DAVID JOHN BRITTEN In Person v DYNAMIC BUSINESS ENTERPRISES PTY LTD [2026] SASC 2

On Appeal from SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (HER HONOUR ASSOCIATE JUSTICE BOCHNER, HIS HONOUR AUXILIARY ASSOCIATE JUSTICE COSTELLO) CIV-25-006524 Appellant: DAVID JOHN BRITTEN In Person Respondent: DYNAMIC BUSINESS ENTERPRISES PTY LTD Counsel: MR S EVANS - Solicitor: SUMMER LAWYERS Hearing Date/s: 15/01/2026 File No/s: CIV-25-01337, CIV-25-013734 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Appeal to a Single Judge) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. BRITTEN v DYNAMIC BUSINESS ENTERPRISES PTY LTD [2026] SASC 2 Judgment of the Honourable Justice B Doyle 20 January 2026 MORTGAGES - MORTGAGEE'S REMEDIES - POSSESSION PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - SERVICE - PERSONAL SERVICE EQUITY - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - UNCONSCIONABILITY, UNCONSCIONABLE DEALINGS AND OTHER FORMS OF EQUITABLE FRAUD The appellant entered into a guarantee in respect of a loan by the respondent to a company associated with the appellant. The guarantee was supported by a mortgage in respect of the property at which the appellant and his wife reside. The respondent instituted proceedings for possession and in the absence of an appearance by the appellant at a hearing on 23 July 2025, an order for possession was made. The appellant made subsequent application to set aside that order, and for a stay against execution of a warrant of possession. Those applications were refused. The appellant appealed against the refusal of a stay (the ‘first appeal’) and, later, against the possession order (the ‘second appeal’). In connection with the second appeal, the appellant contends variously that service of the original proceedings was not effected and that there is a triable issue with respect to the enforceability of the mortgage. The appellant requires an extension of time and leave to appeal in respect of the second appeal. He seeks to join a third party to the appeal, permission to issue a subpoena to the process server to give evidence and discovery of various documents from the respondent. The appellant has filed various affidavits in the original proceedings and in the two appellate proceedings upon which he seeks to rely. -- 1 of 37 -- Held, dismissing the second appeal: 1. the application for an extension of time within which to commence the appeal, and for leave to appeal, is refused; 2. the application to rely on further evidence in connection with the appeals should be refused; 3. had the further evidence and the respondent’s responding evidence been received, the appellant would not have demonstrated that personal service was not effected, or that there is a triable issue with respect to the enforceability of the mortgage; 4. the applications for the issue of subpoenas or the giving of discovery are refused; 5. no additional parties should be joined to the proceeding. Held, dismissing the first appeal: 1. the failure of the second appeal renders the first appeal inutile. Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth); National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) ss 5, 9, sch 1; Real Property Act 1886 (SA) ss 192, 193, 194, 197; Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) rr 194, 217.10(1)(c), 241.1, 241.4(3), referred to. Brackenridge v Bendigo & Adelaide Bank Ltd [2021] SASCA 129; Burke v Public Trustee for the State of South Australia [2022] SASCA 64; De Pasquale v ASCF Managed Investments Pty Ltd [2021] SASC 21; Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd [2004] 219 CLR 165, considered. -- 2 of 37 -- BRITTEN v DYNAMIC BUSINESS ENTERPRISES PTY LTD [2026] SASC 2 Single Judge Appeal—Civil 1 B DOYLE J: These two appeals concern an order for possession and a refusal by an Associate Justice to stay the execution of a warrant of possession. Background 2 The respondent advanced a loan of $386,853.07 to CJDJ Pty Ltd (‘CJDJ’), refinancing an earlier loan made to CJDJ by First Cashflow Solutions Pty Ltd (‘FCFS’), a related entity of the respondent. The loan was secured by a mortgage over the appellant’s residential property located at 146D Ancell Road, Mount Jagged (‘the Property’). He lives there with his wife Mrs Cathy Jayne Britten (‘Mrs Britten’). 3 On 10 June 2025, the respondent (the applicant at first instance) filed an Originating Application in this Court pursuant to s 192 of the Real Property Act 1886 (SA) (‘RPA’). The respondent sought possession of the Property. The application was given a hearing date of 23 July 2025 at 10.15 am. It was supported by an affidavit sworn by a director of the respondent, Matthew Blackburn, on 29 May 2025.1 4 Amongst other things, that affidavit annexed: • an agreement between the respondent as lender, CJDJ as borrower, and the appellant and Mrs Britten as guarantors (‘Loan Agreement’); • a registered instrument of mortgage dated 27 August 2024 in respect of the Property, executed by the appellant (‘Mortgage’); • a default notice dated 17 March 2025 issued to the appellant (‘Default Notice’) and an email to the appellant dated 17 March 2025 attaching the notice; and • an affidavit of service of the Default Notice sworn by Antonio Carbone on 24 April 2025, deposing that the Default Notice was left at the Property with Mrs Britten (in the appellant’s presence) on 3 April 2025. 5 Mr Blackburn’s affidavit deposed that as at the date of its swearing the moneys owed to CJDJ and secured by the guarantee and Mortgage were $449,167.92. 6 On 22 July 2025, the respondent filed an affidavit sworn by Tylor Newlyn that day. The deponent swore that, on 2 July 2025, at approximately 5.40 pm, he 1 CIV-25-006524, FDN3. -- 3 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 2 attended at the Property and served the Originating Application, Mr Blackburn’s affidavit, a draft order and notice of hearing upon the appellant by leaving them in his presence (and informing him that he was doing so) after the appellant declined to open a glass sliding door that separated them. Mr Newlyn also swore that he served those documents, together with a notice to occupier, upon Mrs Britten on the same occasion. He swore that he observed each of the appellant and Mrs Britten pick up the relevant documents addressed to them. 7 On the day after service was (according to Mr Newlyn) effected on the appellant and Mrs Britten, a document styled ‘Notice of Change of Address for Service’ was filed in the underlying action by the appellant, Mrs Britten and CJDJ, giving a PO Box in Mount Compass as the address for service.2 The document asserted that ‘our email addresses are being abused and not utilised correctly’. 8 The appellant did not appear before Costello Aux As J on 23 July 2025 at the appointed time. The remarks record that the evidence before the Court supported a finding of personal service on the appellant. It was noted that there was no indication that any contact had been made by the appellant with the Registry, and that counsel for the respondent had handed to the Court an affidavit affirmed by Mrs Britten which, ‘appears to confirm that documents were at least attempted to be served on the [appellant]’ whilst claiming that service was not properly effected due to the appellant’s asserted ‘mental infirmity’. The Court was satisfied that the order for possession should be made. 9 The affidavit to which reference was made had not been filed,3 but counsel for the respondent properly drew it to the Court’s attention. In it, Mrs Britten swore, inter alia: 2. I make this affidavit in relation to a purported service of documents on my husband, David John Britten, concerning an alleged business debt and the alleged use of our residential property as security for said debt. 3. I can confirm that David Britten has not received, and has had no knowledge of, any paperwork relating to a notice of remedy to default or any proceedings connected to this alleged debt. 4. Although an attempt was made to serve documents at our residence, the person who attended did not successful serve David. At the relevant time, David was not in a condition to accept service due to serious health reasons. 5. Specifically, David is presently on medical leave and has been suffering from a psychological injury, which includes a diagnosed brain injury following recent attempts to take his own life. This situation has significantly impaired his cognitive function and capacity to deal with legal matters. 6. These health issues are connected to broader, ongoing legal and financial issues currently before multiple jurisdictions. In particular: 2 CIV-25-006524, FDN4. 3 CJB 21.07.25. -- 4 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 3 (a) Related matters are currently before the courts and form part of live proceedings. (b) Formal complaints have been submitted to the Australian Financial Complaints Authority (AFCA) and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC). 7. As a result of these ongoing challenges, our household is experiencing acute financial hardship. Nevertheless, it is our full intention to resolve the outstanding matters. We expect this particular matter—concerning the alleged business debt and property security—to be addressed and rectified in the coming months as part of a broader resolution strategy. 8. I respectfully submit this affidavit to clarify that my husband has not been properly served, has not been aware of the proceedings alleged to have been brought against him, and is not in a position to respond at this time due to documented medical incapacity. 9. We hold material to support the above, including medical documentation and copies of complaints submitted to AFCA and ASIC, which can be supplied upon request. 10 A ‘Notice of Acting’ was filed on behalf of the appellant (the respondent below) on 13 August 2025, nominating [email protected] as an email address for service.4 11 On 21 August 2025, following the service of the order for possession on the appellant, an application was filed in the appellant’s name seeking to set aside the possession order on grounds set out in an affidavit sworn by Mrs Britten on 11 August 2025.5 Mrs Britten’s affidavit advanced a number of propositions including that no remedy to default had been served, that the asserted requirements of the National Credit Code6 had not been complied with and that enforcement in circumstances of special disadvantage would be unconscionable. 12 The application was listed for consideration on 19 September 2025 before Bochner As J. The appellant did not appear. Her Honour dismissed the application, observing, inter alia: … No reason has been given for the [appellant’s] not attending court on the day that that order was made, 23 July 2025. Further, there is no suggestion, other than from the [appellant], that the papers were not appropriately served. In fact, affidavits of proof of service make it clear that service was effected on the respondent, as does the fact that he filed what is called a ‘Notice of change of address for service’ on 3 July 2025, some weeks prior to the making of the order for possession. The fact that the [appellant] has himself filed a document on the court file indicates that he was well aware of this action and that service was effected. There can be no argument in those circumstances that service did not occur. 4 CIV-25-006524, FDN 8. 5 CIV-25-006524, FDN10. 