ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v DO [2026] SASC 10

Applicant: ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) Counsel: MS C NOLAN - Solicitor: CROWN SOLICITOR (SA) Respondent: DO Counsel: MR G TRUSCOTT - Solicitor: ABORIGINAL LEGAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT Hearing Date/s: 02/02/0206 File No/s: SCCRM-25-049734, SCCRM-25-049736 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Criminal: Application) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v DO [2026] SASC 10 Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice B Doyle (ex tempore) 2 February 2026 CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - OTHER TYPES OF POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS The respondent was convicted and sentenced for administering a child with a controlled drug, unlawful sexual intercourse by a person in a position of authority and aggravated indecent assault (‘index offending’). He also has a number of previous convictions for violent offending. By originating applications filed on 5 December 2025, the applicant seeks an indefinite detention order pursuant to s 57 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) (‘Sentencing Act’) and, in the alternative, an extended supervision order under s 7 of the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (‘HRO Act’). The respondent’s sentence in respect of the index offending will expire on 6 February 2026. The applicant seeks an interim detention order under s 57(5) of the Sentencing Act. In connection with the indefinite detention order, the applicant proposes to rely, in addition to the index offending, upon as yet unproved allegations of sexual violence committed by the respondent. The respondent resists the making of an interim detention order, emphasising that apart from the index offending the respondent has no convictions for sexual offending, and highlighting limitations in the risk assessments relied upon by the applicant. The respondent also points to the delay in bringing the application. Held, granting an interim detention order: 1. an interim detention order pursuant to s 57(5) of the Sentencing Act will only be appropriate where, in light of the material before the Court, it can be said that there is or will be a real question to be tried as to whether the respondent is incapable of controlling, or unwilling to control, their sexual instincts; -- 1 of 11 -- 2. if so, the Court must then consider whether the risk to the safety of the community makes appropriate the respondent’s detention for a period pending the determination of the indefinite detention order. That inquiry may entail consideration whether an interim supervision order under the HRO Act would provide a sufficient level of protection for the community; 3. if, without proper justification, an application for an indefinite detention order has been delayed until very shortly before the person’s expected release date, with the result that that the period of interim detention will be prolonged, that may militate against making an interim order, but the paramount consideration which guides the power to make an indefinite detention order also guides the discretion whether to make an interim order; 4. if there is a real question to be tried as to whether the respondent is incapable of controlling, or unwilling to control, their sexual instincts, a history of non-sexual violent offending may bear upon whether an interim detention order should be made; 5. it is not necessary to resolve the extent to which the applicant may rely upon unproved allegations of sexual violence on the part of the respondent; 6. the circumstances of the index offending, coupled with the respondent’s unpreparedness to accept responsibility for it, justifies the conclusion that there is a serious question to be tried as to the respondent being unwilling to control his sexual instincts in the relevant sense. The fact that the index offending was committed whilst on parole and was highly likely to result in detection and punishment arguably bespeaks an unwillingness to control his sexual instincts; 7. having regard to the index offending and the prior violent offending, the respondent appears to present an appreciable risk of harm to the safety of the community that, in view of his poor compliance history, would not be satisfactorily managed by the imposition of an interim supervision order; 8. whilst the filing of the application less than two months before the expiry of the sentence was of concern, a partial explanation for that delay has been given, and, in view of the paramount consideration of community safety, the risk posed by the respondent’s release even under strict supervision justifies the making of an interim detention order. Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 49(5), 56(1)(c); Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) s 9; Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) s 23; Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA) s 33F(a); Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) ss 10, 57, 58(1a), 59, pt 3 div 5, referred to. Attorney-General (SA) v Colangelo [2025] SASC 2; Attorney-General (SA) v Gogel [2025] SASC 193; Attorney-General (SA) v GS [2025] SASC 29; Attorney-General (SA) v Kelly [2017] SASC 164; Attorney-General (SA) v Rowe [2025] SASC 189; Attorney-General (SA) v Tipping [2019] SASC 7; Driver v Attorney-General (SA) (2022) 140 SASR 282; Hore v The Queen (2022) 273 CLR 153; McGarry v R (2001) 207 CLR 1; R v Barber [2023] SASC 57; R v Brooker [2024] SASC 84; R v Duell [2021] SASC 146; R v FJM [2015] SASC 99; R v Mountford [2019] SASC 16; R v Stevens [2015] SASC 79; R v Whyte [2006] SASC 56; Thomas v Attorney-General (SA) [2019] SASCFC 21, discussed. -- 2 of 11 -- ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v DO [2026] SASC 10 Criminal 1 B DOYLE J (ex tempore): On 6 February 2026, the respondent’s sentence of imprisonment for offences of administering a child with a controlled drug,1 unlawful sexual intercourse by a person in a position of authority2 and aggravated indecent assault3 will expire. The applicant seeks an indefinite detention order pursuant to s 57 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) (‘Sentencing Act’) and an extended supervision order pursuant to the Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) (‘HRO Act’). Neither application will be able to be determined before that date. The applicant seeks an interim detention order pursuant to s 57(5) of the Sentencing Act and an interim supervision order pursuant to s 9 of the HRO Act. 2 The respondent’s counsel does not have formal instructions in respect of the latter but opposes the former. There is no dispute that the respondent is a person to whom s 57 applies. The issue is whether an interim detention order should be made. 3 The Court may make an interim detention order pursuant to s 57(5) of the Sentencing Act where the Attorney-General has made an application under s 57(3) for an indefinite detention order against a person serving a sentence of imprisonment. The effect of the interim order is that the person is to remain in custody pending the Court’s determination whether to make an indefinite detention order. 4 Section 57(5) specifies no particular criteria for the making of an interim order. Indeed, whilst s 57 identifies the persons who may be made the subject of an indefinite detention order, s 57(7) simply provides that such an order may be made where the Court is satisfied that it is ‘appropriate’. 5 The circumstances in which an indefinite detention order may be ‘appropriate’, and, relatedly, when an interim order should be made pending a determination of that issue, are informed by the text, context and purpose of the section, as confirmed and illuminated by a number of authorities. Indefinite detention orders 6 Division 5 of Part 3 of the Sentencing Act is titled ‘Offenders incapable of controlling, or unwilling to control, sexual instincts’. Section 57(1) provides that a person to whom the section applies will be regarded as unwilling to control sexual instincts if there is a significant risk that the person would, given an 1 Controlled Substances Act 1984 (SA), s 33F(a). 2 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (‘CLCA’), s 49(5). 3 CLCA, s 56(1)(c). -- 3 of 11 -- [2026] SASC 10 B Doyle J 2 opportunity to commit a relevant offence, fail to exercise appropriate control over the person’s sexual instincts. 7 Section 57(6) requires that, before deciding whether an indefinite detention order should be made, the Court must direct that at least two legally qualified medical practitioners inquire into the mental condition of the person and report on whether the person is incapable of controlling, or unwilling to control, the person’s sexual instincts. 8 If an order is made, the person will be detained unless and until the order is discharged under s 58 or the person is released on licence under s 59. In either case the person carries the onus of satisfying the Court either that they are both capable of controlling and willing to control their sexual instincts, or they no longer present an appreciable risk to the safety of the community (whether as individuals or in general) due to their advanced age or permanent infirmity.4 9 In the context of the first of those criteria, consistently with the definition of ‘unwilling’ in s 57(1), the person must demonstrate that there is not a significant risk that they would, given an opportunity to commit a relevant offence, fail to exercise appropriate control of their sexual instincts.5 It has been held that where the application is for release on licence under s 59, that assessment is not made in the abstract. The circumstances in which such an opportunity may arise include the effect on the person’s commitment to appropriate self-control of the conditions of the licence upon which the person’s release would be authorised under s 59.6 That is not to assume that the person will comply with the conditions, or to ignore the possibility that the conditions will not be effective in bolstering the person’s willingness to exercise self-control. It is simply to acknowledge that consideration of the effect of the conditions on the person’s willingness is integral to the determination whether there is not a ‘significant risk’ that the person will fail to exercise appropriate control upon the person’s release on licence.7 10 It follows from the structure of the Division including a circumstance that would justify discharge of the order or release on licence that an order would not be made under s 57(7) unless the Court was satisfied that the person is incapable of controlling, or unwilling to control, their sexual instincts.8 11 In assessing that question, whether by parity of reasoning with the approach to be taken to the inquiry posited by s 59(1a), or as part of the recognition of the 4 Sentencing Act, ss 58(1a) and 59(1a). 