LEGAL SERVICES AND COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE -v- KHOSA [2026] WASC 193

[2026] WASC 193 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA TITLE OF COURT : FULL BENCH CITATION : LEGAL SERVICES AND COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE -v- KHOSA [No 2] [2026] WASC 193 CORAM : STRK J SEAWARD J PALMER J HEARD : 3 FEBRUARY 2026 DELIVERED : 20 MAY 2026 FILE NO/S : LPD 7 of 2024 BETWEEN : LEGAL SERVICES AND COMPLAINTS COMMITTEE Applicant AND MANRAJ SINGH KHOSA Respondent Catchwords: Legal practitioners - Professional misconduct - Removal from Roll of Practitioners - Whether practitioner fit and proper person to remain a member of the legal profession - Failure to pay significant counsel fees over an extended period - False and misleading representations made to counsel and the regulator - Failure to respond to the regulator's request for information and documents over an extended period -- 1 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 Page 2 Legislation: Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) Legal Profession Uniform Law (WA) s 23(1)(c) Result: Order that the practitioner's name be removed from the Roll of Practitioners Category: B Representation: Counsel: Applicant : C M Beetham Respondent : In Person Solicitors: Applicant : Legal Services and Complaints Commission Respondent : In Person Case(s) referred to in decision(s): de Robillard v Council of the New South Wales Bar Association; Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v de Robillard (No 2) [2024] NSWCA 299 Khosa v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2017] WASCA 192 Khosa v Legal Services and Complaints Committee [2024] WASCA 148 Law Society of the ACT v Powrie [2017] ACTSCFC 4; (2017) 12 ACTLR 184 Legal Practice Board v Krstic [2026] WASC 183 Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Goldmsith [2022] WASAT 43 (S) Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Goldsmith [2022] WASAT 43 Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Khosa [2015] WASAT 107 Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Lashansky [2007] WASC 211 Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Oud [2019] WASC 287 Legal Services and Complaints Committee and Khosa [2023] WASAT 90 Legal Services and Complaints Committee and Khosa [2023] WASAT 90 (S) Legal Services and Complaints Committee v Lawson [2024] WASC 158 -- 2 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 Page 3 Legal Services and Complaints Committee v Lourey [2025] WASC 569 Legal Services and Complaints Committee v Staffa [2025] WASC 6 Re Robb (1996) 134 FLR 294 Robertson v Legal Services and Complaints Committee [2025] WASCA 92 Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA); Ex parte Ruba [2020] WASC 237 -- 3 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 4 REASONS OF THE COURT: 1 The respondent (Mr Khosa) is a legal practitioner whose name is presently on the roll of practitioners, although he does not hold a current practising certificate. 2 On 26 October 2023, the State Administrative Tribunal (the Tribunal) made orders recording the Tribunal's findings that Mr Khosa had engaged in professional misconduct.1 Mr Khosa did not appeal that decision.2 3 On 28 March 2024, the Tribunal made a recommendation that Mr Khosa's name be removed from the roll of persons admitted to the legal profession under the Legal Profession Act 2008 (WA) (Legal Profession Act).3 4 Mr Khosa appealed that decision (the Penalty Appeal) but on 22 November 2024, the Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal and dismissed that appeal. 5 On 4 September 2025, Mr Khosa was refused special leave to appeal to the High Court against the dismissal of the Penalty Appeal.4 6 By way of an originating motion dated 27 November 2024 (the Application), the applicant (the LSCC) now applies to the Full Bench of the Supreme Court for an order that Mr Khosa be removed from the roll of practitioners pursuant to s 23(1)(c) of the Legal Profession Uniform Law (WA) (Uniform Law). 7 Mr Khosa opposed the Application. His written submissions opposing the Application were identical to those he relied upon before the Court of Appeal in the Penalty Appeal. He also made some brief oral submissions. 8 At the hearing of its application, the LSCC sought leave to amend the Application, to apply in the alternative, for an order that Mr Khosa be removed from the roll of practitioners pursuant to s 444(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act. 1 Legal Services and Complaints Committee and Khosa [2023] WASAT 90 (the Conduct Reasons). 2 Khosa v Legal Services and Complaints Committee [2024] WASCA 148 (the Penalty Appeal Reasons) [6]. 3 Legal Services and Complaints Committee and Khosa [2023] WASAT 90 (S) (the Penalty Reasons). 4 Khosa v Legal Services and Complaints Committee [2025] HCA Disp 194. -- 4 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 5 9 Mr Khosa also opposes the LSCC's application to amend the Application. The amendment application and the basis of Mr Khosa's opposition 10 Before turning to consider the source of this court's power to order the removal of a practitioner from the roll, it is necessary to say something about the circumstances in which the LSCC sought to amend the Application and the basis upon which Mr Khosa opposed that amendment. 11 As we have mentioned, the Application sought an order under s 23(1)(c) of the Uniform Law but at the substantive hearing of the Application, counsel for the LSCC moved to amend the Application to seek as an alternative, an order pursuant to s 444(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act. 12 The application to amend was prompted by the submissions that counsel for the LSCC made at the hearing, that s 444(1) of the Legal Profession Act survived the repeal of that Act. The LSCC argued that the evident intent of the Legal Profession Act, the Uniform Law and s 37 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA) (Interpretation Act) was that matters commenced under the Legal Profession Act would be resolved under that Act. Counsel (properly) acknowledged that the logical consequence of the acceptance of this argument would be that the provisions of the Legal Profession Act must also govern the removal of a practitioner from the roll of practitioners.5 13 At the hearing Mr Khosa indicated that he had no objection to the LSCC's proposed amendment and indicated that he considered that the application should have been brought under the Legal Profession Act. He also indicated, however, that he had not had an opportunity to consider the matter properly. Given this, we made orders giving Mr Khosa leave to file written submissions addressing the LSCC's amendment application.6 14 Mr Khosa subsequently filed written submissions that reversed his position. Mr Khosa's written submissions opposed the granting of leave to amend the Application. Mr Khosa's written submissions contended that the Legal Profession Act had been repealed, the LSCC must have appreciated this and the fact that it sought to amend the 5 ts 59 - ts 60. 6 ts 64 - ts 66. -- 5 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 6 Application evidenced bad faith.7 The submissions argued that s 444(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act is 'not applicable'.8 15 Although Mr Khosa's Amendment Submissions referred to the repeal of the Legal Profession Act and challenged the applicability of s 444(2)(b) of that Act, they did not contend that the repeal of that Act meant that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to determine the proceedings under that Act, or to make a recommendation to the Full Court pursuant to that Act. 16 Nor was such an argument made in the principal submissions filed by Mr Khosa in opposition to him being removed from the roll, nor did he make any such oral submission. Indeed, the principal written submissions filed by Mr Khosa referred to the Legal Profession Act and seem to assume that that was the relevant legislation to be applied by the Tribunal.9 17 The Tribunal concluded that the Legal Profession Act continued to apply and the jurisdiction it was exercising was the jurisdiction conferred by that Act. Mr Khosa did not dispute the Tribunal's jurisdiction in this regard. The source of the power to remove a practitioner's name from the roll 18 The question of whether the Legal Profession Act has continued application was considered by the Tribunal in Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Goldsmith.10 In that case, after a detailed review of the relevant provisions, the Tribunal concluded that the Legal Profession Act has ongoing operation in matters referred to the Tribunal by the applicant where both the conduct the subject of referral, and the referral itself, occurred prior to that date. That decision was followed by the Tribunal in Mr Khosa's case.11 19 In Robertson v Legal Services and Complaints Committee,12 the Court of Appeal (Buss P, Mitchell and Vaughan JJA) observed that the proceedings before the Tribunal in that matter were instituted under the Legal Profession Act and pursuant to s 37(1) of the Interpretation Act, they continued as if the Legal Profession Act had not been repealed. 