6 National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) sch 1. -- 5 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 4 In any event, as Mr Evans has rightly pointed out, Auxiliary Associate Justice Costello made a finding that service had occurred, therefore it is not a matter of my setting aside the order for possession, it is a matter where the respondent would need to appeal that decision to have that finding set aside. I turn very briefly to the question of the basis for not having the orders set aside. The first is service, I have already dealt with that; the second is non-compliance with the National Credit Code. As Mr Evans has correctly pointed out, this loan is not subject to the National Credit Code and so there was no obligation on the applicant to comply with it. As a result that would not ground an application to set aside the order for possession. Turning to the question of the [appellant’s] ill health; that is a matter the [appellant] has raised many times since the commencement of the action. At no time has any evidence been proffered to substantiate that claim. I note that he claims to have a mental disability, however, as Mr Evans has rightly pointed out, he has been in a position to send copious amounts of email correspondence to the court, which is cogent and reasoned and does not show any evidence of any mental incapacity. While I accept that this is no necessarily a deciding factor, in the absence of any other evidence as to medical incapacity when he has been invited, on more than one occasion to provide that evidence, it is a telling fact. I note that the [appellant] has raised the issue of the need for a litigation guardian. As with the question of his incapacity, this is a question that would need to be determined on the basis of medical evidence and an expert opinion as to whether he lacked the capacity to conduct this litigation. I should note at this point, if medical evidence did support the appointment of a litigation guardian, Cathy Jane Britten will not be appointed as his litigation guardian on the basis that she is not considered an appropriate person to be so appointed. 13 A warrant for possession was issued on 24 September 2025 and execution was scheduled for 7 November 2025. It appears to be common ground that the warrant was affixed to the appellant’s property. The appellant made a further application on 28 October 2025, seeking a stay of the order for possession.7 The application was supported by another affidavit sworn by Mrs Britten on 21 October 2025.8 14 The application for stay was listed for hearing on 4 November 2025. The appellant did not appear. In dismissing that application, Bochner As J said: I note that on Monday, 3 November 2025, the [appellant’s] wife did correspond with the court and advised that Mr Britten was not available this afternoon and gave a number of dates on which he was available. This correspondence came partway through a fairly lengthy chain of correspondence between he court and the [appellant’s] wife about the inappropriateness of the court’s corresponding with someone who is a non-party and the need for Mr Britten to correspond directly with the court, if he wished to do so. The court made it very clear to the [appellant’s] wife that it was not in a position to correspond with her on this matter as she was not a party, and advised very clearly that any communication must come directly from Mr Britten. No such request was ever made by Mr Britten and 7 CIV-25-006524, FDN23. 8 CIV-25-006524, FDN24. -- 6 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 5 indeed, the court has received, to date, very little correspondence directly from Mr Britten. The majority has come from his wife. I note that one of the grounds relied on by the [appellant] for a stay of the execution of the warrant of possession, is the fact that an appeal has been lodged. The [respondent] has today advised that it has not been served with any appeal documents. It has also inquired with the Registry about whether an appeal has been commenced by the [appellant]; the Registry was unable to locate any record of an appeal having been commenced. Given the absence of any evidence that an appeal has in fact been commenced, this is not a ground on which I would consider staying the execution of the warrant. There is no appearance for the [appellant] today, the matter has been called. Given the non-appearance by the [appellant], FDN 23 will be dismissed. 15 The appellant commenced an appeal against that decision on 7 November 2025 (the ‘first appeal’).9 The appeal against the original possession order followed seven days later on 14 November 2025 (‘the second appeal’).10 That appeal requires an extension of time as well as a grant of leave to appeal. Procedural aspects of the appeals 16 The respondent correctly submits that it is appropriate to focus on the second appeal. Success in respect of that appeal would render the first appeal superfluous, and its failure would render the first appeal inutile. 17 An interim stay against execution was obtained in the first appeal proceeding before Kimber J. When the question of its continuance on an interlocutory basis (or the making of a stay in the second appeal) came before me on 11 December 2025, the appellant did not appear.11 18 The respondent adopted the position that it would not oppose the maintenance of the interim stay if the appeals could be heard and determined promptly. 19 The following orders were made: 1. Subject to any objection to be advised by email to Chambers prior to 5.00 pm today, both appeals are to be listed for hearing at 10:15 am on 15 January 2026 before Justice B Doyle. 2. In the event that there is an objection to the appeals proceeding on 15 January 2026, the respondent has liberty to apply at short notice for a hearing in relation to the discharge of the stay made by Justice Kimber, if so advised. 9 CIV-25-013337. 10 CIV-25-013734. 11 Due to industrial action, the parties were advised that the hearing would proceed by WebEx. Despite this, the appellant and his wife apparently attempted to physically attend at Court and sent a ‘selfie’ by email to establish that they had been present but unable to gain entry. Although, given its timing, the email must have been sent by a mobile device, there was no answer when the appellant’s telephone number was dialled during the hearing. -- 7 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 6 3. The appellant is to file his written submissions in support of the appeal by Tuesday, 23 December 2025. 4. The respondent is to file its written submissions in reply by Thursday, 8 January 2026. 5. The parties have liberty to apply at short notice by email. 6. Costs of the applications and today’s attendance are reserved. 20 Shortly following the hearing, the appellant was provided by email with a copy of the orders and a transcript of the hearing. The appellant and Mrs Britten responded on the same day by an email sent from Mrs Britten’s account, confirming that the appellant would be present on 15 January 2026 and inquiring about the issue of subpoenas. No objection was taken to my hearing the matter.12 21 The appellant was advised by email the following day that: • both appeals were listed for hearing on 15 January 2026; • any application for leave to issue subpoenas in connection with an appeal was an exceptional course and should be supported by a written submission on or before 15 December 2025. 22 It is not necessary to detail all the subsequent email correspondence between the appellant or his wife and the Court. However, a number of interlocutory applications were made (and provided informally by email). 23 On 17 December 2025, Mr Britten sent an email to the chambers of McIntyre J containing an unsealed interlocutory application in each appeal. The application effectively sought that the hearing on 15 January 2026 proceed as a directions hearing only, that the appellant have leave to issue subpoenas and that the stay continue until the matter is ultimately heard. The application requested that it be determined on an ex parte basis, citing as the justification that: This application is brought ex parte due to the proximity of the 15 January 2026 listing and the risk of immediate and irreparable procedural prejudice if substantive appeal argument were permitted to proceed before the threshold interlocutory issues concerning service and validity of the judgment are determined. 12 On 11 December 2025, I disclosed my involvement in a previous appeal involving Mr and Mrs Britten. I also disclosed that, shortly after the present matter was allocated to me, my judicial assistant informed me that Mr Newlyn and another person mentioned in the evidence, Mr Carbone, are related or known to her. I asked that my associate, with such alternative administrative assistance as may be required, assist with any administrative matters that may arise in relation to the appeals, so that my judicial assistant would have no relevant involvement in relation to the matter. On the basis of those arrangements, the appellant confirmed at the hearing on 15 January 2026 that he was not seeking my recusal. I nevertheless considered independently whether that circumstance gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias and decided that it did not. -- 8 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 7 24 On 19 December 2025, Mr Britten sent to the Registry and to my chambers a further interlocutory application seeking that the Court make the following orders on an ex parte basis: 1. Pursuant to Rule 34 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA), ebroker Pty Ltd (ACN 606 329 800) be added as a Respondent to appeal proceedings CIV-25-013337 and CIV-25-013734. 2. That the appeal proceedings be amended accordingly to reflect the addition of ebroker Pty Ltd as a respondent. 3. That the Appellant be granted leave to serve the appeal documents and this interlocutory application on ebroker Pty Ltd within seven (7) days of the making of these orders. 4. That ebroker Pty Ltd have fourteen (14) days after service to file and serve any response. 25 On 22 December 2025, the parties were advised by email that: The application will be heard and considered at the outset of the hearings otherwise listed for 10.15 am on Thursday 15 January 2026. His Honour is not satisfied that the application should be dealt with ex parte nor, on the basis of the affidavit material, does he consider it appropriate to discharge the existing procedural orders concerning the appeals. If, in due course, the interlocutory application succeeds, further procedural orders will be considered at that time. 26 The appellant did not file his written submissions in support of the appeal by 23 December 2025. 27 On 7 January 2026, Mrs Britten sent an email to the Registry and to my chambers ‘for and on behalf of David John Britten’ attaching a further proposed interlocutory application seeking: 1. An order that Cathy Jayne Britten be granted leave to assist the Appellant in the conduct of Supreme Court proceeding CIV-25-006524 and the associated appeal proceedings CIV-25-013337 and CIV-25-013734. 2. An order that Cathy Jayne Britten be permitted to attend all directions hearings and interlocutory hearings with the Appellant for the purpose of providing procedural assistance and support. 3. An order that Cathy Jayne Britten be permitted to speak on behalf of the Appellant in relation to procedural, administrative and non-substantive matters as the Court may allow. 4. An order that any correspondence, service of documents and communications from the Court and from the respondent’s representatives may be provided to the Appellant through his wife as authorised agent. 5. Such further or other orders as the Court considers appropriate. -- 9 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 8 28 The email attached an affidavit of the appellant sworn on 7 January 2026. In broad terms the appellant stated that he has been reliant on Mrs Britten, is suffering from mental health issues and has not been able to obtain legal assistance. Various complaints and accusations were made against the respondent. The appellant also swore another affidavit on the same date. 29 On 8 January 2026 the respondent filed its written submissions concerning the appeals. The appellant ultimately provided his submissions on 14 January 2026. 