CARNEGIE -v- WA POLICE [2026] WASC 242

[2026] WASC 242 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CRIMINAL CITATION : CARNEGIE -v- WA POLICE [2026] WASC 242 CORAM : SOLOMON J HEARD : 12 MAY 2026 DELIVERED : 12 MAY 2026 PUBLISHED : 17 JUNE 2026 FILE NO/S : SJA 1031 of 2025 BETWEEN : QUINN CARNEGIE Appellant AND WA POLICE Respondent ON APPEAL FROM: Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Coram : MAGISTRATE M MEDCALF File Number : FR 9569/2024, FR 9570/2024, FR 9571/2024 -- 1 of 19 -- [2026] WASC 242 Page 2 Catchwords: Appeal - Criminal law - Appeal against conviction based on a plea of guilty of dangerous driving contrary to s 61 of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) - Whether there was a substantial miscarriage of justice Legislative and regulatory regime for demerit points - Whether plea of guilty was unfairly induced - Judicial remarks about the consequences of pleading guilty Legislation: Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 (WA) Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 (WA) Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Regulations 2014 (WA) Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) Road Traffic Code 2000 (WA) Result: Extension of time for leave to appeal granted Leave to appeal granted Appeal allowed Decision of magistrate set aside and remitted back to the Magistrates Court Category: B Representation: Counsel: Appellant : In Person Respondent : Mr A Gibson Solicitors: Appellant : In Person Respondent : State Solicitor's Office -- 2 of 19 -- [2026] WASC 242 Page 3 Case(s) referred to in decision(s): BH v Director of Public Prosecutions [2026] WASC 75 Douglas v Director of Public Prosecutions [2025] WASCA 11 Guariglia v The Queen [2010] VSCA 343; (2010) 208 A Crim R 49 Lawson v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 212 Meissner v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 132 Murray v Feast [2023] WASC 273 Murray v Northcott [1990] WAR 219 R v KCH [2001] NSWCCA 273; (2001) 124 A Crim R 233 R v Turner [1970] 2 QB 321 Snook v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2015] WASCA 29 Vella v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 129 Woodhouse v Leslie [2023] WASC 11 -- 3 of 19 -- [2026] WASC 242 SOLOMON J Page 4 SOLOMON J: (This judgment was delivered extemporaneously and has been edited from the transcript to supplement the reasons, include references, headings and to correct matters of grammar and expression.) Introduction Factual background 1 On 9 September 2024, the appellant, Ms Quinn Carnegie, was driving a Hyundai Getz on Karel Avenue in Leeming. Ms Carnegie was, together with other cars, pulled over for the purposes of a random breath test. Ms Carnegie was given a direction by the police to stop. The police alleged that she failed to comply with that direction. In addition, the police alleged that Ms Carnegie failed to obey the signal by hand and a reasonable oral direction of a police officer. 2 Ms Carnegie was told to wind down her window. She refused to do that. Further requests were made of Ms Carnegie, and eventually, a police officer broke the window of the passenger side of Ms Carnegie's car as it stood in a line of cars. Eventually, Ms Carnegie pulled out of the line, among the police officers surrounding her car, and drove off. Charges 3 Ms Carnegie was subsequently arrested and charged with three offences. The first was that, as a driver of a vehicle, she failed to comply with the direction to stop, contrary to s 44 of the Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 (WA) (Road Traffic (Administration) Act). The second was that, as a driver of a vehicle, she failed to obey a signal given by a police officer, contrary to reg 272(1) of the Road Traffic Code 2000 (WA) (Road Traffic Code). The third charge was that, by pulling out of line and driving off with police officers standing at her vehicle, she drove a motor vehicle in a reckless manner, contrary to s 60 of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) (Road Traffic Act). First court hearing 4 The matter came before a magistrate at Fremantle on 29 October 2024. On that occasion, Ms Carnegie was represented by duty counsel. Duty counsel advised the magistrate that Ms Carnegie was entering a plea of guilty in respect of the first two charges, and not guilty in respect of the charge of reckless driving. -- 4 of 19 -- [2026] WASC 242 SOLOMON J Page 5 5 The magistrate confirmed the pleas directly with Ms Carnegie, who pleaded guilty to the first two charges and not guilty to the third charge. The magistrate then adjourned the reckless driving charge for a trial, and adjourned the two charges in respect of which Ms Carnegie pleaded guilty, for mention. It appears that the magistrate had in mind that the two charges, in respect of which Ms Carnegie had entered a plea of guilty, would be dealt with together with the third charge on sentencing, if a sentence was to be imposed in relation to the third charge. Second court hearing 6 The matter ultimately came before a different magistrate in Fremantle on 2 April 2025; that is, the trial for the charge of reckless driving was set down for hearing on that day, together with the two charges to which Ms Carnegie had already pleaded guilty, for sentencing. 