LUDLOW -v- LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD [2026] WASCA 79

[2026] WASCA 79 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA) CITATION : LUDLOW -v- LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD [2026] WASCA 79 CORAM : THOMSON P MITCHELL JA HEARD : 8 JUNE 2026 DELIVERED : 8 JUNE 2026 PUBLISHED : 8 JUNE 2026 FILE NO/S : CACV 102 of 2025 BETWEEN : JEREMY RICHARD LUDLOW Appellant AND LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD Respondent ON APPEAL FROM: Jurisdiction : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL Coram : PRESIDENT GLANCY Citation : LUDLOW and LEGAL PRACTICE BOARD [No 2] [2025] WASAT 131 File Number : VR 47 of 2024 -- 1 of 13 -- [2026] WASCA 79 Page 2 Catchwords: Administrative law - Vocational regulation - Where legal practitioner applied to State Administrative Tribunal for review of decision to refuse application for practising certificate for 2023/2024 financial year - Where review application remained undetermined after conclusion of 2024/2025 financial year - Whether any utility in Tribunal determining review application - Whether Tribunal erred in striking out review application on basis that proceeding had become frivolous, misconceived and lacking in substance with passage of time - Whether in interests of justice to grant leave to appeal against Tribunal's orders Legislation: Legal Profession Uniform Law (WA), s 44, s 45, s 100 Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2022 (WA), s 117 State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 29, s 47, s 105 Result: Leave to appeal refused Appeal dismissed Category: B Representation: Counsel: Appellant : In person Respondent : S R Pack Solicitors: Appellant : In person Respondent : Legal Practice Board Case(s) referred to in decision(s): ACC v Mental Health Tribunal [2025] WASCA 79 Ludlow and Legal Practice Board [2025] WASAT 65 Medical Board of Australia v GLP [2025] WASCA 87 -- 2 of 13 -- [2026] WASCA 79 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 3 REASONS OF THE COURT: 1 At the conclusion of the hearing of the appellant's application for leave to appeal, we made orders refusing leave to appeal and dismissing the appeal. We said that we would publish written reasons for making those orders later. These are our reasons for making the orders. Background 2 On 3 December 2023, the appellant applied for a practising certificate for the 2023/2024 financial year. At that time, he did not hold a practising certificate. On 17 April 2024, a delegate of the respondent refused to grant the appellant's application for a practising certificate, on the ground that he was not a fit and proper person. On 15 May 2024, the appellant applied for a review of that decision in the State Administrative Tribunal. 3 The resolution of the Tribunal proceedings was delayed by the appellant's interim application of 5 September 2024. That interim application sought orders requiring the respondent to state whether it admitted various allegations concerning the appellant's past interactions with the respondent. Those interactions included: 1. Complaints made to the respondent by the appellant about his former wife, who is also a legal practitioner. 2. A decision in September 2019 to cancel the appellant's practising certificate (which was subsequently set aside by consent orders made in the Tribunal in 2020). 3. A refusal of the appellant's application to renew his practising certificate in July 2023, which was the subject of an earlier review application to the Tribunal that was withdrawn by consent. 4 On 4 July 2025, the President of the Tribunal dismissed the appellant's interim application. In doing so, her Honour noted that the considerable time taken to determine the interim application was mostly attributable to the appellant.1 5 On 8 September 2025, the respondent applied to have the review application dismissed under s 47(2) of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) on the basis that the application was frivolous, misconceived or lacking in substance. The respondent contended that 1 Ludlow and Legal Practice Board [2025] WASAT 65 (Ludlow No 1) [33]. -- 3 of 13 -- [2026] WASCA 79 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 4 the decision under review related to an application for a practising certificate for the 2023/2024 financial year, and that the Tribunal was confined to dealing with an application in respect of that year. The respondent contended that, accordingly, any decision by the Tribunal to grant a practising certificate in September 2025 or subsequently would have no operative effect. 6 On 27 November 2025, the President of the Tribunal granted the respondent's application under s 47 of the SAT Act. Her Honour ordered that the review application be struck out on the basis that it was frivolous, misconceived and lacking in substance. 