30 The appeal hearings proceeded on 15 January 2026, with the appellant and Mrs Britten present in person. 31 Although the appellant had earlier raised the prospect of his wife being joined as a party, or of his wife being appointed as his litigation guardian, neither application was pursued. The appellant was content, and proved himself able, to make submissions on his own behalf with Mrs Britten assisting him at the bar table from time to time. On two or three occasions I allowed her to make or supplement an oral submission made by the appellant. The issues, the evidence and the conduct of the appeal hearing 32 The appellant’s grounds of appeal in the second appeal are: 1. The Court erred in finding that service by email was valid. 2. These proceedings have been summary in nature. 3. … 4. The affidavit of Bianca Quan was misleading and relied on false assertions of service. 5. I had no reasonable understanding a mortgage existed on my property. 6. Extreme financial hardship has limited my ability to seek legal counsel. 7. The Lender does not hold a National Credit License and is acting contrary to the National Credit Act 2009 and the ASIC Act 2001. 8. Unconscionable lending pursuant to the ASIC Act 2001 (12CB). 33 In general terms, grounds 1, 2 and 4 go to service and/or the conduct of the proceedings that led to the possession order and grounds 5, 6, 7 and 8 go to the enforceability of the mortgage that was the foundation for the possession order. 34 As refined in the course of the hearing, the outstanding procedural applications were: (1) whether eBroker.com.au Pty Ltd should be joined as a party to the appeal; -- 10 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 9 (2) whether the Court should issue a subpoena to Mr Newlyn for him to attend to give evidence; and (3) whether the Court should require the respondent to give discovery of a video recording of the ‘first Zoom call’ (being a discussion on 19 August 2024 referred to in email correspondence between the parties), or other documents concerning the respondent’s decision to lend. In the course of the hearing the respondent explained that there was no recording of the discussion on 19 August 2024. 35 In respect of the substantive and procedural issues, the appellant’s contentions include that: • he was not served with any documents on 2 July 2025, as deposed to by Mr Newlyn. Further, he says that he was never served with a notice of default and indeed he has still never seen a copy of the complete loan documentation (even the copy contained in the appeal books handed up by him at the hearing); • he was not aware that there were possession proceedings on foot or that a possession order had been made before the notice was affixed to his property in October 2025. None of the steps ostensibly taken on his behalf in the proceedings prior to that time were undertaken by him or with his knowledge; • at the time of entry into the refinancing arrangement, he was financially and personally vulnerable, and his vulnerability was known to and taken advantage of by the respondent; • whilst he was aware that he was being advanced a loan by way of refinance of amounts exceeding $300,000 he was not aware and did not understand that he was granting a mortgage over his property; • the content of the recording of a ‘Zoom’ call (in which the terms of the loan and security arrangements were explained to the appellant and his wife and in which reference was made to the appellant and his wife receiving extensive advice from a solicitor, Mr Sander) does not reflect the reality of the situation. In an earlier discussion, the appellant’s vulnerability was laid bare, the solicitor was not independent and the appellant and his wife were ‘coached’ before the recording of the second ‘Zoom’ call commenced; and • the appellant was introduced to the respondent (or FCFS) by a licensed intermediary ‘eBroker.com.au Pty Ltd’. The fact that an intermediary with a credit licence introduced an unlicensed lender should have been disclosed. 36 The sequence in which the various procedural and substantive issues should be resolved, and the evidence relevant to them, was complicated by the unusual procedural history of the matter. -- 11 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 10 37 Relevantly: • whilst the operative judgment under appeal (the possession order made by Costello Aux As J) was made on 23 July 2025, much of the evidence upon which the appellant evidently sought to rely was contained in affidavits filed in those proceedings after that judgment was given (in relation to the set aside or stay applications). That material is before the Court in respect of the first appeal, but could be said to be ‘fresh evidence’ in respect of any challenge to the possession order (the subject of the second appeal); and • the appellant filed and/or relied upon a number of affidavits in connection with the application in the course of the first appeal for a stay against enforcement pending the hearing of the appeal, and the respondent filed responding evidence. Whilst that material has been considered in the context of an earlier aspect of these appeal proceedings, it is ‘fresh’ (or ‘further’) evidence so far as the substance of the appeals is concerned. 38 Some of the material which would comprise further evidence in respect of the substantive disposition of the appeals may be independently relevant to the interlocutory applications made in connection with the appeals, such as the extension of time application, the application for the issue of a subpoena to Mr Newlyn, and the application to join eBroker.com.au Pty Ltd. 39 The bases for the application for subpoenas (or, as it related to the respondent, specific discovery) and for the joinder of a third party overlapped, to a significant extent, with the underlying assertions, either as to service, or as to the enforceability of the mortgage raised on appeal. 40 Despite the respondent making clear that it may object to reliance on further evidence and although I requested on numerous occasions at the hearing that the appellant identify evidence in support of the factual assertions made in his written and oral submissions, the appellant was not able to be specific or comprehensive about the affidavits (or exhibits) sought to be relied upon. 41 Whilst it would not ordinarily be appropriate to adopt such a course, with a view to efficiency and because, in my assessment, the respondent was likely in a position to manage the prejudice caused to it by doing so, I determined that I should: • take the appellant to be making application to rely on all of the affidavits filed on his behalf in the original proceedings after the possession order and the affidavits filed in each of the two appeal proceedings; • receive those affidavits de bene esse with a view to determining in the course of my reasons, to the extent necessary, whether they are relevant and admissible and should otherwise be received in relation either to an interlocutory application or the substance of the appeals; -- 12 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 11 • permit the respondent to contingently tender its responding material on the basis that it may be relevant either as to joinder, subpoenas or discovery, to oppose the receipt of further evidence and, if received, to answer it; and • invite the parties to make submissions on all issues, recognising, of course, that if ultimately, I were to accede to the joinder, subpoena or discovery applications, I would not proceed to deal with the more substantive questions of an extension of time, leave to appeal and the merits of the appeals. 42 A table listing the affidavits in the three proceedings and the abbreviations that will be adopted is annexed to these reasons. I also received on a contingent basis a replacement exhibit in respect of one of the respondent’s affidavits13 and a USB containing a video,14 which I viewed with the parties’ consent, of a ‘Zoom’ call between the appellant, his wife, Mr Blackburn and Mr Amal Maharaj, before the ‘draw down’ occurred in respect of the refinancing. Joinder 43 It is convenient to deal with the joinder application first. It would be an unusual case where, on an appeal against a possession order, it is necessary or appropriate to join a third party. If the possession order should not have been made, or should not have been made summarily, it might follow that the dispute between the registered proprietor and the putative secured creditor raises claims or issues that overlap with claims against a third party, making the third party’s joinder appropriate. But if there are not grounds to disturb the possession order, whatever claims may or may not exist against a third party are not likely to be appropriately dealt with by joining that party to the appellate proceeding. 44 The appellant contends that eBroker.com.au Pty Ltd acted as a credit intermediary and that it was required to comply with statutory obligations relating to credit assistance, preliminary assessments, suitability and responsible lending. He also contends that it was required under law to disclose that the ultimate lender did not (or was not required to) hold a credit licence. The appellant was not able to identify with any precision the statutory foundation for these assertions. 45 The respondent also contends that the joinder of eBroker.com.au Pty Ltd is necessary to prevent the arguments about unconscionability being ‘determined on a partial narrative’ in which only the enforcement appears. It appears that the appellant’s application is therefore premised to some extent on the misconceived notion that an entity must be made a party if facts and circumstances in which it participated are relevant to issues sought to be raised in a proceeding. 46 Even if a triable case were to be disclosed to the effect that eBroker.com.au Pty Ltd made some misrepresentation in relation to the lending, the immediate 13 MFI-A. This document comprised a creditor’s statutory demand purportedly made by ‘Cathy J Britten of CJDJ Pty Ltd’ against FCFS dated 27 July 2024. 14 MFI-B. -- 13 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 12 question is whether the possession order should be set aside. If any conduct of an intermediary is conduct for which the respondent is or should be responsible, and it has the arguable effect of vitiating the mortgage or making its enforcement unconscionable, it would not be necessary to join the intermediary to the appeal. If the conduct is not attributable in that sense, the appellant’s rights if any against the intermediary can and should be pursued in separate proceedings. 47 No final relief is proposed against eBroker.com.au Pty Ltd. Nor am I satisfied on the basis of my perusal of the affidavit material, including material that the appellant would require permission to rely upon on appeal, that a triable cause of action is disclosed. There is no basis upon which to order its joinder. 48 To the extent that the appellant presses a similar application for joinder in relation to FCFS (and it is not clear that he does), the same reasoning applies. 