7 At the hearing of 2 April 2025, Ms Carnegie was asked by the magistrate whether she pleaded guilty or not guilty to the charge of reckless driving. An exchange ensued between Ms Carnegie, the magistrate and the prosecuting sergeant. Ms Carnegie made reference to her history of difficulty and trauma in dealing with law enforcement agencies. It must have been plain to the magistrate that Ms Carnegie had strong feelings about the way she felt she had been treated over many years by law enforcement. A further exchange then ensued between the magistrate, Ms Carnegie and the prosecuting sergeant, after which Ms Carnegie pleaded guilty. 8 That exchange lies at the heart of this appeal. The exchange was as follows:1 MAGISTRATE: … So if you want to take the matter to trial for reckless driving, the risk for you is that you are convicted of a reckless driving, and then you will end up with a disqualification on your licence. What Sergeant's doing today, is giving you an option to resolve the matter by way of a dangerous driving. You've said to me that you don't wish to do so, but if you do take the charge to a trial it will be for reckless driving and if you are convicted it will be a fine and a six-month disqualification on your licence, minimum. MS CARNEGIE: I'm not saying no to dangerous driving, I'm saying there are other mitigating factors and I don't feel that I should be 1 ts, Western Australia Police v Carnegie, Magistrates Court of Western Australia, 2 April 2025, 6 - 8 (ts 2 April 2025). -- 5 of 19 -- [2026] WASC 242 SOLOMON J Page 6 copping a fine when I've tried to stand up for myself - I've tried to do things legally for 15 years - that's not just a couple of months, that's like - - - MAGISTRATE: So that's not mitigatory - - - MS CARNEGIE: - - - a really long time. MAGISTRATE: - - - that's only circumstances that are personal to you, Ms Carnegie. In relation to the offending, if you accept that your driving on that occasion was dangerous, and you wish to enter a plea of guilty then anything you say may mitigate or reduce the fine, but you would still be - it would still be dealt with by way of a fine today. Sergeant, is there anything in her record that would suggest - - - SERGEANT CLEMENTS: No - no record, your Honour. MAGISTRATE: - - - that a suspended fine can be appropriate. SERGEANT CLEMENTS: That was going to be my suggestion, your Honour. I did indicate to Ms Carnegie - and I neglected to mention - we weren't going to make an application for costs. MAGISTRATE: Yes. … SERGEANT CLEMENTS: … but I was going to recommend a suspended fine. Thank you, your Honour. MAGISTRATE: Okay. So, Ms Carnegie, the court has an ability to, if a fine is imposed, to suspend that fine. It's a similar sentencing exercise like a good behaviour bond which was somewhat - is now a different way of saying that. … So the Sergeant's not going to oppose that, so it may be that that's ultimately how it's dealt with today. MS CARNEGIE: So my deciding factor is - what goes on my record? Because after 15 years of police negligence and corruption, I hate Australia that much that I want to leave and move overseas. So in order to do that - then that is going to have an impact on any visas that I'm able to get. MAGISTRATE: Sergeant, what's your view in relation to a 49 application? SERGEANT CLEMENTS: Your Honour, I - funnily enough, your Honour, I had, before His Honour Hills-Wright, a little while back, and he granted a spent conviction for a speeding offence, so I certainly have no objection to that. That was his - - - -- 6 of 19 -- [2026] WASC 242 SOLOMON J Page 7 MAGISTRATE: Well and there's a news - recent Supreme Court decision now that binds us to consider spent convictions in relation to traffic matters in their entirety, so I think I would need to consider it anyway, and in circumstances where you're not opposed I would be suspending - - - SERGEANT CLEMENTS: Yes - no, I'm not opposed to that. MAGISTRATE: So, Ms Carnegie, essentially I can grant what's called a spent conviction. It's an unusual thing to see in traffic, but in fact the circumstances have changed now because there's a recent Supreme Court decision that says that we should properly consider spent convictions in relation to traffic matters. And in circumstances where you come before the court as someone who is of prior good character, then I would - and it's not opposed - then I would grant a spent conviction. So, ultimately, what the outcome for you today would be - most likely - suspended fine and spent conviction, which means there's no convictions on your record. MS CARNEGIE: Sure. MAGISTRATE: So do you want me to amend the charge and take your plea to the dangerous driving then? MS CARNEGIE: Yes please. MAGISTRATE: All right. You can take a seat while I do that, Ms Carnegie. All right. You can remain seated Ms Carnegie, I will put the charge to you again. So the allegation is now, on 9 September 2024, in Leeming, you drove a motor vehicle in a dangerous manner. Do you understand the charge? How do you wish to plead? MS CARNEGIE: Guilty. 