JEREMY NIPPS AS JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATOR OF OLIVE GROVE INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 074 617 075) -v- WATTS [2026] WASC 237

[2026] WASC 237 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CHAMBERS CITATION : NIPPS -v- WATTS [2026] WASC 237 CORAM : LUNDBERG J HEARD : 11 JUNE 2026 DELIVERED : 11 JUNE 2026 FILE NO/S : COR 116 of 2024 BETWEEN : JEREMY NIPPS AS JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATOR OF OLIVE GROVE INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 074 617 075) First Plaintiff THOMAS BIRCH AS JOINT AND SEVERAL LIQUIDATOR OF OLIVE GROVE INVESTMENTS PTY LTD (ACN 074 617 075) Second Plaintiff OLIVE GROVE INVESTMENTS PTY LTD Third Plaintiff AND NORVAL WATTS First Defendant STELLA WATTS Second Defendant -- 1 of 15 -- [2026] WASC 237 Page 2 Catchwords: Corporations - Insolvent trading and related claims brought by liquidators - Settlement deed executed by all parties - Failure to comply with terms of settlement deed - Whether court has power to enforce settlement deed in existing proceeding by way of summary procedure - Matters to which court should have regard in permitting summary procedure - Turns on own facts Legislation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 180, s 181, s 182, s 241, s 588FB to s 588FE, s 588G, s 588M Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 1 r 4A and 4B, O 53 r 2 Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), s 27 Result: Judgement entered for the plaintiffs in terms sought in the interlocutory process. Category: B Representation: Counsel: First Plaintiff : G Nofal Second Plaintiff : G Nofal Third Plaintiff : G Nofal First Defendant : P Shanahan Second Defendant : P Shanahan Solicitors: First Plaintiff : Hall & Wilcox (Perth) Second Plaintiff : Hall & Wilcox (Perth) Third Plaintiff : Hall & Wilcox (Perth) First Defendant : Hammond Legal Second Defendant : Hammond Legal -- 2 of 15 -- [2026] WASC 237 Page 3 Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Bell v Knight 34 Langdon Road Pty Ltd [2022] VSC 497 Chesterton International (WA) Pty Ltd v Interchange Holdings Pty Ltd (WASC, Heenan J, Lib No. 950056, 21 February 1995, unreported) Commonwealth Bank v Mileoak Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 12 Dalmation Nominees Pty Ltd v Marinovich [1998] WASC 354 Dobbs v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 643 Doug Pascoe Investments Pty Ltd v Urban Cube Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] VSC 809 Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 442; (2005) 53 ACSR 732 General Credits (Finance) Pty Ltd v Fenton Lake Pty Ltd [1985] 2 Qd R 6 Hafertepen v Network Ten Pty Limited [2020] FCA 1456 Karingal St Laurence Limited v Nguyen [2026] VSC 85 Nation Energy (Australia) Pty Ltd v Paltar Petroleum Ltd (admins apptd) [2019] FCA 1473 Otto Energy (Tanzania) Pty Ltd v Swala Energy Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 1180 Pittorino v Meynert [2002] WASC 76 Re Australian Academy of Higher Learning Pty Ltd [2026] VSC 201 Re RM Road Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2025] VSC 382 Roberts v Gippsland Agricultural and Earth Moving Contracting Co Pty Ltd [1956] VLR 555 Seachange Management Pty Ltd v Pital Business Pty Ltd [2009] VSCA 139; (2009) 23 VR 396 The Nyamal Palyku Proceeding (No 7) [2023] FCA 528 -- 3 of 15 -- [2026] WASC 237 Page 4 Table of Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 5 The substantive proceedings....................................................................................................... 5 The interlocutory application ..................................................................................................... 6 The settlement of the proceedings .............................................................................................. 6 Relevant principles ..................................................................................................................... 9 Disposition ................................................................................................................................ 12 Conclusion and orders .............................................................................................................. 15 -- 4 of 15 -- [2026] WASC 237 LUNDBERG J Page 5 LUNDBERG J: Introduction 1 These reasons concern the interlocutory application filed by the plaintiff liquidators to enforce a settlement deed, which the plaintiffs allege has been breached by the defendants. By the terms of the settlement deed, the parties compromised the substantive claims brought by the plaintiffs in the proceedings. 