49 The appellant did not appear to press before me any application that Mrs Britten should be joined as a party. In any event, I do not consider there is a proper basis for her to be joined to the appeal. Service and the summary possession order 50 It is convenient at this juncture to canvass the issues and the material relevant to the question whether the proceedings had been served prior to the possession order being made. 51 Sections 192 and 193 of the RPA provide that: 192—Summons to give up possession Any of the following persons (in the following sections called the claimant) may cause any person in possession of land under the provisions of this Act to be summoned to appear before the Court to show cause why the person summoned should not give up possession to the claimant— (a) the registered proprietor of a freehold estate in possession; (b) any registered mortgagee or encumbrancee where the person in possession is a mortgagor or encumbrancer in default, or a person claiming under such mortgagor or encumbrancer; (c) any lessor with power to re-enter where the rent is in arrear for three months, whether there be or be not sufficient distress found on the premises to countervail such rent, and whether or not any previous demand shall have been made for the rent; (d) any lessor where a legal notice to quit has been given, or the lease become forfeited, or the term of the lease has expired. 193—Summons to contain description of land The summons shall contain a description of the land, and shall require the person summoned to appear before the Court on a day not earlier than sixteen days after the service -- 14 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 13 of the summons. The summons shall be served in the same manner as a writ of summons in an action for the recovery of possession of land in the Supreme Court. 52 Rule 241.1 of the Uniform Civil Rules 2020 (SA) (‘UCRs’) provides: 241.1—Institution (1) A person who claims an entitlement to, and seeks an order for possession of, land may institute an action under this rule for an order for possession. (2) An action under this Part must be instituted by filing an Originating Application and supporting affidavit in accordance with rule 82.1. (3) The applicant may, but is not required to, join an occupier of the land (other than the registered proprietor of the land) and, if the applicant does so, that person is to be joined as an interested party. (4) The supporting affidavit must— (a) depose to or exhibit— (i) if the applicant is the registered proprietor—proof that the applicant is the registered proprietor of a freehold estate in possession within the meaning of section 192(a) of the Real Property Act 1886; (ii) if the applicant is a registered mortgagee or encumbrancee—proof that the person in possession is a mortgagor or encumbrancer in default, or a person claiming under such mortgagor or encumbrancer, within the meaning of section 192(b) of the Real Property Act 1886; (iii) if applicant is a lessor—proof that— (A) the applicant has power to re-enter and the rent is in arrears for at least 3 months within the meaning of section 192(c) of the Real Property Act 1886; or (B) a legal notice to quit has been given, the lease has become forfeited or the term of the lease has expired; (b) exhibit the documents from which the applicant derives title and upon which the applicant bases the entitlement to possession; (c) identify who to the knowledge of the applicant claims possession, or is in occupation, of the land; (d) state whether the National Credit Code applies; and (e) state whether any person has possession of the land as a tenant under, or is a former tenant holding over after termination of, a residential tenancy agreement. (5) The application must contain a proper description of the land and the application or affidavit must include a reference to the certificate of title and any other basic document of title (such as a registered mortgage or registered lease). -- 15 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 14 (6) Unless the Court otherwise orders, the applicant must serve the Originating Application documents on each other party by personal service as soon as practicable. Notes— Section 193 of the Real Property Act 1886 requires that an originating process seeking an order to give up possession under section 192 be served at least 16 days before the hearing. The Court may order substituted service under rule 42.9. 53 As has been explained, the appellant did not appear on 23 July 2025. Pursuant to s 194 of the RPA: 194—Orders on non-appearance to summons If, on the hearing of the summons, the person summoned do not appear, then upon proof of the service of the summons and of the claimant’s title, or on the production of a consent to an order by the person summoned, the Court may order immediate possession to be given to the claimant. 54 This was the provision pursuant to which the possession order was made. Had the appellant appeared and resisted the order, the question would have been whether he could demonstrate some dispute of substance (a ‘triable issue’), in which case, the Court would likely have directed that the matter proceed on pleadings. The summary procedure is reserved for cases that are ‘plain and obvious’, where there is ‘no real question to be tried’.15 55 On one view, the question whether there is a triable issue in respect of the enforceability of the mortgage is beside the point if no successful challenge can be made to the findings that there was a registered mortgage and that service of the summons had been effected. The respondent submits that unless further evidence is received going to the question of service, the possession order cannot be said to be affected by error because the evidence before the Court demonstrated that service had been effected. 56 On another, broader, view, as part of the consideration whether further evidence concerning service should be received, it may be relevant to consider whether, had the appellant appeared on 23 July 2025 or subsequently, he would have been in a position to raise a triable issue. For the moment, I will focus upon the question of service. The appeal grounds 57 Ground 2 is accurate but, on its own, it does not avail the appellant. The proceedings were summary in nature. That is as contemplated by s 194 and r 241.4(3) of the UCRs. The effect of the order once made is the same as a final order for recovery of possession.16 If service was not properly effected, or had a triable issue been raised before the order for possession was made, the matter should not have proceeded in a summary fashion, but if service was properly 15 De Pasquale v ASCF Managed Investments Pty Ltd [2021] SASC 21 at [6]-[8] (Livesey J). 16 RPA, s 197. -- 16 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 15 effected, no triable issue having been raised, it was perfectly appropriate for the possession order to be granted summarily. This shows that ground 2 cannot succeed on its own. 58 Grounds 1 and 4 are misdirected because the Court did not proceed on the basis of email service and the affidavit of Ms Quan to which reference is made in ground 4 was filed after the possession order was made. Even if it could be shown to be misleading it cannot have had any vitiating effect on the order. 59 In written and oral submissions, the appellant asserts that the proceedings were not personally served and, further, that he was not served with a notice to remedy nor made aware of the proceedings at all until October 2025. The latter propositions are not directly relevant to personal service of the proceedings, but they form part of an evidentiary matrix which may shed light on the credibility of the appellant’s denial of personal service of the proceedings and they may also be relevant to the question whether an extension of time should be granted in respect of the second appeal, whether further evidence should be received, or whether further procedural steps, should be taken, with a view to exploring further the question of personal service, such as by the issue of a subpoena or the making of discovery. Evidence potentially relevant to whether service was effected 60 It is helpful to set out the assertions that have been made by the appellant or his wife in respect of service of the proceedings and other documents in chronological sequence, and to consider them in light of the appellant’s overarching submission on appeal that he was never in fact aware of the proceedings before October 2025. 61 In the chronological summary that follows, it is to be remembered that the evidence or material before the Court on 23 July 2025 was limited. (1) Mr Blackburn’s evidence was that on 17 March 2025 at 3.45 pm, a Default Notice was sent by email to [email protected], being the email address nominated for service in the Loan Agreement. His evidence is that on 3 April 2025, at approximately 1.37 pm, it was served on Mrs Britten at the Property (in the appellant’s presence), as described in a sworn affidavit of Mr Antonio Carbone.17 (2) Mr Newlyn’s evidence is that on 2 July 2025 at approximately 5.40 pm he attended at the Property and served the Originating Application and supporting affidavit of Mr Blackburn, together with a notice to occupier.18 17 Blackburn 29.05.25 [18], Exhibit MB1, pp 130-139. The evidence is supported by the evidence of Ms Bianca Quan filed after the possession order was made: Quan 18.09.25 at [4], Exhibit BJQ1. 18 Newlyn 22.07.25, [4]-[6]. -- 17 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 16 (3) The following day, the ‘Notice of Change of Address for Service’, to which reference was earlier made, was filed in the underlying action. (4) Ms Quan’s evidence is that on 11 July 2025 at approximately 2.00 pm, the respondent’s solicitors caused the Originating Application and supporting materials to be sent by way of an electronic link in an email (the title of which provided the action number for the proceedings) to [email protected]. The covering email notified the hearing date and time of 23 July 2025 at 10.15 am.19 The appellant responded to that email on 12 July 2025, denying that he had been served with anything ‘regarding the matter you refer to’ and asserting that he could not open the link. The respondent’s solicitors responded by email sent on 16 July 2025 providing a Dropbox link and indicating that the agent’s proof of service would be provided once it was received.20 Whilst these events pre-date the possession order, Ms Quan’s affidavit was not before the Court on 23 July 2025. (5) On 21 July 2025, Mrs Britten swore an affidavit for the purposes of a Supreme Court proceeding which she sent to the respondent but did not file. This was handed up by the respondent’s counsel at the hearing on 23 July 2025. In that affidavit, Mrs Britten referred to ‘a purported service of documents on my husband’. She swore that ‘although an attempt was made to serve documents at our residence, the person who attended did not successfully serve David. At the relevant time, David was not in a condition to accept service due to serious health reasons’.21 (6) Following the making of the possession order, and as contemplated by the terms of that order, on 31 July 2025, the respondent’s solicitors sent a copy of the order by email to [email protected] At some stage the order was affixed to the door of the residence by Mr Newlyn.23 (7) On 13 August 2025, a notice of acting was filed on behalf of the applicant, nominating [email protected] as an email address for service.24 (8) On 21 August 2025, an interlocutory application was filed in the appellant’s name seeking to set aside the possession order for various reasons including an assertion that ‘[t]his was not adequately served and had not come to the attention of the appellant’. The application was supported by an affidavit sworn by Mrs Britten in which she swore that she was authorised by him to prepare and file the affidavit in support of the interlocutory application. She stated (without providing detail or annexing underlying objective documents in support) that the appellant was suffering an acute mental health condition, 19 Quan 18.09.25 [8]-[9], Exhibit BJQ1, p 12. 20 Quan 18.09.25 [10]-[11], Exhibit BJQ1, pp 13-15. 21 CJB 21.07.25. The document is reproduced as Annexure A to FDN32 (CIV-25-013337). 22 Koleski 23.09.25, exhibit KK1. 