suffer any prejudice if time is not extended. The convictions on all three charges were set aside, an acquittal was entered on one charge, two of the charges were remitted to the Magistrates Court and both have since been dismissed. 67 Finally, there is no merit in any of the proposed grounds of appeal. -- 18 of 19 -- [2026] WASCA 88 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 19 Conclusion 68 For these reasons, we would dismiss the appellant's application for an extension of time. 69 Further, it follows that there is no basis upon which this court could make orders in relation to managing the proceedings in CACV 17 of 2026 with these proceedings, as these proceedings remain dismissed. We would therefore refuse to accept for filing the appellant's further application in an appeal dated 17 March 2026 and supporting affidavit sworn 18 March 2026, as well as the corresponding application in CACV 17 of 2026. 70 Finally, and similarly, as the proceedings remain dismissed, we would refuse to accept for filing the appellant's application in an appeal dated 4 June 2026 and supporting affidavit sworn the same day. 71 We made the following orders in CACR 23 of 2025: 1. The application in an appeal dated 14 November 2025 is dismissed. 2. The appeal remains dismissed by operation of order 3 of the orders made by the court on 23 June 2025. 3. The application in an appeal dated 17 March 2026 and supporting affidavit sworn 18 March 2026 are not accepted for filing. 4. The application in an appeal dated 4 June 2026 and supporting affidavit sworn the same day are not accepted for filing. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. DH Associate to the Hon Justice Archer 23 JUNE 2026 -- 19 of 19 --