BUCKLEY (A PSEUDONYM) v THE KING [2026] SASCA 14

On Appeal from DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (HIS HONOUR AUXILIARY JUDGE BARRETT ) DCCRM-22-322 Appellant: BUCKLEY (A PSEUDONYM) Counsel: MR G LANG - Solicitor: ABORIGINAL LEGAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT Respondent: THE KING Counsel: MS J LITSTER WITH MS E NOONE - Solicitor: DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) Hearing Date/s: 17/02/2026 File No/s: SCCRM-25-015928 A SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Court of Appeal: Criminal) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. BUCKLEY (A PSEUDONYM) v THE KING [2026] SASCA 14 Judgment of the Court of Appeal (The Honourable Justice S Doyle, the Honourable Justice David and the Honourable Justice Stanley) 5 March 2026 APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL - WHEN APPEAL LIES - ERROR OF LAW - PARTICULAR CASES INVOLVING ERROR OF LAW - FAILURE TO GIVE REASONS FOR DECISION - ADEQUACY OF REASONS APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - NEW TRIAL - IN GENERAL AND PARTICULAR GROUNDS - PARTICULAR GROUNDS - VERDICT AGAINST EVIDENCE OR WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE - VERDICT AGAINST WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE - WHEN NEW TRIAL GRANTED - VERDICT UNREASONABLE CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - SEXUAL OFFENCES - MAINTAINING SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH CHILD AND PERSISTENT SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILD Appeal against conviction. The appellant was convicted by a single judge of three counts of the offence of maintaining an unlawful sexual relationship with a child contrary to s 50 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA). The three complainants were the appellant’s daughter and two nieces. They were each under 10 years of age at the time of the offending. The appellant appeals on the grounds that (i) the verdict was unreasonable by reason of the judge excluding as a reasonable possibility the risk of collusion and contamination between the complainants’ evidence, and (ii) the judge’s reasons for excluding that risk were inadequate. -- 1 of 19 -- Held, per the Court, granting permission to appeal, but dismissing the appeal: 1. In the absence of any positive evidence of collusion or contamination having occurred, and in the context of the evidence as a whole, it was open to the judge to exclude collusion and contamination as a reasonable possibility. 2. The judge’s reasons and reasoning for doing so were not inadequate. Evidence Act 1929 (SA) ss 34L, 34S, referred to. Bowen (a pseudonym) v The King [2025] SASCA 36; Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651; Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292; Pell v The Queen (2020) 268 CLR 123, considered. -- 2 of 19 -- BUCKLEY (A PSEUDONYM) v THE KING [2026] SASCA 14 Court of Appeal – Criminal: S Doyle, David and Stanley JJA 1 THE COURT: Following a trial by judge alone, the appellant was convicted of three counts of the offence of maintaining an unlawful sexual relationship with a child. The three complainants were the appellant’s daughter (KB) and two nieces (LB and CB). 2 It was accepted that the evidence of each complainant was cross-admissible between the three charges, this evidence being relevant and admissible as engaging both probability and propensity reasoning. The defence case was that there was a reasonable possibility of collusion or contamination infecting the complainants’ evidence. 3 In finding the charges proved beyond reasonable doubt, the judge accepted the evidence of each complainant as credible and reliable, and relied upon the probability and propensity reasoning contended for by the prosecution. His Honour rejected the defence case of collusion or contamination. 4 The appellant seeks permission to appeal on two grounds, both of which involve a complaint about the judge’s reliance upon the cross-admissible evidence. Ground 1 involves a complaint that there was no basis in the evidence to exclude collusion or contamination as a reasonable possibility, with the result that the verdict is unreasonable. Ground 2 involves a complaint that the judge did not identify or explain a basis for properly excluding collusion or contamination as a reasonable possibility, with the result that his reasons or reasoning were inadequate. 5 For the reasons which follow, neither ground has been made out. Overview 6 It was alleged that the offending by the appellant occurred while the appellant was living with his partner and children (his daughter (KB), and son (SB)) at various addresses in the Riverland. 7 At the commencement of this period, in early 2012, the appellant and his family lived with the appellant’s brother (DB), his brother’s wife (RB), and their two daughters (LB and CB) and son (BB) at a house in Moorook, in the Riverland. CB shared a bedroom with KB. The appellant later moved to an address in Barmera, and then two addresses in Berri (on Omalley Street and then Grenache Avenue). 8 On the prosecution case, the appellant first sexually abused LB (the older of the two nieces) (Count 2), before then sexually abusing CB (the younger of his two nieces) (Count 3), and then KB (his daughter) (Count 1). All three complainants were sexually abused while they were living at their house in Moorook, although -- 3 of 19 -- [2026] SASCA 14 The Court 2 the abuse against KB continued through to when the appellant was living at the two Berri addresses mentioned above. 9 While the offending occurred predominantly in 2012,1 the complainants did not report the offending to police until 2021. KB was the first to make allegations to police, although this was soon followed by complaints from LB and CB. There was some evidence of earlier complaints by each of the complainants, including during a conversation between LB and CB in June 2020, which LB recorded without CB’s knowledge. 10 Although there were differences in detail, each of the complainants described offending against them which involved the appellant getting into their beds behind them, and touching or penetrating their vaginas. There were also occasions when he masturbated while next to them. The offending occurred in circumstances where there was a high risk of detection. The complainants each gave evidence to the effect that they were less than 10 years of age when the offending occurred. 