9 The charge to which Ms Carnegie pleaded guilty was dangerous driving under s 61 of the Road Traffic Act as distinct from the original charge of reckless driving under s 60 of the Road Traffic Act. 10 Thereafter, the prosecuting sergeant read out a brief statement of the facts as follows: It was 12.05 pm, Monday 9 September 2024, when she was driving in Leeming. Police were conducting random breath testing on Karel Avenue, in Leeming. The accused has been part of the queue of traffic where they've stopped her, they've placed her under a requirement to provide a preliminary sample of her breath, which she declined. She also didn't wind down her window or engage with the police. She has then pulled out into the - out of the line of traffic with the police -- 7 of 19 -- [2026] WASC 242 SOLOMON J Page 8 officers nearby, they've held up their hands in a stop - indicate - indicate her to stop, but she kept going, the police officer got out of the way and she drove off. 11 The magistrate then gave her sentencing remarks and concluded by imposing a global fine of $750 in respect of all three charges. The magistrate suspended the fine for three months. The magistrate also determined that Ms Carnegie 'should be relieved of any adverse effect of the conviction' and ordered the convictions to be spent. 12 Plainly, the sentence imposed by the magistrate was consistent with what she had foreshadowed in the event that Ms Carnegie pleaded guilty. Loss of demerit points 13 There was no mention of demerit points at the hearing before the magistrate. Ms Carnegie was unaware of the prospect that she would lose demerit points, less still that it would lead to a disqualification. Some short time after her conviction, Ms Carnegie received notice of nine demerit points. Ms Carnegie was penalised with six demerit points for the offence under s 61 of the Road Traffic Act and three demerit points for her contravention of reg 272(1) of the Road Traffic Code. No demerit points were applicable to the contravention of s 44 of the Road Traffic (Administration) Act. 14 At the time Ms Carnegie only had four points, and therefore her licence was automatically suspended, although I understand that she entered into an arrangement provided for by the Road Traffic Act which permitted her to drive conditionally. Penalties and the legal framework of demerit points 15 Demerit points are imposed automatically and administratively following a relevant conviction. It is instructive to explain the regulatory basis for the imposition of demerit points and the penalties generally for the offences the subject of Ms Carnegie's conviction. 16 As Ms Carnegie was faced with the prospect of the applicable penalty under s 60 and s 61 of the Road Traffic Act, I shall consider the regulatory regime of the penalties applicable to each of them. 17 Turning first to the offence under s 60 of the Road Traffic Act, that section does not stipulate the penalty. Rather s 60B is headed 'Penalties for offences against sections 60 and 60A'. Section 60B differentiates -- 8 of 19 -- [2026] WASC 242 SOLOMON J Page 9 between a first offence, a second offence and subsequent offences. Under s 60B(2), a person convicted of a first offence is liable to a fine of '120 PU' or to imprisonment for 9 months. Section 60B(3) provides that in addition, for a first offence a court must disqualify the offender from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for at least 6 months. Plainly, that was the mandatory disqualification referred to by the magistrate in her exchange with Ms Carnegie in advance of Ms Carnegie electing to plead guilty. 18 As the penalty under the Road Traffic Act is expressed as a number of 'PU', one might harbour a reasonable expectation that the same statute would disclose what is meant by 'PU'. One searches forlornly through the 251 pages of the Road Traffic Act to fulfil that expectation. Any hope that it might be revealed by the glossary of 'Defined Terms' at the back of the Road Traffic Act will be disappointed: 'PU' did not merit selection among the 135 terms defined by that glossary. 