ASHLEY JOHN MCGREGOR v THE KING (STATE) [2026] SASCA 20

On Appeal from DISTRICT COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (HIS HONOUR JUDGE MUSCAT) DCCRM-23-027310 Appellant: ASHLEY JOHN MCGREGOR Counsel: MR A CULSHAW - Solicitor: WILLIAMS BARRISTERS AND SOLICITORS Respondent: THE KING (STATE) Counsel: MR M HINTON KC WITH MS E CATTRALL - Solicitor: DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) Hearing Date/s: 16/09/2025 File No/s: SCCRM-25-015295 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Court of Appeal: Criminal) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. MCGREGOR v THE KING [2026] SASCA 20 Judgment of the Court of Appeal (The Honourable Justice S Doyle, the Honourable Justice David and the Honourable Justice Stanley) 12 March 2026 APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - RIGHT OF APPEAL - WHEN APPEAL LIES - ERROR OF LAW - PARTICULAR CASES INVOLVING ERROR OF LAW - FAILURE TO GIVE REASONS FOR DECISION - ADEQUACY OF REASONS CRIMINAL LAW - EVIDENCE - MATTERS RELATING TO PROOF - STANDARD OF PROOF - CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE - REASONABLE HYPOTHESIS CONSISTENT WITH INNOCENCE CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE - DISMISSAL OF APPEAL WHERE NO SUBSTANTIAL MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE This is an application for permission to appeal against conviction. The applicant, Ashley John McGregor, sought permission to appeal against his conviction for manslaughter following a trial by judge alone. The deceased, Alvin, was the three-week-old son of the applicant and his then partner, Rebecca Denton. At trial, it was not in dispute that Alvin died as a result of an unlawful and dangerous act which caused fatal injuries. The issue instead was whether those fatal injuries were inflicted by the applicant, or by Ms Denton. Each had a window of opportunity. The sole ground of appeal alleged a miscarriage of justice arising from inadequate reasoning, and/or an erroneous approach by the trial judge to the assessment of the evidence, particularly in dealing with the competing hypotheses as to whether the applicant or Ms Denton inflicted the fatal injuries. -- 1 of 23 -- Held, per the Court, refusing permission to appeal and dismissing the appeal: 1. The trial judge’s reasoning was adequate. His Honour identified the issues in dispute, considered the expert evidence as to the cause and timing of the fatal injuries, and considered those findings against the opportunities available to the applicant and Ms Denton. 2. The trial judge was entitled to accept parts of Ms Denton’s evidence and reject other parts. Although his Honour identified criticisms affecting her credibility and reliability, he explained why he nevertheless accepted her evidence on certain matters, including that she had not harmed Alvin. 3. It was open to the trial judge, on the combined force of the circumstantial evidence, to find that the fatal injuries were inflicted during the applicant’s window of opportunity and to exclude the competing hypothesis. 4. In a circumstantial case, the evidence must be considered as a whole. The applicant’s criticisms isolated individual findings, whereas the trial judge adequately explained the inferences drawn from the combined force of the evidence and why the alternative hypothesis was excluded as being reasonably possible. 5. The applicant failed to establish any error or irregularity that was material in the sense that it could realistically have affected the trial judge’s reasoning to the verdict. 6. Accordingly, no miscarriage of justice was established. Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 158(1)(c); Juries Act 1927 (SA) s 7, referred to. Bowen (a pseudonym) v The King [2025] SASCA 36; Brawn v The King (2025) ALJR 872; R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22, discussed. Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651; Da Silva v The Queen (2019) 268 CLR 57; Donald v The King [2024] SASCA 121; Douglass v The Queen (2012) 86 ALJR 1086; Fleming v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 250; JGS v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 48; Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705; Pell v The Queen (2020) 268 CLR 123; Pham v The King [2025] SASCA 94; Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642; R v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618; R v Sexton [2018] SASCFC 28; Trussell v The King (2023) 142 SASR 337, considered. -- 2 of 23 -- MCGREGOR v THE KING [2026] SASCA 20 Court of Appeal – Criminal: S Doyle, David and Stanley JJA THE COURT: Introduction 1 The applicant, Ashley John McGregor, seeks permission to appeal against his conviction for manslaughter1 following a trial by judge alone.2 The applicant was also convicted of the offence of criminal neglect.3 At the commencement of the hearing of the application for permission to appeal the applicant abandoned the appeal against the conviction for criminal neglect. The sole ground of appeal complains of the inadequacy of reasoning, and/or an otherwise erroneous approach by the trial judge to the assessment of the evidence.4 The deceased, Alvin, was the three-week old son of the applicant and his then partner Rebecca Denton. 2 The prosecution case was that the applicant, while forcefully holding Alvin around the chest, shook or threw Alvin, striking his head against a hard and uneven surface, and in doing so, caused trauma to his brain (the fatal injuries);5 and that Alvin’s condition worsened over the period of about 36 hours that followed until his death. On the prosecution case, which was accepted by the trial judge, the applicant committed manslaughter by an overt act of violence that caused Alvin’s fatal injuries. The ground of appeal 3 The application for permission to appeal is made on the following ground: Noting that this was a case where the parties’ cases were that only the appellant or the witness Denton had the opportunity to inflict the fatal injuries, and that each had only a short window of opportunity to do so: 1. There was a miscarriage of justice occasioned by the inadequacy of the learned trial judge’s reasoning and/or treatment of the evidence of events between those two windows. In particular: a. The finding that it was “unlikely” (Reasons [558.20]) or “very surprising” (Reasons [558.30]) that the deceased infant would settle after the application of an ice pack for about 10 minute was speculative and not based in the evidence. 1 Count 1 2 Juries Act 1927 (SA) s 7. 3 Count 2. 4 AB 4. 