AFZAL -v- WA POLICE [2026] WASC 220

[2026] WASC 220 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CRIMINAL CITATION : AFZAL -v- WA POLICE [2026] WASC 220 CORAM : LUNDBERG J HEARD : 3 JUNE 2026 DELIVERED : 12 JUNE 2026 FILE NO/S : SJA 1091 of 2025 BETWEEN : MUHAMMAD KAAB AFZAL Appellant AND WA POLICE Respondent ON APPEAL FROM: Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Coram : MAGISTRATE G MIGNACCA-RANDAZZO File Number : PE 59494 OF 2025 Catchwords: Criminal law - Appeal against refusal by Magistrate to grant a spent conviction pursuant to s 45 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) - Appellant convicted on his plea of guilty of driving under the influence of cannabis contrary to s 64AC(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) - Turns on own facts -- 1 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 220 Page 2 Legislation: Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 8, s 9, s 14 Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), s 64AC(1) Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 45 Spent Convictions Act 1988 (WA), pt 3, sch 3 Result: Leave granted to allow appellant to rely on additional evidence. Leave to appeal refused on each ground. Appeal dismissed. Category: B Representation: Counsel: Appellant : In Person Respondent : M A Hurrelbrink Solicitors: Appellant : In Person Respondent : State Solicitor's Office Case(s) referred to in decision(s): ADA v Director of Public Prosecutions [2022] WASC 112 Brewer v Bayens [2002] WASCA 271; (2002) 26 WAR 510 GNR v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 5 IHS v Director of Public Prosecutions [2025] WASC 437 Lowndes v The Queen [1999] HCA 29; (1999) 195 CLR 665 M v Seidner [2013] WASC 395; (2013) 236 A Crim R 17 Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357 Norbu v WA Police [2024] WASC 473 R v Tognini [2000] WASCA 31 Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473 -- 2 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 220 Page 3 SWS v WA Police [2024] WASC 280 Wright v McMurchy [2012] WASCA 257 -- 3 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 220 Page 4 Table of Contents Factual background..................................................................................................................... 5 Appeal against the refusal to grant a spent conviction ............................................................... 7 The appellant's evidence on appeal ............................................................................................ 8 Exemptions to the Spent Convictions legislation ....................................................................... 9 Relevant principles ................................................................................................................... 10 Disposition ................................................................................................................................ 11 Ground of appeal 1 ............................................................................................................... 11 Grounds of appeal 2 to 5 ...................................................................................................... 12 Ground of appeal 6 ............................................................................................................... 15 Conclusion and orders .............................................................................................................. 16 -- 4 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 220 LUNDBERG J Page 5 LUNDBERG J: Factual background 1 The appellant, who is 26 years of age, was stopped by Police officers on 23 August 2025 whilst driving on Alexander Drive in Yokine. He was required to undergo an oral fluid drug test, which returned a positive result for cannabis. The appellant was charged with an offence under s 64AC(1) of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) (RTA).1 2 The appellant pleaded guilty at the first return of the matter in the Perth Magistrates Court. He was legally unrepresented at the time. The appellant sought a spent conviction order pursuant to s 45 of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) (Sentencing Act). The granting of a spent conviction is 'exceptional' in character, operating as a departure from the ordinary outcome that a conviction will be a matter of record with all of the consequences that may entail into the future. I will return to the applicable principles on this issue in due course. 3 Section 45 relevantly provides as follows: 45. Spent conviction order, making and effect of (1) Under section 39(2), a court sentencing an offender is not to make a spent conviction order unless – (a) it considers that the offender is unlikely to commit such an offence again; and (b) having regard to – (i) the fact that the offence is trivial; or (ii) the previous good character of the offender, it considers the offender should be relieved immediately of the adverse effect that the conviction might have on the offender. 4 Before the Magistrate, the appellant referred to the impact a recorded conviction would have on his employment as a full time security officer and also as an Uber driver.2 As will be seen, the nature of the appellant's employment has changed post-sentence. The appellant informed the court that he had used cannabis approximately two to three 1 Prosecution Notice PE59494/2025. 