5 Hore v The Queen (2022) 273 CLR 153 (‘Hore’) at [51] (Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gordon JJ). 6 Hore at [53]-[67] (Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gordon JJ). 7 Hore at [58] (Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gordon JJ). 8 R v Whyte [2006] SASC 56 at [10] (White J) (in respect of s 23 of the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA), Attorney-General (SA) v Colangelo [2025] SASC 2 (‘Colangelo’) at [93] (McDonald J). -- 4 of 11 -- [2026] SASC 10 B Doyle J 3 self-evidently grave9 (even ‘draconian’) consequence of imposing an order,10 the Court would consider the effect upon the person’s willingness or capacity to control their sexual instincts of any restrictions to which they may be subject if not detained under s 57. Most obviously, that may entail considering the likely effect of any supervision order that would, for some period, likely be imposed on them under the HRO Act if they are not detained.11 An indefinite detention order would not be appropriate if, by reason of the support and monitoring available under a potentially lengthy supervision order or orders, the person would no longer present an appreciable risk to the safety of the community.12 12 The concern of s 57 is community protection, based primarily on an assessment of risk. While conviction of a relevant offence enlivens the discretion, the assessment looks beyond the conviction. Other facts will also inform the risk assessment. But the person is not detained in a punitive response to those facts.13 The purpose of making a detention order under Division 5 is to protect the community from sexual offenders where the risk posed is such that it is inappropriate that they be released, even where they have completed what would otherwise be their period of imprisonment for the offences they have committed. Additionally, it is to ensure that the person receives appropriate treatment, review and supervision.14 Interim detention orders 13 An interim detention order may be made in circumstances where the person’s sentence will expire before the application for an indefinite detention order can be determined. The reports required to be directed pursuant to s 57(6) may not be available for consideration before a person’s sentence has expired. 14 As has been noted, s 57(5) is not prescriptive as to the circumstances in which an interim order is appropriate. As McDonald J has observed:15 The Act does not provide a threshold test or criteria for the making of such an interim order. It follows that the discretion is broad and should be exercised having regard to the purpose of s 57, which is that the paramount consideration is to protect the safety of the community. It is a further relevant consideration that the order is only an interim order which must necessarily be made when the Court has not yet received all of the information needed to make a final determination. 9 Driver v Attorney-General (SA) (2022) 140 SASR 282 (‘Driver’) at [81]-[87] (Kourakis CJ, Doyle and Bleby JJA). See also R v Stevens [2015] SASC 79 (‘Stevens’) at [8] (Bampton J), referring to McGarry v R (2001) 207 CLR 1 at [69] (Kirby J). 10 Thomas v Attorney-General (SA) [2019] SASCFC 21 at [50], [73] (Kourakis CJ, Nicholson and Parker JJ). 11 It may also be appropriate to consider the impact upon the person of the Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA). 12 This proposition was implicit in the analysis of McDonald J in Colangelo and is not disputed by the applicant. 13 Driver at [30] (Kourakis CJ, Doyle and Bleby JJA). 14 R v Hoare [2017] SASC 7 at [64] (Hinton J). 15 Colangelo at [94]. -- 5 of 11 -- [2026] SASC 10 B Doyle J 4 15 In my view, an interim order will only be appropriate where, in light of the material before the Court, it can be said that there is or will be a real question to be tried as to whether the respondent is incapable of controlling, or unwilling to control, their sexual instincts. If so, the Court must then consider whether the risk to the safety of the community makes the respondent’s detention for a period necessary for the determination of the indefinite detention order appropriate. As part of this inquiry, the Court will consider whether and to what extent an interim supervision order under the HRO Act would provide a sufficient level of protection for the community so as to render the respondent’s interim detention inappropriate. 16 Any deprivation of liberty beyond the term of a sentence imposed for a person’s proved wrongdoing must have a strong justification, but the length of time over which the person will need to be detained, and the reasons for that, may bear on the overall discretion to be exercised. 