ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v ADAM SEELEY [2026] SASC 5

Applicant: ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) Counsel: MR S O'FLAHERTY - Solicitor: CROWN SOLICITOR (SA) Respondent: ADAM SEELEY Counsel: MR W MARSH - Solicitor: LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSION (SA) Hearing Date/s: 14/01/2026 File No/s: SCCRM-25-048991 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Criminal: Application) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v SEELEY [2026] SASC 5 Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice B Doyle (ex tempore) 14 January 2026 CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - OTHER TYPES OF POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS The respondent is serving a term of imprisonment shortly to expire for offending including aggravated committing theft using force (‘the robbery’) and assaulting a prescribed emergency worker (‘the assault on a police officer’). The applicant has made an application for an extended supervision order (‘ESO’) under the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (‘HRO Act’) which will not be able to be determined prior to the expiry date. In deciding whether an interim supervision order (‘ISO’) should be made the only contested issue was whether the conduct constituting the two offences just mentioned involved the risk of serious harm to a person, so as to bring the respondent within the definition of a ‘high risk offender’. Held, imposing an ISO: 1. the respondent’s conduct comprising the robbery did not involve a risk of serious harm to the victim of that offending; 2. the assault on a police officer involved a risk of serious physical harm to the police officer; 3. the respondent is a ‘high risk offender’; 4. the criteria for the making of an ISO are established and an ISO should be imposed on the terms proposed by the applicant. -- 1 of 12 -- Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) ss 5, 9(1)(b); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 20AA(3), 21, 83D, 137, referred to. Attorney-General (SA) v Gates (2017) 127 SASR 565; Attorney-General (SA) v Gillard [2022] SASC 104; Attorney-General (SA) v Jeffery (2018) 130 SASR 300; Attorney-General (SA) v Kember [2019] SASC 19; Attorney-General (SA) v Laughlin [2019] SASC 105; Attorney-General (SA) v Wells [2025] SASC 113; Attorney-General (SA) v Wen [2025] SASC 113; Attorney-General (SA) v Wikaire (2017) 127 SASR 565; R v Bailey [2012] NSWSC 107; R v Beetham [2014] QCA 131, discussed. -- 2 of 12 -- ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v SEELEY [2026] SASC 5 Criminal – application 1 B DOYLE J (ex tempore): The respondent is serving a term of imprisonment imposed by the District Court for a number of offences including aggravated committing theft using force1 (‘the robbery’) and assaulting a prescribed emergency worker2 (‘the assault on a police officer’) for a period of four years, two months and 24 days. That term will expire on 19 January 2026. 2 Because the Attorney-General’s application for an extended supervision order (‘ESO’) under the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (‘HRO Act’) cannot be resolved before that date, the applicant makes application for an ‘interim supervision order’ (‘ISO’). Issue for determination 3 The main question arising on the application is whether the respondent is in fact a ‘high risk offender’ against whom such an order can be made, within the meaning of s 5 of the HRO Act, on the footing that he is a ‘serious violent offender’ who was sentenced to a period of imprisonment in respect of a ‘serious offence of violence’. 4 The expression ‘serious offence of violence’ is defined to have the same meaning as in s 83D(1) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (‘CLCA’). The issue is whether either the robbery or the assault on a police officer comprises a ‘serious offence of violence’. There is no dispute that both are indictable offences punishable by imprisonment for a term of five years or more, and that both are therefore ‘serious offences’ within the meaning of s 83D. The real question is whether these were serious offences ‘where the conduct constituting the offence involves—(a) the death of, or serious harm to, a person or risk of the death of, or serious harm to, a person …’. 5 ‘Serious harm’ for these purposes is defined by s 21 of the CLCA to mean: (a) harm that endangers a person’s life; or (b) harm that consists of, or results in, serious and protracted impairment of a physical or mental function; or (c) harm that consists of, or results in, serious disfigurement. 6 It is not contended that the victim of either offence actually suffered serious harm. The question for determination is whether in either case the respondent’s 1 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (‘CLCA’), s 137. 