DARREL RICHARD (a pseudonym) -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2026] WASCA 74

[2026] WASCA 74 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA) CITATION : DARREL RICHARD (a pseudonym) -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [2026] WASCA 74 CORAM : HALL JA SEAWARD JA SMITH J HEARD : 14 APRIL 2026 DELIVERED : 2 JUNE 2026 FILE NO/S : CACR 76 of 2025 BETWEEN : DARREL RICHARD (a pseudonym) Appellant AND THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Respondent ON APPEAL FROM: Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Coram : BARBAGALLO DCJ File Number : IND 601 of 2024 Catchwords: Criminal law - Appeal against sentence - Where appellant committed persistent serious violent and sexual offences against his wife over nine-year period - -- 1 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 Page 2 Where appellant pleaded guilty to 15 offences at first reasonable opportunity - Whether sentencing judge made express error in process by which sentence on count 1 was determined - Whether sentencing judge erred in manner in which discount for pleading guilty applied - Whether there was failure to apply discount to individual sentences - Whether sentence on count 4 manifestly excessive - Whether total effective sentence of 25 years' imprisonment breached totality principle - Whether total effective sentence failed to reflect pleas of guilty Legislation: Criminal Code (WA), s 297(3), s 300(1), s 304(2), s 317(1), s 326 Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 9AA Result: Leave to appeal on grounds 1, 4 and 5 granted Leave to appeal on ground 2 refused Appeal allowed Appellant resentenced Category: B Representation: Counsel: Appellant : C M Townsend Respondent : K C Cook Solicitors: Appellant : Albert Wolff Chambers Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) Case(s) referred to in decision(s): BSA v The State of Western Australia [2025] WASCA 31 Cheeseman v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 78 Eriha v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 167 Gomboc v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 115 -- 2 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 Page 3 Greenland v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 83 Kabambi v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44 Kaokula v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 198 Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; (1998) 194 CLR 610 Quirk v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 76 The State of Western Australia v Popal [2020] WASCA 200 The State of Western Australia v Tulloch [2025] WASCA 17 The State of Western Australia v Winch [2024] WASCA 79 Wilson v The State of Western Australia [2025] WASCA 8 -- 3 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 4 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: 1 Over a nine-year period, the appellant subjected his wife to a remorseless campaign of intimidation, coercive control and violence. The violence included strangulation, assaults with weapons and sexual assaults. The appellant's wife suffered serious injuries including lacerations, a haematoma, and multiple broken bones. Her ordeal finally came to an end when she fled the family home and reported the abuse to the police. 2 The appellant was arrested and charged. He was convicted on his pleas of guilty of 15 offences, including one of persistently engaging in family violence. For these offences, the appellant received a total effective sentence of 25 years' imprisonment. He now seeks leave to appeal against his sentence. 3 There are four grounds of appeal. Ground 1 alleges that the learned sentencing judge made an express error in the process by which she reached a sentence of 5 years' imprisonment on count 1 (the offence of persistent family violence). Ground 2 alleges that there was an error in the manner in which the discount for pleading guilty was applied. Ground 3 was abandoned. Ground 4 alleges that the sentence of 9 years' imprisonment on count 4 was manifestly excessive. Ground 5 alleges that the total effective sentence of 25 years' imprisonment infringed the first limb of the totality principle. 4 As regards ground 1, the sentencing judge did make the alleged error, but it was immaterial as no different sentence should have been imposed in respect of count 1. Ground 2 asserts that the judge erred by applying the discount for pleading guilty to the total sentence, rather than to the individual sentences. We do not accept that that is what the learned sentencing judge did when the whole of her remarks are properly considered. Ground 4 relates to an offence of doing an act which caused grievous bodily harm with intent to inflict such harm. That offence, in which the appellant attacked his wife with a hammer and a spanner and broke four of her bones, was particularly egregious. The sentence of 9 years' imprisonment was stern but well deserved. 5 Ground 5 is more difficult. The total sentence imposed in this case is longer by a very significant margin than any other case involving intrafamilial violence. This is a more serious case and includes sexual offending, as most of those other cases do not. That places it in relatively uncharted territory. Where offending is markedly -- 4 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 5 more serious than other broadly comparable cases, there may be a temptation to view any sentence, however high, as appropriate. However, the lack of truly comparable cases does not prevent this court from making an assessment of whether a breach of the totality principle has occurred. Discretion is always constrained by proportionality, even at the most serious end of the spectrum. Further, a total sentence must take into account all of the circumstances, including whether the appellant has pleaded guilty. 6 The appellant entered his pleas of guilty at the first reasonable opportunity. Those pleas were acknowledged by the sentencing judge as deserving of the highest possible discount, that is 25%. Whilst the discount is to be applied when determining each individual sentence, it should also be reflected in the total effective sentence. If pleas of guilty are not taken into account in the total sentence, there will be no incentive to enter such pleas. The policy in awarding discounts is to encourage early pleas of guilty where appropriate. Such pleas have benefits for the courts and the prosecution, but also for victims, particularly in cases of physical and sexual violence. Resolution of serious charges of that nature without the need for a trial avoids additional traumatisation of victims. If there is no perceptible advantage to pleading guilty, perpetrators may be tempted to use the prolongation of criminal proceedings as a way to further abuse and intimidate their victims. 7 In the present case, the total sentence of 25 years' imprisonment did not reflect the early pleas of guilty. That sentence is equivalent to a sentence after trial of something in excess of 33 years' imprisonment.1 Whilst the offending in this case was appalling and richly deserved a lengthy prison sentence, a total effective sentence of 25 years' imprisonment, having regard to all the circumstances, including the fact that the appellant pleaded guilty at the first reasonable opportunity, is unreasonable or plainly unjust. 8 For the more detailed reasons that follow, we would grant leave on grounds 1, 4 and 5, and refuse leave on ground 2. We would dismiss grounds 1 and 4 but uphold ground 5. We would resentence the appellant to a total effective sentence of 20 years' imprisonment. 1 An exact calculation is impossible because the discount for pleading guilty is made before taking into account any other mitigating factors, though there were few in this case. -- 5 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 6 The offences 9 The appellant was convicted on his pleas of guilty of 15 offences. The offences, the maximum statutory penalties and the sentences imposed are included in the following table: Count (Criminal Code (WA)) Offence (Criminal Code (WA)) Maximum term of imprisonment Sentence 1 Persistent family violence s 300(1) 14 years' imprisonment 5 years'2 imprisonment Cumulative 2 With intent to harm, did an act causing bodily harm s 304(2) 20 years' imprisonment 1 year's imprisonment 3 Aggravated unlawful wounding s 301(1) 7 years' imprisonment 2 years' imprisonment 4 With intent to harm, did an act causing bodily harm s 304(2) 20 years' imprisonment 9 years' imprisonment (Head Sentence) 5 With intent to harm, did an act causing bodily harm s 304(2) 5 years'3 imprisonment Cumulative 6 With intent to harm, did an act causing bodily harm s 304(2) 4 years' imprisonment 7 Aggravated grievous bodily harm s 297(3) 14 years' imprisonment 4 years' imprisonment 8 With intent to harm, did an act causing bodily harm s 304(2) 20 years' imprisonment 7 years' imprisonment 2 Reduced from 11 years for totality and to avoid double punishment. 3 Reduced from 7 years for totality. -- 6 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 7 Count (Criminal Code (WA)) Offence (Criminal Code (WA)) Maximum term of imprisonment Sentence 9 Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm s 317(1) 7 years' imprisonment 2 years' imprisonment 10 Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm s 317(1) 3 years' imprisonment 11 With intent to harm, did an act causing bodily harm s 304(2) 20 years' imprisonment 2 years' imprisonment 12 Aggravated sexual penetration without consent s 326 3 years'4 imprisonment Cumulative 13 Aggravated sexual penetration without consent s 326 3 years'5 imprisonment Cumulative 14 Aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm s 317(1) 7 years' imprisonment 2 years' imprisonment 15 Aggravated sexual penetration without consent s 326 20 years' imprisonment 5 years' imprisonment The facts 10 In 2001, the appellant and the victim (who we will refer to in these reasons by the pseudonym of Veronica) met and commenced a relationship. The appellant was three years and six months older than Veronica, who was 19 years of age at the time. Veronica did not get 4 Reduced from 5 years for totality. 5 Reduced from 6 years for totality. -- 7 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 8 along with her family and moved in with the appellant shortly after meeting him.6 11 In 2004, the appellant and Veronica had a child, a son. There were no issues in the relationship at this time, and when the appellant proposed to Veronica, she accepted. They were married in 2007 and moved to a house in suburban Perth. For approximately five years, Veronica and the appellant's relationship continued without event.7 12 In around 2012, the appellant had a work accident, which caused him to experience erectile dysfunction. At around this time, both the appellant and Veronica's methylamphetamine use increased. The combination of these two issues appears to have caused a change in the nature of the relationship. In particular, severe violence and emotional, financial and physical abuse by the appellant came to be features of the relationship.8 13 Between 2012 and May 2023, the appellant persistently engaged in family violence against Veronica. He regularly assaulted Veronica by punching her to the face and head, burning her with cigarette lighters, methylamphetamine pipes and blow torches, and used tools and other articles, such as baseball bats, to inflict injuries on her body. These assaults mostly occurred within the family home.9 14 [Redacted]. Other photographs depicted burns, scarring and injuries to other parts of her body, including her legs and torso.10 15 Due to the frequency and nature of the assaults on Veronica, the length of time over which they occurred, and the trauma she suffered, she is unable to provide details of many of the assaults. It is also difficult for her to identify with any degree of particularity when specific injuries were caused, other than where there is independent evidence in the form of medical records.11 16 The appellant frequently strangled Veronica as punishment.12 He would use one or two hands in a chokehold. She would be unable to breathe or call out. On occasions, she would try to pull the appellant's hands away from her throat. She deliberately did not grow her nails in 6 ts 8. 7 ts 9. 8 ts 9. 9 ts 9. 10 ts 12. 11 ts 13. 