2 ts 3 (30 October 2025). -- 5 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 220 LUNDBERG J Page 6 days prior to the day in question, and he believed the substance would have cleared his system by then.3 5 The spent conviction order was opposed by the prosecution on public interest grounds. The prosecutor further submitted there was nothing before the court addressing the asserted detriment.4 6 The Magistrate accepted the appellant's guilty plea and imposed a fine of $400 plus costs. The maximum penalty for the offence was a fine of $1,250. His Honour concluded that the statutory pre-conditions for the making of a spent conviction order were satisfied and observed that the appellant had no prior record, was remorseful, unlikely to reoffend, and was a person of good character.5 7 The Magistrate nonetheless refused to exercise the discretion to make a spent conviction order, finding that the power should only be exercised in exceptional and rare circumstances and, further, that there was a public interest in the conviction remaining on the appellant's record, particularly given his work as an Uber driver.6 The Magistrate's concluding remarks concerning the spent conviction application were as follows:7 Judges of the Supreme Court have repeatedly told magistrates that the discretion is to be exercised in exceptional and rare circumstances. A conviction ordinarily stands, with all the consequences that flow from it. Here you put to me a contention that it will affect your employment, as I understand it. I note that you are working as an Uber driver. In my judgement, employers ought to know, whether they are Uber or taxi service employers, that a person has a prior history of driving with a prescribed illicit drug in their oral fluid. Employers should know and have that information to make a judgment as to whether you would get employment in that area. In my view, it would serve to have an informed decision so that there are services provided by people that employers take the view that they are fit and proper to do so. In my view, there is a public interest here in this conviction being part of your record. It may be perceived by you to be harsh, but at the end of the day, you made the choice to consume this illicit drug, and the 3 ts 2 (30 October 2025). 4 ts 3 (30 October 2025). 5 ts 4 (30 October 2025). 6 ts 4 (30 October 2025). 7 ts 4 - 5 (30 October 2025). -- 6 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 220 LUNDBERG J Page 7 consequences of being detected … The application for the spent conviction is refused. Appeal against the refusal to grant a spent conviction 8 The appellant has now sought leave to appeal against the refusal, under div 2 of pt 2 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) (CAA). The appellant has advanced six grounds of appeal.8 The appeal is opposed by the respondent. 9 I heard the appeal on 3 June 2026. The appellant appeared on his own behalf, without legal representation. It is generally accepted that the court should approach matters involving litigants in person with a degree of flexibility beyond that which would be applied were the person to be legally represented, particularly in a criminal setting. It is appropriate, therefore, that some allowance to be given to the appellant in the conduct of the appeal and in assessing the submissions he has advanced. 10 That being said, it is apparent the appellant has had the benefit of some form of external assistance in the preparation and drafting of his grounds of appeal, which have a degree of legal sophistication about them. 11 Adopting a flexible approach to the appellant's procedural non- compliance, I indicated to the appellant I would receive in evidence on the appeal, pursuant to the power in s 40(1)(e) CAA, his further affidavit, notwithstanding the absence of any formal application to adduce additional evidence on appeal and notwithstanding the appellant's failure to comply with the orders made by Forrester J in this regard.9 12 Quite properly, the respondent did not oppose this course. 13 Further, I indicated to the appellant I would take into account the further matters asserted by him from the bar table during the hearing, despite those matters not being presented as sworn evidence. Ultimately, as I will explain, these further matters are not sufficiently cogent to warrant interference in the exercise by the Magistrate of the sentencing discretion, in my respectful view, nor to found the miscarriage of justice conclusion advanced by the appellant. 8 Grounds of appeal emailed to the court on 13 April 2026. 9 Affidavit of the appellant sworn 8 April 2026. See the orders of Forrester J made on 17 March 2026. -- 7 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 220 LUNDBERG J Page 8 The appellant's evidence on appeal 14 It is convenient at this point to summarise the new evidence, and clarify how it relevantly differs from the position put to the Magistrate at first instance. 15 Before the Magistrate, the appellant had indicated he was working as a full-time security officer and undertaking part-time work driving for Uber. As just noted, that position has changed. 16 The appellant now says he has entered the truck driving industry, as a casual driver. He has obtained that employment through a friend, and so has not yet been required to provide a National Police Certificate. 17 The appellant no longer works as a security officer or as an Uber driver. 