RE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1971 (WA); EX PARTE LAWRENCE (a pseudonym) [2026] WASC 239

[2026] WASC 239 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CHAMBERS CITATION : RE RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT 1971 (WA); EX PARTE LAWRENCE (a pseudonym) [2026] WASC 239 CORAM : BYDDER J HEARD : 12 JUNE 2026 DELIVERED : 12 JUNE 2026 PUBLISHED : 16 JUNE 2026 FILE NO/S : CIV 1745 of 2026 MATTER : An application under the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) seeking leave to file an application to transfer a case in the Magistrates Court to the Supreme Court EX PARTE MICHAEL LAWRENCE (a pseudonym) Applicant Catchwords: Application for leave to file originating motion - Registrar refused to accept motion for filing per Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) O 67 r 5(1) - Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act (WA) s 39 - Motion to transfer civil case from Magistrates Court to this Court - Application dismissed - Turns on own facts -- 1 of 21 -- [2026] WASC 239 Page 2 Legislation: Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA) Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) Result: Application dismissed Category: B Representation: Counsel: Applicant : In Person Solicitors: Applicant : In Person Case(s) referred to in decision(s): GLJ v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore [2023] HCA 32; (2023) 280 CLR 442 Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd [No 2] [2021] WASCA 105 Newcrest Mining Ltd v Santos WA Northwest Pty Ltd [No 2] [2022] WASC 410 Re Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA); Ex parte Gates [2018] WASC 213 Re Rules of the Supreme Court; Ex parte Kiefer [2025] WASC 45 Souraki Azad v Jose [2023] WASC 160 UBS AG v Tyne [2018] HCA 45; (2018) 265 CLR 77 -- 2 of 21 -- [2026] WASC 239 BYDDER J Page 3 BYDDER J: Introduction (These reasons were delivered extemporaneously and have been edited from the transcript to include citations and quotations and to correct matters of grammar and infelicity of expression). 1 The applicant seeks leave pursuant to O 67 r 5(1) and r 5(3) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (Rules) to file an application by way of originating motion dated 21 April 2026 (Motion) to transfer a case in the Magistrates Court (Case) to this Court. 2 The applicant seeks leave following a decision by a Registrar of this Court to refuse to accept the motion for filing under the Rules O 67 r 5(1) on the ground that the Motion appeared to the learned Registrar to be an abuse of process of the Court or a frivolous or vexatious proceeding. 3 The Rules O 67 r 5 provides: (1) If any writ, process, motion, application or commission, which is presented for filing, issue or sealing appears to the registrar to be an abuse of the process of the Court or a frivolous or vexatious proceeding, the registrar shall refuse to file or issue such writ, process, motion, application or commission without the leave of a judge or a master first had and obtained by the party seeking to file or issue it. (2) In the case of a motion or an application ordinarily returnable before a master in chambers, an application for leave to file or issue such motion or application shall be made to a master in chambers. (3) In all other cases, an application or commission should be made to a judge in chambers. (4) Applications for leave under subrules (2) and (3) shall be made ex parte and shall be supported by affidavit. 4 The applicant filed an affidavit in support of his application for leave, sworn by him on 12 May 2026 and accepted for filing on 8 June 2026 (Affidavit). 5 Appendix A to the Affidavit is a letter from the applicant to the Court applying for leave under the Rules O 67 r 5(1) and r 5(3). While that letter should have stood alone as the application rather than being -- 3 of 21 -- [2026] WASC 239 BYDDER J Page 4 an appendix to the affidavit, the letter has been accepted for filing as the application for leave. 6 I shall return to the other appendices to the Affidavit later in my reasons. 7 I am satisfied that what the applicant has filed by way of the Affidavit is sufficient to comply with the requirements of the Rules O 67 r 5(1) and r 5(3), so that I should determine whether leave should be granted to file the Motion. For that purpose, I have considered the Affidavit, including all of its appendices, as well as the oral submissions made by the applicant in support of his application for leave this morning. 8 The applicant is a self-represented litigant. By analogy to Vaughan J's observation in Re Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA); Ex parte Gates1 in the context of an application for leave to file and issue a proposed writ, it is necessary to approach the Motion with some flexibility to assess whether the Motion discloses a viable basis upon which the Motion could be granted or could be put into proper form with appropriate amendment and a little assistance from the Court.2 9 Even affording those allowances to a self-represented litigant, like other litigants the applicant is subject to the Rules, which as Vaughan J observed in Gates 'are designed to enhance the efficiency and economy of litigation and reduce the unnecessary expenditure of private and public resources'.3 The material before the Court 10 The material before the Court on this application for leave to file the Motion is that application, the Motion, the Affidavit (including its appendices) and a letter the applicant filed yesterday requesting restricted access to certain documents. 