7 The President found that the decision under review related to the appellant's application for a practising certificate for the 2023/2024 financial year.2 Her Honour held that, under s 44 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (WA) (Uniform Law), the respondent was only empowered to grant a practising certificate for the financial year which was the subject of the application.3 At best, the Tribunal could only set aside the respondent's decision and determine that the appellant should be granted a practising certificate for the 2023/2024 financial year.4 The time within which a renewal application could have been made under s 117 of the Legal Profession Uniform Law Application Act 2022 (WA) (Application Act) for the 2024/2025 financial year expired on 31 December 2024. Even if the Tribunal granted the appellant a practising certificate for the 2023/2024 financial year, that practising certificate would not enable the appellant to practise, so that there would be no purpose for even a positive decision for the appellant on review.5 8 Applying the decision of this court in ACC v Mental Health Tribunal,6 the President held that the power in s 47(2) of the SAT Act, to strike out a proceeding the Tribunal believes to be frivolous, misconceived or lacking in substance, could be exercised when an application which was not pointless when it was commenced subsequently becomes pointless.7 The President observed:8 In the present case, although the review may have resulted in the grant of a practising certificate which would have operated for some period of time in 2023/2024 had the review been completed in time, or alternatively may have allowed the [appellant] to apply for a renewal 2 Ludlow and Legal Practice Board [No 2] [2025] WASAT 131 (primary decision) [45] - [46]. 3 Primary decision [48] - [49]. 4 Primary decision [58]. 5 Primary decision [59]. 6 ACC v Mental Health Tribunal [2025] WASCA 79 [33] - [34]. 7 Primary decision [61]. 8 Primary decision [64]. -- 4 of 13 -- [2026] WASCA 79 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 5 under s 117(4) and s 117(5) of the Application Act had the review been completed within the time relevant to those sections, given that neither of those things are possible now, the review application would be liable to be struck out under s 47 of the SAT Act as frivolous, misconceived or lacking in substance if there is no other reason to conduct the review. 9 In considering whether there was another reason to conduct the review, the President observed:9 The [appellant] says that a review will benefit him because it will find that he was a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate and that any future applications would not then be able to be refused by the Respondent if he continues to behave in the manner which resulted in the finding that he was not fit and proper. That is, that it would neutralise the Respondent's original adverse finding that he was not fit to hold a practising certificate. In my view, there is limited utility to any such finding in this particular case where the decision would only be concerned with conduct of the [appellant] that preceded the date of the decision which is to be reviewed. That is because, in this case the [respondent], in its disciplinary action which it has brought against the [appellant], has made allegations about other conduct to which it will have regard in determining any future application for a practising certificate which the [appellant] might make and which would not be relevant to determining whether the [appellant] ought to have been granted a practising certificate for the 2023/2024 financial year. Determining a review with so little utility, without some other reasons for doing so, would not be an efficient use of the Tribunal's resources or those of the parties. 10 After referring to a contention by the appellant as to the effect of the decision under review on his ability to obtain employment outside the legal profession, which was not supported by any evidence,10 the President concluded:11 In the circumstances of this case, while I accept that there may be some reputational benefit to the [appellant] in a successful review, I have come to the conclusion that because: (a) the [appellant's] conception of what can be achieved for him on the review is misconceived; 9 Primary decision [67] - [69]. 10 Primary decision [70]. 11 Primary decision [71]. -- 5 of 13 -- [2026] WASCA 79 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 6 (b) the benefit to the [appellant] of a finding that he was entitled to a practising certificate for the 2023/2024 financial year is so marginal; and (c) the issues of which he complains are capable of being resolved in a future application, the application can properly be characterised as frivolous, misconceived and lacking in substance and should be struck out pursuant to s 47 of the SAT Act. The appeal to this court 11 On 22 December 2025, the appellant instituted the current appeal to this court against the Tribunal's order striking out his review application under s 47 of the SAT Act. 12 The appellant did not file an appellant's case until 20 April 2026. He advances nine grounds of appeal which are prolix and argumentative. In essence, the appellant advances two core propositions. 13 The first core proposition is that the President erred in failing to find that the Tribunal had power to grant the appellant a practising certificate which would take effect from the date of determination of the review application. The appellant contends that power would exist even if the review application was determined in a subsequent financial year. We note that the 2026/2027 financial year appears to be the earliest the review application could be determined if this appeal were to be allowed and the matter remitted to the Tribunal. 