JRD -v- DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS [2026] WASC 187

[2026] WASC 187 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CRIMINAL CITATION : JRD -v- DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS [2026] WASC 187 CORAM : BYDDER J HEARD : 15 APRIL 2026 DELIVERED : 15 APRIL 2026 PUBLISHED : 12 MAY 2026 FILE NO/S : SJA 1060 of 2025 BETWEEN : JRD Appellant AND DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS Respondent ON APPEAL FROM: Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Coram : MAGISTRATE M MILLINGTON File Number : MI 4950-4967/2025 MI 6095/2025 -- 1 of 16 -- [2026] WASC 187 Page 2 Catchwords: Spent conviction order - Stealing charges - Whether miscarriage of justice - New evidence not before magistrate - Turns on own facts Legislation: Criminal Code 1913 (WA) Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) Result: Appeal allowed Category: B Representation: Counsel: Appellant : In person Respondent : Ms N Sinton Solicitors: Appellant : In person Respondent : Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) -- 2 of 16 -- [2026] WASC 187 Page 3 Cases referred to in decision: A v Staples [2007] WASC 36 AZY v McIntosh [2021] WASC 34 Brewer v Bayens [No 2] [2002] WASCA 271; (2002) 26 WAR 510 Caseley v Zampogna [2006] WASC 259 Colwell v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2012] WASCA 196 GNR v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 5 IHS v Director of Public Prosecutions [2025] WASC 437 JAD v McRae [2022] WASC 220 Jetta v Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia [2021] WASC 234 Lowndes v The Queen [1999] HCA 29; (1999) 195 CLR 665 M v Seidner [2013] WASC 395; (2013) 236 A Crim R 17 Manchanda v WA Police [2025] WASC 49 Norbu v WA Police [2024] WASC 473 R v Tognini [2000] WASCA 31; (2000) 22 WAR 291 Riley v WA Police [2023] WASC 335 Rule v Trudgill [2015] WASC 196 Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473 -- 3 of 16 -- [2026] WASC 187 BYDDER J Page 4 BYDDER J: Introduction 1 The appellant (JRD) was convicted on his plea of guilty of 19 charges of stealing. 2 JRD applied for a spent conviction order in respect of each of the convictions. The learned Magistrate refused to make those orders. JRD appeals from that decision of the learned Magistrate, relying on the sole ground that there was a miscarriage of justice occasioned by the decision of the learned Magistrate to refuse to grant a spent conviction order in respect of each of JRD's convictions. 3 The respondent conceded the appeal. In my respectful opinion that concession was appropriate. While the learned Magistrate did not err in dismissing JRD's application for spent conviction orders on the evidence before his Honour at the time, in light of further evidence led by JRD in his appeal I was satisfied that the refusal of the spent conviction orders has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. 4 After hearing JRD and counsel for the respondent on 15 April 2026, I made the following orders: 1. The application for leave to appeal be granted. 2. The appeal be allowed. 3. There be a spent conviction order in respect of each of the 19 offences of stealing, on charges MI 4950/2025 to MI 4967/2025 (inclusive), and MI 6095/2025, of which JRD was convicted before his Honour Magistrate Millington on 15 July 2025. 4. The reasons to be published are to be anonymised. 5 I also said that I would publish my reasons for making those orders at a later date. These are my reasons. Factual background 6 JRD is 63 years old. He is self-employed, a plasterer by trade and a licensed builder.1 1 Transcript of the hearing before the learned Magistrate on 15 July 2025 (ts) 8. -- 4 of 16 -- [2026] WASC 187 BYDDER J Page 5 7 Between 16 February and 13 April 2025 JRD stole goods from Bunnings Malaga. In essence, the stealing offences were committed by JRD driving into the Bunnings trade yard, putting items in his vehicle and paying for only some of those items. JRD then drove out of the trade yard with all of the items, including those for which he had not paid. 8 JRD made full admissions to the police after he was arrested on 17 April 2025. He also paid Bunnings for the full value of the goods that he stole. 9 The offences were out of character for JRD. Save for a minor traffic offence in 2018, his only other offending had occurred more than 30 years ago. His offences were also committed in the context of very difficult personal circumstances for JRD and his family. 