11 The Affidavit has seven appendices, designated with the capital letters A through G. 12 I have already referred to Appendix A to the Affidavit, which is taken to be the application for leave to file the Motion. 1 Re Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA); Ex parte Gates [2018] WASC 213 (Gates) [3]. 2 See also Re Rules of the Supreme Court; Ex parte Kiefer [2025] WASC 45 (Kiefer) [15] (Lundberg J). 3 Gates [57]. -- 4 of 21 -- [2026] WASC 239 BYDDER J Page 5 13 Appendix B is the Motion. 14 Appendix C is a letter from the learned Registrar to the applicant dated 6 May 2026 informing the applicant that he had refused to accept the Motion for filing pursuant to the Rules O 67 r 5 and providing reasons for that refusal. 15 Appendix D is a document marked 'private and confidential' in which the applicant responds to matters raised by the learned Registrar in the letter that is Appendix C and requests that access be restricted to certain documents. 16 Appendix E is described by the applicant as 'the new affidavit to the CIV 1520 of 2026 in order to be accepted and filed'. However, the document is not an affidavit and has been neither sworn nor affirmed. Instead, the applicant has signed the document and makes a number of allegations of fact in the document. Those allegations are almost identical to the allegations which appear in the Motion. 17 Appendix F is described by the applicant as 'the partially reworked non-exclusive list of items stolen (the reason for the civil matter action), as referred to on lower page 3 of Appendix D'. The list ascribes a monetary value to some but not all of the items in the list. 18 Appendix G is a copy of part (but not all) of a General Procedure Claim form lodged in the Magistrates Court's civil jurisdiction on 22 June 2024, which commenced the Case in that court. The amount of the claim is stated to be $75,000, not including a court filing fee, a service fee and a travelling fee. The description of the claim is stated to be: Stolen items. Involvement in fraudulent court case for benefit Collaborations with others Threats. Violence. Crimes. 19 The applicant also made oral submissions in support of his application for leave before me this morning. -- 5 of 21 -- [2026] WASC 239 BYDDER J Page 6 20 I have carefully considered the material before the Court and the applicant's oral submissions in determining his application for leave to file the Motion. Consideration Transferring civil cases from the Magistrates Court to this Court 21 While the Motion does not refer to the relevant power to order that a civil case be transferred from the Magistrates Court to this Court, that power is to be found in s 39 of the Magistrates Court (Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 (WA) (Civil Proceedings Act). 22 Section 39 of the Civil Proceedings Act relevantly provides: (1) In this section — superior court means the District Court or the Supreme Court. (2) A party to a case in the Court may apply to a superior court for an order that all or a part of the case be transferred to the superior court. (3) The application must be made in accordance with the rules of court that apply in the superior court. (4) The superior court may make such an order if it is satisfied that all or a part of the case is within its jurisdiction and — (a) involves a claim by the claimant or another party, or an issue, that is outside the Magistrates Court's jurisdiction; or (b) should be dealt with by the superior court because of its complexity or because of a question of law involved. 23 Section 39(3) of the Civil Proceedings Act recognises the possibility that rules of court may deal with how an application is to be made under s 39. The Rules do not make specific provision for such an application. 24 However, an application under s 39 of the Civil Proceedings Act is business to be disposed of in chambers under the Rules O 59 r 1(1)(d), because it is an 'application that may be made to the Court or a judge under a written law of the State' and is not an appeal, an application to review a decision or an application that the law says cannot be heard in chambers. As such, an application to transfer a case from the Magistrates Court to this Court must (among other matters) state the -- 6 of 21 -- [2026] WASC 239 BYDDER J Page 7 orders sought by the applicant and the grounds of the application: the Rules O 59 r 3(1) and (3). Relevant legal principles 25 In addition to the principles applicable when an applicant for leave to file a document is self-represented, Gates and Kiefer identify the legal principles relevant to determining this application for leave. 