WATTS -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2026] WASCA 83

[2026] WASCA 83 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA) CITATION : WATTS -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2026] WASCA 83 CORAM : VAUGHAN JA HALL JA SEAWARD JA HEARD : 22 APRIL 2026 DELIVERED : 22 APRIL 2026 PUBLISHED : 15 JUNE 2026 FILE NO/S : CACR 15 of 2026 BETWEEN : REBECCA DENYCE WATTS Appellant AND THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Respondent ON APPEAL FROM: Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Coram : PETRUSA DCJ File Number : IND 963 of 2025 -- 1 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 Page 2 Catchwords: Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Attempt to pervert course of justice - Where appellant made false report to police that her car had been stolen in attempt to prevent her partner from being charged with driving offences - Where appellant sentenced to 20 months' immediate imprisonment - Where appellant sought to rely on additional evidence on appeal regarding nature and extent of domestic violence - Whether additional evidence admissible on appeal - Whether additional evidence establishes miscarriage of justice - Whether sentence of 20 months' imprisonment manifestly excessive Legislation: Criminal Code (WA), s 143 Result: Leave to appeal on grounds 1 and 2 granted Appeal allowed Appellant resentenced to 12 months' immediate imprisonment Category: B Representation: Counsel: Appellant : M J Ajduk Respondent : T B L Scutt Solicitors: Appellant : Legal Aid (WA) Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Betts v The Queen [2016] HCA 25; (2016) 258 CLR 420 Charles v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 114 Goulding v The Queen (1991) 56 A Crim R 75 Kabambi v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44 -- 2 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 Page 3 M v The Queen [2004] WASCA 236 Norton v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 75 R v Roach [2005] VSCA 162 R v Swain [1999] WASCA 22 R v Z [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 AC 467 Ranford v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2006] WASCA 243; (2006) 166 A Crim R 451 Rinaldi v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 53 Sabri v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 71 The King v Huang [2025] NSWSC 120 Tiknius v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 215; (2011) 221 A Crim R 365 Wale v The Queen [2001] WASCA 418 Wellstead v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 130 Wright v The Queen (Unreported, CCAS Ct of WA, Library No 920531, 20 August 1992) -- 3 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 VAUGHAN & SEAWARD JJA Page 4 VAUGHAN & SEAWARD JJA: Overview 1 At the hearing of this appeal on 22 April 2026, we joined with Hall JA in making orders granting the appellant leave to appeal, allowing the appeal and resentencing the appellant to a term of 12 months' immediate imprisonment, with reasons to follow. 2 We have had the considerable benefit of reading the reasons of Hall JA in draft. 3 In relation to ground 1, we would not grant the appellant leave to rely on the additional material for the purposes of establishing that there has been a miscarriage of justice. We would therefore dismiss ground 1 of the appeal. There was, however, a reasonable prospect of the ground succeeding. Hence why we joined in the order granting leave to appeal on ground 1. 4 Whilst we agree that ground 2 of the appeal should be allowed, we have reached our conclusion that the original sentence was manifestly excessive without having regard to the additional material that the appellant sought leave to rely on in the appeal. 5 Our conclusion that the sentence was manifestly excessive required this court to resentence the appellant. For the purposes of that resentencing exercise, we would grant the appellant leave to rely on the additional material. 6 Our reasons for reaching these conclusions are as follows. Ground 1 7 The reasons of Hall JA comprehensively summarise the background facts; the appellant's personal circumstances; the pre-sentence reports; the sentencing hearing and remarks; the grounds of appeal; the application to adduce additional evidence (and the details of that additional evidence); the statement of uncontested facts; and the parties' respective cases on appeal. We will not repeat those details here. 8 By ground 1, the appellant submits that there has been a miscarriage of justice as a result of the sentencing judge not being aware of the full extent of the violent nature of the relationship between the appellant and her partner. In support of this ground, the appellant seeks leave to rely on additional material in the appeal being an affidavit she -- 4 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 VAUGHAN & SEAWARD JJA Page 5 affirmed on 19 March 2026, providing further details regarding her relationship with her partner and the nature and extent of the violence perpetrated against her by her partner. The appellant also seeks to rely on a number of police incident reports and an amended pre-sentence report dated 1 October 2025 that was not brought to the attention of the sentencing judge. 9 The legal principles concerning an allegation of a miscarriage of justice arising from an absence of material before a sentencing judge were outlined by this court in Wellstead v The State of Western Australia.1 Relevant principles and passages from Wellstead are stated in the reasons of Hall JA. In Wellstead the court went on to state:2 [A] conclusion that additional evidence means that a different sentence should have been imposed involves two essential steps. First, the absence of the evidence at first instance gave rise to a miscarriage of justice. Secondly, when account is taken of the additional evidence, the appellate court considers that a different sentence should have been imposed. Thus in KWLD (like in Wheeler), the court refused to admit additional evidence which did not give rise to any reasonable possibility that the sentences imposed would have been different. However, the existence of such a reasonable possibility will not necessarily be sufficient in all cases to establish a miscarriage of justice, particularly where the evidence was known to but not used by an appellant. (emphasis added) 10 The qualification as italicised is bound up in the available grounds and limits of appellate intervention. 11 We are not satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist in this case so as to justify the grant of leave to rely on the appellant's affidavit evidence or the police incident reports for the purposes of ground 1. 12 It is significant in our view that whilst the appellant's affidavit evidence provides further details as to the nature of her domestic relationship, the appellant does not provide any explanation as to why this information was not provided to her counsel at sentencing or to the sentencing judge. 13 There will be some instances where clear inferences can be drawn from a sentencing transcript. In those circumstances, it may be that further explanation is not required. 1 Wellstead v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 130 [91] - [97]. 2 Wellstead [99]. -- 5 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 VAUGHAN & SEAWARD JJA Page 6 14 However, where a ground of appeal alleges a miscarriage of justice in the sentencing process, and that miscarriage arises because information that was known to the appellant was not put before the sentencing judge, we consider it will ordinarily be necessary for a full, frank and cogent explanation to be provided as to why that information was not put before the sentencing judge. Otherwise, the distinction between an appeal and the original sentencing process tends to be obliterated. Insofar as the information was known to the appellant it constitutes evidence that could and ordinarily should have been adduced at the sentencing hearing rather than on appeal after dissatisfaction with the sentencing outcome. 15 Whilst, as Wellstead confirms, the absence of material evidence before the sentencing court may give rise to a miscarriage of justice, where such material evidence was known to the appellant it will only be in an 'exceptional case' that the court will be persuaded that the omission to disclose the evidence has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.3 The onus to demonstrate such an exceptional case lies on the appellant. Where this requires explanation of an omission to adduce available evidence as part of the sentencing process, the omission must ordinarily be the subject of direct evidence by the appellant himself or herself. 16 There is no dispute that the information contained in the appellant's affidavit, which the appellant now seeks leave to rely on, was known to the appellant at the time of her sentencing. The appellant's written and oral sentencing submissions refer to the issue of her domestic relationship and the appellant's counsel at the sentencing hearing submitted that whilst the appellant was not relying on the defence of duress or coercion, the nature of the relationship was nonetheless relevant to the appellant's moral culpability. 17 Further, whilst the appellant may not have had copies of the police incident reports at the time of sentencing, the facts underpinning those police reports must have been known to the appellant at the time of the sentencing. Again, no explanation has been provided as to why this information was not provided to the appellant's counsel or the sentencing judge. 18 On appeal, the appellant's counsel (who was not counsel at the sentencing) invited the court to infer from the sentencing transcript that the appellant had additional information that she wished to provide to the sentencing judge. This was said to have happened when it became clear 3 M v The Queen [2004] WASCA 236 [7] (Steytler J); Wellstead [97] (see also [99]). -- 6 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 VAUGHAN & SEAWARD JJA Page 7 that the sentencing judge considered that the information provided by the appellant to that point was lacking in detail. Counsel submits that the appellant did not make a deliberate forensic decision not to rely on that information at sentencing. 19 Whilst that may be one available inference that can be drawn from the sentencing transcript, there is no affidavit evidence confirming that this was the case or providing any explanation as to why the appellant had not previously provided that information to her counsel to provide to the sentencing court. Counsel for the appellant made a number of submissions in this regard. At times these submissions invited the court to draw further inferences from the sentencing transcript. Counsel for the respondent not only addressed those inferences, but also put forward alternative inferences that he submitted might also be drawn from the transcript. 20 In our view, with no disrespect to counsel in the appeal, both of whom assisted the court in a meaningful way by the provision of very helpful and considered written and oral submissions in the context of an urgent appeal, the number and extent of the inferences that the court was invited to draw from the transcript and associated documents highlights why an appellant in an appeal such as this ought generally provide an explanation on oath or affirmation as to what occurred and why the evidence was not presented to the sentencing judge. A risk of not doing so, is that the parties may invite the court to move from drawing inferences to the realm of speculation or conjecture. We do not consider this to be a sound basis for considering an appeal alleging a miscarriage of justice of this nature. That is particularly so when it is well within the power of the appellant to provide direct evidence on the critical issue. 21 In relation to the amended pre-sentence report, we agree with Hall JA that whilst it was not before the sentencing judge, it contains no material additional information regarding the nature of the appellant's relationship with her partner. In those circumstances we do not consider it can be said that a different sentence would have been imposed on the basis of the amended pre-sentence report alone. 