11 The prosecution relied upon the similarities in the complainants’ accounts of the appellant’s offending as probative of the improbability of them having independently fabricated or concocted false allegations of offending. The prosecution also relied upon the complainants’ evidence as establishing that the appellant had a propensity to sexually offend against his young female relatives. 12 The judge found the three counts had each been established beyond reasonable doubt, making findings largely in terms of the prosecution particularisation of the charged offending. 13 In relation to Count 1 (involving his daughter, KB), the judge found that the appellant committed two unlawful sexual acts, namely aggravated indecent assault and unlawful sexual intercourse, on more than one occasion. Those acts involved rubbing his penis against KB’s genital area, and penetrating her vagina with his penis. The acts occurred between March 2012 and May 2015, when KB was between seven and 10 years of age. 14 In relation to Count 2 (involving his niece, LB), the judge found that the appellant committed two unlawful sexual acts, namely aggravated indecent assault and unlawful sexual intercourse, on more than one occasion. Those acts involved rubbing LB’s vagina and inserting his finger into her vagina. The acts occurred between March 2012 and November 2012, when LB was between nine and 10 years of age. 15 In relation to Count 3 (involving his niece, CB), the judge found that the appellant committed four of the five unlawful sexual acts particularised on the Information. Those acts involved gross indecency (masturbating in CB’s presence), and aggravated indecent assaults (nibbling on CB’s ear, inserting his fingers inside her vagina, and causing her to masturbate his penis). The acts 1 The particularised period against KB extended beyond this year. -- 4 of 19 -- [2026] SASCA 14 The Court 3 occurred between March 2012 and November 2012, when CB was between seven and eight years of age. 16 In so finding, the judge relied in part upon the improbability and propensity reasoning contended for by the prosecution. 17 It is convenient to summarise the evidence at trial before returning to address the appellant’s challenge to the judge’s reliance upon the cross-admissible evidence of the complainants in this way, and the judge’s reasoning on this issue. The evidence at trial 18 The prosecution relied upon evidence given by each of the three complainants. In addition to some agreed facts, the prosecution also called evidence from three further witnesses, RB (the mother of LB and CB), MT (the maternal aunt of KB), and SB (the son of the appellant, and brother of KB). The evidence of KB 19 The appellant’s daughter, KB, gave evidence that the first occasion she was sexually abused by the appellant was in 2012, when she was eight years of age. 20 KB shared a bedroom with her cousin, CB. In the early hours of the morning, KB heard CB say words to the effect of ‘no’ and ‘go’. She saw the appellant get out of CB’s bed. He then got into KB’s bed and lay behind her, under the covers. KB asked the appellant what he was doing, and he said ‘shush, go to sleep’. The appellant then pulled KB’s pyjama pants and underwear down, saying words to the effect that ‘it’s okay, its wrapped’. The appellant then put his penis between KB’s legs and rubbed his penis against KB’s vagina. 21 The appellant later moved to an address on Omalley Street in Berri. On an occasion at this address, the appellant called KB into his bedroom and told KB to lie on the ground. The appellant removed KB’s underwear and rubbed his penis near her vagina. KB described a ‘massive pain’ as the appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. She yelled out, and the appellant apologised. KB noticed she was bleeding. This was the only time the appellant penetrated her vagina. 22 KB described other occasions of the appellant rubbing his penis on her vagina at the Omalley Street address. 23 KB also gave evidence that she was further sexually abused at an address on Grenache Avenue in Berri, when she was 10 years of age. She recalled an occasion in the bathroom where she showered with the appellant. The appellant washed her body, including her vagina. He told her to lie on the ground and rubbed his penis on her vagina. They were interrupted when SB knocked on the door. The appellant told KB to get dressed. 24 KB gave some brief evidence to the effect that she had been sexually abused by others, including not only one of the appellant’s friends who had lived with -- 5 of 19 -- [2026] SASCA 14 The Court 4 them for a while, but also her mother and her mother’s partner. No detail of this other abuse was elicited at trial. The evidence was led pursuant to s 34L of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) for the purpose of explaining the timeline of the complaint evidence, and explaining KB’s reaction to the appellant’s sexual acts. 25 Turning to her evidence of complaint, KB’s initial complaint was to her maternal aunt, MT. However, KB did not recall making this complaint, and thought her initial complaint was to police. On 21 June 2021, when reporting to police sexual abuse by her mother and her mother’s partner, KB mentioned sexual abuse by the appellant. She did not give any detail. KB provided statements to police about the abuse by her mother and her mother’s partner on 24 June 2021 and 20 July 2021. She gave her first detailed account of the appellant’s sexual abuse of her to the police on 27 July 2021. 26 Some time after her statement to the police about the appellant, KB was told that LB and CB had also made statements alleging sexual abuse by the appellant. KB gave evidence that this shocked her, as she did not know what had happened to LB and CB. At the time of giving evidence at trial, KB still did not know any detail about the allegations made by LB and CB. That said, as mentioned earlier, KB had observed the appellant in CB’s bed, and had heard CB say words to the effect of ‘no’ and ‘go’. The evidence of LB 27 The older of the appellant’s two nieces, LB, gave evidence that she initially got along well with the appellant. 