2 The defendants have now indicated they do not oppose the interlocutory application. At the hearing on 11 June 2026, I indicated I considered it appropriate to enter judgment, in the terms sought by the plaintiffs. The basis on which judgment should be entered is explained in the following reasons. The substantive proceedings 3 The proceedings were commenced by the plaintiff liquidators, some two winters ago now, seeking relief pursuant to the insolvent trading provisions in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (CA), as well as relief in relation to certain voidable transactions and breaches of statutory duty by the defendants. The defendants were the former directors of the subject company which is Olive Grove Investments Pty Ltd (Olive Grove). In advancing the claims, the plaintiffs relied on s 180, s 181, s 182, s 588FB to s 588FE, s 588G, and s 588M of the CA. 4 The originating process asserted that debts had been incurred by Olive Grove between June 1996 and December 2022, and between December 2022 and June 2023, while the company was insolvent. The debts in these two periods were alleged to amount to $418,449.77 and $36,134.79 respectively. The total amount sought from the first defendant was $454,584.56, while the claim against the second defendant was only in respect of the amount for the first period, being $418,449.77. 5 The parties filed pleadings and the matter proceeded to a formal mediation in April 2025. The court has been informed that, in November 2025, the proceedings were settled by way of a formal deed of settlement. The plaintiffs assert that the defendants have not complied with the terms of that deed. -- 5 of 15 -- [2026] WASC 237 LUNDBERG J Page 6 The interlocutory application 6 So it was that, on 7 May 2026, the plaintiffs filed an interlocutory process (Application) seeking that judgment be entered against the defendants, and for associated orders concerning the subject property which is located not far from Esperance, on Hicks Road in Myrup (the Property), to give effect to the terms of the settlement. 7 The Application is expressed to be brought pursuant to s 241 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (CA), Order 53 r 2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (RSC), and the court's inherent jurisdiction. 8 The Application is supported by the affidavit of Ms Sophie Charlotte Caldwell, which was affirmed on 7 May 2026 (Caldwell Affidavit). Ms Caldwell is a solicitor for the plaintiffs. In her affidavit, Ms Caldwell deposes to the background to these proceedings and has adduced a copy of the executed deed.1 Ms Caldwell deposes to the matters set out below, among other things. No evidence has been filed by the defendants in opposition. The settlement of the proceedings 9 On 28 November 2025, the parties executed a Deed of Settlement and Release (Settlement Deed) which recorded the terms on which the parties agreed to settle the present proceeding. The instrument is a formal, detailed document, prepared by solicitors. 10 By recital J, after setting out the history of the matter and the allegations advanced by the liquidators in the proceeding, the parties confirmed that, without admission of liability, they agreed to 'resolve all matters arising between them in respect of the matters above on the terms appearing in this deed'. 11 By cl 2(b) of the Settlement Deed, the defendants acknowledged that they had obtained independent legal advice in relation to the matters set out in the deed and understood the general nature and effect of the deed and the obligations involved. The defendants also acknowledged that the plaintiffs entered into the deed in reliance upon the defendants having obtained that legal advice. 12 As to the operative terms of the Settlement Deed, by cl 4(a) the defendants agreed to pay to the plaintiffs the sum of $454,584.56 (being the Settlement Sum). Pursuant to cl 4(b) of the Settlement Deed, 1 Caldwell Affidavit, Attachment SCC-1. -- 6 of 15 -- [2026] WASC 237 LUNDBERG J Page 7 payment of the Settlement Sum by the defendants to the plaintiffs was due on the earlier of: (a) on or before 5.00pm on 30 January 2026, or (b) the date of settlement of the Property. 13 By cl 5 of the Settlement Deed, the defendants were obliged to take steps to market, list and sell the Property, with the sale to be completed within 90 days of execution of the Settlement Deed. I understand the sale of the Property was incorporated as the mechanism by which the defendants were to satisfy the Settlement Sum. 14 By cl 6 of the Settlement Deed, as security for the defendants' obligation to pay the Settlement Sum, the defendants granted the liquidators a charge over their interests, rights, and title in the Property. 