PHILIP JOHN SINCLAIR HYDE v JOHN HAMILTON PETER HYDE [2026] SASCA 13

On Appeal from SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (THE HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE KOURAKIS) CIV-25-014756 Appellant: PHILIP JOHN SINCLAIR HYDE Counsel: MR B ROBERTS KC WITH MR T GUTHRIE - Solicitor: JOHNSTON WITHERS First Respondent: JOHN HAMILTON PETER HYDE Counsel: MR T DUGGAN KC WITH MS A WELLS - Solicitor: LC LAW Second Respondent: ELAINE JOY HYDE Counsel: MR J HETZEL-BONE - Solicitor: DONLAN LAWYERS Third Respondent: JUDITH DEROSE SEARLES Counsel: MR T DUGGAN KC WITH MS A WELLS - Solicitor: LC LAW Fourth Respondent: GREENPATCH PASTORAL PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE OF GLEN HEALTH TRUST Counsel: MR T DUGGAN KC WITH MS A WELLS - Solicitor: LC LAW Fifth Respondent: JOHN HYDE RURAL PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE OF GLEN HEALTH TRUST Counsel: MR T DUGGAN KC WITH MS A WELLS - Solicitor: LC LAW Hearing Date/s: 27/02/2026 File No/s: CIV-25-015481 A SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Court of Appeal: Civil) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. HYDE v HYDE & ORS [2026] SASCA 13 Judgment of the Court of Appeal (The Honourable President Livesey, the Honourable Justice Bleby and the Honourable Justice B Doyle) 5 March 2026 EQUITY - EQUITABLE REMEDIES - INJUNCTIONS - INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTIONS - INJUNCTIONS TO PRESERVE STATUS QUO OR PROPERTY PENDING DETERMINATION OF RIGHTS EQUITY - TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES - IMPLIED TRUSTS - CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS ESTOPPEL - ESTOPPEL BY CONDUCT - PROPRIETARY ESTOPPEL The appellant (‘Philip’) seeks relief including a constructive trust over property on the Eyre Peninsula on which he conducts a farming business (the ‘farming land’). The registered proprietor is the fourth respondent, Greenpatch Pty Ltd (‘Greenpatch’) as trustee of a discretionary family trust (the ‘Trust’). The appointor of the Trust is Philip’s father John (the first respondent) and, upon John’s death, Philip. The directors and shareholders of Greenpatch were Philip, John and Philip’s mother Elaine (the second respondent). Before 2008, Philip conducted a farming business on the farming land in partnership with John and Elaine. -- 1 of 35 -- In 2008, Greenpatch entered into a registered lease in respect of the farming land in favour of Philip and his late wife Julie (‘Lease Agreement’), with an annual rent of $80,000 plus GST. The initial term of the Lease Agreement was five years. The parties did not attend to any formal renewal of the Lease Agreement. Philip continued to make rental payments but missed some payments over the years. Julie died in 2020. Philip continued to operate a farming business on the land, more recently through a corporate trustee. There were periods during 2023 and 2024 when Philip did not make rental payments. The relationship between Philip and his parents broke down by no later than 2024. Philip alleges that John advised that he intended to sell some of the farming land in 2024. Philip lodged caveats in respect of the farming land in November 2024. In December 2024, Elaine was purportedly replaced as a director and shareholder of Greenpatch by his sister Judith (the third respondent). On 29 July 2025, John exercised his power of appointment to appoint the fifth respondent, John Hyde Rural Pty Ltd (‘JHR’) as trustee of the Trust in lieu of Greenpatch. Philip is not a director or shareholder of JHR. JHR then purported to terminate the Lease Agreement. Greenpatch took steps to warn the caveats. The primary judge made an order extending time for the removal of caveats over the farming land but declined to enjoin John, Greenpatch or JHR from disturbing the possession of, preventing access to, or interfering with the quiet enjoyment by Philip of the farming land pending the determination of the proceedings. The appeal is against a decision by an appeal judge dismissing an appeal against the refusal of an interlocutory injunction by the primary judge. The appeal judge considered that the balance of convenience favoured the appellant but that the primary judge had not erred in declining to find that there was an arguable case that would support the injunction. The appeal judge considered that, there was no pleaded representation which addressed the legal position governing the occupation of the farming land and the continuing farming operations before John and Elaine’s deaths, such as to render it unconscientious for the respondents to exercise legal rights under the Lease Agreement. The appellant contends that: 1. the appeal judge erred by implicitly finding that there needed to be a representation as to continuing use to sustain the claims. The proprietary estoppel and constructive trust claimed by Philip is sufficient to give rise to a prima facie claim for relief that would be recognised as having arisen in 2024 when the respondents resiled from representations made to Philip; 2. the appeal judge erred by misconstruing Philip’s pleaded case. Paragraph [33] of the Statement of Claim included a representation as to continuing use and the supporting material facts provide a reasonably arguable basis for an implied representation as to continuing use. The appeal to this Court was heard on an expedited basis because the respondents wish to proceed with a lease in favour of a third party over the farming land. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court made orders allowing the appeal and, subject to the giving of undertakings, granted an injunction in terms reflecting those sought by Philip, with reasons to follow. Held, allowing the appeal: 1. whilst there is genuine scope for debate about whether a constructive trust should be imposed from the time a representor resiles from a representation as to a future disposition but where there is no representation as to continuing use, there are serious questions to be tried as to whether relief may be granted (subject to conditions) in such a case and as to whether an implied representation as to continuing use was made in this case; 2. noting the undertakings proffered, the balance of convenience favours the preservation of the status quo pending a determination of the claims. Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA) s 50(5)(c); Real Property Act 1886 (SA) s 191, referred to. Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57; Birmingham v Renfrew (1937) 57 CLR 666; Chimaera Capital Ltd v Pharmaust Ltd (2007) 64 ACSR 332; E Co v Q, E Co (a -- 2 of 35 -- pseudonym) v Q [a pseudonym] (No 4) [2018] NSWSC 442, [2019] NSWSC 429; European Bank Ltd v Evans (2010) 240 CLR 432; Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101; Hyde v Hyde [2026] SASCA 11; Kramer v Stone (2023) 112 NSWLR 564; McNab v Graham (2017) 53 VR 311; McVicars v South Australian Housing Trust (No 2) [2025] SASCA 56; Mould v Canale [2017] VSC 793; Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583; Pirrottina v Pirrottina [2025] NSWCA 55; Rodda v Ian Rodda Pty Ltd [2015] SASC 95; Rogers v Rogers [2001] VSC 14; Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505; Teachers Registration Board of South Australia v Kourlas [2024] SASCA 88; Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776, considered. -- 3 of 35 -- -- 4 of 35 -- HYDE v HYDE & ORS [2026] SASCA 13 Court of Appeal – Civil: Livesey P, Bleby and B Doyle JJA 1 THE COURT: This is an appeal against a decision of an appeal judge, in turn dismissing an appeal against the refusal of an interlocutory injunction by the primary judge. 2 The appeal judge gave brief reasons for dismissing the appeal on 19 December 2025 in case the appellant wished to seek leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, indicating that more extensive reasons would be published later. In fact, the appeal to the Court of Appeal is as of right.1 3 The appeal was originally listed to be heard in November 2026. It has been necessary to hear and determine the appeal expeditiously,2 and without the benefit of the more extensive reasons foreshadowed. 4 The Court heard argument on 27 February 2026 and, after the submissions were concluded, announced that the appeal would be allowed and that, subject to the giving of certain undertakings, injunctive relief would be granted. These are our reasons for making those orders. Background 5 The appellant (‘Philip’) has for many years, initially in partnership with his parents (‘John’ and ‘Elaine’), the first and second respondents, then for a time with his late wife (‘Julie’), and later in his own right, farmed land comprising a number of titles situated on the Eyre Peninsula (the ‘farming land’).3 6 The farming land is approximately 892 hectares. Whilst the farming activities have changed over time, they presently comprise canola plantations and wheat and barley cropping, as well as running of sheep. Apart from farming infrastructure necessary to support those activities, the improvements include an old family homestead (‘the homestead’), a one bedroom house (‘De Rose Cottage’) and a five bedroom fibre board house (the ‘converted transportable’). 7 At relevant times, the registered proprietor of the farming land was Greenpatch Pastoral Pty Ltd (‘Greenpatch’). Greenpatch held the farming land as trustee of a discretionary family trust known as the ‘Glen Heath Trust’ (‘the Trust’). Under the terms of the Trust, Philip is the ‘Specified Beneficiary’. The ‘General Beneficiaries’ comprise a class of people essentially described as relatives of the Specified Beneficiary and their related entities, together with any persons designated as additional members of the class in a Schedule. Philip’s parents are nominated in the Schedule as additional members of the class of 1 Supreme Court Act 1935 (SA), s 50(5)(c). 2 Hyde v Hyde [2026] SASCA 11. 3 First names are used without any intended disrespect. -- 5 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 2 General Beneficiaries. The Guardian and Appointor of the Trust is John during his lifetime and, after his death, Philip. 8 In the period between 2002 and 2008, the farming activities were conducted by a partnership between John, Elaine, Philip and Julie. The farming activities were augmented by mixed farming on a neighbouring farmland (known as ‘Arran’) leased by Philip in his own name. 9 From early 2008, that partnership was dissolved and Philip conducted a farming business on the farming land and Arran with Julie. Importantly for the purposes of this appeal, Philip and Julie entered into a lease agreement with Greenpatch to lease the farming land for $80,000 per annum (‘the Lease Agreement’). 10 Julie became ill and died in 2020. Philip subsequently commenced a relationship with Sonya Masrosavas (‘Sonya’) in 2021. Whilst the reasons may be contentious, it is common ground that by no later than September 2024, the relationship between Philip (and Sonya) and his parents John and Elaine had broken down. Philip contends that John and Elaine left the farming land because of a disagreement about a tenant that was residing in De Rose Cottage. The respondents contend that they were the subject of abuse by Sonya and felt compelled to leave the homestead for their peace of mind and safety. They say that the tenant of De Rose Cottage was also subject to abuse by Sonya. 