12 ts 13. -- 8 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 9 order to prevent having scratch marks on her throat from having to prise the appellant's hands away. Veronica's neck still feels sore from these attacks, and she cannot turn her head freely. She has suffered permanent damage to her airway, causing difficulty in intubation. Her voice has been permanently changed by becoming deeper and huskier.13 17 An expert medical report records the existence of a 7 mm long dissection (tear) of the cervical segment of the left internal carotid artery, and that the dissection was likely due to one of the previous strangulations that Veronica had experienced.14 18 The appellant and Veronica's son left home in November 2022. The strangulations became longer and more intense after that time. The appellant would push Veronica to the ground and sit on her and choke her with both hands. She would, on some occasions, pass out or convulse as a result of these attacks.15 19 Veronica also suffered serious injuries caused by the appellant. These include multiple broken noses, multiple broken fingers, two broken knees, two broken legs, two broken arms, a broken wrist and multiple broken ribs. Her eye socket has been dislodged, causing her to suffer from diplopia (double vision). She also has a carotid arterial dissection to her neck as a result of the strangling. She has been told that she will need surgery to repair some of the damage to her body.16 20 The appellant would regularly punish Veronica for mistakes that he considered she had made or for not performing sexually for him. The punishment would be in the form of burns, twisting her skin with pliers, stabbing her with screwdrivers, and blows to her body.17 21 On many occasions Veronica agreed to engage in sex to keep the peace, rather than freely consenting. She also learnt other behaviours to keep the appellant calm, such as leaving the television on a show that he liked in order to create a distraction.18 22 On some occasions, the appellant would use weapons to hit Veronica. He hit her with meat cleavers and hammers. On one occasion, she woke in a bedroom on the bottom of a set of bunkbeds. She did not initially recognise where she was. The appellant's sister 13 ts 14. 14 Clinical Forensic Medicine WA report dated 31 October 2024, par 131. 15 ts 14. 16 ts 14. 17 ts 14. 18 ts 15. -- 9 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 10 was on the floor next to her and told her that she was safe and at the appellant's mother's house. Veronica does not remember how she got there or what had happened prior to this in order for her to end up there. However, the appellant's sister recalled picking up Veronica in around 2015 or 2016 and when she arrived, Veronica was naked with a sleeping bag wrapped around her and had marks all over her body. Veronica recalls that she was in excruciating pain and had bruises and cuts all over her body, but had no recollection of how she got those injuries. She was not taken for medical attention on that occasion. 23 On 5 September 2015, Veronica needed to undergo surgery to repair her lip, which was already damaged as a result of repeated assaults. [Redacted]. 24 Due to the extent of the offending, many of the injuries such as the diplopia, the lip trauma, the [redacted] scarring and the carotid dissection, are not the subject of a charged offence as they are the result of a multitude of assaults that the victim can no longer recall with any particularity. They do, however, form part of the context in which the charged offences occurred.19 25 The appellant's control of Veronica was not only exerted through violence and threats of violence. At some point in the relationship, Veronica either stole or defrauded the appellant's family of approximately $10,000. The appellant constantly threatened Veronica with exposure and with reporting this offending to the police.20 26 The appellant's erectile dysfunction worsened and the appellant blamed Veronica for this. He repeatedly threatened to report her to the police for what he said was sexual abuse of him. He made video and audio recordings on his telephone, which he claimed were proof of this sexual abuse.21 Some of these recordings were later located by police. They show Veronica performing sex acts upon the appellant while he repeatedly accuses her of sexual abuse.22 The appellant told Veronica that he was keeping the recordings as proof of her abuse of him so that he could give them to the police if he needed to. When arrested, the appellant told police that these videos would, as he put it, '[e]xplain a lot about their relationship'.23 The recordings do not support the 19 ts 15. 20 ts 16. 21 ts 16. 22 ts 33. 23 ts 16. -- 10 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 11 appellant's claims of abuse. Rather, they show that the appellant created a false narrative in order to exercise control over Veronica.24 27 On occasion, Veronica was tied up during sex as a form of punishment. If she squirmed because she did not want the appellant to do something to her, he would tie her up so she could not move. He would tie her up with a vacuum cleaner cord in a starfish position, with each arm and leg tied to a post of the bed. This happened in the last two years of the relationship, when the violence was escalating. Veronica estimates that the appellant tied her up in this fashion at least once a week during that period of time.25 28 During the period of the offending, the appellant isolated Veronica and controlled everything that she did. She was timed when she went to the shops and was given a set amount of money to spend. She was not allowed access to her own keycard and was questioned if she took longer than expected. This would often escalate into an argument and then physical violence.26 29 The doors to the house were constantly key locked and the appellant would hide the keys from Veronica. If the appellant went to work without her, he would leave her in the company of his mother or sister. She was not permitted to do anything on her own. If she required medical treatment, particularly in regard to injuries received as a result of assaults by the appellant, the appellant would work out what story she would give prior to her attending the hospital. He would then question Veronica and force her to practise the story to get it right before going to the hospital. The appellant took her to different hospitals in an attempt to conceal the extent of the family violence being perpetrated by him.27 30 The appellant obtained work as a farm hand and Veronica would, at times, work with him on the farm. The appellant told the owner of the farm that he brought Veronica with him because 'she would get into trouble if she was left'. At no time was Veronica on the payroll. On the occasions that she did do work at the farm, her pay was included in that paid to the appellant.28 24 ts 95. 25 ts 20. 26 ts 16. 27 ts 16 - 17. 28 ts 17. -- 11 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 12 Count 1 - persistent family violence 31 This count alleged that the appellant had persistently engaged in family violence against Veronica between 1 January 2014 and 6 May 2023.29 A person persistently engages in family violence if the person does an act of family violence on three or more occasions against the same person, each of which is on a different day over a period not exceeding 10 years.30 An act of family violence is an act that would constitute a prescribed offence in relation to a person with whom the offender is in a designated family relationship.31 A designated family relationship includes marriage. Prescribed offences include unlawful wounding, doing an act that causes bodily harm, common assault, assault causing bodily harm, indecent assault and aggravated indecent assault. 32 32 The State identified 11 prescribed offences that constituted the family violence referred to in count 1. These prescribed offences were not covered by other counts in the indictment.33 Accordingly, there was no overlap between count 1 and the other counts, though they all occurred in the same context. 33 Prescribed offence 1 is an aggravated assault causing bodily harm. This occurred in 2014, when the appellant broke Veronica's nose.34 34 Prescribed offence 2 is an aggravated assault causing bodily harm. This offence occurred in December 2014, when the appellant punched and kicked Veronica until she was sore all over her body with cuts and bruises down her side.35 35 Prescribed offence 3 is an aggravated assault causing bodily harm. This offence occurred in around 2014 or 2015, when the appellant cut Veronica's neck twice with a paint scraper. On this occasion, the appellant was angry because Veronica had come outside while he was working on a car and said 'hello' to a neighbour. When she got to the carport, the appellant threw her to the ground and reminded her that she was not allowed to come outside. He then sliced the right-side of her 29 ts 89; WAB 51. Her Honour Barbagallo DCJ refers to the offending occurring between sometime in 2014 and 4 May 2023. However, in accordance with the appellant's indictment IND 601 of 2024, under which he was charged, the dates of offending are between 1 January 2014 and 6 May 2023. 30 Criminal Code (WA), s 299, s 300. 31 Criminal Code, s 299, s 300. 32 Criminal Code, s 299(1). 33 ts 95. 34 ts 95. 35 ts 95. -- 12 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 13 neck with a paint scraper and told her that the next time it would be her throat. [Redacted]. 36 Prescribed offence 4 is an aggravated assault causing bodily harm. On an unknown date between 2014 and 2016, Veronica was living at a caravan park after she had attempted to leave the appellant. The appellant came to visit and became convinced that Veronica was out with someone else when he could not find her. When he found Veronica, he attacked her using his fists and a meat cleaver. He hit her across the back of her legs, arms and head with the meat cleaver. Veronica recalls a lot of blood and leaving the caravan park without cleaning up. She recalls that [redacted] she did not want to have to explain it to anybody.36 37 Prescribed offence 5 is an aggravated assault causing bodily harm. On or around 31 July 2022, the appellant grabbed the victim's finger, bent it backwards and broke it.37 38 Prescribed offence 6 is an offence of aggravated unlawful wounding. On occasions, the appellant would place a kettlebell in the middle of their bed whilst asleep to stop the blankets being pulled off him by Veronica. One night in 2021, while Veronica was asleep in bed, the appellant hit her to the head with the kettlebell, which split her head open in two places. She lost consciousness for a period and later asked the appellant to obtain medical treatment for her. He used butterfly strips to stick the splits in her head together, but refused to take her to a doctor. [Redacted]. 39 Prescribed offence 7 is an offence of aggravated assault causing bodily harm. On 18 October 2022, Veronica was sexually stimulating the appellant with her hand on his penis. Due to her left wrist being broken from a previous assault, she could not maintain a rhythm, causing the appellant to become angry. He was also angry with Veronica for exhaling methylamphetamine smoke from drugs they were sharing. He punched her to the face with a hand in which he was holding a lighter. This caused one of Veronica's [redacted] teeth to become loose. The sexual activity continued, but the appellant became angry when he kissed Veronica and could taste blood, so he struck her in the mouth again. The appellant told Veronica to make him ejaculate before allowing her to go to the bathroom to attend to her injury. The tooth was dislodged and has since been lost. This offence occurred 36 ts 96. 37 ts 96. -- 13 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 14 approximately one week after the offence that is the subject of count 10, which also relates to an assault resulting in loss of another [redacted] tooth. Veronica later attended a dental implant business and obtained a quote for repairs. The appellant said that he would get her teeth fixed when her behaviour improved.38 40 Prescribed offence 8 is an offence of aggravated common assault. On this occasion, on a date unknown, the appellant threw a glass cup at Veronica and hit her in the face.39 41 Prescribed offence 9 is an offence of aggravated common assault. On this occasion, the appellant threw a yellow blowtorch bottle at Veronica, hitting her in the face.40 42 Prescribed offence 10 is an offence of aggravated assault causing bodily harm. On another occasion during the last two years of the relationship, the appellant hit Veronica on the head and the shoulder with a baseball bat after claiming that she had flirted with a man who had bought drugs from the appellant. Veronica went to hospital a few days later after falling over in the night. She had an X-ray, which revealed a broken collarbone. She cannot be certain whether the broken collarbone was as a result of the appellant hitting her with the baseball bat or her falling over in the night as a result of concussion.41 43 Prescribed offence 11 is an offence of aggravated common assault. On another occasion, the appellant burnt Veronica's back and legs with a blowtorch. She did not go to hospital on that occasion.42 Count 2 - with intent to harm, unlawfully caused bodily harm 44 On a date between 1 January 2015 and 4 April 2016, Veronica tripped over the appellant's air compressor in the shed. When they went back inside the house, she complained about how much her shin hurt from tripping. The appellant said, 'Well if you want to feel something that actually hurts', and went to get a meat cleaver. He brought the cleaver back and started hitting Veronica with it, striking her around the legs. She suffered cuts and bruises.43 38 ts 97. 39 ts 98. 40 ts 98. 41 ts 98. 42 ts 98. 