7 Submissions filed 13 February 2026 (Mr Khosa’s Amendment Submissions). 8 Mr Khosa’s Amendment Submissions [33]. 9 Submissions filed 4 April 2025 (Mr Khosa’s Principal Submissions) [36]. 10 Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Goldmsith [2022] WASAT 43 (S) (Goldsmith (S)) [5] - [34]. 11 Conduct Reasons, [135]. 12 Robertson v Legal Services and Complaints Committee [2025] WASCA 92 (Robertson) [7]. -- 6 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 7 The continued application of the Legal Profession Act does not appear to have been challenged in that case, however. 20 In Legal Services and Complaints Committee v Lourey,13 the Full Bench of the Supreme Court (Fiannaca, Hill and Lundberg JJ) characterised the Court of Appeal's decision in Robertson, as assuming the correctness of the approach in Goldsmith. 21 Like in this case, in Lourey the proceedings in the Tribunal had been conducted under the Legal Profession Act, a recommendation for removal made under the same Act and an order then sought from the Supreme Court pursuant to s 23(1) of the Uniform Law.14 22 The practitioner in Lourey had filed written submissions arguing that the proceedings in the Tribunal should be taken to have been conducted under pt 5.4 div 3 of ch 5 of the Uniform Law, rather than under the Legal Profession Act, and that the Tribunal's order recommending to the Supreme Court that the practitioner's name be removed from the Supreme Court roll should be taken to have been made under s 302(1)(f) and s 215 of the Uniform Law.15 The Full Bench noted, however, that the practitioner accepted that nothing turned on whether the Uniform Law applied.16 23 The LSCC argued that it was not open to the practitioner to dispute that the proceedings in the Tribunal should have been conducted under the Legal Profession Act, given that he had accepted that that Act applied before the Tribunal and he had not appealed the Tribunal's decision. The Full Bench agreed and concluded that the LSCC's application should proceed on the basis that the analysis in Goldsmith was correct, without ruling on the question of law.17 24 This case is different to Lourey in that Mr Khosa has not argued that the proceedings in the Tribunal should have been conducted under the Uniform Law. Given the manner in which the proceedings in the Tribunal were conducted and the grounds of appeal in the Penalty Appeal, it might be doubted that it would have been open to Mr Khosa to make such an argument (for similar reasons to those given in Lourey) but as he has made no such argument, there is no need to address it. Mr Khosa's argument is limited to the applicability of 13 Legal Services and Complaints Committee v Lourey [2025] WASC 569 (Lourey) [67]. 14 Lourey, [1] - [2]. 15 Lourey, [65]. 16 Lourey, [70]. 17 Lourey, [68] - [69]. -- 7 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 8 s 444(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act to the application in this court to remove him from the roll. 25 Significantly, none of Mr Khosa's submissions challenged this court's jurisdiction to remove a practitioner from the roll under s 23(1)(c) of the Uniform Law, on a recommendation for removal transmitted pursuant to the Legal Profession Act. Rather, Mr Khosa's submissions proceeded on the basis that that is the only jurisdiction that this court may exercise. 26 The Full Bench in Lourey considered that s 23(1) of the Uniform Law confers jurisdiction on this court to remove a practitioner from the roll, where a recommendation has been transmitted under the Legal Profession Act.18 The Full Bench referred to and relied upon the earlier decision of the Full Bench in Legal Services and Complaints Committee v Lawson (Tottle, Strk and Musikanth JJ).19 In Lawson the Full Bench of the Supreme Court observed:20 Section 22(1) of the Uniform Law provides that this court must maintain a roll of Australian lawyers - the Supreme Court roll - for this jurisdiction containing the names and relevant particulars of persons admitted by the court. Section 23(1) of the Uniform Law provides that this court may order the removal of the name and other particulars of a person from the Supreme Court roll on, among other things, the recommendation of 'the designated tribunal'. In this State 'the designated tribunal' is the Tribunal. Section 23(1) of the Uniform Law confers power on the court to remove the respondent's name from the roll. (footnotes omitted) 27 The same approach was adopted by the Full Bench in Legal Practice Board v Krstic.21 28 As Mr Khosa seems to accept the correctness of this reasoning, or at least does not seek to challenge that reasoning, it does not seem to us necessary to consider whether s 444(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act might provide an alternate source of jurisdiction for this court. Rather, we propose to proceed on the basis that this court has jurisdiction under s 23(1) of the Uniform Law where a recommendation has been transmitted under the Legal Profession Act, on the basis described in Lourey and Lawson. 18 Lourey, [71]. 19 Legal Services and Complaints Committee v Lawson [2024] WASC 158 [11] - [14] (Lawson). 20 Lawson, [14]. 21 Legal Practice Board v Krstic [2026] WASC 183 [26] - [27]. -- 8 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 9 When a practitioner will be removed from the roll 29 Section 23(1)(c) of the Uniform Law does not provide any criteria for the removal of a practitioner's name from the Supreme Court roll, but the principles by which the power may be exercised are well-established.22 They were summarised by this court in Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Oud to include the following:23 (a) The court's jurisdiction with respect to the regulation of the legal profession is not to be exercised for the purpose of punishing the practitioner concerned, but for the protection of the public and the maintenance of the reputation and standards of the legal profession; (b) Where the motion is to remove a practitioner from the roll, the critical question for the court is whether the practitioner is shown not to be a fit and proper person to be a legal practitioner; (c) Fitness to practice law requires that the practitioner must command the personal confidence of his or her clients, fellow practitioners and judges; (d) Removal from the roll is an order reserved for very serious cases, where the character and conduct of the practitioner is seen to be inconsistent with the privileges of further practice; (e) Integrity and honesty are essential characteristics expected of a practitioner, and therefore, the court has generally taken a very serious approach when dealing with dishonesty by a practitioner. 30 A practitioner's failure to understand the impropriety of his or her conduct may be a factor of great importance in determining whether their name should be permitted to stay on the roll. A reason for this is that the lack of appreciation of impropriety and the lack of insight increases the risk of recurrence of the improper conduct.24 Why the Tribunal found Mr Khosa engaged in professional misconduct Mr Khosa did not participate in the hearing before the Tribunal 31 After initially playing an active role in the proceedings, Mr Khosa and then his wife, Ms Ruba, sought the adjournment, or the vacation, of the substantive hearing of the LSCC's application on various grounds 22 Lawson, [15]. 