SUAREZ -v- BRUNSDON [2026] WASC 188

[2026] WASC 188 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CHAMBERS CITATION : SUAREZ -v- BRUNSDON [No 2] [2026] WASC 188 CORAM : STRK J HEARD : 8 MAY 2026 DETERMINED : 8 MAY 2026 PUBLISHED : 13 MAY 2026 FILE NO/S : CIV 1241 of 2026 BETWEEN : LAUREN MARIE SUAREZ Plaintiff AND KANE RONALD BRUNSDON Defendant Catchwords: Person dying intestate - Dispute as to the distribution of and arrangements for ashes - Where dispute has arisen as between deceased's mother and father - Unreasonable delay to be avoided as to collection of ashes - Narrowing of issues by compromise - Turns on own facts Legislation: Administration Act 1903 (WA) Cremation Act 1929 (WA) Cremation Regulations 1954 (WA) Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) -- 1 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 Page 2 Result: Orders made in terms set out in sch A to these reasons Category: B Representation: Counsel: Plaintiff : In Person Defendant : In Person Solicitors: Plaintiff : In Person Defendant : In Person -- 2 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 Page 3 Cases referred to in decision: Attwood v Office of the State Coroner [2020] WASC 198 Bell v Bell [2023] WASC 471 Britt v Office of the State Coroner [2022] WASCA 75 Brown v Weidig [2023] NSWSC 281; (2023) 22 ASTLR 386 Burrows v Cramley [2002] WASC 47 Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406 Frail v Shorey [2021] NSWSC 122 In Estate of Crippen [1911] P 108 Jackamarra v Office of the State Coroner [2021] WASC 301 Jones v Dodd [1999] SASC 125; (1999) 73 SASR 328 Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534 Leeburn v Derndorfer (2004) 14 VR 100 Mathieson v State Coroner of Western Australia [2025] WASC 393 Milenkovic v McConnell [2013] WASC 421 Mourish v Wynne [2009] WASC 85 Naidoo v Williamson [2008] WASCA 179; (2008) 37 WAR 516 Northern Territory v Sangare [2019] HCA 25; (2019) 265 CLR 164 Ohn v Walton (1995) 36 NSWLR 77 Re G (1946) 62 TLR 279 Robinson v Pinegrove Memorial Park Ltd (1986) 7 BPR 15,097 Smith v Tamworth City Council (1997) 41 NSWLR 680 Strzelecki Holdings Pty Ltd v Jorgensen [2019] WASCA 96; (2019) 54 WAR 388 Suarez v Brunsdon [2026] WASC 55 Wentworth v Attorney-General (NSW) [1984] HCA 70; (1984) 154 CLR 518 Williams v Williams (1882) 20 Ch D 659 -- 3 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 4 STRK J: Introduction 1 The late Kaleb Raymond Best died on 9 February 2026. He was 24 years old, had not married and had no children. He was survived by his parents, Lauren Marie Suarez and Kane Ronald Brunsdon. On the evidence before the Court, it appeared that the deceased died intestate. Letters of administration had not been granted. No interim administrator had been appointed. 2 Ms Suarez and Mr Brunsdon could not agree as to who should have carriage of arranging the funeral service, which funeral home should be engaged to conduct the service, and what should be done with respect to the deceased's ashes. For the reasons given on 27 February 2026, Ms Suarez was afforded carriage of the funeral and cremation of the deceased, and an order restraining Mr Brunsdon from interfering with Ms Suarez' arrangements for the disposal of the deceased's body was made: Suarez v Brunsdon [2026] WASC 55. 3 While the Court made orders on 27 February 2026 which concerned the funeral arrangements for the deceased and the cremation, there was no determination then made as to what would be done with respect to the deceased's ashes. The parties were afforded additional time to reflect upon that question, which did not need to be determined with the same urgency as the funeral arrangements.1 4 A funeral service for the deceased was held and there was a cremation. Unfortunately, there remained a dispute as between Ms Suarez and Mr Brunsdon as to what should be done with the ashes in circumstances where no interim administrator of the deceased's estate had been appointed, and neither parent of the deceased acted with authority on behalf of the deceased's estate. 5 On 27 February 2026 programming orders were made with respect to the remaining controversy concerning the ashes in the following terms: 10. Each party must file and serve any further written submissions and any affidavits in relation to their proposal for the ashes of the deceased by 4pm on Tuesday, 31 March 2026. 1 Suarez v Brunsdon [9]. -- 4 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 5 11. What arrangements will be made for the ashes will be determined on the submissions made and evidence read to date, and the papers filed pursuant to order 10 of these orders. 12. Neither party is to take possession of the deceased's ashes until further order. 13. There be liberty to apply in relation to orders 10 to 12 (inclusive) of these orders. 6 Further to the orders made, an outline of submissions and various affidavits were filed in relation to the competing proposals for the ashes of the deceased. 7 On 14 April 2026 Mr Brunsdon requested that the matter be relisted for further hearing pursuant to the order granting liberty to apply.2 The Court was advised that the 'request is made due to concerns regarding the accuracy and truthfulness of certain evidence filed, which the applicant submits should be tested at a hearing'. 8 On 20 April 2026 a directions hearing took place at which Mr Brunsdon indicated that, pursuant to the liberty to apply granted by order 13 of the orders made on 27 February 2026, he wished for a further hearing to proceed and to have the opportunity to file further submissions in advance of the hearing. He was afforded the opportunity to do so. The proceeding was listed for a further hearing to be held on 8 May 2026 as to the arrangements for the deceased's ashes. 9 Programming orders were made which required Mr Brunsdon to file and serve further written submissions as to what arrangements ought be made for the ashes of the deceased (which were to clearly record his preferences with respect to the arrangements) by no later than 4.00 pm on 24 April 2026. No further submissions were filed by that date. 10 Ms Suarez was required to file and serve any responsive further written submissions by no later than 4.00 pm on 1 May 2026. She did not file further submissions. Instead, on 7 May 2026 Ms Suarez filed a further minute of proposed orders. 11 On 8 May 2026 Mr Brunsdon and Ms Suarez attended the hearing. While Mr Brunsdon did not consent to the making of all of the orders promoted by Ms Suarez in her minute filed on 7 May 2026, he was prepared to agree to all save for Ms Suarez' proposed order concerning 2 Order 13 of the orders made on 27 February 2026. -- 5 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 6 the costs of the proceeding. In the end, the issues as between the parties were largely narrowed by compromise. A copy of the final orders made on 8 May 2026 are reproduced at sch A to these reasons. 