RS v THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA [2026] SASC 63

On Appeal from SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (AUXILIARY ASSOCIATE JUSTICE FLOURENTZOU) CIV-24-007821 Appellant: RS In Person Respondent: THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA Counsel: MS E DENBIGH - Solicitor: CROWN SOLICITOR (SA) Hearing Date/s: 17/04/2026 File No/s: CIV-26-000586 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Appeal to a Single Judge) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. RS v THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA [2026] SASC 63 Judgment of the Honourable Justice McIntyre 7 May 2026 PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - PLEADINGS - STRIKING OUT - DISCLOSING NO REASONABLE CAUSE OF ACTION OR DEFENCE TORTS - INTERFERENCE WITH THE PERSON - PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE - PLEADINGS The appellant commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court of South Australia in August 2024. He was arrested on charges of domestic violence in May 2020 and remained in prison until he was acquitted of all charges following a jury trial in the District Court in November 2023. His claim sought damages and compensation. The respondent filed an application to strike out the appellant’s amended claim filed on 25 July 2025. The appellant then filed an application seeking summary judgment against the respondent. Those applications were determined by an Auxiliary Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Her Honour dismissed the appellant’s application for summary judgment, struck out the amended claim without leave to re-plead and awarded costs to the respondent. This is an appeal from that decision. The appellant appeals on eight grounds including that the Auxiliary Associate Justice erred in finding that the appellant’s statement of claim does not identify a cause of action and by declining to grant leave to amend. Further, the appellant contends that her Honour erred in dismissing his application for summary judgment. Held, refusing leave to appeal: 1. There is no demonstrable error by the Auxiliary Associate Justice. 2. The decision is not attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration, nor does it rase a matter of general importance or work a substantial injustice to the appellant. -- 1 of 9 -- Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) rr 1.5, 3, 3.2(2), 12.2, 213.1(1)(a); Bail Act 1985 (SA) s 10A, referred to. Hardel Pty Ltd v Burrell & Family Pty Ltd (2009) 103 SASR 408; Rankine v State of South Australia [2022] SASCA 18; RS v Police [2024] SASC 111; RS v Chief Executive of the Department for Child Protection [2022] SASCA 58; Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; Coco v The Queen (1994) 179 CLR 427; State of New South Wales v Robinson [2019] HCA 46; Groom v State of SA [2017] SASCFC 35; McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia; McDonald & Ors v Minister for Education and Child Development & Ors (No 3) [2016] SASC 79, considered. -- 2 of 9 -- RS v THE STATE OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA [2026] SASC 63 Single Judge Appeal: Civil McIntyre J 1 The appellant appeals orders made by an Auxiliary Associate Justice of this Court on 17 November 2025, dismissing the appellant’s application for summary judgment, striking out the appellant’s amended Claim1 (‘the Amended Claim’) without leave to replead and ordering the appellant to pay the respondent’s costs on a standard basis. 2 For the reasons that follow, I decline to grant permission to appeal. The decision 3 The orders are supported by reasons from the Auxiliary Associate Justice of the same date (‘the Decision’).2 In the Decision, the Auxiliary Associate Justice set out the procedural background to this matter, and her reasons for striking out the Amended Claim without leave to replead and refusing the respondent’s application for summary dismissal of the proceedings. In summary these were: • A finding that the Amended Claim does not plead the legal basis of any cause of action alleged against the respondent, nor does it comply with the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) (‘UCR’).3 • Permission to replead was refused, because the appellant was given numerous opportunities to file a proper pleading and had failed to do so.4 • The respondent’s application for summary dismissal was refused, because the Auxiliary Associate Justice considered that, with the assistance of a lawyer, the appellant may have a reasonable claim to prosecute. That was not, however, apparent on the Amended Claim.5 4 In view of those matters, the Auxiliary Associate Justice did not consider the appellant’s application seeking summary judgment.6 Costs were awarded in favour of the respondent because the respondent was largely successful in its application 1 FDN 44 on CIV-24-007821. 