26 Both Gates and Kiefer were concerned with an application to file and issue a writ. This matter is concerned with an application to transfer a civil case from the Magistrates Court to this Court. That difference will affect the application of the legal principles, because what is required of a writ may differ from what is required of an application to transfer a civil case. Nevertheless, the legal principles remain the same. 27 The Court should adopt a cautious approach to the exercise of the power to refuse leave under the Rules O 67 r 5, because doing so would have the effect of summarily dismissing the proceedings. A similarly cautious approach is taken to the procedures applicable to summary judgment applications by a plaintiff (Rules O 14 r 1(1)) or a defendant (Rules O 16 r 1(1)) and applications to strike out pleadings (Rules O 20 r 19(1)).4 28 Procedures of the kind for which the Rules O 67 r 5 provides are directed to foundational purposes to which the Court should give effect when exercising power under that rule, namely: (a) reinforcing the Court's inherent power to protect itself from the unwarranted waste of its time and resources, consistent with the object of 'maximising the efficient use of available judicial and administrative resources' (Rules O 1 r 4B(1)(c)); and (b) avoiding the loss that those required to defend actions which lack any substance would suffer.5 29 The question for determination is whether the proposed writ, process, motion, application or commission would be an abuse of process or a frivolous or vexatious proceeding.6 30 This involves an evaluative rather than a discretionary assessment giving rise to one uniquely right answer, rather than a range of possible 4 Kiefer [16] (Lundberg J); Gates [20] (Vaughan J). 5 Kiefer [17] - [19] (Lundberg J); Gates [19] (Vaughan J). 6 Gates [20] - [21] (Vaughan J). -- 7 of 21 -- [2026] WASC 239 BYDDER J Page 8 outcomes.7 The assessment involves balancing competing considerations relating to both public and private interests.8 31 As to what constitutes an abuse of process or a frivolous or vexatious proceeding, in Gates Vaughan J said:9 There is considerable overlap between the concepts of 'abuse of process' and whether a proceeding is 'frivolous' or 'vexatious'. The expressions are often used in conjunction or interchangeably. What amounts to an abuse of the court's process is insusceptible of a formulation comprising closed categories. It extends to all categories of case in which the processes and procedures of the court, which exist to administer justice with fairness and impartiality, may be converted into instruments of injustice or unfairness. Abuse of process occurs in any circumstance in which the use of the court's procedures would be unjustifiably oppressive to a party or would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. However, the onus of satisfying the court that there is an abuse of process is a heavy one. The power to dismiss proceedings as an abuse of process should be exercised with caution and only in the most exceptional or extreme case. In Rogers v The Queen McHugh J observed: Although the categories of abuse of procedure remain open, abuses of procedure usually fall into one of three categories: (1) the court's procedures are invoked for an illegitimate purpose; (2) the use of the court's procedures is unjustifiably oppressive to one of the parties; or (3) the use of the court's procedures would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Subsequently, in Ridgeway v The Queen, Gaudron J referred to 'abuse of process' in terms that included within the concept the notion of proceedings that are frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. Her Honour's observations bear repeating: The powers to prevent an abuse of process have traditionally been seen as including a power to stay proceedings instituted for an improper purpose, as well as proceedings that are 'frivolous, vexatious or oppressive'. This notwithstanding, there is no very precise notion of what is vexatious or oppressive or what otherwise constitutes an abuse of process. Indeed, the courts 7 Kiefer [22] (Lundberg J). See also GLJ v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Lismore [2023] HCA 32; (2023) 280 CLR 442 [17] - [18] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler & Jagot JJ), [95] (Steward J) and [161] (Gleeson J) in the context of determining whether to grant a permanent stay of proceedings. 8 Kiefer [21] (Lundberg J); see also Mineralogy Pty Ltd v Sino Iron Pty Ltd [No 2] [2021] WASCA 105 [163] (Buss P, Murphy & Beech JJA), citing UBS AG v Tyne [2018] HCA 45; (2018) 265 CLR 77 [7] (Kiefel CJ, Bell & Keane JJ). 9 Gates [25] - [33] (footnotes omitted). -- 8 of 21 -- [2026] WASC 239 BYDDER J Page 9 have resisted, and even warned against, laying down hard and fast definitions in that regard. That is necessarily so. Abuse of process cannot be restricted to 'defined and closed categories' because notions of justice and injustice, as well as other considerations that bear on public confidence in the administration of justice, must reflect contemporary values and, as well, take account of the circumstances of the case. That is not to say that the concept of 'abuse of process' is at large or, indeed, without meaning. As already indicated, it extends to proceedings that are instituted for an improper purpose and it is clear that it extends to proceedings that are 'seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging' or 'productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment'. (citations omitted) Proceedings will constitute an abuse of process if they are clearly doomed to fail or are plainly unsustainable. In the context of an application to strike out a claim or pleading the terms 'frivolous' and 'vexatious' have