11 Philip alleges that in October 2024, John told him he intended to sell some of the farming land. The respondents agree that John raised this possibility at some stage during 2024, but contend that this was in response to, or prompted by, concerns about Sonya’s conduct, concerns about Elaine’s health, and John’s failure to keep up rental payments under the Lease Agreement. 12 At all events, on 8 November 2024, Philip lodged caveats over the farming land (the ‘caveats’). As has been mentioned, Greenpatch was (and is) the registered proprietor of the farming land. Until 3 December 2024, the three directors of Greenpatch were the appellant, John and Elaine. They were also the three equal shareholders. In December 2024, Elaine was purportedly replaced as a shareholder and director by John and Elaine’s daughter, the third respondent (‘Judith’). Philip contends that Elaine has lacked capacity since at least the time of the events of 3 December 2024 and that minutes of a meeting do not record any business properly transacted at a duly convened meeting of Greenpatch of which he was given proper notice. 13 On 29 July 2025, John exercised his power of appointment by removing Greenpatch and appointing the fifth respondent, John Hyde Rural Pty Ltd (‘JHR’) as trustee of the Trust. On or about the same day, JHR purported to terminate the Lease Agreement and any deemed monthly tenancy. Philip was offered a licence to occupy for about six weeks so that he could wind down his farming business. -- 6 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 3 14 On 31 July 2025, Greenpatch warned the caveats. Philip commenced proceedings in the Supreme Court on 15 August 2025, seeking an extension of time for the removal of the caveats.4 Interim orders were made by consent on 18 August 2025 on the basis that a Statement of Claim would be filed. That was done on 3 October 2025, and a Defence was filed by the respondents on 12 November 2025. Application for injunction 15 On 17 November 2025, the primary judge heard an application for injunctive relief against the respondents, together with an application for a continuation of the order extending time for the removal of the caveats. The injunctive relief sought included that the respondents (that is, John, Elaine, Judith, Greenpatch and JHR) be restrained from further dealing or procuring any dealing in the farming land and, importantly, from disturbing the possession of, or preventing access to, or interfering with the quiet enjoyment by Philip of the farming land. He also sought an order restraining John from exercising any powers as appointor or guardian of the Trust. 16 That relief was sought to preserve the status quo pending a final determination of his claim for a constructive trust over the whole of the farming land. That claim was founded upon a contention that from about 1984, John and Elaine represented, promised or induced the assumption and encouraged an expectation in him that he would succeed to, or at least have the use of, the farming land during the remainder of his parents’ lives and after that time, he would succeed to it absolutely. 17 In seeking interlocutory injunctive relief, Philip proffered various undertakings. These included the usual undertaking as to damages and further that he would: (1) pay a sum (the ‘Charged Sum’) into Court by 30 March 2026 to abide the outcome of the proceedings; (2) not enforce a beneficiary loan account owed by the trustee of the Trust to him in the sum of $137,196.71; (3) pay the sum of $80,000 plus GST per annum for the ongoing occupation of the farming land, in quarterly instalments; (4) not permit any third party to occupy De Rose Cottage and the homestead and procure their vacant possession; (5) maintain the farming land, De Rose Cottage and the homestead in the present condition; and 4 Real Property Act 1886 (SA), s 191. -- 7 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 4 (6) conduct a mixed farming operation on the farming land consistent with the historical practice. 18 There were a number of affidavits before the Court, filed in the original proceeding.5 19 The primary judge decided the application promptly, giving brief reasons on 20 November 2025 (‘Primary Reasons’). 20 The primary judge considered that in light of the claim to a constructive trust, there should not be any dealing with the land until that claim was resolved. That was best achieved by allowing the caveats to remain in place until the trial of the action.6 However, he was not persuaded there was any basis to restrain any further exercise of trust powers by John.7 21 Turning to the question of Philip’s right to farm the farming land pending a determination of his claim, the primary judge referred to the Lease Agreement and noted that the respondents had contended that there were arrears in the order of $233,000, but now believed that with interest and related matters it might greatly exceed that figure.8 The primary judge noted that a notice of termination of the Lease Agreement had been served, requiring vacant possession by 31 December 2025. The term of the Lease Agreement (and any renewal of it) had expired. The appellant was said to be holding over on a monthly tenancy that could be terminated on a month’s notice.9 22 Noting that no claim for relief against forfeiture of the Lease Agreement was pleaded, the primary judge said:10 The relief sought by the applicant is on a broader basis. The basis is that in the discussion with the parents it was always intended and/or promised that he could continue farming the property until the property became his. It is on that broader basis that the injunction is sought. 23 The primary judge referred to aspects of the competing claims of prejudice and observed that it may be that the balance of convenience favoured Philip, but 5 Affidavit of Philip filed 15 August 2025 (FDN 3) (Philip 15.08.25); affidavit of John filed 11 September 2025 (FDN 13) (John 11.09.25); affidavit of Philip filed 3 October 2025 (FDN 16) (Philip 03.10.25); affidavit of Lauren Joanna Roberts filed 3 October 2025 (FDN 18) (Roberts 03.10.25), affidavit of Lauren Joanna Roberts filed 7 October 2025 (FDN 21) (Roberts 07.10.25); affidavit of Philippa Robertson filed 20 October 2025 (FDN 25) (Robertson 20.10.25) affidavit of Philip filed 11 November 2025 (FDN 25) (Philip 11.11.25); affidavit of Bruce Thompson filed 12 November 2025 (FDN 33) (Thompson 12.11.25); affidavit of Lauren Joanna Roberts filed 12 November 2025 (FDN 35) (Roberts 12.11.25); affidavit of Brett Ramsey filed on 17 November 2025 (FDN 36) (Ramsey 17.11.25). 6 Primary Reasons [6]. 7 Primary Reasons [7]-[8]. 8 Primary Reasons [10]. 9 Primary Reasons [9], [12]. 10 Primary Reasons [14]. -- 8 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 5 the respondents’ submission was that the Court need not consider questions of convenience because there was no prima facie case.11 24 The primary judge said that the question then was whether Philip had established a prima facie case ‘so as to permit the Court to proceed to consider the balance of convenience’.12 The judge then concluded:13 Sometimes what parties intended can be determined by looking at the actions they took. In 2008 the parents retired and the applicant commenced farming the property on his own account. At that time, it seems, that the parents required the applicant to enter into a formal written lease in relation to his occupation of the property. The relationship created in that way was one of landlord and tenant. That was what the parties intended by entering into the lease. The lease document is detailed. It imposes obligations on the applicant as tenant. There is no dispute that the applicant is in default of his obligations under the lease. He says that the lease should be disregarded and that the Court should look at the broader picture of promises made by the parents. That is a difficult proposition to accept. The parties entered into a lease. That is what they intended. It created rights and obligations. At all times since 2008 the applicant has occupied the land pursuant to the lease. The applicant is in breach of his obligations. A landlord is entitled to terminate the lease in those circumstances. I do not accept that it is appropriate to disregard the lease. The position advanced by the applicant is the lease should be ignored and there is a broader undertaking to permit him to farm the property. To the extent that historically there may have been such promises, that position may have changed when the parties agreed to enter into the lease. I am unable to find that the applicant has an arguable case to establish that the lease should be ignored and that he otherwise has an arguable right of occupation. He accepts that he needs to pay rent to remain in occupation. That is a landlord and tenant arrangement in any event. In the circumstances the balance of convenience does not need to be considered. The applicant having failed to establish an arguable case, there is no basis on which to enjoin the landlord from terminating the lease and taking back possession of the farm. 25 Philip appealed against the refusal of injunctive relief to a single judge of the Court, contending that:14 (1) the primary judge misapprehended or did not properly engage with his claim that he was entitled to final relief by way of the imposition of a constructive trust arising from no later than the date the respondents resiled from the expectation created in him (in October 2024), such that Philip claims an immediate right to ownership and possession; and (2) the primary judge mistook a number of facts and erred in concluding that Philip’s parents required him to enter a formal lease in relation to his 11 Primary Reasons [15]-[16]. 12 Primary Reasons [19]. 13 Primary Reasons [20]-[24]. 14 Notice of Appeal in CIV-25-014756 (FDN 1), grounds [1], [2]. -- 9 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 6 occupation, that he had not paid rent over a considerable period of time, that there was no dispute that he was in default of his obligations under the Lease Agreement, that he accepted he needed to pay rent to remain in occupation, that the Trust was seeking to pursue ‘market based rent’ to increase its income and that there was no suggestion that Philip could not move to an off- farm property to reside. 