15 By cl 7 of the Settlement Deed, the parties were to seek an adjournment of the substantive proceedings upon execution of the deed, with the proceedings to be discontinued once the Settlement Sum was paid. In the usual way, a set of consent orders was to be signed in advance by the parties to facilitate this process. Importantly, the agreement reached by the parties allowed for the proceedings to remain on foot until the Settlement Deed was effectuated. 16 Pursuant to cl 8 of the Settlement Deed, if the Settlement Sum was not received by the plaintiffs strictly in accordance with cl 4 of the Settlement Deed, the plaintiffs became entitled to, amongst other things, enforce the security over the Property under cl 6 and, without notice to the defendants, make application to the court to obtain judgment. Specifically, pursuant to cl 8(a)(ii)(A), the liquidators would be entitled to obtain judgment: For the Settlement Sum or the amount unpaid together with interest at the penalty interest rate from the date of execution of the Settlement Deed to judgment and the costs of the application. 17 Further, pursuant to cl 8(a)(ii)(B) to (G), the liquidators would be entitled to enforce judgment in respect of the following matters: (a) The defendants and/or any other occupant(s) are to vacate the Property within 30 days of an order obtained from the court. In the event that the defendants and/or any other occupant(s) of the Property fail to give vacant possession of the Property, a warrant of possession may be issued forthwith. -- 7 of 15 -- [2026] WASC 237 LUNDBERG J Page 8 (b) The first and second plaintiffs are to be appointed as the trustees of the sale of the Property. (c) The defendants are to do all things reasonably necessary to cooperate with the first and second plaintiffs in the sale of the Property, including but not limited to leaving the Property in a neat and tidy condition and delivering the keys to Hall & Wilcox Lawyers within 30 days. (d) The first and second plaintiffs are to do everything necessary or expedient to execute all documents on behalf of the defendants to give effect to the orders of the court as necessary, including any contract of sale, any nomination form or similar document, and any transfer of land. (e) The Property is to be sold and upon completion of the sale, the proceeds of sale are to be applied to pay the costs, commissions and expenses of and incidental to the transfer and sale, to then pay the amount owing to the first registered mortgagee, and then to pay the Settlement Sum to the plaintiffs (together with interest and the costs of the Application). The balance of the money was thereafter to be paid to the defendants. 18 Further, for the purposes of obtaining judgment in accordance with cl 8(a) of the Settlement Deed, it was agreed within the instrument that an affidavit sworn by the plaintiffs' solicitor exhibiting a copy of the Settlement Deed would be 'conclusive evidence' of the defendants' irrevocable consent to judgment in the event of their default in payment of the Settlement Sum. Clause 8(a)(iii) provides as follows: For the purposes of obtaining judgment in accordance with clause 8(a) of this deed, an affidavit sworn by Liquidators' solicitor exhibiting a copy of this deed will be conclusive evidence of the Defendants' irrevocable consent to judgment in the event of their default in payment of the Settlement Sum. 19 This provision in the Settlement Deed is similar in nature to a Dobbs certificate,2 although it is much broader in its effect. It may be noted that a Dobbs certificate is typically directed at dispensing with proof of the quantum of a person's liability. 20 Ms Caldwell deposes that, on 19 December 2025, the first and second plaintiffs held a meeting of creditors of Olive Grove and 2 Dobbs v National Bank of Australasia Ltd (1935) 53 CLR 643. -- 8 of 15 -- [2026] WASC 237 LUNDBERG J Page 9 obtained approval to enter into the Settlement Deed, as required by cl 3 of the Settlement Deed. 21 It appears from the affidavit of Ms Caldwell that the solicitors for the plaintiff liquidators have exchanged several communications (by email and telephone) with the solicitors for the defendants since late January 2026 regarding the failures by the defendants to comply with the terms of the Settlement Deed. Between around 23 March 2026 and the filing of the Application by the plaintiffs, there was more or less 'radio silence' from the defendants. 22 Ms Caldwell deposes that, as at 7 May 2026, the Settlement Sum had not been paid by the defendants in accordance with the Deed and the Settlement Sum remained outstanding. In essence, it was asserted the defendants have defaulted under cl 8 of the Settlement Deed. I am told that remains the case at present. Relevant principles 23 It is well accepted the court has power to enforce the compromise of an action within the action itself, and to do so where appropriate by way of a summary procedure. 