18 The appellant is concerned that his conviction will operate as a barrier to obtain further truck driving employment, in organisations that require an appropriate clearance certificate as a condition of employment. 19 On appeal, the appellant reiterated the position he had put to the Magistrate that this incident was a one-off matter, and he expressed his remorse and embraced personal responsibility for the conduct. The appellant further deposed that:10 …the continued existence of this conviction is having a negative impact on my ability to progress in employment and move forward with my life. 20 The appellant sought on appeal to characterise the offence in question as being attributable to the 'particularly difficult period' in his life which followed the 'recent loss of [his] employment' and during which he was 'experiencing significant stress'.11 These matters were not, at least in these terms, put to the Magistrate at the time of sentencing. There is some tension between this assertion and the appellant's indication to the Magistrate that he was working as a security officer and for Uber. At the hearing of the appeal, I raised this issue with the appellant, who explained that he had indeed lost his employment shortly before the date of the offence and regrets not putting this to the Magistrate at first instance. 10 Affidavit of the appellant sworn 8 April 2026 [9]. 11 Affidavit of the appellant sworn 8 April 2026 [2]. -- 8 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 220 LUNDBERG J Page 9 21 Favourably to the appellant, I will accept his explanation on appeal regarding the earlier loss of his employment and accept that he no longer works as a security officer or for Uber, having now embarked on employment as a truck driver. Exemptions to the Spent Convictions legislation 22 The appellant's reliance on his work as a security officer in support of the application for a spent conviction, as put to the Magistrate at first instance, requires some comment, although as the appellant no longer works in that field the point is not determinative on this appeal. 23 As explained in the respondent's submissions, the protections afforded by pt 3 of the Spent Convictions Act 1988 (WA) (the Spent Convictions Act), concerning discrimination on the ground of spent conviction, disclosure, and assessment of character under written laws, are subject to various exceptions. These are delineated in sch 3 to the Spent Convictions Act. 24 For example, persons appointed or being considered for appointment as a police officer are exempted from s 18 (which concerns discrimination of job applicants and employees) and div 4 pt 3 (which includes the assessment of character under written laws) of the Spent Convictions Act.12 25 Further, a person applying for the grant of a licence, permit or approval under the Firearms Act 2004 (WA) is exempt from div 4 pt 3.13 26 By way of further example, a person employed or being considered for employment in the Department of Education Services is exempt from certain provisions within div 4 pt 3.14 27 Relevantly for present purposes, item 8 of cl 1(1) of sch 3 exempts a 'person who holds a licence or permit, or who is applying for the issue or renewal of a licence or permit, under the Security and Related Activities (Control) Act 1996 (WA)'. Such persons are exempt from s 22 and div 4 pt 3. There are similar exemptions for other types of 'security licences' regulated by the Court Security and Custodial Services Act 1999 (WA), the Prisons Act 1981 (WA), and the Public Transport Authority Act 2003 (WA).15 12 Spent Convictions Act, sch 3, cl 1(1), item 4. 13 Spent Convictions Act, sch 3, cl 1(1), item 9. 14 Spent Convictions Act, sch 3, cl 1(1), item 15(3), par 1. 15 Spent Convictions Act, sch 3, cl 1(1), items 12 and 13, item 5 and 10A, and item 11. -- 9 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 220 LUNDBERG J Page 10 28 Accordingly, the consideration of an application for a spent conviction where the applicant holds, or intends to hold, a security licence of the types indicated, should properly have regard to the effects of the exemptions in sch 3 to the Spent Convictions Act, in the assessment of the detriment and any adverse effects which are asserted by the applicant. Relevant principles 29 Before I address the appeal grounds, it is necessary to outline the primary principles of law I must apply in considering this appeal. The principles may be briefly stated. 30 First, an appellate court must be mindful not to substitute its own opinion for that of the sentencing court merely because the appellate court would have exercised the sentencing discretion in a different manner: Lowndes v The Queen.16 The sentencing court must be allowed as much flexibility in sentencing as is congruent with consistency of approach and as accords with the statutory regime that applies: Markarian v The Queen.17 As has been recognised by the High Court:18 The discretion which the law commits to a sentencing court is of vital importance in the administration of our system of criminal justice. 31 Second, it should be remembered that the 'ordinary rule' is that a conviction will be a matter of record with all of the consequences that may entail into the future: R v Tognini.19 An offender who seeks a spent conviction order is seeking a departure from this ordinary rule. Such a departure is permitted by the terms of s 39(2) of the Sentencing Act, which vests a sentencing court with a discretion whether or not to make a spent conviction order. 