19 Those convicted under s 60 before April 2015 would not have suffered such disappointment. Prior to that point, s 5 of the Road Traffic Act was headed 'Terms used', and sensibly included s 5(1a), which provided that 'PU' stood for 'penalty unit or penalty units'.2 20 However, no doubt armed with a compelling policy and a bureaucratic zeal, it was thought to be a good idea to repeal s 5 of the Road Traffic Act altogether and insert the meaning of 'PU' into a different statute. Some guide to the perplexed was provided by the replacement s 5 of the Road Traffic Act, which provides that 'the Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 Part 1 Division 2 provides for the meanings of some terms and abbreviations in this Act' (emphasis added). 21 Hope restored, one turns to the Road Traffic (Administration) Act. Alas though, the mystery is not resolved by so simple a task as turning to s 4 of that statute which is headed 'Terms used in road laws' and contains the meaning of 78 terms. Rather, after dealing with other terms and provisions concerning ownership of and responsibility for a vehicle, one arrives at s 7 of the Road Traffic (Administration) Act. While not over-explanatory, the heading does not lack for simplicity: 'Abbreviations'. The fourth entry in s 7(a) reveals that 'PU' stands for 'penalty unit or penalty units'. Section 7(b) then explains that 'a 2 See, Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) as at 2 April 2015 (repealed on 27 April 2015) s 5(1a). -- 9 of 19 -- [2026] WASC 242 SOLOMON J Page 10 reference to a number of 'PU' is a reference to an amount (in dollars) that is that number multiplied by 50'. 22 One is tempted to observe that it might have been put this way in the Road Traffic Act itself: '1 PU = $50.' 23 Section 61 of the Road Traffic Act creates the offence of dangerous driving. For this offence, the penalty is set out in the same section. Section 61(3) provides that, for a first offence in the absence of aggravating circumstances, the penalty is 'a fine of 60 PU'. 24 Returning to the issue of demerit points, one might have expected the penalty provisions within s 61 of the Road Traffic Act to include some reference to demerit points. The provision makes no reference to demerit points and there appears to be no reference to demerit points anywhere in the Road Traffic Act, other than in a schedule dealing with transitional provisions. Nor is there any indication in the Road Traffic Act that a further undisclosed penalty applies to a conviction under s 61 and that it is contained in another statute altogether - this time the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 (WA) (Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act). 25 Part 4 of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act is headed 'Demerit points'. Section 47 provides that the 'CEO' is to cause the demerit point offence and the number of demerit points that apply to be recorded against that person in the demerit points register. 'CEO' is not defined in the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act. It is however defined in a different statue - the Road Traffic (Administration) Act - which defines terms for any 'road law'. 'Road law' is defined to include the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act.3 The reader of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act would know that because s 3(2) of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act provides that the 'Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 Part 1 Division 2 provides for the meanings of some terms and abbreviations in this Act'. 26 Returning to pt 4 of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act, s 40 sets out the meaning of terms used in pt 4. Section 41 provides that yet another regulatory instrument - this time the 'regulations' - may prescribe an offence under a road law as a demerit point offence and specify the number of demerit points applying to the offence. 'Regulations' is not defined in either the general glossary in s 3 of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act or among the terms defined 3 Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 (WA) s 4 ('road law'). -- 10 of 19 -- [2026] WASC 242 SOLOMON J Page 11 by s 40. However, pt 5 of Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act, which is headed 'Miscellaneous', contains s 61, which empowers the Governor to make regulations prescribing any matter that is required or permitted by the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act to be prescribed. 27 The relevant regulations are the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Regulations 2014 (WA) (Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Regulations). Part 5 of those regulations is headed 'Demerit point scheme'. Regulation 65(2) provides that for the purposes of s 41 of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act, 'an offence under a provision of the Road Traffic Act 1974 that is mentioned in the Table is a demerit point offence in WA, and the number of demerit points set out in the Table opposite the provision is the number of demerit points applying to the offence'. Regulation 65(2) includes a table below the provision. 