2 CLCA, s 20AA(3). -- 3 of 12 -- [2026] SASC 5 B Doyle J 2 conduct constituting the offending involved a risk of serious harm to the victims of the offending. Risk of serious harm 7 The risk must be more than fanciful, theoretical or remote. It must be a real risk but it need not be substantial.3 In considering whether the conduct involved such a risk, as Nicholson J observed in Attorney-General (SA) v Wikaire:4 the focus of the enquiry is not to be confined to the consequences of the offending conduct but extends to the nature or character of the offending conduct itself. The definition of ‘serious offence of violence’ requires the finding of a ‘serious offence’ but one ‘where the conduct constituting the offence’ is of a particular character. … Whether or not an offender has, in fact, caused serious harm (physical or mental) is an important consideration but whether or not such a person poses the risk of causing such serious harm is no less important a consideration. In a case such as the present, whether or not the conduct constituting the offence, in fact, caused serious harm to another may well have been a matter of happenstance dependent on a number of variables including, in particular, how robust the particular victim in question might have been. However, this is not to deny the intrinsic risks to be associated with conduct in the nature of that engaged in by an offender who commits an aggravated robbery such as in the present case. 8 The inquiry is obviously fact-sensitive, but it is instructive briefly to mention some of the decisions canvassed in argument before me today.5 9 In Wikaire, Nicholson J considered that the respondent’s conduct in jumping over the counter of a suburban IGA supermarket holding a screwdriver and demanding money from the sales assistant, ‘particularly, when under the influence of alcohol or an illegal drug’ (given the potential for disinhibition and reduced physical control) involved an obvious risk that a particular victim of the offence might suffer psychiatric sequelae sufficient to give rise to a serious and protracted impairment of mental function. He considered such potential sequelae to include conditions such as post-traumatic stress disorder or an adjustment disorder with anxiety state.6 10 In Attorney-General (SA) v Jeffery,7 the respondent robbed a supermarket using a tree branch which he lifted over his head in a threatening manner demanding money and cigarettes. He waved the stick over the first victim’s head and hit the till with the stick before swinging the stick at the second victim and hitting him in the face. He hit that victim again and the victim fended off further 3 Attorney-General (SA) v Jeffery (2018) 130 SASR 300 at [17] (Hinton J), Attorney-General (SA) v Laughlin [2019] SASC 105 at [18] (Doyle J), Attorney-General (SA) v Wen [2025] SASC 113 at [21] (Kimber J). 4 (2017) 127 SASR 565 at [14]. 5 Attorney-General (SA) v Gillard [2022] SASC 104 at [34] (Kimber J), Attorney-General (SA) v Wen [2025] SASC 113 at [35] (Kimber J). 6 (2017) 127 SASR 565 at [17]. 7 (2018) 130 SASR 300. -- 4 of 12 -- [2026] SASC 5 B Doyle J 3 blows with a broom. The second victim received a scratch and bruise to his forearm and cut to the inside of his upper lip. The first victim said she was worried, angry, stressed out and had become easily irritated. Her sleep had been affected. The second victim described stress, worry, irritation, anger, difficulty with sleep and flashbacks. Hinton J considered that the first victim was vulnerable because she did not know what the respondent was capable of and feared he would hurt her. Reasoning with him did not appear to be an option. The respondent yelled aggressively and continually. His Honour said it could not be doubted that a stick, one to one and a half metres in length and approximately five centimetres thick, could be used by a person to cause great physical injury to another who was unarmed, and used to do so quickly. It was deliberately employed as a weapon with the intention that the first and later second victim would believe it would be used to hurt them if required. Justice Hinton concluded:8 In my view Mr Jeffery’s conduct cannot be considered materially different to that in Wikaire. I do not think the choice of weapon, which is the primary difference between this case and Wikaire, is significant. What must be borne in mind is all of the circumstances in which Mr Jeffery waved the stick above Ms Truong’s head. Bearing those circumstances in mind, as in Wikaire, I consider Mr Jeffery’s conduct to involve a risk that the victim might suffer “significant psychiatric sequelae sufficient to give rise to serious and protracted impairment of a mental function, that is, serious harm”. I agree that such sequelae could include post-traumatic stress disorder or an adjustment disorder with anxiety state. Either disorder may not be permanent, but permanence is not required. The fear and anxiety that results from being a victim of an aggravated robbery may require ongoing medication, may mean a protracted period off work, a necessary change to duties, and often a change of job or career. The pressures associated with these changes in life then have a ripple effect. I do not doubt that conduct such as that engaged in by Mr Jeffery carries with it a risk of mental harm that can result in serious and protracted impairment of physical and/or mental functioning. It was not suggested that the Court could not arrive at such conclusion relying upon its own understanding of common human experience. For these reasons I concluded that Mr Jeffery was a high risk offender. 