5 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [26], AB 61. -- 3 of 23 -- [2026] SASCA 20 The Court 2 b. The evidence that a baby would respond to the application of ice (Reasons [558.23]) was of limited assistance in circumstances where on the prosecution case, ice had been applied for several minutes prior to Denton’s observations. c. The finding that the deceased infant was asleep, drowsy or “sooky” was, standing alone, at least equivocal. To say it “suggested that” the deceased infant had sustained the fatal head injuries overstated the available conclusion (Reasons [558.30]). d. To the extent that the trial judge’s verdicts were based on an acceptance of Denton’s evidence that she did not harm the deceased infant (Reasons [530], [554.3], [558.1]), there is no or no adequate explanation for why his Honour accepted that evidence in the face of warnings (Reasons [435]-[436]) and adverse credit (Reasons [502], [513], [523] and reliability (Reasons [446], [492]) findings. e. There is an imbalance between the treatment of the possibility of a momentary loss of control on the part of Denton (Reasons [554.4.22]) viz a vis the appellant (Reasons [558.36]). f. The crucial paragraph [558] of the Reasons largely recounts uncontroversial but inconclusive matters, or flawed reasoning as described in the other particulars, up to the dispositive bullet point [558.32]. No, or no adequate, reasoning process was exposed in expressing the ultimate conclusion (Reasons [558.32]). g. These particulars relate to the application for permission to appeal the conviction on count 2 which has been abandoned. The issues 4 The application raises the following questions for determination: (i) Did the trial judge adequately deal with the two conflicting hypotheses of the identity of the person who caused the fatal injuries to Alvin? (ii) If the trial judge’s reasoning was inadequate and thereby amounted to an error or irregularity in making certain factual findings, did that amount to a miscarriage of justice? 5 For the reasons that follow, we are satisfied the trial judge’s reasoning was adequate and accordingly no miscarriage of justice was occasioned. Inadequate reasoning: the principles 6 It is well settled that a judge is required to give reasons for verdict following a trial by judge alone; reasons which are sufficient to identify the principles of law applied by the judge and the main factual findings on which the judge relied.6 However, the obligation to give reasons demands more than a bare statement of the principles of law that the judge has applied and the findings of fact that the 6 Douglass v The Queen (2012) 86 ALJR 1086 at [14]. -- 4 of 23 -- [2026] SASCA 20 The Court 3 judge has made. Rather, there must be exposed the reasoning process linking them and justifying the latter and, ultimately, the verdict that is reached.7 7 It is also well settled that there is a distinction between a complaint of inadequate reasons and a complaint of inadequate reasoning, and that care must be taken not to conflate the two concepts.8 In Bowen (a pseudonym) v The King9 the Court of Appeal explained the principles relevant to an appeal on the ground of inadequate reasoning as follows:10 Properly understood, a complaint of inadequate reasons addresses the sufficiency of the judge’s exposition of his or her reasoning process. It involves a complaint that the judge’s reasoning is insufficient, or deficient, for some reason; for example, because it does not sufficiently address the issues of fact and law raised by the evidence and relied upon by the parties, or does not sufficiently expose the judge’s reasons for reaching the conclusions reached. A complaint of inadequate reasoning, on the other hand, addresses the soundness of the judge’s reasoning process. It involves a complaint that the reasoning exposed by the judge is unsound, or defective, for some reason; for example, because it involves some misdescription or misunderstanding of the evidence, or is otherwise misconceived or lacking in logic or common sense. … When making a complaint of inadequate reasoning said to involve a miscarriage of justice, it is not sufficient merely to undertake a general critique of the detail of the judge’s reasons. Nor is it sufficient merely to establish that a particular conclusion or aspect of the reasoning is unsound. It will be necessary to address the significance of the particular aspect of the judge’s reasoning in the context of the reasons as a whole, and to establish that the unsound or defective reasoning was sufficiently fundamental, or material to the outcome, to result in a miscarriage of justice. It will be necessary to establish that the unsound or defective reasoning had a realistic capacity to affect the verdict. Success in establishing this to be the case will, subject to any application of the proviso, ordinarily result in an order for a retrial. [citation omitted]. 8 Subsequently, the High Court in Brawn v The King11 said: … where it has been shown that there was error or irregularity in a criminal trial, such as the breach of the prosecution’s duty of disclosure that occurred in this case, then to establish a miscarriage of justice it must be shown that the error or irregularity was material in the sense that the error or irregularity could realistically have affected the reasoning of the jury to its verdict… 9 The applicant complains of a miscarriage of justice occasioned by inadequate reasoning, or a complaint that the trial judge’s reasons, although apparent, do not 7 Fleming v The Queen (1998) 197 CLR 250 at [28]. 8 Trussell v The King (2023) 142 SASR 337 at [117]; JGS v The Queen [2020] SASCFC 48 at [205]; R v Sexton [2018] SASCFC 28 at [177]. 9 [2025] SASCA 36. 10 Bowen (a pseudonym) v The King [2025] SASCA 36 at [33] and [38]. 11 [2025] HCA 20 at [3], (2025) ALJR 872 at 874. -- 5 of 23 -- [2026] SASCA 20 The Court 4 rationally support the verdict returned. As we understand the applicant’s argument, he is pursuing a ground that the trial judge’s reasoning was inadequate. 10 In order to establish a miscarriage of justice within the meaning of s 158(1)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) it must be shown that an error or irregularity was material in the sense that the error or irregularity could realistically have affected the reasoning of the trial judge to his verdict.12 When a complaint is made of inadequate reasoning, it is necessary to consider the reasoning in the context of the reasons as a whole, and to establish that any unsound or defective reasoning was sufficiently fundamental, or material to the outcome, to result in a miscarriage of justice. This Court has recently emphasized that a high bar must be overcome to reach a conclusion of inadequate reasoning.13 11 When assessing the adequacy of the trial judge’s reasoning in this matter, the central facts in issue must be kept in mind. The primary issue at trial was whether it was the applicant or Ms Denton who caused the fatal injuries. There was no dispute that Alvin died as a result of an unlawful and dangerous act. The case against the applicant was circumstantial.14 12 In a circumstantial case, all of the circumstances established by the evidence are to be considered and weighed in deciding whether every reasonable possibility open on the evidence, consistent with innocence, has been excluded. Neither at trial, nor on appeal, is a circumstantial case to be considered piecemeal.15 Overview 13 The applicant did not give or call evidence at trial. His account was found in three police interviews led by the prosecution in which he denied causing the fatal injuries to Alvin. 14 Ms Denton gave evidence in which she denied causing the fatal injuries. 15 Where there are two conflicting accounts, a finder of fact cannot reason to guilt simply by preferring one account over the other, and if there is a risk of doing so, they must direct against this accordingly.16 16 Counsel for the applicant outlined the issues in contention at the commencement of the trial.17 With respect to the charge of manslaughter on count 1, there was a dispute whether the evidence established that the applicant had committed an unlawful and dangerous act causing the fatal injuries. 