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[2026] SASC 14

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Prosecution: R Counsel: MS J LITSTER WITH MS F LINALE - Solicitor: DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) Accused: JENNI GAYE WILMOTT Counsel: MRS M SHAW KC WITH MR J HENDERSON - Solicitor: CRAIG CALDICOTT LAWYERS Hearing Date/s: 15/01/2026 File No/s: SCCRM-24-007601 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Criminal: Application) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. R v WILMOTT (No 8) Criminal Trial by Judge Alone [2026] SASC 14 Reasons for Ruling of the Honourable Justice McDonald 11 February 2026 CRIMINAL LAW - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - OFFENCES AGAINST THE PERSON - HOMICIDE - MANSLAUGHTER - EVIDENCE EVIDENCE - ADMISSIBILITY - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - OBJECTIONS EVIDENCE - ADMISSIBILITY - OPINION EVIDENCE - EXPERT OPINION This is an application by the accused for exclusion of aspects of Professor Jureidini’s evidence. Professor Jureidini is a paediatric psychiatrist and is to be called as an expert witness by the Director. This Court has previously delivered a ruling permitting Professor Jureidini to give evidence on general matters relevant to his expertise. The accused objects to three aspects of Professor Jureidini’s evidence that the Director proposes to lead. Topically, those aspects are: 1. Professor Jureidini’s expertise and experience with psychological autopsies and root cause analysis. 2. Professor Jureidini’s opinion regarding causes of suicidal ideation in children. 3. Professor Jureidini’s opinion in relation to the deceased’s diagnoses of Reactive Attachment Disorder (RAD) and Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). Objections to topics one and two were abandoned prior to argument. The accused maintains the objection to topic three on the grounds that it does not comply with the Court’s previous ruling and that Professor Jureidini does not have the requisite expertise. Further, it is said that the evidence would impeach the credibility of another Crown witness, which would breach section 27 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA). The Director opposes the application. -- 1 of 16 -- Held: Application partially dismissed – the Director is permitted to lead evidence of: 1. Professor Jureidini’s experience in psychological autopsies and root cause analyses; 2. The means by which to diagnose and the symptoms and signs of ASD and RAD; and 3. Professor Jureidini’s critique of the means by which Dr Curran arrived at her various diagnoses in relation to Jasmine. Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 13, 14(1), 20(4)(b), 30; Evidence Act 1929 (SA) s 27, referred to. R v Wilmott (No 2) [2025] SASC 54; R v Wilmott (No 3) [2025] SASC 55; R v Wilmott (No 5) [2025] SASC 106; R v Wilmott (No 6) [2025] SASC 168; The Queen v Welden (1977) 16 SASR 421; Goncalves v The Queen (1997) 99 A Crim R 193; Graham v Police (2001) 122 A Crim R 152, considered. -- 2 of 16 -- R v WILMOTT (No 8) [2026] SASC 14 Criminal: Ruling re Professor Jureidini McDONALD J. 1 Jenni Gaye Wilmott has been charged with the offence of manslaughter1 and in the alternative with the offences of criminal neglect,2 failing to provide food,3 failing to provide accommodation4 and two counts of aggravated assault causing harm.5 The alleged victim of each of these offences was Jasmine Da-Eun, Ms Wilmott’s 15-year-old adopted daughter.6 Each of the charged offences arise out of allegations about Ms Wilmott’s conduct towards Jasmine, up until Jasmine’s death by suicide. The Information particularises that the offences took place between 1 May 2013 and 7 October 2018, the former being the date on which Jasmine’s adopted father left the household. 2 It is the prosecution case that over that time Ms Wilmott physically, mentally and emotionally abused Jasmine to a level that amounted to criminal conduct. The prosecution relies on both acts and omissions in circumstances in which Ms Wilmott owed Jasmine a duty of care. The acts and omissions relied upon include physical violence, verbal abuse, social isolation, sustained humiliation and the deprivation of food, liberty and suitable accommodation. It is said that these acts and omissions amounted to a failure on the part of Ms Wilmott to provide the standard of care required from a reasonably competent carer. It is the prosecution case that Ms Wilmott’s conduct towards Jasmine was a substantial cause of Jasmine’s death. 3 The trial in this matter commenced on 13 February 2025 with a voir dire hearing. During the course of that voir dire, I heard numerous applications for the exclusion of evidence that the Director relies upon.7 4 On 8 January 2026, Ms Wilmott filed a further interlocutory application seeking the exclusion of additional aspects of the prosecution case. The relevant evidence was identified under the hearings of 1. Professor Jureidini, 2. MW and 3. LW. 5 By the time of the hearing of the application, the Director no longer proposed to lead the impugned evidence in relation to LW. It is therefore not necessary for me to rule on that application. I have delivered a separate ruling in relation to the 1 Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 13. 