11 In Attorney-General (SA) v Laughlin,9 the respondent approached the counter of a service station repeatedly shouting ‘give me the money’, her face partially covered, and holding a syringe. Identifying a point of distinction from an earlier decision in Attorney-General (SA) v Gates,10 Doyle J emphasised that the respondent in the case before him not only produced the syringe and pointed it in a threatening matter whilst demanding money, but attempted to jump the counter. Whilst unsuccessful, that conduct demonstrated a preparedness to close quarters.11 The conduct was therefore considered to be ‘dynamic’, similar to that in Wikaire. In concluding that the requisite risk was demonstrated, Doyle J said:12 8 (2018) 130 SASR 300 at [63]-[65]. 9 [2019] SASC 105. 10 (2017) 127 SASR 565. 11 [2019] SASC 105 at [20]. 12 [2019] SASC 105 at [22]-[26]. -- 5 of 12 -- [2026] SASC 5 B Doyle J 4 I accept that in this case there is no evidence that the victim in fact suffered any mental or psychiatric sequelae and, in that sense, the case is factually distinguishable from Wikaire. I also accept that there is no evidence of any obvious vulnerability on the part of the victim, unlike the situation before Kelly J in the Kember case. However, in my view, these factual distinctions are of little significance in circumstances where the application is one based upon the degree of risk associated with the relevant conduct. I accept that the assessment of risk must be approached on the basis that the victim was a person without any particular known vulnerability and so might be assumed to be a person of normal fortitude. But, in my view, that still means the matter is to be approached with some flexibility and allowing for some range of susceptibility, albeit perhaps excluding the most vulnerable and the most robust of persons on the basis that that would involve dealing with risks which are of a more theoretical nature rather than those which the section is intended to capture. Being the victim of any armed robbery would be an extremely confronting and frightening experience. I do not think the choice of weapon makes much difference in this respect. But to the extent it does, the threatened use of a syringe, with the obvious and intended threat of the risk of infection with some serious communicable disease, is a particularly confronting choice of weapon. I am satisfied that an armed robbery, or attempted armed robbery, involving the production of a syringe and an attempt to jump the counter (which suggests a preparedness to close quarters and deploy the syringe), gave rise to a risk that the victim might suffer significant psychiatric sequelae sufficient to cause a serious and protracted impairment of a mental function within the terms of the definition of serious harm. I note that in this case the respondent contends that the victim was able to retreat to a secure area. But, in my view, it is significant that the victim was not in this secure place at the time of the initial brandishing of the syringe and the threats or demands to hand over the money, or indeed when the respondent commenced his attempt to jump the counter. In my view, the fact that the victim was ultimately successful in retreating to a safe area is of little significance in assessing the risk of serious psychiatric harm, given that the victim was initially exposed in the way I have described. I emphasise that in the conclusions I have reached I have not overlooked the need to have regard to both the degree of risk of harm, but also the nature of the harm in question and, in particular, the requirement that the mental harm be of a serious and protracted impairment of a mental function. For these reasons, I am satisfied that the respondent is a high risk offender. 12 In Attorney-General (SA) v Kember,13 the respondent threatened and robbed an 84 year old victim who was using a walking frame, involving himself in a struggle such that the elderly man fell to the ground. Given the vulnerability of the victim, it is unsurprising that Kelly J was satisfied that the conduct involved the relevant risk. 13 In respect of matters involving assault or physical threats (absent any theft), I will briefly mention three decisions canvassed in argument: Attorney-General 13 [2019] SASC 19. -- 6 of 12 -- [2026] SASC 5 B Doyle J 5 (SA) v Wells,14 Attorney-General (SA) v Gillard15 and Attorney-General (SA) v Wen.16 14 In Wells, the victim had been threatened and tied up before being assaulted again. The respondent punched the victim to the head whilst he was in that restrained state. Naturally, the victim could not defend himself or in any way cushion the blow. Because of assaults committed before and after by others, it was not possible to identify the harm caused by the respondent’s punch. Hinton J said:17 In my view the delivery of a blow to the head of an individual who is restrained, such that the head must absorb the full impact of the blow, carries with it a risk of serious harm. I feel fortified in my conclusion by recent experience here and interstate regarding the serious injuries and sometimes death that may be caused by one punch of even moderate force delivered to the unsuspecting, unprepared victim. I have had the benefit of seeing Mr Wells in the dock. Dr O’Brien described him as burly. That description is apt. It is apparent from his size and stature that any punch that he dispatched would carry quite some force. 