10 Those circumstances were described by counsel for JRD before the learned Magistrate as follows:2 By way of explanation, your Honour, he really instructs me that he's not really sure why he offended in the way he did. He instructs that, essentially, it was the culmination of a number of ongoing stresses in his life. Firstly, his wife has been dealing with a number of health issues. She has had breast cancer twice. She has had a tumour in her heart requiring open-heart surgery. She has suffered from bowel cancer and, in the last couple of years, she has also been diagnosed with liver cancer. So this has obviously caused him significant stress and distress. Secondly, he has his own health issues, including blood pressure and the need for a hip replacement. Thirdly, he lost his mother a couple of years ago during surgery at a hospital. His brother also died of brain cancer about four years ago. He is also struggling with depression and has been - was on antidepressants for some time. He did stop those antidepressants about six months ago, and probably, in hindsight, shouldn't have stopped taking his medication, and he says that he was feeling pretty down and was struggling to cope. He has made efforts to go back to his psychologist. I have a report from his psychologist to show that, since this offending, he has attended at, I think, two sessions, and is intending to continue to attend on his doctor. He accepts that he needs some help. He was really feeling quite lost in his life and without a purpose at the time of these offences, and so, to his credit, he has taken steps to mitigate any future risk. He knew he was doing the wrong thing. He says that, really, it was a compulsion, and he was unable to stop himself until he was arrested and 2 ts 7 - 8. -- 5 of 16 -- [2026] WASC 187 BYDDER J Page 6 stopped by the police. In terms of the items stolen, he explains that it was really a combination of items he required for home and his business, and he doesn't really have any other explanation, apart from being under significant stress and probably, to some extent, grief at the time. The hearing before the learned Magistrate on 15 July 2025 11 In support of JRD's application for a spent conviction order, his counsel submitted that JRD was unlikely to commit a similar offence again, he had taken steps to re-engage with his psychologist to try to address the issues underlying his offending and he was of prior good character. 12 In this context, JRD relied on a report dated 14 July 2025 from Mr Alessandrini, a psychologist. Mr Alessandrini stated that JRD had received psychological intervention for a period in 2020 and had been receptive to the intervention throughout that period. 13 Mr Alessandrini also noted that JRD had resumed psychological intervention in 2025, had attended two sessions and was scheduled to be seen again in July 2025. 14 He also addressed JRD's presentation and psychological status and said that JRD had 'recently demonstrated dissociative tendencies which can be attributed to complex grief presentations'.3 He also noted as particularly relevant to JRD's case that he was experiencing 'emotional numbness (absence or marked reduction of emotional experience and its attribution to behaviours undertaken)'.4 15 The report went on to record the proposed psychological intervention for JRD and that JRD remained committed to ongoing psychological intervention. 16 JRD's counsel also submitted that if spent conviction orders were not granted, there was a potential adverse effect on obtaining renewal of his builder's licence. In addition, JRD has contracts with various agencies to visit mine sites where a police clearance is required. 17 The application for spent conviction orders was opposed because of the seriousness of the offending. The prosecutor emphasised that 3 Psychological Report by Dr Alessandrini dated 14 July 2025 (Dr Alessandrini Report), 3. 4 Dr Alessandrini Report, 3. -- 6 of 16 -- [2026] WASC 187 BYDDER J Page 7 JRD's offending was significant and 'went on and on'. He also noted that compulsion had been an issue for JRD, as JRD's counsel had said.5 18 The learned Magistrate sentenced JRD to a community based order for eight months for one of the offences and a global fine of $3,000 for the other offences. 19 As to the application for spent conviction orders, the learned Magistrate said:6 There's an application for a spent conviction. That application is opposed by the prosecution. I need to be satisfied you're unlikely to commit such an offence again. I need to be satisfied you're a person of previous good character and, if I'm satisfied of those two things, I need to consider whether I should relieve you of the adverse effect of a conviction. … The real issue … is 19 charges before the court. … I accept that I have placed you on a community-based order. I accept that you're getting some addition from the psychological services that you have had some contact for a while, and that may put you back on the track … that it was prior to all this. Look, I accept you're a person of previous good character and … I just think, given the volume of offending involved, that it's not appropriate to grant a spent conviction. I'm not satisfied that there won't be any further offending. So the application for a spent conviction is refused. The basis for JRD's appeal 20 It is not in dispute that JRD can appeal from the learned Magistrate's refusal to make the spent conviction orders. A person who is aggrieved by a 'decision' of a court of summary jurisdiction may appeal to the Supreme Court against that decision.7 21 The learned Magistrate's refusal is a decision of that kind.8 22 JRD must obtain leave to appeal.9 If leave to appeal is not granted on at least one ground of appeal, the appeal is taken to have been dismissed.10 5 ts 10. 