28 Under the table, the number of demerit points applying to s 61 is 6.4 29 In summary, for the offence of dangerous driving under s 61 of the Road Traffic Act: (1) Section 61 of the Road Traffic Act provides the penalty for a first-time offence as 60 PU; (2) PU is not defined or explained in the Road Traffic Act. However, it is explained in s 7 of the Road Traffic (Administration) Act as 'an amount (in dollars) that is that number multiplied by 50'; (3) There is no mention of any demerit points penalty in s 61 which otherwise sets out the penalty for the offence; (4) There is no relevant reference to demerit points in the Road Traffic Act at all; (5) Part 4 of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act deals with demerit points. Section 41 provides that the 'regulations' specify the number of points applicable to an offence. The term 'regulations' is not defined, but s 61 empowers the governor to make regulations. Section 47 provides that the CEO (defined in a different Act) is to cause the relevant number of demerit points to be recorded against the person; and 4 Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Regulations 2014 (WA) reg 65(2). -- 11 of 19 -- [2026] WASC 242 SOLOMON J Page 12 (6) Reg 65(2) of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Regulations includes a table. The table provides that six demerit points apply to an offence under s 61 of the Road Traffic Act. 30 That is the regulatory framework by which demerit points are applied for an offence under s 61 of the Road Traffic Act. It is effected administratively by the CEO and is not referenced in the penalty provision of the Road Traffic Act. 31 The other offence for which Ms Carnegie was penalised with demerit points was her contravention of reg 272(1) of the Road Traffic Code. The Road Traffic Code generally provides the penalty at the end of the relevant section. At the end of reg 272, the Road Traffic Code states: Points: 3 (driver) Modified penalty: 2 PU (driver or pedestrian) 32 Curiously, there does not appear to be anywhere in the Road Traffic Code explaining that 'Points' means demerit points. However, reg 9(5) of the Road Traffic Code provides that the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Regulations reg 65(3) and (4) 'make provision in relation to demerit point offences under these regulations and the demerit points for those offences'. Regulation 65(3) of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Regulations states that for s 41 of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act, 'an offence that involves the driving or use of a motor vehicle is a demerit point offence in WA if it is an offence under the Road Traffic Code for which a penalty is expressed as a number of points, and the number of demerit points applying to the offence is that number of points'. 33 Again, one is tempted to observe that it might have been simpler to state in the Road Traffic Code itself under the relevant provision: Demerit points = 3 (driver). Appeal 34 On 16 May 2025, Ms Carnegie filed an application for leave to appeal. The appeal notice indicated that the appeal was in respect of the sentence for all three charges. 35 An appeal against the decision of a court of summary jurisdiction cannot be commenced later than 28 days after the decision, unless this court orders otherwise. However, if a person is sentenced on a later date -- 12 of 19 -- [2026] WASC 242 SOLOMON J Page 13 than the date on which the person is convicted of the offence, the time for appeal runs from the date of sentencing. As the magistrate's orders were made on 2 April 2025, the last day to appeal under was 28 days later, on 30 April 2025 36 Therefore, Ms Carnegie requires an extension of time in which to appeal. Whether an extension of time is to be granted is ultimately determined by what is in the interests of justice. Ms Carnegie has not addressed the 16-day delay in any substantial way. However, as the extension was not opposed, Ms Carnegie is unrepresented, and given my conclusions in relation to this matter, I consider that it is in the interests of justice to grant an extension of time. 37 On 5 November 2025, Ms Carnegie filed an amended appeal notice. The amendments were not opposed. In the amended appeal notice, Ms Carnegie seeks leave to appeal against all three convictions. The appeal notice sets out one ground of appeal, which reads: 'Nine demerit points and loss of licence. I don't feel that previous trauma, human trafficking, was taken into account.' 