2 RS v The State of South Australia (Supreme Court of South Australia, Auxiliary Associate Justice Flourentzou, 17 November 2025) (‘RS’). 3 Ibid at [49]. 4 Ibid at [47], [50], [51]. 5 Ibid at [51]. 6 Ibid at [52]. -- 3 of 9 -- [2026] SASC 63 McIntyre J 2 and because the respondent provided the appellant with numerous opportunities to rectify his pleadings.7 Leave to appeal required 5 The impugned decision was a discretionary decision made on a matter of practice and law. The decision is properly characterised as an interlocutory decision. In Hardel Pty Ltd v Burrell & Family Pty Ltd,8 Kourakis J (as he then was), with whom Nyland and David JJ agreed, considered the distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order:9 An action is brought so that the controversy between the parties may be adjudicated. A final order determines the underlying matter, or some part of it, and for that reason will generally dispose of the action or an element of it. An interlocutory order, on the other hand, determines an aspect of the forensic procedure in accordance with which the matter will be adjudicated. For that reason it will generally direct the course of further proceedings rather than determine any part of the subject matter of the dispute. It must be remembered that the action itself is no more than the procedure by which the court’s jurisdiction is invoked; it must not be conflated with the subject matter of the controversy. Consequently, an order bringing an action to an end by dismissal of the action or default judgment may still be interlocutory. 6 Whilst the Amended Claim is struck out without permission to replead, there is no order dismissing the proceedings. The proceedings remain on foot with the potential for the appellant to apply for permission to file a further amended Claim which complies with the UCR. Accordingly, the appellant requires leave to appeal under UCR r 213.1(1)(a). 7 As the Court of Appeal stated in Rankine v State of South Australia:10 Whether leave to appeal should be granted has been expressed in different ways but, in essence, the question is whether this Court is satisfied that: (a) the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to warrant its reconsideration on appeal, or raises an issue of principle or general importance, and (b) allowing the decision to stand would work a substantial injustice to the applicant. These two limbs are typically treated as cumulative requirements for a grant of leave to appeal, but ultimately the Court will act in the interests of justice. Grounds of appeal 8 The Notice of Appeal11 sets out grounds of appeal under eight headings. The grounds are difficult to follow. The headings are: 7 Ibid at [53]–[54]. 8 (2009) 103 SASR 408. 9 Ibid at [24]. 10 [2022] SASCA 18 at [2]–[3]. 11 FDN 1. -- 4 of 9 -- [2026] SASC 63 McIntyre J 3 • Ground 1: Error in Exercising Discretion to Strike out Without Leave • Ground 2: Illogical and Unreasonable Exercise of Discretion • Ground 3: Error in Failing to Identify a Disclosed Cause of Action • Ground 4: Error in Failing to Apply Common Law Principles • Ground 5: Error in Failing to Apply Adelaide Brighton Principles • Ground 6: Denial of Procedural Fairness • Ground 7: Error in Rewarding Respondent’s Non-compliance • Ground 8: Failure to Apply Binding Principle on Leave to Replead 9 The matters set out under each heading do not greatly assist in discerning the gravamen of the appeal nor do the five sets of written submissions, summary of argument and chronology filed by the appellant. Moreover, to the extent that the appellant seeks to agitate other matters unrelated to this appeal, such as the application of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights12 and to challenge earlier decisions relating to the strike out of previous iterations of the Statement of Claim,13 the submissions are irrelevant. The appellant made oral submissions in respect of each ground at the hearing. Grounds 1 & 3 10 These two grounds are interlinked. In Ground 1, the appellant contends that the Auxiliary Associate Justice erred by striking out his Claim “without requiring the state to prove that its warrantless entry arrest seizure and 572-day detention were lawful”.14 In Ground 3 the appellant in effect contends that the Auxiliary Associate Justice erred in finding that his Claim does not identify a cause of action. 11 The appellant, in Ground 1, asserts that the onus is on the respondent to justify its actions. Unless and until the appellant sets out a proper claim against the respondent, the respondent bears no such onus. 12 The appellant’s claim has its origins in his arrest in May 2020. The background is set out in the decisions of RS v Police15 and RS v Chief Executive of the Department for Child Protection.16 I will not repeat what is set out there but, in summary, the appellant contends that police entered his home without a warrant, seized his property without warrant and, I infer, improperly charged him with offences. He remained in custody because he was charged with a prescribed 12 FDN 13, Part 4. 