22 Therefore, we are not satisfied that a miscarriage of justice has occurred because the appellant's affidavit evidence, the police incident reports and the amended pre-sentence report were not before the sentencing judge. We would therefore not grant the appellant leave to rely on the additional material for the purposes of ground 1 of the appeal. Ground 1 should be dismissed. -- 7 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 VAUGHAN & SEAWARD JJA Page 8 Ground 2 23 By ground 2, the appellant submits that the sentence of 20 months' immediate imprisonment is manifestly excessive as to both type and length. 24 The legal principles governing appeals alleging that a sentence is manifestly excessive (or inadequate) are not in dispute and were outlined by this court in Kabambi v The State of Western Australia.4 The relevant principles and passages are stated in the reasons of Hall JA. 25 We have reached the same conclusion in relation to ground 2 as Hall JA, being that in all the circumstances whilst a sentence of immediate imprisonment was justified, a sentence of 20 months' immediate imprisonment was unreasonable or plainly unjust. 26 In reaching this conclusion, we have had regard to the maximum penalty; the circumstances and seriousness of the offending; the appellant's personal circumstances; and the various comparable cases (as summarised by Hall JA). 27 In considering the appellant's personal circumstances, we have had regard to the information that was before the learned sentencing judge in relation to her relationship with her partner, but not the additional material which the appellant now seeks leave to rely on in the appeal. Also relevant to our conclusions are that the appellant pleaded guilty at the earliest opportunity and expressed remorse for her actions. Further, the appellant does not have a criminal record containing any similar offences and is the carer of two young children. 28 In reaching our conclusion, we agree with Hall JA's conclusions as to the seriousness of the offending ([123] of his Honour's reasons) and in relation to general deterrence ([125] - [126] of his Honour's reasons). Resentencing 29 In light of our conclusion regarding ground 2, it fell to this court to exercise the sentencing discretion afresh. This court had all the necessary information to carry out that sentencing exercise. 30 We considered it was open to this court to have regard to the appellant's affidavit evidence, the amended pre-sentence report and the police incident reports for the purposes of resentencing the appellant. 4 Kabambi v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44 [21]. -- 8 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 VAUGHAN & SEAWARD JJA HALL JA Page 9 31 There was no objection by the respondent to the receipt of the material for this purpose.5 32 Further, whilst counsel for the respondent referred to the decision of the High Court in Betts v The Queen,6 we consider the situation in Betts is sufficiently different to the present case. Here, the appellant does not seek to run a different case by way of mitigation on appeal than she did before the sentencing judge. Rather, the appellant seeks to provide further details of a central element of her plea in mitigation, being the nature of her relationship with her partner and the impact of this on her moral culpability. 33 We agreed with Hall JA, for the reasons his Honour has given, that the appellant should be resentenced to a term of immediate imprisonment of 12 months, backdated to commence on 7 October 2025, and that the appellant be eligible for parole. Conclusion 34 For these reasons, we joined in the making of the orders outlined in [139] of Hall JA's reasons. HALL JA: 35 At the conclusion of the hearing of this appeal against sentence the court made orders granting leave to appeal, allowing the appeal and resentencing the appellant, with reasons to follow. These are my reasons for joining in those orders. 36 The appellant was convicted on her plea of guilty of one count of attempting to pervert the course of justice, contrary to s 143 of the Criminal Code (WA). The offence involved the making of a false report to police that the appellant's car had been stolen. The false report was made to prevent her partner being prosecuted on a charge of recklessly driving the vehicle whilst being pursued by police. On 7 October 2025, the appellant was sentenced to 20 months' immediate imprisonment with an order that she be eligible for parole. She sought leave to appeal against that sentence. 37 There are two grounds of appeal. The first ground alleges that there has been a miscarriage of justice as a result of the sentencing judge not being aware of the full extent of the violent nature of the 5 Appeal ts 19. 6 Betts v The Queen [2016] HCA 25; (2016) 258 CLR 420. -- 9 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 10 relationship between the appellant and her partner. The appellant alleges that relevant information contained in an amended pre-sentence report was not brought to the attention of the sentencing judge. The appellant also seeks to rely on additional evidence on the appeal, including an affidavit sworn by her and a number of police incident reports. The second ground alleges that the sentence is manifestly excessive as to both type and length, having regard to the circumstances of the offence, the appellant's personal circumstances, the maximum penalty and comparable cases. 38 Although the amended pre-sentence report was not before the sentencing judge, it contains no material additional information regarding the nature of the appellant's relationship. The appellant's affidavit and the police incident reports do, however, contain relevant additional information. That information provides details of the duration, nature and frequency of violence and shows that the appellant was fearful of her partner. The additional information also shows that the appellant's partner requested her to make the false report in terms that contained an implied threat. Whilst the learned sentencing judge made some allowance for the fact that the appellant was in a violent relationship and that her partner had requested her to make the false report, the significance of that relationship was not apparent from the limited information that was available at that time. The additional evidence should be admitted on the appeal as there is a satisfactory explanation for why it was not adduced in the sentencing proceedings, and it establishes that a different sentence should have been imposed. 39 As regards ground 2, taking into account that the appellant entered a plea of guilty at the first reasonable opportunity, was remorseful, was the mother of two dependent young children and made the false report at the behest of her partner with whom she was in a relationship marked by persistent domestic violence, the sentence of 20 months' imprisonment was unreasonable or plainly unjust. The circumstances of the offence were sufficiently serious that, notwithstanding the appellant's personal circumstances, a sentence of immediate imprisonment was appropriate. However, 20 months' imprisonment was beyond the range of sentences properly open in the circumstances of this case. 40 For the more detailed reasons that follow, I agreed that leave to appeal should be granted on both grounds, the appeal allowed, the sentence of 20 months' imprisonment set aside, and the appellant resentenced. The appeal was brought out of time and an extension was -- 10 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 11 required. Although the delay was not adequately explained, an extension was granted having regard to the merits of the appeal. I agreed that the new sentence should be one of 12 months' immediate imprisonment with an order that the appellant be eligible for parole. The facts 41 At about 12.10 am on Thursday, 12 December 2024, the driver of a white Holden Commodore Calais motor vehicle was involved in a pursuit with police in Port Kennedy and drove recklessly to evade being apprehended.7 The driver of the vehicle was JB, the domestic partner of the appellant. The appellant was the registered owner of the vehicle. 42 JB successfully evaded police and abandoned the vehicle in Meadow Springs to avoid being apprehended by police. He telephoned the appellant and asked her to pick him up in Meadow Springs in an Uber rideshare.8 43 Shortly after the police pursuit, and whilst the appellant was out collecting JB, police attended at the appellant's home address in Hillman. This was the address shown in the vehicle registration records. Police officers spoke to the appellant's adult daughter in relation to the whereabouts of the vehicle. Whilst police were in attendance, the appellant's daughter exchanged text messages with the appellant.9 The appellant told her daughter to tell the police that the car had been stolen. It became apparent to the police that the appellant had told her daughter to say this and, being suspicious that this was a false report, the officers told the appellant's daughter to tell the appellant not to make such a report. 44 Later that same day, the appellant and JB formulated a plan to report the vehicle stolen as JB believed that there was a chance that the police had identified him during the pursuit, and that he would be charged with that offence. The intention in making the false report was to prevent JB being prosecuted for his reckless driving whilst being pursued by police the night before. 45 At 2.59 pm on 12 December 2024, the appellant called the general police telephone number and made a false report that her car had been stolen from her home address. She told the police operator that the car 7 ts 5. 8 ts 6. 9 ts 6. -- 11 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 12 had been stolen at around 10.20 pm - 10.40 pm the previous night.10 She said that, at that time, she was sitting in her front lounge room trying to get her daughter to sleep, and that her partner was present. She said that they were watching a movie, and they thought they saw lights pulling in the driveway, because they shone through the window. She said that her partner got up and looked out of the window to see who it was and saw her car reversing out and taking off towards the primary school. She said that her partner ran out to the back of the house, grabbed his motorcycle and tried to chase after the car. Her partner returned sometime later and said he could not keep up, and that he was going to walk around and look for the car. She said that her partner had been looking for the car ever since then. 46 The operator asked a number of times who normally drove the vehicle, and the appellant said that it was only herself.11 The appellant said that the vehicle was parked in her open carport, was possibly unlocked, and had a broken key in the ignition.12 When asked why she did not call police when she saw someone stealing the vehicle, the appellant said that her partner thought he could catch up with the vehicle on his motorcycle.13 When asked again why she did not call the police, the appellant said that she tried calling but was not sure if it was life threatening or a triple zero matter. When asked if she had told anyone else, the appellant said that a neighbour across the street came out and asked what was happening. The appellant told the neighbour that her car had been taken. 47 As to whether anyone else knew of the theft, the appellant said that her daughter who was also at home at the time was aware and that her partner had spoken to one of his friends on the telephone and that she had rung her brother.14 She said that her older daughter had stayed with her two younger children when she went out and had a look for the car on foot and in another car. 48 On 4 February 2025, the appellant was arrested by police and taken to the Rockingham police station where she participated in an electronic record of interview. The appellant made full admissions. In particular, she admitted that the vehicle had not been stolen and that she 10 ts 6; prosecution sentencing brief 6. 11 ts 6, 20; prosecution sentencing brief 3, 7. 12 Prosecution sentencing brief 7. 13 ts 6 - 7, 20; prosecution sentencing brief 8. 14 ts 7, 21; prosecution sentencing brief 9. -- 12 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 13 had reported it stolen because JB had asked her to do so.15 She did not know what JB had done during the police chase. 