6 ts 12 - 13. 7 Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) s 7(1). 8 Criminal Appeals Act s 6(g); AZY v McIntosh [2021] WASC 34 (AZY) [26] - [30] (Tottle J). 9 Criminal Appeals Act s 9(1). 10 Criminal Appeals Act s 9(3). -- 7 of 16 -- [2026] WASC 187 BYDDER J Page 8 23 The court must not grant leave in respect of a ground of appeal unless the court is satisfied that the ground has a reasonable prospect of succeeding.11 A ground will have a reasonable prospect of success in this sense if it has a rational and logical prospect of succeeding; that is, it would not be irrational, fanciful or absurd to envisage it succeeding in that forum; in effect, that it has a real prospect of success.12 24 Even if a ground of appeal might be decided in favour of JRD, the court may dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred.13 However, the possibility that an appeal may be dismissed on this basis is not to be considered in determining whether a ground has a reasonable prospect of success.14 Applications to adduce further evidence 25 JRD applied to adduce further evidence, by way of affidavits sworn by him on 25 February 2026, 31 March 2026 and 9 April 2026 and by his wife on 25 February 2026. 26 JRD's wife deposed to JRD's good character and provided evidence of her health conditions. 27 In his February affidavit, JRD deposed to the potential effect of his convictions on renewing his builder's licence and to his health conditions, including being diagnosed in November 2025 with stage 3 melanoma. 28 In his March affidavit, JRD deposed to his psychological intervention and provided a further report from Mr Alessandrini dated 19 March 2026. Relevantly for present purposes, Mr Alessandrini said in his report that JRD: [C]ontinues to progress functionally and adaptively very well from responsible and working function perspectives. He has maintained consistently responsible and trustworthy engagement with his customer/client base, while also demonstrating respectful community participation under his trade and building company auspices. He has demonstrated considerable reflective and remorseful propensities with a continued desire to uphold good community standing. 11 Criminal Appeals Act s 9(2). 12 Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473 (Samuels) [56] (Steytler P, Wheeler and Roberts-Smith JJA). 13 Criminal Appeals Act s 14(2). 14 Samuels [56] (Steytler P, Wheeler and Roberts-Smith JJA). -- 8 of 16 -- [2026] WASC 187 BYDDER J Page 9 … [JRD's psychological test scores] indicate that he is not experiencing a clinically significant degree of psychological distress. The progression of his overall psychological well-being from date of first presentation to the present day is a testament to the work he has undertaken and represents sound psychological robustness. [His] Depression score is in the moderate range. A Depression score in the moderate range may mean the client is struggling with decreased interest in activities, and moderate self-criticism. However, given [JRD] has encountered the presentation of medical health concerns requiring ongoing management since October 2025, this is deemed a contributing factor to his depressive symptomatology score. [JRD's] Anxiety and Stress scores fall within the normal range, indicating no significant levels of anxiety or stress based on this assessment. Therefore, it is anticipated that it remained highly unlikely that [JRD] will re-offend given his sessional presentations to me up until this point in time. [JRD] has committed to attending one further appointed session on 01/04/2026, in order to further reinforce the psychologically adaptive modalities that he has engaged to ensure ongoing maintenance of the positive work undertaken and gains he has made to date. 29 In his April affidavit, JRD deposed to the timing of his registration renewals and that he had completed psychological intervention. 30 I must decide the appeal on the evidence and material that were before the learned Magistrate.15 However, for the purposes of dealing with the appeal I may admit any other evidence.16 31 In M v Seidner,17 Pritchard J set out principles relevant to the exercise of the power to admit other evidence: The test for the admission of fresh evidence is whether, had the evidence been before the sentencing court, a different sentence may have been imposed. Evidence of facts since the sentence was imposed may be received to show facts relevant to the sentencing process, which were in existence 15 Criminal Appeals Act s 39(1). 16 Criminal Appeals Act s 39(3) and s 40(1)(e). 