17 If, without proper justification, an application for an indefinite detention order has been delayed until very shortly before the person’s expected release date, with the result that the period of interim detention will be prolonged, that may be a factor to consider. But it needs to be remembered that the paramount consideration which guides the power to make an indefinite detention order is the protection of the safety of the community.16 That consideration must also guide the discretion to make an interim order.17 Accordingly, whilst unexplained delay on the part of the State is not irrelevant,18 it could never obviate the need to consider the risk associated with supervised release. Furthermore, whilst applications may be commenced substantially in advance of the person’s expected release date, the scheme does not require that to be done,19 and there may be good reasons for the assessment required by the section to be made at a time more proximate to the person’s release date and with the benefit of a more complete understanding of their behaviour and any treatment undertaken whilst in custody.20 18 The fact that release on supervision may consume scarce resources for what proves only to be a relatively brief period is not itself a justification for detention (of course, continued detention also involves considerable resources). But in some cases, the disruption and uncertainty associated with establishing appropriate supervision and accommodation arrangements for a short time may militate in favour of the person’s continued detention, particularly where, on a preliminary and necessarily tentative assessment, there appears a real prospect that an indefinite detention order will ultimately be made. In other cases, where the person has readily available suitable accommodation and supports that give a level of 16 Sentencing Act, s 57(8). 17 Colangelo at [110] (McDonald J). 18 Stevens at [8]-[10] (Bampton J), Attorney-General (SA) v Tipping [2019] SASC 7 at [7]-[8] (Kourakis CJ), Attorney-General (SA) v GS [2025] SASC 29 at [47] (Stein J). 19 Colangelo at [100]-[101] (McDonald J). 20 Indeed, an application made at the time of sentencing for the index offending or well prior to the person’s earliest release date may be refused on the basis it is premature: see, eg, R v Mountford [2019] SASC 16 at [61]-[63] (Nicholson J), R v Duell [2021] SASC 146 at [76]-[78] (Bampton J), R v Barber [2023] SASC 57 at [68] (McDonald J), R v Brooker [2024] SASC 84 at [38]-[42] (Kimber J). -- 6 of 11 -- [2026] SASC 10 B Doyle J 5 comfort that a relatively short period of closely supervised release presents an acceptably low risk, the prospect of providing the person a brief period in which to demonstrate that they would respond well to supervision rather than detention may be a reason, additional to the self-evident importance of liberty, to decline to make an interim detention order. 19 Another matter that may bear on the discretion whether to make an interim order is the risk to the community posed not only by the risk that the respondent may not control their sexual instincts, but the risk that they may engage in non- sexual violent offending. Whilst the risk of violent offending alone is insufficient to justify detention under s 57, it may argue in favour of detention where there is a risk that the respondent will engage in sexual offending. 20 To summarise and to state the obvious, the facts and circumstances of the respondent will require close consideration. The evidence 21 The applicant tendered without objection two affidavits sworn by Catherine Nolan on 5 December 2025 and 30 January 2026, together with 38 exhibits. The respondent’s circumstances 22 The respondent is a 55 year old man who, by virtue of the convictions for the offences mentioned earlier, is a person to whom s 57 applies. 23 The index offending, to which I will return, comprise the respondent’s only convictions for sexual offending, but he has a history of other offending and, as will be explained, the applicant proposes to contend that on the application for an extended supervision order the Court may give consideration to evidence of otherwise unproved criminal acts. Prior or other offending history 24 In addition to a number of convictions for drug, dishonesty and property offences, the respondent was convicted of 10 offences of violence between 1995 and 2023. Most relevantly: • on 13 December 2013, he was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault of a domestic partner and their nine year old child. The conduct involved assaulting his partner by hitting and kicking her and assaulting the child by grabbing him by the throat and throwing him to the ground and kicking him. The respondent was sentenced to nine months imprisonment, suspended on his entry into a bond; • on 21 March 2014, the respondent was convicted of three counts of assault causing harm. For that and other offending he was sentenced to 12 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of eight months, suspended on entry -- 7 of 11 -- [2026] SASC 10 B Doyle J 6 into a bond. The offending involved another domestic partner and was attended by methamphetamine use, with the respondent injecting the victim with an unknown controlled drug against her will and systematically assaulting her over a prolonged period; • on 17 February 2017, the respondent was convicted of assault causing harm and sentenced to eight months two weeks imprisonment (cumulative with other sentences imposed for other conduct). The assault involved an unprovoked assault on a victim who was knocked unconscious and suffered other injuries; and • on 12 September 2023, the respondent was convicted of aggravated assault against a child, his seven year old biological son, and was sentenced to seven months imprisonment. The respondent had kicked the boy in his bottom and testicles from behind. It was said to have formed part of a shameful pattern of intimidation, fear and emotional abuse. 