26 At a directions hearing in respect of the appeal, the appeal judge gave the appellant an opportunity to file and rely upon further affidavit evidence relating to the Lease Agreement and the question of rent paid under it. Philip took up that opportunity, filing a further affidavit he had sworn.15 27 The respondents filed a notice of alternative contentions concerning the balance of convenience and what was described as ‘disentitling conduct’, namely Philip’s failure to pay the rent, his sub-letting of De Rose Cottage without the consent of the trustee of the Trust and his ‘direct mistruth’ that he had not sub-let the farming land.16 28 The appeal judge heard the appeal on 19 December 2025 and, as mentioned earlier, gave brief reasons for its dismissal. The appeal judge said:17 I dismiss the appeal because no error has been shown in the Associate Justice's finding that there is not an arguable case. On the representations pleaded by the appellant, there is no representation which addresses the legal position governing the occupation of the farm and the continuing fanning operations before the natural respondents' death such as to render it unconscientious for the respondents to exercise the legal rights under the lease. If l had come to the opposite conclusion, I would have found that the balance of convenience favoured the continued occupation and undertaking of the farming operations by the appellant. I accept that some level of prejudice might have been dealt with by the sale of some sheep or their temporary agistment, but in effect, that would not have saved the farming operation. Ultimately, they are just winding down measures and ultimately the fanning operation would have come to an end. To restock and gear up again for another farming operation would be a considerable expense. Plainly, if the farm is sold, then it would be the end of the fanning operation. Moreover, if there were an arguable case that the applicants held a proprietary interest, significant and substantial countervailing considerations would be necessary to deny him an opportunity to go to trial on that case. In terms of the disentitling conduct, they are contested allegations which could only be determined at trial. But as I have said, in the circumstances where no arguable case is to that proprietary interest, giving a right to present occupation and undertaking the farming operations has been shown, the Associate Justice was correct to dismiss the application for injunctions preserving the status quo. 29 The appellant’s appeal is against this decision. 15 Affidavit of Philip dated 12 December 2025 (FDN 6) (Philip 12.12.25). 16 Notice of Alternative Contention in CIV-25-014756 (FDN 14). 17 Settled ruling of Kourakis CJ in CIV-25-014756 on 19 December 2025. -- 10 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 7 Grounds of appeal 30 By his notice of appeal filed on 23 December 2025, the appellant contends that the appeal judge erred in finding that there was no error shown in the primary judge’s finding that there was not an arguable case. He contends that the appeal judge erred by implicitly finding that there needed to be a representation as to continuing use to sustain the claims when the claim in proprietary estoppel and constructive trust was sufficient to give rise to a prima facie claim for relief that would be recognised as having arisen in late 2024, when the respondents resiled from representations by them or their privies.18 31 Secondly, the appellant contends that the appeal judge misconstrued Philip’s pleaded case. He points to paragraph [33] of the Statement of Claim and emphasises that an express representation is not necessary; it may arise by conduct.19 Expedition 32 At a callover on 6 February 2026, neither party applied to expedite the appeal. The appeal was listed to be heard in November 2026. On 13 February 2026, the respondents made application for vacant possession in the original proceedings. A supporting affidavit disclosed that JHR was negotiating with a prospective tenant for a new lease of the farming land with a proposed commencement date of 1 March 2026. 33 Three days later the respondents filed a further affidavit disclosing that, on 13 February 2026, Judith, on behalf of JHR, had entered into a lease in respect of the entire farming land in favour of Richard and Kerrie Strauss (the ‘Strauss lease’), due to commence on 1 March 2026. The annual rental is $170,000 per annum plus GST (if applicable). 34 That prompted an application for expedition of the appeal by Philip, together with temporary injunctive relief. On 18 February 2026, Livesey P made orders expediting the appeal. Principles and approach 35 The principles governing the grant of injunctive relief are well-settled. It is for the applicant for injunctive relief to show ‘a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo’ pending a final hearing.20 36 As that formulation suggests, there is an inter-relationship between the strength of the serious question and the balance of convenience or, as it is 18 Notice of Appeal in CIV-25-015481 (FDN 1), ground [1]. 19 Notice of Appeal in CIV-25-015481 (FDN 1), ground [2]. 20 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57 at [65] (Gummow and Hayne JJ). -- 11 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 8 sometimes described, ‘the risk of doing an injustice’.21 Even where there is room to doubt the strength of the serious question, an injunction may be appropriate where the balance of convenience strongly favours making the order.22 Ordinarily, the applicant for relief will be expected to proffer an undertaking as to damages.23 Its sufficiency may bear significantly on the balance of convenience. 37 As has been mentioned, the appeal is as of right. Where an appeal is against the exercise of discretion whether to grant an injunction, appellate restraint may be required. In the present case, the grounds attack the primary judge’s conclusion about the existence of a serious question to be tried, and contend that he erred by misapprehending the appellant’s case. It appears to be common ground between the parties that the correctness standard applies to the judge’s failure to be satisfied of a serious question. If the judge misapprehended the parties’ cases or the evidence in some material respect, that would provide a ground for the Court to reconsider the evaluative exercise even if the deferential standard applies. 38 A determination of this appeal requires a consideration of the appellant’s pleaded case and the evidence proffered in support of it. 39 That is not to say that the respondents’ pleaded case and any evidence led by them is irrelevant. However, if the appellant’s material raises a fairly arguable claim to final relief which would be rendered nugatory or seriously undermined by the withholding of interlocutory relief, the fact that aspects of that case will be subject to challenge, or even face significant forensic or legal difficulty, may not be decisive against the grant of relief. An application for an interlocutory injunction is not a trial of the issues. But nor is it sufficient to articulate claims in the abstract which amount to no more than theoretically possible outcomes. The applicant must point to pleadings and evidence sufficient to demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of success to justify preservation of the status quo pending trial. 40 Even if it were desirable to analyse the parties’ pleadings and evidence in close detail, the need for interlocutory injunctive relief to be resolved promptly may require that practical assessment be made at a relatively high-level. That is so here. In many cases a close analysis will not be desirable, including because the Court must allow for the likelihood, based on experience, that claims and defences evolve and are refined, making an assessment of the prospects of ultimate relief necessarily impressionistic. 21 McVicars v South Australian Housing Trust (No 2) [2025] SASCA 56 at [8] (Livesey P), referring, inter alia, to Chimaera Capital Ltd v Pharmaust Ltd (2007) 64 ACSR 332 at [83]-[84] (French J). 22 McVicars v South Australian Housing Trust (No 2) [2025] SASCA 56 at [8] (Livesey P), referring to Teachers Registration Board of South Australia v Kourlas [2024] SASCA 88 at [9]-[10] (Livesey P). 23 European Bank Ltd v Evans (2010) 240 CLR 432 at [17] (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Heydon and Kiefel JJ). -- 12 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 9 41 It follows that the following summary of the appellant’s case, and the responses so far made to it, may not do complete justice to the cases of each of the parties. The appellant’s case 42 Although there have been additions to the farming land over the years, parts of the farming land have been in the Hyde family for a long time and have been passed down from John’s grandfather Kenneth, to John’s father Brian, and then to John.24 Philip resided on the farming land during his childhood and teenage years and helped in various ways with farming duties as a youngster.25 43 When he finished school in late 1984 he worked in the farming business,26 and was paid $100 per week.27 Brian died in 1986 and from that time Philip worked for a partnership comprising John and Elaine, earning about $200 per week from 1991.28 44 From 1991, Philip was a partner of the farming business together with his parents, sharing profit distributions equally, albeit Elaine was a school teacher who was not physically engaged in farm work.29 By this time Philip was married to Julie. They lived in a modest transportable house on the property.30 45 In the period from 1995, the farming business transitioned from predominantly sheep farming to a more mixed-use farm with more cropping uses and less grazing.31 There is some dispute about the extent to which Philip performed the more physically demanding work but it is reasonable to assume that he was engaged in demanding farm work throughout this period, including land clearing to support cropping. 46 Between 1997 and 2002, further land was purchased (‘Section 25’) and was held by Greenpatch as trustee. It took some time and effort to clear and ready the land for cropping.32 In 2002, a new partnership was formed with Philip, Julie and Philip’s parents John and Elaine as the four partners.33 Philip leased the Arran land in 2005, and it was used as part of the farming business. The farming partnership had a loan with Elders, secured by a mortgage over the farming land.34 Philip contends that John reduced his involvement over time, and that Julie contributed 24 Statement of Claim [13]. 25 Statement of Claim [16]. 26 Statement of Claim [16]. Philip alleges he worked seven days per week. The respondents do not accept he was required to work to that extent: Defence [17]. 27 Statement of Claim [18](j). This is admitted in Defence [18], though it is pleaded that Philip received free board. 28 Statement of Claim [19], [20]; admitted Defence [19], [20]. 29 Statement of Claim [22](a)-(b); admitted Defence [22], save that the respondents say this partnership commenced only in 1995. 30 Statement of Claim [22](d); admitted Defence [22]. 31 Statement of Claim [24]; partially admitted Defence [24]. 32 Statement of Claim [25]; relevantly admitted Defence [25]. 33 Statement of Claim [26](a); admitted Defence [26](a). 34 Statement of Claim [26](c); admitted Defence [26](c). -- 13 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 10 to the business by completing book-work, with John and Elaine increasingly taking holidays away from the farm. There is some dispute about these contentions.35 Further, John contends that the finance with Elders was mainly required for the purchase of cropping equipment procured by Philip, the cost of which could not be supported by the partnership’s cash flow at that time.36 47 In 2008, the previous partnership was dissolved and Philip and Julie conducted the farming business in a new partnership. John and Elaine transferred their interest in the partnership assets to Philip and Julie, who assumed the liabilities of the old partnership.37 On 1 April 2008, Greenpatch entered into the Lease Agreement with Philip and Julie with an annual rent of $80,000.38 It will be necessary to come back to the significance of this later. 