MARGERET OCAMPO In Person v SOUTH AUSTRALIAN HOUSING TRUST [2026] SASCA 23

On Appeal from SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL (PRESIDENT HUGHES) 2026/SIR000024 Appellant: MARGERET OCAMPO In Person Respondent: SOUTH AUSTRALIAN HOUSING TRUST Counsel: MR C PAGER - Solicitor: CROWN SOLICITOR (SA) Hearing Date/s: 06/03/2026, 11/03/2026, 12/03/2026 File No/s: CIV-26-002878 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Court of Appeal: Civil) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. OCAMPO v SOUTH AUSTRALIAN HOUSING TRUST [2026] SASCA 23 Reasons for Decision of the Honourable President Livesey (ex tempore) 12 March 2026 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS - SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL SOCIAL WELFARE - HOUSING SCHEMES - PUBLIC HOUSING APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - STAY OF PROCEEDINGS The applicant urgently applied for a stay pending an application for leave to appeal an order made for vacant possession of a residential tenancy made by the President of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal). Following an application for internal review pursuant to s 70 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA), the President varied previous orders made by the Tribunal, permitting the applicant to re-occupy the premises until 3 March 2026. The applicant sought the reversal of the vacant possession order and a continuation of the lease. The respondent opposed the application for a stay and applied for summary dismissal of the appeal on the basis that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of obtaining leave to appeal or of otherwise succeeding on appeal. The appeal first came before the Court on 6 March 2026. An urgent hearing was sought by the applicant on the basis that the consequences of the Tribunal’s decision were dire for her and her children. The matter was adjourned to permit the applicant, who is not legally represented, an opportunity to adduce evidence regarding any prejudice she claimed would arise from enforcement of the vacant possession order. When the matter was heard on 11 March 2026, the applicant put forward a new argument to the effect that when she signed the lease, she had been promised a new tenancy after that lease, and she -- 1 of 9 -- presented evidence concerning her claimed prejudice. The respondent presented evidence to the effect that, whilst a new tenancy was discussed, no assurance was given and, in the alternative, that any assurance given was subject to the applicant complying with the terms of her lease agreement. Held (the Court), granting the application for a stay and dismissing the application to summarily dismiss the appeal: 1. The proposed appeal faces difficulties. However, the hearing of an urgent stay application is not the occasion to resolve disputed questions of fact, particularly in circumstances where the competing assertions have not previously been aired in the Tribunal. 2. The balance of convenience strongly favours the applicant. 3. There is sufficient merit in the applicant’s appeal to warrant a stay pending an early hearing of the appeal. 4. The enforcement of the vacant possession order is stayed until the earlier of midday on 23 April 2026, or the further order of this Court, on condition that the applicant continues to observe the terms of the probationary lease agreement, including by continuing to pay rent. 5. As there is some utility in the appeal, it is appropriate to dismiss the application for summary dismissal. 6. The applications for leave to appeal, and for an extension of time, will be heard by the Court of Appeal on Tuesday, 24 March 2026. Residential Tenancies Act 1995 (SA) ss 93(4), 110(1)(m); South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) ss 70, 71(1)(a)(i), 71(2), 71(5), 73(2); Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) rr 212.5(1), 212.5(2)(c)(ii), referred to. Crown Melbourne Ltd v Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 1, discussed. Beamer Pty Ltd v Star Lodge Supported Residential Services Pty Ltd & Ors; Najjar Special Accommodation Services Pty Ltd & Ors v Kimis Pty Ltd & Ors [2005] VSC 236; Franklin v South Australian Housing Authority [2024] SASCA 3; Henderson v Housing Choices South Australia Ltd (2019) 345 FLR 412; Hyde v Hyde & Ors [2026] SASCA 13; Marschall v Elson (No 2) [2023] SASCA 3; McVicars v South Australian Housing Trust (No 4) [2025] SASCA 109; Rebbeck v Housing SA [2024] SASCA 86; Upton & Anor v Fynes [2021] SACAT 84, considered. -- 2 of 9 -- OCAMPO v SOUTH AUSTRALIAN HOUSING TRUST [2026] SASCA 23 Court of Appeal – Civil LIVESEY P (ex tempore): Introduction 1 This is an urgent application for a stay pending an application for leave to appeal a decision made by the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal) on 10 February 2026, ordering vacant possession of a residential tenancy by midday on Tuesday, 3 March 2026.1 2 For the following reasons, the application for a stay is granted, and I dismiss the application for summary dismissal of the appeal. The applications for leave to appeal, and for an extension of time, will be heard by the Court of Appeal during the afternoon of 24 March 2026. The urgent hearings 3 When this matter came on urgently last Friday, 6 March the Tribunal bailiff was due to enforce the vacant possession order on Wednesday, 11 March. The applicant is not legally represented. Accordingly, I explained to the applicant the issues arising on an argument for a stay, and that she needed to tell me what errors were made by President Hughes, as well as give me evidence of any prejudice she claimed would arise from enforcement.2 4 The respondent opposed the application for a stay and applied for summary dismissal of the appeal. Given the public holiday last Monday, the respondent agreed to defer enforcement of the order until midday on Friday, 13 March 2026, to enable the applications to be determined. 