43 ts 99. -- 14 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 15 Count 3 - aggravated unlawful wounding 45 On 5 September 2015, Veronica and the appellant were in the hobby room of their house, smoking methylamphetamine. Veronica accidentally broke one of the methylamphetamine pipes. The appellant was holding a paring knife at the time. He became angry about the broken pipe and made a stabbing gesture with the knife towards Veronica. She held her hand up as a defence and the knife pierced the middle of her right hand. 46 The appellant wrapped Veronica's hand in a tea towel and took her to a hospital. She told health workers that she had fallen and cut her hand on a sharp car part. She had approximately five stitches and was made to stay at the hospital for approximately a week to do hand physiotherapy. [Redacted]. Count 4 - with intent to harm, unlawfully caused bodily harm 47 On a day between 16 June 2016 and 30 June 2016, the appellant and Veronica drove to bushland in Red Hill. Once there, the appellant repeatedly questioned Veronica about a conversation she had had in the previous month with an unknown male in relation to drug dealing. The appellant was calm at first but became angry, demanding, 'Tell me everything you know, I am just going to break you', and, 'What did he look like?'.44 48 The appellant and Veronica got out of the car and the appellant picked up a hammer and struck Veronica to her right lower leg, causing her immediate pain. The appellant again demanded, 'Tell me who it was', to which Veronica replied, 'I don't know', and made an unsuccessful attempt to get up from the ground where she had fallen so she could run away. 49 The appellant then picked up a large shifting spanner and struck Veronica first to one kneecap and then the other, causing her immediate pain. 50 The appellant continued to demand information, telling Veronica that he believed she was lying and that she was not to move. He said, 'I am going to break you some more' before swinging the spanner down towards her head. Veronica lifted up her arm to protect her face and the spanner hit her arm. She felt immediate pain and heard a crack. She 44 ts 99 - 100. -- 15 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 16 rolled into a foetal position to try to protect herself, anticipating further assaults. 51 The appellant then picked up Veronica, placed her in the car and took her home. He refused to allow her to obtain medical treatment for a week. She begged the appellant to take her to a hospital. He finally did so, after forcing her to rehearse a story about a [redacted] accident to cover how she received the injuries. 52 On 30 June 2016, Veronica attended a hospital and underwent a medical examination, which confirmed that her lower right leg (tibia) was broken, requiring surgery and the insertion of a metal rod. Her lower left arm (ulna), was also broken, requiring surgery with pins and screws inserted in order to set it.45 53 The damage to Veronica's kneecaps was overlooked until 20 July 2016, when she attended hospital again. As she had complained about ongoing knee pain, an X-ray was performed, confirming that she had broken kneecaps on both legs. The kneecaps healed without surgery.46 Count 5 - with intent to harm, unlawfully caused bodily harm 54 On a day between 7 July 2016 and 30 July 2016, Veronica and the appellant were at home after she had been released from hospital following the events referred to in respect of count 4. She was lying down while the appellant administered blood-thinning injections, which required her to remain still. The appellant was questioning her about whether or not a rod had been surgically inserted into her leg. The appellant went to the kitchen and returned a short time later with a 10 cm paring knife. 55 Veronica was fearful of what the appellant intended to do, but continued to lie still. The appellant said, 'I am checking to see whether they put a rod in there'. The appellant sliced once across the victim's lower right leg, midway down her leg, causing a laceration approximately 5 cm long and opening the skin up sufficiently for the wound to bleed heavily. 56 On 30 July 2016, Veronica had to visit the hospital for a check-up and the wound was observed by a treating doctor. The laceration was unable to be pulled together due to tension on the skin but it was 45 ts 100. 46 ts 100. -- 16 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 17 sufficiently deep enough that an X-ray was required to confirm that there had been no damage to the underlying bone.47 Count 6 - with intent to harm, unlawfully caused bodily harm 57 On a day between 23 December 2019 and 31 December 2019, Veronica and the appellant were in their bedroom at home. The appellant wanted Veronica to participate in sexual activity but she did not want to. She was on the bed when the appellant grabbed a blue baseball bat that he kept in the bedroom. He swung the baseball bat, striking Veronica to the right ankle. She cried out in pain and the appellant told her to be quiet. 58 Veronica curled into a foetal position on the bed and attempted to roll away. The appellant swung the baseball bat a second time and struck her on the left ankle. 59 Veronica did not seek medical attention for approximately one week following this assault, as she had other injuries not recorded that she did not want to explain and that she could not conceal with makeup or hair. On 31 December 2019, she attended a hospital and an X-ray was performed. It confirmed that she had a broken right ankle as a result of the assault.48 Count 7 - aggravated doing of grievous bodily harm 60 On a day between 20 and 31 July 2022, the appellant and Veronica returned home from work and were walking into the house. Veronica was carrying various work and lunch bags. The appellant became angry because, in his view, she was taking too long, the dog had run away, and it was raining. The appellant and Veronica were in the doorway of the house when the appellant picked up a baseball bat that was near the front door and swung it at Veronica. He struck her to the upper-side of her left lower arm, causing immediate pain. She thought her arm was broken and asked to be taken to the hospital to receive medical attention. The appellant refused and told her that he needed her at work for the next week. 61 During the following week, Veronica experienced intense pain to her arm. On 31 July 2020, she attended a hospital and had an X-ray. It was found that she had a fractured radius, and surgery was required to insert a rod and properly set the broken bone. She also had a fracture to 47 ts 101. 48 ts 101 - 102. -- 17 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 18 a finger, requiring sedation in order to have the finger properly aligned. It is believed that the finger injury was the result of a different assault.49 Count 8 - with intent to harm, unlawfully caused bodily harm 62 On 17 August 2020, the appellant and Veronica were in the bedroom at home, engaging in sexual activity. The appellant wanted to penetrate Veronica's vagina with a baseball bat. She told him that she did not want him to do that. The appellant became angry at her refusal and used the thick end of the baseball bat that he was holding to hit Veronica's vagina. He hit the right-side of her vagina, below the pubic bone, without penetrating the vagina. He used some force, and Veronica felt immediate pain. 63 The area in which Veronica had been assaulted began to swell, causing her pain, including pain whilst urinating, and an inability to sit or walk properly. Given the size of the swelling, the appellant took Veronica to a hospital to get medical treatment. She required surgery to remove a large haematoma from her right labia, which measured 71 mm by 36 mm. Without surgery, Veronica would not have been able to urinate properly and may have suffered permanent injury to her vagina.50 64 This was not an isolated occurrence. When violence escalated during sex as a result of the victim saying no, she would be punished by being hit, punched, strangled, or sexually punished.51 Count 9 - aggravated assault causing bodily harm 65 On a day between 31 May 2022 and 1 September 2022, the appellant and Veronica were sharing a methylamphetamine pipe when he became angry at her because he believed she was wasting some of the drugs. He took a cigarette lighter from her and jammed it into the hollow of her throat, causing a significant burn which blistered. He then wanted to have sex with Veronica and did not allow her to attend to her neck for another 10 - 15 minutes.52 Count 10 - aggravated assault causing bodily harm 66 On a day between 1 and 31 October 2022, the appellant and Veronica were in the bedroom on the bed, facing each other. Veronica 49 ts 102. 50 ts 102 - 103. 51 ts 103. 52 ts 103. -- 18 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 19 was using her hands to sexually stimulate the appellant. The appellant was holding a methylamphetamine pipe in one hand and a lighter in the other. It was common for the appellant to use methylamphetamine during sexual activity. The appellant started to exchange the smoke he had inhaled from the pipe into Veronica's mouth. He became angry as he believed that she was failing to inhale the smoke for a sufficient period of time. He struck her to the mouth with a clenched fist and whilst holding the lighter. 67 Veronica felt her [redacted] tooth come loose, and she clenched her teeth shut to keep the tooth in. The appellant believed that Veronica was angry with him. He asked her to show him her tooth. When she opened her mouth, blood spilt over the appellant and the bed. This angered the appellant who, with a closed right fist, still holding the lighter, forcibly jabbed Veronica to the mouth, dislodging the tooth altogether and causing it to fall to the floor of the bedroom. 68 The appellant picked up the tooth from the floor and told Veronica that he intended to keep it as a memento. She asked for her tooth back, but the appellant refused. She applied an ice pack to her mouth. She experienced swelling and further bleeding. A week later, the appellant behaved in the same manner, causing Veronica to lose her other [redacted] tooth (see count 1, prescribed offence 7).53 Count 11 - with intent to harm, unlawfully caused bodily harm 69 On a date unknown in 2023, Veronica was helping the appellant on the farm where he worked. Their son was also with them. Their son was approximately 19 years old at the time. Veronica and her son were holding up a piece of gyprock. The appellant became angry that Veronica was not holding the gyprock properly and stabbed a Tek gun that he was using into her leg a few times. As he did so, he turned it on whilst it was held against her skin. A Tek gun is an impact drill driver.54 70 Photographs [redacted], taken later, showed scarring [redacted] from the impact of the drill driver. [Redacted]. Counts 12 and 13 - aggravated sexual penetration without consent 71 On a date unknown between 1 and 4 May 2023, the appellant and Veronica were in the bedroom. The appellant had jammed the bedroom 53 ts 103 - 104. 54 ts 104. -- 19 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 20 door shut as the lock was broken. They were engaged in sexual activity, and they had both used methylamphetamine. 72 Veronica was on the floor, between the appellant's legs, performing oral sex on him. He was seated on the edge of the bed. Her [redacted] teeth were missing as a result of the previous assaults and, as she performed oral sex, she inadvertently scraped his penis with her remaining teeth, causing him pain. He hit her on the head with a closed fist and pushed her away. She rolled back off her knees and went into the foetal position on the floor. 73 The appellant then asked Veronica if she was clean and told her to go and have a shower to clean herself. As she was showering, the appellant came into the bathroom with a large vibrator, which was approximately the size of a one litre bottle. A number of dildos and vibrators were subsequently found in the house. It was not possible to identify which of the items was used on this occasion. Veronica was fearful of what the appellant was planning. When she returned to the bedroom, the appellant was lying naked on the bed. She saw a reciprocating saw, the vibrator, lubricant, and needles for methylamphetamine on the bedside table. She said nothing at this time as she knew from previous experience it would only exacerbate the appellant's anger. She did not wish to engage in any further sexual activity as they had already had sexual intercourse approximately five to six times that day. However, she felt guilty and consented to do so when the appellant promised it would be the last time that day.55 74 Veronica lay down on the bed and she and the appellant startled fondling each other's genitals. The appellant then inserted his hand into Veronica's vagina. The appellant said that he wanted to try something new, and put two hands into her vagina at the same time. She said 'no', as she was due to have her period and had pains in her stomach. The appellant said that she was making excuses and inserted his second hand into her vagina, causing her extreme pain. Veronica began to cry and the appellant told her to 'suck it up'. That conduct relates to count 12 on the indictment. 