17 M v Seidner [2013] WASC 395; (2013) 236 A Crim R 17 (M v Seidner) [26] - [28] (footnotes omitted), in which Pritchard J cited Colwell v The State of Western Australia [No 2] [2012] WASCA 196 [29] - [30] (Newnes AJA, with whom Pullin and Mazza JJA agreed), Caseley v Zampogna [2006] WASC 259 [19] (Blaxell J) and A v Staples [2007] WASC 36 [17] (Hasluck J). -- 9 of 16 -- [2026] WASC 187 BYDDER J Page 10 at the time of a sentence but either not known to the sentencing judge or not properly appreciated at the time. For the purpose of determining whether failure to make a spent conviction order amounts to a miscarriage of justice, an appellate court may have regard to new information which has been gathered for the purposes of the appeal and shows the appellant's good character and the likely consequences of a conviction. 32 As Lundberg J recently observed in IHS v Director of Public Prosecutions,18 when speaking of additional evidence a distinction is observed between fresh evidence and new evidence. As in IHS, it is unnecessary for me to explore this distinction because the admission of the additional evidence described above at [25] - [28] was not opposed and this is an appeal against sentence only.19 33 Moreover, Mr Alessandrini's later report with its account of JRD's response to psychological intervention was not available to JRD at the time of sentencing. JRD had placed before the learned Magistrate a report from Mr Alessandrini current as at the day before he appeared before his Honour. 34 The four affidavits and in particular JRD's March affidavit depose to additional facts that are relevant to whether he should be granted a spent conviction order in respect of each of his offences, including whether JRD is likely to re-offend. It was appropriate to admit the additional evidence. Determining whether there has been a miscarriage of justice 35 JRD does not contend by his sole ground of appeal that the learned Magistrate erred in refusing to make the spent conviction orders. Instead, JRD relies on evidence that was not before the learned Magistrate and contends that, taken with the evidence that was before his Honour, refusing to make the orders occasioned a miscarriage of justice. 36 As Derrick J observed in JAD v McRae:20 18 IHS v Director of Public Prosecutions [2025] WASC 437 (IHS) [42]. 19 That is not to say that evidence known to and readily obtainable by the appellant at the sentencing hearing will invariably be admitted on appeal or be capable on appeal of establishing a miscarriage of justice, when it is said that the miscarriage of justice arose because the additional evidence was not before the sentencing court: see Jetta v Director of Public Prosecutions for Western Australia [2021] WASC 234 [80] (Derrick J); Riley v WA Police [2023] WASC 335 [30] (Forrester J). 20 JAD v McRae [2022] WASC 220 [71] (footnotes omitted and emphasis added). -- 10 of 16 -- [2026] WASC 187 BYDDER J Page 11 [I]n a case such as the present where there is additional evidence before the court that was not before the magistrate and which goes to the issue of the appropriateness or otherwise of the making of a spent conviction order in respect of the appellant's conviction, the question whether the magistrate made an error by not making a spent conviction order on the material that was before her is not relevant. The finding of error on the part of the magistrate in not making a spent conviction order is not required for the conclusion that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. Rather, the question is whether taking account of the additional evidence admitted on the appeal, the magistrate's failure to make a spent conviction order has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. 37 In answering the question posed by Derrick J in JAD v McRae, I must consider the merits of JRD's application for a spent conviction order afresh in relation to each offence.21 However, I cannot interfere with the learned Magistrate's decision merely because I would have exercised the discretion differently.22 I must be satisfied that his Honour's decision not to grant the spent conviction orders has occasioned a miscarriage of justice taking into account the additional evidence on the appeal. 38 If, on the evidence before me on the appeal, I am satisfied that not making the spent conviction orders has occasioned a miscarriage of justice, I can allow the appeal even if on the evidence before the learned Magistrate, it was open to his Honour to refuse to make the spent conviction orders.23 Principles applicable to deciding whether to make a spent conviction order 39 The learned Magistrate imposed a community based order on JRD for one of the offences and a global fine in respect of his other offences. A court imposing a fine or a community based order on an offender who is a natural person may do so with or without making a spent conviction order.24 40 Section 45(1) of the Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) (Sentencing Act) sets out the pre-conditions which must be established before a court can make a spent conviction order, namely that: (a) the offender is unlikely to commit the offence again; and 21 Manchanda v WA Police [2025] WASC 49 (Manchanda) [20] (Whitby J). 22 Lowndes v The Queen [1999] HCA 29; (1999) 195 CLR 665 [15] (the Court). 