23 Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Oud [2019] WASC 287 [17]. 24 Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Lashansky [2007] WASC 211 [35] (Wheeler & McLure JJA, EM Heenan J); Khosa v Legal Profession Complaints Committee [2017] WASCA 192 [188] - [195] (Murphy & Beech JJA) and Lawson, [157]. -- 9 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 10 on different occasions.25 As a consequence, neither Mr Khosa, nor anyone acting on his behalf, attended the substantive hearing before the Tribunal.26 32 No witnesses were called on Mr Khosa's behalf, nor did he give evidence, tender any documents, or make any submissions.27 33 The LSCC's proceedings against Mr Khosa were commenced in the Tribunal in August 2017.28 34 In November 2019, the Tribunal provisionally listed the matter for a three day hearing commencing on 25 March 2020. Those hearing dates were confirmed on 25 February 2020.29 35 Those hearing dates were vacated on 17 March 2020, a week before the hearing was supposed to commence, after Mr Khosa filed documents that took the LSCC by surprise.30 36 Following a lengthy series of interlocutory skirmishes, on 5 July 2022, the matter was relisted for a five day hearing on 20 March 2023.31 37 On 23 February 2023, Mr Khosa sought an adjournment of the final hearing because of: (a) his need to care for Ms Ruba's father which had arisen due to Ms Ruba's mother's ill-health in December 2022; (b) the need for him to complete a course of study which was a requirement of Centrelink benefits he was receiving; and (c) his own ill-health.32 38 On 8 March 2023, the then President of the Tribunal dismissed the adjournment application. Her Honour was satisfied that alternative care arrangements could be made for Mr Khosa's father-in-law and that Mr Khosa was entitled to apply for an exemption from the Centrelink 25 Conduct Reasons, [35] - [132]. 26 Conduct Reasons, [107] - [109]. 27 Conduct Reasons, [110]. 28 Conduct Reasons, [35]. 29 Conduct Reasons, [36]. 30 Conduct Reasons, [37]. 31 Conduct Reasons, [38]. 32 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [17]; Conduct Reasons, [40] - [41]. -- 10 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 11 study requirement. In relation to Mr Khosa's medical situation, the President observed:33 I turn to the third reason [Mr Khosa] relies upon as a basis for an adjournment and that is that in his evidence he says that he and his wife were involved in a car accident in 2020 and that as a result has been unable to move with speed and unable to work continuously since that time. The difficulty with that evidence and the submission that follows is that the hearing has been listed since July of last year, but in the course of his exchange with me today [Mr Khosa] acknowledged that while he claimed he had done some preparation since July, he was planning on doing the bulk of preparation for the hearing in the couple of months prior to the hearing commencing, that is, in January and February. The upshot seems to be that notwithstanding his physical limitations, [Mr Khosa] chose not to undertake most of the preparation for the hearing on the assumption that life would not impede his or the developments in his life would not impede his preparation and notwithstanding he was aware of what he says are his physical limitations in preparing. 39 The President was not satisfied that Mr Khosa would be unable to attend the hearing. Her Honour found that Mr Khosa's predicament in relation to preparation was largely of his own making, and that in any event he still had time to prepare his case.34 40 The President also noted that Mr Khosa sought an adjournment of four to 10 months and her Honour was concerned at the effect of this further delay on the memory of witnesses. The President also noted that there was nothing in the evidence or Mr Khosa's submissions to give the Tribunal confidence that he would be substantially better prepared if the adjournment was granted. Her Honour also regarded the significant time it had taken to get the matter to hearing as weighing strongly against the grant of an adjournment. Her Honour dismissed the adjournment application.35 41 The following day, 9 March 2023, Mr Khosa obtained a medical certificate from a general practitioner stating that he 'has a medical condition and will be unfit for work from 09/3/2023 to 24/3/2023 inclusive'. Mr Khosa emailed the certificate to the Tribunal on 13 March 2023. There followed an exchange of emails between Ms Ruba and the Tribunal which indicated that a further adjournment 33 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [18]. 34 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [19]. 35 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [20]. -- 11 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 12 application would be heard on 16 March 2023 and the Tribunal expected Mr Khosa's general practitioner to attend that hearing to answer questions. There was no appearance for Mr Khosa at the hearing on 16 March 2023, which was adjourned to the following day. Ms Ruba attended the hearing on 17 March 2023 on Mr Khosa's behalf and sought an adjournment based on the medical certificate.36 42 At the hearing on 17 March 2023, the Deputy President dismissed the adjournment application on the basis of the lack of detail in the medical certificate and the insufficiency of the steps taken to have the doctor attend the Tribunal. His Honour said that in those circumstances he was unable to place much weight on the medical certificate. His Honour observed:37 It may be that further applications to adjourn the hearing will be made next week. I make no comment about that. Any such applications will be addressed on their merits at the time. But right now, at the moment, I don't have sufficient information before me to warrant vacating the hearing that has, as I've said several times now, been listed for several months. On that basis, I'm not satisfied that [Mr Khosa] is medically incapable of attending the hearing, and in the absence of any other material in support of the application, I dismiss the application. 43 In the early hours of the morning of 20 March 2023, Ms Ruba emailed further material to the Tribunal, including the following letter addressed 'to Whom It May Concern':38 [Mr Khosa] is registered under my care. I have known this patient for about 9 years. He has a number of long term medical conditions. He has also has [sic] a number of social stresses at present. These include: 1. Uncontrolled hypertension - this is currently under management and review. He also has Non-Insulin Dependent Diabetes and is under specialist care for this. 2. Neck pain and back pain following Road Traffic Accident. He was seen by Pain Management Specialist in Dec 2022 and is currently undergoing treatment for his chronic pain. 3. Non-insulin Dependent Diabetes which is under specialist care. 36 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [21]; Conduct Reasons, [47] - [62]. 37 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [22]; Conduct Reasons, [63] - [67]. 38 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [23]; Conduct Reasons, [68] - [70]. -- 12 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 13 I am concerned that given the above physical and mental stresses, a Disciplinary Hearing may cause a deterioration in his physical state. I would be grateful if the above could be taken into account and his hearing deferred for 4 weeks. 44 Ms Ruba attended the hearing on 20 March 2023, but Mr Khosa did not. During her submissions in support of an adjournment application, Ms Ruba advised the Tribunal that Mr Khosa was then in hospital. The Tribunal ordered:39 2. The matter is adjourned to 9.30 am on 21 March 2023... 3. [Mr Khosa] have leave to file and serve any material associated with or relating to his admission at Fiona Stanley Hospital on either or both of 19 March 2023 and 20 March 2023 by 5 pm on 20 March 2023. 