AMELIA LOUISE MICHAILESCU v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2026] SASC 8

On Appeal from MAGISTRATES COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (MAGISTRATE KLEINIG) [2025] SAMC 171 Appellant: AMELIA LOUISE MICHAILESCU Counsel: MR W MICKAN - Solicitor: CALDICOTT & ISAACS Respondent: COMMISSIONER OF POLICE Counsel: MS ND BOSMAN - Solicitor: CROWN SOLICITOR (SA) Hearing Date/s: 17/12/2025 File No/s: SCCRM-25-037067 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Magistrates Appeal: Criminal) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. MICHAILESCU v POLICE [2026] SASC 8 Judgment of the Honourable Justice Bampton 5 February 2026 MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT TRAFFIC LAW - OFFENCES - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - TURNING OFFENCES - OTHER TURNING OFFENCES TRAFFIC LAW - LICENSING OF DRIVERS - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - DISQUALIFICATION, CANCELLATION OR SUSPENSION OF LICENCES - CONVICTIONS OF TRAFFIC OFFENCES RELATING TO OTHER MATTERS - DEMERIT POINTS The appellant pleaded guilty to the offence of making a U-turn at traffic lights without a U-turn permitted sign contrary to r 40 of the Australian Road Rules – where the appellant followed GPS instructions when completing the U-turn – where appellant applied pursuant to s 98B(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) to the sentencing Magistrate for a reduction in demerit points on the basis that proper cause existed – where the Magistrate dismissed the application – whether the Magistrate erred in failing to find that proper cause existed. Held: 1. Time within which to bring the appeal is extended to 10 September 2025. 2. The appellant’s reliance on the GPS device, the short duration of the U-turn, the light traffic conditions, and the absence of embarrassment to other road users does not render the offence atypical or amount to other proper cause pursuant to s 98B(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA). 3. It was reasonably open to the Magistrate to dismiss the application for reduction of demerit points. -- 1 of 8 -- 4. Appeal dismissed. Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) ss 98B, 98BC, 98BE; Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA); Australian Road Rules (SA) r 40; Road Traffic (Miscellaneous) Regulations 2014 (SA); Motor Vehicles Regulations 2010 (SA), referred to. Commissioner of Police v Ellis [2024] SASC 87; Muto-Henderson v Police [2017] SASC 139; Bialobrzeski v Police [2016] SASC 99, considered. -- 2 of 8 -- MICHAILESCU v POLICE [2026] SASC 8 Magistrates Appeal: Criminal 1 BAMPTON J: On 9 July 2025, Amelia Michailescu pleaded guilty to the offence of making a U-turn at traffic lights without a U-turn permitted sign contrary to r 40 of the Australian Road Rules (“the ARR”). The maximum penalty for this offence is $4501 and two demerit points.2 At the sentencing hearing on 4 August 2025, no conviction was recorded, and Ms Michailescu was fined $100. The Magistrate refused Ms Michailescu’s application pursuant to s 98B(4) of the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) (“the MVA”) to reduce the demerit points prescribed by the Motor Vehicles Regulations 2010 (SA) pursuant to s 98B(1) of the MVA (“the application”). As a consequence, Ms Michailescu incurred two demerit points. 2 Ms Michailescu now appeals that refusal. The appeal is out of time. As the respondent does not oppose an extension, I extend the time to appeal to 10 September 2025. Ms Michailescu’s evidence 3 The Magistrate accepted the evidence of Ms Michailescu given by way of affidavit and confirmed on oath as detailed in her Honour’s reasons for refusing the application as follows: • On 4 August 2024 following a football game, [Ms Michailescu] was driving home and was using a GPS navigation system. • [Ms Michailescu] realised that her car was low on fuel and she stopped in a nearby petrol station. • After refuelling, the GPS re-calculated her route and the route that was proposed by the GPS involved doing a U-turn at upcoming traffic lights. • Ms Michailescu followed the GPS instructions and completed the U-turn. • There was no embarrassment caused to any other vehicle. Traffic was light at the time. • However, police pulled her over and issued an expiation notice for making a U-turn at traffic lights. 4 The Magistrate recorded that the offending U-turn (“the U-turn”) occurred on a Sunday evening and therefore was not at a time when there was busy traffic around. The U-turn was performed at a time the lights were green for 1 Road Traffic (Miscellaneous) Regulations 2014 (SA), Schedule 4, Part 3. 