49 The appellant told police that she had received a telephone call that night from JB asking if she could catch an Uber to where he was. She collected him in an Uber near Gordon Road in Mandurah. She saw her car when she picked up JB. The appellant said that she had owned the car for a couple of months.16 JB had bought the car from his boss and used the vehicle at night when the appellant was asleep. When he got into the Uber, he told her that he had been in a chase. When she asked him if there was a chance that the police could have seen him, he said that there was a chance they had because they had boxed him in.17 50 The appellant said that her older daughter was at home with the younger children when she went to collect JB. She accepted that police attended at her house whilst she was out, and that she had communicated with her daughter and told her to say that the vehicle was stolen. The appellant also admitted that the next day she had rung the police and reported the vehicle as stolen. She said that the sole purpose of reporting the vehicle stolen was to keep JB out of gaol, to stop him being charged and divert police from what occurred. She said that she '[d]idn't want my kid's dad sent back to gaol again'.18 When asked if there was anything else she wanted to say, the appellant said, 'Just say I'm sorry for making a false report'.19 51 At the commencement of the police interview, the appellant was asked about her relationship with JB. She said that she had been in a relationship with him for five years.20 When asked what her relationship was like, she said, 'Pretty shit at the moment'. When asked what the relationship was like at the time of the offence, she said, 'It was pretty shit then as well, yeah'. Personal circumstances 52 The appellant was 35 years old at the time of the offending and is the mother of three children. Her oldest daughter was 18 years old at 15 ts 7 - 8, 21. 16 ts 8. 17 ts 8. 18 Prosecution sentencing brief 23. 19 Prosecution sentencing brief 26. 20 Prosecution sentencing brief 18. Note that at sentencing, her Honour found that the appellant had been in a relationship with JB for at least seven years, which coincides with the information contained in the letter from JB relied on by the appellant during sentencing. -- 13 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 14 the time of the offence, her son was 7 years old and her younger daughter, 3 years old. 53 The appellant has a history of childhood trauma. Although there is some estrangement within her family, she remains close to her three older brothers. The appellant left school in year 9 and later completed a Certificate III in General Education at TAFE.21 54 As at the sentencing date, the appellant was the full-time primary carer to her two younger children. Her older daughter was also residing with her. The appellant was communicating with the Department of Child Protection and Family Support regarding the care of the younger children, particularly her younger daughter, who has some developmental issues. The department considered that there were risks to the children associated with family and domestic violence perpetrated by JB against the appellant.22 In character references provided at sentencing, the appellant was described as a devoted mother, who was concerned for the effect on her children if she was imprisoned and her younger children taken into care.23 55 The appellant had been in a relationship with JB for seven years at the time of the offence and he is the father of her two younger children. The relationship was marked by domestic violence, which will be referred to in more detail later in these reasons. 56 The appellant has a criminal record, though it consists almost exclusively of driving and minor drug offences. She has never previously been imprisoned, and the record contains no offences of a similar nature to this one. 57 The appellant pleaded guilty at the first reasonable opportunity, consistent with her having made full admissions to the police when interviewed. She wrote a letter to the court expressing remorse and instructed her lawyer that she took full responsibility for her actions. 21 ts 22. 22 Pre-sentence report, dated 26 August 2025, 2. 23 Conviction appeal bundle of documents 89, 91. -- 14 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 15 The pre-sentence reports 58 A pre-sentence report dated 26 August 2025 was before the sentencing judge. In the section of the report dealing with the appellant's account of the offence, it states:24 On 12 December 2024 an evade incident occurred with the co-accused (her partner) driving [the appellant's] vehicle unlicensed. The co-accused and [the appellant] formulated a plan to report the vehicle stolen to avoid the co-accused returning to prison. The Police Statement of Material Facts note the co-accused was attempting to coerce [the appellant] to report the vehicle stolen; this aligns with [the appellant's] version of events. [The appellant] reports the offence was the result of her being the victim of family domestic violence and she felt unable to enact active resistance out of fear. 59 Later in the report, it states:25 [The appellant] disclosed family domestic violence in her current relationship with the co-accused. [The appellant] advised she wishes to remain in the relationship on the terms that her and her partner receive counselling and participate in a program to address the Family Domestic Violence. … [The appellant] reports she is presently engaged with Child Protection due to the family domestic violence, further reporting her 3 1/2 year old daughter is non-verbal because of the trauma she has witness perpetrated by her father against [the appellant]. [The] Department for Child Protection and Family Support confirmed the family are presently an open case and they are investigating family and domestic violence concerns. … During interview [the appellant] disclosed feeling overwhelmed stating she is worried for her children and the impact the family domestic violence has on their mental health. [The appellant] receives practical support and counselling from Salvation Army advising this is a positive support and will be ongoing. 24 Pre-sentence report, dated 26 August 2025, 1. 25 Pre-sentence report, dated 26 August 2025, 2 - 3. -- 15 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 16 60 The report was prepared in a format suitable for presentation to a Magistrates Court. An amended report in a format suitable for the higher courts was prepared dated 1 October 2025. The difference between the two reports is largely one of formatting, although some of the points made in the earlier report are elaborated on. 61 In particular, in the 1 October 2025 report, in the appellant's account of the offence, the following is stated:26 Reports indicate the co-accused attempted to coerce the appellant into making the false report, which aligns with [the appellant's] account. [The appellant] stated that she felt compelled to comply due to fear of repercussions, describing herself as a victim of family and domestic violence. She expressed self-condemnation for her actions, acknowledging that while she regrets making a false report, she felt she had no viable alternative at the time due to the coercive and threatening behaviour of her partner. 62 In the section dealing with family background and relationships, there is reference to the Department of Child Protection and Family Support having concerns regarding family and domestic violence. The report states:27 [The appellant] is currently in a relationship with the co-accused, which she describes as impacted by Family and Domestic Violence (FDV). Despite this, [the appellant] has expressed a desire to remain in the relationship, contingent on both parties engaging in counselling and participating in a program to address the current FDV. Sentencing proceedings 63 Counsel for the appellant in the sentencing proceedings provided written submissions which suggested that the appellant's abusive relationship was relevant to her moral culpability.28 The submissions state that the appellant did not disclose the nature of the relationship to counsel before entering her plea and did not wish to raise any defence of coercion or duress as she wanted to take full responsibility for her actions. However, counsel submitted that the nature of the relationship remained relevant to sentencing.29 64 In oral submissions, counsel for the appellant said that JB had an attitude of seeking to control the appellant. The sentencing judge 26 Pre-sentence report, dated 1 October 2025, 1. 27 Pre-sentence report, dated 1 October 2025, 2. 28 Outline of sentencing submissions on behalf of Rebecca Denyce Watts, dated 2 October 2025, par 17. 29 ts 11 - 12. -- 16 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 17 responded by noting that the appellant chose to remain in the relationship. Her Honour then said:30 Now, I understand the cycle of domestic violence. But there is no evidence here, that first of all, any threats or whatever were made, or that there was any use of actual violence or threatened violence for her to make the complaint. She had ammunition, if you like, to say, no, I won't, because the police have already said to [her daughter], don't do it. 65 A little later, her Honour said:31 [W]hilst I appreciate that being in - from everything I see in the courtroom, that, you know, it is difficult to get out of troubling relationships. Your client's had an opportunity, she continues to have that opportunity, but she has indicated a desire to continue, albeit, you know, we both get some counselling. And in the absence of anything direct, how do I - yes, there may be some control, but control happens in all relationships, to some extent, doesn't it? Your partner asks you to do something, you're a little reluctant but you still do it. And that doesn't mean that they're controlling you. You still have some independent will. 66 Counsel responded to this by saying that whilst it was accepted that the appellant's circumstances did not meet the defence of duress, the relationship remained a relevant consideration to the appellant's moral culpability. Counsel submitted that the dynamic of the relationship was such that it was difficult for the appellant to say no to her partner. The following exchange then occurred:32 PETRUSA DCJ: Well, difficult doesn't mean can't. [COUNSEL]: And I'm not suggesting that, your Honour. PETRUSA DCJ: Right. [COUNSEL]: I'm just suggesting difficult. PETRUSA DCJ: And that's the problem. It's always difficult in a relationship to say no to your partner. [COUNSEL]: I would suggest to your Honour that this is different from it being always difficult, that this is in the context of a domestic violence relationship, such that the Department's involved. 30 ts 10. 31 ts 10 - 11. 32 ts 11 - 12. -- 17 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 18 PETRUSA DCJ: Well, but I don't know. But this is the point, [counsel], I don't know the extent of any domestic violence. Right? There's domestic violence and there's domestic violence. It is a spectrum, and I do not know where this sits on that spectrum, right. And, you know, how do I make any assessment of that? And you're asking me to somehow make some assessment of that, to reduce her moral culpability? How does that work? How can I make - how can I make that kind of conclusion in a vacuum? [COUNSEL]: Your Honour, I stand by the submission that it is relevant to the sentencing, that it is (indistinct) - - - PETRUSA DCJ: I'm not saying it's not relevant to the sentencing, but you are asking me to reduce her moral culpability because of it. That's a very different submission. 67 At this point the transcript records the sentencing judge telling someone in the court to sit down and then inviting defence counsel to continue her submissions. Counsel apologises and the judge says, 'That's alright, you're not responsible for the actions of others'.33 68 Counsel maintained that the nature of the relationship was relevant in sentencing and said:34 [M]y submission is that it's not equivalent to there always being some element of not wanting to say no to a partner in all relationships, it is more than that. And it is happening in the context of a domestic violence - I accept we do not know the severity of the domestic violence, I accept that, your Honour. But there are more than - in fact, there's reluctance from [the appellant] to say that it's a domestic violence relationship, but she has said it to a number of people. 69 The learned sentencing judge noted that there was a difficulty in not knowing the extent of the domestic violence and that she did not know the circumstances in which the department had become involved. Her Honour said that whilst she could accept there was 'something going on', it was difficult to treat it as a significant mitigating factor without supporting information. Her Honour then noted that whilst she was prepared to accept that the relationship had some mitigating value:35 [T]here's obviously a dynamic there, that does make it more difficult for her to exercise her independent will. But she still has some. 33 ts 12. 