28 She was first sexually abused by the appellant in 2012, when she was about nine years of age. She felt sick during the night and woke to get water from the kitchen. The appellant asked her what she was doing, and she told him she was feeling sick. The appellant let the dogs in to sleep with LB, and told her he would take the dogs out before LB’s parents woke so she would not get into trouble. The appellant later came into LB’s bed and lay behind her. He said that he would rub her stomach so she would feel better. She said ‘no’, but he did so anyway. The appellant then moved his hand lower. He rubbed the top of her vagina and inserted a finger into her vagina. The following day, the appellant told LB that she was his favourite, and that he loved her more than his own children. LB said it felt ‘good to finally be someone’s favourite’. The appellant also gave her some lollies, telling her to eat them quickly before the other children could see. 29 LB gave evidence that similar sexual abuse happened on approximately 20 occasions. Each time she was rewarded with treats. 30 The last occasion also occurred in her bedroom. This occasion ‘hurt worse’ than the others. She was not sure whether this was because the appellant penetrated her vagina with more fingers, or more deeply than on other occasions. -- 6 of 19 -- [2026] SASCA 14 The Court 5 31 Overall the abuse lasted about two months. LB recalls subsequently seeing the appellant giving CB treats and calling her his favourite. 32 LB did not tell her mother about what the appellant had done to her, or what she feared he might be doing to CB. 33 LB’s initial complaint was during a conversation with her sister, CB. The conversation occurred in June 2020, when LB was 17 or 18 years of age. LB recorded the conversation without CB’s knowledge, and did not disclose the recording to anyone until she gave it to police in 2021. She made the recording because she had been struggling with what had happened to her, and felt she needed to know whether the appellant had done anything to her sister. 34 In the recording, while LB was predominantly asking CB if the appellant had ever touched her inappropriately, LB also disclosed to CB that the appellant used to ‘cuddle’ her in bed. She clarified at trial that this was a reference to cuddles of a sexual nature which occurred when the appellant would enter her bed. 35 LB’s mother, RB, gave evidence that, in April 2021, LB told her that the appellant had lain behind her and put his hands on top of her underwear near her vagina. LB did not want to give her any more detail. 36 LB was not directly asked about her complaint to her mother. However, her evidence included reference to her elaboration upon her initial complaint in a statement to police on 23 August 2021. LB said that this was the only time she had spoken to anyone else about the offending. 37 As to LB’s knowledge of any offending against the other complainants, she did not ever see the appellant in KB’s or CB’s beds; however, she did once see him leave the bedroom they shared. LB also said that she saw the appellant giving her sister, CB, treats and telling her that she was his favourite. 38 LB gave evidence that her mother told her that KB had spoken to police about the appellant, and asked her whether she needed to book an appointment for her. LB did not know what KB had told police, but she told her mother to book an appointment with police for both LB and CB. 39 LB said she does not know what CB told the police. She only knows what CB told her in their conversation that she recorded. When asked, CB had told LB that she did not want to talk about anything. The evidence of CB 40 The appellant’s younger niece, CB, gave evidence that her clearest memory of being sexually abused by the appellant was an occasion when she was eight or nine years of age. The appellant entered the room she was sharing with KB, and got into her bed. CB felt the appellant’s belt and jeans behind her. She felt a bouncing rhythm and could hear the appellant swearing under his breath. She felt -- 7 of 19 -- [2026] SASCA 14 The Court 6 the appellant get up off the bed, and when she looked on the bed she noticed a wet patch on her bed and what ‘I know now was ejaculation’. The appellant did not touch her during this incident. 41 Another incident CB recalled also occurred when she was eight or nine years of age. The appellant lay behind her in her bed. CB was made to reach behind and masturbate the appellant’s penis. The appellant also rubbed CB’s vagina with his fingers. 42 CB also gave evidence that there were multiple occasions when the appellant would enter her bed, lie behind her and nibble her ear. 43 CB’s initial complaint was to her sister, LB, in the conversation which LB recorded in June 2020. CB did not know this conversation was being recorded. She told LB the appellant had come into her bedroom and had lain down next to her with his pants down. She referred to the appellant getting up to get toilet paper and wipe CB’s bed. CB also told LB in this recording that the appellant would go into KB’s bed. 44 CB was cross-examined about her references in the recording to not knowing whether her recollections of the appellant coming into her room were a dream, and to pushing her memory to one side ‘thinking it was not real’. Her evidence was that the sexual abuse was real; that she had kept hoping it was a dream, but it was not. 45 CB later spoke to police on 23 August 2021. At that time, CB only told police about the ejaculation incident. After giving her first statement, CB spoke to LB and asked her to arrange another meeting with police, as there were further things CB wanted to say. But she did not tell LB what those details were. On 24 March 2022, CB provided a further statement to police in which she mentioned the other occasions of sexual abuse. When asked during cross-examination why she did not include these other occasions in her first statement, CB acknowledged that she had not initially told the police everything. She said there were some things she was not comfortable revealing and some things she had not remembered at that stage. 46 CB said she had not said anything to anyone else about the occasions of sexual abuse by the appellant (that is, apart from what she had said to LB in the recorded conversation and to police). She said she did not recall telling her mother any detail, but that her mother had told her she knew about the ejaculation incident. 