5 When the matter was called on early on Wednesday, 11 March, the applicant put forward a new argument to the effect that she had been promised a new tenancy, and she presented evidence concerning her claimed prejudice. The matter was adjourned to later in the day to permit the respondent to consider the applicant’s new argument and her evidence of prejudice, as well as to provide its own evidence regarding the probationary lease agreement and to make enquiries about emergency housing for the applicant and her three children. 6 Ultimately, the respondent adduced further evidence and said that no emergency housing would be made available, though the applicant could apply to be placed on a list to be given priority housing. Any application would not be actioned for six months by reason of an exclusion period that applies to previously 1 Margaret Ocampo v South Australian Housing Trust, [18] (2026/SIR000024, President Hughes, 10 February 2026, Unpublished). 2 Rebbeck v Housing SA [2024] SASCA 86, [16] (Livesey ACJ). -- 3 of 9 -- [2026] SASCA 23 Livesey P 2 evicted tenants. Alternatively, the applicant could apply to other housing providers with the benefit of a “warm referral” from the respondent. 7 The respondent was, however, prepared to extend the enforcement date to 23 April 2026, being the end of the maximum 90-day period permitted under s 93(4) of the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 (SA) (the Residential Tenancies Act). 8 After receiving the further evidence, I heard argument late yesterday. The Tribunal decision and the proposed appeal 9 The proposed appeal is against a decision of the President of the Tribunal. Pursuant to s 71(1)(a)(i) of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) (the SACAT Act), an appeal from a decision of a Presidential member of the Tribunal lies to the Court of Appeal and, by s 71(2) of that Act, that appeal is only by leave. 10 On an application for internal review pursuant to s 70 of the SACAT Act, the President varied orders made by the Tribunal on 19 January 2026, effectively permitting the applicant to re-occupy the premises until Tuesday, 3 March 2026. The President made those orders because she was satisfied that, although the applicant had breached her tenancy agreement and failed to remedy those breaches, and the tenancy had been terminated, there were circumstances of severe hardship which justified a later date for vacant possession. 11 The date for giving vacant possession was varied to 3 March 2026, when the applicant’s probationary fixed term tenancy of 12 months would expire in any event. 12 By s 71(5) of the SACAT Act, the Supreme Court may, on appeal, make any interim, ancillary or consequential order that the Court considers appropriate and, by s 73(2) of that Act, the Court may make an order staying the operation of a decision until the proceedings are finally resolved. By r 212.5(1) of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) (the UCR), where jurisdiction to hear an appeal is vested in the Court of Appeal, a single judge may make interlocutory and ancillary orders. 13 The applicant’s notice of appeal dated 6 March 2026 sought the reversal of the vacant possession order and a continuation of the lease on the following handwritten grounds: 1. decision was based on wrong information 2. Failed to consider relevant information 3. Factual Errors 14 The applicant also sought an extension of time and leave to appeal. -- 4 of 9 -- [2026] SASCA 23 Livesey P 3 15 The applicant told me that she had made attempts to obtain legal advice on Tuesday. I was provided with a copy of an email from the Magistrates Court Legal Advice Service outlining, in substance, what I had explained to the applicant last Friday. The applicant had been provided with a copy of the transcript of the hearing on Friday which, evidently, she gave to the advice service. 16 When I asked the applicant to explain her case on appeal she said, in substance, that she had entered into the probationary lease on the basis of an assurance that the lease “would be continued” after 12 months.3 In response to my questions, the applicant explained that when she signed the lease in the presence of “Annie”, the housing manager, and “Solomon”, her Anglicare support worker, she was told that if she paid rent and kept doing what she was doing there would be no issues about getting another lease. 17 These submissions were made in response to the written submissions from Mr Pager, counsel for the respondent, which explained that the applicant had previously been evicted from another South Australian Housing Trust property in 2023 for issues similar to those giving rise to the present proceedings, being failures to keep contact with the Trust, together with failures to provide access to the property. Instead of enforcing that order, the respondent granted the applicant a new six-month lease on strict conditions and, after there was compliance with that lease, the applicant was given the probationary 12-month lease the subject of the present proceedings. 