25 The respondent also has a prior conviction for unlawfully remaining on the premises of a former domestic partner. He was demanding entry and making serious threats of violence if the demands were not met. The index offending 26 On 8 July 2021, the respondent was sentenced in the District Court of South Australia to a term of imprisonment of six years, 10 months and 16 days, with a non-parole period of three years and 10 months, backdated to commence on 22 March 2019, for the offences set out earlier in these reasons. 27 The victim was the respondent’s 16 year old stepson. On 22 March 2019, the victim was unwell and remained home from school. He was left in the care of the respondent, who ran a bath for the victim. The victim then sat in his underpants, whilst the respondent shaved the victim’s legs. The respondent applied a blindfold, which he convinced the victim to accede to, and injected him with methylamphetamine. The victim was then guided to a bedroom the respondent shared with the victim’s mother. The respondent removed the victim’s underpants and, over a two hour period, performed fellatio on him and masturbated him, whilst playing pornography on a laptop. The victim made an immediate complaint when he was able to leave the home and the respondent was arrested that day. The sentencing remarks of Soulio DCJ make shockingly apparent the impact this offending is likely to have had on the victim and the victim’s mother. Unproved offending 28 The applicant proposes also to rely upon a raft of further allegations of sexual and violent conduct made by separate victims between 2004 and 2019. These allegations have not been the subject of findings of guilt to the criminal standard. The allegations include but are not limited to allegations that the respondent violently raped two separate female complainants on numerous occasions. -- 8 of 11 -- [2026] SASC 10 B Doyle J 7 29 It is not necessary to detail these allegations. The parties have foreshadowed a desire that the Court rule on whether materials relevant to those allegations may properly be considered by the medical experts who will be directed to provide reports relevant to the making of an indefinite detention order or an extended supervision order. The issues that may bear on that question have been canvassed elsewhere,21 but need not be resolved on this application. 30 I consider that I am in a position to decide this application without placing any positive reliance upon unproven allegations,22 although, as I will explain, I consider that the extent and nature of the allegations is relevant to meet, or at least neutralise, a submission made by the respondent’s counsel. Treatment and risk assessments 31 The respondent undertook the Violence Prevention Program whilst in custody in 2018. His conduct resulted in him being asked to leave group sessions on some occasions and he required individual sessions. His estimated risk of violent reoffending was thought to remain in the high range, post treatment. When granted parole he lived at the address of the index offence victim (and his mother) for approximately five months before he offended and was arrested. 32 During his most recent period in custody, the respondent was assessed in November 2021 as being at well above average risk of sexual reoffending should he not receive treatment. Despite receiving about 22 hours of individual treatment, he was also assessed in January 2026 as being in the well above average range of sexual reoffending and a high risk of domestic violence reoffending. He was considered to be a high harm perpetrator who was at elevated risk of using high impact or potentially lethal domestic and family violence in the future. 33 On various occasions over the past 10 years he has made statements or comments reflecting a lack of insight into, and an unpreparedness to take responsibility for, his offending. For example, in August 2024, he claimed in respect of the index offending that ‘the drug use and sex was all consensual’ and that the teenage victim had been ‘walking around the home provocatively in underpants’. He is reported on numerous occasions to have himself boasted of a capacity for deception. In his most recent post treatment report dated 29 January 2026, the author refers to the respondent having entrenched misogynistic and entitlement-based beliefs. 21 Driver at [30], [49]-[50] (Kourakis CJ, Doyle and Bleby JJA), and see Attorney-General (SA) v Rowe [2025] SASC 189 and Attorney-General (SA) v Gogel [2025] SASC 193. 