47 As for CB’s knowledge of the appellant’s offending against the other complainants, CB said she had seen the appellant in KB’s bed a few times; however, she was not sure what was happening on those occasions. CB also said that on one of the nights when the appellant had tried to get into her bed, she had told the appellant ‘no’ and to go away; and that she saw him then get into KB’s bed. CB said that she did not know what happened to KB, and that she had not -- 8 of 19 -- [2026] SASCA 14 The Court 7 spoken to KB about any details. But she assumed the appellant had done to KB what he had done to her, because she had seen the appellant get into KB’s bed. 48 CB said that she did not see anything else happen between the appellant and anyone else. Other prosecution evidence 49 RB, the mother of LB and CB, gave evidence as to timelines and family movements. She gave evidence that LB told her that the appellant was treating CB as a favourite. She also gave evidence that, in April 2021, LB told her that the appellant had lain behind her and put his hand on top of her underwear, but under her pants and near her vagina. But LB did not want to talk any more about it, and went into an ‘attack’. RB’s evidence was that her daughters, LB and CB, had not given any detail, or otherwise told her what was in their police statements. 50 MT, the maternal aunt of KB, gave evidence that in April 2021, KB came to live with her in Renmark. She said that, prior to KB making her first statement to the police (late July 2021), KB had told her that the appellant had sexually abused her. But she did not give her any detail. 51 SB, the son of the appellant, and brother of KB, did not recall any occasions of favouritism, and was not aware of any acts of a sexual nature between the appellant and any of the complainants. The defence case 52 In denying the allegations against the appellant, the defence case relied upon both the forensic disadvantage by reason of the passage of time, and the inability of the prosecution to refute collusion beyond reasonable doubt. Defence counsel cross-examined each of the complainants on the topic of collusion. 53 The appellant gave evidence at trial. His denial of the offending included evidence that he did not at any time lie down with any of the complainants, under any circumstance. He acknowledged that he did rub LB’s stomach in her bedroom early one morning when she was unwell. He also acknowledged that he had told LB that she was his favourite (because she had helped him with the chores), before later saying this to CB. But he denied giving either of them treats that were not given to all of the children. The appeal 54 As mentioned at the outset of these reasons, the appellant’s appeal focusses upon the difficulties in excluding a reasonable possibility of collusion or contamination having infected the evidence of the complainants. 55 The appellant referred this Court to the authorities recognising the importance of ensuring that the possibility of collusion or contamination can be excluded in cases involving cross-admissible evidence from multiple -- 9 of 19 -- [2026] SASCA 14 The Court 8 complainants. In particular, the appellant referred to the following observations from the reasons of Mason CJ, Wilson and Gaudron JJ in Hoch v The Queen:2 Thus, in our view, the admissibility of similar fact evidence [from multiple complainants of similar incidents of sex offending] in cases such as the present depends on that evidence having the quality that it is not reasonably explicable on the basis of concoction. That is a matter to be determined, as in all cases of circumstantial evidence, in the light of common sense and experience. … If the depositions of witnesses in committal proceedings or the statements of witnesses indicate that the witnesses had no relationship with each other prior to the making of the various complaints, and that is unchallenged, then, assuming the requisite degree of similarity, common sense and experience will indicate that the evidence bears that probative force which renders it admissible. On the other hand, if the depositions or the statements indicate that the complainants have a sufficient relationship to each other and had opportunity and motive for concoction then, as a matter of common sense and experience, the evidence will lack the degree of probative value necessary to render it admissible. 56 The appellant acknowledges that these observations were made in the context of a dispute about admissibility, and that, by reason of s 34S of the Evidence Act, the risk of collusion or concoction is no longer a basis for objecting to the admissibility of evidence of other similar sex offending. However, he argues that these observations remain instructive as to the capacity for this risk to undermine the probative value of such evidence. In particular, he argues that where collusion cannot be excluded as a reasonable possibility, then this undermines the ability to rely upon any improbability reasoning arising out of any similarities in the complainants’ various accounts. It also undermines the credibility and reliability of their evidence more generally. 57 The appellant contends that this was a case in which the risk of collusion or contamination was particularly high. In support of this contention, the appellant relies upon the obvious and ample opportunity for collusion, given the familial relationships between the complainants. He also relies upon the circumstance that each of the complainants took a number of years to report their allegations to police, but then did so within a relatively close period of time. The appellant points to the recorded conversation between LB and CB as illustrative of the risk of at least some degree of collusion or contamination. He points to the fact that CB initially reported only one incident to police, and only later mentioned further abuse after some encouragement from her sister and mother to make a further report. 58 The appellant also points to the similarities in the allegations made by the complainants. Whilst conscious that these similarities might ultimately support the probative value of the evidence, the appellant emphasises that they are also consistent with collusion or contamination (which must be excluded before the evidence can have the probative force contended for by the prosecution). 2 Hoch v The Queen (1988) 165 CLR 292 at 297. -- 10 of 19 -- [2026] SASCA 14 The Court 9 59 The judge did not overlook the general significance of excluding collusion or contamination to the defence case. Rather, having addressed the evidence of the complainants denying any collusion or contamination, his Honour accepted their evidence and found that collusion had been excluded as a reasonable possibility. 