56 75 Sometime shortly after the previous incident, Veronica masturbated the appellant's penis. When, due to her loss of concentration, she hurt his penis, the appellant accused her of doing it on purpose because she did not want to use two hands. The appellant 55 ts 104 - 105. 56 ts 105. -- 20 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 21 then picked up the vibrator and attempted to insert it into Veronica's anus as a form of punishment. She tried to slide away from the appellant to prevent him from inserting the vibrator into her anus. However, the appellant persisted, and he also put his hand into her vagina at the same time. As he was inserting the vibrator, the appellant said, 'Don't push just relax'. Veronica had a natural urge to push the vibrator out of her anus and she lost control of her bowels, causing her to defecate. The appellant became angry, removing his hand from her vagina. She got out of the bed and went to the shower, with the vibrator still inserted. 76 The appellant was yelling, saying, 'There's a big mess to clean' and that 'I told you not to push, to relax'. Veronica cleaned herself, the sheets, and the vibrator in the shower. She then tried to appease the appellant by telling him that they could wait until a bit later to try again. She said this in order to calm him down. She had started to bleed from her vagina, and had intense pains in her stomach which she likened to labour pains. She continued to experience faecal incontinence for days after this incident, together with heavy cramp-like pains. This conduct constitutes count 13 on the indictment.57 Counts 14 and 15 - aggravated assault causing bodily harm and aggravated sexual penetration without consent 77 On 4 May 2023, Veronica and the appellant were at home in the lounge room. She was performing fellatio on him and accidentally scraped his penis with her teeth. 78 The appellant grabbed an ornamental steel banana and struck Veronica to the right-side of her head with the pointed end of the banana. There was impact with the inside of her right ear. She cried out in pain, felt hot, dizzy, and nauseous, and bled from the inside of her ear as a result. This conduct constitutes count 14 on the indictment.58 79 The appellant applied rudimentary first aid to Veronica's ear by inserting something to stop the bleeding and then pulling her beanie down to hold it in place. He then pushed her head and mouth back onto his penis, forcing her to continue performing fellatio on him. That conduct constitutes count 15 on the indictment.59 57 ts 105 - 106. 58 ts 106. 59 ts 106. -- 21 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 22 80 Later the same day, Veronica and the appellant argued. She had left the back door unlocked so that their dog could leave the house. Usually, the appellant would check to make sure that the door was locked, but he failed to do so on this occasion. Veronica went out to the backyard of the house. She believed she would be safer there because the appellant would not do anything that could be seen or heard by the neighbours. The appellant chased her out to the backyard, and she ran back inside and locked the glass door behind her. She feared that he would break the door. She grabbed some shoes and fled the house. She hid in a nearby garden for approximately one hour. 81 Veronica then walked to her sister-in-law's house and told her everything that had happened in the previous few days. She went to a hospital later that day and received medical treatment for her ear and ongoing incontinence problems that she had suffered as a result of the offence constituted by count 13. She did not return to the marital house after this time.60 The arrest and police interview of the appellant 82 The appellant was arrested on 4 August 2023. He participated in an electronic record of interview that lasted approximately three and a half hours.61 In that interview, he claimed that he had video footage of Veronica's sexual abuse of him on his mobile telephone. He said he had told her that he was recording the 'abuse' for the purpose of showing it to the police. He said he blamed her for injuring his penis, and that the police could see footage of this on his mobile telephone.62 83 The appellant said that both he and Veronica were on unemployment benefits, and that she was able to keep the benefits she received and had her own bank card.63 He said that Veronica did not have her own mobile telephone because she did not need one as they were together all of the time.64 He accounted for Veronica's facial injuries by saying that they occurred when he pushed her off him when she was sexually abusing him. He said he could only take so much and then had to push her off. When requested to provide details as to how 60 ts 106 - 107. 61 ts 107. 62 ts 108. 63 ts 32. 64 ts 108. -- 22 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 23 Veronica had abused him, he said that the police would be able to see it in the footage.65 84 Later in the interview, the appellant claimed that cuts to Veronica's face came from her passing out from low iron and collapsing onto a wall. He said that her broken ankle was from a shopping trolley. He said that the broken leg and kneecaps were from a [redacted] accident. He said that he did not know how she had got a broken arm. He said that she lost her [redacted] teeth from pulling on sheets with her teeth during sex. He said that he did not know how she had got the haematoma to her vagina. He claimed that when he inserted two hands into her vagina it was with her consent, and that she had inserted the vibrator into her anus.66 85 The appellant told police that he had never struck Veronica but said he had pushed her off him a couple of times and she had fallen on to the bedhead. He said that on one of these occasions, a few years ago, she had got a deep cut to her inside right arm. She did not go to hospital because it healed by itself.67 86 Following the interview, police searched the house to look for the devices the appellant stated would have Veronica's sexual abuse recorded on them. Police located a number of devices on which there were numerous recordings of Veronica masturbating the appellant whilst he talked about her sexual abuse of him. There were also audio recordings of sexual activity in which the appellant could be heard threatening Veronica, whilst slapping or hitting her. None of the recordings revealed any offences of sexual abuse committed by Veronica upon the appellant.68 87 The appellant remained in custody from the time of his arrest on 4 August 2023. He pleaded guilty to the offences at the earliest reasonable opportunity.69 Victim impact 88 Veronica attended various hospital emergency departments on at least 13 occasions. She did not seek medical attention every time she was assaulted. The appellant would often refuse to allow her to obtain 65 ts 108. 66 ts 107 - 108. 67 ts 108. 68 ts 109. 69 ts 33. -- 23 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 24 medical attention, and, if she did go, would decide what the medical staff would be told in order to account for the injuries. 89 Medical records confirm that, during the period of the abuse, Veronica received the following injuries; three broken noses; multiple rib fractures; a broken collarbone; a right upper arm fracture; a laceration to the hand; loss of tissue from repeated splits to the lip; a right leg fracture; a right ankle fracture; two left arm fractures; multiple finger fractures; a left knee fracture; a right knee fracture; a labial haematoma; vernacular diplopia (misalignment of the eye socket causing double vision); dissection of the carotid artery; [redacted]. All of these injuries were the result of assaults by the appellant.70 90 Veronica continues to suffer from her injuries, some of which will require further treatment and surgery. [Redacted]. 91 Veronica provided a victim impact statement. She said that she loved the appellant and still loves him, though she also fears him. She said that she has come to hate the way she looks and how she feels about herself. She said that she ran away to stop the appellant hurting her and because she feared what he would do. Veronica no longer has confidence in herself and believes that she is broken and not good enough. She does not believe that she can ever again have an intimate relationship, and would rather remain single and safe. 92 Veronica states that the appellant controlled all the finances and she felt that there was nothing that belonged to her. She now finds that she does not have the ability to manage money. She spends money as soon as she gets it as she is scared that someone will take it off her. She was unable to work for much of the time whilst married to the appellant. When she did work the appellant kept her earnings. She has no superannuation. 93 Veronica states that prior to the abuse, she was a friendly, easy-going person. She was isolated during the abuse and the only people she knew were the appellant's family. She now feels very lonely and says it is difficult for her to socialise with others or find employment [redacted]. She lacks trust in other people and feels like she is only half the person that she once was. It is hard for her to make friends, and she no longer has a relationship with her son as he has accepted the appellant's account that she was the abuser. Veronica says that the appellant introduced her to drugs and that she only used drugs 70 ts 33. -- 24 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 25 as a way to connect with him. She has not used drugs since leaving him. She has had to cope with withdrawing from drug use and medical treatments on her own. 94 Veronica describes what she went through, accurately, as torture. The psychological impact includes anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder. She is hypervigilant and triggered by mundane events, such as a slamming door. She is currently receiving treatment for her mental health and expects this to continue for a long time. A report from her treating psychologist confirmed the impact on Veronica's mental health and her significant treatment needs. Personal circumstances 95 The appellant was born on 17 October 1978. He was 46 years of age at the time of sentencing and between 35 and 44 years during the period of the offending. 96 The appellant is the middle of three children born to his parents' union, and the only son. His parents separated when he was an adult. There was domestic violence in the family, perpetrated by his father on his mother. There was also domestic violence in the appellant's grandparents' home. The appellant had a close relationship with both of his parents and overall described a positive childhood. His mother passed away four years ago from cancer, and the appellant is estranged from his father.71 97 The most significant intimate relationship that the appellant has had in his life has been with Veronica. That relationship spanned 22 years, having commenced in early 2001. Veronica was a friend of the appellant's younger sister. The relationship commenced when the appellant was aged 22. There was one child of the marriage, a son who is now 20 years of age.72 The appellant's son remains supportive of him and is estranged from Veronica. The sentencing judge noted that the son appeared to have accepted the appellant's false narrative that he was the real victim.73 98 The appellant was diagnosed with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and dyslexia as a child. This resulted in him having to repeat a year of primary school. His education was further impacted 71 ts 114. 72 ts 114. 73 ts 109. -- 25 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 26 by a motor vehicle accident when he was 13. This resulted in him being homeschooled for a year whilst he recovered. He suffered a number of serious injuries as a result of that accident, and experienced bullying and social isolation. Prior to the injuries, the appellant had had a positive experience at school and was a reliable attendee. He left school after completing year 10 when he was 16 years of age. 99 After leaving school, the appellant attended a program designed to build self-confidence and prepare him for the workplace. Following this, he commenced work as a metal worker and continued in that work for two years. He then worked as a plasterer's labourer for two years, before becoming a plasterer. He worked as a plasterer for the next 14 years. At the end of that period, the appellant was 35 years of age and suffered from an increasingly painful back injury. As a result, he had to cease working.74 100 The appellant then derived an income from dealing in illicit drugs. This continued for a period of approximately three years. When the appellant was aged 38, he gained employment as a farmhand. He was still employed in that role when he was arrested and charged. 101 The appellant continues to suffer from ongoing back pain and receives analgesic medication to manage his discomfort. He is otherwise in reasonably good physical health. 