18 The respondent filed an affidavit which contained evidence from Ms Annie Rawlings, Team Leader and Housing Officer,4 which was to the effect that no assurance was given to the applicant, though the applicant was told that Ms Rawlings may recommend another fixed term lease if there were “no concerns” about a range of matters, including the condition of the property. The respondent also relied on an email sent by Ms Rawlings for the attention of the Minister dated 11 March 2026, which denied that there was any guarantee given about another fixed term lease. The respondent exhibited its “Probationary and fixed term lease agreements policy”, but there was no evidence to suggest that this was ever given, or comprehensively explained, to the applicant. The policy seems to anticipate the prospect of “another lease agreement” rather than an extension of any lease.5 The application for a stay 19 By her application for a stay dated 6 March 2026, the applicant sought an urgent hearing, claiming that “relevant facts were ignored and … the consequences of the decision are dire for myself and the children in my care”. 20 It is necessary for the applicant to demonstrate proper reasons for the favourable exercise of the discretion to grant a stay pending an application for 3 Affidavit of Ms Ocampo dated 12 March 2026, [1]. 4 Affidavit of Mr Pager dated 11 March 2026, p 2, [3]. 5 Affidavit of Mr Pager dated 11 March 2026, p 10. -- 5 of 9 -- [2026] SASCA 23 Livesey P 4 leave to appeal. Even assuming that there is a bona fide appeal with some prospect of success, it is also necessary for the applicant to address why the balance of convenience favours the grant of a stay, including any prejudice likely to be suffered by any party depending on whether a stay is or is not granted. If there is no utility in an appeal, it will usually be difficult to demonstrate that a stay should be granted.6 21 The “Lease agreement” which was signed on 26 February 2025 specified that it was a probationary lease with a fixed term starting on 4 March 2025 and ending on 3 March 2026. Though subject to various statutory provisions, this agreement is nonetheless a “lease” as ordinarily understood.7 By clause 35.2, the respondent was permitted to end the tenancy immediately in the event of a “serious breach”. Otherwise, by clause 35.3, the tenancy “will automatically end on the expiry date”. 22 The applicant has not demonstrated any arguable error in the reasons of the President concerning the questions whether she breached the terms of her tenancy and failed to remedy those breaches. In the circumstances, there appears to be no good reason to question the finding that, on the material available to the Tribunal, the respondent was justified in issuing a “Notice to remedy breach of the tenancy agreement” on 30 October 2025, followed by a “Notice of termination of the tenancy agreement” on 20 November 2025. 23 Accordingly, the respondent was permitted to seek an order for vacant possession on 8 December 2025 and, ultimately, the orders the subject of this appeal. It ought not be overlooked that the hearing in the Tribunal was punctuated by a number of adjournments because of the applicant’s ongoing failure to attend those hearings. 24 However, the issue raised yesterday is different. The applicant has raised for the first time the suggestion that an officer of the respondent represented that a new tenancy would be granted at the conclusion of the present tenancy. It is clear that there is, at the least, scope for dispute about what was said at the time of entry into the probationary 12-month lease in late February 2025. The competing assertions have not previously been aired and no findings have been made about them. Neither the applicant nor the respondent’s officer have been cross-examined. The hearing of an urgent stay application is not the occasion to resolve disputed questions of fact. 25 Making full allowance for the fact that the applicant is not legally represented and that she has not been in a position to put evidence or submissions before the Court in any considered way, I accept that she has raised an argument which could 6 Franklin v South Australian Housing Authority [2024] SASCA 3, [8] (Livesey P), and the cases there cited. See also Marschall v Elson (No 2) [2023] SASCA 3, [10] (Livesey P, Lovell and Doyle JJA). 7 Henderson v Housing Choices South Australia Ltd (2019) 345 FLR 412, [95] (Peek J). -- 6 of 9 -- [2026] SASCA 23 Livesey P 5 conceivably cut across the findings made by the Tribunal, though there is a question as to whether the applicant’s allegations go far enough.8 26 The respondent countered that the expired lease was for a fixed period and the powers of the Tribunal are limited. The respondent contended that it is not possible to extend, let alone suspend or stay the retaking of possession of, a lease which has expired in accordance with its own terms.9 The respondent relied on the maximum 90-day extension period contained in s 93(4) of the Residential Tenancies Act, which operates to the exclusion of the general power contained in s 110(1)(m) of that Act.10 27 The respondent also relied on the fact that any statement made by the respondent’s officer was necessarily subject to the applicant’s ongoing compliance with the terms of her lease agreement. She failed to do that. Any promised extension therefore fell away with the applicant’s failure to comply with the terms of her probationary 12-month lease before there was any opportunity to consider any extension or new lease. 