14 The appellant's second core proposition is that the President should have held that it was not appropriate to strike out the appellant's review application as:12 a. it might remove an impediment to any subsequent application for a practising certificate; and b. setting aside the Respondent's decision might 'neutralise any adverse consequences' that might flow generally from a finding that the [appellant] was not a fit and proper person to hold such a licence. Leave to appeal: general principles 15 Under s 105 of the SAT Act, the current appeal can only be brought if this court gives leave to appeal. 12 Ground 8. -- 6 of 13 -- [2026] WASCA 79 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 7 16 The principles governing the grant or refusal of leave to appeal are well established and were reiterated by this court in Medical Board of Australia v GLP.13 The court recognised that the ultimate issue is whether the grant of leave is in the interests of justice having regard to all the circumstances of the particular case. However, in many cases it may be necessary for an applicant seeking leave to appeal to show that there is sufficient doubt about the correctness of the Tribunal's decision to justify the grant of leave to appeal and that to allow the error to go uncorrected would impose substantial injustice. 17 We also note that, generally, an appeal under s 105 of the SAT Act can only be brought on a question of law: see s 105(2). Section 105 creates an exception to this requirement when the Tribunal's decision is made in a proceeding for review of a decision made under the Application Act and Uniform Law, and the decision has the effect of depriving a person of the person's capacity to lawfully pursue a vocation. We will assume, without deciding, that the present case falls into this exception. Even on that assumption, leave to appeal should be refused for the following reasons. Disposition Scope of the Tribunal's review jurisdiction 18 As the primary judge correctly observed, the respondent's power under s 44(1) of the Uniform Law is a power to, 'on application', grant or renew a practising certificate 'in respect of a financial year'. Under s 44(4), an application cannot be made unless the applicant reasonably intends to practise principally in the relevant jurisdiction 'during the currency of the certificate or renewal applied for'. Section 45(1)(c) of the Uniform Law relevantly allows the respondent to grant or renew a practising certificate only if satisfied that the applicant has indicated in the application that he or she does not hold, and has not applied for, another certificate in another jurisdiction that would be in force 'concurrently with the certificate whose grant or renewal is sought under this section'. 19 These provisions of the Uniform Law indicate that a practising certificate is granted or renewed in respect of a particular financial year on application for grant or renewal in that financial year. The appellant's application for a practising certificate, having regard to the passage set out at [45] of the primary decision, was for the grant of a practising certificate in the 2023/2024 financial year. The respondent's decision 13 Medical Board of Australia v GLP [2025] WASCA 87 [39] - [41]. -- 7 of 13 -- [2026] WASCA 79 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 8 which was the subject of the review application in the Tribunal was a decision to refuse to grant the appellant a practising certificate for the 2023/2024 financial year. 20 The appellant contends that the President erred in focusing on his application for a practising certificate rather than his review application. The review application sought an order granting him a practising certificate without specifying a year for which the practising certificate was sought. There is no merit to that contention. The relevant right of review conferred by s 100(1)(a) of the Uniform Law is of a decision to refuse to grant or renew a practising certificate. It was the respondent's decision to refuse to grant the appellant a practising certificate for the 2023/2024 financial year that was the subject of the review. The respondent only had power to grant a practising certificate for the financial year which was the subject of the application. The Tribunal's powers on review under s 29 of the SAT Act corresponded to those of the respondent when it made the reviewable decision. The Tribunal's powers were not expanded by the terms in which relief was sought in the appellant's application for review. 