24 The power is afforded by, at least, s 24(7) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), but the plaintiffs rely, in the present case, on the wide powers in s 241 CA as well. Section 241 CA gives to the court 'a broad supervisory power to make any orders, and give any directions, that it considers appropriate in relation to proceedings brought or intervened in with leave'.3 The power in s 241 CA has been exercised, for example, to support the dismissal of substantive proceedings to implement a settlement.4 25 There are several established decisions of this court which explain the applicable principles and the approach to be adopted, in respect of an application such as the present one.5 26 Judicial analysis as to whether it is appropriate to enforce judgment in such a circumstance, by way of a summary procedure, often commences by reference to the decision of the Victorian Full Court in Roberts v Gippsland Agricultural and Earth Moving 3 Fiduciary Ltd v Morningstar Research Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 442; (2005) 53 ACSR 732 [15] (Austin J). 4 Nation Energy (Australia) Pty Ltd v Paltar Petroleum Ltd (admins apptd) [2019] FCA 1473 (Stewart J). 5 Chesterton International (WA) Pty Ltd v Interchange Holdings Pty Ltd (WASC, Heenan J, Lib No. 950056, 21 February 1995, unreported); and Dalmation Nominees Pty Ltd v Marinovich [1998] WASC 354 (Murray J) (Dalmation Nominees). See also Pittorino v Meynert [2002] WASC 76 (Scott J). -- 9 of 15 -- [2026] WASC 237 LUNDBERG J Page 10 Contracting Co Pty Ltd.6 The action in that case was for payment of money for work performed for the defendant, which was settled on written terms requiring payment to the plaintiff, which was not made. 27 The Full Court (Lowe, O'Bryan and Smith JJ) concluded the defendant had no answer to the motion for summary judgment and accepted that the court had jurisdiction in 'certain simple cases' to enforce an agreement for the compromise of the action on a motion for judgment in the action itself.7 28 Smith J expressed himself in more circumspect terms than the other members of the court, and undertook a detailed analysis of the principles. His Honour held that the compromise might be enforced within the same action:8 ...notwithstanding the fact that it involves matters extraneous to the action, and notwithstanding that there is a substantial question raised as to the terms or validity or enforceability of the agreement, provided that the Court is clearly satisfied that justice can be done under the summary procedure. At least this is so where all that the Court needs to order for the purpose of enforcing performance upon just terms is a stay of proceedings or a dismissal of the action or some relief claimed in the action. 29 Smith J described the critical question in such applications as whether the court can be satisfied that justice can be done by summary enforcement of a settlement agreement.9 His Honour referred to the need to consider a variety of matters involving questions of degree, including the extent to which extraneous matters are involved, how substantial are the questions to be determined, to what extent questions of credibility are likely to arise, and whether pleadings and discovery may be desirable.10 30 In this court, after referring to Roberts v Gippsland, Murray J in Dalmation Nominees expressed himself as follows as to the proper characterisation of such an application:11 It is right, I think, to regard an application to summarily enforce an agreement to compromise an action as being one akin to an application 6 Roberts v Gippsland Agricultural and Earth Moving Contracting Co Pty Ltd [1956] VLR 555 (Roberts v Gippsland). 7 Roberts v Gippsland (557) (Lowe and O'Bryan JJ), (562) (Smith J). 8 Roberts v Gippsland (564) (Smith J). 9 Roberts v Gippsland (562) (Smith J). 10 Roberts v Gippsland (564) (Smith J). 11 Dalmation Nominees (14). -- 10 of 15 -- [2026] WASC 237 LUNDBERG J Page 11 for summary judgment expressly so made. If the court takes the same approach to both applications, in my opinion, the same position will be reached. It is said of an application for summary judgment that it will not be granted unless it is clear that there is no real question to be tried because the result of the application is the making of a final judgment determining the rights of the parties inter se... And so it will be for the applicant for summary judgment to satisfy the court that the ground exists for the grant of the remedy because there is no question to be tried by which the applicants claim to judgment may be resisted, so that the action may be disposed of summarily, there being no reason that the action should go to trial... (citations omitted) 31 It has been observed that the power to enforce a compromise in this summary manner may well be wider than once was the case.12 In this court, the case management considerations identified in O 1 r 4A and r 4B RSC will be relevant to the court's assessment of a summary enforcement application, including the goal of the elimination of delays, and the objects of promoting the just determination of litigation, disposing efficiently of the business of the court, and the need to maximise the efficient use of available judicial and administrative resources. 