12 Brawn v The King (2025) 99 ALJR 872 at [11]. 13 Donald v The King [2024] SASCA 121 at [80]; Pham v The King [2025] SASCA 94 at [16]. 14 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [402]-[406], AB 74. 15 R v Hillier (2007) 228 CLR 618 at [46]-[48]; see also, Dansie v The Queen (2022) 274 CLR 651 at [12]. However the ground of appeal in those matters was that the verdict was unsafe and unsatisfactory, the principles applicable to a circumstantial case must always be kept in mind. 16 Da Silva v The Queen (2019) 268 CLR 57 at [11]. 17 T 23-26. -- 6 of 23 -- [2026] SASCA 20 The Court 5 17 By the conclusion of the trial, the issues had narrowed significantly.18 18 It was not disputed that Alvin had died in the way opined by the medical experts and that the person who inflicted the fatal injuries would be guilty of manslaughter. The sole issue was whether the applicant was that person. 19 Alvin died in the early hours of 23 April 2021. The cause of death was attributed to blunt cranio-cerebral trauma, involving rotational or angular forces of the head with or without impact.19 20 There was no dispute at trial that he had suffered the fatal injuries on 21 April 2021 that caused his death. Nor was there any dispute that the fatal injuries were the result of a deliberate infliction of force, most likely by shaking or throwing. For most of 21 April 2021 both the applicant and Ms Denton were home with Alvin. However, for each of them, there was a window of time during which they had the opportunity to inflict the fatal injuries. Summary of the key evidence 21 Alvin was born on 2 April 2021. He remained in hospital until 5 April 2021 for tests. From when he was discharged, until 21 April 2021, he was a generally healthy baby.20 He lived with his parents, the applicant and Ms Denton, and Ms Denton’s 11-year old son from an earlier relationship, Blake. Alvin slept in a bassinet in the lounge room. Ms Denton and the applicant would take turns sleeping on the couch in the lounge room with Alvin while the other slept in the bedroom so that they were not both tired all the time.21 22 On 21 April 2021, Blake was staying with his maternal grandmother and was excluded from having caused the fatal injuries.22 The events of 21 April 2021 (i) At about 10:30 a.m. Ms Denton left the house to go shopping with her stepmother, Sheryl Bickley. Alvin was in the sole care of the applicant while Ms Denton was out. (ii) At about 10:30 a.m. the applicant attempted to call Ms Denton, but was unsuccessful. (iii) At about 10:31 a.m. the applicant called Ms Denton again; that call lasted for 9 seconds. (iv) At about 11:55 a.m. there was a text message exchange between Ms Denton and the applicant. Ms Denton told the applicant she was 18 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [413], AB 132. 19 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [20], AB 60. 20 Exhibit P19, Agreed Facts 3-14, specifically Agreed Fact 8. 21 T 73. 22 T 86-87. -- 7 of 23 -- [2026] SASCA 20 The Court 6 having coffee with Ms Bickley, after which she would drop Ms Bickley at her place of residence and then come home. (v) At 12:08 p.m. the applicant texted a reply “awesome baby xoxoxoxox”.23 (vi) At 12:14 p.m. Ms Denton received a phone call from the applicant in which he stated he had tripped over the dog and accidentally knocked the bassinet on its side, causing Alvin to fall out. Ms Denton could hear Alvin crying hysterically. Ms Denton said she asked the applicant whether they needed to take Alvin to the hospital and he said no, and to see how he was when she returned.24 Ms Denton and Ms Bickley immediately returned to the house shared by the applicant and Ms Denton. The applicant was holding Alvin who was asleep. The applicant had an ice pack on Alvin’s top lip. The ice pack was wrapped in a tea towel.25 The applicant was crying. He said he wished he grabbed something else.26 He said that the bassinet had tipped over. Alvin fell out of the bassinet and hit his face on a music box that hung in the bassinet.27 (vii) When Ms Denton took Alvin from the applicant she saw a little cut underneath Alvin’s top lip. Alvin did not wake up. The ice pack was cold. She could not remember whether she had taken the ice pack off Alvin and put it back on.28 (viii) The applicant told Ms Denton that he and the dog had gotten off the couch at the same time, causing him to trip over the dog. He said he grabbed onto the bassinet which tipped over, Alvin fell out and hit his face on the music box which was inside the bassinet.29 In fact, Alvin had suffered a cut to his frenulum, the piece of tissue inside the mouth which connects the top lip to the gum.30 There was a conversation about whether to take Alvin to a doctor, but since he had calmed down, Ms Denton and the applicant decided to monitor him.31 (ix) Later in the afternoon the applicant went to the chemist and purchased children’s Panadol. The purchase was made at 3:50 p.m.32 23 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [80]-[86], AB 74. 24 T 88. 25 The evidence differs on whether the ice pack was wrapped in a Tea Towel, or a Chux wipe. 26 T 90-91. 27 T 91. 28 T 94. 29 T 88-91. 30 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [287], [340]-[341], AB 101,120. 31 T 94. 32 Exhibit P19, Agreed Fact 22. -- 8 of 23 -- [2026] SASCA 20 The Court 7 (x) Alvin was in the sole care of Ms Denton while the applicant left the house to purchase Panadol. (xi) Ms Denton gave evidence that the applicant wanted to purchase the Panadol because Alvin was having difficulty feeding. However, in cross-examination, Ms Denton agreed that she may have been mistaken about that because the book in which they recorded Alvin’s feeding schedule had an entry that the first feed after the bassinet incident was 4:30 p.m.33 (xii) At about 4:30 p.m. Alvin was given a dose of Panadol.34 (xiii) The evidence at trial was that from the afternoon of 21 April 2021, Alvin was, for the most part, asleep or drowsy.35 (xiv) A forensic paediatrician, Dr Edwards, gave evidence that Alvin’s behaviour at this point was consistent with him having sustained a head injury. (xv) In the evening of 21 April 2021 the applicant and Ms Denton bathed Alvin. He did not wake at all during the bath. Photographs of Alvin in the bath were tendered and Dr Edwards gave evidence as to his presentation. Dr Edwards said that Alvin’s stretched position was indicative that the brain injury had already occurred prior to that time. (xvi) Ms Denton gave evidence that on 22 April 2021 Alvin seemed “a bit extra clingy”. He would cry when she put him in his bassinet and would only stop when she picked him up.36 At one point that afternoon an attempt was made to feed Alvin using the syringe that had come with the Panadol as he was not latching onto the bottle. The feeding book recorded this as occurring between 1:00 and 1:20 p.m. Dr Edwards gave evidence that the loss of the ability to latch is something that forms part of a brain injury presentation.37 (xvii) Ms Denton said, at about 10 to 15 minutes after the syringe feed, that the applicant suggested she blow cannabis smoke into Alvin’s face when she next smoked. He suggested this as he considered that Alvin’s feeding issues might have been due to withdrawal from cannabis as Ms Denton consumed it while pregnant. She gave evidence that she did so.38 33 T 174-175. 34 T 106, 239. 