often been used interchangeably. For example, an action is frivolous if it is obviously (or plainly) unsustainable and an abuse of the process of the court. It may for the same reason be categorised as vexatious. An action is frivolous when it is not worthy of serious consideration, is insupportable in law, discloses no cause of action or is groundless. So too a matter that is without substance or is fanciful is frivolous. The term is apt to describe proceedings in which the plaintiff's claim is so obviously untenable that it cannot possibly succeed or in which there is no serious question to be tried. An action is vexatious if it has no reasonable prospects of success. The term has also been said to be apt to describe an action which is a sham and which cannot possibly succeed. Apart from the hopeless case - those that are obviously untenable or manifestly groundless - an action may be vexatious due to the motive of the litigant. Proceedings are vexatious if they are instituted with the intention of annoying or embarrassing the person against whom they are brought. So too proceedings are vexatious if they are brought for collateral purposes. A proceeding will also be vexatious if it is productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment. 32 I now turn to apply these principles to the application for leave before the Court. -- 9 of 21 -- [2026] WASC 239 BYDDER J Page 10 The Motion, the Affidavit and the requirements of s 39 of the Civil Proceedings Act This Court's power to transfer the Case 33 This Court's power to transfer all or part of the Case is conditioned on it being satisfied that all or a part of the Case is within this Court's jurisdiction and: (a) involves a claim by the claimant or another party, or an issue, that is outside the Magistrates Court's jurisdiction; or (b) should be dealt with by this Court because of its complexity or because of a question of law involved. Whether the Case falls within this Court's jurisdiction and outside the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court Subject to the jurisdictional limit, both courts appear to have jurisdiction 34 I have already referred to the description of the applicant's claim in the General Procedure Claim form (Appendix G to the Affidavit). That description sheds little if any light on the nature of the applicant's claim and uses language more consistent with criminal complaints than civil claims. 35 The Motion opens with the words: At the hearing below in the Supreme Court/ [sic], [the applicant] will apply for transferral of the matter (GCLM [matter number]) from the Magistrates Court to the Supreme Court of Western Australia. For the goal of: Full confession by THE DEFENDANT of who, where, when, how the items have been accessed, moved, located. FULL return of the stolen items. Plus additional financial damages for the pain, emotional distress, legal inconvenience, personal time, and efforts taken by THE PLAINTIFF to recover the items in the past five years. Those financial damages would be upward of $600 000. (Reasoning: the PLAINTIFF could have taken an annual job paying upward of $150 000 per annum, yet they have been stuck in COVID-era poverty, and forced to expend significant time progressing toward a civil trial to recover the valuable items. The covid-era has negatively impacted aspects of society including access to -- 10 of 21 -- [2026] WASC 239 BYDDER J Page 11 legal services, and the congestion of the WA courts, and congestion of the WA housing opportunities.) 36 It is not a purpose of civil proceedings to secure 'confessions'. In a civil context, the Rules include processes that may result in a party having to disclose matters which the party does not wish to disclose, such as through admissions to pleadings (the Rules O 20), answers to interrogatories (the Rules O 27), discovery and the production of documents (the Rules O 26 and O 36B) and the giving of evidence (see for example the Rules O 36). However, the purpose of those processes is to facilitate the just and efficient resolution of disputes and not to secure 'confessions'.10 37 Civil proceedings can be brought in this Court to recover possession of personal property that is unlawfully detained. However, the Magistrates Court also has civil jurisdiction in 'a claim to recover possession of personal property that is unlawfully detained where the value of the property is not more than the jurisdictional limit'.11 38 Civil proceedings can be brought in this Court on a cause of action for damages. Such a claim can be brought in respect of many (but not all) causes of action in the Magistrates Court, provided once again that the claim is not more than the jurisdictional limit.12 The cause or causes of action on which the applicant relies for damages is at best unclear from the General Procedure Claim form (Appendix G to the Affidavit) or the opening words of the Motion. It is also not apparent what other basis the applicant may have for obtaining damages or other compensation by order of this Court or any other court. 39 After the opening words of the Motion I have already quoted, the Motion sets out a number of allegations against the defendant as the grounds of the application to transfer the Case to this Court. Those allegations are largely but not entirely arranged under headings which correspond to the description in the General Procedure Claim to which I have already referred. 