23 Newlyn 23.09.25, [2]. The date given in the affidavit must be in error, since it predates the order. 24 CIV-25-006524, FDN8. -- 18 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 17 requiring her to handle legal and administrative matters on his behalf. Mrs Britten swore that ‘David has never been personally served with a Remedy to Default notice or with valid Supreme Court originating process; nor have I been authorised to accept service on his behalf’. Later in the affidavit it was asserted that ‘[a]ny ‘service’ by dropping a letter at a back gate while the [appellant] was in hospital is invalid and, in context, falls well short of the personal service contemplated by s 88 [National Credit Code] and the UCR’.25 The affidavit made other assertions relating to the enforceability of the mortgage and the service of a default notices. This affidavit, which was obviously not before the Court when the possession order was made, prompted Ms Quan’s affidavit, to which reference has been made. (9) In support of an interlocutory application filed in the appellant’s name on 18 September 2025,26 Mrs Britten swore that ‘David has not personally received any initial notice of default, remedy opportunity, or originating process in these proceedings. I have observed service attempts being misdirected, including at a neighbour’s gate. We reside in a rural area where properties are not clearly identified by street numbers, which has caused confusion’.27 (10) A warrant of possession subsequently issued. In support of an application filed on 30 October 2025 to stay execution of a warrant of possession pending a (yet to be filed) appeal, Mrs Britten swore an affidavit again asserting her authority to act on his behalf and stating, amongst other things that ‘[u]ntil recently we believed these matters were being managed legally by Professor Hart, a long-term colleague who had been assisting with our affairs. We later discovered that he had passed away, explaining why the matter was not progressed as we believed’.28 Mrs Britten swore that: These matters have still not been brought to Mr Brittens attention in their entirety and I have limited access to Court SA … 11. We were never served with any originating application or remedy notice commencing these proceedings. Earlier affidavits and correspondence already filed confirm that no formal service occurred. Possession order and further non-service 12. Dynamic appears to have obtained a possession order dated 23 July 2025 without serving us or notifying us of any hearing. We did not attend because we were unaware of its existence. 25 CJB 21.08.25. 26 CIV-25-006524, FDN13. 27 CJB 09.09.25. 28 CJB 21.10.25. -- 19 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 18 … Warrant of possession dated 17 October 2025 14. On Friday 17 October 2025 a document headed ‘Warrant of Possession’ was found affixed to the door of another premises, not our home. We were never personally served nor did we receive correspondence from the Court or the Sheriff about execution. (11) The affidavit purported to annex a ‘Copy of prior order recording nil amount and stay of enforcement’.29 That document is styled a ‘Guardian Certificate’ and appears to comprise an affidavit sworn by the appellant on 4 September 2025. In that affidavit, the appellant deposed, inter alia, that: An attempt was made to serve me shortly after I had been discharged from hospital following an attempt on my own life. During this attempt, the process server harassed me, saying words to the effect of ‘be a real man and take these documents’. For the record, I did not accept service. … My treating medical practitioners have advised me that it is in my best interests to limit exposure to stressful and technical financial dealings, as these matters exacerbate my condition. For this reason, I rely on my wife, Cathy Jayne Britten, to manage and coordinate such matters on my behalf. (12) On 6 November 2025, the appellant swore an affidavit that was filed in the first appeal proceedings, in which he deposed that:30 This Matter relates to a business loan that the mortgage was never consented too Originally I was never served any notices or remedy to default and stipulated that I would not accept it electronically Further to this proceedings were issued without my knowledge and a judgement was obtained without me being able to attend … FURTHER I was not advised of any subsequent hearings (13) In submissions dated and filed 10 November 2025 in the first appeal proceedings, said to be prepared by Mrs Britten on behalf of the appellant (and signed also by him), it was asserted:31 The alleged Dropbox link sent on 16 July 2025 was inaccessible, and no affidavit of receipt has been provided. 29 CJB 21.10.25, exhibit CJB1. 30 DJB 06.11.25, [3]-[5], [9]. 31 CIV-25-013337, FDN8. -- 20 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 19 (14) Also on 10 November 2025, the appellant swore an affidavit filed in the first appeal proceedings in which he made a number of assertions and denied that the original proceedings had been properly served. Amongst other things, he swore that:32 Ms Quan has also claimed service was effected by a Dropbox link; I did not receive, access, or consent to service by that method. (15) On 11 November 2025, the appellant swore an affidavit in the second appeal in support of an extension of time within which to bring that appeal. He swore, inter alia, that:33 This affidavit sets out the background of the matter, the circumstances under which I became aware of the original judgment, and the reasons why the appeal has been filed outside the usual time limit. … I was never served with, nor notified of, the hearing [on 23 July 2025] or the order made on that date. No notice, correspondence, or electronic notification through the CourtSA system was received by me, and I was unaware that any possession proceedings or judgment had occurred. The first occasion on which I became aware of these proceedings was in October 2025, when a warrant was delivered to my residence. This was the first indication that an order for possession had been made. Following receipt of the warrant, my wife Cathy Jayne Britten and I attended the Supreme Court Registry seeking clarification. Registry staff informed us that documents and correspondence previously lodged by my wife had remained in an internal inbox and had not been processed or accepted on the Court record. … At the time of the original proceedings I was without legal representation, unfamiliar with CourtSA, and experiencing financial hardship and ill health. These circumstances contributed to my failure to respond or appear, though this was not deliberate. Upon discovering the existence of the judgment, I acted promptly to seek information and to lodge this appeal supported by appropriate documentation. (16) On 18 November 2025, Mrs Britten swore a lengthy affidavit in the first appeal proceedings. It stated, inter alia:34 Events Between August and October 2025 and How I Became Gradually Aware of Proceedings Between August and October 2025 I was trying to manage the matter myself because I was gradually becoming aware of proceedings through indirect means, not proper service. 32 DJB 10.11.25, [3.6]. 33 DJB 11.11.25. 34 CJB 18.11.25. -- 21 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 20 … False Service – Affidavit of Tylor Newlyn (Referencing affidavit of service dated 22 July 2025) Documents were never handed to me or to David. They were dumped at a neighbour’s fence, the wind blew them everywhere, and the conduct of the men who brought them was aggressive. The initial demand and remedy was not served, and attempts to rely on electronic means were also inappropriate because we had not consented to be served electronically and there was no order for substituted service. Under the Uniform Civil Rules 2020, personal service of an individual normally requires that the document be actually given to the person, or, if they refuse to take it, that it be put down in their presence after telling them what it is. Leaving documents at a nearby property after menacing interaction with us does not meet that definition. We have this proof on surveillance camera. On both occasions the men came onto our rural property in a small white car, drove in a reckless way, did wheelies, and shouted that they would ‘keep coming back’. Their purpose was clearly to frighten and intimidate us, not to calmly and lawfully serve court documents. There was no conversation in which either David or I were told, ‘These are court documents, we are serving you’. There was no request for acknowledgement, no signature, and no attempt to ensure that we personally received the documents. I even offered for a solicitor to accept service but suspiciously they did not want this. Despite this, Mr Newlyn has sworn an affidavit saying that service occurred in accordance with the rules. I say that affidavit is false in substance, because what actually happened bears no resemblance to proper service. We were never personally served, and we made it clear as soon as we became aware of proceedings that we had not been properly notified. The use of an affidavit to say otherwise has caused serious procedural unfairness and has contributed to orders being made without us having a fair chance to be heard. There must be other rules and service under the property legislation and various other Acts that support the basic requirement that people be properly notified before serious steps are taken against their property and rights, and I say those basic principles were not followed here. (17) On 4 December 2025, the appellant swore an affidavit he filed in the second appeal proceeding containing the following assertions in response to Mr Newlyn’s affidavit of service:35 I say that the account given by Mr Newlyn is false. At no time on 2 July 2025 at or around 5.40 pm did I see or speak to Mr Newlyn or any other process server at my home. I did not attend at any glass sliding door, I did not hear my name called out, and I did not see any documents placed at or near the door in the manner he describes. 35 DJB 04.12.25. -- 22 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 21 I am certain that had any process server been at the property and attempted to speak to me in the way described, I would recall it. No such conversation occurred. At all relevant times we had our front gate locked in any event. I further say that Cathy did not receive or knowingly collect any originating process or hearing documents in the way described by Mr Newlyn. She did not have a clear, informed opportunity to understand that legal proceedings had been commenced or that a hearing date had been set. The first time I became substantively aware of the detail of the Costello and Bochner proceedings was after orders had already been made, when I started receiving communications about enforcement. By that stage, I had been denied the opportunity to appear, seek advice, or respond to the material. The effect of Mr Newlyn’s affidavit is to suggest that we were properly served and simply chose not to engage. That is untrue. In reality, we were not served in any way that gave us fair notice. Cathy has had other dealings with him in a different context and I say there is a conflict of interest which further supports the need for his evidence to be tested carefully. Given the seriousness of this issue, I respectfully seek that the Court grant leave to issue a subpoena to Mr Newlyn (and, if appropriate, to Mr Frank Carbone) requiring them: a. to attend for cross-examination regarding service; and b. to produce any logs, phone records, photographs, GPS records or contemporaneous notes relating to the alleged service event. (18) On 9 December 2025, the appellant swore an affidavit in the original proceeding in which he swore, inter alia:36 Further I was never served with the Originating Application. No process server approached me to give me documents. Nothing was left at the house or in the letterbox. I understand, in an affidavit of service who we later discovered was sworn by a man named Tylor Newton. What occurred at our property is not reflected correctly in that affidavit. Mr Newton attended the property once. He entered the land aggressively, performing wheelies in a manner that frightened me. He did not identify himself as a process server, did not explain that he had documents for me, and did not hand me any envelope or papers. Instead he made personal and abusive remarks including saying that I was ‘not a real man’. This was extremely distressing as I had recently attempted to take my own life. Mr Newton said words to the effect that he or others would keep coming back. I interpreted this as harassment, not lawful service of documents. He did not leave any documents on the property or hand anything to me. I did not understand his attendance to be related to legal proceedings. I only discovered later, after judgment, that he had sworn an affidavit claiming to have served me. This is not correct. 