PHILIP JOHN SINCLAIR HYDE v JOHN HAMILTON PETER HYDE [2026] SASCA 11

Applicant: PHILIP JOHN SINCLAIR HYDE Counsel: MR B C ROBERTS KC WITH MR T GUTHRIE - Solicitor: JOHNSTON WITHERS First Respondent: JOHN HAMILTON PETER HYDE Counsel: MS A WELLS - Solicitor: LC LAW Second Respondent: ELAINE JOY HYDE Counsel: MR J HETZEL-BONE - Solicitor: DONLAN LAWYERS Third Respondent: JUDITH DEROSE SEARLES Counsel: MS A WELLS - Solicitor: LC LAW Fourth Respondent: GREENPATCH PASTORAL PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE OF GLEN HEALTH TRUST Counsel: MS A WELLS - Solicitor: LC LAW Fifth Respondent: JOHN HYDE RURAL PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE OF GLEN HEALTH TRUST Counsel: MS A WELLS - Solicitor: LC LAW Hearing Date/s: 18/02/2026 File No/s: CIV-25-015481 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Court of Appeal: Civil) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. HYDE v HYDE & ORS [2026] SASCA 11 Ruling of the Honourable President Livesey (ex tempore) 18 February 2026 APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - OTHER MATTERS This is an application seeking an expedited appeal hearing. The appellant claims an interest in his parents’ farming land by way of constructive trust or equitable estoppel, comprising a right of occupation together with a right to ownership upon the death of his parents. The appellant’s application for an interlocutory injunction preventing the respondents retaking possession pending the trial of his claim was dismissed by Dart AsJ in November 2025, and an appeal to Kourakis CJ in December 2025 was dismissed. At a callover on 6 February 2026, the matter was listed for hearing before this Court in November 2026, subject to any argument as to expedition. The appellant now seeks expedition on the basis that a new lease of the land between the respondents and a third party was executed on 13 February 2026 and is due to commence on 1 March 2026. The respondents opposed the application. They contended that the appellant knew that a new lease was being negotiated and the application is too late, and that an expedited appeal hearing would prejudice them. Held: -- 1 of 4 -- 1. The Court grants expedition of the hearing of the appeal, to be heard on Friday, 27 February 2026. 2. Had it been disclosed at the 6 February 2026 callover that a new lease dated 13 February commencing on 1 March 2026 was imminent, the Court would have dealt with this matter on the basis that it required expedition. 3. Any question of costs is reserved. Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 50(5)(c), referred to. E Co v Q [2018] NSWSC 442; Kramer v Stone (2023) 112 NSWLR 564; Kramer v Stone (2024) 99 ALJR 126; McDonald & Anor v Attorney-General for the State of South Australia [2022] SASCA 43; McNab v Graham (2017) 53 VR 311; Roberts v Roberts [2021] SASC 72, considered. -- 2 of 4 -- HYDE v HYDE & ORS [2026] SASCA 11 Court of Appeal – Civil – Application LIVESEY P (ex tempore): 1 This is an application seeking an expedited appeal hearing, where the second respondent abides the order of the court. Consequently, I will refer to the balance of the respondents collectively as “the respondents”. 2 The appellant claims an interest in his parents’ farming land by way of constructive trust or equitable estoppel, comprising a right to occupy together with a right to ownership upon the death of his parents.1 3 When this matter came before the Associate Justice in November 2025, he pointed to the 2008 lease between the appellant and his parents, and the appellant’s breach of that lease, in finding that no injunction should be imposed which prevented the respondents from seeking possession before a trial of the appellant’s claims. The interest that would arguably arise on the death of the appellant’s parents could be protected by extending caveats and, accordingly, the application for an injunction was dismissed. 4 On appeal to the Chief Justice in December last year, his Honour found that the balance of convenience favoured the appellant but, on the representations pleaded by the appellant, there was no representation which addressed the legal position governing the occupation of the land and continuing farming operations before the respondents’ death, such as to render it unconscientious for the respondents to exercise their legal rights under the lease. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. 5 The appellant challenges that ruling, pointing to his pleadings and the decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal in McNab v Graham.2 For the purposes of today’s application, I need not address that challenge. 6 The respondents oppose the appellant’s application, contending that the appellant is too late, because he has long known that a lease was being negotiated. 1 Because the appeal is concerned with “relief in the nature of an injunction”, leave to appeal is not required: Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 50(5)(c); McDonald & Anor v Attorney-General for the State of South Australia [2022] SASCA 43, [3] (Livesey P and Bleby JA). 2 McNab v Graham (2017) 53 VR 311, [102]-[107] (Tate JA, with whom Santamaria JA and Keogh AJA agreed). For his estoppel case, the appellant relies on Kramer v Stone (2024) 99 ALJR 126, [37]-[41] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman and Beech-Jones JJ). In Kramer v Stone (2023) 112 NSWLR 564, [84] (Ward P, with whom Leeming and Kirk JJA agreed), it was explained that on a claim for a constructive trust based on a cause of action in proprietary estoppel, “an express representation or promise is not necessary (indeed, the representation or promise may derive from conduct)”. See also E Co v Q [2018] NSWSC 442, [904]-[947] (Ward CJ in Eq). The elements of the cause of action for constructive trust substantially overlap with those of proprietary estoppel: Roberts v Roberts [2021] SASC 72, [642] (Blue J). -- 3 of 4 -- [2026] SASCA 11 Livesey P 2 It now transpires that a new lease of the land, between the respondents and a third party, was executed on 13 February 2026. That lease is on much better terms than the lease with the appellant, and in relation to which he is in breach. The new lease is due to commence on 1 March 2026. 7 The respondents also point to the callover on 6 February 2026, when this matter was listed for hearing before the Court of Appeal in November later this year. They say that the request to expedite the hearing of the appeal on or before 27 February 2026 now prejudices them because, during the callover, no earlier date was available and their senior counsel is now in hospital until early March. 8 It is true that the parties were given a November hearing date at the callover on 6 February 2026. However, when Ms Wells asked whether that was the earliest date available, my response was that that was the earliest date, “[s]ubject to any argument about expedition”.3 9 At that time, there was no suggestion from any party that expedition was required, or that there were any imminent steps being taken. In particular, there was no suggestion that a lease dated 13 February commencing on 1 March 2026 was imminent. Had that been disclosed, I would have dealt with this matter on the basis that it required expedition. 10 Whether the commencement date of the new lease can be deferred is presently not known to me. However, in all of the circumstances, I am prepared to grant expedition in the hearing of the appeal. The hearing can be accommodated before the Court of Appeal on Friday, 27 February at 10.15 am, with two hours allocated. The appellant has filed an outline and says his submissions can be concluded within half an hour. 11 The appellant has leave to file the book of affidavits which has been lodged with the Registry, and the respondents will have until Wednesday, 25 February 2026, at 4.00 pm, to file an outline of argument and list of authorities. 12 The callover listed for this Friday, 20 February 2026, is vacated, and the possession application listed for Monday, 23 February 2026, should be stood over to a date on or after 27 February 2026. 13 In the circumstances, I think it is appropriate that any question of costs be reserved. 3 Transcript, p4. -- 4 of 4 --