32 Third, the conditions for the making of a spent conviction order are set out in s 45 of the Sentencing Act. The legislation directs the court not to make a spent conviction order unless three conditions are satisfied. The prerequisites to the making of the spent conviction order are: (1) the court must consider that the offender is unlikely to commit such an offence again; 16 Lowndes v The Queen [1999] HCA 29; (1999) 195 CLR 665 [15]. 17 Markarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357 [27]. 18 Lowndes v The Queen [15]. 19 R v Tognini [2000] WASCA 31 [27] - [28]. -- 10 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 220 LUNDBERG J Page 11 (2) the offence must be trivial, or the offender must be of previous good character (being express alternatives to each other); and (3) having regard to the pre-condition that the offence must be trivial, or the offender must be of previous good character, the court must consider that the offender should be relieved immediately of the adverse effect that the conviction might have on the offender: ADA v Director of Public Prosecutions.20 33 Fourth, the first two pre-conditions must be established before the court considers whether it is satisfied that the discretion can be exercised to make a spent conviction order. The pre-conditions must be established by convincing evidence: Brewer v Bayens.21 The exercise of the discretion to grant a spent conviction order is regarded as being of an exceptional character: R v Tognini.22 The sentencing court has a discretion, not a duty, to make a spent conviction order: GNR v The State of Western Australia.23 34 Fifth, consideration must be given to all the circumstances of the offender and the offence, including its seriousness, as well as the public interest: Wright v McMurchy.24 The public interest relevantly includes 'maintaining the community's confidence in the judicial system and ensuring general deterrence by the public record of convictions'. The public interest also 'comprises a consideration of employers being aware of an offender's conduct, where that conduct is relevant in assessing the offender's reliability and suitability for the type of work undertaken by the offender': ADA v Director of Public Prosecutions.25 Disposition 35 I can now turn to consider the grounds of appeal. Ground of appeal 1 36 By ground 1, the appellant contends the Magistrate misdirected himself by applying a threshold to the exercise of the statutory discretion 20 ADA v Director of Public Prosecutions [2022] WASC 112 (McGrath J). 21 Brewer v Bayens [2002] WASCA 271; (2002) 26 WAR 510 [14]. 22 R v Tognini [27] ‑ [28]. 23 GNR v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 5 [44]. See also ADA v Director of Public Prosecutions [34]. 24 Wright v McMurchy [2012] WASCA 257 [59]; ADA v Director of Public Prosecutions [34]. 25 ADA v Director of Public Prosecutions [37], citing Brewer v Bayens [17] - [18]. -- 11 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 220 LUNDBERG J Page 12 in s 45 which is inconsistent with the statutory framework.26 37 That is not so. 38 The Magistrate's reference to the discretion being exercised in 'exceptional and rare circumstances' was not a gloss on the statutory language, but a proper recognition of the accepted scope of the discretionary power and the manner of its exercise. The observations of the Magistrate reflect an approach consistent with binding appellate authority, as correctly submitted by the respondent. 39 The first ground of appeal has no merit. Leave to appeal on ground 1 will be refused. Grounds of appeal 2 to 5 40 As correctly characterised by the respondent, in broad terms, Grounds 2 to 4 assert that the Magistrate failed to consider certain matters as part of the sentencing exercise. Further, by Ground 5, the appellant contends that the Magistrate gave unreasonable weight to the public interest whilst not giving weight to certain statutory objectives. When examined collectively, Grounds 2 to 5 in effect assert that the Magistrate improperly exercised his discretion to order a spent conviction. 41 I will set out the substance of these grounds and then explain how they should be dealt with by the court. 42 By ground 2, the appellant asserts the Magistrate failed to apply mandatory statutory considerations, in that he failed to give proper weight to the appellant's age, his lack of criminal history, his early guilty plea, his remorse, his cooperation, the low-level positive oral fluid result, and the significant employment related consequences.27 In the appeal ground, the reference to employment was drafted by reference to the 'difficulty maintaining a security licence'. 43 By ground 3, the appellant asserts the Magistrate failed to consider the appellant's 'personal circumstances and rehabilitative context'. The appellant contends the Magistrate: 26 Appeal ground 1 states: 'The learned Magistrate erred by stating that the power to grant a spent conviction is one to be exercised only in 'exceptional and rare circumstances'. This constitutes a misdirection. Section 45 does not impose an exceptional-circumstances threshold. The Magistrate therefore applied a test that is inconsistent with the proper construction of the provision and with binding appellate authority'. 