35 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [605], AB 178-179. 36 T 102. 37 T 525-526. 38 T 127, 192-194. -- 9 of 23 -- [2026] SASCA 20 The Court 8 (xviii) Alvin did not feed after 4:30 p.m. on Thursday, 22 April 2021. Ms Denton gave evidence that he would not take the bottle when she tried to feed him at 8:30 p.m., and she forgot to set her alarm for his 12:00 a.m. feed.39 (xix) At around 6:30 a.m. on 23 April 2021, Ms Denton woke and found Alvin cold and unresponsive. After trying unsuccessfully to wake him, she took him into the bedroom where the applicant attempted CPR using two fingers. They rushed him to the Noarlunga Hospital where he was pronounced dead.40 (xx) Alvin’s cause of death was attributed to a head injury.41 There were fractures on his ribs consistent with chest encirclement, and bruises to the scalp consistent with having been struck on an object.42 He also had an apparent bruise and abrasion to the right side of his lip, a torn frenulum, an apparent bruise on his left cheek and a bruise on his back. While the bassinet incident may have accounted for the bruising to Alvin’s face and lip, it could not have accounted for the rib fractures, brain injury or bruising to the scalp.43 23 Ms Denton gave evidence that she was never violent with Alvin and did not inflict any injuries on him.44 The prosecution case 24 As we have said, it was the prosecution case that on 21 April 2021, while Ms Denton was away from the house, the applicant shook or threw Alvin, causing fatal injuries, following which Alvin continued to deteriorate until he died on 23 April 2021. The defence case 25 It was the defence case that it could not be excluded as a reasonable possibility that Ms Denton had caused the fatal injuries when she was alone with Alvin in the afternoon of 21 April 2021. 26 Ms Denton pleaded guilty to a charge of criminal neglect on the basis of her failure to seek medical attention for Alvin. She was sentenced prior to trial. The applicant submitted that he and Ms Denton both had the opportunity to inflict what proved to be the fatal injuries on 21 April 2021. The window of opportunity for each was brief. For Ms Denton it was when the applicant went to the chemist to buy Panadol. For the applicant it was between the conclusion of the 12:14 p.m. phone call and Ms Denton’s return home. The timing could be limited in that way 39 T 123. 40 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [17], AB 59. 41 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [20], AB 60. 42 T 349, 390, 396-397, 492. 43 T 501, 515, 520. 44 T 148. -- 10 of 23 -- [2026] SASCA 20 The Court 9 because the expert evidence was that Alvin’s hysterical crying, which could be heard during the phone call at 12:14 p.m., was inconsistent with him having suffered the fatal injuries by that stage.45 Other witnesses 27 Ms Bickley gave evidence that the applicant called Ms Denton at about 11:00 a.m on 21 April 2021.46 In cross-examination she considered that it was possible the call occurred at around the agreed time of 12:14 p.m. Ms Bickley said that after that call was terminated, Ms Denton said to her, “We have to go. Ashley’s dropped the baby”.47 This was inconsistent with the statement given immediately after Alvin’s death.48 Ms Bickley said that when they arrived at the house the applicant was holding Alvin who appeared asleep. The applicant was crying and saying he tripped over the dog and said, “I’ve got him calmed down now”.49 In cross-examination Ms Bickley was confronted with an earlier statement in which she had said that Alvin was “awake but drowsy”, and going back to sleep.50 She agreed she made the statement and agreed that was in fact what she saw. However, later in cross-examination she reverted to her earlier evidence that Alvin was asleep.51 Ms Bickley said that the applicant handed Alvin to Ms Denton, and that apart from a cut on his lip, there was no other visible injury. Ms Bickley did not notice the applicant holding anything except Alvin, and said nothing was being done about the cut on Alvin’s lip when the applicant was holding him. She did not give any evidence about the ice pack.52 28 Dr Edwards gave evidence that a failure to respond to the application of ice would cause her to be “concerned about whether that baby had an altered level of consciousness”.53 The applicant’s interviews 29 As we have said, three interviews were conducted with the applicant. The first two were within hours of Alvin being pronounced deceased on 23 April 2021. The third was conducted on 7 May 2021. The content of the interviews were summarised by the trial judge.54 30 Over the course of the interviews conducted with the applicant he described the bassinet incident and the injury to Alvin’s lip. He said that Alvin cried for about 10 minutes. Alvin’s cry was hysterical at first, but once he applied ice it became a “sooky” cry. He thought the ice had settled Alvin. He said he wet a 45 T 523-524. 46 T 263-264. 47 T 254. 48 T 265. 49 T 256-257. 50 T 267. 51 T 269. 52 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [558], AB 165. 53 T 522. 54 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [329]-[331], AB 107-119. -- 11 of 23 -- [2026] SASCA 20 The Court 10 clear blue Chux cloth and applied the ice pack. He later described this as him grabbing “an ice thing, wrapped the cloth around it”. He said when Ms Denton arrived home Alvin was “sooky” but awake.55 In a subsequent interview he denied shaking Alvin, after this was put to him. He also denied that he had become frustrated with Alvin when he cried after the bassinet incident.56 Trial judge’s reasoning 31 The applicant submits that the reasoning of the trial judge on count 1 was that the prosecution excluded as a reasonable possibility that Ms Denton inflicted the fatal injuries on Alvin, and that instead it was proven beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant did so.57 Crucially, the trial judge held that this critical finding of fact was based on the combination of the inferences to be drawn from evidence set out by the trial judge58 which satisfied him beyond a reasonable doubt that the applicant inflicted the fatal injuries. 32 The applicant submits that the trial judge’s reasoning is flawed. He submits that much of the evidence referred to is neutral as between the competing hypotheses of the applicant being the assailant, or Ms Denton being the assailant. While the reasons must be read as a whole, the applicant submits that on a proper analysis the trial judge primarily relied on three points to justify his ultimate finding of guilt on count 1, namely: (i) An acceptance of relevant aspects of Ms Denton’s evidence which, on the applicant’s case, was unreasoned or not adequately reasoned, in light of warnings and criticisms that appeared elsewhere in the reasons but which were not referred to in the assessment of Ms Denton’s evidence on the central issues in dispute; (ii) An acceptance of the inference to be drawn from Alvin not overtly reacting to the application of ice as being an indication that Alvin was already experiencing an altered level of consciousness at that point in time, the significance of which, on the applicant’s case, overstated the effect of the evidence; and (iii) An acceptance that Alvin was sleepy or drowsy between Ms Denton’s arrival home and the applicant leaving for the chemist. On the applicant’s case, the totality of this evidence demonstrated that these observations, if accepted, were as consistent with Alvin’s usual disposition as they were with the symptoms of a concussion. 