21 The appellant submits that, under the statutory framework, he had no power to specify how long either the respondent would take to determine his application for a practising certificate or the Tribunal would take to determine his review application. In our view, this does not justify construing the legislation to give the Tribunal power to grant a practising certificate for a financial year that was not the subject of the application refused by the respondent. While the appellant does not control these matters, one of the main objectives of the Tribunal, specified in s 9 of the SAT Act, is to act speedily and with as little formality as is practicable. Section 32 of the SAT Act confers various powers on the Tribunal which are evidently designed to facilitate achievement of this objective. In a case such as the present, it is to be expected that the Tribunal will exercise its powers to attempt to ensure that the review application is not rendered redundant by the passage of time. 22 In the present case programming orders made by the Tribunal on 25 June 2024 contemplated a hearing of the review application after 9 September 2024. As the President recognised, a determination of the review application in the appellant's favour prior to the end of 2024 would not have lacked utility. If the Tribunal had granted the appellant a practising certificate for the 2023/2024 financial year by that time, the appellant could then have applied before the end of 2024 to renew that -- 8 of 13 -- [2026] WASCA 79 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 9 certificate for the 2024/2025 financial year.14 If the renewal application was accepted, then a certificate granted by the Tribunal for the 2023/2024 financial year would be taken to have continued in force from 1 July 2024 until the determination or withdrawal of the renewal application.15 23 Unfortunately, the Tribunal appears to have been diverted from the achievement of the main objective of acting speedily by the appellant's misguided interim application referred to at [3] - [4] above. Determining the interim application resulted in delay, which the President mostly attributed to the appellant. However, delay in this particular case does not provide a proper basis for concluding that the Tribunal had power to grant a practising certificate for a financial year that was not the subject of the decision under review, and which the respondent could not have granted when making that decision. 24 Therefore, in our view, the President was correct to conclude that the respondent and Tribunal only had power to grant the appellant a practising certificate for the financial year which was the subject of the application. In this case, the application was for the grant of a practising certificate for the 2023/2024 financial year. The appellant's contention that the President erred in failing to find that the Tribunal had power to grant the appellant a practising certificate which would take effect from the date of determination of the review application cannot be accepted. At the time of the Tribunal's decision on 27 November 2025, the earliest the review application could have been heard and determined was in the 2025/2026 financial year. Accordingly, the President was correct to conclude that success in the review application could never allow the appellant to practise under a practising certificate granted by the Tribunal, or the renewal of a practising certificate granted by the Tribunal. That aspect of the Tribunal's decision is not attended by sufficient doubt to justify the grant of leave to appeal. Other utility in determining the review application 25 The President did not hold that some other utility in determining the review application, such as reputational benefit, was incapable of leading the Tribunal to decline to strike out the appellant's review application under s 47 of the SAT Act. Rather, in the passages referred to at [9] - [10] above, her Honour concluded that the extent of that utility was so limited that it was proper to characterise the review application as 14 That renewal application could have been made under s 117(4) of the Application Act. 15 Under s 117(5) of the Application Act. -- 9 of 13 -- [2026] WASCA 79 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 10 frivolous, misconceived and lacking in substance. That conclusion was reached in the context where: (a) the principal benefit claimed by the appellant was reputational; (b) the issue of the appellant's fitness to practise was the subject of other proceedings pending in the Tribunal; and (c) the appellant could still apply for a practising certificate for the current or a future financial year, and seek a review of any refusal to grant the application. In that context, in our view the President's assessment was correct. 26 A focus of the appellant's submissions was a statement by the respondent's delegate in refusing his 2023/2024 practising certificate. The observation was to the effect that, for it to be possible for him to hold a practising certificate in the future, the appellant would have to change his behaviour in stated respects. The appellant, who says he is not willing to change his behaviour, wants to contend that this observation was not justified. However, the right of a review conferred by s 100 of the Uniform Law is relevantly of a decision to refuse to grant a practising certificate rather than the reasons for the decision, or comments made when advising a practitioner of the decision. There would be no imperative for the Tribunal to make any finding about the respondent's observation if it were to determine the current review application. The observation will not be binding on the parties or the Tribunal in any subsequent proceedings, including a future application for a practising certificate. 