12 Neither party was represented in this proceeding. Given the serious breakdown in communication as between the parties; the real prospect of there being a controversy as to each party's entitlement to or use of funeral insurance and to other funds that had been raised through a 'Go Fund Me' page to meet funeral expenses (such as the costs of the funeral service, the cremation and the interring of the ashes of the deceased); and the real prospect of future probate proceedings concerning the estate of the deceased (as the parties have equally- ranking rights to apply for letters of administration), I indicated my intention to publish reasons with respect to the orders made on 8 May 2026. These reasons concern the ashes of the deceased, the costs of interring the ashes of the deceased, and the costs of the proceeding (including all reserved costs). These reasons should be read with the reasons given on 27 February 2026. Legal principles 13 The Court has an inherent jurisdiction and also jurisdiction vested by s 4 and s 45 of the Administration Act 1903 (WA), to not only determine who should have carriage of a funeral but where and how a body should be disposed of, which jurisdiction includes the manner in which the ashes of a person should be dealt with.3 14 As was recorded in my earlier reasons,4 the relevant legal principles in determining who should have possession and control of a body were outlined in Britt v Office of the State Coroner at [52] to [66]. There, the Court of Appeal considered the principles relevant to the Court's discretion to make orders as to who should have carriage of a funeral, both in circumstances where there is a will, and where there is no will. 15 As was also recorded in my earlier reasons, the common law recognises that there is no property in the body of a deceased person. Executors are entitled to custody and possession of the body for the purpose of determining funeral arrangements.5 However, the position is 3 Britt v Office of the State Coroner [2022] WASCA 75 [52]; Bell v Bell [2023] WASC 471 [24] (Lundberg J). 4 Suarez v Brunsdon [12]. 5 Suarez v Brunsdon [13], citing Williams v Williams (1882) 20 Ch D 659; Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406; Burrows v Cramley [2002] WASC 47 [15] - [16] (Pullin J). -- 6 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 7 more complex when a person dies without leaving a will or naming an executor. 16 Where the Court is concerned with competing claims by relatives as to who should have carriage of a funeral, and the person has died intestate, it is typical for the Court to order that the body be released to the person with the highest ranking entitlement to apply for letters of administration. The person to whom the body is released will then be left to determine funeral arrangements.6 17 Jones v Dodd was a decision which concerned an Aboriginal man who died intestate without any significant assets, where there was unlikely ever to be an application for administration. In that case, Perry J (Millhouse and Nyland JJ agreeing) recorded that the proper approach in such cases is to have regard to the practical considerations which will vary considerably between cases, and the need to have regard to the sensitivity of the feelings of the various relatives and others who might have a claim to bury the deceased, bearing in mind also any religious, cultural or spiritual matters which might touch upon the question.7 18 As Mitchell JA explained in Britt v Office of the State Coroner, where persons with equally-ranking rights to apply for administration are in dispute about funeral arrangements, practical considerations may also be significant in the manner in which the Court's discretion is exercised.8 19 Mitchell JA further recorded as follows:9 A number of single judge decisions in other States have recognised the relevance, in disputes about burial, of considerations other than who is likely to be entitled to obtain letters of administration. Relevant matters have been recognised to include, to the extent they are known to the court, cultural considerations, the deceased's wishes and the wishes and sensitivities of living close relatives of the deceased. Regard has also been given to the need for the funeral and burial to be held in a timely way, and the costs and logistical difficulties attendant upon competing proposals. Various single judge decisions have recognised that, in some 6 Britt v Office of the State Coroner [54], Mitchell JA citing by way of example Attwood v Office of the State Coroner [2020] WASC 198 [10]; Jackamarra v Office of the State Coroner [2021] WASC 301 [7] - [12]; Mourish v Wynne [2009] WASC 85 [22] - [24]; and Burrows v Cramley [17]. 7 Jones v Dodd [1999] SASC 125; (1999) 73 SASR 328 [51], as described in Britt v Office of the State Coroner [56]. 8 Britt v Office of the State Coroner [57] (Mitchell JA, with Murphy & Beech JJA agreeing); Jones v Dodd [51]. 9 Britt v Office of the State Coroner [58] - [61], [65]. -- 7 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 8 cases, it is not practicable to attempt to resolve disputes as to who has the better claim to be administrator where the proper resolution of the dispute would require substantial evidence and the testing of that evidence. The weight to be attributed to each of the relevant factors mentioned above is to be determined in the particular factual context of the dispute in the case. It appears from the above discussion that the court will ordinarily order that the body be released to: 1. the executor of the deceased's will; or 2. if there is no will, the person who appears on the state of the evidence before the court to be the person who is most likely to receive a grant of administration of the intestate estate (who will ordinarily be the person with the greatest interest in the estate). However, that is to be regarded only as a common or usual approach, not an approach which is to be rigidly applied. The approach to be taken, and the weight to be given to the various considerations, depends upon the particular circumstances of the case. In determining the person to whom a deceased's body should be released, the court is not required to make any final determination of who is entitled to the intestate estate or administration of the estate. Often, as in the present case, the court will not be in a position to fairly and properly make a final determination as to who has such an interest or entitlement. Disputes about the release of a deceased's body must necessarily be resolved as soon as possible after the death of the deceased. There will always be an imperative for expedition in disputes of this nature, and it would be an affront to the dignity of the deceased and the emotional well-being of those close to the deceased for the funeral to be delayed for many months after death to allow questions of interest and entitlement to be fairly and properly resolved. That need for an expedited determination of the question of the deceased's funeral arrangements arises at a time when the parties to the dispute are in the midst of their grieving over the loss of a loved one. … Therefore, in determining how the discretion should be exercised in the case of a deceased who dies without a valid will, the court need not, and generally does not, finally resolve disputes as to the existence of an interest in, or entitlement to a grant of administration of, an intestate estate. Rather, the court is concerned with the question of who (if anyone) appears, on the state of the evidence then before the court, to be most likely to receive a grant of administration of the intestate estate. The court will usually determine that question in an expedited summary way without needing to resolve every factual dispute that may be -- 8 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 9 relevant to the grant of administration and without undertaking any extensive cross-examination. (footnotes omitted) 20 I proceeded on the basis that these matters were equally applicable to the resolution of disputes between relatives of a deceased person to their entitlement to possession and disposal of his or her ashes. 