102 In terms of his mental health, the appellant claims that his use of methylamphetamine was fuelled by his 'bad head space'. He was diagnosed with bipolar disorder in his early 30s; however, the appellant believes (but has not confirmed) that this was a misdiagnosis. He was prescribed medication for this condition but did not find it helpful. The appellant claims that he has no current mental health concerns. 75 103 The appellant is a non-smoker and rarely drinks alcohol. He commenced using methylamphetamine when he was 35 years of age. At that time, he used the drug approximately three times a day and funded this use by dealing in drugs. The appellant had periods of abstinence of up to four years; however, he admits that he continued to use methylamphetamine in recent years. He has participated in a Narcotics Anonymous program whilst remanded in custody and has expressed a willingness to undertake substance abuse counselling.76 74 ts 115. 75 ts 115. 76 ts 115 - 116. -- 26 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 27 104 The appellant has a criminal history. He first appeared in court at the age of 19 for traffic offences. He did not offend again until 2004, when he was convicted of three offences of possessing firearms and ammunition. In 2017, the appellant was convicted of an offence of aggravated assault. The victim of that offence was Veronica, and it resulted from her presentation to hospital in 2016. The appellant was originally charged with more offences at that time, but they were discontinued because Veronica did not wish to proceed. The appellant received no sentence for the one offence that remained. More recently, the appellant has convictions in 2019 and 2021 for driving under the influence of an illicit drug.77 Pre-sentence and psychological reports 105 A pre-sentence report stated that, despite pleading guilty, the appellant engaged in minimisation and victim-blaming when interviewed. He said that Veronica had sexually assaulted him for years. He claimed that he had never intended to hurt Veronica and pointed to the absence of violent offences on his criminal record. The author of the report noted a lack of victim empathy or even concern for Veronica's wellbeing.78 The report concluded that the appellant appeared not to understand the seriousness of his offending and displayed no remorse, and that this did not bode well for future victim safety.79 106 The psychological report stated that the appellant had poor insight and self-awareness when interviewed about the offending. He tended to distort information in order to present himself in a positive way. His account of events was confusing and inconsistent with other sources of information. He initially denied the offending and then claimed that he was a victim of sexual abuse and that his offending was a response to that abuse.80 The psychologist noted that the appellant was an emotionally immature man who did not take responsibility for his offending. Later in the report, the psychologist said that the appellant externalised blame onto his victim and did not express any regret or remorse.81 107 The psychologist stated that the appellant appeared to have destabilised in his mid-30s, when he was unable to work and began to 77 ts 116. 78 Pre-sentence report dated 8 October 2024, 2. 79 Pre-sentence report dated 8 October 2024, 4. 80 Psychological report dated 7 October 2024, 2. 81 Psychological report dated 7 October 2024, 7. -- 27 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 28 use methylamphetamine. He and his victim were in a co-dependant and highly dysfunctional relationship. He had demonstrated aggressive and controlling behaviour, particularly when he sensed a loss of control or a risk of abandonment. He suffers from ADHD and has not developed appropriate coping skills. He appeared to have become increasingly paranoid and delusional whilst using methylamphetamine, and this likely exacerbated his aggression. He was assessed as being at high risk of reoffending in a similar manner.82 Sentencing remarks 108 The learned sentencing judge commenced her remarks by making a lifetime family violence restraining order preventing the appellant from approaching or having any contact with the victim for the rest of her life.83 109 The sentencing judge detailed the facts and the impact on the victim. She referred to the vulnerability of the victim, particularly having regard to the degree of coercion and control that the appellant exercised.84 Her Honour noted that the appellant had entered his pleas of guilty at the first reasonable opportunity, and determined that the appropriate reduction for those pleas pursuant to s 9AA of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) was 25%.85 110 As to the question of remorse, the sentencing judge accepted that in some circumstances pleas of guilty could be a demonstration of remorse. However, her Honour said that the appellant's pleas of guilty were difficult to reconcile with his various assertions and attitudes. She noted the appellant's denials and false claims when interviewed by police. She said that the appellant continued to make such false claims when interviewed for the purposes of the pre-sentence report and the psychologist's report. 86 111 The sentencing judge acknowledged receiving a letter from the appellant in which he apologised to the victim and said that he could not offer any excuses or justifications for the offending. The appellant also said that he had not previously considered himself a violent person, and that the drug use had distorted his thinking. Her Honour said that it was beyond belief that the appellant did not consider himself to be a 82 Psychological report dated 7 October 2024, 7. 83 ts 85. 84 ts 93 - 95. 85 ts 116. 86 ts 116 - 117. -- 28 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 29 violent person, given the many acts of violence that he had perpetrated. She said that the fact that the appellant may have been drug-affected did not excuse his behaviour nor prevent him from appreciating the nature of the conduct he was engaged in. Further, the drug use did not deprive the appellant of the ability to know or appreciate that what he was doing was wrong. Her Honour concluded that the appellant had demonstrated little insight and had no genuine remorse for his offending. 87 112 The sentencing judge said that there were a number of factors that contributed to the appellant's offending. These included; his exposure to domestic violence as a child, and the normalisation of that behaviour; his unwillingness to be truthful about his conduct; his methylamphetamine use; his attitudes to violence in a domestic context; his attitude towards his own erectile dysfunction issues; his poor relationship skills; and his pro-criminal associates. Her Honour said that, unless these issues were addressed, the appellant would remain at high risk of reoffending.88 She noted that the appellant had taken some steps towards addressing his drug use by attending the Narcotics Anonymous program. He had also expressed a willingness to undertake substance abuse counselling.89 113 As to the seriousness of the offences, her Honour said, in respect of count 1:90 In relation to count 1, the following matters are relevant to the court's assessment of the seriousness of this - of these kinds of offences: firstly, the length of the period over which the victim was subjected to the persistent family violence; secondly, the frequency with which the victim was subjected to family violence within that period. Thirdly, the nature of the acts of family violence to which the victim was subjected; fourthly, the psychological impact of the persistent family violence upon the victim, including the impacts of constant psychological stress that may be involved in living with the person who acts - whose acts of family violence are unpredictably spasmodic; fifthly, the physical impacts of the persistent family violence upon the victim. Sixthly, the degree of dependence of the victim upon the offender, and any limits on the ability of the victim to extricate herself from the 87 ts 117 - 118. 88 ts 118. 89 ts 119. 90 ts 120 - 121. -- 29 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 30 situation; and seventh, the extent to which the acts of persistent family violence were intended or likely to have effect of trapping the victim in the violent relationship, or deterring the victim from leaving the relationship. Of course, that list is not intended to be exhaustive. There are some features of your offending that I seek to highlight. I'm going to turn to count 1 first. In relation to count 1, looking at the matters I've just outlined, the length of period over which the victim was subjected to persistent family violence was over nine and a half years. That is a long time by any sense of measurement. Secondly, the frequency with which the victim was subjected to family violence within that period was regular and persistent. The events particularised by the victim are representative of a relationship that was saturated with such violence. Thirdly, you subjected the victim to acts of family violence that were, individually and in combination, tortuous, barbaric, demeaning, humiliating, at times life-threatening, controlling, and enduring. Fourthly, your persistent family violence offending has had a psychological impact upon the victim. I have already referred to that. Fifthly, the physical impact your persistent family violence has had on the victim, a matter to which I've already referred. Sixthly, the degree of dependence of the victim upon you and any limits on her ability to extricate herself from the situation. I've canvassed the vulnerabilities of the victim, including the financial and other controls you had over her, which made her, in my view, entirely dependent on you. Seventh, the extent to which the acts of persistent family violence were intended or likely to have the effect of trapping the victim in the violent relationship, or deterring the victim from leaving the relationship. I again have canvassed the accumulated effect your offending has had on the victim and her inability to leave the relationship, including her perception that she wasn't able to leave the relationship. There can be no doubt whatsoever that you did what you did to the victim to completely control her and cause maximum fear and humiliation to her. In addition, I am of the view that you preyed upon and further created vulnerabilities in the victim to engage in this domestic violence in the way that you did for as long as you did. I've already referred to the impact your offending has had on her. 114 As to count 4, her Honour said:91 In respect of count 4, your offending in count 4 involved some serious aspects to it, including the following: the fact that you took the victim out to the bush where she was isolated from everyone and everything; the fear she must have been feeling, not knowing what was to become 91 ts 122. -- 30 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 31 of her at your hands, added to the fact that she was so isolated that she had no ability to seek assistance from anyone from the violence that you would visit upon her on this occasion. There's also, of course, the fact that you used weapons to fracture four of her bones, and in doing so, you rendered her completely unable to run from you and your violence. The use of weapons gave the victim no chance to defend herself against the might of you wielding those weapons, not to mention the fear she must have felt at that time. The fact that you disabled her initially by breaking her leg, and then continued to assault her with weapons to break both bones - to break both kneecaps, rendering her completely unable to flee from you. So you got her while she was down and completely incapable of doing anything to stop you. The pain and suffering the victim must have been in with four fractured bones would have been almost unimaginable, and yet you denied her the ability to seek medical treatment for one week, which also retarded her ability to recover from those injuries. You effectively tortured the victim in the most barbaric of ways. It was deliberate, it was cruel, it was callous, it was sustained, and without possible justification. This is a very serious example of offending of this kind. 115 Later in her remarks, the sentencing judge noted:92 The State has invited me to find that your offending in counts 1, 4, 12, and 13 falls into the worst category for offending of this kind. In order for offending to fall into the worst category of offending of this kind, I do not have to find that it's the worst case imaginable. I have decided, ultimately, I am not prepared to give your offending a label in the category of seriousness in which it falls. For there can be no doubt that your offending in each of those counts and your conduct more broadly is truly abhorrent in every respect. Your criminal conduct amounts to a gross breach of trust and commitment the victim invested in you and the intimacy she bestowed upon you. That breach materialised itself repeatedly and over a very long period of time. You did not change your ways when you were charged and pleaded guilty to an offence in October 2014. Your violent and intimidating conduct did not abate until the victim brought an end to it when she fled for her life on 4 May 2023. Your offending is a very serious example of a sustained and persistent course of domestic violence over a very lengthy period of time. 92 ts 123 - 124. -- 31 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 32 116 The sentencing judge referred to the principle of totality and applied it in the following way:93 I also take into account that I am sentencing you in relation to 15 offences. To sentence according to law, I must necessarily fix an appropriate sentence for each offence, and then consider questions of cumulation, concurrency and totality. I am to impose a sentence that takes into account a large number of factors, but in looking at those factors, I must impose an overall sentence that is commensurate with your criminal offending. I also have at the forefront of my mind to ensure that I do not double punish you where count 1 encapsulates your offending more broadly. In my view, there needs to be some cumulation as between counts, although moderated for reasons of totality. I am to consider all sentencing options available to me, and I have. There of course is only one sentencing option that must be imposed on you, and that is a term of imprisonment to be immediately served. 