23 Rule v Trudgill [2015] WASC 196 [35] (Allanson J). 24 Sentencing Act 1995 (WA) s 39(1) and s 39(2)(c) and (d). -- 11 of 16 -- [2026] WASC 187 BYDDER J Page 12 (b) the offence is trivial or the offender is of previous good character; and (c) having regard to the triviality of the offence or the previous good character of the offender, the offender should be relieved immediately of the adverse effect that the conviction might have on the offender. 41 The pre-conditions must be established by convincing evidence.25 42 Further, it is only if the first two pre-conditions are established that the court can consider whether it is satisfied that a spent conviction order should be made, having regard to the triviality of the offence or the previous good character of the offender.26 43 The court has a discretion to make a spent conviction order and is under no duty to do so.27 The applicable principles were outlined in Tognini:28 In my opinion it is appropriate to conclude that having regard to its effect on the ordinary operations of the Spent Convictions Act, the discretionary power to make a spent conviction order conferred by s 45 of the Sentencing Act should be regarded as being of an exceptional character. If the necessary pre-conditions are established, the court should go on to have regard to the seriousness of the offence before it in the circumstances of its commission and in the circumstances personal to the offender. It should take as the ordinary rule the fact that a conviction will be a matter of record with all the consequences that may entail into the future. It should therefore look to see whether there is some particular circumstance to show that it would be desirable, not only from the point of view of the offender but also, having regard to his or her rehabilitation, from the point of view of the community, why the adverse effect of the conviction should be immediately set aside. That may often be found in the fact that the conviction, if not declared to be spent, might be a particular impediment to the offender following a particular career, practising a particular profession or undertaking particular employment. It may be that it will be the case that that would be productive of exceptional hardship to the offender and his family, or it may simply be that it can be seen that to relieve the offender of the adverse effects of the conviction will positively aid that person's 25 Brewer v Bayens [No 2] [2002] WASCA 271; (2002) 26 WAR 510 (Brewer v Bayens) [14] (Burchett AUJ, with whom Wallwork and Wheeler JJ agreed). 26 Norbu v WA Police [2024] WASC 473 (Norbu) [26] (McGrath J). 27 R v Tognini [2000] WASCA 31; (2000) 22 WAR 291 (Tognini) [24] (Murray J, with whom Malcolm CJ and Wallwork J agreed); GNR v The State of Western Australia [2015] WASCA 5 [44] (McLure P, with whom Buss and Mazza JJA agreed). 28 Tognini [27] - [28] (Murray J, with whom Malcolm CJ and Wallwork J agreed). -- 12 of 16 -- [2026] WASC 187 BYDDER J Page 13 rehabilitation in a way which may be seen to best accord with the interests of the community. The court may be aided to reach that conclusion if it thinks that there is no pressing public interest in being able to continue to have access to the fact of conviction as part of the process of securing the protection of the community. 44 The public interest considerations to which Murray J referred in Tognini include: [M]aintaining the community's confidence in the judicial system and ensuring general deterrence by the public recording of convictions. The public interest also comprises a consideration of employers being aware of an offender's conduct, where that conduct is relevant in assessing the offender's reliability and suitability for the type of work undertaken by the offender.29 45 The power to make a spent conviction order 'should only be sparingly exercised in a clear case where, for cogent reasons, its exercise is seen to be desirable'.30 Has a miscarriage of justice been occasioned by the refusal to make spent conviction orders? The first two pre-conditions have now been established 46 In sentencing JRD, the learned Magistrate accepted that he was of previous good character. However, his Honour was not satisfied that JRD was unlikely to commit the offences again. 47 In my respectful opinion, it was plainly open to the learned Magistrate to make those findings on the evidence. JRD was clearly of previous good character based on his record. It was far less clear that JRD was unlikely to commit further offences, despite the remorse demonstrated by his pleas of guilty at the earliest opportunity and his having repaid Bunnings the value of the goods he had stolen. 48 JRD had recently committed his offences. Their commission was attributed to a compulsion which may well have continued to exist at the time of sentencing. JRD had only recently commenced further psychological intervention. If JRD had submitted that the learned Magistrate had erred in not being satisfied on the evidence before his Honour that JRD was unlikely to reoffend, I would have rejected that submission. 