28 As for any suggestion that, at best for the applicant, the officer’s representation concerned a new lease and not an extension of the old lease which has expired, the respondent relied on Crown Melbourne v Cosmopolitan Hotel.11 The respondent relied on that case for the proposition that any case on promissory estoppel requires that the representation be clear, precise and unambiguous, capable of being understood in a particular sense by the person to whom it is addressed, and that the resulting assumption be acted upon to the applicant’s detriment. 29 In that case, the plurality held that a landlord’s statement that tenants would be “looked after at renewal time” could not bind the landlord to offer a further lease because it “did not have the quality of a contractual promise of any kind”.12 The uncertain nature of the statement, combined with the absence of any agreed terms, meant that the statement lacked the adequate promissory quality to be binding. The landlord retained a discretion as to any future lease terms. There was no evidence of conduct undertaken in reliance on the statement.13 30 The plurality held that the phrase “looked after at renewal time” could not convey to a reasonable person that a further lease would be offered and, in any event, the tenants had not shown that any assumption was acted upon.14 For that reason, the High Court held that the Victorian Court of Appeal had erred in 8 Cf Franklin v South Australian Housing Authority [2024] SASCA 3, [24]-[25] (Livesey P). 9 Beamer Pty Ltd v Star Lodge Supported Residential Services Pty Ltd & Ors; Najjar Special Accommodation Services Pty Ltd & Ors v Kimis Pty Ltd & Ors [2005] VSC 236, [448]-[458] (Hollingworth J). 10 Upton & Anor v Fynes [2021] SACAT 84, [32]-[40] (Hughes P). 11 Crown Melbourne Ltd v Cosmopolitan Hotel (Vic) Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 1 (Crown Melbourne). 12 Crown Melbourne (2016) 260 CLR 1, [28] (French CJ, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 13 Crown Melbourne (2016) 260 CLR 1, [31]-[33] (French CJ, Kiefel and Bell JJ). 14 Crown Melbourne (2016) 260 CLR 1, [35], [39] (French CJ, Kiefel and Bell JJ). -- 7 of 9 -- [2026] SASCA 23 Livesey P 6 remitting the estoppel issue to the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal, as there was no possibility of making out the estoppel case.15 31 These are weighty considerations, suggesting that the applicant’s new case faces considerable difficulty, including the need to explain the failure to raise it earlier. Nonetheless, it is necessary to remember that this is a stay application being fought on untested evidence in circumstances of some urgency. 32 As for the balance of convenience, the respondent asserted that this favoured the respondent. It was suggested that there may be a problem with future rent payments. However, there is no evidence that the applicant has failed to pay rent. She is presently in credit on her rent payments. In addition, the applicant is willing to submit to a condition that she must continue to pay rent. 33 Moreover, the evidence provided by the applicant demonstrates that the balance of convenience strongly favours her. The applicant is a sole parent caring for three children aged 16, 14 and five years. According to her general practitioner, she is making significant progress in her own recovery from illicit drug use. The prospect of homelessness puts her at high risk of potential relapse. Her eldest child has developed significant anxiety and recently expressed suicidal thoughts related to the loss of his home. In addition, the applicant is continuing to deal with other, significant family stress associated with caring for her seriously ill father and brother. 34 These matters weigh heavily in connection with the balance of convenience, despite the obvious difficulties associated with the appellant’s prospects on appeal.16 35 Ultimately, and on balance, I am satisfied that there is sufficient merit in the applicant’s appeal to warrant a stay pending an early hearing of the appeal. Summary dismissal of the appeal 36 The respondent has applied for summary dismissal of the appeal on the basis that the applicant has no reasonable prospect of obtaining leave to appeal or otherwise succeeding on appeal. The application is made pursuant to r 212.5(2)(c)(ii) of the UCR. 37 The respondent relied on McVicars v South Australian Housing Trust (No 4) for the proposition that there is no point in granting the applicant an opportunity to amend the notice or grounds or, indeed, in allowing the matter to go to an appeal hearing because that would, in the circumstances, unnecessarily put the parties to further time, trouble and cost.17 15 Crown Melbourne (2016) 260 CLR 1, [41]-[44] (French CJ, Kiefel and Bell JJ) 16 Cf Hyde v Hyde & Ors [2026] SASCA 13, [36] (Livesey P, Bleby and B Doyle JJA). 17 McVicars v South Australian Housing Trust (No 4) [2025] SASCA 109, [25]-[28] (Livesey ACJ). -- 8 of 9 -- [2026] SASCA 23 Livesey P 7 38 In circumstances where there now appears to be some utility associated with this appeal, I am not prepared to summarily dismiss it. Conclusion 39 The application for a stay is granted. 40 The enforcement of the vacant possession order is stayed until midday on 23 April 2026, or until the further order of the Court, whichever is the earlier. That is on condition that the applicant continues to observe the terms of the probationary lease agreement, including continuing to pay rent. 41 I dismiss the application to summarily dismiss the appeal. The appeal will be heard in the Court of Appeal on 24 March 2026. 42 The parties have liberty to apply. Any question of costs is reserved. -- 9 of 9 --