36 CIV-25-006524, FDN30. -- 23 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 22 Because I was never served with a Remedy to Default Notice or the Originating Application, I did not know proceedings had commenced. I did not know of the hearing before His Honour Judge Costello on 23 July 2025. I therefore could not appear. Had I been properly served, I would have responded, sought legal advice, and attended court. The judgment was entered in circumstances where I had no knowledge of the case and no opportunity to be heard. (19) On 9 December 2025, Mrs Britten swore an affidavit which addressed the topic of service of the original proceedings.37 She swore that: No court documents were delivered to our property or left in our property, and no process server attended and handed us an Originating Application or any other initiating document. … I understand that the plaintiff relies on an affidavit of service sworn by a process server named Tylor or Tyler Newton, who is apparently connected with Carbone Lawyers or other agents. I say that whatever is sworn in his affidavit does not correctly describe what occurred at our property. Mr Newton did come onto our rural property on one occasion. His behaviour was aggressive and intimidating. He drove in such a way that he performed wheelies on the land, which caused us significant alarm. During this visit he did not knock on the door in a formal way, did not ask to speak calmly about any legal matter, and did not attempt to hand over any documents in a manner consistent with serving court process. Instead, he made abusive and personal comments to my husband, including saying that David was ‘not a real man’. This was particularly cruel and distressing because David had recently attempted to take his own life and was in a very vulnerable condition. Mr Newton also made remarks to the effect that he or others would ‘keep coming back’, which we interpreted as a threat rather than a professional attempt to serve legal documents. At no stage did Mr Newton clearly identify himself as a process server acting for Dynamic Enterprises Pty Ltd, nor did he explain that he was attempting to serve an Originating Application or any other court document. He did not hand any documents to either of us, nor did he leave a sealed envelope or other papers behind on our property. At the time, we believed that his conduct was some kind of harassment or intimidation, possibly connected to other disputes, but we did not understand it to be related to any formal legal process or to these proceedings. 37 CJB 09.12.25. -- 24 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 23 … I only discovered later, when looking at materials for this application, that there was said to be an affidavit of service from Mr Newton which purported to record personal service. That affidavit is inconsistent with what actually occurred. As a result, no lawful or valid service of the Originating Application took place, either through Mr Newton or through any other person or method. Hearing before Judge Costello and default judgment on 23 July 2025 I subsequently learned that the matter was listed before His Honour Judge Costello on 23 July 2025 and that the default judgment was entered on that date. Neither David nor I attended that hearing. We did not attend because we did not know that the proceeding had been commenced, we had not served with the Originating Application or any listing notice, and we had never been given any Remedy to Default notice. If we had been properly served with the documents and notified of the hearing date, we would have taken steps to appear, seek legal advice, and put our position before the Court. (20) On 7 January 2026, the appellant swore an affidavit he filed in the first appeal proceeding in which he stated, inter alia, that ‘[a]ll documents filed to date in this mater have been prepared and lodged by my wife on my behalf’.38 62 In his written submissions in support of the appeals (‘AWS’), the appellant submits that: As previously deposed, the individual attending the property did not identify himself as a process server, did not provide documents, engaged in intimidating and abusive conduct, told Mr Britten to ‘be a real man’ and left without effecting service or leaving documents. 63 In oral submissions before me, the appellant submitted that:39 The respondent also relies on alleged service of the originating action by Mr Tyler Newton. The individual I now know to be him attended my property and spoke with my wife. He never identified himself as a process server and didn’t state his business. My wife told him to leave. I was standing on the balcony some 30 m away – he looked up at me and shouted: ‘Be a real man and I’ll keep coming back’. He then got in his car, and left wheels spinning down my drive. We live on a country property, your Honour. Neither Cathy nor myself were handed any documents, and certainly no documents were left. Cathy said he was very intimidating, and assumed it was something related to her ex- partner, Daniel Hogben. 64 The respondent contends that: • the material before the Court on 23 July 2025 amply supported the finding that service of the proceedings had been properly effected; 38 DJB 07.01.26 B. 39 Transcript of hearing 15 January 2026, p 24. -- 25 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 24 • any challenge to that decision requires a relatively lengthy extension of time given the second appeal was not filed until 14 November 2025, and the explanation given by the appellant (that he was not aware of the proceedings at all until the warrant of possession came to his attention in October 2025) is so patently false that the extension should be refused for that reason alone; • the material relied upon by the appellant to challenge the finding of personal service is inconsistent and incredible, particularly when considered in the light of the responding evidence. For that reason, permission to rely on further evidence going to service should be refused; and • if the Court receives the further evidence, there is no proper basis upon which to overturn the finding of service and permission to appeal against the possession order should be refused on the basis it is not reasonably arguable. 65 Relatedly, the respondent contends that the Court should not issue a subpoena to Mr Newlyn (or otherwise require him to be made available for cross- examination) because there is no sufficient basis to embark upon that course. Essentially, there is insufficient substance to the claim of non-service to warrant that course. 66 Whether an extension of time should be granted, whether leave to appeal should be granted, and whether permission should be given to rely on further evidence on appeal are related questions in the present case. If attention is confined to the material before the Court when the possession order was made, there is no basis to challenge the decision made and, consequently, no utility in granting an extension of time and insufficient prospects of success to warrant a grant of leave to appeal. 67 The Court has power in its discretion to hear further evidence on an appeal to a single Judge under r 217.10(1)(c) of the UCRs. The discretion is not circumscribed by the common law principles governing the reception of ‘fresh evidence’ on appeal, but similar considerations apply. It will be generally relevant to consider: • whether the evidence was available, or could with reasonable diligence have been obtained, for use at the hearing below; • whether the evidence is such that it would have had an important influence on the decision below. While it need not necessarily be decisive, it must be more than merely relevant or useful; • the likely practical impact of receiving the evidence, including whether it is controversial or contested, and if so likely to require cross-examination, further responding evidence and/or that the matter be remitted for rehearing; and -- 26 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 25 • the public interest in the finality of litigation.40 68 In a case in which a party contends that they were not served with a proceeding before an impugned order was made, it will often be appropriate to permit the party to rely on further evidence relating to the question of service because, by hypothesis, the party will usually be contending that they had no opportunity to resist the making of the order, including on the basis that they had not been validly notified of the proceeding. 69 However, because a factor relevant to the discretion whether to permit further evidence is whether the evidence (or the substance of it) could have been raised below, it is appropriate to consider not only whether the material that the appellant wishes to rely upon would have an important influence on a finding whether service was properly effected, but also whether the material brought forward by the appellant satisfactorily addresses whether, even assuming he had not been properly served, he was aware of the proceedings and the hearing date and time. And in considering whether the material that the appellant wishes to rely upon would have an important influence on the finding about service, it is relevant to consider its internal consistency, its comprehensiveness and its inherent cogency. 70 Against that background, several observations may be made about the evidence the appellant has brought forward, including what it does not address. 71 First, there is the striking circumstance that, before the possession order was made, a ‘Notice of Change of Address for Service’ on behalf of the appellant was filed in the proceeding. As the respondent submitted, this gives rise to a reasonable inference that the appellant, or somebody who claimed to have authority to act for him, was aware that the proceedings existed. If the appellant and Mrs Britten had never taken possession of any legal documents, and if they never knew that the process server who attended their premises was in any way associated with the respondent, it is unclear how they would have known about the proceedings in which this notice was filed. 72 I raised this issue in the course of submissions with the appellant and adjourned briefly so that he could consider that and one or two other issues, discuss it with his wife, and make any response about it. After the adjournment, the appellant submitted that a ‘generic email’ (attaching the notice) was sent by his wife ‘to many parties’ because they were having service issues on a number of unrelated matters. He said that unfortunately the Courts Administration Authority was included in the email and it ‘added’ the notice to the CIV-25-006524 file, unfortunately giving the impression of knowledge of service. I made clear that the email was not before me and if there was no application to tender the email that may affect what I would make of the submission. I invited the appellant to locate the email and consider applying for its tender. He did not take up that opportunity. 