33 The applicant submits that the trial judge placed “no little weight” on the evidence of Alvin’s reaction to the ice pack placed on his lip, in finding that, by the time Ms Denton returned home from the shops, Alvin had suffered the fatal 55 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [325]-[335], AB 107-117. 56 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [331], AB 117-119. 57 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [555]-[558], AB 163-171. 58 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [558], AB 164-171. -- 12 of 23 -- [2026] SASCA 20 The Court 11 injuries. The references to the ice pack in the evidence amounted to two findings by the trial judge: first, that it was unlikely that Alvin had settled between the 12:14 p.m. phone call and Ms Denton’s arrival home by reason of the application of ice only; and second, that Alvin’s failure to react to the application of ice was demonstrative of an altered level of consciousness at that time. The applicant submits that neither finding was supported by the evidence. Moreover, the applicant submits the former was a speculative finding that was not the “subject of evidence” while the latter required a closer consideration of the relevant evidence. 34 The trial judge relied on the following steps in reasoning to the verdict of guilty on the charge of manslaughter: (i) The trial judge identified the issues in dispute.59 In doing so, he accepted the opinion of Dr Edwards that the fatal injuries were not caused by the bassinet tipping over, and the opinion of the forensic pathologist, Dr Langlois, that the cause of Alvin’s death was from a deliberate act of shaking or throwing, with impact onto an uneven surface, resulting in the infliction of a head injury. (ii) The trial judge considered the timing of the infliction of the rib fractures and head injuries suffered by Alvin and found that the fatal injuries were inflicted between 12:15 p.m. and 8:55 p.m. on 21 April 2021. (iii) The trial judge considered the opportunities available for Ms Denton and the applicant to have caused the fatal injuries. He found that neither witnessed the other inflict the fatal injuries. The two windows of opportunity therefore were between 12:15 p.m. and 12:25 p.m., the time between the conclusion of the call with Ms Denton and when she returned home, and for about 15 minutes around 3:50 p.m. when the applicant left the house to purchase Panadol. (iv) The trial judge assessed the evidence of Ms Denton, and the explanations given by the applicant in his police interviews, having regard to the criticisms made by each party and giving himself the appropriate warnings and directions about the evidence.60 (v) The trial judge excluded as a reasonable possibility that Ms Denton inflicted the fatal injuries. In doing so the trial judge explained the basis for this conclusion.61 (vi) Having excluded Ms Denton as having inflicted the fatal injuries, the trial judge went on to consider whether it had been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant inflicted the fatal injuries. He found that the fatal injuries were inflicted by the applicant some time after he 59 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [397]-[417], AB 130-133. 60 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [430]-[551], AB 139-159. 61 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [554], AB 160-163. -- 13 of 23 -- [2026] SASCA 20 The Court 12 finished his telephone call with Ms Denton at 12:15 p.m. and before Ms Denton returned home at 12:25 p.m. on 21 April, and in doing so explained the basis for this conclusion.62 35 As the trial judge explained, the combined force of the inferences to be drawn from the whole of the evidence that he set out excluded any alternative hypotheses as being a reasonable possibility.63 36 However, the applicant submits that the evidence instead supports the proposition that Alvin was a quiet and sleepy baby. He submits the nature of Alvin being a quiet and sleepy baby undermines the forensic significance of the observations made of Alvin’s condition after Ms Denton and Ms Bickley returned home. Further, he submits the trial judge’s reasons overstate the effect of Dr Edwards’ evidence without taking the necessary intermediate step of determining whether Ms Denton and/or Ms Bickley’s evidence as to Alvin’s behaviour was accepted. The applicant criticised the trial judge for taking the step from a finding that Alvin’s behaviour was consistent with an extant concussion, to being suggestive of that conclusion and therefore the applicant’s guilt, without any reasoning process that considered alternative hypotheses. Accordingly, the applicant submits that the reasoning process on the central planks to the finding of guilt in particulars (a), (b) and (c) of ground 1 was inadequate.64 37 We do not accept this submission. Particulars (a), (b), and (c) 38 Particulars (a), (b) and (c) deal with the trial judge’s conclusions or findings on three discrete points. Particulars (a) and (b) are complaints that the trial judge’s findings as to the inferences to be drawn from the “ice pack evidence” were not supported by the evidence. Particular (c) is a complaint that the trial judge’s reasoning when making findings about Alvin’s drowsy or “sooky” presentation after the bassinet incident was inadequate. 39 The evidence in this matter cannot be considered piecemeal or in isolation. The Court must consider the judgment as a whole when determining whether the trial judge appropriately reasoned when finding that the applicant inflicted the fatal injuries. Each of the impugned findings bore on, but were not individually determinative of, the trial judge’s ultimate conclusion that the applicant inflicted the fatal injuries to Alvin between 12:15 p.m. and 12:25 p.m. on 21 April 2021. The trial judge had regard to each of the evidential matters raised65 in combination when arriving at this conclusion. 62 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [558], AB 164-171. 63 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [558.32], AB 169. 64 Paragraph [3] of these reasons. 65 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [558], AB 164-171. -- 14 of 23 -- [2026] SASCA 20 The Court 13 40 The trial judge made his findings after he had excluded as a reasonable possibility that Ms Denton inflicted the fatal injuries. 