2 Ibid s 14(1). 3 Ibid s 30 (Version 13.8.18-5.9.18 as at the date of the offence). 4 Ibid s 30. 5 Ibid s 20(4)(b). 6 Ms Wilmott was also previously charged with the offence of deception, however a nolle prosequi was entered in relation to that charge during the course of the voir dire. 7 R v Wilmott (No 2) [2025] SASC 54; R v Wilmott (No 3) [2025] SASC 55; R v Wilmott (No 5) [2025] SASC 106; R v Wilmott (No 6) [2025] SASC 168. -- 3 of 16 -- [2026] SASC 14 McDonald J 2 evidence of MW. This is my ruling in respect of the additional objections taken to the evidence of Professor Jureidini. Professor Jureidini 6 Professor Jon Jureidini is a psychiatrist who has specialised in paediatric psychiatry. His role in relation to this matter has been to provide an opinion addressing the issue of causation. 7 Ms Wilmott previously filed an application seeking the exclusion of the evidence of Professor Jureidini in its entirety. 8 After hearing evidence and submissions, I ruled that Professor Jureidini would be permitted to give general evidence about factors that may lead to a child developing a suicidal ideation, however, he will not be permitted to give evidence applying those considerations to the facts of this case. It follows that it will not be open to the prosecution to ask Professor Jureidini to express an opinion as to whether Ms Wilmott’s conduct was the primary determinant cause of Jasmine’s death. 9 As a consequence of this ruling, the prosecution prepared a schedule setting out a summary of the topics to be led during Professor Jureidini’s evidence. The schedule was provided to Ms Wilmott’s legal representatives, resulting in a further application for the exclusion of aspects of the evidence that the prosecution proposes to lead. 10 Arguably, the application is not for the exclusion of further evidence, but rather for clarification of whether the topics identified by the prosecution as relevant, are captured by my earlier exclusionary ruling. Topic 1: Expertise and experience with psychological autopsies; Professional experience; Root cause analysis; Psychological autopsies 11 The first topic that is the subject of the application falls under the heading of ‘Topic 1: Expertise and experience with psychological autopsies”. In particular, Ms Wilmott objected to Professor Jureidini giving evidence about his involvement in conducting “root cause analyses” and “psychological autopsies” in relation to youth suicides. 12 The basis of the objection is two-fold, namely: (a) The evidence is irrelevant in light of Wilmott [No 2] [2025] SASC 54. (b) The limited number of psychological autopsies and root cause analysis that Professor Jureidini reports to have conducted are not scientifically validated, are unpublished, and unavailable for scrutiny. -- 4 of 16 -- [2026] SASC 14 McDonald J 3 13 In R v Wilmott (No 2)8 I described Professor Jureidini’s involvement in psychological autopsies and root cause analyses in the following terms:9 An essential component of the various roles that Professor Jureidini has held involve the skills that he has developed in undertaking “psychological autopsies”. Professor Jureidini explained that to conduct a “psychological autopsy” is to “attempt to go back over the circumstances that lead up to the suicide and discern what might have been the cause or contributions to it”.10 This form of analytical approach has underpinned the clinical, advisory and academic roles that Professor Jureidini has held. It is his ability and experience in conducting psychological autopsies that the prosecution relies heavily upon in support for the admission of the evidence of Professor Jureidini’s ultimate opinion that Ms Wilmott’s conduct towards Jasmine was the primary cause of her death. … It was in the context of discussing Professor Jureidini’s role in the Adolescent Mental Health Mortality Committee that the topic of Professor Jureidini’s involvement in conducting “root cause analyses” was first raised. Ordinarily, the Mortality Committee would be restricted to considering and examining case notes. However, on occasions it was determined by the committee that a more in-depth root cause analysis was necessary. In those circumstances a request would come from the Serious Incident Review Committee asking that appropriate experts/professionals be identified to lead a root cause analysis. Professor Jureidini explained that a root cause analysis is a systematic way of looking at critical incidents that have taken place in a medical setting.11 The analysis involves a deep investigation of all of the