21 It has also been observed that cases involving disputes between parents in this context are not about who was the better parent or which parent has the least flaws. That said, criminality, misconduct or worse associated with the death of a person may require that a person forfeit the right to a grant of administration,10 and would likely be weighed in the balance in any dispute between relatives as to funeral arrangements and disposal of ashes. 22 In Leeburn v Derndorfer (2004) 14 VR 100, with reference to the principles set out in Smith v Tamworth City Council (1997) 41 NSWLR 680, Byrne J described how ashes are treated:11 In the case of cremation at least, it is at this point that the path through the judicial forest begins to peter out. In his Smith v Tamworth City Council proposition 8, Young J states that cremation is nowadays the equivalent to burial. This is, of course, correct in the sense that the executors have available to them the choice of cremation in deciding as to the manner of disposition of the body. But an important difference between cremation and other methods of disposition is that, after cremation, there remain the ashes. The obligations of the executors with respect to the body may be complete after cremation, but what rights and obligations do they have with respect to the ashes? … In addition to burial, the ashes may be dealt with in a way that would not be possible with respect to a dead body: they may be sprinkled over or distributed loosely on the surface of the earth, they may be retained in an unburied state or they may be divided and the parts dealt with in different ways. Also, when they are buried, they are not subject to the qualified statutory prohibition against exhumation. Moreover, so long as they are not dispersed or otherwise lose their physical character as ashes, they may be owned and possessed. To my mind, therefore, it is apt to characterise the legal status of the ashes as similar to that of the preserved body in Doodeward v Spence (1908) 6 CLR 406 at 412. In this way the application of fire to the cremated body is to be seen as the application to it of work or skill which has transformed it from flesh 10 Frail v Shorey [2021] NSWSC 122 [127] citing In Estate of Crippen [1911] P 108 and Re G (1946) 62 TLR 279. 11 Leeburn v Derndorfer [17], [27]. -- 9 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 10 and blood to ashes, from corruptible material to material which is less so. The legal consequence of this accords with what I apprehend to be the community attitude and practice. Ashes which have in this way been preserved in specie are the subject of ordinary rights of property, subject to one possible qualification. In this way, ownership in the ashes may pass by sale or gift or otherwise. The only qualification, which, if it exists, may require some working out, arises from the fact that the ashes are, after all, the remains of a human being and for that reason they should be treated with appropriate respect and reverence. (footnotes omitted) 23 The fact that ashes may be respectfully dealt with in various ways is a consideration to be given in informing the practical circumstances. This was the conclusion reached by Lindsay J in Brown v Weidig [2023] NSWSC 281; (2023) 22 ASTLR 386. 24 In Brown v Weidig the deceased died intestate, without issue or assets, and the Court was required to determine what orders were to be made to facilitate the disposal of the body of the deceased. The plaintiff was the father of the deceased and the defendant was the mother. They were estranged. The plaintiff wanted a burial and the defendant wanted a cremation (and was content to share the ashes with the plaintiff). Lindsay J reached the conclusion that:12 Although convenience often attaches to use of the law of probate and administration of estates as a paradigm for decision making, a Court is not obliged to employ it if the administration of justice in a particular case points in another direction. What is ultimately required is a decision, informed by practical wisdom, which allows a body to be disposed of in an orderly way with as much respect as may be possible for the dignity of the deceased and those of his or her community, or (as in this case) his or her communities, who mourn a death and year[n] to remember a life. … In a case such as the present, the general law governing grants of probate and administration and the management of property in the administration of a deceased estate offers little assistance as to how the Court's jurisdiction should be exercised. The deceased left no will of any description, formal or informal. Under the current rules of intestacy (found in Ch 4 of the Succession Act) his parents would rank equally as the persons entitled to his estate, had he left any. They have very different perspectives of the problem to be solved in these proceedings … 12 Brown v Weidig [60], [62]. -- 10 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 11 25 After considering the parties' positions and the evidence adduced, Lindsay J accepted that regardless of the claims made about the nature and viability of the deceased's relationships, he had had a loving relationship with both parents and his siblings. Lindsay J also made the following observations:13 Neither parent should be denied an opportunity to grieve their loss of the deceased or to seek closure in the proximity of a resting place chosen for his mortal remains. These proceedings provide no occasion to set one culture against another as if necessarily inconsistent. To endeavour to resolve the parties' forensic contest within such a framework would not, in my opinion, be to accord to the deceased as an autonomous person, or to his family as a whole, or in its factional parts, the respect required for a young man who belonged to them all and is universally mourned. … The manner of the deceased's death and the state of his mortal remains demonstrate a need, on any view of the parties' disputation, for adoption of a solution adapted to the circumstances of the case rather than either party's preferred solution. 26 In the end, the Court determined to permit the defendant to cremate the deceased with the ashes to be divided between the parents (should the plaintiff wish to receive a share). In doing so, Lindsay J accepted that a cremation followed by a distribution of ashes among the family of the deceased is an accepted outcome even in 'hotly contested proceedings'.14 27 In contrast, in Mathieson v State Coroner of Western Australia [2025] WASC 393 at [63], McGrath J declined to order that the ashes of the deceased child be divided as it was contrary to the wishes of the deceased's primary carer (where one of the issues in contention was who should take possession of the ashes after cremation). Again, this was a decision which ultimately turned on its own facts. 28 I proceeded in the disposition of this application cognisant of these principles. 13 Brown v Weidig [71] - [72], [74]. 14 Brown v Weidig [78]. -- 11 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 12 Cremation Act 29 I also noted that s 7 of the Cremation Act 1929 (WA) provides as follows: (1) Where any dead human body has been cremated in a crematorium, and the person who obtained the permit required by this Act for the cremation of such body desires to dispose of the ashes of such body after cremation otherwise than by burial upon the site of the crematorium, it shall be lawful for the Board or controlling authority of the cemetery, or the association in whose crematorium the body was cremated, to deliver the said ashes to the said person for removal from the crematorium. (2) Subject to subsection (1), the ashes of a dead human body after cremation shall not be removed from the crematorium in which such body was cremated, except for the purpose of burial in the site of the crematorium. 