40 Burke v Public Trustee for the State of South Australia [2022] SASCA 64 at [455] (Doyle JA). -- 27 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 26 73 Secondly, there is the circumstance that Mrs Britten swore an affidavit on 21 July 2025 relating to the question of service using a document with a Supreme Court designation and provided it to the respondent before the 23 July 2025 hearing. That is difficult to square with ignorance of the existence of the proceedings. Amongst the many affidavits filed by Mrs Britten there does not appear to be a satisfactory explanation of the circumstances that led her to prepare and provide that affidavit to the respondent. As has been noted, the tenor of that affidavit was that service was ineffective by reason of her husband’s mental state at the time and in that sense was inconsistent with the proposition that no papers were left at the residence and that the appellant and his wife were under the misapprehension that the attendance of a process server earlier that month related to a matter involving Mrs Britten’s ex-husband. 74 Thirdly, there is the circumstance that whilst the appellant submits in relation to his extension of time application that he was entirely unaware of the possession proceedings before October 2025: • he responded to email correspondence from the respondent’s solicitors in mid July 2025 that contained a reference to the action, clear notice of the date and time of the forthcoming hearing and links to the relevant documents; and • a number of documents were filed in his name in the proceedings in addition to the document filed on 3 July 2025 but before October 2025. This includes a Notice of Acting on 13 August 2025, three interlocutory applications and two affidavits sworn by Mrs Britten. 75 As to the former, this was first addressed by the appellant in a written submission on 10 November 2025 in terms suggestive that the Dropbox link was ‘inaccessible’. In an affidavit sworn by him the same day, he asserted in conclusory and unclear terms that ‘I did not receive, access, or consent to service by that method’. This fails to come to grips with the fact that he responded to an email informing him of the date and time of a hearing of proceedings between him and the respondent. Whatever one might make of the suggestion that there was a difficulty with the link, the failure to deal with this issue is surprising. He does not state, for instance, that the email sent under his name was in fact sent by his wife and that she did not tell him anything about it. 76 As to the latter, the various contentions to the effect that steps were taken in the proceedings by his wife without his knowledge are problematic. That is because, as noted earlier in the context of Mrs Britten’s affidavit of 21 August 2025 in support of the appellant’s application of the same day, she swore that she was authorised by her husband to prepare and file the affidavit. There is also amongst the materials an affidavit apparently prepared by the appellant himself on 4 September 2025 relating to questions of service. It is difficult to understand why the appellant would have prepared and sworn that document if he had no knowledge of the proceedings. In respect of the appellant’s mental state, it is relevant to observe that despite the observations made by -- 28 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 27 Bochner As J, it remains the case that no objective evidence relating to the appellant’s mental or other health difficulties has been brought forward. 77 Next, the statements and evidence made by Mrs Britten and the appellant about an occasion on which a person now understood to be Mr Newlyn attended at their residence are inconsistent. For example: • in the affidavit sworn by Mrs Britten before the possession order was made, the primary issue raised was the efficacy of service in light of the appellant’s mental state; • her affidavit of 21 August 2025 was along similar lines but referred to the inefficacy of ‘dropping a letter at the back gate’ while the appellant was in hospital; • Mrs Britten’s affidavit of 9 September 2025 referred to having observed service attempts being misdirected, ‘including at a neighbour’s gate’, and emphasised that the lack of street numbers has ‘caused confusion’; • the appellant’s affidavit (styled a ‘Guardian Certificate’) of 4 September 2025 describes an occasion where a process server said to him he should ‘be a real man and take these documents’; • on 18 November 2025, Mrs Britten swore that documents were ‘dumped at a neighbour’s fence, the wind blew them everywhere’. She asserted that ‘leaving documents at a nearby property after menacing interaction with us does not meet that definition. We have proof of this on surveillance camera’. In the same affidavit she states for the first time that she offered for a solicitor to accept service and that Mr Newlyn did not agree to that; • on 4 December 2025, the appellant denies any conversation with the process server of the kind described by the process server and says that ‘we had our front gate locked in any event’; • on 9 December 2025, the appellant said that Mr Newlyn performed ‘wheelies’, did not identify himself as a process server and did not hand him any envelope or papers and did not leave any documents on the property; • on 10 December 2025, Mrs Britten similarly described ‘wheelies’ and said that Mr Newlyn did not leave any documents behind on the property; • in oral submissions on 15 January 2026, the appellant submitted that Mr Newlyn had attended and spoken with his wife and that he was standing on a balcony 30 metres away when Mr Newlyn said he should ‘be a real man’ before getting in his car and leaving ‘wheels spinning down my drive’. He said that no documents were left (whether near a neighbour’s fence or otherwise). -- 29 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 28 78 The appellant did not produce or seek to tender the surveillance footage referred to in Mrs Britten’s 18 November 2025 deposition, nor was the assertion by Mrs Britten that she and the appellant believed that a deceased Professor has been handling their affairs ever explained or returned to. Some allowance must be made in the case of self-represented litigants for evidence in written form that is expressed imperfectly or incompletely. However, standing back and considering all the material, including the material that the respondent would in fairness be permitted to rely upon if further evidence were to be permitted on the question of service, my conclusion is that the nature and quality of the evidence that the appellant wishes to rely on is lacking in cogency. It does not possess the capacity to exert an important influence on the outcome of the question whether the judge below was wrong to accept that service had been effected. 79 Before finally resolving the question whether the evidence should be received, and, relatedly whether any other related or ancillary relief should be granted, it is appropriate to canvass the substance of the grounds that the appellant wishes to raise about enforcement of the mortgage. Enforceability of mortgage and unconscionable conduct 80 The appellant does not dispute that CJDJ received the benefit of over $300,000 by way of the respondent agreeing to refinance its loan facility with CJDJ (which he had previously secured). 81 Instead, by the grounds of appeal set out earlier, he asserts that he had no reasonable understanding a mortgage existed on his property (ground 5) and that there was ‘unconscionable lending’ within the meaning of provisions of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) (‘ASIC Act’) (ground 8). These are the only two grounds requiring any detailed consideration. 82 Ground 6, which asserts that financial hardship has prejudiced the appellant’s capacity to seek legal counsel, lacks any substance as a ground of appeal. The appellant in fact briefly had representation in the appellate proceedings. Those representatives withdrew when an issue arose about the authenticity of an email relied on by the appellant. 83 Ground 7 can also be put to one side. It depends upon the proposition that the respondent was required to hold a licence under the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) (‘NCCP Act’). As the respondent’s counsel explained in the course of careful written and oral submissions, that turns on the meaning of ‘credit activity’. When one traces through the various definitions,41 the fact that the loan was made to a company and not to a natural person and was not for personal, domestic or household purposes is sufficient to defeat the contention that 41 See, eg, NCCP Act, ss 5 and 9 and Schedule 1. -- 30 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 29 the respondent required a credit licence. The fact that the Mortgage secured a guarantee given by a natural person does not alter the position.42 84 Returning to the grounds that the appellant lacked a reasonable understanding that he was granting a mortgage and that the guarantee or Mortgage was entered into in circumstances that could be described as unconscionable, the appellant contends that: • the residence the subject of the possession order was built by him and is a family home; • the appellant is in receipt of a pension, has minimal income, has no legal education, little commercial or financial experience and has not been involved in litigation of this nature; • the appellant relied on intermediaries and advisers in entering into the original borrowing transaction; • when he entered into those arrangements, neither he nor his wife understood, nor were they advised in ‘clear, plain, or comprehensible terms, that the transaction would operate as, or be enforced as, a mortgage over their family home’; • at the time the loan was entered into the appellant and his wife were experiencing severe financial hardship and had recently lost their mothers; • the appellant was suffering from health difficulties; • these circumstances were known, ‘or ought to have been known’, to the intermediaries and lenders involved in the transaction; and • the appellant did not understand that the loan documentation would expose him personally to the loss of his home. 85 A contention that the appellant did not fully understand the effect of the arrangements into which he entered, even if accepted, would not avail him in the absence of relevant unconscionability. He does not appear to assert non est factum in relation to the revised loan documents including the guarantee or the Mortgage. Subject to any rights he may have in equity or under statute, he is bound by the documents he signed.43 86 The respondent contends that there is no utility in receiving further evidence relating to the question of unconscionability, and, if that evidence is received, no 42 Brackenridge v Bendigo & Adelaide Bank Ltd [2021] SASCA 129 at [124]-[125] (Lovell, Livesey and Bleby JJA). 