circumstances leading up to a young person’s suicide. Those experts involved have a mandate to go out and interview people rather than being limited to a review of the paperwork. The idea behind conducting such an analysis is to attempt to determine what caused the suicide and then put in place recommendations to prevent those same events occurring in the future. Professor Jureidini explained that root cause analysis is a methodology that is used in a wide variety of settings. They are undertaken in both private medical health settings as well as public health settings. In order to be selected for involvement in a root cause analysis, it is necessary for the participants to have received the relevant training and it is not uncommon for the team to be cross-disciplinary. Professor Jureidini has been trained in conducting this form of analysis. He had undertaken a training program that had run for at least two days and has been required to undertake periodical refreshers either every two or five years.12 It was Professor Jureidini’s evidence that he has led approximately five root cause analyses, at least four of which related to youth suicide. 14 This evidence forms part of Professor Jureidini’s overall expertise in considering and assessing the various contributing causes to a youth developing a suicidal ideation. Any exposure to youth suicide in a psychiatric or therapeutic 8 [2025] SASC 54. 9 Ibid at [14]-[21]. 10 T213. 11 T193. 12 T461. -- 5 of 16 -- [2026] SASC 14 McDonald J 4 context is a relevant component of Professor Jureidini’s expertise. That is particularly so when it involves a consideration of the causative link between a child’s life experiences and the decision to end their life. 15 I also do not accept that the evidence should be excluded on the basis that the psychological autopsies and root cause analyses are not scientifically validated, are unpublished and unavailable for scrutiny. 16 The basis of this objection elevates the work engaged in by Professor Jureidini to a status that it does no purport to have. There is no suggestion that the work engaged in equates to some form of scientific study, upon which objective reliance can be placed by members of the broader scientific community. 17 As I have said, the nature of the work undertaken by Professor Jureidini forms part of the broader matrix of expertise that Professor Jureidini has developed over many years of specialising in this field. 18 By the time of submissions on this application, Mrs Shaw KC had engaged in further discussions with the prosecution, as a result of which she now accepts that this evidence can be led on the basis that I have set out. 19 The criticisms that she has raised will be a matter of weight rather than admissibility. Topic 2: Causes of suicidal ideation in children; Impact of injuries 20 The second topic of the application fell under the heading “Topic 2: Causes of suicidal ideation in children”. Objection to this topic was made on the following ground: (a) The proposed evidence was excluded in Wilmott [No 2] [2025] SASC 54, which permits Professor Jureidini to only give general evidence as to the causes of suicide. 21 Following the discussions referred to above, Mrs Shaw KC similarly withdrew this objection by the time of submissions. It is now accepted that evidence can be led on this topic by the prosecution. Topic 3: Medical diagnoses; Specific diagnoses; Dr Jenny Curran; Reactive Attachment Disorder; Autism Spectrum Disorder 22 Ms Wilmott does however maintain her objection to Professor Jureidini giving evidence that in his opinion Jasmine did not have a Reactive Attachment Disorder (‘RAD’) or Autism Spectrum Disorder (‘ASD’). This evidence will necessarily contradict and criticise the evidence of Dr Jenny Curran, who will give evidence that she diagnosed Jasmine with both of these disorders. -- 6 of 16 -- [2026] SASC 14 McDonald J 5 The evidence of Dr Curran 23 Before considering the objection to the evidence proposed to be led from Professor Jureidini, it is convenient to first identify the nature of the evidence to be given by Dr Curran. 24 Dr Curran is a Senior Consultant Psychiatrist in Intellectual Disability with a particular expertise in ASD. At the time she first met with Ms Wilmott and Jasmine, Dr Curran was working for the Centre for Disability Health, which provided a health clinic for adults and youths with intellectual disabilities or ASD, with complex health issues including mental health issues. 25 Dr Curran worked together with a general practitioner, Dr Margaret Kyrkou and a specialist intellectual disability and mental health nurse, Kerry Rye, as a team. The team was known as the GAP (Global Assessment of Psychopathology) service for children and youth with developmental disabilities. The focus of their work was the assessment of school aged children and adolescents with intellectual disabilities, autism or behavioural issues. Dr Curran and her team provided care for Jasmine in the GAP service at the Centre for Disability Health between October 2014 and August 2015. 