60 In nevertheless challenging the verdicts, the appellant’s submission on appeal is two-fold. The first is that the risk of collusion or contamination was such that there was simply no proper basis for excluding collusion or contamination as a reasonable possibility, with the result that the verdict is unreasonable (Ground 1). The second involves a complaint that the judge did not identify or explain a basis for properly excluding collusion or contamination as a reasonable possibility, with the result that his reasons or reasoning were inadequate (Ground 2). As an aspect of both complaints, the appellant argues that even if the risk of dishonest collusion was properly excluded as a reasonable possibility, the risk of more subtle innocent infection or contamination was not, and could not have been, properly excluded. 61 Before addressing these two complaints, it is appropriate to summarise the judge’s reasoning on the issue relating to the risk of collusion or contamination. The judge’s reasons 62 The judge commenced his reasons by setting out the charges and addressing some formal matters. His Honour then summarised the evidence in the prosecution and defence cases in quite some detail. The judge next summarised the parties’ addresses. 63 In summarising the prosecutor’s address, his Honour set out the prosecutor’s submissions in relation to various topics, including the negation of collusion and the cross-admissibility of the evidence of each complainant. Similarly, in summarising defence counsel’s address, his Honour set out the key submissions made in relation to collusion and cross-admissibility. The judge mentioned defence counsel’s submission to the effect that, while there was no direct evidence of collusion or contamination, the fact that the nieces (LB and CB) gave their statements after KB gave her statement raised the danger of this having occurred. His Honour also mentioned defence counsel’s submission that it was not known what encouragement was given to CB between her two statements, noting that the first statement mentioned only one incident whereas the later statement included more extensive allegations. The judge also mentioned defence counsel’s submission to the effect that LB’s recording of the conversation she had with CB involved some prompting of CB. His Honour noted defence counsel’s submission that unless collusion and contamination are excluded as reasonable possibilities, then the evidence from the other complainants could not be probative. 64 In the operative section of his reasons, the trial judge commenced by addressing the issue of collusion and contamination, noting that any inability to exclude this as a reasonable possibility would not only undermine the relevance of the complainants’ evidence for improbability and propensity purposes, but also make not guilty verdicts ‘near inevitable’. -- 11 of 19 -- [2026] SASCA 14 The Court 10 65 The judge then explained what he meant by the risk of collusion or contamination. He explained that collusion could occur where two or more people decide together to make up a false story, but that there were also other scenarios, such as where one complainant tells another complainant a false story and that second complainant decides to make up their own false story. Alternatively, contamination might occur where one complainant gives a version of abuse (whether true or false), and the second complainant comes to believe wrongly that they were abused in a similar way. The judge summarised that, whatever the precise mechanism, if similarities in a complainant’s account are the result of discussion or information about the other’s account, then the evidence loses its probative value. 66 Against this, the judge recognised that there were also situations in which learning of another complainant’s allegations might not involve any collusion or contamination, but nevertheless give the second complainant the confidence to report their (genuine) allegations of sexual abuse. 67 The judge also noted the tension between similarities in complainants’ allegations adding to the probative force of the evidence, and similarities being suggestive of, or at least consistent with, collusion or contamination. 68 The judge then set out his reasons for excluding any collusion or contamination affecting KB’s evidence, being satisfied that KB did not discuss her allegations with her cousins LB or CB prior to reporting them to police in June 2021: [193] I am satisfied that in the years between 2012 and 2021 KB had no discussion with LB or CB about the reports she made to the police on 21 June 2021. She had been living with her mother and MN since about 2015/2016. On her account, she had been abused by them during some of that time. She had left that house and moved in with her aunt, MT. She had gone to the police on 21 June 2021 and briefly mentioned being sexually abused by her father, but her first long statement to the police on 24 June was about her mother and MN. [194] I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecution has excluded both collusion and contamination in respect of KB. 69 The judge next excluded the possibility that LB’s evidence had been affected by collusion or contamination: [195] I am also satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was no collusion or contamination between KB and LB. I accept the evidence of RB and LB about the circumstances of LB making her report to the police. LB had already had her recorded conversation with her sister [CB] in 2020. While the terms of her complaint about sexual abuse by the accused during that conversation were brief and somewhat oblique, there is in my view no doubt by 2021 she had articulated sexual abuse by the accused. She said the first time she knew of KB having made a complaint about the accused was when her mother told her outside a supermarket that KB had made a statement to police about the accused, and should she, RB, make an appointment for her too. LB said ‘yes’, and to make one for her sister as well. No one asked RB -- 12 of 19 -- [2026] SASCA 14 The Court 11 how she came to know of RB how she came to know of KB’s report to the police but there is no suggestion that RB told LB the details of that report. I accept that LB thought it possible KB was reporting parental neglect by the accused. 