48 It is alleged that in the period that followed, Philip and Julie and, after Julie’s death, Philip, took a number of steps in relation to the farming business. In broad terms:39 • further parcels of surrounding land were leased to be used in conjunction with the farming land; • there was a significant outlay in relation to plant, equipment, infrastructure and stock; • there was a consequential increase in debt which, from 2009, was financed through Rabobank, and supported by a mortgage given by Greenpatch over land held by the Trust secured to a maximum amount of $360,000, which was later increased; and • by the time of the proceedings, Philip was the sole borrower, with a total debt in the order of just over $1 million. 49 Philip pleads that during this period he and Julie renovated the converted transportable, contributed one-third of council rates and emergency services levies for the farming land and maintained the homestead and De Rose Cottage.40 50 Philip’s pleaded case culminates relevantly in paragraphs [33]-[40] of the Statement of Claim, where it is alleged that: 33. From about 1984, John and Elaine represented, promised and/or induced the assumption and encouraged the expectation in Philip that he would succeed to, or at 35 Statement of Claim [26](d)-(f); Defence [26](d)-(e). 36 Defence [26](c). 37 Statement of Claim [27]; admitted Defence [27]. John’s evidence is that despite this he did continue to work on the farm: John 11.09.25 [54]-[66]. 38 Statement of Claim [27](e), John 11.09.25, exhibit JH2. 39 Statement of Claim [28]; largely admitted Defence [28]. 40 Statement of Claim [28]; partly admitted, but denied with respect to the homestead and De Rose Cottage in Defence [28]. -- 14 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 11 least have use of, the Farming Land during the remainder of John and Elaine’s lives and after that time, he would succeed to them absolutely. 34. The representations, promises and/or inducement and encouragement referred to in the preceding paragraph made by John and Elaine, were as follows: a. Conversations between Philip and a combination of Brian, Nancy, John, and Elaine (all engaged in by or in the presence of John and or Elaine) in Philip’s childhood and teen years, the specific details of which Philip cannot now precisely remember but the substance of which concerned the following matters, all of which (both individually and cumulatively) conveyed to Philip the desire of John and Elaine for Philip to become a farmer and work in the Farming Business on the Pre-Existing Land and succeed to the Farming Business and Farming Land in the future: i. the Hyde’s family’s long history of farming on the Pre-Existing Land and the passing down of the farm from generation to generation and from working parents to working son or sons; ii. the need for Philip as the sole male descendant of John to work on the farm and keep the Pre-Existing Land on that side of the family; iii. the prospect of Philip finishing school and working on the farm as Brian and John did for the purpose of succeeding to the farm; b. Brian, Nancy, John and Elaine (all engaged in by or in the presence of John and Elaine) directing Philip’s attention, interest and time from a young age on matters concerning the farm and away from other outside careers and interests; c. Philip commencing work in the Farming Business in 1984 immediately after finishing school for little reward with the consent of Brian, John and Elaine; d. Philip continuing to work for John and Elaine in or around 1986 in the 1986 Partnership with the consent of John and Elaine; e. Judith moving off-farm from the time she finished school in or around 1988 to pursue other careers and opportunities including her purchase of the Aldgate Property and otherwise making no meaningful contributions to the Farming Business and maintaining, improving and retaining the Farming Land from that time with the consent of John and Elaine; f. Julie moving to the farm to live permanently with Philip and raise a family there with the encouragement of John and Elaine including the purchase by John and Elaine and the subsequent renovation of the transportable home by Philip and Julie referred to at paragraphs 22 (d) and 28 (i) herein; g. conversations Philip had with Brian and or John at ‘smoko’ in the homestead shortly after he commenced work on the farm (all in the presence of John and sometimes Elaine), the specific details of which Philip cannot now precisely remember but the substance of which involved Brian and or John saying to him that if he worked hard and stayed on the farm it would be his; h. Philip’s entry into the 1991 Partnership with John and Elaine and Julie’s later entry in the 2002 Partnership both with the consent of John and Elaine; -- 15 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 12 i. the 1991 Partnership changing the nature of the farming operation to a mixed use farm in or around 1995 which arm of the Farming Business was run almost exclusively by Philip with the consent of John and Elaine; j. the establishment and partial disclosure by John to Philip of a corporate and trust structure for succession planning purposes sometime after the establishment of the Trust in 1995 which despite Philip not understanding the specific mode of asset holding adopted by John and Elaine at that time conveyed to Philip a desire of John and Elaine to provide for Philip’s succession in the Farming Business and the Farming Land sometime in the future; k. the purchase of further land (section 25) in 1998 in the corporate and trust structure created by John which was secured by the Adelaide Bank Mortgage and which debt was paid off overtime using partnership monies; l. Philip spending significant time and effort clearing section 25 along with others for the purpose of cropping with the consent of John and Elaine; m. conversations over the years, details of which Philip cannot now precisely remember, where John would question Philip on why Philip and Julie would be spending money on renovating the transportable home when they would be moving into the homestead one day with John and Elaine moving into the cottage; n. John and Elaine making Philip an equal shareholder and director of Greenpatch in 2002, which despite Philip not having a detailed understanding of the rights and obligations of these positions and their relationship with the ownership of the Farming Land, conveyed to Philip a desire of John and Elaine to start to implement their succession to him by increasing the control and responsibility of Philip in respect of the Farming Business and the Farming Land; o. John gradually phasing himself out of the Farming Business and Philip from 1995 onwards undertaking all of the cropping work, Julie from 2002 taking on the bookwork for no further reward and Philip from 2005 onwards undertaking most of the hard manual labour required for the Farming Business with the consent of John and Elaine; p. John and Elaine transferring all of the partnership assets and liabilities to Philip and Julie in or around 2008 at the end of the 2002 Partnership for the purpose of Philip and Julie conducting their own business on the Farming Land; q. Philip and Julie’s entry into the lease agreement with Greenpatch which has been in place since 2008 with John and Elaine consent; r. Philip and Julie acquiring further substantial plant and equipment from 2008 on particularised at paragraph 28 (c) herein with the consent of John and Elaine; s. conversations over the years between John and or Elaine and Philip, details of which Philip cannot now precisely remember, wherein John and or Elaine said to Philip that they were saving a ‘nest egg’ for Judith in terms of cash savings to provide for her, which conveyed to Philip he was to have the Farming Land; -- 16 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 13 t. Philip and Julie making the contributions towards maintaining and improving the Farming Land including those from 2008 onwards as particularised at paragraphs 28 (d) – (j) herein; u. a conversation in or around 2008 when Philip and Julie formed the 2008 Partnership and were looking to borrow money to buy machinery to increase cropping in which Philip asked John to transfer him some land of the Farming Land so he could use it as security for the loan and in response John said ‘stop carrying on, or I will give it to your sister’; v. Philip and Julie being borrowers subject to the Rabobank Mortgage on 2 July 2009 and John signing that mortgage on behalf of Greenpatch as mortgagor; w. conversations over the later years from 2008 onwards, the specific details of which Philip cannot now precisely remember but the substance of which involved Philip pressing John on the need for some land in Philip’s name, in response to which John would become agitated and make statements similar to those in paragraph 34 (u) herein; x. the terms of the Trust Deed from 1995 which provide for Philip to be the appointor and guardian of the Trust upon John’s death pursuant to the Contingent Appointor Appointment and the Contingent Guardian Appointment; y. in or around October to November 2023, when John, Elaine, Philip and Sonya attended on Edna O’Brien, solicitor, to make new wills, John said in the presence of the others that by way of succession Philip was to get the farm and Judith was to get the cash which conveyed to Philip he was to succeed to the Farming Land and Judith was to have any outside interests; z. John and Elaine’s succession planning documentation prepared in November 2023 following the conversation in paragraph 34 (y) herein, continuing to provide for Philip to become appointor of the Trust upon John’s death and for any loans owed to John and Elaine from the Trust being forgiven at the time of their deaths; aa. all of John and Elaine’s conduct from the time Philip commenced in the Farming Business on the Farming Land in 1984 until October 2024 which were consistent with the assumption and expectation of Philip particularised at paragraph 33 herein. 