15 In Gillard, the respondent had been in a heated argument with the victim following which he made contact with an open hand to the side of the victim’s head, causing the victim to fall to the floor. The sentencing judge made clear the hit was with a hand and not a fist. It was a single blow. The victim suffered injuries to the right eye cavity. Kimber J was not prepared to find that this was caused directly by the blow. He was, however, satisfied the blow was a forceful one of sufficient force to cause the victim to fall to the ground.18 It was not argued that the blow in fact caused serious or protracted physical harm. 16 The submission made by the Attorney-General was that the conduct consisted of or resulted in a serious and protracted impairment of mental function, on the basis the victim said he lived in constant fear of being assaulted again. Kimber J was not persuaded that this amounted to a serious and protracted impairment of mental function. 17 Turning to whether the conduct involved a risk of serious and protracted impairment of a physical or mental function, Kimber J accepted that the head can be a vulnerable part of the body and that it was notorious that falls to the ground may cause very serious injury if the head strikes the ground first, but emphasised the need to return to the conduct. He was only satisfied the conduct was a forceful blow to the side of the head with an open hand. He could not quantify the degree of force used, other than to say it was sufficient to cause the victim to fall to the ground. Kimber J was satisfied the conduct involved a theoretical risk of serious and protracted impairment of a physical function, but he was not satisfied it was 14 [2017] SASC 149. 15 [2022] SASC 104. 16 [2025] SASC 113. 17 [2017] SASC 149 at [44]. 18 [2022] SASC 104 at [18]-[19]. -- 7 of 12 -- [2026] SASC 5 B Doyle J 6 greater than that. It was not real or recognisable in the requisite sense.19 Nor was he satisfied it carried the requisite risk of serious mental harm.20 18 In Wen, the respondent, a female, presented an oyster knife to a police officer in an interview room. The officer told the respondent to put it down twice but she did not do so. The officer was able to leave the room and secure the respondent in the room. There was little detail about the configuration of the room when the knife was presented and the evidence did not suggest more than temporary fear on the part of the officer. 19 Applying common human experience in the making of an evaluative judgment,21 Kimber J observed that although the room was likely of a modest size and the respondent declined to put the knife down when asked, there was nothing in the evidence about the description of the knife, any suggestion of difficulty encountered by the officer in leaving the room, nor a precise description of the passage of time involved.22 His Honour said that nothing was known about the victim other than that they were a police officer and the conduct of the respondent caused them fear. It followed that nothing was known about whether the victim was particularly vulnerable. He said:23 Given their work, it is sadly well known that police officers can experience serious illness. Nevertheless, I am not satisfied that it is appropriate to assume that a police officer is any more, or less, likely to experience a serious and protracted impairment of a mental function after an incident such as this compared to a person not engaged in such work. 20 After referring to a number of decisions of the Court about the approach to be taken to the flexibility and range of susceptibility applied to a person assumed to be of normal fortitude,24 Kimber J said that:25 whether the Attorney-General has met his burden must be decided bearing in mind the facts of this case. That a weapon was produced, and was pointed at the victim; that the respondent can be assumed to have been behaving erratically given her conduct; that the victim experienced fear; and that it is known that victims who are subject to violent conduct can sometimes experience impairment of a mental function which is serious and protracted are all matters which weigh in favour of the outcome urged by the Attorney-General. At the same time, nothing is known about the weapon other than that it is described as an oyster knife; nothing is known about how long the victim was in the room with the respondent before being able to leave; there is nothing to suggest that the victim had any difficulty in leaving the room; there is nothing to suggest that the victim experienced anything more than fear; nothing to suggest that the feeling of fear was anything other than temporary; and the victim is not to be treated as being in the class of persons who may be the most vulnerable. 19 [2022] SASC 104 at [29]. 20 [2022] SASC 104 at [34]. 21 [2025] SASC 113 at [21]. 22 [2025] SASC 113 at [24]. 23 [2025] SASC 113 at [32]. 24 [2025] SASC 113 at [33]-[35]. 25 [2025] SASC 113 at [36]-[37]. -- 8 of 12 -- [2026] SASC 5 B Doyle J 7 As mentioned, it is the case that persons subject to violence can suffer an impairment of a mental function which is serious and protracted. Further, as mentioned, given the respondent has a personality disorder and given her past conduct, there is a very real risk that in the future she will act in a way which poses the risk to others. It may be that if more were known about the offence, that the jurisdiction to make the order would exist. Nevertheless, on the material before me, and as I must focus on the conduct constituting the offence, on the balance of probabilities, I am not satisfied that the risk of an impairment of a mental function, which was both serious and protracted, was anything more than remote. 