70 In the judge’s view, it was likely that RB found out about KB’s report from police, as a result of KB suggesting to police that her father might have touched the other girls too. This was consistent with KB’s evidence that her father came to her bed from CB’s bed when CB told him to go away. 71 The judge then explained his basis for excluding the possibility of collusion or contamination affecting the CB’s evidence: [197] In respect of CB, I am also satisfied that she has not colluded with anyone to give her account, nor has her account been contaminated by anyone else. So far as her first statement is concerned, I find that she was in a similar position to that of her sister. The first she knew of KB having gone to the police was when she was told that an appointment had been made for her to see the police. She had already taken part in the conversation with LB in 2020 although she did not know it was being recorded. While she said at the time it might have been a dream, she was speaking of sexual abuse by the accused. [198] It is true that CB spoke to KB, her mother and her sister before she gave what appears to be her first statement. [199] CB said there was an occasion before she made her statements where she was driving with KB and she asked her ‘if anything’s happened’, KB ‘just kind of brushed it away’. That topic was not explored in cross-examination. [200] CB said that she thought that before she made her statement, she told her mother about the sheet incident, but she said nothing about being told of anyone else’s account. CB said that her sister told her that she should put in a statement about what the accused had done to her. LB told her that KB had gone to the police and that the accused had been arrested. CB said that she never knew the details of the accounts of KB or LB before or after she gave her statements. [201] It is plain that CB told the police only about the sheet incident when she made her first statement. She gave an account of the further abuse in the second statement. She acknowledged that she had been encouraged by her sister to make a second statement. She said that at the time of the first statement there were things she was not comfortable talking about and there were things that she had not remembered. [202] As I have already indicated, it is not every discussion between witnesses that amounts to collusion or contamination. Hearing that another witness has reported sexual abuse is not of itself evidence of either. Nor does being encouraged to report abuse or getting up the courage to do so. [203] In the case of CB, the differences between her account and those of KB and LB tell against collusion and contamination. She did not experience the sorts of abuse KB reported. The accused did not get on top of her on the floor. He did not penetrate her vagina with his penis and cause her pain. She resisted the accused by telling him to go away. KB did not feel able to resist. LB fled to her mother’s room when the accused suggested once again letting the dogs in. She experienced the accused ejaculating. Neither of the other two did. -- 13 of 19 -- [2026] SASCA 14 The Court 12 [204] In my view, CB’s initial reluctance, and the differences between her account and that of the others, tells credibly against collusion and contamination. Although she said she saw the accused go from her bed to KB’s bed, she never claimed to have witnessed any abuse of KB. If she had colluded with KB, there was ample opportunity to bolster KB’s account. [205] I exclude collusion and contamination in respect of CB. 72 The judge next addressed the complaint evidence in some detail, including the conversation between LB and CB which LB covertly recorded. 73 The cross-admissible use of the evidence for the purposes of improbability and propensity reasoning was the next topic addressed. The judge noted the potential use of the evidence in both of these ways, but reminded himself that this reasoning should not be equated with proof of the allegations. The latter required a focus upon the credibility and reliability of the individual complainants. 74 The judge then addressed the defence suggestion of a motive to lie. It was suggested that the complainants’ antipathy towards the appellant might have led them to lie. However, the judge rejected this submission: [251] I find that while each of the complainants came at various stages, and for various reasons, to dislike the accused, they were not motivated to lie about the sexual matters. I am satisfied that gradually, over a long time, they came to see that his sexual behaviour was wrong, and they got up the courage to complain about it. 75 The judge next addressed some inconsistencies between the complainants’ in-court evidence and earlier out-of-court statements, before then addressing the credibility and reliability of the evidence of each of the complainants. The judge spent several paragraphs grappling with the pertinent aspects of the evidence of each of the complainants, concluding that each of them was credible and generally reliable. 76 The judge’s evaluation of the appellant’s evidence, on the other hand, resulted in him identifying various respects in which his evidence was not credible, and then ultimately rejecting his denials of sexual offending against each of the complainants. The judge appropriately noted that his ultimate task was not, of course, accomplished by preferring the evidence of one or more of the complainants over the appellant. Rather, it involved considering whether the allegations in respect of each complainant had been established beyond reasonable doubt. 77 The judge concluded the operative section of his reasoning by referring back to his earlier conclusion that the complainants’ evidence was credible and generally reliable. He then brought to bear the cross-admissible evidence, concluding that his analysis of the similarities (and dissimilarities) between their evidence supported the improbability of falsehood or mistake by the complainants. This was in a context where his Honour was able to ‘exclude collusion and contamination between them, or them and others’, being ‘satisfied there was -- 14 of 19 -- [2026] SASCA 14 The Court 13 none’.3 His Honour added that the combined effect of the evidence of the three complainants led to the conclusion that the accused had a propensity to sexually offend against his young female relatives and that he acted on that propensity.4 78 The judge concluded by making findings beyond reasonable doubt, broadly in terms of the prosecution case in respect of each of the three charges – as summarised earlier in the ‘Overview’ section of these reasons. His Honour found the three charges proved, and convicted the appellant of each. Ground 1: unreasonable verdict 79 The principles