13 FDN 7, Part 5. 14 T4.12–14. 15 [2024] SASC 111 at [6]–[11]. 16 [2022] SASCA 58 at [7]. -- 5 of 9 -- [2026] SASC 63 McIntyre J 4 offence which meant that there was a presumption against bail unless he could establish the existence of special circumstances.17 It appears from his oral submissions that the appellant sought a review of bail decisions but was unsuccessful. He remained in custody from his arrest until his acquittal following a jury trial in the District Court; a period of 572 days. In support of his contentions the appellant relied upon a series of authorities listed in his list of authorities including Plenty v Dillon,18 Coco v The Queen19 and State of New South Wales v Robinson20 (‘Robinson’). These cases are relevant to the issue of police powers but not to the question that faced the Auxiliary Associate Justice which was the respondent’s application to strike out the Amended Claim. The issues to be determined were whether the appellant’s Amended Claim disclosed a cause of action and whether it complied with the UCR. These cases, and the others cited by the appellant, do not assist. 13 The appellant maintains that his arrest, the 572 days he spent in prison and his acquittal disclose the essential elements of various unspecified causes of action. Without more, they do not. He does not identify causes of action, nor does the appellant address the essential elements of any causes of action. For example, whilst reference is made to trespass and false imprisonment, no reference is made to the essential elements of the torts of false imprisonment or trespass. The pleaded facts arguably assert matters such as misfeasance in a public office, malicious prosecution or negligence but again the essential elements are not addressed. Further, the appellant does not specifically identify and plead any material facts said to give rise to a duty of care owed by the respondent. Nor does the appellant identify how the respondent, in initiating or maintaining the criminal proceedings, acted maliciously. It is not enough that he was acquitted. 14 Groom v State of SA21 (‘Groom’) was an appeal against summary judgment awarded on the basis that the appellant’s Statement of Claim disclosed no reasonable basis for any of the claims alleged by the appellant. In dismissing the appeal, Nicholson J (with whom Kourakis CJ and Hinton J agreed) said:22 On the present state of the authorities, and as a general rule, neither SAPOL nor the DPP owe a citizen a duty of care in respect of prosecutorial or investigative functions. The appellant has not pleaded any facts which would serve to distinguish, in any material way, his situation from this general position. [Citations omitted] 17 Bail Act 1985 (SA) s 10A. 18 (1991) 171 CLR 635. 19 (1994) 179 CLR 427. 20 [2019] HCA 46 (‘Robinson’). 21 [2017] SASCFC 35. 22 Ibid at [36]. -- 6 of 9 -- [2026] SASC 63 McIntyre J 5 15 The same is true in the present case. Insofar as the appellant claims to have been falsely imprisoned for 572 days, I note the following observations of Nicholson J in Groom:23 The appellant has also alleged that he was falsely imprisoned. This complaint derives from two periods of incarceration in the Adelaide Remand Centre resulting each time from a refusal by a Magistrate to grant bail. The appellant contends that the withdrawal of the 31 charges in December 2013 demonstrates that there was “no proven basis” for the incarcerations such that he was, in effect, falsely imprisoned. However, the Magistrates in question exercised lawful authority, at the time, to refuse bail.24 That lawful authority is not to be diminished or removed by a later determination that no underlying offence had been committed. In this case the appellant’s incarceration resulted from a court order and no action for false imprisonment will lie.25 16 The same would appear to apply in the present case. 17 Further, to the extent that there are facts pleaded, the facts have not been set out in a clear or chronological manner. It is not possible to ascertain what facts are being relied on in respect of what causes of action. These are matters which go beyond mere technical deficiencies in the pleading for which latitude may be afforded to a self-represented litigant.26 It does, as the Auxiliary Associate Justice said in her decision,27 mean that the respondent is not able to file a meaningful defence. 