38 Through her affidavit evidence, her written submissions and her oral submissions before me this morning, it was apparent that the substantive basis that Ms Carnegie advances in respect of her appeal, as expressed in that one ground, is this: that in Ms Carnegie's exchange with the magistrate, the magistrate did not make reference to the fact that, upon conviction following her plea of guilty, Ms Carnegie would receive demerit points. Ms Carnegie essentially says that she would not have pleaded guilty had she been aware of the consequence of the loss of demerit points, and that the failure to point that out in the circumstances was unfair and amounts to a substantial miscarriage of justice. 39 I understood the reference to her 'previous trauma, human trafficking' to be a reference to matters that Ms Carnegie wished to raise, had she been given the opportunity to defend the charge. I make two points about that understanding of the basis for Ms Carnegie's appeal. 40 The first is that that is the way that the respondent understood the appeal, and indeed, that is reflected both in the respondent's written submissions and confirmed in oral submissions before me today. 41 The second point is that much, if not most, of Ms Carnegie's affidavit evidence that she filed in respect of the appeal was directed to -- 13 of 19 -- [2026] WASC 242 SOLOMON J Page 14 the difficulties and trauma she says she experienced with law enforcement over many years. The respondent initially objected to all that evidence. I received the evidence on the basis that it was merely indicative of the matters that Ms Carnegie might have wished to raise had she not been persuaded to plead guilty and had elected to defend the matter. I make no finding about those matters. Nor by the admission of that evidence do I suggest that they establish the truth of the contents of the affidavits. On that basis, the respondent withdrew its objection, and the evidence was received. 42 Section 7(1) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) permits an aggrieved party to appeal to a single judge of this court in respect of the decision made by a court of summary jurisdiction. Under s 8(1)(b), an appeal may be made on the ground that there has been a miscarriage of justice. Section 8(2) expressly provides that the appeal may be advanced against the decision, even if the decision was made after a plea of guilty. Appeal against conviction following a plea of guilty 43 An appellant who seeks to appeal a conviction based on a plea of guilty is a matter that has been the subject of many decisions. I refer first to the decision of the High Court in Meissner v The Queen,5 in particular the joint judgment of Toohey and McHugh JJ, and the separate judgment of Dawson J. It is sufficient to observe that, particularly where an accused is represented by a lawyer - even if that lawyer be duty counsel who has not had a lengthy history in the matter - the court is entitled, and may appropriately act, on an unambiguous and unqualified plea of guilty. 44 Having examined the transcript of 29 October 2024, it is plain that Ms Carnegie pleaded guilty with the assistance of a lawyer in a manner that was unambiguous, and in respect of which there was no suggestion of any equivocation. The court was quite entitled to accept that plea of guilty. In my view, there is no substantial miscarriage of justice in the court accepting the plea of guilty in relation to the first two charges, and I would not be prepared to grant leave to appeal seeking to set aside those convictions. 45 The position is different, however, in relation to the third charge. The third charge engages the more complex principles which were set out in various decisions of the Court of Appeal, including Lawson v 5 Meissner v The Queen (1995) 184 CLR 132. -- 14 of 19 -- [2026] WASC 242 SOLOMON J Page 15 The State of Western Australia,6 Vella v The State of Western Australia,7 Murray v Northcott,8 Snook v The State of Western Australia [No 2],9 and Douglas v Director of Prosecutions.10 46 Based on these cases, I will emphasise two points. First, one of the established bases for setting aside a plea of guilty is where the guilty plea has been obtained by improper inducement. Secondly, it is important to point out that the circumstances which will amount to a miscarriage of justice are not closed and cannot be exhaustively listed. The ultimate question to be determined is whether Ms Carnegie has established in all the circumstances that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. In that regard, as was said in Murray v Northcott, much has been written as to the care which should be exercised in ascertaining the integrity of pleas of guilty in the courts of summary jurisdiction. 