35. In reliance upon the representations, promises, assumptions and expectations referred to at paragraph 34 herein, Philip: a. worked more than ‘full time’ hours (being Monday to Friday 8:30 – 5:30pm and on Saturday and Sunday mornings); b. received low wages during the period 1984 to 1991; c. received partnership distributions in the 1991 Partnership and the 2002 Partnership during the period 1991 to 2008 that were not proportionate to the contributions made by him to the Farming Business and the Farming Land; d. forewent increased partnership income and a split of profit in the 1991 Partnership and the 2002 Partnership during the period 1991 to 2008 by -- 17 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 14 reinvesting back into the Farming Business and Farming Land in terms of capital expenditures on the Farming Land, stock, machinery and other improvements and also the acquisition of further land; e. forewent increased partnership income in the 2008 Partnership during the period 2008 to 2020 by maintaining and improving the Farming Land including constructing machinery and sheds, putting in bores, troughs, replacing fencing and modernising infrastructure and otherwise maintaining John and Elaine; f. forewent increased income in the Farming Business by meeting certain general living and nonbusiness expenditures of John and Elaine including but not limited to water, electricity, fuel, phone, insurances and use of motor vehicle; g. received no distributions from the Trust from 2008 to present with all income distributed to John and Elaine; h. received and took minimal holidays; i. received no superannuation benefits during the period 1984 to 2008 and little superannuation benefits from that time; j. had no provision for long service leave; k. undertook 41 years of hard physical work; l. forewent opportunities to purchase farming properties in his own name and to improve or consolidated such properties; m. forewent opportunities to pursue alternative career or living arrangements that were off-farm; n. took on substantial personal debt to run the Farming Business on the Farming Land from 2008; o. paid substantial sums for interest on this personal debt; p. entered into lease arrangements for surrounding properties to use in conjunction with the Farming Land. 36. By reason of the matters pleaded in the preceding paragraph, Philip has suffered substantial detriment by his reliance upon the assumptions and expectations referred to at paragraph 34 herein. 37. John and Elaine knew or intended that Philip would act or refrain from acting on the assumptions and expectations referred to at paragraphs 33 and 34 herein, and it was the common intention of John, Elaine and Philip that the assumptions and expectations would be fulfilled. 38. The relationship between John and Elaine on one hand and Philip on the other hand has now collapsed irretrievably and John and Elaine have moved away from the Farming Land. -- 18 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 15 39. By reason of the matters pleaded in paragraphs 16 to 38 herein, it is unconscionable for John and Elaine to resile from the representations, promises, inducements or encouragements referred to in paragraphs 33 to 34 herein and to: a. deny Philip use of the Farming Land during the remainder of their lifetimes; b. deny Philip of his proprietary interest in the Farming Land or further or in the alternative to succeed as appointor and guardian of the Trust and as sole controller of Greenpatch such to have use and control the Farming Land during his lifetime. 40. In the circumstances, Philip is entitled to: a. a constructive trust over the Farming Land including any interest John, Elaine and Greenpatch hold in the Farming Land; b. further or in the alternative, a constructive trust over John and Elaine’s shares in Greenpatch; c. further or in the alternative, an order that John resign as appointor and as guardian of the Trust and director of Greenpatch or not take steps to exercise any powers as appointor or guardian of the Trust or director of Greenpatch during the remainder of his lifetime that are contrary to Philip’s expectation as particularised at paragraph 34 herein. 51 In the paragraphs that follow, Philip pleads the elements of a claim in estoppel by encouragement and alleges that if the assumptions or expectations referred to in paragraphs [33] and [34] are not fulfilled, he: 45. … will suffer detriment in that: a. he will not have any interest in the Farming Land; b. he will not enjoy any expectation of succeeding in the future, in whole or in part, to all (or any) of the Farming Land; c. he will not be able to maintain the Farming Business without use of the Farming Land as it will be unviable; d. he will have substantial debt and other obligations which were dependent upon him having use and subsequent succession to the Farming Land; e. he will need to relocate and live away from the Farming Land. 52 Philip pleads that John, Elaine and Judith have sought to resile from the representations, promises, inducements or encouragements as pleaded in paragraphs [33] and [34], in that: 47. … they have: a. conveyed to Philip via John in October 2025 their intention to sell the Farming Land; -- 19 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 16 b. engaged a real estate agent for the purpose of selling some the Farming Land including entering into an agency agreement on 24 April 2025; c. Elaine purportedly being replaced as a director of Greenpatch and transferring her shares in that company to Judith on 3 December 2024; d. warned the caveats particularised at paragraph 31 herein on or around 31 July 2025; e. entered into the Deed of Appointment on 29 July 2025, which purportedly replaced Greenpatch as trustee of the Trust of which Philip is a director and shareholder and replaced it with John Hyde Rural without notice to Philip and otherwise without any genuine commercial basis for this to have occurred; f. purported to terminate the Lease Agreement on or around 29 July 2025 and to offer a limited grazing licence to Philip for the shearing and removal of sheep off the property for a fee of $10,000 per month; g. demanding payment for some historical lease payments that John had previously told Philip did not need to be paid and for which he had therefore not previously rendered an invoice according to the parties standard practice; h. filed an affidavit in these proceedings denying Philip any proprietary interest in the Farming Land and any certainty to succeed to the position of appointor and guardian with the Farming Land retained until that time. 53 It is then alleged that by reason of the preceding matters, John, Elaine and Judith are estopped and precluded from denying Philip the use of the farming land during the remainder of their lifetimes and from denying Philip any proprietary interest in the farming land or alternatively his succeeding as appointor and guardian of the Trust and as sole controller of Greenpatch.41 54 As may be expected, the allegations in these paragraphs are largely denied by the respondents. Without being comprehensive, they allege that: • the alleged conversations are insufficiently pleaded and vague;42 • Philip was adequately remunerated for his work when he was an employee;43 • working more than a 35 hour week whilst a partner of a farming business is not unexpected;44 • the increase in debt for which Philip was responsible was a result of his own decision to acquire specialist plant and equipment to pursue cropping over stock;45 41 Statement of Claim [48]. 42 Defence [34](a)(1). 43 Defence [34](c). 44 Defence [35](a). 45 Defence [35](d). -- 20 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 17 • John and Elaine gifted their share of the partnership to Philip and Julie because they no longer intended to carry on farming and for love and affection, but the ownership of the farming land was to remain in the Trust, held on a discretionary basis;46 • Philip’s role as a one-third director of Greenpatch reflected John and Elaine’s intention that he have the value of one-third of the farming land on their death;47 • there was no promise or expectation that Philip would receive all of the farming land;48 and • the Lease Agreement was consistent with the legal structure otherwise in place, namely, that the fee simple was held in the Trust.49 55 With respect to the Lease Agreement, the respondents say that its term expired in April 2013 and that Philip remained in occupation after that time on a deemed monthly tenancy, terminable on one calendar month’s notice, but subject to the terms of the expired Lease Agreement. It is pleaded that by late July 2025, Philip had been put on notice that his failure to pay rent was causing hardship to John and Elaine and that the arrears exceeded $200,000.50 In those circumstances, JHR was entitled to and did terminate the tenancy with effect from 31 August 2025. They say that they subsequently became aware of an unapproved sub-letting or sub-licensing of the farming land which also amounted to a breach.51 The respondents appear to deny the allegation in paragraph [47](g) of the Statement of Claim to the effect that John had on occasion told Philip he did not need to pay rent and would not be invoiced for it.52 56 The respondents’ Defence also contains a number of criticisms of the form or of the allegations in the Statement of Claim and their sufficiency to establish a claim in estoppel or for the recognition of a constructive trust, including as against Greenpatch or JHR. 57 Finally, it should be noted that the pleadings also contain allegations about Elaine’s capacity and, consequently, the efficacy of transactions or resolutions involving Greenpatch after the parties fell into dispute.53 58 The affidavits that were filed when the injunction application was heard by the primary judge by and large address the allegations in the pleadings, albeit that it may be anticipated some topics will be addressed in greater detail at trial. It will 46 Defence [34](p). 47 Defence [34](n). 48 Defence [34](u). 49 Defence [34](q). 50 Defence [47](f). 51 Defence [47](7). 52 Defence [47](g). 53 Statement of Claim [49]-[57]. -- 21 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 18 be necessary to come back to the evidence as it relates to the critical issue of Philip’s right to occupy the farming land during John and Elaine’s lifetime. 59 Relatedly, it is necessary to consider in more detail the evidence about the Lease Agreement and the rent payments. As noted earlier, the appeal judge gave the appellant an opportunity to supplement the evidence on that topic. 60 In his first affidavit filed on 15 August 2025, Philip had given evidence to the effect that: • prior to the Lease Agreement being made, he continued to increase his role in the family farming operation during the 2003 to 2008 period and his father gradually scaled back his involvement with Philip being responsible for the entire cropping operation and almost all of the heavy labour work in respect of the sheep and Julie performing all of the book-work;54 • in early 2008, by which time John was 66 years old, Philip had discussions with his parents about whether he and Julie should have their own partnership. Shortly afterwards, the four of them met with a lawyer and the partnership was dissolved and a formal lease document was drawn up wherein Julie and Philip leased the farming land from Greenpatch for $80,000 per annum;55 • Julie and Philip entered into the Lease Agreement with Greenpatch to provide his parents with an annual amount to live off comfortably for the remainder of their lives.56 The rental reflected two-thirds of the market rate for a lease of land at that time;57 • Philip’s recollection (without access to the financials) was that the rate also resulted in his parents receiving roughly the same from the lease payments as they would have received if the partnership had continued with them involved, albeit without having any expectation to perform any work in the farming business. Philip and Julie continued to meet all of their general expenditures of Philip’s parents, as the previous partnership had done;58 • at the same time as entry into the Lease Agreement, John and Elaine transferred all of the partnership assets including the plant and equipment, sheep and stock-in trade to Philip and Julie for no consideration;59 • during the period 2008 to 2018, Julie and Philip continued to run their farming business, lease various additional parcels of surrounding land, build up plant, equipment and stock, take on further debt and make payments to 54 Philip 15.08.25 [30](j). 