32 Whether or not a settlement agreement may be enforced in the proceedings themselves, by way of an interlocutory application, is an issue which was examined by Colvin J in The Nyamal Palyku Proceeding (No 7).13 His Honour accepted that, if the court was satisfied as to the terms of a binding agreement to settle proceedings then it might make orders to give effect to the settlement upon an interlocutory application in the proceedings themselves, referring to Otto Energy (Tanzania) Pty Ltd v Swala Energy Ltd (No 2)14 and Hafertepen v Network Ten Pty Limited.15 There are some additional jurisdictional issues which arise in this context in proceedings in the Federal Court, but the general principles identified by Colvin J are broadly applicable to such applications in this court. 33 Colvin J recognised the court retained a discretion whether to entertain such an interlocutory application and might require separate proceedings to enforce the alleged agreement if the interests of justice required such a course. His Honour also referred with approval to the matters identified by Daly AsJ in Bell v Knight 34 Langdon Road Pty 12 Seachange Management Pty Ltd v Pital Business Pty Ltd [2009] VSCA 139; (2009) 23 VR 396 [40]. 13 The Nyamal Palyku Proceeding (No 7) [2023] FCA 528. 14 Otto Energy (Tanzania) Pty Ltd v Swala Energy Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 1180 [13]‑[14] (McKerracher J). 15 Hafertepen v Network Ten Pty Limited [2020] FCA 1456 [46]‑[56] (Katzmann J). -- 11 of 15 -- [2026] WASC 237 LUNDBERG J Page 12 Ltd16 as being matters which may be relevant to whether justice can be done by enforcing a settlement agreement without separate proceedings. Those matters are: (a) whether the settlement agreement concerned included a term allowing the reinstatement of the proceeding and the entry of judgment upon default; (b) whether all interested parties were before the court; whether the facts were uncontested and/or whether there was any dispute about quantum, and, to the extent there were such disputes, whether the resolution of those disputes turned upon the credibility of witnesses; (c) whether requiring the issue of a new proceeding would cause further delay and expense; and (d) whether there has been any unexplained delay on the part of the applicant for summary enforcement in seeking relief. (footnotes omitted) Disposition 34 The plaintiffs submit the court should proceed to enter judgment and make orders in accordance with the terms of the Settlement Deed executed by the parties. The plaintiffs say this is an appropriate case to follow that course. 35 I respectfully agree. 36 The enforcement sought in the present circumstances presents as being an entirely appropriate vehicle for summary enforcement, within the present proceedings. It is consistent with the justice of the case that the plaintiffs be permitted to enter judgment on the terms agreed in the Settlement Deed. I adopt that view for the following reasons, and having regard to the principles set out at [23] to [33] above. 37 First, the compromise in this case was effected by way of an executed settlement deed. The terms of the compromise are clearly set out within the formal instrument signed by the parties. The fact the instrument was prepared and executed as a deed is not without significance. 38 Second, the preconditions to the enforcement of the Settlement Deed have been satisfied. 16 Bell v Knight 34 Langdon Road Pty Ltd [2022] VSC 497 [57]. -- 12 of 15 -- [2026] WASC 237 LUNDBERG J Page 13 39 Third, the matters which are the subject of the Settlement Deed concern the payment of money by the defendants. These are matters which fall within the compass of the substantive proceedings themselves, and are not extraneous thereto, although were that to be so, it would not necessarily be disentitling. That is a factor to consider.17 40 I am conscious the Settlement Deed, and the proposed terms of judgment, deal with the sale of the defendants' property in order to fund the payment of the Settlement Sum. That Property does not form part of the subject matter of the proceedings. There are certainly authorities which support the position that, where the agreement deals with property as to which no question was raised in the primary suit, the court would ordinarily leave the party to proceed to enforcement by separate action. See, for example, the observations of Matthews J in Re RM Road Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2).18 41 The inclusion of a regime by which the Property is to be sold is intended in this case to facilitate payment of the judgment sum. It is part of the mechanism by which the parties agreed to facilitate payment. That is the basis on which cl 5, cl 6 and cl 8 of the Settlement Deed have been drafted. In any event, the defendants raise no objection in this regard. 