4. [Mr Khosa] shall have leave to make a further application to adjourn or vacate the hearing at the recommencement of the proceedings but only on the basis of any material filed and served by 5:00 pm on 20 March 2023. 45 Ms Ruba subsequently emailed two applications to vacate the substantive hearing, one on medical grounds and the other on the ground that Mr Khosa was unable to pay the fees of his expert witness. In support of the application to vacate on medical grounds, Ms Ruba provided a 'Fiona Stanley Hospital Emergency Medicine Summary' (Hospital Summary). This was described by the Tribunal in the following terms: 40 The [Hospital] Summary states that [Mr Khosa] had presented to the Fiona Stanley Hospital Emergency Department at 5.24 am on Monday, 20 March 2023 with, amongst other things, a headache described as '4/10' (which we understand to be an indication of the level of pain), an episode of blurred vision and pain 'over paraspinal muscles', all of which were said to have started 'simultaneously on Saturday'. The notes of the history taken includes reference to additional stressors, such as the ill-health of his parents-in-law, that he had been preparing for the hearing and that his general practitioner had given a medical certificate to the Tribunal which was 'denied'. The [Hospital] Summary lists his prior medical history as Type 2 Diabetes, hypertension and the effects of a motor vehicle accident in 2020. It describes both the physical examinations and investigations undertaken of the [appellant], including a CT brain scan and an ECG. Both the examination and investigation were described in terms that we 39 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [24]; Conduct Reasons, [71] - [75]. 40 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [25]; Conduct Reasons, [84] - [85]. -- 13 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 14 understand as normal. The 'principal diagnosis' given is 'Neurological - + Headache - Headache'. 46 The Hospital Summary indicated that the appellant was discharged home at 11.10 am on 20 March 2023, under a plan to discharge with a medical certificate and 'Gp follow-up for TFTs and appropriate management pending results'. 41 47 At 9.00 am on 21 March 2023, a letter signed by Mr Khosa and Ms Ruba was emailed to the associates of the presiding Deputy President and the President. The letter indicated that neither Mr Khosa nor Ms Ruba would participate further in the proceedings. Calls immediately before and after the commencement of the hearing at 9.30 am on 21 March 2023 went unanswered. Neither Mr Khosa nor anyone representing him attended the hearing. The Tribunal determined to proceed with the hearing in Mr Khosa's absence.42 48 On 21 March 2023, the Tribunal dismissed Mr Khosa's application for an adjournment on the basis that there was no new medical information before the Tribunal.43 The professional misconduct alleged by the LSCC 49 Before the Tribunal, the LSCC alleged three grounds of misconduct against Mr Khosa. The first two were concerned with his alleged failure to pay counsel's fees and associated conduct, including alleged false and/or misleading representations. The third was concerned with his alleged failure to appropriately respond to the LSCC's requests for information and documents.44 Ground 1: Mr Khosa's failure to pay counsel 50 Ground 1 alleged that Mr Khosa paid his own firm's invoices out of trust money, in preference to counsel's invoices and made false or misleading representations that there were insufficient funds to pay the balance of counsel's invoice.45 The circumstances giving rise to the ground were as follows. 41 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [25]. 42 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [26]; Conduct Reasons, [86] - [92]. 43 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [27]; Conduct Reasons, [93] - [106]. 44 Conduct Reasons, [2] - [3]. The full terms of the allegations made by the LSCC are recorded at: Conduct Reasons, [133]. 45 Conduct Reasons, [21]. -- 14 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 15 51 Mr Khosa was, from 1 November 2012 to 30 June 2015, the sole legal practitioner director of an incorporated legal practice trading as Angove Law.46 52 During the period from August 2013 until March 2014, Mr Khosa acted for Rosebridge Nominees Pty Ltd (Rosebridge) in certain proceedings.47 53 On or around 27 August 2013, Rosebridge signed a costs agreement with Angove Law which provided a fee estimate for the overall legal costs, including counsel's fees as disbursements payable by Rosebridge, to be in the amount of $125,000. On the same day, Rosebridge paid $7,500 into Angove Law's trust account.48 54 In early October 2013, Angove Law briefed senior counsel to appear on behalf of Rosebridge in the proceedings and Mr Khosa asked Rosebridge to deposit $250,000 into Angove Law's trust account. Rosebridge advanced a payment of $75,000 and authorised the withdrawal and disbursement of monies held in the trust account for the payment of 'any invoices rendered by Angove [Law] or counsel'.49 55 No further monies were deposited by Rosebridge into Angove Law's trust account.50 56 Mr B was engaged by Angove Law to act as junior counsel for Rosebridge in the proceedings. His retainer provided that Angove Law would be liable for the payment of all Mr B's invoices 'even if' Angove Law had 'not received funds from [the] client to pay the bill'.51 57 Mr Khosa signed the retainer on 14 November 2013 in his capacity as Angove Law's sole legal practitioner.52 58 On 18 October 2013, Mr B also provided Angove Law with his costs disclosure, in which he estimated that his fees in the proceedings would be between approximately $135,000 and $180,000.53 59 Mr B later issued Angove Law with five invoices totalling $172,621.35, consisting of invoices issued on:54 46 Conduct Reasons, [6]. 47 Conduct Reasons, [7]. 48 Conduct Reasons, [8] - [9]. 49 Conduct Reasons, [10] - [11]. 50 Conduct Reasons, [16]. 51 Conduct Reasons, [12] - [13]. 52 Conduct Reasons, [12]. 53 Conduct Reasons, [14]. -- 15 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 16 (a) 30 October 2013 for $24,472.80 (the October Invoice); (b) 2 December 2013 for $58,018.95; (c) 24 December 2013 for $34,882.65; (d) 31 January 2014 for $48,648.60; and (e) 28 February 2014 for $6,598.35. 60 Angove Law made two payments to Mr B in part payment of his invoices. The first was made on or around 29 November 2013 in the amount of $7,000, and the second was made on or around 18 December 2013 in the amount of $5,000.55 61 Angove Law paid each of its own invoices in full (out of trust money) when they fell due.56 62 On 29 November 2013, Mr Khosa emailed Mr B the following:57 I confirm that a part payment of $7,000 was made via EFT on your invoice. I had reached the payment limit for the day. I will attend to the outstanding balance next week. 63 Part of the LSCC's case before the Tribunal was that this email made representations that were knowingly false. The LSCC referred to the representations made by this email as the payment representation.58 64 The balance of Mr B's invoices were never paid.59 Ground 2: Mr Khosa's establishment of a new incorporated legal practice 65 Ground 2 was that Mr Khosa attempted to avoid Angove Law's liabilities to Mr B by establishing a new firm: Law on Newcastle and making false and/or misleading representations to the Legal Practice Board when he did so.60 54 Conduct Reasons, [15]. 55 Conduct Reasons, [17]. 56 Conduct Reasons, [18]. 57 Conduct Reasons, [19]. 58 Conduct Reasons, [133], [196] - [219]. 59 Conduct Reasons, [20]. 