governing appellate consideration of whether a verdict of guilty is unreasonable are well-known and not in dispute. It is not necessary to set them out. They are as set out in M v The Queen, and recently reiterated and elaborated upon in cases such as Pell v The Queen5 and Dansie v The Queen.6 80 As foreshadowed earlier in these reasons, the appellant’s submission is that the risk of collusion or contamination was so great in the present case that it was incapable of being excluded. In contending that the risk was incapable of being excluded, the appellant points to not only the relationships between the complainants (and hence opportunity for them to have discussed their respective allegations), but also the illustrations of the risk potentially playing out through not only the recorded conversation between LB and CB, but also the discussions that appeared to have occurred (at least with RB) around the time they reported their allegations to the police. The appellant points to the significant delay, yet ultimately relatively similar timing, in the complainants reporting their allegations to the police. He points to the similarities in their accounts as being consistent with collusion or contamination. He also points to the complainants’ apparent antipathy towards the appellant as giving them a potential motive to lie or fabricate allegations about him. 81 We do not accept the appellant’s overarching submission. It is true, and must be accepted, that there were features of this case that called for careful consideration of the risk of collusion or contamination, and which, if not able to be resolved through consideration of the evidence as a whole, may well have been insurmountable obstacles to convictions on the three charged counts. However, in the end, there was no more than a risk of collusion or contamination; there was no positive evidence of it having in fact occurred. The complainants each gave evidence in which they were asked about, and gave accounts of, the (limited) extent of their conversations with others about their allegations. In the case of each, there was some evidence of complaint which occurred well in advance of their similarly timed complaints to police. 3 Trial reasons at [286]. 4 Trial reasons at [287]. 5 Pell v The Queen (2020) 268 CLR 123. 6 Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651. -- 15 of 19 -- [2026] SASCA 14 The Court 14 82 In our view, the judge, as the trier of fact who heard the evidence from each of the complainants in the context of the evidence as a whole, was in a position to exclude collusion and contamination as a reasonable possibility. Whatever doubt this Court might have from a consideration of the record of the trial, and the features of the case relied upon by the appellant, it is a doubt that was capable of being resolved through the judge’s advantage from having heard the evidence at trial. Whilst the passage from Hoch v The Queen relied upon by the appellant is a reminder of the risk of collusion or contamination that exists in a case such as the present, it does not mean that the risk in this case was one that was indelible, or inherently incapable of being resolved by reference to the evidence at trial. 83 For this reason, Ground 1 must fail. However, it remains necessary to consider whether the judge’s reasons and reasoning adequately addressed the risk of collusion and contamination. Ground 2: inadequacy of reasons or reasoning 84 Once again, the principles governing the inadequacy of a judge’s reasons or reasoning are well-known and not in dispute. They need not be set out. They have been summarised in decisions of this Court such as Bowen (a pseudonym) v The King.7 85 As has already been explained, the appellant contends that, even if the risk of collusion or contamination was capable of being resolved through the judge’s advantage from having seen and heard the complainants give evidence, in the context of the evidence as a whole, nevertheless the judge did not set out an adequate basis for this in his reasons. 86 In considering this submission, it is appropriate to commence with the observation that the judge clearly recognised, and squarely addressed in some detail, the risk of collusion and contamination. The pertinent aspects of the judge’s reasons have been summarised above. At a general level, the judge plainly appreciated and considered, and meaningfully grappled with, the risk of both collusion and contamination. 87 However, in developing his submissions in support of this ground, the appellant relies upon various features of the evidence, and the judge’s reasons. It is convenient to address several of these features. 88 The appellant argues that the judge focussed upon deliberate or dishonest collusion without adequately appreciating or addressing the risk of a more subtle innocent form of contamination from the complainants having spoken with one another. We do not accept this criticism of his Honour’s reasons. As mentioned in our earlier summary of his Honour’s reasons, he commenced the relevant section of his reasons by expressly adverting to several of the different potential forms or manifestations of collusion and contamination. This included innocent 7 Bowen (a pseudonym) v The King [2025] SASCA 36. -- 16 of 19 -- [2026] SASCA 14 The Court 15 contamination. It cannot fairly be said that the judge overlooked, or did not address, the risk of innocent contamination. 89 The judge was quite careful in identifying and assessing the evidence as to the nature and timing of potentially relevant interactions between the complainants, and with others such as RB (the mother of LB and CB). This included reference (at paragraph [193]) to KB’s evidence as to the limited interactions she had with LB and CB in the years preceding her complaint to the police. We do not think that the judge’s failure to mention the possibility of electronic communications between KB and LB or CB during this period means that he overlooked it. 90 It is apparent from a fair reading of the judge’s reasons that he endeavoured to assess the risk of not only intentional collusion, but also innocent contamination or infection of the complainants’ evidence through their knowledge of each other’s allegations. The judge’s awareness and consideration of this risk is also apparent from his Honour’s references to the alternative possibility that their awareness of other allegations might simply have given them the confidence or courage to come forward with their own true allegations, rather than being induced into making false allegations. 