55 Philip 15.08.25 [30](k). 56 Philip 15.08.25 [32](n). 57 Philip 15.08.25 [30](k). 58 Philip 15.08.25 [30](l). 59 Philip 15.08.25 [30](k). -- 22 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 19 Philip’s parents under the Lease Agreement. They spent a significant amount on maintaining and improving the farming land during this period including constructing machinery and hay sheds, putting in bores, troughs, replacing fencing and modernising infrastructure;60 and • recently John had demanded payment for some historical lease payments that he had previously told Philip did not need to be paid.61 61 In his affidavit filed on 12 December 2025, Philip elaborated upon the entry into the Lease Agreement and the rental payments, swearing that: • the lease structure was proposed by his parents as a means to allow them to receive a comfortable annual income instead of the partnership income they had been earning, and one of them (likely John) said it had been suggested by their accountant as the most tax effective way of getting annual income;62 • John put forward the rent figure as a less than market rent on the basis of Philip’s interest in the land at that time;63 • the Lease Agreement was prepared by Nicholls Gervasi at his parents’ request and without Julie or Philip reviewing or getting advice about the document. They did not engage in any negotiation before signing it;64 and • Philip was happy to go ahead because it met their family needs at the time, was tax effective and was a further step towards Philip succeeding to the farm by increasing his control and responsibility.65 62 Philip does not recall anyone referring to the Lease Agreement or its terms other than in very occasional discussions about rent from time to time between 2008 and 2024.66 There was no mention or discussion of the Lease Agreement expiring, converting to a monthly tenancy, attracting rent at 125% of the previous rate, or attracting interest on any arrears. There was no discussion about how the arrangement applied in light of the residence Philip substantially renovated on the farming land.67 63 Philip’s evidence is that there was nothing to suggest that his parents viewed him as being on the farming land only as a tenant and subject to vacation on one month’s notice.68 It can be accepted that there may be questions about the 60 Philip 15.08.25 [30](n). 61 Philip 15.08.25 [4](f), [41](f). 62 Filed in CIV-25-014756 (FDN 6) (Philip 12.12.25) [4](a)-(b). 63 Philip 12.12.25 [4](c). 64 Philip 12.12.25 [4](e)-(g). 65 Philip 12.12.25 [4](i). 66 Philip 12.12.25 [5]. 67 Philip 12.12.25 [6]. 68 Philip 12.12.25 [10]. -- 23 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 20 admissibility of aspects of this evidence at trial, but a fine analysis of those issues is not necessary on this application. 64 Turning to the payments said to be outstanding, Philip has given evidence about payments said not to have been made during the periods 1 July 2017 – 30 September 2017, 1 July 2019 – 30 September 2019 and 1 January 2023 – 1 July 2024. Broadly, Philip’s evidence is that before the dispute in 2024, there were cordial discussions about the issue of rent payments. The discussions were initiated by John who, mindful of seasonal or other farming difficulties, would say that the upcoming payments did not need to be made. Philip’s evidence was that by this stage his parents were financially comfortable. He accepted his father’s generous offers not to pay. His mother would then refrain from sending an invoice.69 65 Philip also gives evidence that at the time of the July 2019 payment, Julie was very sick with cancer, and that was part of the discussion about non-payment. In the 2023-2024 period, John was aware that stock prices had been low for a while and that Philip had a large tax bill following Julie’s death and was also dealing with a substantial equipment breakdown. There was also a sharp drop in sheep prices.70 Philip’s evidence is that he otherwise made payments (at least until the dispute crystallised). 66 Philip’s financial statements and tax records are summarised in a table that is reproduced below:71 Financial Statements – Annual payments Financial statements Tax records 2010 $80,000 $80,000 2011 $80,000 $80,000 2012 $80,000 $80,000 2013 $80,000 $80,000 2014 $80,000 $80,000 2015 $82,598 $82,598 2016 $85,196 $85,196 2017 $85,196 $85,196 69 Philip 12.12.25 [13]. 70 Philip 12.12.25 [14]. 71 Philip 12.12.25 [15]. -- 24 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 21 2018 $65,196 $65,196 2019 $85,196 $85,196 2020 $65,196 $65,196 2021 $85,196 $85,196 2022 $85,196 $85,196 2023 $43,031 $43,031 2024 N/A N/A 2025 N/A N/A 67 More recently, it appears that Philip has been making payments, totalling a little over $100,000 since late 2024. Evidence filed in the original proceeding in connection with the application for vacant possession suggests that a further payment in the sum of $22,000 was paid on 31 December 2025. Greenpatch applied this to historical arrears.72 68 The respondents adduced evidence before the primary judge which showed their calculation of the full extent of the arrears calculated by applying interest (compounded quarterly).73 The total arrears were said to be approaching $300,000, or approaching $400,000, depending on the interest rate used, although in either case much of that relates to compounding interest and non-payments in the period when the dispute came to a head. Consistently with Philip’s evidence, the missed payments before late 2022 appear to have been relatively limited. 69 It is relevant to recall, at this juncture, that the Lease Agreement was with Greenpatch as trustee of a Trust in respect of which Philip was the Specified Beneficiary. Philip adduced evidence that the Trust’s accounts showed a beneficiary loan account in the sum of $137,196.71, which he asserts was payable to him on demand.74 The evidence relating to the balance of convenience 70 Both the primary judge and the appeal judge appear to have been satisfied that, on the whole, the balance of convenience favoured the grant of injunctive relief. As has been mentioned, the appellant proffered an undertaking as to damages and has done so since the outset of the proceeding. 72 Roberts 13.02.25 [15], [20], filed in CIV-25-009655. 73 Ramsey 14.11.25, exhibits BR1 and BR2. 74 Philip 03.10.25 [6]. -- 25 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 22 71 In an affidavit he filed on 3 October 2025, Philip described the status of the farming operations at that time and swore that if he were unable to continue using part or all of the farming land, he would suffer prejudice in that:75 • the overall viability of the farming business is based on having use of all of the land along with neighbouring parcels that he leases; • it may not be possible to find alternative land to use for his stock at short notice, and would be expensive if it could be achieved, and disposing of stock at short notice would be disadvantageous; • if he were to ultimately establish his claim he would need to re-establish stock from scratch which would be difficult and expensive; • he would need to store and relocate or sell all of his farming equipment which is substantial. Sale would be disadvantageous; • he would likely have no choice but to leave certain fixed infrastructure to which he had contributed; • he would continue to have to service his financial obligations to Rabobank and might be called upon to pay down principal; • he would need to exit leases of neighbouring land or keep farming that land but at a less viable scale; • he would need to leave his home in which he has lived for most of the past 20 years; and • if he succeeded there was a risk his parents could not compensate him for the loss of his business. Consideration 72 The appellant’s first ground of appeal focuses upon the proposition that in view of the substantial detrimental reliance suffered by him in reliance on expectations or assumptions encouraged by John, there is a material prospect that the Court would recognise a constructive trust as having arisen when John and the other respondents resiled from the position they had previously represented or encouraged. 73 The appellant relies upon authorities in which he submits that courts have granted relief which recognises or imposes a constructive trust arising over property from the point at which the respondent has unconscientiously resiled from an expectation represented or encouraged by that party, even though the expectation may have related to a transfer of the property in the future, or by a 75 Philip 03.10.25 [5]. -- 26 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 23 testamentary disposition. Recognising that the label may not be entirely apt, this may be described as involving the imposition of a constructive trust on an ‘accelerated basis’.76 The appellant submits that the appeal judge (and the primary judge) overlooked this aspect of Philip’s case. 74 In the appellant’s submission, whilst it may only be recognised when a court makes a final determination of rights, Greenpatch held the farming land subject to a constructive trust in favour of Philip when John adopted the position that the farming land might be dealt with in a fashion inconsistent with Philip succeeding to ownership and control of the farming land upon John and Elaine’s death.77 If, as the appellant contends, there is a serious question to be tried as to the recognition of a constructive trust in Philip’s favour from a date in or around 2024, the purported termination of the Lease Agreement by JHR in July 2025 might be seen to be irrelevant on the footing that Philip’s rights under the constructive trust effectively subsumed his interest as a lessee (potentially, as well, bringing to an end any lease obligations). Alternatively, it is submitted to be reasonably arguable that the purported appointment of JHR was ineffective and that, in any case, whilst Greenpatch remained the registered proprietor it was for it, and not JHR, to take action to terminate any existing right of occupation on Philip’s part. 75 The appellant acknowledges that equity might only impose relief of the kind under discussion subject to conditions that may be necessary to ensure that there is no disproportion between the rights conferred and the expectation from which a respondent has resiled. For instance, a constructive trust might be recognised subject to the applicant for relief making a payment effectively by way of commutation of the benefit of receiving the value of property prior to the time at which, had the expectation been honoured, it would have been enjoyed. 