34 ts 12. 35 ts 13. -- 18 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 19 Sentencing remarks 70 After summarising the facts of the offence, the sentencing judge said:36 Now, what you've done was very serious because if every time someone broke the law there was a person who was willing to lie for them to provide, in effect, some form of alibi, then the law could not properly do its job. And those responsible for offences could not be punished. Whilst all offences of this kind are serious, it is particularly serious that you, having received a warning by police not to report the car stolen, did just that. And you maintained this in the face of some persistent questioning by the police operator. You maintained your position until you were spoken to police two months later. 71 The sentencing judge referred to the maximum penalty for the offence of 7 years' imprisonment and then turned to aggravating and mitigating factors. Her Honour noted that the appellant at the age of 35 did not have the benefit of youth. The appellant's criminal record was not 'overly serious' but did indicate that she was a person who does not always comply with the law and was not of prior good character.37 Her Honour said that these factors in combination indicated that personal deterrence was something that had to be taken into account. 72 The sentencing judge referred to the appellant's personal circumstances and noted that:38 You say that there is family violence in your relationship with [JB]. But you want to remain in that relationship, provided the two of you receive counselling and participate in a program to help address those issues. 73 A little later, her Honour said:39 Insofar as the current offending is concerned, you take full responsibility for your actions. And you're not trying to blame it on duress or pressure from [JB]. I accept that there has been violence in your relationship with [JB]. But when it comes to this particular, there's no evidence of specific threats he made relating to this, or that there were not other options open to you, particularly given there's this warning by the police. APPELLANT: There is, though. There is records of it. And I went and got the charges dropped. 36 ts 21. 37 ts 21. 38 ts 22. 39 ts 23 - 24. -- 19 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 20 PETRUSA DCJ: It is clear from what you said to the police in the record of interview, your relationship with him has been, to use your words: Pretty shit. But nonetheless, you did what you did because you didn't want him to go to jail. And so that is something that you will have to accept. You, however, have, in my view, shown genuine remorse. 74 The sentencing judge said that whilst the case against the appellant was a strong one, there was no reason not to allow the maximum discount for the plea of guilty, being 25%.40 Her Honour referred to the importance of general deterrence and noted that the seriousness of this offence was reflected in the fact that the appellant had deliberately made a false report to police with the clear intention of ensuring that JB was not charged and would escape responsibility for his actions for failing to stop and drive recklessly. 75 The sentencing judge then said:41 I accept that there was violence in the relationship and that you may well have felt pressure to do this. However, it is no answer to this charge to complain that you had no options when there were ones available. You also persisted in the complaint when given options to withdraw it. And then you embroidered the account to make it more believable. I consider this offending to be at least at the mid-range of seriousness for offences of this kind. 76 The sentencing judge said that a further serious aspect of the offence was that the appellant was endeavouring to protect JB from an offence that placed members of the community at risk, given that he was involved in a police pursuit. 77 The sentencing judge said that she was satisfied that the only appropriate sentence was one of imprisonment and that having looked at all of the relevant factors again, she was not satisfied that suspending the sentence was appropriate. Her Honour then imposed a sentence of 20 months' immediate imprisonment and made an order that the appellant be eligible for parole. 40 ts 24. 41 ts 24. -- 20 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 21 Grounds of appeal 78 The grounds of appeal are as follows: 1. There has been a miscarriage of justice as a result of the sentencing judge not being aware of the full extent of the violent nature of the relationship between the appellant and her co-offender. Particulars a) There was a miscarriage of justice as a result of the learned sentencing judge not being in receipt of the amended written pre-sentence report dated 1 October 2025 which contained additional information about the appellant's motivation for the offending. b) There was a miscarriage of justice as a result of the learned sentencing judge not being made aware of the extent of the physical, emotional and verbal violence experienced by the appellant during her relationship with the co-offender. 2. The sentence imposed is manifestly excessive as to both type and length having regard to the circumstances of the offences, the appellant's personal circumstances, the maximum penalty and comparable cases. Additional evidence 79 The appellant has filed an application seeking to adduce additional evidence in relation to ground 1. The evidence consists of an affidavit from counsel for the appellant, Ms Ajduk. That affidavit sets out information received from the District Court confirming that only the first pre-sentence report was supplied to the sentencing judge. 80 Ms Ajduk's affidavit also annexes an affidavit of the appellant and a series of police incident reports. The appellant's affidavit 81 In her affidavit the appellant states the following:42 • She has been in a relationship with JB for eight and a half years. • They dated for at least a year before moving in together. 42 Affidavit of Miranda Jane Ajduk, dated 27 March 2026, 6 - 7, annexure B (affidavit of Rebecca Denyce Watts, affirmed 19 March 2026). -- 21 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 22 • Their son was born on 30 June 2018. Their daughter was born on 11 November 2021. • During the course of their relationship, JB has been violent towards her. • JB was imprisoned in 2021 for aggravated burglary and spent two and a half years in custody before being released. • When JB was released from prison in March 2022, he began to be violent. JB was using methylamphetamine, she thinks on a daily basis. The abuse commenced by being verbal and then started to get physical. • When they were arguing, JB would put his hand over her mouth to stop her talking and it would escalate from there. • The physical violence has included JB grabbing her by the throat, grabbing her by the hair, knocking her teeth out and hitting her to the head, in the stomach, and on the arms and legs. He would be physically violent towards her at least once a week. • JB also made many verbal threats, such as to kill her and to flog her. He would make derogatory remarks and damage property, including by cutting her clothes. He would time how long it would take her to take the children to school or to go to the shops and she would be questioned on why it took her so long. • When they fought, JB would take her bank card and her telephone. He would check through her phone and would smash it. It was rare that she would have a phone that would last a week. Her eldest daughter tried to break up fights a couple of times and JB would approach her and yell and tell her to get out of the way. • In relation to the offence, JB told her that she needed to report the car as stolen 'otherwise he was going to get locked up and taken to gaol'. • The next day, JB had gone to work, and she called him to see where she needed to pick him up from. He asked if she had called the police and she said no. He said, 'You better report it so it can get sorted'. She did not want to have another argument -- 22 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 23 and for it to turn physical and she knew that if she did not report it, it would get physical. She was very anxious at the time because she did not want it to get violent and did not want the children to see that happen as they had been exposed to violence before. • After she and JB were charged, they were both released on bail. There was as 'big argument' in March 2025, during which, JB assaulted her, chopped up her clothes and threatened to kill her. The police came on this occasion and stayed until she was escorted with her children to a hotel. A statement was taken the following day and the police then arranged for her to stay at a caravan park. JB was arrested and charged as a result of her statement. He received bail but breached his curfew and was remanded in custody. She later gave a statement to police saying that she did not want to proceed with the charges against him. The police incident reports 82 Ms Ajduk's affidavit also annexes nine police incident reports that relate to reports of family violence at the appellant's home address. Those reports can be summarised as follows: 1. On the evening of 9 July 2020, a neighbour reported that a man had been beating his wife and that she was observed running down the road bleeding from the face, asking neighbours not to call police. She was observed to be carrying a baby of about 12 - 18 months old. When police attended, a woman's screams could be heard from the house. The appellant was observed to be in a distressed state with makeup running from her eyes from crying. She said that JB had been woken by their 2-year-old son and was angry and smacked the child on the leg to discipline him. An argument ensued, in which JB grabbed the appellant by her clothes in a threatening and abusive manner. The appellant picked up the child and ran from the house with her elder daughter. JB followed and grabbed her, again by her clothes, whilst she was holding her son. No physical injuries were observed by the police. The child had tears running down his face. The appellant said that she did not wish to provide a statement.43 43 Affidavit of Miranda Jane Ajduk, dated 27 March 2026, 8 - 15, annexure C. -- 23 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 24 2. On the morning of 1 November 2020, a neighbour called, stating that he could hear neighbours yelling and screaming at each other and that a man was seen grabbing a woman by the hair. When police attended, the appellant had left with her young son. JB was present and said that he had had an argument with the appellant but denied any assault, saying that the argument was verbal only. The appellant was contacted by police and said that during the argument, JB had grabbed her by the hair but she did not want to make any complaint for assault or to provide the police with a statement. She only wanted JB removed from the house. Police issued a 72-hour police order to JB.44 3. On the afternoon of 2 June 2024, police attended and spoke with JB in regard to a report of arguing. JB said that there had been a verbal argument and that he intended to leave in an Uber. Police spoke to the appellant, who was visibly upset and said that there was an argument regarding a dog making a mess in a room. When pressed, the appellant admitted she was afraid when JB got into a heightened state of anger and feared for the safety of her children. She said that JB had never been physical with her before but she does get afraid when they get into an argument, so she shuts down. The appellant's elder daughter was present and agreed that JB would yell when he was angry and she was afraid of what might happen. A 72-hour police order was issued to JB.45 4. On the afternoon of 30 October 2024, police attended at the house after receiving a report that the caller had seen a man hit a woman in the face. The woman yelled to the caller to call police. Police attended and spoke to the appellant, who stated that she and JB had had an argument in their back garden. The appellant said that she was not fearful for her safety and that it was simply a verbal argument. Police contacted the original caller, who said that she heard shouting coming from the incident location, looked over the back fence and saw a man hit a woman across the face. The