18 The Auxiliary Associate Justice was correct to find that the Amended Claim did not plead the legal basis of any cause of action. Furthermore, she was also correct to find that the Amended Claim does not comply with the UCR. Accordingly, the appellant has not established any error in the decision to strike out the Amended Claim. Grounds 1, 2, 6 & 8 19 The appellant contends that the Auxiliary Associate Justice erred in failing to grant leave to amend, in circumstances where the Auxiliary Associate Justice observed that “I understand the elementary basis of [the] applicant’s grievances” and that “it may be that with the assistance of a lawyer, the applicant has a reasonable claim to prosecute…”.28 20 The Auxiliary Associate Justice, whilst not granting the appellant leave to amend, left open the possibility of an application to amend which would require the appellant to satisfy the Court that the proposed pleading was in the appropriate 23 Ibid at [44]. 24 See generally, Part 3 of the Bail Act 1985 (SA). 25 Trotter v State of South Australia, unreported Supreme Court of South Australia, judgment No. S3713, 27 November 1992; and on appeal Trotter v State of South Australia, unreported Supreme Court of South Australia (Full Court), judgment No. S4702, 28 July 1994. 26 McDonald & Anor v State of South Australia; McDonald & Ors v Minister for Education and Child Development & Ors (No 3) [2016] SASC 79 at [125]–[127]. 27 RS at [50]. 28 Ibid at [51]. -- 7 of 9 -- [2026] SASC 63 McIntyre J 6 form. This was an appropriate course of action in circumstances where the appellant had five attempts to rectify his Claim and had failed to do so. UCR r 1.5 provides as follows: The object of these Rules is to facilitate the just, efficient, timely, cost-effective and proportionate resolution or determination of the issues in proceedings governed by these Rules. 21 The Court in making orders ought to have regard to the object of the rules29 and the overarching obligations of the parties as set out in UCR r 3. The appellant has not complied with his overarching obligations in particular by failing to comply with the pleading rules. In those circumstances, the Court may make such orders as it thinks fit in the interests of justice by reason of a failure by a person to comply with overarching obligations.30 The orders made by the Auxiliary Associate Justice were in line with the spirit and letter of the UCR. No error has been demonstrated. 22 Insofar as the appellant appears to complain of a denial of procedural fairness in these grounds of appeal, I reject that contention. The appellant filed a voluminous quantity of submissions and affidavit material to oppose the respondent’s application. The appellant was given multiple opportunities to rectify his Claim, before the respondent made the application that was the subject of the Auxiliary Associate Justice’s decision. That application was a process available to the respondent under the Rules. There was no procedural unfairness. Ground 4 23 The appellant contends that the Auxiliary Associate Justice erred in failing to apply “Robinson v State of New South Wales”. That appears to be a reference to Robinson.31 As outlined above, that is a case concerning police powers and specifically the power to arrest without warrant. It is not relevant to the respondent’s application to strike out the Amended Claim. There was no error in the Auxiliary Associate Justice’s failure to have regard to that case. Ground 5 24 The appellant contends that the Auxiliary Associate Justice erred in dismissing the appellant’s application for summary judgment.32 In view of the ruling in respect of the respondent’s application,33 there was no need to consider the appellant’s application because his own Amended Claim was to be struck out. In those circumstances, any applications about the respondent’s purported response to the Amended Claim were rendered inutile. There is no error in the 29 Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) r 12.2. 30 Ibid at r 3.2(2). 31 Robinson (n 19). 32 FDN 63 on CIV-24-007821. 33 FDN 49 on CIV-24-007821. -- 8 of 9 -- [2026] SASC 63 McIntyre J 7 Auxiliary Associate Justice’s approach dismissing the applicant’s application for summary judgment. Ground 7 25 In this ground the appellant contends that the Auxiliary Associate Justice erred in rewarding the “respondent’s litigation misconduct”. The asserted litigation misconduct is not particularised. The respondent denies any such misconduct. I see no basis for concluding that there was any such misconduct. Conclusion 26 Having considered each of these matters, I am not satisfied that the appellant has demonstrated any error on the part of the Auxiliary Associate Justice. I do not consider that the decision is attended by sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration on appeal, nor does it raise a matter of general importance. Further, the decision does not work a substantial injustice to the appellant in circumstances where he has had numerous opportunities to rectify his Statement of Claim and where he is not precluded from applying for permission to file a further amended claim which complies with the UCR. I decline to grant leave to appeal. -- 9 of 9 --