27 The President referred to the appellant's submissions that 'a review will benefit him because it will find that he was a fit and proper person to hold a practising certificate and that any future applications would not then be able to be refused by the [r]espondent if he continues to behave in the manner which resulted in the finding that he was not fit and proper'.16 Her Honour did not err in failing to find that the utility in enabling the appellant to challenge the observation referred to in the previous paragraph made it inappropriate to strike out the review application under s 47 of the SAT Act. Tribunal's decision not attended by sufficient doubt to justify leave 28 Therefore, we do not accept either of the two core propositions raised by the appellant's grounds of appeal, noted at [13] - [14] above. 16 Primary decision [67]. -- 10 of 13 -- [2026] WASCA 79 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 11 Accordingly, the grounds of appeal do not provide a basis for impugning the President's decision that the appellant's review application had become frivolous, misconceived and lacking in substance and should be struck out pursuant to s 47 of the SAT Act. In our view, the correctness of that decision is not attended by sufficient doubt to justify the grant of leave to appeal. No substantive injustice 29 Further, even if we were wrong about the appellant's prospects of success in the appeal, there would be no substantive injustice in leaving any error involved in the Tribunal's decision uncorrected. 30 As noted above, the question of the appellant's fitness to practise is a live issue in other pending Tribunal proceedings. The collateral reputational benefits which the appellant hopes to achieve from a determination of the review application can be pursued in those other proceedings. 31 Further, if the appellant wants a practising certificate for the 2026/2027 financial year, he can apply for one under the Uniform Law and seek a review of any new refusal decision in the Tribunal. The appellant therefore has alternative means of achieving the outcome which he contends could be achieved if his review application is successful. 32 If this court were to grant leave to appeal, the hearing and determination of the appeal would likely be completed towards the end of the year. If the appeal were allowed, the review application would be remitted to the Tribunal for determination. The Tribunal would then need to list the review application for hearing. Having regard to the expanded temporal scope of the review application which would likely be consequent upon a successful appeal, further programming orders would be required to make the matter ready for hearing. In this scenario, the earliest hearing of the remitted review application would likely be in the first half of 2027. 33 On the other hand, if the appellant were to now apply for a practising certificate, a new review application could be brought immediately after the respondent's decision, if the application were refused. At the hearing before us, counsel for the respondent indicated that the respondent would deal with any new application by the appellant for a practising certificate as expeditiously as possible. The respondent will be able to determine the new application well before this court would determine this appeal. The period required for the Tribunal to hear and -- 11 of 13 -- [2026] WASCA 79 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 12 determine the new review application after it is made is unlikely to be much different from the time to hear and determine the current review application from the time it is remitted to the Tribunal. 34 Given the above considerations and the lack of substantive progress in the current review application proceedings, a new application for a practising certificate is not substantially less efficacious than pursuing this appeal and then a determination of the review application if the appeal is allowed. Even if (contrary to our view) the Tribunal erred in striking out the current review application under s 47 of the SAT Act, there would be no substantive injustice in leaving that error uncorrected. 35 The appellant also referred to the additional cost of having to apply for a new practising certificate. However, the appellant cannot avoid this cost if he wants to obtain a practice certificate for a new period. Orders 36 Having regard to the above matters, at the conclusion of the hearing of the application for leave to appeal we were satisfied that it was not in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal. We therefore made the following orders: 1. Leave to appeal is refused. 2. The appeal is dismissed. 3. The appellant is to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal to be fixed in the amount of $1,000. The order for costs followed the event. The amount fixed for costs was substantially less than that claimed by the respondent. Counsel for the respondent indicated he would be content with an order fixing the lower amount given the appellant's current impecunious state. The sum of $1,000 appeared to us to be reasonable in these circumstances. -- 12 of 13 -- [2026] WASCA 79 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 13 I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. LK Associate to the Hon Justice Mitchell 8 JUNE 2026 -- 13 of 13 --