police were unable to locate JB but a 72-hour police order was issued due to the alleged physical violence.46 44 Affidavit of Miranda Jane Ajduk, dated 27 March 2026, 16 - 21, annexure D. 45 Affidavit of Miranda Jane Ajduk, dated 27 March 2026, 22 - 27, annexure E. 46 Affidavit of Miranda Jane Ajduk, dated 27 March 2026, 28 - 35, annexure F. -- 24 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 25 5. On the morning of 6 November 2024, a neighbour called police, reporting that a man at the appellant's house was 'bashing his missus', that the woman was screaming for help and that the man was yelling and physically abusing her. Police attended and observed clothing and other personal items on the lawn at the front of the property. The appellant answered the door and said that JB had already run from the address before police arrived as he knew they were coming. She said that there had been an argument regarding discovering used needles in a bag on the front seat of her car. She said that JB had 'flipped out and started yelling and screaming at her'. During this altercation, JB had smashed the appellant's telephone. The appellant's 18-year-old daughter had intervened and they had both told JB to leave. He had run away and the appellant, in anger, had thrown his belongings onto the front lawn. The appellant denied that any assault had occurred, and she had no visible injuries.47 6. On the morning of 23 November 2024, a triple zero call was received, in which a female could be heard saying 'please help me' before the line disconnected. Police attended at the appellant's house and found JB at home. He stated that he and the appellant had had a verbal argument about the children and their schooling. Police then contacted the appellant on the telephone and she said that JB had been out with another woman the previous night, she had raised this with him and they had got into a verbal argument. She did not allege any physical violence or threats. After speaking to all parties, police had concerns about ongoing acts of family violence and issued a 72-hour police order to JB.48 7. On the evening of 16 January 2025, a caller rang police stating that she could hear a male hitting a little boy and yelling at a female in the house. The caller stated that incidents at the house were an ongoing issue. Police attended at the house and spoke to the appellant. She said that there had been a verbal argument with JB but that no physical altercation had taken place, however, prior to JB leaving the address, he had smashed his own vehicle window. A decision was made to issue a 72-hour 47 Affidavit of Miranda Jane Ajduk, dated 27 March 2026, 36 - 43, annexure G. 48 Affidavit of Miranda Jane Ajduk, dated 27 March 2026, 44 - 49, annexure H. -- 25 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 26 police order but it is not apparent from the incident report whether it was served on JB.49 8. On the evening of 2 February 2025, a caller reported that a man and a woman were yelling and swearing at children and that the man could be heard telling a child to 'walk like a dog'. Police attended and located the appellant at the address, who confirmed that she had engaged in a verbal disagreement with JB, who had since left. The welfare of the children was checked. Efforts to locate JB were unsuccessful and no further action was taken.50 9. On the morning of 20 April 2025, police received a call from a person staying at an Airbnb stating that they could hear a woman saying, 'Please call the police' and that a man was assaulting her and that he had a gun. Police attended and noted that JB had left the premises. The appellant, who was present, told police that whilst she was sitting on the toilet, JB entered the bathroom and hit her to the head about five times. It started with slaps, then a closed fist. JB then placed both his hands around her throat and squeezed. She felt like she could not breathe, however, did not feel light-headed. JB then made a comment about sorting this out with a '.22'. The appellant advised that JB had a home-made gun, which was about 30 cm long and black in colour. The gun had a lever, which operates as a firing pin. She saw him firing the gun last week in front of friends. It was made six months ago at his home in the back shed. He had gone to his car to grab some stuff and then left the address on foot with the roller shutter remote. It would appear that this incident resulted in charges being proffered against JB.51 Statement of uncontested facts 83 The respondent initially gave notice that the appellant was required for cross-examination on her affidavit. However, the need for that to occur was obviated by the parties agreeing that a statement of agreed facts could be received on the appeal as if given orally or on affidavit as part of the appellant's application to adduce additional evidence. 49 Affidavit of Miranda Jane Ajduk, dated 27 March 2026, 50 - 55, annexure I. 50 Affidavit of Miranda Jane Ajduk, dated 27 March 2026, 56 - 61, annexure J. 51 Affidavit of Miranda Jane Ajduk, dated 27 March 2026, 62 - 69, annexure K. -- 26 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 27 84 Relevantly, the statement of uncontested facts establishes that:52 • The appellant was in company with JB when she communicated with her daughter when the police were at the house. • The appellant and JB parted company at some time after the exchange with her daughter, and before 2.11 am. Between that time and 2.27 pm, the appellant unsuccessfully tried to call JB 34 times. • The appellant called the Police Assistance Centre, with the intention of reporting the car stolen, at 10.13 am. However, she hung up after being on hold for 25 minutes. • The conversation referred to in the appellant's affidavit, in which JB told her, 'You better report it so it can get sorted', took place at 2.29 pm when JB called the appellant using a workmate's telephone.53 • Immediately following that telephone call, the appellant made two further calls to the Police Assistance Centre and made the false report. Ground 1 - the additional evidence Appellant's submissions 85 The appellant submits that whilst the second pre-sentence report was in substantially similar terms to the first report, it did contain some additional information regarding the relationship of the appellant and JB.54 In particular, the appellant points to the parts referring to the appellant feeling compelled to comply due to fear of repercussions and that she felt that she had no viable alternative. 86 The appellant also submits that her affidavit provides details of the nature and extent of the violence in the relationship. The second pre-sentence report, the appellant's affidavit and the police incident reports, when taken together, establish that the family violence experienced by the appellant went beyond leaving her feeling pressured to commit the offence.55 Rather, the appellant felt that as a result of the 52 Statement of uncontested facts, filed 23 April 2026. 53 Affidavit of Miranda Jane Ajduk, dated 27 March 2026, 7 [19], annexure B (affidavit of Rebecca Denyce Watts, affirmed 19 March 2026). 54 Conviction appeal bundle of documents 11 - 12, par 18. 55 Conviction appeal bundle of documents 12, par 20. -- 27 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 28 significant abuse she had suffered she had no alternative other than to commit the offence. 87 The appellant submits that the additional evidence is relevant to an assessment of the seriousness of the offending. It has the effect of significantly reducing the appellant's moral culpability.56 Had the additional evidence been available at the time of sentencing it would have had a material impact on the sentence imposed. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the sentencing judge was concerned about the lack of information regarding the nature of the domestic violence asserted by the appellant. Respondent's submissions 88 The respondent submits that the evidence of violence in the relationship must have been known to the appellant and a decision was evidently made not to rely on it.57 A miscarriage of justice will be difficult to establish where the evidence was known but not relied on, even if it could have had an impact on the sentence imposed. 89 In any event, the respondent says that it has not been established that the additional evidence would have resulted in a different sentence being imposed.58 The sentencing judge acknowledged the existence of a violent relationship and that the appellant felt under pressure, but recognised that the appellant accepted full responsibility. The respondent submits that a 'logical tension' exists between these incongruous factors,59 such that the mitigating effect of domestic violence could not be afforded greater weight than it already was. The relevant legal principles 90 The legal principles applicable where it is alleged that there has been a miscarriage of justice arising from the fact that some information relevant to sentencing was not before the primary judge were set out in Wellstead:60 A sentencing judge cannot ordinarily be said to have erred by proceeding in a manner contrary to, or without having regard to, evidence which was not before the sentencing court. A miscarriage of justice may arise from the absence of material evidence before the primary court. However, it is clear that such a miscarriage will not 56 Conviction appeal bundle of documents 12, par 22. 57 Conviction appeal bundle of documents 38, par 34. 58 Conviction appeal bundle of documents 38, par 35. 59 Conviction appeal bundle of documents 26, par 8. 60 Wellstead [91] - [94]. -- 28 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 29 arise in all cases, and that the identification of miscarriage must be undertaken consistently with the nature of an appeal, in a manner that does not 'have the practical effect of obliterating the distinction between original and appellate jurisdiction'. That is illustrated by the approach taken in cases referred to in LWD, where the court noted the distinction usually drawn between matters which existed but were not known at the time of sentencing and matters which have come into existence since the time of sentence. Those authorities recognise that, ordinarily, evidence will not be admitted of events which have occurred since the sentence was imposed. As recently reiterated in Baynah, that is because: '[A]n appellate court does not fulfil a continuing supervisory role over the effect of a sentence of imprisonment upon an individual. Where a sentence, appropriate when passed, has, by reason of subsequent events, turned out to be excessive, that is a matter for executive government, rather than this court.' It has been recognised that, consistently with the role of an appellate court, evidence of events subsequent to the time of sentencing may be received to show facts relevant to the sentencing process which were in existence at the time of sentencing but either not known to the sentencing judge or not properly appreciated at the time. That may occur, for example, where a mental health impairment which existed prior to sentencing is diagnosed, or its significance is appreciated, after sentencing has occurred. A miscarriage of justice may arise from the absence of evidence of that kind at the sentencing hearing. That was the kind of evidence sought to be advanced in Wheeler, although ultimately the appeal was dismissed on the basis that the additional evidence did not, as a matter of fact, justify a lower sentence being imposed in that case. Once error or miscarriage is established, this court may receive evidence of the offender's rehabilitation in the period since the sentencing hearing, under s 41(4)(a) of the Criminal Appeals Act. However, even once express or inferred error is established, then, exceptional cases apart, the question of whether some different sentence ought to have been imposed is answered by consideration of the material that was before the sentencing court and any relevant evidence of post-sentence conduct. (citations omitted) 91 In Wellstead, the court went on to note that the distinction between fresh and new evidence, whilst of less significance in respect of an -- 29 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 30 appeal against sentence, was relevant in determining whether a miscarriage of justice had occurred:61 As Owen JA noted in Wheeler, the distinction between 'fresh' and 'new' evidence is of lesser significance in an appeal against sentence than it is in an appeal against conviction. However, the distinction