60 Conduct Reasons, [32]. -- 16 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 17 66 On 28 April 2014, Mr B wrote to Mr Khosa claiming that his outstanding fees at that stage were $160,621.35, for which he had obtained a certificate of taxation from the Supreme Court.61 67 On 15 June 2015, Mr B's solicitors demanded that Mr Khosa provide a payment plan in respect of the outstanding fees by no later than 17 June 2015.62 68 The next day, on 16 June 2015, Mr Khosa arranged an appointment to speak to the Legal Practice Board's Executive Director.63 The meeting took place on 17 June 2015, and on the same day, Mr Khosa also lodged an application with the Australian Securities and Investment Commission to incorporate a new company: Law on Newcastle Pty Ltd.64 69 On 23 June 2015, Mr Khosa filed a Notice of a Corporation's Intention to Provide Legal Services (Form 7) with the Legal Practice Board by which notice was given that Law on Newcastle would provide legal services.65 70 On 9 July 2015, Mr Khosa filed a Notice of Cessation of Legal Practice by a Former Incorporated Legal Practice (Form 9) with the Legal Practice Board by which notice was given that Angove Law would cease providing legal services.66 71 In each of the Form 7 and the Form 9, Mr Khosa answered questions to the effect that Angove Law's practice was not being taken over by Law on Newcastle.67 Ground 3: Mr Khosa's lack of response to the LSCC 72 Ground 3 was that Mr Khosa failed to respond within an appropriate time, to five requests or summonses issued by the Legal Practice Board.68 73 Mr B complained to the LSCC about Mr Khosa's failure to pay his fees. As part of its investigation into that complaint, and in relation to its investigation into matters which subsequently arose, the LSCC 61 Conduct Reasons, [23]. 62 Conduct Reasons, [25]. 63 Conduct Reasons, [26]. 64 Conduct Reasons, [27]. 65 Conduct Reasons, [29]. 66 Conduct Reasons, [30]. 67 Conduct Reasons, [31]. 68 Conduct Reasons, [34]. -- 17 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 18 requested that Mr Khosa provide information and documents. It also issued summonses to the same effect.69 74 The LSCC made five distinct requests and summonses which Mr Khosa failed to respond to.70 The findings of professional misconduct made by the Tribunal Ground 1: Mr Khosa's failure to pay counsel 75 In relation to Ground 1, the Tribunal found that Mr Khosa: (a) failed to pay four of Mr B's invoices, and only partly paid the fifth;71 (b) made payments from funds held in trust for invoices issued by Angove Law, in preference to paying Mr B his outstanding fees;72 (c) following part payment of the October Invoice, falsely and misleadingly represented to Mr B that he had sufficient funds to pay the balance of that invoice, that full payment had not been made due to the bank's daily payment limit, and that the balance would be paid the following week.73 76 The Tribunal considered that Mr Khosa's failure to pay counsel's fees may not have been alone enough to warrant a finding of professional misconduct.74 77 The Tribunal referred to its decision in Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Goldsmith75 which also involved a failure to pay counsel's fees. It considered that the facts in Re Robb76 (a decision of the Full Bench of the ACT Supreme Court) were more analogous, however. It referred to observations made by the Full Bench in that case that:77 Delay or failure by a solicitor to pay counsel is of course not a new phenomenon and will probably occur from time to time so long as there 69 Conduct Reasons, [33]. 70 Conduct Reasons, [34]. 71 Conduct Reasons, [179]. 72 Conduct Reasons, [195]. 73 Conduct Reasons, [213] - [215]. 74 Conduct Reasons, [224]. 75 Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Goldsmith [2022] WASAT 43 (Goldsmith). 76 Re Robb (1996) 134 FLR 294, 329 - 330. 77 Conduct Reasons, [225]. -- 18 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 19 is a divided profession … There will no doubt often be reasons advanced in order to justify such delay or failure. But where the solicitor holds a client's funds for the very purpose and uses them for the solicitor's own ends, then the solicitor's conduct is such that the Court must take steps to ensure that the solicitor concerned and other members of the profession who might act likewise, whether through indifference or ignorance, understand the seriousness of their breach of duty. … It is necessary then that the order of the Court, although not punitive in character, deliver the message that no matter how efficient, eminent or popular the practitioner, conduct like that in the present case must be understood by all practitioners to amount to professional misconduct. (Tribunal's emphasis) 78 The Tribunal thought that 'considerable weight' needed to be given to Mr Khosa's decision to prioritise payment of Angove Law's fees over counsel's and the consequent very significant delay to the payment of the large sum due to counsel.78 79 The Tribunal acknowledged that while Mr Khosa benefited from the preferential payment, in the context of the sums outstanding, the sums paid to Angove Law were not considerable and would not have made much difference to the total sum outstanding. It also acknowledged that Mr Khosa and Angove Law were experiencing considerable financial hardship. The Tribunal did not consider that these circumstances were mitigatory, however, and it thought that even taking these matters into account, Mr Khosa's conduct was professional misconduct.79 80 The Tribunal also considered that Mr Khosa's conduct breached rule 26 of the Legal Profession Conduct Rules 2010 (WA) (the Conduct Rules) in that the sums owed were not paid within a reasonable time. Rule 26(2) of the Conduct Rules required a practitioner who engaged another practitioner to pay the engaged practitioner's fees within a reasonable time.80 81 The Tribunal considered that a reasonable time was 30 days. The Tribunal noted that rule 4(2) of the Conduct Rules provided that a 78 Conduct Reasons, [226]. 79 Conduct Reasons, [227] - [230]. 80 Conduct Reasons, [151], [231]. -- 19 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 20 breach of the rules 'may constitute unsatisfactory professional conduct or professional misconduct'.81 82 The Tribunal observed that while Mr Khosa's decision to prefer payments to Angove Law ahead of counsel involved him preferring his personal interests over his ethical obligations, it did not involve dishonesty. The Tribunal considered that this conduct alone did not justify a finding that Mr Khosa was not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice.82 83 The Tribunal found that the email that Mr Khosa sent on 29 November 2013 was factually incorrect and he knew that when he sent it.83 84 The Tribunal concluded that the payment representation was alone professional misconduct. It considered that when combined with the failure to pay counsel and the preferential payment of Angove Law, Mr Khosa's conduct was clearly sufficiently serious to establish that he was not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice.84 Ground 2: Mr Khosa's establishment of a new incorporated legal practice 85 In relation to Ground 2, the Tribunal found that Mr Khosa: (a) at a meeting with the Legal Practice Board, represented that Angove Law was solvent, when that representation was false and he knew it to be false;85 (b) in forms provided to the Legal Practice Board concerning Angove Law's closure and the establishment of Law on Newcastle, represented that Law on Newcastle was not taking over Angove Law's practice, when that representation was false and he knew it to be false;86 (c) decided to avoid the debt owed to Mr B by 'deriving' Law on Newcastle from Angove Law;87 and 81 Conduct Reasons, [232]. 82 Conduct Reasons, [234] - [236]. 83 Conduct Reasons, [196] - [219]. 84 Conduct Reasons, [240]. 85 Conduct Reasons, [271]. 86 Conduct Reasons, [303]. 