41 Particular (a) misstates the finding66 that it was unlikely that a baby, who had been screaming hysterically approximately 10 minutes earlier, would settle so quickly in response to the application of a cold ice pack to the lip and eye. This finding was in relation to the applicant’s comments to police in the second and third interviews, particularly that Alvin “settled pretty much straight away”.67 It was open to the trial judge to reject that suggestion, and his explanation for why he did so was adequate. It was open to the trial judge on the evidence to find that it was also unlikely that 10 minutes after Alvin was screaming hysterically, he would have settled to the degree that those observing him considered he was either drowsy and about to fall asleep, or already asleep. The evidence of the applicant’s explanation to the police was so unlikely as to justify the trial judge’s conclusion that it was not true that Alvin had merely settled as the applicant claimed. Instead, the trial judge found Alvin was displaying symptoms of the head injury by the time Ms Denton returned home. 42 The trial judge explained the basis of his acceptance of the evidence of Dr Edwards concerning the circumstances by which she concluded that by the time Ms Denton returned home Alvin was already experiencing an altered level of consciousness consistent with him having sustained a head injury.68 During cross- examination Dr Edwards agreed that babies who become very distressed can become quiet and then sleep after expending energy crying, and Alvin’s tiredness or sleeping might have been attributable to the occurrence of the bassinet incident 10 minutes earlier. However, notwithstanding that observation, Dr Edwards considered that a baby with a normal level of consciousness, i.e., not one suffering from a head injury, would be expected to react or respond to the application of ice to the face by opening their eyes, possibly whimpering, or showing some signs of movement.69 That was not how the witnesses described Alvin’s presentation when the ice pack was being applied to his face and eye immediately after Ms Denton had returned home.70 The evidence was that Alvin did not wake up at any point after Ms Denton took him from the applicant.71 On the contrary, the description of Alvin’s presentation was consistent with him exhibiting the symptoms of a baby who had suffered a traumatic head injury. 43 We accept the respondent’s submission that each of the findings in relation to particulars (a), (b) and (c) were supported by the combined force of the following evidence: 66 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [558.20], AB 167. 67 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [330]-[331], AB 110-119. 68 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [558.23]-[558.30], AB 167-168. 69 T 566-567. 70 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [558], AB 164-171. 71 T 94. -- 15 of 23 -- [2026] SASCA 20 The Court 14 (i) The applicant told police in his first interview that he picked up Alvin, placed the ice on Alvin’s lip, and called his partner.72 He said that the first cry Alvin made was hysterical, but after the ice was applied, it was just a “sooky” cry. In the second and third interviews he said that Alvin was hysterical following the bassinet incident for five to 10 minutes, but that Alvin then calmed down after he placed ice over his lip.73 (ii) Ms Denton gave evidence that Alvin was asleep when she returned home.74 Ms Denton said the applicant was cradling Alvin “like you do with a normal newborn baby” and that he had an ice pack on Alvin’s lip.75 She said that she took Alvin and the ice pack from the applicant and the ice pack was still cold.76 Ms Denton gave evidence that she looked at Alvin’s top lip and saw a little cut.77 Later in her evidence, in response to questions from the trial judge, Ms Denton explained that she looked underneath Alvin’s lip and saw the cut.78 In cross- examination, she agreed that she had to “turn his lip up to see it”.79 Given the location of the injury, this would have likely involved the removal of the ice pack from Alvin’s lip. The portions of transcript relied on by the applicant reveal that Ms Denton accepted the proposition that after she reapplied the ice pack Alvin did not stir. Ms Denton’s evidence was as follows:80 Q. When you grabbed Alvin, what happened to the icepack that Mr McGregor was holding to his lip. A. He passed it on to me. Q. Did you continue to hold it on his lip. A. Yes. Q. Did you remove it and have a look before keeping it there. A. Yes, I had a look at his top lip. Q. When81 did you see at that point. A. Just a little cut underneath his top lip [INDICATES]. Q. I think you pointed with your finger underneath the point directly below your nose. 72 Exhibit P12, Exhibit MFI-P12A lines [361]-[396]. 73 Exhibit P14, Exhibit MFI-P14A lines [603]-[625], [253]-[258] and [687]-[723]. 74 T 90.4. 75 T 90.20-21. 76 T 94. 77 T 93-94. 78 T 147.27-148.13. 79 T 166-167. 80 T 93.30-94.15. 81 We accept this is probably a mistranscription of “What”. -- 16 of 23 -- [2026] SASCA 20 The Court 15 A. Yes. Q. Did Alvin wake up at any point when you took him. A. No. Q. Was the icepack cold. A. From memory, yes. Q. Did you take the icepack on and put it back on Alvin at any point. A. I can’t remember exactly. Q. At least when you had a look at Alvin’s lip and then put the icepack on, did he stir or anything when you replaced the icepack on him. A. No. (iii) Dr Edwards gave the following expert evidence about the application of the ice pack:82 Q. So if, for example, the child that was observed had an icepack being applied to the lip, would you expect the application of the icepack to be something that would arouse an otherwise healthy baby. A. Yes. Q. And if the icepack was on the lip, removed and then reapplied shortly after, would you expect that to arouse an otherwise healthy baby. A. Yes. Q. So if doing that process didn't arouse the baby, might that be a sign that the concussion is already operable at that point. A. Yes. I would consider, if I was given that history, that that is not an expected response in that circumstance and that would lead me to be concerned about whether that baby had an altered level of consciousness at that point in time. HIS HONOUR Q. Is that because of the cold, associated with the icepack, not resulting in a response from the otherwise healthy baby. A. And given that it was presumably being applied to an injury that would be painful, so both of those things, and the cold would exacerbate the pain. You'd expect some at least stirring or reaction to that, yes. (iv) In cross-examination, Dr Edwards was asked about whether the bassinet incident and the hysterical crying that followed could have made Alvin tired, and whether his apparent tiredness or sleeping could 82 T 522.22-523.8. -- 17 of 23 -- [2026] SASCA 20 The Court 16 be attributable to that reaction.83 While she agreed that babies who become distressed can become quiet and sleep after that use of energy, she later stated that “a baby who was tired from crying, who had a normal conscious level, so did not have a head injury, we would expect that application of ice to the face to open their eyes, maybe whimper, show some signs of body movement”.84 44 Notwithstanding criticisms of the approach taken by the trial judge that Ms Denton’s evidence was unclear and confusing because of the way a number of propositions were put in a single question, the clear import of Ms Denton’s evidence was that the applicant handed her Alvin and the ice pack, she removed the ice pack to look at the injury, and then she put the ice pack back onto Alvin’s lip. Even absent a specific recollection of the movement, it necessarily follows from Ms Denton’s evidence, considered as a whole, that she examined Alvin’s injury while he was in her arms, that she reapplied the ice pack, and he did not stir during that time. That is the only available mechanism she could have used to examine Alvins injury. Her evidence was predicated on Alvin being asleep when she took him from the applicant.85 On that basis, Dr Edwards’ opinion had a proper factual foundation. 