between fresh and new evidence may, in a particular case, bear significantly upon the question of whether the absence of evidence at first instance gives rise to a miscarriage of justice. A miscarriage of justice may more readily arise in an appeal against sentence from the absence of evidence which was not known to, or reasonably obtainable by, the appellant at the time of sentence. In general terms, a miscarriage of justice will be difficult to establish where evidence was actually known to an appellant and not used in the sentencing hearing. This point was made by Howie AJ in Fordham v The Queen, in a passage cited in Betts: 'Generally before fresh or new evidence will be received by this Court, it must be shown that the sentencing of the appellant in the absence of that evidence resulted in a miscarriage of justice. As a general rule, where that evidence was available to the defence at the time of sentencing, a miscarriage of justice would rarely result simply from the fact that the evidence was not before the sentencing judge, even if the evidence may possibly have had an impact upon the sentence passed.' In M v The Queen, decided under the appeal provisions that preceded the Criminal Appeals Act, Steytler J made similar observations: 'The guiding principle, as I understand it, is simply that the Court has a discretion to admit new evidence so as to avoid a miscarriage of justice. For myself, I would be reluctant to say anything which might be taken to limit that broad principle. However, I think that it can safely be said that, where the further evidence was known to the applicant at the time of sentencing, it will only be in an exceptional case that the Court will be persuaded that the failure to disclose it has resulted in a miscarriage. Even criminal defendants will ordinarily be made to bear the consequences of their own decisions and there are sound policy reasons for emphasising the need to ensure that all relevant evidence is adduced before the primary tribunal and for discouraging the possibility of withholding evidence for tactical reason.' We agree with those observations which, in our view, remain applicable under the provisions of the Criminal Appeals Act. The need to consider the particular circumstances in which the evidence was not adduced at 61 Wellstead [95] - [97]. -- 30 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 31 sentencing in order to determine whether there is a miscarriage of justice is also indicated by the passage of Wheeler emphasised in the quote at [82] above. (citations omitted) 92 In summary, where a ground of appeal asserts that a miscarriage of justice is established by additional evidence, there are two steps in determining the ground. First, is the additional evidence admissible on the appeal? Secondly, if that evidence had been before the sentencing judge can it be said that a different sentence would have been imposed? 93 The discretion to admit new evidence to avoid a miscarriage of justice is broad. Where the further information was known to the appellant at the time of sentencing, it will only be in exceptional circumstances that the failure to disclose it will result in a miscarriage of justice. This is because an appellant will ordinarily be made to bear the consequences of their decisions. This assumes that the appellant (or their counsel) has made a considered decision not to rely on the evidence. The merits 94 If appellants are not held to the decisions made at the sentencing hearing as to what information to put, or not put, before the sentencing judge there is an obvious risk that an appeal against sentence will merely become a second sentencing hearing. Appellants could withhold information at sentencing with a view to raising it on appeal if they are unsatisfied with the sentence imposed. This would have the effect of obscuring the essential difference between primary and appeal proceedings.62 Appeals against sentence depend on proof of error or a miscarriage of justice. A miscarriage will not occur if an appellant seeks to rely on information on appeal that they chose not to rely on at sentencing. 95 Appeals must generally proceed upon the assumption that an appellant has had an opportunity to put forward any relevant information in their possession at the primary sentencing hearing. However, there may be cases where that assumption is shown to be unsound. The fact that relevant information was in the possession of the appellant but not brought forward at the sentencing hearing might suggest, in the absence of any other explanation, that a deliberate 62 See Rinaldi v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 53 [84] (Steytler P, with Wheeler & Pullin JJA agreeing). -- 31 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 32 decision was made not to rely on it. But the possibility that there may be some other explanation should not be too readily discounted. 96 The relevant questions in a case such as the present are: 1. Was the additional evidence that the appellant seeks to adduce on appeal in the possession of, known to, or reasonably available to, the appellant at the time of sentencing? 2. Was the appellant afforded a reasonable opportunity to adduce that evidence at the sentencing hearing? 3. Did the appellant make a deliberate forensic decision not to adduce or rely on that evidence at the sentencing hearing? 97 The onus is on the appellant to establish that the answer to any of these questions is 'no'. That would usually be achieved by the appellant providing affidavit evidence as to the circumstances in which the evidence was not adduced at the sentencing proceedings. The fact that the appellant does not address that issue in her affidavit is an obstacle to success on this ground, but not an insurmountable one. There may be sufficient information in the materials from the sentencing court to draw firm inferences as to what occurred. 98 In the present case, the written sentencing submissions and defence counsel's oral submissions indicate that the appellant had not provided counsel with details of the abuse. Indeed, she had not disclosed the abuse at all until after the plea of guilty was entered.63 It is apparent that the appellant was reluctant to reveal the full extent of the violence to her counsel, perhaps out of shame, or fear, or some misguided sense of loyalty to JB. This is consistent with the ambivalence of the appellant when dealing with the police as revealed in the police incident reports, behaviour which is typical for victims of domestic violence. Furthermore, the police incident reports were not available to counsel at the time of the sentencing hearing. It can be inferred that counsel was not in possession of the additional information now sought to be adduced on appeal. It follows that counsel did not make a considered forensic decision not to rely on that information. 99 On the other hand, it can be inferred that the appellant was in possession of the additional information or at least knew of its 63 Outline of sentencing submissions on behalf of Rebecca Denyce Watts, dated 2 October 2025, par 17. -- 32 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 33 existence. This was information within the appellant's personal experience and must have been known to her at the time of sentencing. She was also present in court when the sentencing judge mentioned that there was a lack of detail in the allegations of domestic violence and that this made it difficult to draw conclusions as to the relevance of that relationship to the offence. It is at least arguable that this made it clear that details of the abuse were required, and that the appellant was on notice of the need to provide such information. Thus, the first question posed at [96] must be answered 'yes'. 100 As regards whether there was a fair opportunity for the appellant to adduce the additional evidence in the sentencing proceedings, it is important to carefully consider the circumstances in which the issue arose. The need for details was only raised in the course of sentencing submissions by the judge. Before this matter was raised, the appellant could reasonably have believed that the more general information about the relationship that she had disclosed to her counsel and the pre-sentence report author was sufficient. There was no opportunity for the appellant to discuss with her counsel the implications of the judge's concerns and the options that may be available for addressing it. To suggest that the appellant should have intervened would be to impose a very heavy burden on the appellant - a layperson unlikely to be familiar with court processes and who was standing in peril of her liberty. In my view, the appellant had no reasonable opportunity to adduce the evidence that was available to her. The second question must be answered 'no'. 101 In any event, it cannot be inferred that the appellant made a deliberate forensic decision not to rely on the additional evidence. When the sentencing judge first raised her concern about the lack of detail, the transcript of the sentencing hearing records the judge telling someone in the court to sit down and the appellant's counsel then apologising to the judge.64 The only reasonable inference is that the appellant stood up at this point because she wanted to raise the fact that more detailed information was available. Further, the fact that the appellant interrupted the judge during her sentencing remarks to say that there were reports of the abuse is strong evidence that the appellant wished to rely on such evidence. Plainly, the appellant was claiming that the relationship was relevant to her decision to commit the offence and that there was evidence to support her claims. This is not 64 ts 12. -- 33 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 34 consistent with a forensic decision to abandon any reliance on such evidence. The third question must also be answered 'no'. 102 In my view, the appellant cannot be said to have made a decision at the sentencing hearing not to rely on the evidence which she now wishes to adduce on appeal. This is not a case where it could be said that choices made regarding the presentation of the case in the primary court stand in the way of adducing the additional evidence on the appeal. Accordingly, in the unusual circumstances of this case, the appellant should be permitted to adduce the additional evidence on the appeal. To the extent that it is only in exceptional cases where information known to the appellant at the time of sentencing can establish a miscarriage of justice, in my view, this is such an exceptional case. 103 It is then necessary to consider whether the evidence would have made a difference to the sentence imposed. Although the sentencing judge acknowledged the existence of a violent relationship and that the appellant felt pressured, her Honour also commented on the lack of detail available.65 She suggested that the appellant was essentially in the same position as any person in a relationship who feels under an obligation to their partner. Her Honour noted that the appellant was not deprived of the ability to make a choice and had accepted full responsibility for her actions. 104 With respect to the sentencing judge, the coercion felt by a person who is the victim in a long-term violent relationship cannot be likened to the sense of obligation felt by any person in a personal relationship. Whether or not there was a specific threat regarding the making of the false report, a violent relationship may cause the victim to be more compliant out of fear that refusal or resistance will result in an argument which could spiral into violence. A history of such arguments may well engender in the victim a mentality of appeasement to the perpetrator. There may be no need for specific threats of violence if the victim does not comply with demands because violence has become a predictable consequence that the victim has learnt to fear. 105 In any event, the additional evidence does provide evidence that there was at least an implied threat of violence if the appellant did not comply with the request to report the car as stolen. In the telephone call made to the appellant immediately prior to the appellant making the 65 ts 11. -- 34 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 35 police report JB said, 'You better report it so it can get sorted'.66 When viewed in the light of the evidence of the history of the relationship, this statement carried the plain implication that things would be worse for the appellant if she did not do as she had been asked. That is, she would be at the receiving end of a violent assault. Counsel for the respondent properly conceded that was so. According to the appellant's affidavit (the truth of which was not contested), after receiving this call she knew that if she did not report the car as stolen, JB would get physical.67 106 Duress may in some circumstances amount to a defence to a charge. However, duress that does not rise to this level can still have mitigatory value. The appellant did not seek to argue that she had no freedom of choice at all. To the contrary, she accepted that she bore responsibility for the choice she made. However, choice is not a simple binary matter. The fact that a person's freedom to choose is constrained by considerations such as the fear of consequences from a violent partner is a factor that can reduce moral culpability. To say that the appellant was not deprived of her ability to make a choice is to say no more than she could not claim the complete defence of duress. However, it overlooks the mitigating effect that duress falling short of the defence can have. The weight to be given to this factor will depend on the extent, nature and duration of the violence, or threats of violence, and the degree to which the violence or threats have affected the freedom of choice of the person concerned. 