27 Appeal ground 2 states in part: 'The Magistrate's reasoning did not demonstrate a balanced or lawful application of the required statutory factors'. -- 12 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 220 LUNDBERG J Page 13 …did not consider that the appellant's lapse occurred during a period of acute stress linked to a recent loss of employment, which the appellant inadvertently failed to mention to the Court. This circumstance is directly relevant to the assessment of rehabilitation, risk of reoffending, and whether the conviction should be spent. 44 By ground 4, the appellant asserts an error occurred in the Magistrate's assessment of the 'detriment'. The ground expressly asserts that the Magistrate failed to consider that 'the appellant is a licensed security officer', that a 'recorded conviction directly jeopardises this licence and the appellant's current and future employment', that 'the appellant works two jobs (security + Uber) to support himself and family', and that 'the conviction imposes disproportionate and ongoing hardship on future income and livelihood'. 45 By ground 5, the appellant asserts the Magistrate gave unreasonable weight given to the public interest consideration. The appellant submits the Magistrate 'elevated general public interest considerations without adequately balancing them against statutory objectives including rehabilitation, good character, personal impact, and proportionality'. 46 To the extent to which the above grounds assert the Magistrate failed to take into account matters of which he was not aware, they have no merit. 47 To the extent to which the appellant relies on matters concerning his employment as a security officer or as an Uber driver, the grounds can largely be put to one side given the appellant's new field of employment and his indication to this court that he is no longer driving for Uber, or working as a security officer. Any purported error in this regard would not give rise to a substantial miscarriage of justice, such that the court would be justified in dismissing the appeal in any event: CAA, s 14(2). 48 As to the general criticisms of the Magistrate, and his failure to consider various matters such as detriment and rehabilitation, the grounds lack any substance, in my view. The Magistrate's reasons reveal his Honour had regard to the appellant's character, his remorse, his age, his lack of criminal record, and his good character, in his assessment of the preconditions to the application of s 45 of the Sentencing Act. His Honour's analysis was entirely orthodox. 49 His Honour was also plainly conscious of the potential detriment the appellant would suffer in the context of his Uber driving -- 13 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 220 LUNDBERG J Page 14 employment, and recorded his view that 'employers ought to know' of the conviction. There was a distinct lack of cogency in the material before the Magistrate as to the possibility of detriment being suffered and the extent of that detriment. Indeed, the evidence was sparse. The evidentiary platform in this regard remains similarly sparse on appeal. The appellant's submissions as to detriment primarily rely on inference and require a degree of speculation by the court as to the potential consequences to him from a recorded conviction. 50 Nonetheless, the court below could not exclude the possibility that this conviction might be taken into account by a future employer in a way which adversely affects his ability to secure employment.28 His Honour certainly did not exclude this possibility. The prospect that the conviction may have an adverse effect on his future employment does not necessarily mean that it is unjust if he were not to be relieved of the consequences of the conviction, as McGrath J observed in Norbu v WA Police.29 Rather, the adverse consequences on the appellant's future employment prospects are factors to be weighed with all other considerations bearing on whether a spent conviction should be made. 51 On a fair reading of the sentencing remarks, the Magistrate gave consideration to the potential detriment which the appellant might suffer, but regarded the public interest consideration as having greater weight in the context of the appellant's employment as a driver for Uber and as security officer. The offence in question had a rational connection to the employment then being undertaken by the appellant, and there was an obvious public interest in allowing future employers the opportunity to consider that offence in any recruitment decision concerning the appellant. That assessment was open to the Magistrate. In any event, the potential detriment to the appellant in relation to his employment as a security officer is weakened by the exemptions in the legislation as earlier described, and the reality that the appellant no longer works in that field. 52 In my view, it was entirely open to the sentencing court in this case to give greater weight to the public interest considerations relative to matters personal to the appellant. The appellant's submission that the Magistrate gave unreasonable weight to this consideration, or elevated the public interest factors above all other matters, is not borne out by the transcript of the hearing or the sentencing remarks. 28 M v Seidner [2013] WASC 395; (2013) 236 A Crim R 17 [66] (Pritchard J). 