45 With respect to particular (c), the trial judge made findings about Ms Denton and Ms Bickley’s evidence as to Alvin’s demeanour.86 These findings laid the foundation for the trial judge’s acceptance of Ms Denton’s evidence about Alvin being asleep. The trial judge considered that Ms Bickley’s evidence of her observations of Alvin being “awake but drowsy, going back to sleep”, were still consistent with symptoms of concussion.87 It was open to the trial judge to rely on Ms Denton’s evidence of her observations of Alvin’s appearance and lack of responsiveness when she returned home. Her evidence found some support in the evidence of Ms Bickley, although we note, as the trial judge acknowledged, that their recollections differed to the extent that Ms Bickley thought that Alvin was drowsy rather than asleep, as Ms Denton described him. As the trial judge explained, that difference need not have caused the trial judge to reject that aspect of Ms Denton’s evidence.88 46 Particulars (a), (b), and (c) are not made out. Particular (d) 47 In relation to particular (d) of ground 1 the applicant submits that the trial judge, in relying upon Ms Denton’s evidence, did not make any allowance, or at 83 T 566. 84 T 567.2-6. 85 T 94.5-6. 86 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [554.4.10]-[554.4.15], AB 160-163. 87 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [558.7]-[558.15], AB 165-166. 88 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [558], AB 164-171. -- 18 of 23 -- [2026] SASCA 20 The Court 17 least appropriate allowance, for the legitimate criticisms of Ms Denton’s evidence. We do not accept this submission. 48 The trial judge identified and warned himself of the matters he needed to consider in deciding what, if any, of Ms Denton’s evidence he could rely on in making findings of fact.89 Having set out those matters, the trial judge explained how he assessed them in making the relevant findings of fact for arriving at the verdict of guilty. We do not accept the submission that the trial judge, having identified those matters of concern, failed to have regard to them in making the critical findings of fact. On the contrary, he said he did.90 49 Critically, long before Ms Denton had the opportunity to inflict the fatal injuries on Alvin, the applicant had that opportunity, and Alvin’s appearance, immediately after that opportunity arose for the applicant to inflict the fatal injuries, was that of a baby who had already suffered a brain injury. 50 It was always open to the trial judge to accept parts of Ms Dentons evidence and reject other parts. 51 The trial judge held there was no reason to find that Ms Denton was mistaken or that she had lied about any of the matters he had accepted;91 matters of which related to the sequence of events between Ms Denton returning home, and her placing Alvin back in the bassinet. 52 In his reasons the trial judge explained why he rejected the applicant’s evidence of Alvin having settled in the 10 minutes before Ms Denton returned home by the mere application of the cold ice pack.92 In this regard, he relied on the evidence of Ms Denton and of Ms Bickley of their observations of Alvin at that time. Both Ms Denton and Ms Bickley denied in cross-examination that Alvin was sobbing when they returned home.93 53 Those observations were the foundation for Dr Edwards’ opinion. The trial judge’s approach was an orthodox exercise in fact finding by applying the basis rule to evidence relied on by Dr Edwards in forming her opinion.94 The trial judge stated that “as Dr Edwards said, these are observed symptoms that are consistent with an altered state of consciousness or concussion suggesting that by the time Ms Denton returned home, Alvin had already sustained the head injuries”. The trial judge’s conclusion was informed by his earlier findings about Dr Edwards’ evidence.95 89 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [430]-[437], AB 139-140. 90 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [437], AB 140. 91 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [558.7]-[558.15], AB 165-166. 92 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [558.30], AB 168-169. 93 T 170-171, 267. 94 The “basis rule” is the factual basis that underpins opinion evidence. 95 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [558.21]-[558.25], AB 167. -- 19 of 23 -- [2026] SASCA 20 The Court 18 54 The consistency of the evidence of Alvin’s symptoms, to the opinion of Dr Edwards, formed a piece of circumstantial evidence which bore on the likelihood that the critical injuries were inflicted in the first window of opportunity as opposed to the second window. Properly read,96 his Honour accumulated his earlier findings about Alvin’s presentation, Dr Edwards’ evidence about symptoms of concussion, and the findings about the ice pack; and that accumulation informed the trial judge’s ultimate conclusion that the head injury had been sustained by the time Ms Denton returned home. 55 The trial judge did not consider the descriptor that Alvin was “sooky” to be inconsistent with the descriptions of him being drowsy or sleeping. To the extent the trial judge accepted that it was a symptom of concussion, this was not the only evidence which supported the intermediate finding based on observations of Alvin’s presentation after Ms Denton returned home.97 It was that evidence which supported Dr Edwards’ opinion, which was the foundation for the trial judge’s finding.98 56 As we have said earlier in these reasons,99 the applicant submits the trial judge’s process of reasoning to guilt can be distilled to three bases upon which the applicant asks the Court to intervene and quash the verdict of guilty. For the reasons we have given we do not accept the criticism of the trial judge’s approach. It is important to remember when considering an application for permission to appeal against conviction on the ground of inadequate reasoning that a high bar must be overcome to allow an appeal on that ground. 57 First, the trial judge explained adequately the basis upon which he relied on the evidence of Ms Denton, acknowledging the flaws in aspects of her evidence.100 Despite the valid criticisms he considered existed in regard to her evidence, which affected her reliability and credibility, he was nonetheless prepared to accept her evidence as truthful in relation to a number of matters, most importantly of which was that she had never harmed Alvin.101 He was entitled to do so. 58 A trier of fact is entitled to accept parts of a witness’ evidence and reject other parts. The assessment of the weight to be accorded to a witness’ evidence by reference to the manner in which it was given is a task which remains with the trier of fact.102 Where the trial judge accepted Ms Denton’s evidence he explained why he did so.103 Where that evidence was supported by other evidence led at trial, the trial judge identified and explained how he applied that other evidence to his findings concerning the evidence given by Ms Denton. It was not necessary for 96 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [558.30], AB 168-169. 97 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [558.30], AB 168-169. 98 Ramsay v Watson (1961) 108 CLR 642; Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705. 99 Paragraph [32] of these reasons. 100 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [438]-[531], AB 140. 101 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [530], AB 155. 