107 In fairness to the sentencing judge, the information available at the time of sentencing was limited. There was information that indicated that there was a violent relationship but there were no details as to the nature, frequency, and duration of the violence. There was little to suggest any direct causative link between the violent relationship and the commission of the offence, other than the claim by the appellant that she felt under an obligation to comply with her partner's request. The details provided by the appellant in her affidavit and the police incident reports place the appellant's sense of obligation into a much clearer context. 108 The additional evidence establishes that there was a long-term violent relationship between the appellant and JB, that he was prone to 66 Affidavit of Miranda Jane Ajduk, dated 27 March 2026 7, par 19, annexure B (affidavit of Rebecca Denyce Watts, affirmed 19 March 2026). 67 Affidavit of Miranda Jane Ajduk, dated 27 March 2026 7, pars 20 - 21, annexure B (affidavit of Rebecca Denyce Watts, affirmed 19 March 2026). -- 35 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 36 violent outbursts of temper, and that the appellant genuinely feared him. She also feared for the safety of her children. In coming to this conclusion, I do not overlook the fact that the last three police incident reports relate to events that occurred after the offence. The relevance of those reports is limited to what they reveal of the nature of the relationship, even though they cannot have contributed to the state of mind of the appellant at the time of the offence. 109 The fact that the appellant often denied physical violence when police were called needs to be seen in the light of the fact that she was in a long-term relationship with JB and that he was the father of two of her children. It is also well known that the victims of domestic violence often deny the violence and refuse to press charges even though this may seem to be contrary to their best interests. What may seem to be misguided loyalty to an abusive partner is a typical feature of such relationships. Victims commonly feel conflicted, afraid, ashamed and unwilling to admit the full extent of the violence. In any event, on some of these occasions, neighbours reported observing acts of physical violence. 110 In my view, the additional information materially adds to the information that was available at sentencing and is of such a nature as to be likely to have resulted in a different sentence. Whilst the appellant chose to make the false police report, that choice occurred in the context of a violent relationship and was made at the request of the perpetrator of that violence and for his benefit. I accept that the appellant believed that non-compliance may have resulted in an altercation with her partner, with the accompanying risk of physical violence. Thus, the violent relationship was a contributing factor to the decision to make the false report. In these circumstances the moral culpability of the appellant was reduced. The need for personal deterrence was also reduced as there was nothing to indicate that the appellant would have committed an offence of this nature had it not been for the request of her violent partner. 111 Leave to appeal on ground 1 should be granted. The additional evidence should be admitted on the appeal. That evidence establishes that there has been a miscarriage of justice. Ground 1 should be upheld. -- 36 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 37 Ground 2 - was the sentence manifestly excessive? Appellant's submissions 112 The appellant submits that the offence lacked a number of aggravating factors that can arise in cases of this type.68 The deception did not carry through to court proceedings and did not involve implicating an innocent third party. The offending was of relatively brief duration and when confronted by police the appellant made full admissions, including implicating JB. 113 There were also a number of significant mitigating factors, including that the appellant pleaded guilty, was remorseful, had a history of childhood trauma, and that the offending had occurred in the context of a violent relationship where the appellant felt under pressure to commit the offence. In addition, the appellant was the primary carer of two young children, had not previously been imprisoned, and was assessed as suitable for a community based order. 114 The appellant accepts that there is no sentencing tariff for offences of attempting to pervert the course of justice, but that sentences of immediate imprisonment are ordinarily imposed. The appellant suggests that there are no cases that are comparable with that of the appellant, having regard to the context of pressure from an abusive partner.69 Nonetheless, the appellant submits that such cases as there are support the contention that the sentence of 20 months' immediate imprisonment is manifestly excessive. In this regard the appellant refers to Ranford (No 2) v The State of Western Australia;70 Goulding v The Queen;71 R v Swain;72 Wright v The Queen;73 and Charles v The State of Western Australia.74 The appellant submits that in the circumstances of this case the appropriate disposition was a suspended sentence. Respondent's submissions 115 The respondent submits that the challenge to the type of sentence imposed could only succeed if the appellant establishes that a suspended sentence was the only type of sentence properly available in 68 Conviction appeal bundle of documents 14, par 31. 69 Conviction appeal bundle of documents 15, pars 33 - 34. 70 Ranford v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2006] WASCA 243; (2006) 166 A Crim R 451. 71 Goulding v The Queen (1991) 56 A Crim R 75. 72 R v Swain [1999] WASCA 22. 73 Wright v The Queen (Unreported, CCAS Ct of WA, Library No 920531, 20 August 1992). 74 Charles v The State of Western Australia [2021] WASCA 114. -- 37 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 38 the circumstances of this case.75 The respondent submits that the fact that offences of this type ordinarily attract immediate terms of imprisonment is a significant obstacle to the appellant's argument. 116 The respondent submits that the mitigatory value of non-exculpatory duress is dependent on the circumstances. In some cases relating to drugs, the weight to be afforded to claims of duress has been said to be reduced having regard to the fact that the offender willingly involved themselves in the drug trade or had opportunities to deal with the situation they found themselves in other than by committing the offence.76 Whilst the respondent does not suggest that a victim of domestic violence should be equated with a person willingly involving themselves in the drug trade, it is suggested that the appellant had opportunities to act differently or to withdraw. 117 The respondent submits that the onus is on the appellant to prove duress and that an offender must establish and not merely assert duress.77 Courts should approach claims of non-exculpatory duress with a degree of circumspection. In assessing such claims, the court is entitled to consider the form and duration of the offender's conduct, the nature of the threats made, and the opportunity to report this to the authorities.78 The court is required to assess the objective gravity and moral culpability of the offending in light of the duress.79 118 The respondent submits that the continuing, indeed increased, relevance of general deterrence in cases involving duress should be observed.80 In the context of drug offending, the respondent notes that general deterrence may provide a counter-threat and discourage others from exploiting vulnerable victims. The respondent says that this consideration applies equally to domestic violence victims. Significantly reduced sentences for domestic violence victims acting under pressure would not only encourage abusers to apply pressure for that purpose but also enmesh victims and their abusers together in shared criminality. 75 Conviction appeal bundle of documents 39, par 37. 76 Conviction appeal bundle of documents 41 - 42, pars 45 - 47. See, for example, Sabri v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 71 [30] (Mazza JA, with McLure P agreeing); Wale v The Queen [2001] WASCA 418 [7] (Steytler P). 77 Conviction appeal bundle of documents 42, par 48. 78 Tiknius v The Queen [2011] NSWCCA 215; (2011) 221 A Crim R 365 [49] (Johnson J, with Tobias AJA & Hall J agreeing). 79 The King v Huang [2025] NSWSC 120 [125] - [127]. 80 Conviction appeal bundle of documents 43, par 50. -- 38 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 39 119 The respondent submits that most of the comparable cases referred to by the appellant are significantly different factually to the present case and are unsuitable as direct comparators. Whilst the case of Norton v The State of Western Australia81 has some similarities, the sentence of 18 months' immediate imprisonment imposed in that case was held to be severe, but not manifestly excessive, in circumstances where the offender had better antecedents and prospects than the present appellant. 120 The respondent submits that the sentence imposed on the appellant was high, but not manifestly excessive. The domestic violence context did not remove the need for general and personal deterrence. The circumstances of the offence were serious having regard to the fact that the appellant sought to prevent the prosecution of her partner for serious and dangerous conduct. The relevant legal principles 121 The general principles governing appeals contending that error should be inferred on the basis that an individual sentence is manifestly excessive or inadequate, or that the total effective sentence infringes the first limb of the totality principle, are well established. Those principles were summarised in Kabambi:82 (1) Sentencing is a discretionary exercise. An appellate court can intervene only if the appellant demonstrates either an express or implied material error. Express error involves acting on a wrong principle, for example by mistaking the law or facts or taking into account an irrelevant matter. Implied error arises where the end result is so unreasonable or unjust that the court must conclude that a substantial wrong has occurred. Thus, an appellate court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the sentencing court merely because the appellate court would have exercised a sentencing discretion differently. (2) In order to determine whether a sentence for an individual offence is manifestly excessive or inadequate, the offence should be viewed in light of the maximum sentence prescribed by law for the crime, the standards of sentencing customarily imposed with respect to it, the place that the criminal conduct occupies in the scale of seriousness of crimes of that type, and the offender's personal circumstances. 81 Norton v The State of Western Australia [2007] WASCA 75. 