47 In addition to those principles, I observe that div 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) sets out the procedure for dealing summarily with any charge. Section 59 provides for the initial procedure in relation to the pleading and sets out the matters of which the court should be satisfied before requiring the accused to plead to the charge. Part 5 sets out provisions that are applicable to any prosecution in any court. Section 129(1) provides that the section applies if an accused pleads guilty in a court, but does not apply if the plea is made in a court of summary jurisdiction to a charge that is to be dealt with that does not apply in this case. 48 Section 129(2) states as follows: Unless the plea is a written plea given to a court of summary jurisdiction, the court must not accept the plea unless — (a) the accused is represented by a legal practitioner; or (b) if the accused is not so represented, the court is satisfied the accused understands the plea and its consequences. (emphasis added) 49 At the hearing of 2 April 2025, Ms Carnegie was not represented. Accordingly, s 129(2) applied. The court was therefore required to be satisfied that the accused understood the plea and its consequences. In 6 Lawson v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 212. 7 Vella v The State of Western Australia [2006] WASCA 129. 8 Murray v Northcott [1990] WAR 219. 9 Snook v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2015] WASCA 29. 10 Douglas v Director of Public Prosecutions [2025] WASCA 11. -- 15 of 19 -- [2026] WASC 242 SOLOMON J Page 16 my view, the 'consequences' include the statutory imposition of demerit points. 50 I should make it clear that my conclusions are not based on the statutory provision. I would have reached the same conclusions based on my assessment of the circumstances as a matter of justice. But I make reference to the wording of that section because I believe it reinforces and reflects the conclusions to which I have come. Consideration 51 The issue raised by this appeal arises from the magistrate's comments mentioned at [8] in the exchange regarding Ms Carnegie's plea of guilty. I should say immediately that although the cases refer to 'improper inducement', the word 'improper' needs to be understood in its rather technical sense. I do not doubt that the magistrate was motivated entirely by a desire not only for efficiency and common sense, but indeed to act in the interests of Ms Carnegie herself. Nevertheless, as I shall come to, the cases are replete with cautionary observations about comments that might be made by judges in relation to the prospect of penalty if an accused pleads guilty. 52 I am left with the clear impression and without any doubt that any reasonable person would have understood the magistrate to be saying that if Ms Carnegie pleaded guilty, a suspended fine and a spent conviction would be the extent of the consequences of the plea of guilty. Moreover, as set out above, the magistrate said in the course of an exchange with Ms Carnegie leading to her plea of guilty: [T]he risk for you is that you are convicted of a reckless driving, and then you will end up with a disqualification on your licence. What Sergeant's doing today, is giving you an option to resolve the matter by way of a dangerous driving… if you do take the charge to a trial it will be for reckless driving and if you are convicted it will be a fine and a six-month disqualification on your licence, minimum. 53 In my view, by those words, Ms Carnegie was entitled to believe that if she pleaded guilty it would not lead to a disqualification - by the imposition of demerit points or otherwise. 54 I have set out above the regulatory framework for the imposition of demerit points. Demerit points are a penalty which ordinary members of the community are commonly required to confront. It is an area of the law that the great majority of the public engage with in the course of their lives, often numerous times. It is perhaps the most -- 16 of 19 -- [2026] WASC 242 SOLOMON J Page 17 common penalty imposed by the Parliament in the everyday lives of the community; and yet, it is regulated by a labyrinth web of complexity better suited to a scavenger hunt at a Mensa picnic. 55 It is sufficient to observe that it is difficult enough for a lawyer, or indeed a judge, to understand how the operation of various provisions of different Acts and different sets of regulations conclude with the imposition of demerit points. I do not think it would be fair to have expected Ms Carnegie, even if she had read s 61 of the Road Traffic Act or reg 272 of the Road Traffic Code, to have understood what consequences would follow. 