21 The applicant in the present case contends that each of the robbery and the assault of a police officer involved both a risk of serious physical harm and a risk of serious mental harm. In making those submissions, the applicant’s counsel appropriately acknowledged the relatively sparse factual material before the Court. As Kimber J emphasised in Wen, that may make the discharge of the Attorney- General’s onus difficult. The robbery 22 In sentencing the respondent in respect of the robbery, Barklay DCJ said: On 24 April 2021, at about 11.40 pm, you entered an On the Run service station at Para Hills, armed with a red trolley pole which was approximately 50 to 60 cm in length. You approached the sales assistant, and whilst holding the pole in the victim’s direction you demanded that he give you money and told him ‘Don’t leave any notes or I’ll hit you’. You also demanded two packets of cigarettes and a lighter. You left on foot. 23 There is no evidence before me about the precise configuration of the service station, the impact if any of the offending on the victim or any further details that might shed more light on the way in which the respondent’s conduct would have been perceived by the victim. Although the sentencing remarks identify the respondent as alcoholic and with some behavioural deficits, and although it may be inferred that alcohol or illicit drugs were likely involved in the offending, it is not open to infer that the victim would have appreciated those matters. 24 Dealing first with the risk of serious physical harm, the applicant submitted that although no actual physical harm was caused, what is required is an objective assessment of the risk of relevant harm being caused. The applicant submitted in that respect that, the threat of physical harm having been made, it may well have been acted upon had the assistant not complied. 25 I would not accept that submission. In my respectful view, whilst one looks to the risk rather than the actuality of physical or mental harm, that involves assessing the range of non-speculative and realistic outcomes apt to result from the actual offending conduct of the respondent. The respondent did not in fact act on any threat he made. In my view, to include (within the risk assessment concerning physical harm) outcomes of the respondent engaging in further and distinctly different criminal conduct to that which he is proven to have committed would be to untether the risk assessment from the criminal conduct which the language of the definition provisions identifies as the anchor for the inquiry. -- 9 of 12 -- [2026] SASC 5 B Doyle J 8 26 Turning then to the risk of mental harm, in my view the facts and evidence before the Court distinguish this matter from those robbery cases in which a finding of a risk of serious mental harm has been made. 27 First, the weapon used by the respondent was not as inherently dangerous as a gun, a knife or even the syringe brandished in Laughlin. Whilst there is little detail given in relation to the trolley pole, its colour and length suggest it is likely to have been a heavy plastic or perhaps light metal object. Undoubtedly, a weapon of that kind could cause serious physical harm, leading to the kind of fear and apprehension that might cause serious mental harm, but whether that kind of apprehension was a real possibility in the present case would depend upon further facts and circumstances such as the likelihood of the assistant perceiving that the respondent might be in a position to inflict heavy or repeated blows using the object in question. 28 There was no evidence before me as to the configuration of the service station nor as to whether others who might have been able to assist were in the vicinity. However, it must be a real possibility that, at least by the time the victim was being directed to empty the till, the victim was behind a counter which could not readily have been jumped or walked around and that the victim may have had access to a secure room behind the till. I cannot make positive findings to that effect, but the absence of evidence in this case operates to the disadvantage of the party carrying the onus. 29 Similarly, it is possible that service station attendants will have had some training about how to protect themselves and safely retreat in the event of an attempt by an offender to move over or behind the service counter. Whilst I could not make a finding to that effect on balance, the question is whether I can make a finding on balance that there is a more than speculative or remote risk that the respondent’s conduct as described above would cause not just fear, shock and a period of anxiety, but a serious and protracted impairment of mental function. 30 The facts and circumstances in Jeffery are clearly distinguishable in this respect as the respondent had already come sufficiently close to the victim as to land blows on them. Accordingly, whilst the weapon in that case may have been no more dangerous than the pole used here, it had in fact been deployed in that case. The respondent on the facts before me held and pointed the pole but had not brandished or swung it in a menacing way, much less achieved contact. Wikaire may similarly be distinguished. The victim in that case was facing an apparently intoxicated or drug-affected offender who had jumped the counter. 