30 I proceeded on the basis that Ms Suarez was the person who obtained the permit for cremation required by the Cremation Act, and it would be lawful for the Metropolitan Cemetery Board, which as at 8 May 2026 had possession of the ashes at the Pinnaroo Valley Memorial Park, to give the ashes to Ms Suarez under s 7(1) of that Act.15 31 As the nearest surviving relatives of the deceased, both Ms Suarez and Mr Brunsdon had been equally entitled to apply for the permit,16 although in the end, Ms Suarez obtained an order on 27 February 2026 that she have carriage of the funeral service and cremation of the deceased.17 32 While the Cremation Act regulates who the Board or controlling authority may lawfully give the ashes to, it is not determinative of who is ultimately entitled to possession of the ashes.18 Background 33 As was recorded in my earlier reasons, the deceased died on 9 February 2026. The deceased predeceased his parents. He was not married nor in a de facto relationship. He had no children. 15 See Milenkovic v McConnell [2013] WASC 421 [29] - [31]. 16 Cremation Act s 8(3B); Cremation Regulations 1954 (WA) reg 3 and reg 11, sch 1 form 6. 17 Order 1 of the orders made on 27 February 2026; Suarez v Brunsdon [85], sch A. 18 See Robinson v Pinegrove Memorial Park Ltd (1986) 7 BPR 15,097 where it was held that the executor of the estate was ultimately entitled to determine what was to happen to the ashes regardless of any contract or regulation requiring the ashes to be delivered by the cremation authority to the applicant for the cremation. -- 12 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 13 34 The deceased was the only child of Ms Suarez and Mr Brunsdon. He had six siblings (all of whom are the children of Ms Suarez, four being under the age of 18), and three nephews (the eldest being aged seven). 35 As at the date of his death, the deceased was 24 years old. On the evidence read, the deceased left no written instructions, by way of will or otherwise, as to what he wanted by way of funeral arrangements or for his remains. 36 As is recorded above, on the evidence before the Court, it would appear that the deceased died intestate. Letters of administration had not been granted, nor had an interim administrator been appointed. 37 On intestacy, Ms Suarez and Mr Brunsdon and the deceased's six siblings are all persons entitled in distribution. On the evidence, pursuant to s 25(1)(a) of the Administration Act, a grant of administration of the estate of the deceased (having died intestate) might be granted to any of the four adults, being Ms Suarez, Mr Brunsdon and the deceased's eldest siblings Dylan Claydon (aged 24) and Ava Best (aged 18). 38 In the circumstances deposed to, Ms Suarez and Mr Brunsdon will rank equally in their entitlement to apply for the grant of letters of administration. 39 The evidence as to the relationship that the deceased had with each of his parents was summarised in my earlier reasons.19 Neither Ms Suarez nor Mr Brunsdon were cross-examined. 40 Ms Suarez deposed that the deceased resided with her from birth until the age of about nine (from September 2001 to about 2010), and again from the age of about 16 to about 20 (from 2018 to 2021). He resided with his maternal grandparents for six months in 2021 (he was aged about 20). 41 Ms Suarez detailed in her third affidavit her contact with and care for the deceased into adulthood. 42 The deceased was Mr Brunsdon's only child. Mr Brunsdon maintained that the deceased lived with Ms Suarez until about the age of eight, and he would see the deceased on weekends. Mr Brunsdon 19 Suarez v Brunsdon [26] - [28] and [52] - [55]. -- 13 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 14 also maintained that he was the deceased's primary carer from the age of about eight until the age of about 17 years and six months. 43 Mr Brunsdon gave evidence to the effect that he and the deceased resided together in Melbourne for a period, and that they had a relationship after the deceased had turned 18 years of age. He also gave evidence that his relationship with the deceased was a very close one, and that he regarded the deceased as his best friend; and that he assisted the deceased in securing an apprenticeship and bought him his tools. 44 In the course of the hearing on 26 February 2026, Mr Brunsdon made reference to having assisted the deceased in purchasing his home in early 2026.20 In his later affidavit, Mr Brunsdon deposed that to help the deceased achieve his dream of home ownership, Mr Brunsdon acted as guarantor for his mortgage and completed all necessary bank paperwork to make the purchase possible.21 45 As to the relationship between Ms Suarez and Mr Brunsdon, Ms Suarez deposed to there being a serious breakdown in communication as between them.22 There is no ongoing relationship between the parties. It appeared to have deteriorated many years ago. 46 The estrangement of the parents, now of long duration, had been accompanied by allegations of drug use and threats of violence against the father and reciprocal allegations of abandonment of the deceased and poor parenting against the mother, the truth or fairness of which I was in no position to determine with any degree of certainty. Ms Suarez' position 47 In summary, it had been Ms Suarez' first preference to take possession of all of the ashes of the deceased. However, by her minute of proposed orders filed on 7 May 2026 Ms Suarez recorded her preparedness to agree to an arrangement whereby Mr Brunsdon would arrange for all of the deceased's ashes to be interred at Pinnaroo Valley Memorial Park. Ms Suarez' position over time is outlined below. She was not cross-examined. 20 ts 7, 18 (26 February 2026); Suarez v Brunsdon [55]. 21 Affidavit of KR Brunsdon sworn 29 March 2026, par 7. 22 Suarez v Brunsdon [43] - [49]. -- 14 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 15 Ms Suarez' earlier affidavits 48 In her first affidavit sworn and filed in support of the originating process, Ms Suarez deposed to her wish that after cremation the ashes of the deceased be returned to her.23 49 In her third affidavit sworn on 27 February 2026 Ms Suarez described her preferences as to the final placement of the deceased's ashes in the following terms:24 50 At the hearing on 26 February 2026, Ms Suarez expressed an intention to 'get keepsakes made' from the ashes for the deceased's siblings to keep even if the ashes are scattered.25 51 When asked whether a sharing of the ashes was something that Ms Suarez had considered, she responded 'I know they need to have parts of them to make mementos. It's not a big part, but I would like it'.26 52 Ms Suarez also stated:27 I would be happy if we could have some parts made into jewellery, and then maybe it put in a plaque in Pinnaroo, because that is central for everyone … Rather than scattering, so there is a place to go on. 53 Further, Ms Suarez at the hearing on 26 February 2026 stated that she did not want the deceased's ashes taken to Gracetown, Western 23 Affidavit of LM Suarez sworn 24 February 2026 (orders sought). 24 Affidavit of LM Suarez sworn 27 February 2026, pars 23 - 25. 25 ts 13 (26 February 2026). 26 ts 13 (26 February 2026). 