10 This is reflected in, for example, provision under the Evidence Act 1906 (WA) s 11 to compel an answer to an incriminating question in a proceeding which a person has declined to answer on the ground that the person's answer will incriminate or tend to incriminate the person, such that the answer will not be admissible in evidence in criminal proceedings against the person except for perjury committed in the proceeding. 11 Civil Proceedings Act s 6(1)(d). The jurisdictional limit does not apply if the parties consent to the Magistrates Court having jurisdiction (Civil Proceedings Act s 6(1)(f)), but there is no suggestion that the parties have consented in that way. 12 Civil Proceedings Act s 6(1)(a)(i). Once again, the jurisdictional limit does not apply if the parties consent. -- 11 of 21 -- [2026] WASC 239 BYDDER J Page 12 40 They contain serious allegations, including of criminal conduct, with nothing more before this Court than the bare assertion of the applicant to support them. Further, the allegations are not particularised in a way that would permit the defendant to respond appropriately to the allegations or enable this Court to identify and determine the issues in dispute in a manner consistent with the objects of positive case flow management. I will return to those objects in a moment. 41 The Motion also refers to the applicant's engagement with Western Australia Police and the steps he has taken to have his claims dealt with by the District Court and this Court. In addition, the Motion alleges that the defendant in the Case: is now trying (April 2026 and May 2026) to attempt efforts to cut and run BEFORE any trial commences. [The defendant] has stated [the defendant] is to sell [suburb stated] residential property where the goods are intrinsically linked. This is not a coincidence. It is a deliberate effort continue wrongdoing. 42 The Motion also contends that this Court: must not delay in transferring the matter and listing it for trial. There is urgency in the matter, due to the ongoing behaviour of THE DEFENDANT. 43 This contention assumes that the Case, if transferred, is at a stage where it could be listed immediately for trial. If regard is had solely to the material currently before this Court, the Case could not be listed immediately for trial if it was transferred to this Court. 44 The applicant's claims would have to be advanced in a manner that is consistent with the objects of positive case flow management, namely: (a) promoting the just determination of litigation; and (b) disposing efficiently of the business of the Court; and (c) maximising the efficient use of available judicial and administrative resources; and (d) facilitating the timely disposal of business; and (e) ensuring the procedure applicable, and the costs of the procedure to the parties and the State, are proportionate to the value, importance and complexity of the subject matter in dispute; and -- 12 of 21 -- [2026] WASC 239 BYDDER J Page 13 (f) that the procedure applicable, and the costs of the procedure to the parties, are proportionate to the financial position of each party.13 45 The Rules are to be construed and applied, and this Court's processes and procedures are to be conducted, so as best to ensure the attainment of those objects (the Rules O 1 r 4B(2)). On no view could it be said that listing the Case for trial in its current form (at least as it appears from the material currently before this Court) would be consistent with or ensure the attainment of those objects. Nor could it be said that the applicant's claim as expressed in the Motion and the General Procedure Claim form (Appendix G to the Affidavit) are compliant with the relevant requirements of the Rules. Significant work would have to be done before the Case could be listed for trial in this Court. 46 The applicant does not depose to the current status of the Case in the Magistrates Court or provide any further evidence about the Case, except for a reference to the defendant denying the applicant's allegation that the defendant has stolen any of the applicant's personal property at page 2 of Appendix D to the Affidavit. It may be there is additional material which could be put in evidence before this Court and support a different view on readiness for trial, including a more detailed statement of the applicant's claim and the defendant's response to that claim. 47 If the Case is ready for trial, the only reason on the material before this Court why the applicant cannot pursue an urgent hearing in the Magistrates Court is because the applicant contends that the Case is beyond that court's jurisdictional limit. Subject to the jurisdictional limit of the Magistrates Court, so far as can be ascertained from the material before this Court the applicant's claims in the Case are within the jurisdiction of both courts.14 The applicant's contention that the Case exceeds the Magistrates Court's jurisdictional limit 48 The jurisdictional limit of the Magistrates Court is $75,000.15 13 Rules O 1 r 4B(1). 14 I note in this regard that the applicant expressly rejects the suggestion that he is pursuing an action in defamation in the Magistrates Court case, which would not be within the Magistrates Court's jurisdiction (Civil Proceedings Act s 6(5)(c)): see the Affidavit, Appendix D, page 4. 