102 Pell v The Queen (2020) 268 CLR 123 at [38]. 103 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [554.4], [558.2], [558.7], [558.15], [558.27], [590], [595] and [601], AB 160-178. -- 20 of 23 -- [2026] SASCA 20 The Court 19 the trial judge to repeat in respect of each finding that he took into account his earlier findings about Ms Denton’s reliability and credibility. It is clear that he did so. 59 Second, there was no error in the trial judge’s approach in relying on the evidence of Alvin’s lack of reaction or responsiveness to the application of the ice pack to his lip, which was intrinsic to the formation of Dr Edwards’ opinion upon which the trial judge ultimately relied for his verdict. While it was the trial judge’s reliance on Dr Edwards’ evidence of Alvin’s lack of reaction to the application of the ice pack which indicated that he had already suffered a brain injury, this was not the only evidence that supported her opinion. In addition to the fact of a cold ice pack being applied was the fact that it was being applied to the site of the frenulum which had been injured and, as a result, was already painful. This only served to underscore the force of Dr Edwards’ opinion as to the significance of Alvin’s lack of reaction to the application of the ice pack.104 We do not accept the submission put on appeal that Alvin’s lack of reaction is explained by the ice pack having created a numbing effect having been applied for at least 10 minutes prior to Ms Denton returning home. Again, the trial judge was entitled to reason in the way he did. In any event, that submission finds no support in the evidence. 60 Third, the applicant submits that the evidence of the observations of Alvin being drowsy when Ms Denton and Ms Bickley returned home is explicable on the basis that he was a naturally quiet baby such that reliance by the trial judge on this evidence was misplaced. That submission ignores the entire factual context of what occurred. Even assuming for the purpose of argument that Alvin was a naturally quiet baby, the evidence that only 10 minutes earlier he had been heard screaming hysterically after he had fallen out of the bassinet, striking his face on a music box, which caused injury, to which ice was applied to an already painful site, necessarily required some evidence that excluded as a reasonable possibility that Alvin, having experienced that traumatic episode, had returned to his natural quiescent state in such a short space of time. That submission completely disregards the surrounding circumstances. In addition it lacks support in the evidence. There is little evidence, apart from the self-serving statements of the applicant in a police interview, that Alvin was a particularly quiet baby.105 After all, when he suffered the fatal injuries he was only 19 days old. In such a short period of time it was not really possible to make a meaningful assessment of this kind. Visitors to the house, namely, Ms Bickley,106 Ms Denton’s stepfather, Mr Trevor Creek,107 Ms Denton’s stepmother, Ms Sarah Harris,108 and a friend of Ms Denton, Ms Victoria Knott109 gave evidence that he was a normal newborn baby who was frequently sleeping when they visited. 104 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [372]-[373], [378], AB 126-127, T 522-523. 105 Exhibit P14, Exhibit MFI P14A lines [991]-[1002]. 106 T 252-253. 107 T 277-278. 108 T 288-289. 109 T 295. -- 21 of 23 -- [2026] SASCA 20 The Court 20 61 Particular (d) is not made out. Particular (e) 62 In relation to particular (e) the applicant complains of the trial judge’s treatment of the applicant’s and Ms Denton’s reaction to the bassinet incident and how this impacted on the likelihood of them having harmed their child. We accept the submission of the respondent that this complaint must be considered in the context of the combined force of all of the evidence. 63 In considering the window of opportunity available to each to have inflicted the fatal injuries, the trial judge made two critical findings. First, he accepted Ms Denton’s evidence that she did not inflict those injuries; second, the trial judge considered it inherently improbable that she would have inflicted the fatal injuries when the applicant was out purchasing Panadol. He made those findings on the basis of the undisputed evidence given by Ms Denton. 110 A critical basis for the distinction between the opportunities available to each was evidence of the existence of a trigger for frustration. 64 In addition to the evidence given by Ms Denton, the trial judge also had the evidence of Dr Edwards; that crying is quite commonly cited as a trigger for frustration followed by action that causes harm to a child.111 It was common ground that there had to be a trigger in this case.112 There was evidence from both the applicant and Ms Denton that Alvin was hysterically crying as a result of the bassinet incident. Ms Denton gave evidence that after she returned home Alvin slept until his next feed at about 4:30 p.m. On the other hand, at the opening of the window for the applicant to have inflicted the fatal injuries, the undisputed evidence was that Alvin, who was in the care of the applicant, was crying hysterically. 65 The trial judge was entitled to take into account the inherent unlikelihood of Ms Denton having behaved in such a violent way at the time the applicant was away purchasing Panadol. Unlike the situation where Alvin was in the applicant’s care, there was no evidence of any triggering incident when Alvin was left alone in her care. The trial judge’s reasoning in this regard is set out clearly.113 66 Particular (e) is not made out. Particular (f) 67 Particular (f) is a complaint of no, or inadequate reasoning, in reaching the ultimate conclusion resulting in a verdict of guilty.114 For the reasons already given, we do not accept this submission. 110 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [554.3]-[554.4], AB 160-163. 111 T 374. 112 T 734. 113 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [554.22] to [554.26], AB 167-168. 114 R v McGregor [2025] SADC 22 at [558], AB 164-171. -- 22 of 23 -- [2026] SASCA 20 The Court 21 68 We accept the submission of the respondent that when considering the judgment and reasons as a whole, particularly against the key issues in the trial, and the state of the evidence by the conclusion of the trial, the trial judge’s reasoning on each of the issues was adequate. Each piece of circumstantial evidence supported the other. To draw out discrete pieces of the evidence, or findings made on those matters, undermines the combined force of the inferences that were available to the trial judge. There was no error by the trial judge in relying upon them. 69 The trial judge’s reasons adequately addressed the conflicting hypotheses concerning the identity of the person who inflicted the fatal injuries to Alvin. There is no reason to doubt that the trial judge was correct in finding it was the applicant. 70 Each of the impugned findings were open to the trial judge and were supported by the evidence. The reasoning did not amount to an error or irregularity which would occasion a miscarriage of justice. 71 Particular (f) is not made out. Conclusion 72 In these circumstances, there is no basis to quash the convictions on count 1 or count 2. 73 We would refuse permission to appeal and dismiss the appeal. -- 23 of 23 --