87 Conduct Reasons, [320]. -- 20 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 21 (d) made the false representations to the Legal Practice Board described above as part of an attempt to avoid Angove Law's debt to Mr B.88 86 The Tribunal observed that the gravamen of Ground 2 was dishonesty and that its findings in relation to the ground involved findings of dishonesty.89 87 The Tribunal found that Mr Khosa had dishonestly misrepresented the relevant circumstances to the Legal Practice Board on three occasions: during a meeting on 17 June 2015 and in each of the Form 7 and the Form 9.90 88 The Tribunal found Mr Khosa had 'derived' Law on Newcastle from Angove Law in an attempt to avoid Angove Law's debts including those owed to Mr B. It considered that the steps taken by Mr Khosa were dishonest. It found that he had engaged in professional misconduct.91 Ground 3: Mr Khosa's lack of response to the LSCC 89 In relation to Ground 3, the Tribunal found that Mr Khosa failed, without reasonable excuse, to respond to various requests and demands for information and documents from the LSCC. Ground 3 contained five sub-grounds, each of which concerned a particular request or demand. In relation to the fifth sub-ground, the Tribunal found that Mr Khosa had obstructed the exercise of the LSCC's investigator's powers.92 90 The Tribunal thought that although Mr Khosa had engaged in obstructionist conduct, Ground 3 did not involve dishonesty. It did not consider that the conduct was alone sufficient to establish that Mr Khosa was not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice.93 91 The Tribunal did consider, however, that Mr Khosa's failure to respond to several requests over a lengthy period, without reasonable excuse, was sufficient to establish professional misconduct.94 88 Conduct Reasons, [333]. 89 Conduct Reasons, [334]. 90 Conduct Reasons, [243] - [303], [335]. 91 Conduct Reasons, [304] - [333], [336] - [337], [340] - [346]. 92 Conduct Reasons, [386], [407], [427], [445], [455], [464] - [465]. 93 Conduct Reasons, [474] - [475]. 94 Conduct Reasons, [477]. -- 21 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 22 Why the Tribunal made its recommendation 92 The Tribunal made a recommendation that Mr Khosa's name be removed from the roll of practitioners for eight reasons.95 93 First, the Tribunal noted that in relation to Grounds 1 and 2, it had found that Mr Khosa had engaged in conduct, including deliberately dishonest conduct, that was such as to warrant a conclusion that he was not a fit and proper person to engage in legal practice. Although the Tribunal acknowledged that, given the passage of time, it was not bound to conclude that Mr Khosa was still unfit to practice, it thought its findings still carried considerable weight.96 94 Secondly, the Tribunal noted that its findings on Grounds 1 and 2 involved findings of deliberate dishonesty. It noted that integrity and honesty are essential characteristics expected of a practitioner, and that intentionally misleading someone is a serious breach of a practitioner's professional duty. The Tribunal also considered that misleading the Legal Practice Board should be seen in the same light as misleading a court.97 95 Thirdly, the Tribunal observed that while the findings in relation to Ground 3 did not involve dishonesty, they were nonetheless very grave. The Tribunal noted that its findings included that Mr Khosa obstructed the exercise of the LSCC's investigator's powers.98 96 The Tribunal thought that even without that particular finding, Mr Khosa failed to meet his obligation to assist the regulator over five separate time periods spanning a period of several years.99 97 Fourthly, the Tribunal observed that Mr Khosa's conduct persisted for a considerable period of time, from the end of 2013 when he misled Mr B, through 2015 when he misled the Legal Practice Board and failed to respond to its requests, through 2016 and 2018 when he continued to fail to respond to its requests and obstructed its investigator.100 95 Penalty Reasons, [39] - [61]. 96 Penalty Reasons, [40] - [41]. 97 Penalty Reasons, [42] - [44]. 98 Penalty Reasons, [45]. 99 Penalty Reasons, [46]. 100 Penalty Reasons, [47]. -- 22 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 23 98 Fifthly, the Tribunal noted that Mr Khosa stood to benefit from the dishonest conduct which was the subject of Ground 2.101 99 Sixthly, the Tribunal considered it significant that the conduct the subject of Ground 2 occurred around the time that Mr Khosa's practising certificate was suspended for other misconduct. The Tribunal observed that at the very time that Mr Khosa was being sanctioned for 'not honest' behaviour, he engaged in dishonest conduct by making false representations to the Legal Practice Board. The Tribunal considered that the fact that Mr Khosa engaged in dishonest conduct at that time supported a finding that he was inherently unsuitable for practice.102 100 Seventhly, the Tribunal observed that Mr Khosa had a prior record of disciplinary action for dishonesty. It referred to a finding in 2015, that Mr Khosa knowingly breached a personal undertaking to another practitioner.103 101 The Tribunal thought that this confirmed that Mr Khosa's conduct was not an isolated act of misjudgement. Rather, the Tribunal considered that Mr Khosa engaged in several instances of dishonest and otherwise inappropriate conduct over a lengthy period of time.104 102 Eighthly, the Tribunal considered that Mr Khosa had shown no insight into, or remorse for, his conduct. The Tribunal thought that Mr Khosa's failure to properly acknowledge and accept his failings revealed a lack of insight.105 103 In addition to these eight reasons, the Tribunal considered that it was necessary to have regard to the need for general deterrence. It considered that Mr Khosa's conduct needed to be condemned in the strongest terms to ensure that practitioners clearly understand the implications of such behaviour.106 Why the Court of Appeal dismissed the Penalty Appeal 104 After Mr Khosa filed the Penalty Appeal, a registrar of the Court of Appeal issued a notice to him to attend a hearing to determine whether the appeal, or any ground, should be struck out. That hearing 101 Penalty Reasons, [48]. 102 Penalty Reasons, [51] - [54]. 103 Legal Profession Complaints Committee and Khosa [2015] WASAT 107. 104 Penalty Reasons, [55] - [56]. 105 Penalty Reasons, [57] - [61]. 106 Penalty Reasons, [62] - [64]. -- 23 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 24 was adjourned once at Mr Khosa's request but the Court of Appeal refused a second adjournment request. Mr Khosa had filed written submissions, however, that the Court of Appeal had regard to.107 105 There were seven grounds of appeal in the Penalty Appeal:108 1. The Tribunal erred in denying the Appellant the opportunity to be heard resulting in a miscarriage of justice. 2. The Tribunal breached Section 9 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004[.] 3. The Tribunal erred in disregarding the Appellant's statutory duties as a director of an incorporated entity pursuant to the Corporations Act which entity was also an incorporated legal practice. 4. The Tribunal erred when it admitted a report into evidence in circumstances where the [Committee] was aware that the author had lied to established his expertise and the report produced by the author was based on non-applicable standards. 5. The Tribunal erred in finding dishonesty in VR34/2015 Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Khosa[.] 6. The Tribunal erred in awarding the Committee costs when the Committee engaged in conduct that misled the Tribunal[.] 7. The Exercise of Bad Faith since the Hill J's [sic] decision in Ex Parte Ruba [2020] - misleading conduct by the Committee[.] Ground 1 106 The Court of Appeal reviewed the history of the proceedings before the Tribunal and the Tribunal's reasons for refusing the adjournment applications.109 The Court of Appeal noted that Mr Khosa attended the hearing that took place on 15 December 2023 to determine the penalty that should be imposed and made written and oral submissions at that hearing.110 107 The Court of Appeal considered that there was no evidence before the Tribunal which could have formed a proper basis for it to conclude that Mr Khosa was incapable of attending the hearing in March 2023 because of medical impairment. It thought that the medical 107 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [10] - [14]. 108 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [7]. 109 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [15] - [32]. 