27 ts 14 (26 February 2026). -- 15 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 16 Australia, in accordance with a suggestion that allegedly had been made by Mr Brunsdon.28 54 At the hearing on 27 February 2026, Ms Suarez confirmed that her primary preference was to keep all of the ashes, that her secondary preference was a division of the ashes, and further that she wished that the deceased be cremated, as expressed in her affidavit sworn on 27 February 2026.29 55 In response to Mr Brunsdon's concern as to the dividing of the ashes, Ms Suarez stated:30 It's not that I want him to not be whole. I don't feel like doing that won't make him whole. I feel like scattering of ashes, in a sense, doesn't make somebody whole. If he's quite happy for it to be spread anywhere, then why would it be so absurd for me to keep a little bit of him for everybody to just have with them close? Ms Suarez' affidavit of 31 March 2026 56 In addition to the affidavits made by Ms Suarez prior to the hearing on 26 and 27 February 2026, Ms Suarez also made an affidavit on 31 March 2026. 57 In the affidavit Ms Suarez among other things described the steps she had taken to arrange the deceased's funeral. Further, she deposed that she did not wish to ask the deceased's siblings to be involved in this proceeding while they tried to grieve their brother.31 58 As to the affidavit of Ryvan Gersmanis (described below), Ms Suarez deposed that she would not justify her relationship with her son in response to the opinions expressed by Mr Gersmanis, which she described as being unfounded and untrue.32 59 As to her wishes with respect to the deceased's ashes, Ms Suarez deposed that it remained her wish, and the wish of her children, that the deceased's ashes be returned to them in full.33 Ms Suarez deposed that having the ashes on display in the home would be a 'tangible' way to remember the deceased, but made no further comment as to how the 28 ts 13 (26 February 2026). 29 ts 58 (27 February 2026). 30 ts 60 (27 February 2026). 31 Affidavit of LM Suarez sworn 31 March 2026, par 6. 32 Affidavit of LM Suarez sworn 31 March 2026, par 5. 33 Affidavit of LM Suarez sworn 31 March 2026, par 14. -- 16 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 17 ashes would be kept.34 Further, she deposed that she maintained that costs of the proceeding ought be made payable by the defendant for what she described as being 'a much unnecessary ordeal'.35 The minute of proposed orders filed on 7 May 2026 60 On 7 May 2026 Ms Suarez filed a minute of proposed orders which recorded as follows: The Applicant seeks the following orders: 1. The respondent organises the interning of Kaleb Raymond Best ashes at Pinnaroo Valley by the metropolitan cemetery board at Pinnaroo Valley Park no. 10 to be finalised within 2 weeks. 2. The respondent does not take take [sic] possession of the ashes. 3. The respondent advise the plaintiff the plot location 4. The Respondent be responsible for costs associated for the interning 5. For Clarity the memorial plaque be engraved with the wording “KALEB RAYMOND BEST/BRUNSDON 25.9.2001 - 9.2.2026 FOREVER 24 A DEARLY LOVED SON, BROTHER, GRANDSON, UNCLE, NEPHEW AND FRIEND OUR HEARTS ARE SHATTERED BUT YOU WILL LIVE ON WITHIN OUR FONDEST MEMORIES! WE LOVE YOU! UNTIL WE SEE YOU AGAIN XX Those we love don't go away, they walk beside us every day unseen, unheard but always near - so loved, so missed, so dear FOREVER IN OUR HEARTS, GONE TOO SOON. 6. The photo to be used on his plaque to be the same as used on the front cover of his funeral Order of service booklet. 7. The respondent pay the plaintiffs cost of and incidental to this application. Mr Brunsdon's position 61 In the course of the proceeding it had, at times, been difficult to discern the preferred position of Mr Brunsdon with respect to the deceased's ashes. Before the hearing on 8 May 2026, the Court had understood that in summary, Mr Brunsdon proposed that the deceased's ashes be shared equally as between each of the deceased's parents, with 34 Affidavit of LM Suarez sworn 31 March 2026, par 11. 35 Affidavit of LM Suarez sworn 31 March 2026, par 17. -- 17 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 18 the intention that there be a memorial erected at Pinnaroo Valley Memorial Park which would have an inscription that referred to the deceased as 'Kaleb Brunsdon', rather than 'Kaleb Raymond Best'. 62 However, at the hearing on 8 May 2026, Mr Brunsdon informed the Court of his preparedness to agree to an arrangement whereby he would arrange for all of the deceased's ashes to be interred at Pinnaroo Valley Memorial Park at his own cost (as was proposed by Ms Suarez in her minute of proposed orders). There remained however a controversy as between the parties as to who should bear the costs of the proceeding. 63 Mr Brunsdon's position over time is outlined below. 64 In addition to his own evidence and communications to the Court, Mr Brunsdon caused five affidavits in support of his position to be filed, together with a letter of support. They are outlined below. As some of the deponents share the same surname, I refer to those deponents by their given names. I do so for ease of reference. No disrespect is intended. Neither Mr Brunsdon nor any deponent of the affidavits in support were cross-examined. Mr Brunsdon's earlier evidence 65 At the hearing on 26 February 2026, when asked what his preference as to the ashes might be, Mr Brunsdon responded:36 I'm open. I'm open. Like I said, I just – we both just get rid of the ashes and – together and have somewhere we can remember it. 66 As to spreading the ashes, Mr Brunsdon expressed the view that it was the 'best option'.37 Mr Brunsdon further expressed the following in relation to Ms Suarez' wish to create commemorative pieces with the deceased's ashes:38 I just don't feel comfortable. She was getting necklaces and putting these ashes in there, and she's getting his hair and making lockets and wristbands and that with his hair. I just find that a bit morbid[.] 36 ts 13 (26 February 2026). 37 ts 13 (26 February 2026). 38 ts 14 (26 February 2026). -- 18 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 19 67 At the hearing on 27 February 2026, Mr Brunsdon again expressed his feelings towards commemorative pieces made with the deceased's ashes as follows:39 I just find it very disturbing that [Ms Suarez] wants to make trinkets out of these ashes and give them to people. My son would be absolutely — I just can't get over it. I find it — I just want my son to be all one[.] 68 Mr Brunsdon further demonstrated a desire for the ashes to be kept as one and scattered 'in a nice place … where everyone can remember him from' and not be divided, or distributed in commemorative pieces. Mr Brunsdon stated 'my son would rather this'40 and later stated:41 if my son knew that he was going to get spread and people were going to get lockets and have him in bits in there, he would be – he wouldn't be very happy. 69 This sentiment was again expressed by Mr Brunsdon later in the hearing on 27 February 2026.42 70 In the course of the same hearing, Mr Brunsdon expressed no wishes as to the specific location for the scattering of the deceased's ashes, rather he expressed his desire for the ashes to be scattered 'somewhere nice and peaceful' and said that 'anyone' can have an input in the chosen location.43 Mr Brunsdon was agreeable to a plaque at Pinnaroo Valley Memorial Park, but again emphasised his personal preference for the ashes to be kept together as one, and objected to half of the ashes going to Ms Suarez.44 Mr Brunsdon's affidavit of 29 March 2026 71 In addition to the evidence he gave and the submissions made in the course of the hearing on 26 and 27 February 2026, Mr Brunsdon made an affidavit which he swore on 29 March 2026. 