15 Civil Proceedings Act s 4. -- 13 of 21 -- [2026] WASC 239 BYDDER J Page 14 49 In Appendix F to the Affidavit, the applicant refers to various items which he alleges were stolen from him. As I have noted, the applicant ascribes a monetary value to some (but it appears not all) of the items in that list. 50 Many of the items on the list to which the applicant ascribes a monetary value are items which can be of little or any value in and of themselves, but are ones to which the applicant attributes value because he believes they constitute evidence which may lead to the recovery of damages or compensation in legal proceedings. A sample of those items, drawn from the first to appear in the list, will be sufficient to indicate the nature of those items: 1994. Log book. Entries took 90 hours plus. Directly related to legal case. [Privileged]: Discussions with school authorities. Relevant facts. Incident reports. Value: Upwards of $150 000. … 1995. Discussions with certain members of the public. Facts. Advice. Upwards of $40 000. Legal Aid applications. Supporting documents etc. Including [Privileged] information. Mail from Legal Aid. [Privileged]: Youth Legal aid discussions. Value: Upwards of $100 000. [Privileged] Interactions with Perth District Court, Registry staff, Court of Petty Sessions. Paperwork. Names. Advice. Instructions. Mail correspondence from court. Receipts. Phone call list and phone call log of phone calls directly related to/from courts. Value: Upwards of $300 000. Mail from community organisations directly related to Legal matters. Value: Upwards of $45 000. Business cards. Names of 'responsible adults' involved in some way in helping me versus the restraining order lies being peddled. [Privileged] information. Value: upwards of $70 000. -- 14 of 21 -- [2026] WASC 239 BYDDER J Page 15 Receipts. Weekly living cost budgets. Month, by month. AusStudy application/s. Paperwork. Supporting evidence. Rental receipts. Value: Upwards of $17 000. … 1996. Correspondence with courts. Receipts. Mail to /from. Written discussions. Typed discussions. Across 40 weeks of the year. Substantial time. [Privileged] information. Correspondence with Legal Aid. Letter/s from. Evidence, explanations. [Privileged] information. Youth Legal Aid. Meetings. Discussions. Valuable advice. [Privileged] information. Written logs. Name cards, points of contact. Research. Legal research (more than four weeks cumulative). Newspaper, media articles. Dates, Reporter names, issue numbers. Typed defence. Written Defence for two false Restraining order applications. Extensive preparations for trial. Trial notes (written/typed), evidence, etc. Witness lists, questions of witnesses. Questions for police. Etc. Disks -5¼ floppy disks, PC programs. Computer database. Value: Upwards of $3000. All information associated with successful Restraining order application against [redacted]. Preparatory work, evidence, questions. Etc. Police contact, names, discussions. [Privileged] information. Legal prep work -assaults and more. For impending trial. Value: Upwards of $30m. (Reason: ongoing effects since then of my name being trashed, sullied -with specific regard to ramifications of 1996.) Community contacts, leads, organisations. (extensive time put in.) Photos. Negatives of photos. Log books. Receipt books. Evidence of weekly living costs. Week by week. Rental receipts. Value: Upwards of $27 000 (Due to difficulty of trying to reconstruct that specific day by day information). Medical centre visit for cut ear. Ear drops for. Medicare receipt of. (Courtroom related) [Privileged] information. [Value]: Upwards of $2m. (Why. Because it really happened.) -- 15 of 21 -- [2026] WASC 239 BYDDER J Page 16 … 1997. Receipts. Phone call logs to/from Perth Central Courts. [Privileged] information. Legal work (substantial personal time put in.) 1st week January-March 1007. June 1997 to December 1997. Least 42 weeks of the year. Discussions with WA Police January, February. Paperwork served by WA Police. Names, roles. Evidence supplied to WA Police. Application/s and supporting information to Legal Aid. Applications to AuStudy [sic] and background information. End of January, February 1997. Food and living receipts provided to Commonwealth Government as evidence of week to week costs. (February -April 1997). Trial File/s for February 1997. All the court records, printouts, names, times, . Value: Upwards of Upwards of $70m. (Why. Ramifications of that turned more and more people in the public away from me. Put in the fullest of efforts, yet clearly was a lack of effort from others. 51 To the extent that the applicant contends that these items (and similar items on the list) have anything like the values he attributes to them in and of themselves, those contentions are fanciful. To the extent that the applicant contends that these items are evidence that is necessary or at least important to successfully pursuing legal proceedings which will result in damages or other compensation equivalent to the values which he ascribes to them, this Court could not be satisfied of those matters on the material before it. 52 There are other items in the list in Appendix F to the Affidavit to which the applicant ascribes a value of which the Court cannot possibly be satisfied on the material before it. To take one example, cited in respect of the year 1999: Information database. Value: $70 000 upwards. 