DU v WANG (No 2) [2026] SASCA 73

On Appeal from DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (HER HONOUR JUDGE THOMAS) CIV-20-002586 Applicant: ZHIGANG DU In Person Respondent: CHANG MIN WANG Counsel: MR L GENTRY - Solicitor: BRIDGES LAWYERS Hearing Date/s: 29/05/2026 File No/s: CIV-25-013606 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Court of Appeal: Civil) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. DU v WANG (No 2) [2026] SASCA 73 Ruling of the Honourable President Livesey (ex tempore) 29 May 2026 APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - OTHER MATTERS COURTS AND JUDGES - JUDGES - DISQUALIFICATION FOR INTEREST OR BIAS - PARTICULAR GROUNDS - PREJUDGMENT COURTS AND JUDGES - JUDGES - DISQUALIFICATION FOR INTEREST OR BIAS - REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF BIAS GENERALLY This is Mr Du’s second interlocutory application, seeking an order for disqualification. Mr Du is not legally represented. He supports this application by reference to two matters. The first concerns an observation at the last hearing on 7 April 2026 that he should reconsider his 19 grounds of appeal and see if it was possible to distil them. The second concerns the dismissal of his application for further documents in a previous ruling. This appears to be an application based on prejudgment. Held, dismissing the application: 1. A judge must not too readily accede to applications to recuse or disqualify on the grounds of apprehended bias. The applicant must do more than point to earlier decisions adverse to the applicant, especially where those decisions do not involve any prejudgment of the issues arising in connection with the matters yet to be decided by the Court. 2. No opinion was expressed about the merits of the appeal. Mr Du was simply told that it is most unlikely that 19 grounds of appeal would all be upheld and invited to reconsider his grounds. 3. Mr Du has failed to demonstrate that the requisite apprehension of ostensible bias has arisen. -- 1 of 4 -- Cain v Commissioner of Police [2026] SASCA 39; Du v Wang [2026] SASCA 34; Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 279 CLR 148, considered. -- 2 of 4 -- DU v WANG (No 2) [2026] SASCA 73 Court of Appeal – Civil – Application LIVESEY P (ex tempore): Introduction 1 There has been an application made this morning by Mr Du that I not continue to sit in this matter. 2 Mr Du supported that application by reference to two matters. The first is that I made an observation at the last hearing, on 7 April 2026, that he should reconsider his 19 grounds of appeal and see if it was possible to distil them. At that time, he hoped to get legal advice but that has not happened. The second matter is that I dismissed his application for further documents in my ruling dated 7 April 2026.1 In the course of that ruling, I explained why I dismissed the application. Today, Mr Du says that I was not fair and I did not listen to him. In response, Mr Gentry has submitted that the requisite apprehension does not arise in respect of the matters that I addressed on the last occasion. The determination of the application 3 This appears to be an application based on my prejudgment of the issues. So far as the merits of the appeal are concerned, I expressed no opinion about the merits of the appeal. I simply explained that it is most unlikely that 19 grounds of appeal would all be upheld.2 4 So far as the application for further documents is concerned, Mr Du says that my ruling was wrong. He says, in answer to the matters I raised in my earlier reasons, that the documents are relevant, though he cannot explain why they are relevant. In addition, he says that the documents were not obtained by his former legal advisors for use in the trial because those former legal advisors are corrupt. The ruling that I made on the last occasion was based on what Mr Du put before the Court and did not preclude Mr Du from bringing a further application if there were proper grounds to do so, in particular, if he was in a position to address the questions which I raised with him on the earlier occasion, and again today. 5 An apprehension of ostensible bias arises where the fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the questions the judge is required to decide. It is necessary for an applicant seeking disqualification to: 1 Du v Wang [2026] SASCA 34. 2 As was done recently in Cain v Commissioner of Police [2026] SASCA 39, [9] (Livesey P and Stanley JА). -- 3 of 4 -- [2026] SASCA 73 Livesey P 2 • Identify the factor that might lead the judge to resolve the questions arising for decision other than on their legal and factual merits; • Articulate the logical connection between that factor and apprehended deviation from the judge deciding those questions on their merits; and • Assess the reasonableness of that apprehension from the perspective of a fair-minded lay observer. 6 A judge must not too readily accede to applications to recuse or disqualify on the grounds of apprehended bias. The applicant must do more than point to earlier decisions adverse to the applicant, especially where those decisions do not involve any prejudgment of the issues arising in connection with the matters yet to be decided by the Court. 7 The fact that I have made a decision adverse to Mr Du does not mean that I will not fairly consider any further application that he may make, nor does it mean that I will not properly evaluate and consider his arguments on appeal. The requisite apprehension does not arise.3 Conclusion 8 Accordingly, I decline to disqualify myself from continuing to sit in Mr Du’s matter. 3 Nor is it a case where it is necessary exercise prudence, so as to avoid potential inconvenience, cf Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337, [20] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ); QYFM v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2023) 279 CLR 148, [129] (Edelman J), [216] (Steward J), [277]-[279] (Jagot J). -- 4 of 4 --