72 In that affidavit, Mr Brunsdon deposed to having engaged solicitors (Lewis Kitson), to try to resolve the dispute with Ms Suarez as to the deceased's ashes, and he attached to his affidavit correspondence that he caused to be sent to Ms Suarez on 39 ts 42 (27 February 2026). 40 ts 56 (27 February 2026). 41 ts 57 (27 February 2026). 42 ts 59 to 61 (27 February 2026). 43 ts 57 (27 February 2026). 44 ts 57 (27 February 2026). -- 19 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 20 18 March 2026.45 By that correspondence, Mr Brunsdon proposed that the controversy be resolved by the parties filing consent orders to the effect that:46 (a) The Deceased's ashes be distributed as follows: (i) The Plaintiff to receive 50% of the Deceased's ashes to be dealt with by the Plaintiff in her discretion. (ii) The Defendant to receive 50% of the Deceased's ashes to be dealt with by the Defendant in her discretion. (b) Our understanding is that the Deceased's ashes are in the possession of Bare Funerals, and we propose a further Order authorising Bare Funerals to release the ashes to the Plaintiff and the Defendant pursuant to that set out above. (c) That each party pay their own costs, including the costs previously reserved. 73 In his affidavit, Mr Brunsdon reiterated that he wished for the deceased's ashes to be split in equal parts and to have a memorial at Pinnaroo Valley Memorial Park.47 As to the form of the memorial, Mr Brunsdon deposed as follows:48 What I am asking is fair as I would like to have a memorial with the funds raised on go fund me as I am the beneficiary [sic]. Kaleb didn't call himself a [Best]. Kaleb was known to his closest friends and family as Kaleb Brunsdon, and i would prefer that his memorial be held under the name Kaleb Brunsdon. Submissions made by Mr Brunsdon and further statement of position 74 In the outline of submissions filed by Mr Brunsdon, he reiterated his wish for the ashes be divided equally, and that there be a memorial at Pinnaroo Valley Memorial Park. He also submitted that his requests were reasonable and motivated solely by love for his son and respect for his memory.49 75 By an email dated 30 March 2026, the Court was provided with a copy of a third party letter of support (which is noted at [92] below). 45 Affidavit of KR Brunsdon sworn 29 March 2026, par 16, annexure A. 46 Affidavit of KR Brunsdon sworn 29 March 2026, annexure A. 47 Affidavit of KR Brunsdon sworn 29 March 2026, par 20. 48 Affidavit of KR Brunsdon sworn 30 March 2026, pars 17 - 18. 49 Mr Brunsdon's outline of submissions filed 29 March 2026, par 12. -- 20 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 21 76 The Court also received an email communication from Mr Brunsdon on 31 March 2026 at 3.11 pm. The text of that email communication was as follows: Please find attached letter of support as my first wishes for the Remains are to be kept whole and have a memorial at pineroo for Kaleb if not then have to split but I would prefer to have the ashes as whole and a memorial at pinneroo cemetery. 77 Before the hearing on 8 May 2026 the Court received a number of email communications from Mr Brunsdon. In those communications, among other things, Mr Brunsdon indicated that he was prepared to agree to the deceased's ashes being interred at Pinnaroo Valley Memorial Park; that he would pay for a memorial; and that he had made contact with Pinnaroo Valley Memorial Park and had arranged an appointment. Mr Jacob Brunsdon's affidavit of 27 March 2026 78 The first of the five additional affidavits was sworn by Jacob Brunsdon on 27 March 2026. Jacob was the uncle of the deceased and deposed to having had frequent, regular, and ongoing contact with the deceased throughout his life and to having been familiar with the deceased's upbringing and his relationship with his parents. 79 Jacob deposed that from his own observations, Mr Brunsdon had had an ongoing, close and supportive relationship with the deceased throughout his life, and in his affidavit he described the same.50 He also deposed that in contrast to the close relationship as between father and son, from his observations the involvement of Ms Suarez with the deceased was limited, irregular, and not consistent over time.51 It was his evidence that based on his observations, the deceased's closest, most stable and most consistent parental relationship was with his father.52 Jacob supported the ashes of the deceased being placed in the care and control of Mr Brunsdon.53 50 Affidavit of J Brunsdon sworn 27 March 2026, pars 3 - 11. 51 Affidavit of J Brunsdon sworn 27 March 2026, par 12. 52 Affidavit of J Brunsdon sworn 27 March 2026, par 14. 53 Affidavit of J Brunsdon sworn 27 March 2026, par 15. -- 21 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 22 Ms Valerie Kay Brunsdon's affidavit of 27 March 2026 80 The second was the affidavit sworn on 27 March 2026 by Valerie Kay Brunsdon, the deceased's paternal grandmother. Valerie deposed as follows: I am the mother of Kane Ronald Brunsdon and the grandmother of Kaleb Raymond Best Kane has always been a good father to his son and always wanted to have a big part in Kalebs life he went to court so many times to try and get visitation rights with Kaleb then finally at the age of 9 Lauren left Kaleb with his father. Kaleb was not in a good state he was very confused and did not understand why he was at his fathers house permanently [sic]. Kane tried to give him stability and a routine and raised him to respect others and also have a good work ethic and he succeeded. They were very close as they just had each other for all those years There was no delaying from Kane for the funeral as Ava Kalebs sister was due to fly out to Japan for a 2 week holiday and it was going to be held when she returned. We hadn't heard anything for awhile about the funeral arrangements and I did not know where my grandsons body was being held so kane decided he would start funeral arrangements when I contacted Lauren to ask where Kaleb was and informed her that Kane had started arranging the funeral she said that she had already arranged it and if we wanted a song or photos to send them to her I also asked about Kalebs ashes and told her Kane would like to scatter them with Kalebs uncle who died 23 years ago and they were scattered at Gracetown Lauren replied unfortunately that was not going to happen as I am going to get the ashes made into necklaces. Kane and Kaleb were very good mates and I think he deserves to share in some of his sons ashes. They had a very special bond together as a single father and son. Mr Ryvan Gersmanis' affidavit of 29 March 2026 81 The third was the affidavit sworn on 29 March 2026 by Ryvan Gersmanis. Ryvan deposed that he had been a close friend of the deceased, had known him since primary school, and had lived with the deceased from the age of 18 to 24. 82 He described from his own observations the relationship between the deceased and Mr Brunsdon as being a close and supportive one, and that of the deceased and his mother as being more limited and not consistently close or ongoing. -- 22 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 23 Mr Dylan Nicholas Claydon's affidavit of 31 March 2026 83 The fourth was the affidavit of Dylan Nicholas Claydon sworn on 31 March 2026. Dylan was the deceased's eldest brother and the son of Ms Suarez and Darryl Claydon. 