53 Of the remaining items on the list in Appendix F to the Affidavit to which the applicant ascribes a value, the sum of those alleged values is well below the Magistrates Court's jurisdictional limit of $75,000. 54 I have already referred to the applicant's claim for damages. As I have said, the cause or causes of action on which the applicant relies for -- 16 of 21 -- [2026] WASC 239 BYDDER J Page 17 damages is at best unclear and it is not apparent what other basis the applicant may have for obtaining damages or some other form of compensation. 55 Further, on the material before this Court the applicant's claim in the Case is for $75,000, not including certain fees. A claim for $75,000 is within the jurisdictional limit of the Magistrates Court and it is the Case, involving a claim for $75,000, that the applicant wishes to apply to transfer to this Court. This Court could not be satisfied that the Case falls outside the Magistrates Court's jurisdiction 56 For all of these reasons, this Court could not be satisfied that the Case involves a claim by the applicant or another party, or an issue, that is outside the Magistrates Court's jurisdiction. It follows that it would not be open to this Court to transfer the Case from the Magistrates Court unless the Case should be dealt with by this Court because of its complexity or because of a question of law involved. Whether the Case should be dealt with by this Court because of its complexity or because of a question of law involved 57 The applicant does not rely on this basis for transferring the Case to this Court. 58 Further, the material before the Court does not identify any complexity or question of law which suggests that the Case should be dealt with by this Court. 59 On the material before the Court, it could not be satisfied that the Case should be dealt with by this Court because of its complexity or because of a question of law involved. Conclusion 60 On the material before the Court, the applicant's application to transfer the Case to this Court has no reasonable prospects of success because, for the reasons I have given: (a) the only apparent reason why the Case could be said to be outside that court's jurisdiction is that it exceeds the Magistrates Court's jurisdictional limit and this Court could not be satisfied on the material before it that the Case exceeds that limit; -- 17 of 21 -- [2026] WASC 239 BYDDER J Page 18 (b) it has not been suggested that the Case should be dealt with by this Court because of its complexity or because of a question of law involved and there is nothing in the material before this Court that would enable it to be satisfied that there is complexity or a question of law of the relevant kind; and (c) in those circumstances this Court could not order the transfer of the Case under s 39 of the Civil Proceedings Act. 61 As his proposed application under s 39 of the Civil Proceedings Act has no reasonable prospects of success, it is vexatious and leave should not be granted to the applicant to file his proposed application. Further, the nature of the issues I have identified with the Motion is such that if leave was granted to file the Motion, it would be unjustifiably oppressive upon the defendant in the Case currently before the Magistrates Court to have to respond to the Motion and it is inevitable that the disputes the Motion would generate would waste the time and resources of this Court, the applicant and the defendant in the Case. 62 I have considered whether I should give the applicant an opportunity to amend the Motion before I determine his application for leave to file it. I have also considered whether the applicant should be given the opportunity to file additional evidence before I determine his application for leave. However, the difficulties I have identified with the Motion and the other material before the Court are such that it would not be appropriate to do either of those things. 63 Leave should not be granted to file the Motion in its current form. I respectfully agree with the learned Registrar that the Motion is an abuse of process or otherwise frivolous or vexatious. 64 The view I have taken does not preclude the applicant from seeking to file another application to transfer the Case to this Court under s 39 of the Civil Proceedings Act. However, it would be necessary for the applicant to identify in his application (supported by an appropriate affidavit) the orders he seeks and his grounds for seeking those orders, including why he says that the Case (or part of the Case) he seeks to have transferred: (a) involves a claim by the claimant or another party, or an issue, that is outside the Magistrates Court's jurisdiction; or -- 18 of 21 -- [2026] WASC 239 BYDDER J Page 19 (b) should be dealt with by this Court because of its complexity or because of a question of law involved. 