117 The sentencing judge initially determined that a sentence of 11 years' imprisonment was appropriate for count 1. However, this sentence was reduced, for totality reasons and to avoid double punishment, to 5 years' imprisonment.94 The sentences imposed and the orders for accumulation and concurrency are reflected in the table that appears earlier in these reasons. Her Honour made an order that the appellant be eligible for parole. She initially stated that eligibility would arise after serving 24 years, but this was corrected in a subsequent hearing to 23 years.95 Given the correction, the ground in relation to this error (ground 3) was abandoned at the hearing of the appeal. Grounds of appeal 118 The grounds of appeal are as follows: 1. The Learned Sentencing Judge erred in law when sentencing the Appellant with respect to Count 1 by having regard to, impliedly, an erroneous maximum penalty. 2. The Learned Sentencing Judge erred in law in her application of [s 9AA] of the Sentencing Act by deducting the 25% discount from the total effective sentence, rather than the individual sentences that her Honour would have otherwise imposed. 93 ts 127. 94 ts 129. 95 ts 129. -- 32 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 33 3. [This ground was abandoned] 4. The Learned Sentencing Judge imposed a sentence with respect to Count 4 that was, in all the circumstances, manifestly excessive. 5. The Learned Sentencing Judge imposed a sentence that infringed the first limb of the totality principle, having regard to the circumstances including those personal to the Appellant. Ground 1 - implied error as to the maximum penalty for count 1 Submissions 119 In essence, the appellant's argument is that the sentencing judge must have made an error regarding the maximum penalty for this offence because her Honour's initial position before considering totality was that 11 years' imprisonment was the appropriate sentence. The maximum statutory penalty for the offence of persistent family violence is 14 years' imprisonment. Even if her Honour had started at the maximum, a 25% discount for pleading guilty would have produced a sentence of 10 years 6 months' imprisonment. This is said to support a conclusion that her Honour must have made an error regarding the maximum penalty.96 120 The respondent notes that early in the sentencing remarks the sentencing judge correctly referred to the maximum statutory penalty.97 However, it is accepted that to reach a sentence of 11 years after applying the discount of 25%, her Honour must have made a mistake as to the maximum penalty or a mistake in calculating the discount. The question that remains is whether a different or lesser sentence should have been imposed on this count. Merits 121 Lawyers, and judges, are not generally renowned for their prowess in mathematics. They are more apt to make calculation errors than errors regarding the maximum penalty. In the present case, the fact that the sentencing judge referred to the maximum penalty of 14 years' imprisonment in her remarks makes it unlikely that she made the implied error alleged by the appellant. Having said that, clearly an error of some sort was made. It should not have been possible to reach an initial position of 11 years' imprisonment if the 25% discount was 96 WAB 18. 97 WAB 41. -- 33 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 34 fully applied, even assuming that the starting point was the maximum penalty. 122 The real question is whether the error was material. Section 31(4) of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) provides that this court may allow an appeal against a sentence if, in its opinion, a different sentence should have been imposed. If the court is not so satisfied, the appeal must be dismissed. The final sentence imposed on count 1 was 5 years' imprisonment, after a substantial reduction for totality and the avoidance of any double punishment. The sentence of 11 years' imprisonment was merely a step in the process. Unless this court is satisfied that a different sentence than 5 years' imprisonment should have been imposed, this ground must fail. 123 At the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the appellant accepted that this offending was at the upper end of offending of its type. Counsel said that the issue was that the sentence still contributed significantly to the total sentence. He accepted that ground 1 in this regard was effectively subsumed into ground 5. 124 To the extent that this ground has any independent life, in our opinion, no different sentence other than 5 years' imprisonment should have been imposed. The offending was plainly extremely serious. The appellant's personal circumstances were unremarkable. Comparable cases such as The State of Western Australia v Winch98 and Wilson v The State of Western Australia99 do not suggest that a different sentence would have been appropriate. Those cases will be referred to in more detail later in these reasons. 125 Leave to appeal in respect of this ground should be granted, but the ground fails. Ground 2 - application of the s 9AA discount Submissions 126 The appellant submits that the sentencing judge erred by deducting the 25% discount for pleading guilty from the total effective sentence, rather than the individual sentences imposed for each offence. This is said to be supported by the fact that her Honour said in her remarks, 'I've reduced the sentence I would otherwise have imposed on you' 98 The State of Western Australia v Winch [2024] WASCA 79. 99 Wilson v The State of Western Australia [2025] WASCA 8. -- 34 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 35 (emphasis added).100 The use of the singular is said to support an inference that her Honour applied the discount to the total sentence. This is said to be an error having regard to what this court said in BSA v The State of Western Australia.101 127 The respondent submits that the sentencing judge's reference to 'the sentence' is capable of being interpreted as a shorthand reference to each of the sentences imposed. The respondent notes that this interpretation is supported by the fact that immediately after that reference, her Honour refers to the pleas of guilty in the plural when she says, 'They were made at the earliest reasonable opportunity' (emphasis added).102 128 The respondent further submits that when stating the individual sentences for each count, the sentencing judge expressly applied the totality principle to reduce a number of the sentences prior to making orders for concurrency and cumulacy. This is consistent with her Honour having already applied the discount for pleading guilty to each of the individual sentences. Whilst it may have been preferable for the sentencing judge to have made this expressly clear, when the remarks are considered as a whole, the alleged error is not established.103 Merits 129 In BSA this court said:104 When sentencing an offender for more than one offence, a sentencing judge is required to determine an appropriate sentence for each offence (including any discounts for an offender's guilty pleas and cooperation with authorities) before proceeding to consider questions of cumulation, concurrency and totality. The total effective sentence must be commensurate with the circumstances of the offending as a whole, the offender's personal circumstances and all relevant sentencing factors. 130 In BSA, the relevant ground of appeal was that the sentencing judge erred in law by deducting the discounts allowed for the pleas of guilty and the appellant's assistance to law enforcement authorities from the total effective sentence, instead of from each individual sentence. A confidential addendum to the sentencing remarks in that 100 WAB 19; ts 116. 101 BSA v The State of Western Australia [2025] WASCA 31. 102 WAB 43. 103 WAB 43. 104 BSA [37]. -- 35 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 36 case supported the contention that the discount for cooperation had been made from the total sentence. The State conceded that if the sentencing judge had applied the discounts to the total sentence and not to the individual sentences, this would be an erroneous approach. The court accepted that concession was appropriate and that the error had been made. In doing so, reference was made to the need for this process to be followed to ensure that orders for cumulation or concurrency are not made upon an imperfect foundation.105 131 It might be thought that, where the discount is the same for all counts, it is immaterial whether the discount is deducted from the total sentence or the individual sentences. However, that overlooks the process required by s 9AA of the Sentencing Act. That section requires that any deduction for pleading guilty be made from the head sentence. The head sentence is defined as the sentence that would have been imposed for that offence if the offender had been convicted after trial, and before taking into account any mitigating factors. The mitigating factors for individual offences may well be different. Thus, the discounting process can only properly be done at the level of each individual offence. Further, because the discount is applied before taking into account mitigating factors, a percentage discount from each individual head sentence will not necessarily produce the same outcome as the same percentage discount from the total sentence. 132 Where a court reduces a sentence for a plea of guilty, the court must state that fact and the extent of the reduction in open court.106 This is usually achieved by stating the percentage discount which has been determined as appropriate. Where the pleas of guilty have all been entered at the same time and in the same circumstances, it will be common for the same discount to apply to all of the charges. That was the position here. There is no requirement for the sentencing judge to expressly state the starting point (the head sentence) for each count or the calculations by which the discount has been applied. It is sufficient to state the percentage discount and to say that this has been taken into account in determining the sentences.107 133 The only support for the appellant's argument is the use of the singular 'sentence' in the sentencing judge's remarks. There is otherwise nothing to suggest that her Honour failed to apply the 105 BSA [39]; Pearce v The Queen [1998] HCA 57; (1998) 194 CLR 610 [45] - [48] (McHugh, Hayne & Callinan JJ). 106 Sentencing Act, s 9AA(5). 107 Greenland v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 83 [174]. -- 36 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 37 discount to the individual sentences (except, perhaps, the anomaly referred to in ground 1). To the contrary, her Honour stated each individual sentence and, in doing so, appeared to take into account all relevant factors, other than totality.108 Her Honour then made adjustments for totality and orders as to concurrency and accumulation.109 There was no discount for pleading guilty deducted from the total sentence, either expressly or by implication. 134 When the sentencing remarks are considered as a whole, there is no reasonable basis for contending that the sentencing judge made the alleged error. Leave in respect of this ground should be refused. Ground 4 - was the sentence on count 4 manifestly excessive? Submissions 135 The appellant submits that the following features indicate that the sentence of 9 years' imprisonment imposed on count 4 was manifestly excessive: (a) The appellant entered a plea of guilty at the earliest reasonable opportunity. (b) Whilst the offending occurred in an isolated area, there was no suggestion that the appellant kidnapped the victim, although it is accepted that the nature of their relationship was such that the victim would likely have felt that she had to accompany the appellant. (c) The case that the State relied on in sentencing, Eriha v The State of Western Australia110 (in which a sentence of 9 years' imprisonment was imposed for a similar offence with the same maximum penalty), was more serious. It involved the kidnapping of the victim by multiple offenders acting in concert. The offending in that case was sustained over a longer period of time and resulted in the victim being abandoned in a remote area. The victim continued to have limited use of his hands and was unable to walk any significant distance. 