2 Motor Vehicles Regulations 2010 (SA), Schedule 4, Part 1, now repealed and replaced by the Motor Vehicles Regulations 2025 (SA) which commenced on 1 September 2025. -- 3 of 8 -- [2026] SASC 8 Bampton J 2 Ms Michailescu’s direction of travel. The Magistrate also recorded that no other road user present was endangered or embarrassed by the execution of the U-turn. 5 No submission was put to the Magistrate that the U-turn was trivial or trifling. 6 The basis for the application was that proper cause pursuant to s 98B(4) of the MVA existed to reduce the number of demerit points, either by one point or to zero, on the grounds that the offending was atypical, it was short-lived, it was done in reliance on a GPS device, and there was no purposeful disobedience to the road rule that was contravened. The Magistrate determined that, having considered all of the circumstances of the U-turn, it was not atypical. Her Honour remarked that she considered it to be a relatively typical instance, albeit not the most serious offending, of its kind. Her Honour stated that the circumstances that make it less serious are not circumstances that make it atypical. Her Honour explained that whilst the U-turn was short-lived, a U-turn at an intersection controlled by traffic lights, will last as long as it takes to undertake the manoeuvre. 7 In relation to Ms Michailescu’s reliance on the GPS device, her Honour pointed out that the rule that a driver may not undertake a U-turn at an intersection in South Australia controlled by traffic lights in the absence of a sign permitting such a manoeuvre is a basic and fundamental rule of traffic control. Her Honour said that it would undermine the purpose of that law and undermine public safety to permit reliance on a GPS device in order to remove the full consequences of executing a U-turn in breach of r 40 of the ARR. Accordingly, her Honour concluded that the discretion to reduce the number of demerit points was not enlivened. Ms Michailescu’s submissions 8 Ms Michailescu submitted that whilst the Magistrate did not refer to her personal circumstances, those circumstances are relevant to the quantification of the reduction in demerit points should she make good her complaint concerning the existence of proper cause. It was submitted that Ms Michailescu is a single mother with two children aged eight and 10. She is the sole carer and provider for both children and does not have family support. She relies on her driver’s licence to transport the children to school, extracurricular activities, and appointments. 9 Ms Michailescu stated that at the time of the offence her driver’s licence was subject to a 12-month good behaviour condition imposed pursuant to s 98BE(2) of the MVA (“the condition”), the completion of which required that she not accrue two or more demerit points within the period of the condition. The condition commenced in March 2023. Other than the offending the subject of this appeal, Ms Michailescu would have successfully completed the condition. It was further submitted that at time of the hearing before the Magistrate, Ms Michailescu was between jobs and had been pursuing employment opportunities as a truck driver. She was scheduled to obtain a licence in July 2025 which would have enabled her to drive trucks. If she accrued more than one demerit point, she would lose her licence and, by extension, it was submitted, her employment opportunity. -- 4 of 8 -- [2026] SASC 8 Bampton J 3 10 Further, it was submitted that Ms Michailescu volunteers with the State Emergency Service (“SES”) and is an active member of that organisation. It was further submitted that she is a crew leader and has engaged in a number of different courses to develop her skills and become more involved in the SES. Obtaining a truck licence would also enable her to engage in operational SES roles requiring the use of heavy vehicles. 11 It was pointed out that pursuant to s 98BE(2a) of the MVA, if the person whose driver’s licence is subject to a good behaviour condition breaches the good behaviour condition, they will become liable to disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence for twice the period for which the disqualification would have applied under s 98BC. Section 98B(4) 12 Section 98B(4) of the MVA prescribes: (4) If a court by which a person is convicted of an offence is satisfied by evidence given on oath forthwith on conviction that the offence is trifling, or that any other proper cause exists, it may order that a reduced number of demerit points, or no demerit points, are incurred by the person in respect of that offence. 