110 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [33]. -- 24 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 25 certification provided was vague and did not provide a proper basis for an adjournment.111 108 The Court of Appeal considered that there was nothing in Mr Khosa's grounds or submissions that provided any proper basis for impugning the Tribunal's discretionary decisions to refuse the adjournments. It thought that there was no arguable basis for contending that Mr Khosa was denied a reasonable opportunity to respond to the complaints made against him.112 109 The Court of Appeal noted that it is well established that it is not necessary to give a party an unlimited opportunity to present a case. It observed that what is required is that the parties are provided with a sufficient opportunity to present their cases. It said that a party who is given a sufficient opportunity to present their case, and who fails to take advantage of that opportunity without reasonable cause, cannot complain that they have been denied procedural fairness.113 110 The Court of Appeal considered that the proper inference to be drawn was that Mr Khosa decided not to participate in the hearing in March 2023, in a context where he had expressed dissatisfaction with the Tribunal proceedings and his state of preparedness for them.114 111 The Court of Appeal considered that Mr Khosa had been given ample opportunity to prepare for the hearing and the evidence did not establish that he suffered from any medical impairment which prevented him from attending the hearing in March 2023. The Court of Appeal's view was that the Tribunal was plainly correct to refuse the adjournment applications and proceed with the hearing in Mr Khosa's absence. It concluded that there was no arguable denial of procedural fairness.115 Ground 2 112 Ground 2 was that the Tribunal failed to achieve the objectives of s 9 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (the SAT Act) which provides that: 116 111 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [34]. 112 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [35]. 113 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [36]. 114 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [37]. 115 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [37]. 116 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [38]. -- 25 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 26 The main objectives of the Tribunal in dealing with matters within its jurisdiction are - (a) to achieve the resolution of questions, complaints or disputes, and make or review decisions, fairly and according to the substantial merits of the case; and (b) to act as speedily and with as little formality and technicality as is practicable, and minimise the costs to parties; and (c) to make appropriate use of the knowledge and experience of Tribunal members. 113 The Court of Appeal accepted that it was arguable that the objective identified in s 9(b) of the SAT Act was not achieved, given the length and complexity of the proceedings. The court observed, however, that the delay was partly attributable to Mr Khosa's own conduct.117 114 The Court of Appeal considered that in the relevant circumstances, the failure to achieve the objective did not provide a proper basis for dismissing the LSCC's complaint without determining its substantive merits. It observed that the delay did not prevent the Tribunal from resolving the complaints in a manner which was fair to all parties. It also considered that to have dismissed the complaint without any determination of the complaint on its substantial merits would have failed to achieve the objective provided for in s 9(a) of the SAT Act.118 Ground 3 115 Ground 3 contended that the Tribunal erred in disregarding the appellant's statutory duties as a director of Angove Law under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). 116 The Court of Appeal noted that Mr Khosa's submissions pointed to the duties that he owed to Angove Law. The submissions argued that the LSCC's case before the Tribunal was that he had derived a benefit from Angove Law without compensating it. He submitted that this view was erroneous, as Law on Newcastle purchased assets from Angove Law which reduced Angove Law's liabilities and avoided Angove Law incurring further debt and, if he had been allowed to be 117 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [40]. 118 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [40] - [42]. -- 26 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 27 heard, he would have led evidence that would have negated any allegation of 'phoenixing' activity.119 117 The Court of Appeal noted that Mr Khosa was not denied an opportunity to be heard but rather chose not to participate in the proceedings and that the Tribunal was required to determine the case on the evidence before it.120 118 The Court of Appeal also observed that the misconduct found by the Tribunal was not ceasing the business of Angove Law, or the terms on which its assets were transferred to Law on Newcastle, but rather the making of false and misleading representations as part of an attempt to avoid Angove Law's liabilities.121 Ground 4 119 Ground 4 contended that the Tribunal erred by admitting expert evidence to which Mr Khosa had objected. The Court of Appeal observed that this ground was without merit as the expert evidence was not in fact admitted into evidence.122 Ground 5 120 Ground 5 contended that the Tribunal erred 'in finding dishonesty in VR34/2015 Legal Profession Complaints Committee v Khosa'. The court observed that this was a reference to earlier disciplinary proceedings that were the subject of an earlier decision of the Court of Appeal in Khosa v Legal Profession Complaints Committee.123 121 Mr Khosa contended that the Tribunal had wrongly understood that a finding of dishonesty was made in VR34/2015 when no such finding was made. He argued that it was accepted in that case that he had made a mistake.124 122 The Court of Appeal referred to the Tribunal's reasons in VR34/2015 and noted that the Tribunal had found that 'a degree of dishonesty was involved'. It noted that the Court of Appeal's subsequent reasons also referred to a 'degree' of dishonesty. The Court of Appeal considered the references made by the Tribunal to 119 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [45]. 120 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [46]. 121 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [46]. 122 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [47] - [48]. 123 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [49] - [52]. 124 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [53]. -- 27 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 28 VR34/2015 in this case and did not consider that those reasons even arguably disclosed any mischaracterization of the findings in VR34/2015.125 Ground 6 123 Ground 6 contended that the Tribunal erred in awarding the LSCC costs when it engaged in conduct that misled the Tribunal.126 124 In support of this ground Mr Khosa referred to the LSCC's pursuit of tendering expert evidence, an alleged failure of it to refer the Tribunal to director's duties under the Corporations Law and allegations in relation to the conduct of VR34/2015. The Court of Appeal considered, however, that none of those matters actually arose for determination in the proceedings before the Tribunal.127 Ground 7 125 Ground 7 referred to the 'Exercise of Bad Faith since' Hill J's decision 'in Ex Parte Ruba [2020] - misleading conduct by the Committee'. The Court of Appeal described this ground as opaque. The Court of Appeal referred to the written submissions filed by Mr Khosa which referred to no reference being made to certain handwritten notes.128 126 The Court of Appeal noted that the reference to Hill J's decision seemed to be a reference to the decision in Re Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA); Ex parte Ruba.129 The court noted that that case concerned an application by Ms Ruba for leave to issue a writ of summons against the Board in which she claimed loss and damages alleged to be caused by the conduct of the Board in disciplinary proceedings against Mr Khosa. It referred to the fact that Hill J refused leave on the basis that the proposed writ would be an abuse of process and frivolous and vexatious and that Hill J did not make any finding of misconduct by any officer of the Board or the LSCC.130 127 The Court of Appeal concluded that the ground did not provide any apparent basis for setting aside the Tribunal's decision.131 125 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [54] - [57]. 