84 Dylan sought to emphasize that his affidavit was made to assist the Court in understanding the deceased's values and wishes, particularly in relation to his ashes, estate, property and maternal/paternal relationships.54 85 As to the deceased's wishes, Dylan deposed as follows:55 In regard to the Deceased remains, It is my belief that, after each family member has had the opportunity to spend time with the ashes, they should be scattered at a neutral location accessible to family and friends who wish to visit, alternatively a niche/ plaque to be purchased at Pinnaroo Valley Memorial Park where the ashes can remain. It is my understanding and belief that the Deceased would not have wished for his ashes to be divided, or for any part of them to be used to create jewellery, keepsakes, or other personal mementos. The intention is that the ashes be treated with respect and dignity, consistent with the Deceased's values. 86 Dylan deposed that the deceased had maintained relationships with both of his parents, however, these relationships were not typical mother/father relationships, and Dylan described the same. 87 As to Dylan's evidence which concerned the proper administration of the deceased's estate, this was not yet a matter before the Court and it was not necessary for the purposes of the question to be determined (that is, the possession and arrangements for the deceased's ashes) to recount the same. Mr Darryl Claydon's affidavit of 31 March 2026 88 The fifth was the affidavit of Darryl Claydon sworn on 31 March 2026. Darryl is the father of Dylan, who is the firstborn son of Ms Suarez. 89 Darryl sought to emphasize that his affidavit was not made in support of either Ms Suarez or Mr Brunsdon, but in support of the 54 Affidavit of DC Claydon sworn 31 March 2026, par 6. 55 Affidavit of DC Claydon sworn 31 March 2026, pars 7 - 9. -- 23 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 24 deceased and what Darryl believed the deceased's wishes were, based on his personal conversations with the deceased and his observations of the deceased's relationships and values. 90 As to the deceased's wishes, Darryl deposed as follows: Nine days prior to Kaleb's passing, Kaleb and I both attended my grandson Elliot's fourth birthday party. On that day, I arrived on my motorcycle, and Kaleb approached me and asked about my bike. We began discussing riding and the dangers of traffic, and I mentioned that on the way to the party, I had nearly been involved in an accident. During that conversation, I stated that if anything were to ever happen to me, I would want my ashes to be spread in the ocean. Kaleb responded to me by saying that if anything were to happen to him, he would like his ashes to be spread in the ocean as well. He did not specify a particular location, however he was clear in expressing that this is what he would want. Although Kaleb did not nominate a specific place at that time, I note that on multiple occasions he spoke fondly of time spent 'down south' with his father and paternal family, including Christmases and family gatherings. It is my belief that this area held personal significance to him, and while I do not put this forward as a definitive instruction, I respectfully suggest that it may be considered as a meaningful location in line with his wishes. … In summary, based on my direct conversation with Kaleb, I firmly believe that he wished for his ashes to be spread in the ocean, and I respectfully ask that this wish be given proper consideration. 91 Darryl also described in his affidavit family relationships and circumstances as to who might best serve as administrator of the deceased's estate. Again, that is not presently a matter before the Court and it is not necessary for the purposes of the question to be now determined to recount the same. 92 Finally, I note that Mr Brunsdon also filed a letter of support provided by a person who had known Mr Brunsdon for approximately 36 years, which described Mr Brunsdon's devotion as a father and his profound grief.56 56 Letter of support of S Rowles dated 29 March 2026. -- 24 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 25 Disposition concerning the arrangements for the ashes 93 By 8 May 2026 the controversy had largely narrowed by compromise. In the end, orders were made that were substantively in the form promoted as proposed orders 1 to 6 of Ms Suarez' minute (reproduced at [60] above). In determining it appropriate to make such orders, I was cognisant of the following. Person most likely to be granted letters of administration 94 As was recorded in my earlier reasons at [62] to [64], on the limited evidence before me, it would appear that the deceased died intestate. Letters of administration had not been granted. No interim grant had been sought. 95 Ms Suarez and Mr Brunsdon and the deceased's six siblings are all persons entitled in distribution. On the evidence, pursuant to s 25(1)(a) of the Administration Act, a grant of administration of the estate of the deceased (having died intestate) might be granted to any of the four adults, being Ms Suarez, Mr Brunsdon and the deceased's eldest siblings Mr Dylan Claydon (aged 24) and Ms Ava Best (aged 18). 96 As is noted above, criminality, misconduct or worse associated with the death of a person may require that a person forfeit the right to a grant of administration.57 In this case, there was no evidence of any such association with the death of the deceased. 97 In the circumstances deposed to, Ms Suarez and Mr Brunsdon will rank equally in their entitlement to apply for the grant of letters of administration. 98 In the end, Ms Suarez and Mr Brunsdon supported the making of orders substantively in the form proposed at orders 1 to 6 of Ms Suarez' minute (reproduced at [60] above). Wishes of the deceased 99 As at the date of his death, the deceased was 24 years old. He did not document what he wanted by way of funeral arrangements or for his remains. However, Darryl did depose to a conversation he had with the deceased close to his death as to the deceased's desire to have his ashes spread in the ocean. 57 Frail v Shorey [127] citing In Estate of Crippen, and Re G. -- 25 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 26 Wishes of the close relatives of the deceased 100 As is noted above, in the end, Ms Suarez and Mr Brunsdon supported the making of orders substantively in the form proposed at orders 1 to 6 of Ms Suarez' minute (reproduced at [60] above). 101 Dylan was the deceased's eldest brother and the eldest son of Ms Suarez and Darryl. His wishes as deposed to are reproduced at [85] above. 102 There is no evidence as to the wishes of Ava Best (aged 18), the deceased's other adult sibling. 103 As to the deceased's paternal grandmother, she supported Mr Brunsdon receiving a share of the deceased's ashes. Her position is reproduced at [80] above. Assessment of the relevant factors 104 It was not possible in a case like this to produce a perfect solution. 105 At the hearing on 8 May 2026, both parents expressed the wish to compromise and for the deceased's ashes to be interred at Pinnaroo Valley Memorial Park. That was a significant move from the preferences each had championed. 106 In the circumstances deposed to, Ms Suarez and Mr Brunsdon will rank equally in their entitlement to apply for the grant of letters of administration. In such a role they would be entitled to make arrangements with respect to the deceased's remains. 107 On the evidence, I did not consider there to be a good basis to deny either Ms Suarez or Mr Brunsdon a say with respect to the arrangements to be made for the ashes in favour of the other parent. As was the case in Frail v Shorey, this case was not about who was the better parent or which parent had the least flaws. I accepted for the purposes of this application that both parents had a relationship with their adult child and both wished to mourn their child. 