13 In considering the proper cause test in Commissioner of Police v Ellis (“Ellis”), Stanley J stated:3 It can be seen that the proper cause test is the first stage of a two-stage process. The proper cause test must be satisfied in order to overcome the threshold for the exercise of the Court’s discretion to reduce demerit points. 14 In determining whether any other proper cause exists, I may only take into account matters that relate to the circumstances of the U-turn and any such circumstances relating to the U-turn must be such as to distinguish it from the more serious or even typical breaches, so as to render it in practical terms a lesser offence. If proper cause does exist, I may exercise a discretion considering all the relevant factors and decide to order a reduction of demerit points or that no demerit points are incurred. It is well-established that the personal circumstances of Ms Michailescu do not provide a proper basis for proper cause to be established. It is only the circumstances of the driving in question that are to be taken into account when assessing if there is proper cause to reduce the demerit points. 15 Ms Michailescu referred to the decision of Blue J in Muto-Henderson v Police,4 and submitted the focus is on features which, whilst not trifling, demonstrate that the conduct is sufficiently atypical or of a lesser degree of seriousness when compared to the typical example of the offence. It was submitted in this way, the Court is considering a person’s conduct against a notional, unstated, comparator, whose conduct amounts to a typical offence or an offence of an ordinary level of seriousness. It was submitted that in this connection it is 3 [2024] SASC 87 at [15]. 4 [2017] SASC 139 at [15]-[16]. -- 5 of 8 -- [2026] SASC 8 Bampton J 4 important not to view proper cause as a spectrum populated by a point of seriousness or typicalness that the offending must fall below to conclude that proper cause exists. It was submitted that a number of objective features are relevant to the existence of proper cause, including the traffic being light, there being no danger posed to others, the conduct being momentary or fleeting, the non-embarrassment of others, the need to exercise a rapid judgement, or whether there is some extenuating explanation. 16 It was argued the Magistrate’s conclusion that proper cause did not exist was wrong and that a contrary finding ought to have been made. It was submitted that the Magistrate erred in her assessment of Ms Michailescu’s reliance upon the GPS device, dismissing that consideration on the basis that it: … would undermine the purpose of [r 40] and undermine public safety to permit reliance on a GPS device in order to remove the full consequences of [a breach of r 40]. It was submitted that this conclusion does not engage with the true relevance of Ms Michailescu’s reliance on the GPS device, namely that it bore upon her state of mind, and therefore went to an assessment of the seriousness of the offending. It was submitted that Ms Michailescu was being sentenced on the basis of an honest but mistaken belief that the U-turn was lawful. As such, her state of mind was directly relevant to her culpability which is less than someone who has actual knowledge of the illegality of their conduct. It was submitted that this erroneous approach impacted the way in which the Magistrate evaluated whether Ms Michailescu’s conduct was typical and did not consider the state of mind of an offender who commits “the paradigm offence”. It was contended that the offender who commits the paradigm offence executes a U-turn with the actual knowledge of the wrongfulness of their conduct, which, it was reiterated, is a qualitatively different and more objectively serious mental state to that held by Ms Michailescu. 17 Further, it was argued that the Magistrate’s assessment of the offending being short-lived was incomplete. It was submitted that this was not limited to the bare mechanics of the U-turn, that is how long it took to complete it. Rather, Ms Michailescu made a rapid decision to conduct the U-turn, having exited the petrol station and with the GPS device recalculating the route. It was submitted that this hampered her ability to assess whether a U-turn was permitted at the intersection and further such a state of affairs is less than a driver who makes a conscious, deliberate, and thought-out decision to execute a U-turn. Further, it was submitted that the typical offence of this nature is one where there is a degree of risk or embarrassment occasioned to other road users and the Magistrate accepted that Ms Michailescu’s conduct did not present a risk of harm to other road users. 