91 Related to this, we do not accept the submission that the judge, by focussing upon the recorded conversation of LB and CB as evidence of initial complaint, failed to appreciate its significance as illustrative of the risk of collusion or contamination. It is true that the judge addressed the recorded conversation in more detail when addressing the complaint evidence, but he did not overlook its significance to the risk of collusion or contamination. He expressly referred to this conversation when addressing this risk in respect of the evidence of both LB (paragraph [195]) and CB (paragraph [197]). In circumstances where his Honour had addressed the evidence as to the circumstances and content of that conversation elsewhere in his reasons, this was sufficient to indicate his Honour’s consideration of the significance of this conversation to the risk of collusion and contamination. 92 Having considered the transcript of the recorded conversation, we accept that there was some risk of the sisters slightly reinforcing and influencing each other’s recollections of their interactions with the appellant during this conversation. However, we do not see any difficulty with the judge’s satisfaction that this conversation did not ultimately prevent the exclusion of collusion or contamination as a reasonable possibility. It was open to the judge to accept that CB’s transition from references in that conversation to being unsure whether her allegations might have been a dream, through to her evidence that the sexual abuse did occur, was merely a product of her own coming to terms with what had happened to her, rather than being indicative of her being influenced by what LB told her. 93 Similarly, we do not accept that the judge overlooked the significance of the timing of the complainants’ reports to the police. Having noted that KB’s report -- 17 of 19 -- [2026] SASCA 14 The Court 16 to police was soon followed by the reports made by LB and CB, the judge addressed the risk of collusion or contamination leading to, or affecting, the allegations reported by LB and CB. However, his Honour accepted (at paragraph [195]) the evidence of RB and LB as to how these subsequent reports came about, being circumstances which did not involve any collusion or contamination. 94 Further, his Honour expressly addressed (paragraphs [197]-[201]) the circumstance that CB initially disclosed only one incident to police, and that it was not until several months later that she reported the balance of her allegations. Whilst acknowledging that RB and LB had spoken to her about the abuse in general terms, and that LB had encouraged her to give a further statement, the judge accepted that any influence of this was confined to giving her the confidence to report, rather than the content of her allegations. The judge accepted that the more limited disclosure in her first statement to police was a product of her not being comfortable about, or not then remembering, aspects of what she subsequently said occurred to her. Again, not only did the judge address this issue in his reasons, but he did so in a matter that was reasonably open to him, and not irrational. 95 Next, the appellant argues that the judge did not properly address two further, and related, aspects of the risk of contamination or collusion. In particular, he argues that the judge did not address the risk that the dissimilarities between aspects of the complainants’ allegations was not necessarily a contra-indication of contamination or collusion; that it was possible that there was collusion or contamination as to the central aspect of their allegations (for example, sexually abusing them whilst lying behind them in their beds) with the individual complainants then individually adding the differences in additional detail. Once again, we do not accept this complaint. Although the judge did not squarely address this argument in terms, the judge was plainly alive to, and expressly considered, the subtle and potentially conflicting significance of the extent of similarities and dissimilarities between the complainants’ accounts. In our view, the judge’s references to the extent of those similarities and dissimilarities was sufficient, and revealed a logical and reasonable approach to the issue (for example, at paragraphs [203] and [204]). 96 The appellant also criticises the judge’s approach of sequentially addressing the risk of collusion or contamination for each of the complainants, without adequately appreciating or addressing the more general risk arising from the evidence as a whole. In our view, there is no merit in this criticism. Reading the judge’s reasons as a whole, there is no doubt that his Honour appreciated and addressed the general risk. It is a strength rather than a vice of his reasons that the judge descended to a relatively detailed consideration of the various aspects of the circumstances and evidence in the case that were most pertinent when considering this risk. In our view, his Honour’s reasons involve an appropriate consideration of not only the general risk, but also the more specific manifestations of that risk focussed upon by the parties in their addresses. -- 18 of 19 -- [2026] SASCA 14 The Court 17 97 We conclude this analysis of the challenges to the adequacy of the judge’s reasons and reasoning on the issue of the risk of collusion and contamination by emphasising that the judge was not required to address the detail of every aspect of the evidence and submissions at trial. His Honour’s obligation was to provide a rational treatment of all of the significant matters arising in the evidence and submissions, having regard to the way in which the trial was conducted. Approaching the matter in that way, we are not satisfied that the judge’s reasons or reasoning were inadequate. To the contrary, we consider that his Honour addressed the risk of contamination or collusion in a clear and thorough manner that appropriately reflected the forensic contest at trial. To the extent that there was any aspect of the risk of collusion or contamination not addressed by the judge, this was a function of the way in which the case was run, and the forensic focus of the parties. It is not demonstrative of any inadequacy in the judge’s reasons. 98 The complaint the subject of Ground 2 has not been made out. Conclusion 99 We grant permission to appeal, but dismiss the appeal. -- 19 of 19 --