65 The Court's refusal of leave to file the Motion should not be taken to express a concluded view about whether an application to transfer all or part of the Case to this Court under s 39 of the Civil Proceedings Act would have merit, or any view at all on whether the applicant has any claim with substance against the defendant in the Case or against anyone else. Other matters 66 The Court may make an order on its own initiative or on the application of any person that restricts access to information or a record or other thing (matter) if it considers, relevantly, that in the interests of justice access to the matter should be restricted or the matter is privileged or confidential.16 67 The learned Registrar made a consent order on 13 May 2026 in the following terms: 1. Until further order of the Court: (a) the Originating Motion dated 21 April 2026; and (b) the Affidavit of [redacted] sworn on 12 May 2026 and attachments to the affidavit, (the Documents) are restricted documents on the basis of the interests of justice. 2. Unless otherwise ordered, the existence and content of the Documents restricted by these orders are not to be accessible to or known to: (a) any other party to this proceeding; or (b) subject to order 3, any other person. 3. These orders do not restrict the existence and content of Documents being accessible to or known to judicial officers or staff of the Court. 68 The applicant maintains his request for access to be restricted in those terms. However, his principal concern is with Appendix C and Appendix D to the Affidavit, about which he says he has 'Concerns 16 Rules O 67B r 5. -- 19 of 21 -- [2026] WASC 239 BYDDER J Page 20 around [the learned Registrar's] letter being used to thwart, discredit, deny, the lawful progression of my civil matter in the courts of Western Australia.'17 69 In determining whether it is in the interests of justice for access to the Motion or any part of the Affidavit to be restricted, I must have regard to the open justice principle.18 Having regard to that principle, I am not persuaded that it is in the interests of justice to restrict access to the Motion or any part of the Affidavit for the reason given by the applicant. I have made it clear that the Court's refusal of leave to file the Motion does not involve any view at all on whether the applicant has any claim with substance against the defendant in the Case or against anyone else. 70 I have also reviewed the Motion and the Affidavit to determine whether any part of those documents is confidential or privileged. There are references in the documents to certain appendices being 'private and confidential'. That does not suffice to make them confidential. There are also references in the Affidavit to certain things being privileged. I have quoted some of those references in my reasons. There is nothing in the Affidavit (or my reasons) which would waive legal professional privilege in those things if it exists. 71 However, access to an affidavit containing material that is scandalous, irrelevant or otherwise oppressive has been restricted by order under the Rules O 67B r 5.19 The Motion and the Affidavit contain serious allegations against the defendant in the Case, with nothing more than the bare assertion of the applicant to support them. In those circumstances, it is in the interests of justice that the Court of its own motion restrict access to the Motion and the Affidavit under the Rules O 67B r 5. 72 The applicant also seeks restricted access to the letter he filed yesterday. I would not restrict access to that letter on the basis sought by the applicant, namely that '[i]t would simply be used to discredit my lawful, honest efforts in a near-future civil trial'. However, access to the letter should be restricted given that it refers to other material which I have concluded should be restricted. 17 Affidavit, Appendix D, page 1. 18 The relevant principles were summarised in Newcrest Mining Ltd v Santos WA Northwest Pty Ltd [No 2] [2022] WASC 410 [17] - [18] (Tottle J). 19 Souraki Azad v Jose [2023] WASC 160 [71] (Lundberg J). -- 20 of 21 -- [2026] WASC 239 BYDDER J Page 21 73 I have quoted from parts of the Motion and the Affidavit in my reasons and have considered whether those parts of my reasons should be suppressed. I have concluded that they should not be suppressed. 74 Those quotations do not identify the defendant, do not provide information that is likely to lead to the identification of the defendant and do not describe the allegations made against the defendant in anything but the most general terms. However, to minimise the risk of the defendant being inadvertently identified, the name of the applicant will also be anonymised in my published reasons. Conclusion and orders 75 For these reasons, I will make the following orders. 1. The application for leave to file the originating motion dated 21 April 2026 (originating motion) is refused. 2. The consent orders made by a Registrar of this Court on 13 May 2026 restricting access to certain documents are vacated. 3. Pursuant to Order 67B rule 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) and until further order of the Court, access to the originating motion, the application for leave to file the originating motion dated 11 May 2026, the applicant's affidavit sworn 12 May 2026 (including all of its Annexures) and the applicant's letter filed 11 June 2026 is restricted to the judicial officers and staff of this Court, because it is in the interests of justice that others not have access to the allegations made by the applicant in those documents. 4. There be no order as to costs. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. ST Associate to the Hon Justice Bydder 16 JUNE 2026 -- 21 of 21 --