108 ts 128 - 129. 109 ts 129. 110 Eriha v The State of Western Australia [2011] WASCA 167. -- 37 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 38 (d) The injuries to the victim's kneecaps healed without surgery. Whilst there appear to be some residual effects, they are not debilitating. 136 The appellant concedes that the offence was serious. Defence counsel at sentencing accepted that that the offending was 'at the very least, up there, at the upper end'.111 However, the sentencing judge did not make a finding that this offence fell into the worst category. The appellant submits that there was no demonstrated intent to endanger the victim's life.112 137 The respondent submits that it is not an overstatement to describe the appellant's offending in count 4 as monstrous and carried out with chilling premeditation. The injuries were serious and were inflicted using weapons. The victim was vulnerable, having been subject to approximately four years of violence, isolation and subjugation by the appellant at this time. The appellant's prevention of the victim accessing medical treatment was especially callous. The case of Eriha is broadly comparable. Whilst the offence in that case occurred in company it did not have the aggravating factor of occurring within the context of a violent domestic relationship.113 Merits 138 The general principles governing appeals contending that error should be inferred on the basis that an individual sentence is manifestly excessive or inadequate, or that the total effective sentence infringes the first limb of the totality principle, are well established. Those principles were summarised in Kabambi v The State of Western Australia:114 (1) Sentencing is a discretionary exercise. An appellate court can intervene only if the appellant demonstrates either an express or implied material error. Express error involves acting on a wrong principle, for example by mistaking the law or facts or taking into account an irrelevant matter. Implied error arises where the end result is so unreasonable or unjust that the court must conclude that a substantial wrong has occurred. Thus, an appellate court cannot substitute its own opinion for that of the 111 ts 50. 112 WAB 24. 113 WAB 44 - 46. 114 Kabambi v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 44 [21]. -- 38 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 39 sentencing court merely because the appellate court would have exercised a sentencing discretion differently. (2) In order to determine whether a sentence for an individual offence is manifestly excessive or inadequate, the offence should be viewed in light of the maximum sentence prescribed by law for the crime, the standards of sentencing customarily imposed with respect to it, the place that the criminal conduct occupies in the scale of seriousness of crimes of that type, and the offender's personal circumstances. (3) The first limb of the totality principle requires that the total effective sentence imposed on an offender who has committed multiple offences bears a proper relationship to the overall criminality involved in all of the offences (including those, if any, in respect of which the offender is still serving or is yet to serve a term of imprisonment), viewed in their entirety, having regard to all relevant facts and circumstances including those referable to the offender personally (and including, for example, the desirability of accommodating any wish to rehabilitate), all relevant sentencing factors and the total effective sentences imposed in comparable cases. (4) The range of sentences customarily imposed for a crime does not establish the range of a sound exercise of the sentencing discretion. Sentences customarily imposed in comparable cases provide a yardstick or reference point for ensuring broad consistency in sentencing, bearing in mind the scope for significant variations in relevant sentencing factors, and that there is no single correct sentence. What is important is the unifying principles which sentences imposed in comparable cases reveal and reflect. (5) When this court dismisses an appeal against sentence and when it resentences on a successful appeal, its decision does not fix the upper or lower limit of the range. (6) Where there is a challenge on totality grounds, the severity of a sentence imposed on an individual count generally falls to be assessed in light of the sentences imposed in respect of the other counts and its contribution to the total effective sentence. A heavy individual sentence (which is not manifestly excessive) may be softened by an order that it be served concurrently with -- 39 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 40 sentences imposed in relation to the other counts. A relatively light sentence (which is not manifestly inadequate) may, as a practical matter, have increased severity if it is ordered to be served cumulatively. The real question is whether the total effective sentence is unreasonable or plainly unjust. 139 The maximum penalty for the offence of doing an act causing bodily harm with intent to harm, contrary to s 304(2) of the Criminal Code (WA) (the Code) is 20 years' imprisonment. 140 There is no established range of sentences for offences of this type because of the wide variety of circumstances in which offences are committed, and the wide variety of personal circumstances and antecedents of the offenders who commit them.115 The factors that are relevant in determining the appropriate sentence for an offence contrary to s 304(2) of the Code include:116 (a) the nature and seriousness of the offender's intent to harm; (b) the nature and seriousness of the offender's act which resulted in the victim's injuries; (c) the nature and seriousness of the bodily harm caused to the particular victim, or the severity and other circumstances of the actual or likely endangering of the particular victim's life, health or safety, as the case may be; and (d) the potential (as distinct from the actual) consequences of the offender's conduct. 141 Adjectives are not required to convey the seriousness of this offence by the appellant. A mere summary of the salient facts is all that is necessary. The appellant drove an extremely vulnerable victim to a remote location. There he questioned her and, when dissatisfied with the answers, assaulted her with a hammer and a spanner. He used sufficient force to break a leg, an arm and both kneecaps. The assault was sustained, and the appellant did not desist even after breaking the victim's leg, even though she was unable to defend herself or flee. The appellant plainly intended to inflict serious harm, and he achieved that purpose. In the aftermath, the victim was entirely dependent on the 115 The State of Western Australia v Tulloch [2025] WASCA 17 [100]; The State of Western Australia v Popal [2020] WASCA 200 [74]; Cheeseman v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 78 [84]; Quirk v The State of Western Australia [2019] WASCA 76 [57]. 116 Tulloch [99]; Kaokula v The State of Western Australia [2016] WASCA 198 [63]. -- 40 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 41 appellant to obtain the medical attention that she needed. He delayed doing so for a week, unnecessarily extending the suffering of the victim. That delay was motivated entirely by concern for himself and without any regard for the health and wellbeing of the victim. The fact that the victim's kneecaps healed without surgery does not reduce the seriousness of the offence. The potential for more serious consequences is readily apparent. 142 The appellant's personal circumstances were unremarkable. His exposure to domestic violence as a child, his use of drugs, and his relatively minor mental health issues, provided very minimal mitigation. The only mitigating factor of significance was his early plea of guilty. 143 The fact that the sentencing judge did not make a finding that this offence was in the worst category is of no consequence. The significance of such a finding is that it will justify the imposition of a sentence at or near the maximum. Her Honour did not impose a sentence at or near the maximum. Nor could her Honour have started at the maximum before making the deduction for pleading guilty as the sentence of 9 years' imprisonment is significantly less than 20 years less 25%. 144 The appellant has not provided any cases which are said to be comparable. The respondent has suggested that Eriha is broadly comparable.117 The appellant submits that Eriha involved more serious offending than count 4.118 The assistance afforded by a single case is limited, but as it is the only case that has been referred to, we will consider it. 145 In Eriha, the offender pleaded guilty to an offence of causing grievous bodily harm with intent to cause such harm. That offence attracts the same maximum penalty. He was also charged with a number of other offences. At the time of the offence in that case, the offender was aged 22 and the victim was a slightly built youth of 17. The offender had considerable animosity towards the victim. The offender and two accomplices kidnapped the victim and, after assaulting him at another location, took him to an isolated bush location. The victim was tied up and his shirt removed. He was urinated on. He was suspended by his feet and his wrists tied together. In this position, he was kicked to his head, chest and stomach. He was 117 WAB 45 - 46. 118 WAB 23. -- 41 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 42 lowered to the ground and a blunt blade used to carve a word onto his bare chest. He thought he was going to die. A claw hammer was used to strike the back of each of his hands repeatedly, causing intense pain and serious permanent injury. He was then struck repeatedly to his legs and the heels of his feet with a metal tyre lever. Again, this caused extreme pain and serious injuries. The appellant and his accomplices then abandoned the victim in his injured state and without food, water or adequate clothing. The victim's injuries included numerous lacerations, a broken leg and a split kneecap. The sentencing judge made a finding that the grievous bodily harm offence fell into the worst category and imposed a sentence of 9 years' imprisonment (which formed part of a total sentence of 11 years' imprisonment). A challenge to that sentence on the ground that it was manifestly excessive was dismissed. Mazza J (with whom McLure P & Newnes JA agreed) said that the sentence was 'undoubtedly severe' but reflected the exercise of sound sentencing discretion.119 146 We do not accept that Eriha was a more serious case than the present case. There are some features of that case that are not present here, such as the fact that it occurred in the context of a kidnapping, took place over a longer period of time, was committed in company, involved humiliation of the victim, and that the victim was abandoned in an isolated location. However, there are other aggravating features of this case, such as that the offence occurred in the context of a long-term abusive relationship, and that the appellant prevented the victim from obtaining medical treatment for a week. As in Eriha, the appellant's criminality was of the highest order and 'warranted a long custodial sentence to provide proper punishment, denunciation, public protection and general and specific deterrence'.120 147 In our view, whilst the sentence of 9 years' imprisonment was a lengthy one for an offence of this nature, it was entirely justified by the circumstances. Though we would grant leave to appeal, this ground fails. Ground 5 - implied error as to the total effective sentence Submissions 148 The appellant concedes that the overall criminality of the appellant was significant, and that there was a sustained and entrenched course of 119 Eriha [64] (Mazza J, with McLure P & Newnes JA agreeing). 120 Eriha [62] (Mazza J, with McLure P & Newnes JA agreeing). -- 42 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 43 domestic violence over a nine-year period. However, the appellant did plead guilty at the earliest possible opportunity. It is accepted that there was little else by way of mitigation. There was no remorse and little insight demonstrated. The appellant had taken some steps to address one contributing factor, his methylamphetamine use. The appellant says that there are no useful comparators. Taking all of those factors into account, the appellant submits that the total sentence of 25 years' imprisonment was unreasonable or plainly unjust. 