108 Darryl's evidence revealed that the deceased had indicated a preference not in the end promoted by either of his parents (that is, the spreading of the deceased's ashes in the ocean). -- 26 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 27 109 Apart from appointing an executor, a person has no right to dictate what will happen to his or her body.58 That said, I considered it appropriate to weigh the evidence of the deceased's preference (as deposed by Darryl) in the balance. 110 Mr Brunsdon agreed that he would not take possession of the ashes of the deceased, but would organise the interring of the ashes at Pinnaroo Valley Memorial Park. He also agreed to the making of orders which would make him personally responsible for meeting the costs associated with interring the deceased's ashes (that is, Mr Brunsdon agreed to meet the costs of interring the ashes and the placement and engravement of a memorial plaque). The Court understood that this agreement had been reached in circumstances where Ms Suarez had met the costs of the funeral and the cremation of the deceased. 111 Having given careful consideration to all of the evidence filed, including the evidence of Darryl as to the deceased's stated preference, the evidence of Dylan (the deceased's brother) as to Dylan's preference, and the fact that a compromise had been reached as between the parties, in all of the circumstances, I considered it appropriate to order that the ashes of the deceased be interred at Pinnaroo Valley Memorial Park. This was a solution reached by the parties, one that had been adapted to meet the circumstances. Costs of the proceeding 112 The costs of the hearing on 26 and 27 February 2026 were reserved until the controversy concerning the deceased's ashes was determined, as were the costs with respect to that part of Ms Suarez' application which concerned the ashes of the deceased.59 113 Ms Suarez moved for an order that Mr Brunsdon pay her costs of and incidental to the proceeding. In summary, she sought to recover compensation in the form of costs from Mr Brunsdon to compensate her for the ordeal of this proceeding. Mr Brunsdon resisted the making of such an order. If any adverse order was to be made against him, he submitted that the costs ought be shared as between him and Ms Suarez. 114 Where costs should fall is at the discretion of the Court.60 The discretion to order costs under s 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1935 58 Smith v Tamworth City Council (693 - 694), point 2. 59 Suarez v Brunsdon [89]; orders 4 and 14 of the orders made on 27 February 2026. 60 Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA) s 37. -- 27 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 28 (WA) is very wide.61 The only restrictions are those provided elsewhere in the Supreme Court Act and the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), or in any other Act; and the fact that the discretion must be exercised judicially, in accordance with established principles and factors directly connected with the litigation.62 The discretion must be exercised so as to achieve what is fair and just between the parties according to the circumstances of the particular case.63 115 It is well established that an order for the payment of costs by one party is compensatory in nature; it is not for the purpose of punishment. Costs generally follow the event because such an order is intended, at least to the extent that the costs incurred were not unreasonable or unreasonably incurred, as compensation (and vindication) for the successful action or application.64 116 Neither party was represented in the proceeding. The disbursements incurred by Ms Suarez by way of filing fees were relatively modest. 117 While Mr Brunsdon's communications to Ms Suarez in relation to funeral arrangements were wholly unacceptable, both parents had an interest in all of the matters raised in this proceeding. While Ms Suarez was successful in obtaining orders for the carriage of the funeral service and cremation of the deceased, the arrangements for the ashes reflected a compromised position (neither party in the end pressing for or receiving their preferred outcome). 118 In all of the circumstances I concluded that it was appropriate that the costs of the proceeding be shared. 119 Ms Suarez confirmed that her disbursements were limited to the initial filing fee. In all of the circumstances an order was made compelling Mr Brunsdon within three business days of the making of the order to pay $980 to Ms Suarez, being half of the costs incurred by Ms Suarez by way of filing fees in this proceeding. 61 LexisNexis, Civil Procedure Western Australia, vol 1 (at 12 May 2025) at [66.1.2], citing Wentworth v Attorney-General (NSW) [1984] HCA 70; (1984) 154 CLR 518, 528; Naidoo v Williamson [2008] WASCA 179; (2008) 37 WAR 516 [39]. 62 LexisNexis, Civil Procedure Western Australia, vol 1 (at 12 May 2025) at [66.1.2], citing Naidoo v Williamson [39], [42]; Strzelecki Holdings Pty Ltd v Jorgensen [2019] WASCA 96; (2019) 54 WAR 388 [48] - [50]. 63 LexisNexis, Civil Procedure Western Australia, vol 1 (at 12 May 2025) at [66.1.2], citing Latoudis v Casey (1990) 170 CLR 534, 558. 64 LexisNexis, Civil Procedure Western Australia, vol 1 (at 12 May 2025) at [66.1.2], citing Latoudis v Casey; Northern Territory v Sangare [2019] HCA 25; (2019) 265 CLR 164 [30] - [31]; Ohn v Walton (1995) 36 NSWLR 77. -- 28 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 29 Conclusion 120 On 8 May 2026 orders were made in the form reproduced at sch A to these reasons, which orders also resolved the remaining controversy concerning the costs of this proceeding. 121 For the avoidance of doubt I record here that the Court was not required to make, and did not make, any final determination of who is entitled to the intestate estate or administration of the deceased's estate.65 It would be prudent however for immediate steps to be taken to appoint an administrator or an interim administrator, given that the Court understands that the deceased had purchased a property that was mortgaged in favour of a financial institution. 122 I also note that in the future, the parties may seek to be reimbursed for their costs associated with the funeral, the cremation and the interring of the deceased's ashes. As is noted above, there is a real prospect of there being a controversy as to entitlement to or use of funeral insurance and other funds that had been raised through a 'Go Fund Me' page for those purposes. 123 Without giving the Construction, Forestry and Maritime Employees Union (CFMEU) notice, it was again not appropriate to bind it by an order of the Court with respect to the meeting of the costs of any memorial or the interring of the deceased's ashes. Similarly, it was again not appropriate to bind by court order Mr Sam Turner, who raised funds following the deceased's death through the 'Go Fund Me' page. 124 While I did not make any order with respect to the funds that the CFMEU or Mr Sam Turner may hold, depending on the terms on which they each hold funds, the orders of the Court and these reasons may again assist if there is a later dispute with respect to the application of those funds. 65 Consistent with Britt v Office of the State Coroner [60]. -- 29 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 30 Sch A - Orders made on 8 May 2026 -- 30 of 31 -- [2026] WASC 188 STRK J Page 31 I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. DS Associate to the Honourable Justice Strk 13 MAY 2026 -- 31 of 31 --