22 This makes it unnecessary to address the respondent’s submission that s 10 of the Sentencing Act applies to an order made under s 57, and militates against reliance on unproved allegations. It is sufficient to note that the observations in Attorney-General (SA) v Kelly [2017] SASC 164 at [60]-[61] (Nicholson J, referring to R v FJM [2015] SASC 99) and in Driver (at [39]) may stand in the way of the submission. -- 9 of 11 -- [2026] SASC 10 B Doyle J 8 34 He has also consistently asserted that rehabilitation treatment was unnecessary. Unfortunately, the respondent has not successfully completed a sex offender treatment program. Consideration 35 I consider that the circumstances of the index offending, coupled with the respondent’s unpreparedness to accept responsibility for it, justifies the conclusion that there is a serious question to be tried as to the respondent being unwilling to control his sexual instincts in the relevant sense. 36 Nothing in the circumstances of the offending or any subsequent reflection upon it by the respondent suggests that the offending was the result of situational pressures that are unlikely to recur. The respondent’s counsel submits that the respondent was 48 years old at the time of the index offending and that ‘if [he] were unwilling or unable to control his sexual instincts one would expect a man of 48 years of age to have other instances of related offending’. In my view, the extent and nature of the allegations noted earlier is such that I should not give substantial weight to that submission. That is not to accept the allegations as proved. It is simply to exercise caution in relation to a submission that is proposed to be countered by evidence in due course. 37 In my view, the fact that the index offending was committed whilst on parole and was highly likely to result in detection and punishment arguably bespeaks an unwillingness to control his sexual instincts. 38 That conclusion is bolstered by the risk assessments that have been made by persons who have assessed him, but it is not dependent upon it. In that regard, I note the respondent’s counsel’s submission that one of the risk assessments referred to was not a formal assessment and that both of the most relevant assessments referred to by the applicant had regard to unproved allegations. I accept that it would be dangerous at this stage to place substantial reliance on those assessments. I nevertheless consider there is a real and substantial question to be tried as to the respondent’s willingness to control his sexual instincts. 39 Moreover, having regard to his history of convictions for violent offending, and the fact that the index offending was committed whilst on parole, I consider the respondent presents an appreciable risk of harm to the safety of the community. I am not satisfied that the risk can be satisfactorily managed by the imposition of an interim supervision order. The respondent’s history shows him to be a person capable of committing sudden and serious assaults of high magnitude. His offending has not been confined to victims with whom he has had a prolonged period within which to cultivate trust or by which to create opportunities for offending. He has a poor record of compliance with supervisory conditions associated with parole, bail agreements and bonds. I am not satisfied that the terms of an interim supervision order will provide an adequate measure of community protection. -- 10 of 11 -- [2026] SASC 10 B Doyle J 9 40 I note the respondent’s submission that the 26 January 2026 letter from the Deputy Presiding Member of the Parole Board supports the imposition of a supervision order and does not in terms address an indefinite detention order. I do not consider from the context and tenor of the letter that it can be inferred that the Parole Board considers continuing detention would be inappropriate.23 I note also that the most stringent monitoring conditions are proposed over an initial twelve month period. 41 It is of concern that the application for an indefinite detention order was first made less than two months before the expiry of his sentence. However, I was told this morning that the delay is at least partly attributable to inquiries being made as to whether the complainants in respect of unproven allegations would support the applicant’s reliance upon those allegations in this proceeding. Be that as it may, the result is that an indefinite detention order will likely see the respondent’s interim detention extended for several months longer than might otherwise have been the case. I also accept the submission that apart from the loss of liberty, the relatively late application is likely to have engendered a sense of grievance on the part of the respondent, who was planning for his release. 42 In the end, however, in view of the paramount consideration of community safety, I conclude that the risk posed by the respondent’s release even under strict supervision justifies the loss of the respondent’s liberty. 43 I am satisfied that an interim detention order should be made. In circumstances where the application for an extended supervision order will be dealt with concurrently with the application for an indefinite detention order, it is not necessary to make an interim supervision order at this time. I will neither grant nor dismiss that application at this stage. 23 On 10 August 2023, the Presiding Member of the Parole Board wrote that the Board would support consideration being given to a s 57 application. -- 11 of 11 --