82 Kabambi [21]. -- 39 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 40 (3) The first limb of the totality principle requires that the total effective sentence imposed on an offender who has committed multiple offences bears a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved in all of the offences (including those, if any, in respect of which the offender is still serving or is yet to serve a term of imprisonment), viewed in their entirety, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances including those referable to the offender personally (and including, for example, the desirability of accommodating any wish to rehabilitate), all relevant sentencing factors and the total effective sentences imposed in comparable cases. (4) The range of sentences customarily imposed for a crime does not establish the range of a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion. Sentences customarily imposed in comparable cases provide a yardstick or reference point for ensuring broad consistency in sentencing, bearing in mind the scope for significant variations in relevant sentencing factors, and that there is no single correct sentence. What is important is the unifying principles which sentences imposed in comparable cases reveal and reflect. (5) When this court dismisses an appeal against sentence and when it resentences on a successful appeal, its decision does not fix the upper or lower limit of the range. (6) Where there is a challenge on totality grounds, the severity of a sentence imposed on an individual count generally falls to be assessed in light of the sentences imposed in respect of the other counts and its contribution to the total effective sentence A heavy individual sentence (which is not manifestly excessive) may be softened by an order that it be served concurrently with sentences imposed in relation to the other counts. A relatively light sentence (which is not manifestly inadequate) may, as a practical matter, have increased severity if it is ordered to be served cumulatively. The real question is whether the total effective sentence is unreasonable or plainly unjust. The merits 122 The maximum penalty for an offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice is 7 years' imprisonment: Criminal Code, s 143. 123 The seriousness of this offence was reflected in the fact that it was an attempt to avoid the prosecution of the appellant's partner for a serious offence relating to reckless driving in the course of police pursuit. The appellant made a false report that the car had been stolen. The report was detailed and incorporated a false alibi for her partner. The appellant made the false report despite having been warned by -- 40 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 41 police not to do so. On the other hand, the appellant did not falsely implicate any other person, the report had no discernible effect on the police investigation, and the appellant made a full confession when confronted by police. 124 The personal circumstances of the appellant favoured leniency. She pleaded guilty at the first reasonable opportunity and expressed remorse for her actions. Though she had a criminal record it did not include any offences of a similar nature. She was the primary carer for two young children. Significantly, she made the false report at the behest of her abusive partner in circumstances where she feared the consequences if she did not comply. 125 General deterrence remained an important sentencing consideration. However, I am unable to accept the respondent's contention that general deterrence may have increased importance where the offender is subject to non-exculpatory duress such as domestic violence.83 The suggestion appears to be that greater weight should be given to general deterrence for such offenders to discourage them from relenting to threats. The effect of this would be to cancel out the mitigatory value of the duress and to penalise the victims of domestic violence for the conduct of their abusers. This would be inconsistent with the fact that non-exculpatory duress is usually treated as reducing moral culpability. 126 In my view, general deterrence is neither more nor less important in cases where the offender is acting under non-exculpatory duress. It is an important factor in respect of offences of attempting to pervert the course of justice, but the weight to be accorded to it does not vary because the personal circumstances of the offender include being in an abusive domestic relationship. Making an appropriate allowance for a reduction in moral culpability due to duress is not inconsistent with general deterrence. The suggestion that making such an allowance will encourage abusers to exploit their victims credits abusers with greater rationality than they deserve. The law is unlikely to influence abusers by increasing the punishment of their victims. 127 As to the comparable cases, in Ranford, the offender arranged for a co-offender to sign a false statutory declaration stating that he was driving Ranford's vehicle when it was recorded speeding. The 83 cf Tiknius [50] - [53] (Johnson J, with Tobias AJA & Hall J agreeing), citing R v Roach [2005] VSCA 162 [15] (Callaway JA, with Ormiston & Charles JJA agreeing) and R v Z [2005] UKHL 22; [2005] 2 AC 467 [70]. -- 41 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 42 co-offender was to be paid for his involvement, though that did not eventuate. Both offenders entered pleas of guilty and were remorseful. On appeal, Ranford's sentence was reduced from 15 months' immediate imprisonment to 8 months' immediate imprisonment. The co-offender's sentence was reduced from 15 months' immediate imprisonment to 6 months' imprisonment suspended for 12 months. 128 Goulding, Wright and Swain are pre-transition cases (having been decided in 1991, 1992 and 1999, respectively) and that is reflected in the sentences imposed. In Goulding, the offender was the passenger in a vehicle that was involved in an accident. The driver was her boyfriend who was disqualified from driving. The offender made a false report to the police that she was the driver. She was warned that other information indicated that her boyfriend was the driver and that if she was lying, she could be charged. When later interviewed she adhered to her false story. She only admitted the offence when her boyfriend confessed. Sentences of 12 months' immediate imprisonment were imposed on the offender and her boyfriend. Leave to appeal was refused. 129 In Swain, the offender acquired a driver's licence in the name of another person after being disqualified from driving. He used the false identity to transfer three vehicles and to complete a change of address form. He incurred driving infringements in the false name. Finally, he was stopped while driving an unlicenced motorcycle and gave the false name. He endorsed a summons issued in the false name with a plea of guilty. The offender admitted the offending when interviewed and pleaded guilty. On a State appeal a suspended sentence was set aside and a sentence of 15 months' immediate imprisonment substituted. 130 In Wright, the offender was convicted of two offences. The first offence arose from the offender providing police with a stolen driver's licence as proof of identity. The second offence arose when the offender used the false identity when issued with a traffic infringement and a vehicle examination order. She pleaded guilty and was the primary carer of three children. A total sentence of 18 months' immediate imprisonment was reduced on appeal to 12 months' immediate imprisonment. 131 In Charles, the offender wrote three letters in false names in order to support a bail application by an acquaintance who was charged with serious drug offences. The offender also met with a community corrections officer who was preparing a home detention report. She -- 42 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 43 gave a false name and provided false information, again in an effort to assist in the bail application. The offender initially denied the offence when police located drafts of the letters. The offender pleaded guilty. She had a criminal record, including prior convictions for dishonesty offences. An appeal against sentence was allowed on the basis of an error in treating the plea as late when it was in fact a fast-track plea. A sentence of 2 years 6 months' immediate imprisonment on the single charge was reduced to 22 months' immediate imprisonment. 132 In Norton, the offender made a false report that her car had been stolen in order to make an insurance claim. In fact, the offender had been facing financial difficulties and had made an arrangement with a juvenile to take the car and burn it so that she could make the false report. A sentence of 18 months' immediate imprisonment for an offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice was described as severe and at the top of the range, but not manifestly excessive. 133 Limited assistance can be derived from the comparable cases referred to. There is no tariff for offences of this type. The most that can be said of the comparable cases is that they suggest that the sentence imposed here was very high, particularly when the personal circumstances of the appellant are taken into account. 134 In my view, having regard to the maximum penalty, the relative seriousness of the offence, the appellant's personal circumstances, and the limited assistance afforded by comparable cases, the sentence of 20 months' immediate imprisonment was unreasonable or plainly unjust. Whilst a sentence of immediate imprisonment was justified, a significantly lower sentence was appropriate. 135 Leave to appeal on ground 2 should be granted. Ground 2 should be upheld. Conclusion and resentencing 136 The respondent conceded that if only count 2 succeeded the additional evidence could still be received by the court on resentencing. However, counsel for the respondent properly noted that if ground 1 failed on the basis that the appellant could have adduced the additional evidence at sentencing, that could also stand in the way of it being used in resentencing: see Betts. As I would allow ground 1, this is not a difficulty that I need to deal with. -- 43 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 44 137 The appellant also provided further information at the appeal hearing regarding her progress towards rehabilitation. She has served 6 months' imprisonment since being sentenced and in that time has engaged in a number of courses. She has completed a senior first aid course and an active parenting course. She has obtained an accreditation in relation to labouring work. She has taken up opportunities to work in prison, including working in the kitchen and volunteering to work weekends. She has regular visits from her children, who remain in the care of her eldest daughter and brother and his partner. 138 The facts of the offending and the personal circumstances of the appellant are otherwise summarised earlier in these reasons. Like the sentencing judge, I consider that a discount for pleading guilty of 25% was appropriate. Having regard to those matters, and in particular the fact that the offence occurred in the context of an abusive relationship, I agreed that the appropriate sentence was one of 12 months' immediate imprisonment. I was not satisfied that a suspended sentence would properly reflect the seriousness of the offending. 139 For those reasons I joined in the making of the following orders: 1. The time for the appellant to commence an appeal against the sentence imposed on her on 7 October 2025 by the District Court of Western Australia, Petrusa DCJ, in respect of the conviction the subject of count 1 of indictment IND 963 of 2025 is extended to 11 March 2026. 2. The appellant is granted leave to adduce each of MFI A-1, MFI A-2, MFI-A3, and MFI-A4 as additional evidence in the appeal. Each of MFI A-1, MFI A-2, MFI-A3, and MFI-A4 is admitted as evidence in the appeal. 3. The appellant is granted leave to appeal on grounds 1 and 2 set out in the appellant's case dated 27 March 2026. 4. The appeal is allowed. 5. The sentence imposed on the appellant by Petrusa DCJ in the District Court of Western Australia on 7 October 2025 on count 1 of indictment IND 963 of 2025 is set aside. In substitution thereof, the appellant is resentenced as follows: (a) Count 1, a term of 12 months' immediate imprisonment. -- 44 of 45 -- [2026] WASCA 83 HALL JA Page 45 (b) The new sentence is backdated to commence on 7 October 2025. (c) The appellant is eligible for parole. 6. Any application to access or inspect exhibit MFI A-1 is to be referred to a judge of appeal for consideration and determination. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. RD Associate to the Honourable Justice Hall 15 JUNE 2026 -- 45 of 45 --