76 Or, in a case like the present, if it is found that the Lease Agreement or some similar arrangement continued to govern the parties’ arrangements whilst John and Elaine remained alive, the relief might only be awarded subject to the appellant making payment of the arrears found to be due (and not repaid prior to judgment).78 77 Alternatively, as the appellant argues under his second ground of appeal, the Court may ultimately be satisfied that Philip was encouraged to understand that the arrangements provided for under the Lease Agreement in 2008 comprised a convenient and tax-effective way of recognising that the farming operations were being taken over by Philip (and his then wife) to the exclusion of John and Elaine, but on the basis that Philip’s right to farm the land was not exhausted by the Lease 76 McNab v Graham (2017) 53 VR 311, E Co v Q [2018] NSWSC 442, E Co (a pseudonym) v Q [a pseudonym] (No 4) [2019] NSWSC 429, Pirrottina v Pirrottina [2025] NSWCA 55. 77 Philip emphasises that John’s own evidence is that JHR should be at liberty to sell the farming land without impediment: John 11.09.25 [79]. 78 The extent of the arrears might be affected by arguments about whether there was a kind of forbearance or forgiveness of the debt that may otherwise have arisen. The arrears might also be set-off against any beneficiary loan account balance. -- 27 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 24 Agreement or any monthly holding-over applying after its non-renewal, nor vulnerable to termination without more upon a material breach of the lease terms. 78 The appellant contends that the fact that no attention was given to renewing the Lease Agreement, nor to the application of the provisions that contemplated a 25% increase in rent payments during any period of holding-over, is consistent with the proposition that the parties did not treat Philip’s right to live and farm on the farming land as strictly de-limited by the Lease Agreement. In the same vein, the appellant points to the respondents’ apparent acquiescence in the fact that Philip commenced to undertake farming activities through a corporate entity (which was not the lessee under the Lease Agreement) as another indication that the Lease Agreement was not seen as governing, or at least not as exclusively governing, the parties’ dealings.79 79 The respondents contend that these arguments are flawed because: (1) the authorities relied upon are distinguishable; and (2) they overlook a distinction between an estate in possession in respect of the farming land and a remainder interest in the farming land. 80 The respondents contend that at best for the appellant he might establish that John and Elaine (and thereby Greenpatch) held their respective interests in (or in respect of) the farming land on trust (a) for themselves for the life of the survivor of them, and (b) in remainder, in fee simple, for the appellant. On that basis, it was wholly within John and Elaine’s power to terminate the Lease Agreement for breach during their lives and grant another lease without impugning in any way the appellant’s future interest. In the respondents’ submission there was no expectation of present use on Philip’s part apart from pursuant to the Lease Agreement. 81 It may be accepted, as the respondents submit, that to say that equitable remedies are flexible and may be moulded to the justice of the case is not a licence to engage in ‘palm tree justice’. The remedial flexibility of equity should not be confused with a power to create (or limit) rights based on idiosyncratic notions of fairness.80 82 The respondents contend that the only authorities in which a constructive trust has been recognised or imposed on and from an earlier time than corresponded with the expectation or assumption engendered by the respondents’ conduct are cases in which there was also a representation that the applicant would have a continuing right of use of the property before the promised disposition. The respondents drew attention to a case in which a constructive trust arising before 79 John 11.09.25 [50]-[51]. 80 Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583 at 615-616 (Deane J, Mason J agreeing). -- 28 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 25 the promised date of conveyance was refused,81 and to the limited nature of any ‘floating trust’ that may be recognised inter vivos in the case of mutual wills.82 83 The appellant counters that the authorities in which constructive trusts have been recognised from a time earlier than title may have been transferred had an expectation been honoured are not limited to cases in which there has also been a representation that the property can be used in the intervening period.83 84 The respondents’ contentions are substantial. As the decision in Giumelli v Giumelli84 illustrates, there will be occasions where, despite the unconscientious departure from a representation, the recognition of a constructive trust may, for one reason or another, be disproportionate to the value of the expectation engendered. On the other hand, where there is unconscionable conduct that consists of resiling from a promise or assurance that has induced conduct to the other party’s detriment, the relief which is necessary is usually that which reflects the value of the promise,85 particularly when the detriment suffered involves ‘life- changing decisions with irreversible consequences of a profoundly personal nature’.86 85 In the present case, supposing that the appellant succeeds in demonstrating that conduct of the relevant respondents over a period of time led him reasonably to believe and expect that the farming land would be his upon his parents’ death, this is likely to have been on the basis that this would enable him to continue the farming business he had conducted on it for many years with the knowledge and consent of his parents. On one view, that expectation would be thwarted by treating any entitlement to relief as taking effect only upon his parents’ death if the practical consequence is to permit his parents, by entering into an arrangement such as the Strauss lease, to bring an end to Philip’s farming business now, with potentially devastating financial consequences. To be confined to a possible future interest as lessor of the farming land might not reverse the relevant detriment. 86 In a case in which there may be many decades to pass before the likely death of the promisor, it can readily be seen that a court would hesitate to recognise an ‘accelerated’ constructive trust in the absence of some further representation as to use of the property in the intervening period. It seems to us, however, that there is at least a serious question to be tried as to the availability of a constructive trust of the kind contended for in this case in circumstances where John and Elaine are not 81 Rogers v Rogers [2001] VSC 141 at [101]-[104] (Hansen J). 82 Birmingham v Renfrew (1937) 57 CLR 666 at 675 (Latham CJ), 689-690 (Dixon J). 83 Emphasis was placed in particular on the treatment by Ward CJ in Eq in E Co v Q [2018] NSWSC 442 at [1209]-[1212] of the approach taken by Nicholson J in Rodda v Ian Rodda Pty Ltd [2015] SASC 95 and Rodda v Ian Rodda Pty Ltd [2015] SASC 128, and upon the approach taken in Mould v Canale [2017] VSC 793. 84 (1999) 196 CLR 101. 85 Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505 at [85] (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ). 86 Kramer v Stone (2024) 281 CLR 484 at [40] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman and Beech-Jones JJ). -- 29 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 26 living on or using the farming land and where, if appropriate, conditions to compensate them for any accelerated benefit may fairly be fashioned. 87 It is not appropriate to resolve, on this application, whether that would be to take a step not yet taken in the decided cases, nor to weigh into difficult questions about the remedial or institutional characterisation of a constructive trust recognised or ordered in response to a claim in proprietary estoppel. It is sufficient to say that there is genuine scope for debate as to the proper approach. 88 In any event, the existence of a serious question to be tried should be considered holistically, and with reference to the contentions made by the appellant under his second ground of appeal. 89 The second ground raised by the appeal is that the appeal judge misapprehended the pleadings when he said that there was no pleaded representation which addressed the legal position governing the occupation of the farm and the continuing farming operations before the natural respondents’ death such as to render it unconscientious for the respondents to exercise the legal rights under the Lease Agreement. 90 It may be doing the appeal judge’s reasons a disservice simply to point to paragraph [33], extracted earlier. The appeal judge may have considered that paragraph [33] rose no higher than the particular allegations advanced in paragraph [34], and that those allegations did not include any express representation to the effect that Philip would have the right to farm the land during John and Elaine’s lives independently of the Lease Agreement. 91 It is true that those paragraphs do not include an express representation to that effect. However, the pleading does include statements that took as their premise that Philip would take over the farming business on the farming land, and that he would ultimately live in the homestead. There are pleaded statements that implied that Philip, rather than Judith, would receive the land. There are also facts pleaded which show that Philip had heavily invested in the farming business (with the debt partially secured by a mortgage granted by Greenpatch over the farming land),87 including by committing himself to neighbouring land, in a way that would have been seriously improvident if he was occupying only pursuant to a holding over terminable on one month’s notice. 92 Further, as the appellant submitted, the words and conduct of the parties, and what they understood about each other’s beliefs and expectations, will need to be explored at trial, and in light of the full context of the parties’ dealings. On the appellant’s case, the background to the Lease Agreement and the rental figure nominated in it should be seen as reflecting an understanding that, even prior to 87 See, eg, John 11.09.25 [63]-[65]. -- 30 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 27 2008, Philip had a one-third interest in the farming land.88 The appellant relies in particular upon the fact that, prior to 2008, the partnership did not pay rent to Greenpatch.89 Whilst understandings such as these are contested by the respondents, who suggested a different explanation in argument before us, they do tend to reinforce the importance of what may emerge in the evidence at the trial. 93 As has already been mentioned, the appellant contends that John (and Greenpatch) did not insist on compliance with or even refer to the terms of the Lease Agreement before the parties fell into dispute in 2024. The appellant will contend at trial that in context the conduct of John gave rise to a representation or an encouragement to believe that Philip would be permitted to continue to carry on his farming business on the farming land on a basis which was independent of any rights conferred by the Lease Agreement. The Lease Agreement was understood to be a convenient, tax-effective way of Philip’s parents deriving some income in retirement. The appellant contends that there was, however, a broader familial arrangement rather than one in which Philip’s rights were circumscribed by the terms and conditions of the Lease Agreement. 