56 The matter of judges making observations about the consequences of pleading guilty have been discussed in a number of cases. Various authorities and issues in that context were discussed at some length by Nettle J in the decision of Guariglia v The Queen.11 The matter was also the subject of commentary by Lord Parker CJ in R v Turner.12 Nettle J also referred to various other decisions, including a judgment of Ipp J in the R v KCH in the New South Wales Court of Appeal.13 57 Nettle J's remarks included the following:14 [T]here is much to be said for Lord Parker CJ's view that, once an accused is subjected to a trial judge's intimation as to the advantages of pleading guilty, it is idle to suppose that the accused has a wholly free choice as to whether to plead guilty, … it seems to me as a matter of objective fact that, depending on the nature and terms of a judicial intimation as to the advantages of an accused pleading guilty, it may have a profound influence on the accused's decision to plead guilty and thus contribute materially to the entry of the plea. … If as a matter of objective fact a judicial intimation as to the advantages of pleading guilty is found to have contributed materially to an accused's decision to plead guilty, it is appropriate to regard the decision as having been procured by improper pressure and thus as not an exercise of the accused's free choice. ... A trial judge should not decide, and should be seen not to have decided, whether any or what discount is to be allowed for a plea of guilty until after the plea has been entered. To intimate in advance of a plea of guilty that such a plea would lead to a discount on sentence is an inappropriate engagement in judicial plea bargaining which has the 11 Guariglia v The Queen [2010] VSCA 343; (2010) 208 A Crim R 49. 12 R v Turner [1970] 2 QB 321, 327. 13 R v KCH [2001] NSWCCA 273; (2001) 124 A Crim R 233. 14 Guariglia v The Queen [34] - [35], [38]. -- 17 of 19 -- [2026] WASC 242 SOLOMON J Page 18 potential to dissuade an accused from exercising his or her rights, and thereby to result in a miscarriage of justice. 58 Counsel for the respondent made careful and, with respect, sensible submissions in advancing the argument that although the situation was unfortunate, it did not rise to the level of a substantial miscarriage of justice. Counsel submitted that the authorities have set out the matters that ought to be explained and disclosed by a magistrate in respect of consequences of sentencing. It is well established that those matters do not include the necessity for the magistrate to spell out all the consequences of pleading guilty, even a consequence that would inevitably follow by reason of the statutory scheme. Counsel submitted that if this court were to regard what occurred as a substantial miscarriage of justice, it would go well beyond what the authorities have established is required to be said by magistrates and it would impose an undue burden on magistrates in an already very difficult environment. 59 I accept, as I have said - indeed, on a number of occasions - that magistrates operate in a very difficult environment and must deal with matters essentially on the run in a pressured and stressful context.15 It would indeed be wrong for this court to unduly add to the burden of the extremely important work that they do. 60 Nevertheless, this is not a case where the magistrate simply did not avert to the consequences of a guilty plea. As I have explained, any reasonable person would have understood the magistrate to have indicated strongly to Ms Carnegie that a spent conviction and a suspended fine was all that would result from a plea of guilty. As I have said, the magistrate's express reference to disqualification in respect of the existing charge of reckless driving rather than the alternative charge of dangerous driving would have led a reasonable person in Ms Carnegie's position to believe that disqualification would not follow from a plea of guilty, howsoever that might arise. 61 In my view, that misunderstanding, however unfortunate, went to the root of Ms Carnegie's plea of guilty. The absence of any reference to the nine demerit points in my view must therefore amount to a substantial miscarriage of justice, notwithstanding the best intentions, the common sense and the good faith of the magistrate. In all the 15 See, eg, BH v Director of Public Prosecutions [2026] WASC 75 [164]; Murray v Feast [2023] WASC 273 [181]; Woodhouse v Leslie [2023] WASC 11 [33]. -- 18 of 19 -- [2026] WASC 242 SOLOMON J Page 19 circumstances, therefore, I am persuaded that the conviction for dangerous driving should be set aside. 62 Accordingly, what emerges from all of that is that the convictions of FR 9571 of 2024 and FR 9569 of 2024 will stand. The conviction for FR 9570 of 2024 for dangerous driving will be set aside. As the magistrate imposed one sentence for all three charges, it follows that the sentence in respect of all three charges will be set aside. Conclusion 63 Orders will be made extending time to bring leave to appeal in respect of the conviction for FR 9570 of 2024. Leave to appeal against that conviction will be granted and the appeal will be allowed. That conviction will be set aside and remitted back to the Magistrates Court for hearing. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. NV Associate to the Hon Justice Solomon 17 JUNE 2026 -- 19 of 19 --