126 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [58]. 127 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [59] - [60]. 128 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [61]. 129 Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA); Ex parte Ruba [2020] WASC 237. 130 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [61] - [62]. 131 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [63]. -- 28 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 29 Conclusion 128 The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal and dismissed the appeal. It considered that none of the grounds had any reasonable prospect of succeeding and the correctness of the Tribunal's decision was not attended by sufficient doubt to justify the grant of leave to appeal.132 Why Mr Khosa contends his name should not be removed from the roll 129 The written submissions that Mr Khosa filed in opposition to the LSCC's application that he be removed from the roll, simply repeated the submissions that he had made to the Court of Appeal in the Penalty Appeal. 130 With respect, for the reasons given by the Court of Appeal discussed above, none of those submissions have any merit. The matters raised by Mr Khosa are misconceived and none of them meaningfully call the Tribunal's conclusions into question. 131 The LSCC contended that Mr Khosa was precluded from making these submissions in the Application by the doctrines of issue estoppel or abuse of process, and because the Tribunal's findings were conclusive by reason of s 444(1) of the Legal Profession Act which survived the repeal of the Legal Profession Act, or by reason of the operation of the statutory scheme established by the Uniform Law.133 132 Given the clear lack of merit of Mr Khosa's submissions, however, the question of whether it was open to him to advance them appears academic. We therefore do not consider it necessary in this case to determine whether he was precluded from making the submissions and, if so, on what basis. 133 Mr Khosa also made brief oral submissions at the hearing of the Application. Those submissions raised three matters, none of which had merit. 134 First, Mr Khosa argued that the Tribunal's decision was 'unsound' because it was made without any evidence from him and without cross-examination. It was argued that in such circumstances, this court 132 Penalty Appeal Reasons, [65]. 133 The applicant relied upon to two decisions from other jurisdictions: Law Society of the ACT v Powrie [2017] ACTSCFC 4; (2017) 12 ACTLR 184 and de Robillard v Council of the New South Wales Bar Association; Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v de Robillard (No 2) [2024] NSWCA 299 [222] - [227] (Gleeson JA, with whom Griffiths AJA agreed). -- 29 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 30 cannot achieve 'actual persuasion' as mandated by Briginshaw v Briginshaw.134 135 Given that this court is not engaged in a fact finding exercise, the present relevance of the Briginshaw standard might be doubted. But even if it were relevant, the lack of any evidence from Mr Khosa and the lack of any cross-examination does not establish that the Tribunal's decision was unsound, particularly in circumstances where Mr Khosa chose not to attend the conduct hearing. 136 Secondly, Mr Khosa submitted that the LSCC's conduct had deprived him of a fair opportunity to put forward his case.135 Mr Khosa was not deprived of a fair opportunity to put forward his case. For the reasons given by the Court of Appeal, the Tribunal was right to refuse Mr Khosa's adjournment requests. Mr Khosa chose not to attend the conduct hearing. He then elected not to appeal the Tribunal's conduct decision. He attended the penalty hearing and made submissions. He then appealed the Tribunal's decision on penalty, as he was entitled to do. 137 Thirdly, Mr Khosa indicated that he relied upon the affidavit that he filed in support of his application for special leave to appeal to the High Court.136 The precise point that Mr Khosa was intending to make by 'relying on his affidavit' was unclear. Mr Khosa's affidavit spans 713 paragraphs and 62 pages. It is in a narrative form that describes events that commenced when Mr Khosa moved to Perth in 2012 and addresses his dealings with the Legal Practice Board and his involvement in various disciplinary proceedings before the Tribunal. 138 The affidavit was filed in support of his application for special leave to appeal against the Penalty Appeal. It would therefore seem intended to address matters canvassed in that appeal and whether special leave should be granted. It is therefore not apparent to us that the affidavit was intended to raise any matter we have not already addressed. 139 That said, we have considered the affidavit and its contents do not seem to raise any relevant matter of merit. 140 Although the LSCC did not argue that Mr Khosa was precluded from making his oral submissions, it may be that he was, for the same 134 ts 65, ts 67. 135 ts 65, ts 67. 136 ts 65, ts 67. -- 30 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 31 reasons that he may have been precluded from making his other submissions. Again, however, the lack of merit of Mr Khosa's submissions means that the question is academic. Whether Mr Khosa's name should be removed from the roll 141 In our view, Mr Khosa is not a fit and proper person to be a legal practitioner. 142 In relation to the matters the subject of Grounds 1 and 2 before the Tribunal, Mr Khosa made deliberately misleading statements to counsel (Mr B) and the Legal Practice Board. 143 As is recorded at [94] of these reasons, the Tribunal considered that misleading the Legal Practice Board should be seen in the same light as misleading a court.137 144 Ultimately, in the disposition of the Application, it was not necessary for this court to be drawn on whether a practitioner's obligation to the LPCC is equivalent to that owed by a practitioner to the court, as an officer of the court. It is sufficient to record that a practitioner who has acted in a manner intended to mislead the LPCC will have engaged in conduct which is incompatible with the characteristics of honesty and integrity that are required for the maintenance of proper standards of the profession.138 145 The fact that Mr Khosa misled counsel and the LPCC but not the public did not in our view ameliorate the misconduct identified in these grounds. A very serious approach must be taken to such deliberately dishonest conduct. Integrity and honesty are essential qualities expected of a legal practitioner. Mr Khosa lacks these essential qualities. 146 Mr Khosa has previously been the subject of disciplinary proceedings involving findings of dishonesty. That the conduct the subject of Ground 2 occurred around the time he was suspended for that other conduct, reveals a profound lack of insight. That he continues to lack insight is evident from his continued denials of wrongdoing and his failure to accept responsibility for his actions. Such lack of insight means that there is an increased risk that he will engage in such conduct again in the future. 137 Penalty Reasons, [42] - [44]. 138 Consistent with the approach adopted in Legal Services and Complaints Committee v Staffa [2025] WASC 6 [131]. -- 31 of 32 -- [2026] WASC 193 REASONS OF THE COURT Page 32 147 In our view, the removal of Mr Khosa's name from the roll is necessary to protect the public and to maintain the reputation and standards of the legal profession. His conduct must be condemned in the strongest terms and is inconsistent with continued membership of the profession. Conclusion 148 For all of these reasons, we will order Mr Khosa's name be removed from the roll of practitioners pursuant to s 23(1)(c) of the Uniform Law. 149 We will hear from the parties on the question of costs. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. VS Associate to the Hon Justice Palmer 20 MAY 2026 -- 32 of 32 --