31 I am not satisfied that the robbery was a ‘serious offence of violence’ in the required sense. The assault on the police officer 32 In sentencing the respondent in relation to the assault, Barklay DCJ said: -- 10 of 12 -- [2026] SASC 5 B Doyle J 9 … on 10 October 2021, police were tasked to attend McDonald’s on Hindley Street because you were refusing to leave the premises. When police arrived you were leaning on a counter top apparently asleep. When police woke you up and told you that you were required to leave you became aggressive and uncooperative. When the police officer attempted to escort you outside the premises you resisted and threw up your arms and grabbed hold of the police officer. You were restrained by the police officer and whilst he attempted to put you on the ground you punched him once in the face with a clenched fist. The punch forms the basis of the assault emergency worker charge. 33 The judge later described the offending as ‘relatively serious’ and as demonstrating a ‘complete lack of regard for authority’, but those undoubtedly justified descriptions shed limited light on the precise mechanics of the assault. 34 Emphasising the well-known potential for a single blow to cause real and lasting harm to a victim,26 the applicant submits that the respondent’s conduct comprising the offence of assault involved a serious risk both of physical and mental harm. 35 The respondent, whilst acknowledging the theoretical risk associated with a single blow, emphasises that the sentencing remarks are not explicit as to the degree of force used and submits that, in circumstances where there is no evidence of actual injury caused to the officer, I cannot be satisfied that there was a non- speculative risk of serious physical harm. With respect to the risk of mental harm, the respondent submits that I should not proceed on the basis that the police officer was a member of a particularly vulnerable class. I agree with that submission and with the observations made about that topic by Kimber J in Wen. 36 In relation to the risk of physical harm, I accept that the risk of a single blow causing serious and protracted physical impairment must depend upon the nature of the blow. It is true that the remarks do not reveal, and no further evidence has been led to establish, whether or not the blow was glancing in its impact. However, what is known is that the blow was with a closed fist to the officer’s face, and that it was effected whilst the officer was attempting to take the respondent to the ground. 37 Unlike an open-handed blow to the side of a head, of the kind described in Gillard, it seems to me that closed-fist punches to the face are likely to admit of a narrower range (or distribution) of force and intensity. Putting play fights or horseplay to one side, a punch to the face is not commonly delivered half- heartedly. 38 That is not to say that the results of an intended punch to the face may not include a glancing blow (because the victim turns their face, slightly diverts the direction of the punch, or for some other reason) and it is not to say that the force actually exerted will always be such as to be capable of causing serious and non- transitory damage. But in my view, what must be assessed is whether in 26 See, in other contexts, R v Beetham [2014] QCA 131 at [20] (McMurdo P, Muir JA and Douglas J agreeing), R v Bailey [2012] NSWSC 107 at [111] (RA Hulme J). -- 11 of 12 -- [2026] SASC 5 B Doyle J 10 intentionally punching the officer in the face with a closed fist in the manner that he did, the respondent engaged in conduct that involved a real and not remote risk of harm of the requisite kind. 39 I accept that this case is not as clear cut as Wells, where the victim was restrained and the respondent was observed to be burly. But the respondent appears to be a person of at least average strength and agility, and his punch was evidently sufficiently swift as to substantially penetrate or by-pass any defensive manoeuvre the police officer was able to make. It can be assumed the blow did not in fact cause serious and protracted harm but I consider there was a non- speculative prospect that it could have. In those circumstances, and whilst the matter is relatively finely balanced, I conclude that the respondent’s conduct involved a risk of serious physical harm. 40 That makes it unnecessary to consider whether the offending also involved a risk of serious mental harm. I have some reservations about that, but I need not pursue and resolve that question. Whether an ISO should be imposed 41 The respondent has not advanced submissions in opposition to the proposition that he is a person who poses an appreciable risk to the safety of the community if not supervised. 42 All that needs to be decided at this juncture is whether the matters alleged in the material supporting the application would, if proved, justify the making of an extended supervision order.27 I am satisfied of that requirement having regard to what that material discloses about the respondent’s history of violent offending, alcohol and drug use and the risk assessments made in respect of him. Whether an ESO should ultimately be made is a question for another day. 43 The terms of the interim supervision order will be as proposed. They entail electronic monitoring and a curfew, subject to the usual exceptions, between 9.00 pm and 6.00 am. 27 HRO Act, s 9(1)(b). -- 12 of 12 --