29 Norbu [31] (McGrath J), citing Brewer v Bayens [17] - [18] (Burchett AUJ, with whom Wallwork and Wheeler JJ agreed) (footnotes omitted). 30 Tognini [24] (Murray J, with whom Malcolm CJ and Wallwork J agreed). -- 13 of 16 -- [2026] WASC 187 BYDDER J Page 14 49 However, as I have noted above that was not JRD's submission and it is unnecessary for JRD to demonstrate error on the learned Magistrate's part to succeed in the appeal. 50 The respondent concedes that, if the additional evidence and in particular Mr Alessandrini's most recent report had been available to the learned Magistrate, it is likely that his Honour would have found that JRD was unlikely to commit the offences again. That concession is appropriately made. I am satisfied having regard to the evidence before the learned Magistrate and the additional evidence admitted in the appeal that JRD is unlikely to commit a stealing offence again. 51 I must therefore consider whether JRD should be relieved of the adverse effects of his conviction. Should JRD be relieved of the adverse effects of his conviction? 52 In considering whether the discretion to make a spent conviction order in respect of each of JRD's offences should be exercised in his favour, I must have regard to: (a) the seriousness of each of JRD's offences in the circumstances of its commission and in the circumstances personal to JRD; (b) whether there is some particular circumstance to show that it would be desirable both from JRD's point of view and, having regard to his rehabilitation, from the community's point of view for the adverse effect of the conviction to be immediately set aside; and (c) whether there is a pressing public interest in being able to continue to have access to the fact of conviction as part of the process of securing the protection of the community. 53 In considering those matters, I should take as the ordinary rule the fact that a conviction will be a matter of record with all the consequences that may entail into the future. I should also regard the discretionary power to make a spent conviction order as being of an exceptional character. -- 14 of 16 -- [2026] WASC 187 BYDDER J Page 15 The seriousness of the offences in the circumstances of their commission and the circumstances personal to JRD 54 The amount and frequency of JRD's offending increased the seriousness of his offences. However, the offences were committed in circumstances of extraordinary and cumulative stress. 55 They were out of character and, having regard to the evidence and in particular Mr Alessandrini's most recent report, it is unlikely he will re-offend in that way again. Moreover, as the learned Magistrate accepted in sentencing him, JRD had done everything he could to rectify the harm caused by his offending.31 The circumstance on which JRD relies to support the making of a spent conviction order for each offence 56 JRD relies on the potential effect of his convictions on the renewal of his builder's licence and on his contracts for work on mine sites requiring a police clearance. I accept that his convictions may have an adverse effect on JRD in both respects. 57 I also accept, as the respondent submitted, that JRD's convictions may adversely affect his ability to conduct business, including from a reputational standpoint, because JRD is the director of his company. Public interest considerations Rehabilitation 58 JRD has already demonstrated his remorse for his offending and taken effective steps toward rehabilitation. 59 Granting spent conviction orders to JRD will plainly assist his rehabilitation. The orders will help JRD to put behind him offending that was out of character and the product of extraordinary stress and will support the psychological intervention which he sought in response to his offending. 60 Spent conviction orders will also ensure that JRD's livelihood and that of his dependents, including his wife who has significant medical conditions, will not be put at risk. 31 ts 11. -- 15 of 16 -- [2026] WASC 187 BYDDER J Page 16 General deterrence 61 The circumstances in which JRD committed his offences reduces the weight that I would otherwise have attached to general deterrence. Public interest in employers being aware of the convictions 62 JRD is self-employed and 63 years of age. 63 Given the circumstances of JRD's offending, there is no pressing public interest in employers (or other members of the public) being able to continue to have access to the fact of JRD's convictions as part of the process of securing the protection of the community. Disposition 64 Having regard to these considerations, and being satisfied that the discretion to grant a spent conviction order in respect of each of his offences has been enlivened, I was satisfied that JRD had established his ground of appeal and spent conviction orders should be granted. 65 For those reasons, I made the orders on 15 April 2026 set out above at [4]. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. ST Associate to the Hon Justice Bydder 12 MAY 2026 -- 16 of 16 --