43 Toll (FGCT) Pty Ltd v Alphapharm Pty Ltd (2004) 219 CLR 165 at [41]-[45] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ). -- 31 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 30 triable issue about unconscionability. The respondent emphasises the following matters: • there is no satisfactory objective evidence about the appellant’s mental health and the evidence is more consistent with the proposition that any disclosure by the appellant or Mrs Britten of any health issues on the appellant’s part post-dated the entry into the loan and the grant of the Mortgage;44 • the evidence tends to suggest that if any appropriate pressure was applied in relation to the refinancing arrangements, it was pressure applied by the appellant and Mrs Britten to FCFS and the respondent; and • the video of the Zoom call that took place before the ‘draw down’ powerfully demonstrates that the arrangements were carefully explained to the appellant and his wife, that they interacted in a manner which suggested they well understood what was involved and that they had received their own legal advice about the arrangements.45 87 In making good those submissions, my attention was drawn to evidence in support of the following matters: • the original loan with FCFS was serviced for 22 weeks before CJDJ defaulted (in July 2024);46 • a Zoom call occurred in which the appellant and his wife informed FCFS that they had been locked out of their commercial premises and were seeking to relocate. They asserted in this context (contrary to the language of the loan agreement) that they considered that interest was to have been capitalised rather than paid weekly. They requested a further $75,000 be lent to CJDJ for relocation purposes, which would be repaid from the sale of a property and distribution from Mrs Britten’s mother’s estate;47 • by email sent on 23 August 2024, Mr Blackburn of FCFS said that FCFS was not prepared to increase the loan, but would permit a period of three months of capitalised interest;48 44 In this respect, the respondent draws attention to Mrs Britten’s correspondence of 30 Octover 2024 (referred to in DJB 14.11.25) which spoke of recent changed circumstances including the appellant suffering a health crisis. This tends to suggest that any acute health issues had arisen after the refinancing. 45 MFI-A. 46 Maharaj 17.11.25, [12.1]-[12.4]. 47 Maharaj 17.11.25, [12.5]-[12.7]. 48 Maharaj 17.11.25, [12.9]. -- 32 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 31 • Mrs Britten responded the following day saying that the debt would be disputed ‘with the demand that’s served without further notice to you’, being a reference to a statutory demand;49 • on 27 August 2024, Mrs Britten purportedly served a statutory demand on FCFS on behalf of CJDJ.50 The claimed debt proceeded on the basis that previous direct debits were wrongful payments in view of CJDJ’s entitlement to capitalise interest; • Mrs Britten sent emails asserting that time had expired for negotiation and that a liquidator was imminently to be appointed to FCFS. She also said that a winding up proceeding had been lodged in the Supreme Court. She demanded an additional advance of $100,000;51 • it was in those circumstances that the respondent (a related entity of FCFS) agreed to advance the new loan with an additional $60,000 to CJDJ. A deed of settlement was prepared which provided for the withdrawal of the statutory demand;52 • after this exchange, but before the draw down, the recorded Zoom call took place. In the course of that call, the terms are very fully explained and the appellant and Mrs Britten confirmed that they had received legal advice from Mr Sander ‘many times’. Mrs Britten joked ‘I think we just about stayed over there one night’. The appellant and Mrs Britten described the terms as ‘crystal’ clear. They expressed their gratitude to Mr Maharaj; • the loan drawdown occurred in September 2024; and • it was on 30 October 2024 that the respondent was informed about the appellant’s ‘health crisis’ and further funding of $50,000 was sought (and refused).53 88 I viewed the video recording of the Zoom call and formed the impression that the appellant and Mrs Britten understood and agreed to the terms of the refinancing and were not taken advantage of. They asked relevant questions and interacted normally with FCFS’s representatives. The discussion is lengthy and affords a significant opportunity to observe the parties’ interactions. The impression it conveys does not sit comfortably with the appellant’s assertion that during the discussion he was subject to ‘extreme pressure and fear’.54 89 The appellant submitted that: 49 Maharaj 17.11.25, [12.10]. 50 MFI-A. 51 Maharaj 17.11.25, [12.12]-[12.14]. 52 Maharaj 17.11.25, [14]. 53 Maharaj 17.11.25, [20]-[25]. 54 DJB 14.11.25 -- 33 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 32 • in the earlier (unrecorded) Zoom call on 19 August 2024, he and his wife conveyed their financial and other difficulties to the respondent’s representatives (such that they were aware of circumstances giving rise to a special disadvantage); • whilst they were referred to a solicitor (Mr Sander) in relation to the refinancing, he was not independent and never provided ‘any counsel’. According to the appellant’s submission ‘he was basically for ID purposes’; • whatever may appear from the recorded Zoom call, the appellants were ‘coached by Amal Maharaj as to what to say and what not to say’. 90 These assertions are not, on my assessment of the material, properly supported by evidence in admissible or clear form. The second and third propositions are serious and surprising assertions and ought to have been supported by detailed evidence as distinct from conclusory assertion. 91 The material sought to be relied upon is not, when considered in the context of material that the respondent would be permitted to rely on in answer to it, likely to influence my assessment of whether there is a triable issue about whether enforcement of the Mortgage would be unconscionable at general law or by reference to the ASIC Act. I therefore consider it should not be received as ‘further evidence’ on the appeal. In the end, however, that makes little difference because, if I were to receive the evidence and consider it together with the evidence relied upon by the respondent, I would not be persuaded that there was a triable issue of that kind. Disposition 92 My conclusion that the material that the appellant wishes to rely upon would not identify a ‘triable issue’ in relation to the enforceability of the mortgage tends to reinforce the inutility of granting an extension of time within which to appeal against the possession order and the inutility of receiving further evidence going to service. That is because, even if I extend time and receive the evidence going to service and even if, contrary to my expressed view, there is reason to disturb the finding that personal service had been effected, there is not a reasonable prospect that, on a fresh hearing of the possession application, a different outcome would result. 93 For similar reasons, there is no sufficient justification for requiring Mr Newlyn to attend to give evidence. Nor is there a basis to delay disposing of these appeals whilst the respondent (or FCFS) gives discovery in relation to documentation relating to the finance arrangements. 94 For the reasons I have given, I would: • decline to extend time within which to bring the second appeal on the basis that the explanation given for it (that the appellant was entirely unaware of -- 34 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 33 the proceedings before October 2025) cannot be accepted and because the appeal has insufficient prospects of success, making the extension inutile; • refuse leave to appeal because whilst the consequences of refusing leave are significant, the appeal lacks sufficient prospects of success; • conclude that, had an extension of time been granted, and leave given, the appellant should not be permitted to rely on further evidence because it lacks the cogency in all the circumstances to be of influence in the disposition of the appeal. In respect of the material relating to the enforceability of the mortgage, it could have been raised or flagged before the possession order was made. Even if, which I do not accept, personal service was not effected, the hearing date and time were notified to the appellant; • conclude that, had that evidence been received it nevertheless fails to persuade me, when considered together with the respondent’s responding evidence, that service was not effected, or that there is a triable issue with respect to the enforceability of the mortgage; • decline to issue a subpoena to Mr Newlyn; • decline to order further discovery from the respondent or any other party; and • refuse to join any third party to the appellate proceeding. 95 The second appellate proceeding must therefore be dismissed. The first appeal serves no purpose and must also be dismissed. I will hear the parties as to costs. -- 35 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 34 Appendix – Table of relevant affidavits FDN Filed CIV-25-006524 (Original Proceedings) Abbreviation 3 11.06.25 Affidavit of Matthew Blackburn 29.05.25 Blackburn 29.05.25 4 03.07.25 Notice of change of address for service of Britten not filed Affidavit of Cathy Jayne Britten 21.07.25 CJB 21.07.05 5 22.07.25 Affidavit of Tylor Newlyn 22.07.25 Newlyn 22.07.25 6, 7 23.07.25 Possession order made by Costello Aux As J 8 13.08.25 Notice of Acting of David John Britten 10 21.08.25 Affidavit of Cathy Jayne Britten 12.08.25 CJB 21.08.25 12 18.09.25 Affidavit of Bianca Josephine Quan 18.09.25 Quan 18.09.25 14 18.09.25 Affidavit of Cathy Jayne Britten 09.09.25 CJB 09.09.25 16 19.09.25 Application to set aside refused by Bochner As J 18 23.09.25 Affidavit of Karen Koleski 23.09.25 Koleski 23.09.25 19 23.09.25 Affidavit of Tylor Newlyn 23.09.25 Newlyn 23.09.25 24 30.10.25 Affidavit of Cathy Jayne Britten 21.10.25 CJB 21.10.25 25 04.11.25 Stay refused by Bochner As J 30 10.12.25 Affidavit of David John Britten 09.12.25 DJB 09.12.25 33 09.12.25 Affidavit of Cathy Jayne Britten 09.12.25 CJB 09.12.25 35 16.12.25 Affidavit of David John Britten 16.12.25 DJB 16.12.25 41 07.01.26 Affidavit of David John Britten 07.01.26 (also filed in CIV-25-013337) DJB 07.01.26 A FDN Filed CIV-25-013337 (first appeal) Abbreviation 3 07.11.25 Affidavit of David John Britten 06.11.25 DJB 06.11.25 6 07.11.25 Affidavit of Bianca Josephine Quan 07.11.25 Quan 07.11.25 9 10.11.25 Affidavit of David John Britten 10.11.25 DJB 10.11.25 11 12.11.25 Affidavit of Alice Mary McInerney Taylor 12.11.25 Taylor 12.11.25 15 12.11.25 Affidavit of Bianca Josephine Quan 12.11.25 Quan 12.11.25 16 15.11.25 Affidavit of Bianca Josephine Quan 17.11.25 Quan 17.11.25 17 19 17.11.25 Affidavit of David John Britten 14.11.25 (filed twice) DJB 14.11.25 20 17.11.25 Affidavit of Amal Maharaj Maharaj 17.11.25 24 19.11.25 Affidavit of Cathy Jayne Britten 18.11.25 CJB 18.11.25 28 22.12.25 Affidavit of David John Britten 19.12.25 (also filed in CIV-25-013734) DJB 19.12.25 31 17.12.25 Affidavit of David John Britten 17.12.25 (also filed in CIV-25-013734) DJB 17.12.25 37 12.01.26 Affidavit of David John Britten 12.01.26 (also filed in CIV-25-013734) DJB 12.01.26 39 07.01.26 Affidavit of David John Britten 07.01.25 DJB 07.01.26 B -- 36 of 37 -- [2026] SASC 2 B Doyle J 35 (also filed in CIV-25-013734) 40 07.01.26 Affidavit of David John Britten 07.01.25 (also filed in CIV-25-006524 and CIV-24- 013734) DJB 07.01.26 A FDN Filed CIV-25-013734 (second appeal) Abbreviation 2 14.11.25 Affidavit of David John Britten 11.11.25 DJB 11.11.25 4 05.12.25 Affidavit of David John Britten 04.12.25 DJB 04.12.25 8 22.12.25 Affidavit of David John Britten 19.12.25 (also filed in CIV-25-013337) DJB 19.12.25 10 23.12.25 Affidavit of David John Britten 17.12.25 (also filed in CIV-25-013337) DJB 17.12.25 14 12.01.26 Affidavit of David John Britten 12.01.26 (also filed in CIV-25-013337) DJB 12.01.26 16 07.01.26 Affidavit of David John Britten 07.01.25 (also filed in CIV-25-013337) DJB 07.01.26 B 17 07.01.26 Affidavit of David John Britten 07.01.25 (also filed in CIV-25-006524 and CIV-25- 013337) DJB 07.01.26 A -- 37 of 37 --