121 149 The respondent submits that whilst the total sentence may properly be described as severe, it is not unreasonable or plainly unjust, having regard to the overall seriousness of the appellant's offending. The respondent notes the importance of general deterrence and the recognised firming up of sentences for offences committed in the course of domestic violence.122 As to the offence of persistent family violence, the respondent relies on Winch and Wilson. Another recent case involving sustained serious domestic violence is Gomboc v The State of Western Australia.123 150 The respondent submits that the only mitigating factor was the appellant's pleas of guilty.124 He had demonstrated no remorse, does not consider himself a violent person, had maintained that he was the real victim and was at very high risk of reoffending. The combination of those factors with the serious nature of the offences compels a conclusion that only a very significant custodial sentence would adequately reflect the relevant sentencing considerations, including that this offending was an exceptionally serious example of a sustained and persistent course of family violence over a lengthy period of time, and was in gross breach of the trust reposed in the appellant by the victim. There was a need for the total effective sentence to properly reflect the criminality of the appellant's relentless offending against the victim and the high-order seriousness of all of the offending. Merits 151 General and personal deterrence are important sentencing factors for offences of domestic violence. Offences of this nature generally involve an abuse of trust and a victim who is vulnerable to the offender. Victims often have difficulty extricating themselves from an abusive relationship. It is important when sentencing offenders to take into 121 WAB 25 - 26. 122 WAB 47. 123 Gomboc v The State of Western Australia [2023] WASCA 115. 124 WAB 49. -- 43 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 44 account the need to protect vulnerable people. Domestic violence is a scourge on society. Awareness of this type of offending and concern to prevent it have grown markedly in recent years. Persistent violence and intimidation in the context of family relationships must be strongly discouraged by appropriate sentences.125 152 It is indisputable, and not in fact disputed by the appellant, that the overall offending was of great seriousness and deserving of a lengthy sentence of imprisonment. The real question is whether the total sentence of 25 years' imprisonment was disproportionate, particularly having regard to the fact that the appellant pleaded guilty at the first reasonable opportunity. 153 As noted earlier in these reasons, the discount for pleading guilty should be applied when determining the appropriate sentence for each individual offence. That does not mean that the value of the pleas is then exhausted and of no further relevance. When determining the appropriate total effective sentence, the sentencing judge must take into account all relevant factors, including the seriousness of the offending as a whole, the personal circumstances of the offender, and whether the offender pleaded guilty or was convicted after trial. 154 In this case, the appellant pleaded guilty at the first reasonable opportunity. That brought the proceedings to a speedier conclusion and avoided any uncertainty as to whether the appellant would be found guilty on all charges. It avoided what may have been a lengthy and complex trial. Importantly, it spared Veronica the additional trauma that would inevitably be caused by a trial. The sentencing judge assessed the value of the plea as being at the maximum allowable of 25%. That discount should be reflected in both the individual sentences and the total effective sentence. 155 The discount for pleading guilty must be real if it is to reward offenders and act as an incentive to others. In the case of domestic violence, there is particular importance in encouraging early pleas. The discount afforded for early pleas must overcome any desire on the part of the offender to delay proceedings for their own benefit or to continue their abuse of the victim. As this court said in Winch:126 [T]here is a need to be mindful of the possibility that offenders who have repeatedly committed offences of violence against their partners, while engaging in manipulative and controlling behaviour, may delay 125 Wilson [195] (Hall JA). 126 Winch [109]. -- 44 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 45 pleading guilty for the purpose of testing whether the victim of this behaviour will persevere with their allegations and give evidence after a long period of reflection. The offender may also seek to use delay to exercise control and to perpetuate the suffering of the victim. 156 There are no truly comparable cases. For completeness, we will refer to those cases mentioned in submissions, but it is accepted by both parties that this case is significantly more serious than any of those referred to. 157 In Gomboc, the offender pleaded guilty to 19 counts, which included; two counts of aggravated assault occasioning bodily harm; one count of with intent to harm doing an act endangering life, health or safety; one count of aggravated unlawful wounding; one count of wilful and unlawful damage; one count of being armed in circumstances likely to cause fear; seven counts of making threats to harm; and six counts of making threats to kill. The offending was against the offender's partner and occurred over a period of three and a half years. The victim was vulnerable and was left with severe anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder. The offender punched, kicked, and strangled the victim. He negligently wounded her with a knife, threw objects at her, threatened to kill her whilst armed and smothered her with a pillow. Discounts for pleading guilty of between 8% and 18% were allowed. The sentencing judge imposed a total effective sentence of 11 years 10 months' imprisonment. An appeal on a totality ground was allowed, and the offender was resentenced to 9 years 6 months' imprisonment. Other cases relating to sentencing in domestic violence cases were reviewed at [203] - [214]. 158 The present case is significantly more serious than Gomboc. The nature of the violence and the injuries inflicted on the victim were of an entirely different magnitude. Although the number of offences was similar, the offences in the present case were more serious and included sexual offences. Gomboc provides no useful guidance to the appropriate total sentence in this case. 159 In Winch, the offender was convicted on his late plea of guilty of one count of persistently engaging in family violence. The offending occurred over an eight-year period and involved seven prescribed offences against his partner. The prescribed offences included assaults, a threat to harm, threats to kill, and acts likely to endanger life, health or safety. Some of the threats involved the use of dangerous weapons. The offender had a record of violence. A discount of 12% for pleading guilty was allowed. A sentence of 2 years 3 months' immediate -- 45 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 46 imprisonment was imposed by the sentencing judge. On a State appeal, that sentence was found to be manifestly inadequate and the offender was resentenced to 5 years 8 months' imprisonment. 160 The present case is of entirely different order to Winch. There was only one offence in Winch, and the violence was significantly less serious. There was no sexual offending in that case. That case provides no useful indication of the appropriate total sentence in the present case. 161 In Wilson, the offender was convicted on his pleas of guilty of seven offences, including one of persistent family violence; two of unlawful assault causing bodily harm; three of doing an act likely to endanger life, health of safety of a person; and one of being armed in circumstances likely to cause fear. The offending continued over a five-and-half-year period and included acts of punching, pushing, shaking and grabbing the victim by the throat. On one occasion, the appellant strangled the victim until she lost consciousness. Threats of violence were made, including with weapons. Some of the offending occurred in the presence of children, and there was frequent verbal abuse. Leave to appeal against a total effective sentence of 7 years' imprisonment was refused. 162 The present case is significantly more serious than Wilson. The nature of the violence and the injuries inflicted on the victim were of an entirely different magnitude. The offences in the present case were more serious and included sexual offences. As leave to appeal was refused in Wilson, it was not even reasonably arguable that the sentence in that case was unreasonable or plainly unjust. Wilson provides no useful guidance to the appropriate total sentence in this case. 163 The absence of truly comparable cases does not preclude this court from deciding that the totality principle has been breached. It merely has the consequence that there are no cases that provide a yardstick against which to assess the total sentence. 164 Having regard to the maximum penalties, the circumstances of the offences, the appellant's personal circumstances, and the limited assistance provided by comparable cases, we are satisfied that this offending was richly deserving of a very long custodial sentence. Having said that, the pleas of guilty were an important mitigating factor and the 25% discount should have been reflected in the total sentence. -- 46 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 47 In our view, when that factor is taken into account, the total sentence is unreasonable or plainly unjust. 165 Leave to appeal on ground 5 should be granted and the appeal allowed on that ground. Conclusion and resentencing 166 This court has all the information necessary to resentence the appellant. The facts of the offending and the appellant's personal circumstances are set out earlier in these reasons. Like the sentencing judge, we would allow a 25% discount for pleading guilty at the first reasonable opportunity, pursuant to s 9AA of the Sentencing Act. 167 The appellant has been in custody since his arrest, originally on remand and subsequently as a serving prisoner. Information provided for the purposes of resentencing indicates that the appellant has participated in Narcotics Anonymous and has undertaken some educational courses. The courses relate to workplace safety and career development. He has completed programs focussing on rehabilitation, accountability and self-reflection. He commenced a family violence course and a drug course but was unable to complete these as he was moved to another prison. He has been engaged in full-time work in prison. 168 The appellant's offending involved exceptionally serious and relentless coercive control that comprised physical, emotional, financial, psychological and psychosocial abuse. It also involved demeaning, barbaric and violent acts of sexual abuse. 169 Significant sentences of imprisonment are required for such abhorrent offences, particularly where the acts of violence cause life-threatening and permanent injuries which affect the physical and mental health of victims such as Veronica, who has been left with not only a very altered appearance, but life-changing disabilities. Lengthy sentences of imprisonment are necessary in such circumstances to protect the victims of such offending, and also to deter others from such offending in an effort to protect vulnerable persons in the general community. 170 An appropriate total effective sentence is one of 20 years' imprisonment. This sentence is one that, in our opinion, bears a proper relationship to the overall criminality of the appellant's offending, and takes account of specific and general deterrence. -- 47 of 48 -- [2026] WASCA 74 JUDGMENT OF THE COURT Page 48 171 We would not vary any of the individual sentences imposed by the sentencing judge. We would, however, make the sentence on count 5 concurrent, entirely for totality reasons. That results in a new total effective sentence of 20 years' imprisonment. We would make an order that the appellant be eligible for parole. 172 The appeal was commenced approximately six months late and an extension is required. An affidavit of the appellant's counsel explains some, but not all, of the delay. However, given that there is merit in the appeal an extension should be granted. Orders 173 We would make the following orders: 1. An extension of time to appeal is granted. 2. Leave to appeal on grounds 1, 4 and 5 is granted. 3. Leave to appeal on ground 2 is refused. 4. The appeal is allowed. 5. The sentence imposed on count 5 of IND 601 of 2024 be varied by substituting an order that the sentence of 5 years' imprisonment be served concurrently with the sentence on count 4. The new total sentence is 20 years' imprisonment. 6. That sentence is backdated to commence on 4 August 2023. 7. The appellant is eligible for parole. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. RR Associate to the Hon. Justice Hall 11 JUNE 2026 -- 48 of 48 --