18 Accordingly, it was submitted that these matters demonstrate that the premise of the Magistrate’s approach to Ms Michailescu’s use of the GPS device was logically flawed for three reasons. Firstly, it collapses the two-stages of the test in s 98B(4). The question of whether proper cause exists is anterior and conceptually separate to the question of whether discretion ought to be exercised to reduce the -- 6 of 8 -- [2026] SASC 8 Bampton J 5 number of points incurred. Secondly, it was submitted that the existence of proper cause is to be determined by reference to the circumstances of a particular case rather than in abstract, which the Magistrate in effect did by referencing reliance upon GPS devices undermining public safety. Thirdly, it was submitted that Ms Michailescu’s conduct did not, on the Magistrate’s finding, pose a risk to the safety of the public. 19 It was contended that the combined effect of Ms Michailescu’s lesser state of mind, the fact that the traffic was light, that there was no embarrassment or risk posed to other road users, and her conduct was brief, is such that Ms Michailescu’s conduct can properly be characterised as of a lesser degree of seriousness and, thus, not a typical offence. It was argued that this supports the conclusion that the imposition of the prescribed demerit points would result in a disproportionate penalty. The respondent’s submissions 20 As Stanley J explained in Ellis, proper cause “will rarely be found to exist on the basis of a mistaken subjective belief … absent some other unusual factor relevant to the offending driving”.5 I agree with the respondent’s submission that Ms Michailescu’s reliance on the GPS device is analogous to the overreliance on vehicle systems considered in Ellis.6 Such reliance does reflect Ms Michailescu’s state of mind in that she chose to trust and follow GPS technology and was inattentive to the default position prescribed by the ARR. I agree with the submission that compliance with the physical signage is paramount pursuant to the statutory scheme prescribed by the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) and the ARR. The default position in South Australia pursuant to r 40 of the ARR is that a driver must not make a U-turn at an intersection with traffic lights unless there is a U-turn permitted sign at the intersection. 21 I further agree with the submission that making a U-turn at an intersection with traffic lights while relying on a GPS device does not render the offence atypical for the purposes of s 98B(4). GPS guidance provides assistance, not a legal directive, and does not override the law prohibiting U-turns at intersections with traffic lights. As submitted, GPS reliance is foreseeable and does not transform the U-turn into something out of the ordinary, it remains a typical breach of the ARR. 22 A short-lived U-turn at an intersection with traffic lights is still a clear contravention of the ARR and does not become atypical merely because its duration was brief.7 23 I agree with the submission that the U-turn undertaken at an intersection with traffic lights with no signage permitting a U-turn, and the lack of other traffic does 5 [2024] SASC 87 at [23]. 6 Ellis concerned overreliance on the vehicle as a means of detecting speed zone changes. 7 Bialobrzeski v Police [2016] SASC 99; Muto-Henderson v Police [2017] SASC 139. -- 7 of 8 -- [2026] SASC 8 Bampton J 6 not diminish its seriousness or make it out of the ordinary.8 Further, I agree that the Magistrate’s reliance on the GPS device did not collapse the two-stage process prescribed by s 98B(4) as it is relevant to the first stage, that is, whether proper cause exists. Ms Michailescu’s reliance on the GPS device reflected her state of mind, choosing to trust technology over the ARR, but this subjective factor does not amount to proper cause unless unusual objective circumstances exist. 24 Ms Michailescu’s “lesser state of mind”, the short duration of the U-turn, the light traffic conditions, and the absence of embarrassment to other road users do not render the U-turn atypical or amount to “other proper cause” pursuant to s 98B(4). Without more, the threshold required to enliven the discretion has not been met. I agree with the characterisation of Ms Michailescu’s offending as involving a typical breach and none of the matters relied on by her amount to proper cause. 25 I agree with the observation that allowing reductions for demerit points based on subjective factors, like GPS reliance or personal convenience, would erode the deterrent effect of the statutory purpose of the demerit point scheme enacted by Part 3B of the MVA and public safety. 26 It was reasonably open to the Magistrate to dismiss the application for reduction of demerit points. 27 I dismiss the appeal. 8 Muto-Henderson v Police [2017] SASC 139. -- 8 of 8 --