42 Fourth, the Settlement Deed expressly allows the plaintiff liquidators to make application to this court to enforce the compromise in the event there is a failure to comply with its terms. I refer to cl 8(a)(i) and (ii). The Settlement Deed contemplated and addressed this eventuality. The settlement reached by the parties allowed for the proceedings to be adjourned pending payment of the Settlement Sum, with the proceeding to be discontinued only following payment. It is tolerably clear that the parties contemplated that, should there be a failure to comply with the Settlement Deed, the plaintiff liquidators would be permitted to return to the court on an interlocutory application to enforce its terms. 43 Fifth, there has been no suggestion from the defendants that the validity or enforceability of the Settlement Deed will be challenged on any grounds. 17 Dalmation Nominees (14) (Murray J), referring to General Credits (Finance) Pty Ltd v Fenton Lake Pty Ltd [1985] 2 Qd R 6, 10 (McPherson J). 18 Re RM Road Services Pty Ltd (in liq) (No 2) [2025] VSC 382 (Matthews J). See also, more recently, Doug Pascoe Investments Pty Ltd v Urban Cube Pty Ltd (No 2) [2025] VSC 809 (Matthews J) (Doug Pascoe Investments). -- 13 of 15 -- [2026] WASC 237 LUNDBERG J Page 14 44 Sixth, the material before the court does not indicate that any contested factual issues require consideration as a necessary part of the plaintiffs' enforcement application. 45 Seventh, the court can infer that the commencement of fresh proceedings by the liquidators, involving a full trial to enforce the agreement, would cause additional expense to be incurred and result in delay. The process of the liquidation of Olive Grove would not be best served by such a requirement. It has not been suggested that pleadings or discovery would be required to enable the plaintiffs to enforce the agreement, or for the defendants to resist it. 46 Eighth, I refer to the 'conclusive evidence' provision in the Settlement Deed. The provision embodies an agreement between the parties which permits the liquidators' solicitor to exhibit a copy of the Settlement Deed to an affidavit, and rely on that affidavit as conclusive evidence of the defendants' 'irrevocable consent to judgment', in the event there is a default. 47 Following a query from the court as to the effectiveness of such a clause, counsel for the plaintiffs referred the court to Commonwealth Bank v Mileoak Pty Ltd19 and Doug Pascoe Investments.20 These authorities refer to such clauses as being typical or common, and support the effectiveness and utility of such contractual provisions.21 48 There is considerable force in the views respectively expressed by Mandie J and Matthews J in the authorities to which I have just referred. In general terms, and consistent with orthodox contractual principles, I can see good reason for the court to permit a party to rely on such provisions, in aid of an enforcement application. 49 Ninth, the parties to the proceeding are all named as parties to the Settlement Deed, and there are no additional parties identified in the instrument. 50 Tenth, there are no other discretionary factors which weigh against the grant of summary judgment in this case, and certainly there can be no suggestion of delay, given the matters deposed to by Ms Caldwell. 19 Commonwealth Bank v Mileoak Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 12 [7] (Mandie J). 20 Doug Pascoe Investments [100], [104] – [106] (Matthews J). 21 Examples of such certificates, as an evidentiary assisting provision in a settlement instrument, can be seen in Karingal St Laurence Limited v Nguyen [2026] VSC 85 (Fary AsJ) and Re Australian Academy of Higher Learning Pty Ltd [2026] VSC 201 (Fary AsJ). -- 14 of 15 -- [2026] WASC 237 LUNDBERG J Page 15 Conclusion and orders 51 I will accordingly make orders in terms of the plaintiff's Application, including to enter judgment for the plaintiffs against the defendants in the sum of $454,584.56, together with orders as to interest and costs as explained at the hearing, and for the sale of the Property. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. LM Associate to the Honourable Justice Lundberg 11 JUNE 2026 -- 15 of 15 --