29 Norbu v WA Police [2024] WASC 473 [48] (McGrath J). -- 14 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 220 LUNDBERG J Page 15 53 I would refuse leave to appeal in respect of grounds 1 to 5, there being no sound basis for the assertions of error on the part of the sentencing Magistrate. Put another way, the criticisms of the Magistrate lack substance such that the appellant is, in effect, inviting this court to substitute its own sentence for that imposed by the sentencing court. That is not a permissible course for this court to adopt. Ground of appeal 6 54 Finally, by ground 6, the appellant contends that the decision not to order a spent conviction was manifestly unreasonable and an improper exercise of discretion. I have already explained that I do not regard the refusal at first instance as being manifestly unreasonable. However, I understood the appellant to also contend that the refusal, when considered in light of the additional evidence now presented, constituted a miscarriage of justice. 55 By s 8(1)(b) CAA, an appeal may be advanced on the ground there has been a miscarriage of justice. However, even if a ground of appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, the court may dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred: CAA, s 14(2). 56 I have granted leave to the appellant to adduce additional evidence on appeal, having regard to the width of the power to do so. The additional evidence relied upon by the appellant must nonetheless be carefully evaluated to assess its cogency. 57 In this case, the additional material reveals the appellant has, post- sentence, altered his field of employment, commencing employment as a truck driver, and moving away from his previous tandem employment as a security officer and Uber driver. It is this new field of employment which the appellant says provides a basis for the miscarriage of justice contention. There are several reasons why I would reject this assertion. 58 First, while post-sentence evidence can be adduced in support of a miscarriage of justice ground, considerable care is needed where the new material points to a complete change in the offender's employment which was not apparent at sentencing, in contrast to material which further explains or clarifies the factual position which existed at the time of sentencing. Such care is required to ensure the jurisdiction being exercised by this court is appellate in nature, tethered to the original sentencing process, and not a wholly different application which could not have been asserted below. -- 15 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 220 LUNDBERG J Page 16 59 Second, the new field of employment relied on by the appellant is evidently not based on a period of training undertaken by the appellant, nor the acquisition of qualifications, the benefit of which would be left in jeopardy through the recording of the conviction. In truth, the appellant has embarked on a fresh field of employment through personal choice. The appellant's circumstances stand in stark contrast to those cases where an offender, who demonstrates he or she has held employment in a profession or industry for a lengthy period and potentially following years of training, or through obtaining the necessary qualifications, has been relieved of the immediate consequences of a conviction. I refer, by way of example, to the approach adopted by this court in relation to the circumstances of the heavy diesel mechanic in SWS v WA Police,30 the financial manager in ADA v Director of Public Prosecutions, and the engineer in IHS v Director of Public Prosecutions.31 60 Third, it is unclear for what period the appellant intends to pursue this new endeavour. At the least, the appellant's change in employment since October 2025 allows for the possibility that his chosen field of endeavour may change again in the future, to a field to which different considerations apply. 61 Fourth, for so long as the appellant remains employed in the truck driving industry, there remains a public interest for prospective employers to be aware of this conviction, even though it appears to be an isolated circumstance. 62 In summary, in my respectful view, this is not an appeal in which the court has been presented with additional evidence which would justify the conclusion that the original sentencing decision would, if left undisturbed, be manifestly unreasonable and amount to a miscarriage of justice. Conclusion and orders 63 In my view, none of the appellant's grounds have merit. 64 The appellant of course requires leave to appeal in respect of each of the grounds and, in order to secure leave, he must demonstrate a ground has a reasonable prospect of succeeding,32 meaning that the 30 SWS v WA Police [2024] WASC 280 (Whitby J). 31 IHS v Director of Public Prosecutions [2025] WASC 437 (Lundberg J). 32 CAA, s 9(2). -- 16 of 17 -- [2026] WASC 220 LUNDBERG J Page 17 ground is required to have a rational and logical prospect of succeeding.33 Unless leave to appeal is granted on at least one ground, the appeal is taken to have been dismissed.34 65 For the reasons I have set out above, I consider the appellant has failed to demonstrate a basis for leave to appeal to be granted in respect of any of the grounds of appeal and I will accordingly refuse leave to appeal in respect of each of the grounds. It follows that I must dismiss the appeal. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. IR Associate to the Hon Justice Lundberg 12 JUNE 2026 33 Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473 [56] (Steytler P, Wheeler & Roberts-Smith JJA). 34 CAA, s 9(3). -- 17 of 17 --