94 The respondents emphasise the statement of the plurality in Kramer v Stone,90 that in cases of proprietary estoppel by encouragement there must be a ‘clear and unequivocal’ promise,91 and submit that the facts and circumstances pleaded in paragraph [34] do not disclose a case of that kind. The respondents submit that much of the historical conduct is equivocal.92 95 In the appellant’s submission, the plurality’s observations do not gainsay the proposition that representations may arise from conduct including omissions, and need not be founded in express oral or written promises.93 He contends that the observations made by Ward P (with whom Leeming and Kirk JJA agreed) in Kramer v Stone remain sound.94 Her Honour said that in the field of proprietary estoppel by encouragement, a representation may be implied from conduct, may sometimes not be susceptible to precise legal analysis, and may be sufficiently clear if it was reasonable for the representee to have interpreted it as having a meaning which it was capable of bearing and upon which it was reasonable for the representee to rely.95 88 Philip points to the fact that cl 7.1 of the Lease Agreement contemplated that during any renewed term, the rent would be fixed at two-thirds of the market rental value if not otherwise agreed: see Philip 15.08.25, exhibit PJSH7. 89 See, eg, John 11.09.25 [44]. 90 (2024) 281 CLR 484. 91 (2024) 281 CLR 484 at [37] (Gageler CJ, Gordon, Edelman and Beech-Jones JJ). 92 For instance, the fact that the relevant partnership did not pay rent to Greenpatch before 2008 was equally capable of being seen as an act of generosity, rather than as reflecting that Philip had acquired or been promised an interest in the farming land. 93 The appellants relied in particular upon the Court’s apparent approval, in footnote 68, to the approach in Thorner v Major [2009] 1 WLR 776. 94 Kramer v Stone (2023) 112 NSWLR 564. 95 Kramer v Stone (2023) 112 NSWLR 564 at [84]-[87]. -- 31 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 28 96 The question is whether, allowing for some refinement and perhaps some elaboration in the course of more detailed evidence at trial, the material facts and circumstances pleaded in paragraph [34] provide a seriously arguable foundation for the more high-level proposition pleaded in paragraph [33] and, ultimately, whether there is disclosed a serious question to be tried to the effect that Philip was encouraged to act on the basis that he would have the ongoing use of the farming land during his parents’ retirement and until their death, when he would succeed to ownership or control of the land. There is a further question as to whether this use was not wholly governed by and subject to compliance with the Lease Agreement or any implied monthly tenancy after the Lease Agreement expired. 97 In our view, having regard to the two bases upon which the appellant puts his claim (which correspond to the two grounds of appeal), there are serious questions to be tried as to the existence and scope of a constructive trust which protects Philip’s right to possession of the farming land for the purposes of the farming business during John and Elaine’s lives, likely subject to conditions. 98 To be clear, none of this is to reject the respondents’ contentions as unmeritorious. They will require careful attention at trial. It might be that the court is ultimately not satisfied that express or implied representations with sufficiently clear meaning were made. The court might not be satisfied that the appellant’s decisions were materially influenced by any conduct on his parents’ part. Or it may be that any express or implied representations, as they concerned occupation and use of the farming land during John and Elaine’s lives, were subject to an express or implied qualification with which Philip did not comply, so that there was no unconscientious departure from any representations. These, however, are amongst the trial issues. There are serious questions to be tried. It follows that the appeal judge erred in finding otherwise. 99 Indeed, even if there was room to question the strength of the serious questions, this is a good example of a case where the inter-relationship between the serious questions and the balance of convenience is important. Both needed to be evaluated when determining whether and on what terms relief might be granted. Re-exercise of discretion whether to grant relief 100 It remains to be considered whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted. That requires a consideration of both the strength of the prima facie case and questions of convenience. There is also the question of ‘disentitling conduct’ relied upon by the respondents. 101 Like the appeal judge, we consider the balance of convenience favours the appellant; indeed we think it strongly favours the preservation of the status quo. Once the appellant is required to vacate the farming land, it is almost certain that his farming business will come to an end, at least in any form approximating its current state. The prospect of re-establishing the farming business in 12 months or more following a trial and any appeal is far from clear or obvious. -- 32 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 29 102 If the injunction is granted JHR will not be in a position to give effect to the Strauss lease on and from 1 March 2026. The rental under that lease is higher than had been agreed under the Lease Agreement. However, in lieu of the undertaking numbered (3) set out earlier in these reasons, the appellant now proffers an undertaking to make ongoing payments in respect of his occupation of the farming land pending the Court’s resolution of the matter in the amount of $170,000 plus GST. 103 In respect of arrears, he continues to proffer an undertaking in terms of the undertaking numbered (1) set out earlier in these reasons, albeit that the Charged Sum (defined to mean $105,803.29) will be paid into court by 30 June 2026. That undertaking, coupled with the undertaking numbered (2) regarding non- enforcement of the beneficiary loan account, provides a measure of security. 104 Whilst there remains a risk of prejudice to the respondents, for example that at the conclusion of the proceedings they are no longer able to obtain similar leasehold terms, or the appellant is unable to make good both on an adverse costs order and his undertaking as to damages, those risks are less pronounced than are the risks to Philip’s interests if injunctive relief is wrongly withheld. 105 Withholding interlocutory relief may subject the respondents to some exposure towards the counterparties to the Strauss lease. Limited weight should be given to that exposure for various reasons, including because the evidence does not clearly establish whether the Strauss parties would be likely to make a claim, or on what basis that claim might be made. Much may turn on any disclosure and discussions about the possible impact of this litigation. We have no evidence about any of that. We were not invited to bring to bear any prejudice to the Strauss parties. 106 Whilst, before the appeal judge, the respondents pressed allegations about the appellant’s disentitling conduct and lack of clean hands, the evidence shows that these are contested allegations, insufficiently clear to warrant a denial of interlocutory relief. That was the view of the appeal judge and it has not been challenged on the appeal before us. 107 We were satisfied that the appellant has demonstrated a sufficient likelihood of success to justify the preservation of the status quo pending a final hearing. Accordingly, upon the undertakings proffered by the appellant, we made orders allowing the appeal and granting injunctive relief, together with other consequential orders. 108 There was some debate before us about whether the grant of injunctive relief should be subject to the appellant undertaking in all respects to comply with the terms and conditions of the Lease Agreement, and to account for any rent he had received from a tenant of the homestead or De Rose Cottage. We were not satisfied that it should be. It is undesirable that undertakings be required in terms that may -- 33 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 30 be productive of disputation, particularly where they are not necessary fairly to balance the rights and interests of the parties on a temporary basis. Orders 109 The Court pronounced orders in these terms. Remarks Pursuant to the orders made on 21 October 2025 (FDN30), the Appellant charged his estate and interest in 30 Pine Crescent Coffin Bay SA 5607 being the whole of the land comprised in Certificate of Title Register Book Volume 5061 Folio 140 (the Coffin Bay Property) in favour of the Glen Heath Trust (the Trust) for the amount of $105,803.29 (the Charged Sum). Undertaking The Appellant gives the usual undertaking as to damages (UCR 111.1(4)). The Appellant undertakes, until the hearing and determination of proceedings in this Court bearing action number: CIV-25-009655 (the primary proceedings) or until further order of the Court: Purported rental arrears 1. to pay the Charged Sum as defined in FDN30 into Court by 30 June 2026 to abide the outcome of the primary proceedings; 2. not to enforce the beneficiary loan account of the Appellant recorded in the financial statements of the Trust for the 2023 Financial Year in the sum of $137,196.71; Ongoing occupation of the farming land 3. to pay to the Trust the sum of $170,000 plus GST per annum to occupy the Farming Land (as defined in the Appellant’s Statement of Claim (FDN17) (the Claim), to be paid by monthly instalments in advance in the sum of $14,166.67 plus GST with the first payment to be made on 1 March 2026 for the first monthly period being 1 March 2026 to 31 March 2026. 4. not to permit any third party to occupy the residences defined as De Rose Cottage and the Homestead in the Claim; 5. to maintain the Farming Land, De Rose Cottage and the Homestead in their present condition (subject to fair wear and tear); 6. to conduct a mixed farming operation on the Farming Land consistent with the historical practice adopted by the Appellant on the Farming Land during the period 2008 to the date of these undertakings; (collectively, the Undertakings). Order The Court orders that upon the Undertakings: -- 34 of 35 -- [2026] SASCA 13 The Court 31 1. The appeal be allowed. 2. Order 2 of the orders made on 19 December 2025 (as to costs) be set aside. 3. The Court re-exercise the discretion to grant an injunction to restrain the Respondents from disturbing the possession of, preventing access to, or interfering with the quiet enjoyment of the Appellant to the Farming Land until the hearing and order of the Court. Order for Costs 4. The First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Respondents pay: (a) the Appellant’s costs of this appeal; and (b) the appeal to the appeal judge. 110 In view of the desirability that the claims be determined expeditiously, the Court also made an order that the proceeding be assigned to the Special Classification List to be managed by a Judge of the Court.96 96 Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA), r 320.1. -- 35 of 35 --