26 Within the GAP service, Dr Curran’s primary role was to assess Jasmine’s behaviours of concern as reported by Ms Wilmott in relation to the possibility that Jasmine had an unrecognised neurodevelopmental disorder, with or without an additional mental health problem. 27 Ms Wilmott initiated contact directly with the Centre for Disability Health by telephone call, specifically requesting Dr Curran’s involvement with Jasmine concerning her behaviours. 28 Dr Curran advised Ms Wilmott that it would also be necessary for Jasmine to have an appointment with Dr Kyrkou in order to have a comprehensive assessment approach to the behaviours of concern. Dr Curran would have explained to Ms Wilmott that the reason for this process was that many children with developmental disabilities have unrecognised medical conditions that sit behind a behavioural disorder. 29 Dr Curran first met with Jasmine in about October 2014.13 It was Dr Curran’s initial opinion after seeing Jasmine and obtaining a history from Ms Wilmott, that Jasmine’s presentation was a complex case requiring further assessment by herself and her colleagues. Initially Dr Curran diagnosed Jasmine with a mood disorder (Depressive Episode) with chronic anxiety and obsessive-compulsive features, based on Jasmine’s presentation and the history provided by Ms Wilmott. An 13 Dr Curran no longer has the notes available to her that would enable her to give more precise details about this first consultation. -- 7 of 16 -- [2026] SASC 14 McDonald J 6 appointment was made for Jasmine’s medical status to be reviewed by Dr Kyrkou and Ms Rye on 8 December 2014. 30 On 27 April 2015, Dr Curran produced an ASD diagnostic report for Jasmine. This report was based on an assessment undertaken by Dr Curran between 21 March 2015 and 26 April 2015. This confirmed that Jasmine met the criteria for a DSM-5 diagnosis of ASD. 31 Immediately after the ASD diagnosis, Ms Wilmott requested that Dr Curran complete the relevant sections of a NDIS application utilising the ASD diagnosis. That document shows that Dr Curran recorded that RAD and ASD were both relevant diagnoses for Jasmine. Dr Curran explained that this was not the first time that she had seen these two diagnoses together in the same child. 32 On 18 May 2015, there was a further joint appointment with Dr Curran and Ms Rye at which both Ms Wilmott and Jasmine attended. At this appointment there was discussion about exploring the potential benefits and goals of play based therapy. This was to address Jasmine’s express wish to be less clumsy and it was intended that Ms Rye would provide a series of therapy sessions. 33 Four appointments were scheduled with Ms Rye, however Jasmine only attended the first on 5 June 2015. The remaining three appointments were cancelled by Ms Wilmott. 34 Dr Curran’s involvement in Jasmine’s psychiatric care and behavioural issues was subsequently handed over to the Women’s and Children’s Hospital Psychiatry services under Dr Callary, and a private paediatrician who specialised in eating disorders, Dr Yiu. 35 Dr Curran explained that the transfer of the care from the GAP service occurred for a number of reasons, including an increase in the acuteness and severity of Jasmine’s behavioural problems in July 2015, Ms Wilmott’s preference for Jasmine’s disordered eating to become the focus of help and concern that there was still the possibility of an unrecognised metabolic issue that required further assessment beyond the GAP area of expertise. The evidence of Professor Jureidini 36 In his affidavit Professor Jureidini discussed Dr Curran’s various diagnoses of Jasmine. He was critical of the circumstances in which she came to make those diagnoses. He observed:14 Dr Jenny Curran diagnosed Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD). While considered an expert on ASD, Dr Curran seems to have based her assessment on a cursory examination and uncritical reliance on Ms Wilmott’s response and to have somewhat unconvincingly 14 Affidavit of Jon Jureidini dated 27 September 2022 at [11]-[15]. -- 8 of 16 -- [2026] SASC 14 McDonald J 7 explained away Jasmine’s sociability (Jasmine ‘can engage in an apparently “normal” way until the lack of true empathy is recognised’). Dr Curran also diagnosed Jasmine with other psychiatric disorders (Reactive Attachment Disorder [RAD], OCD, Mood Disorder) without adequate evidence being documented for any of these diagnoses. As ill-informed as these diagnoses were, Ms Wilmott consequently had legitimate professional support for her claims that Jasmine had significant disability. Jasmine’s brother [LW], Ms Wilmott’s friends, other family members, Jasmine’s father and stepsiblings, respite carers, and teachers all described Jasmine in a way that does not support a diagnosis of RAD or ASD. Although Ms Wilmott claimed in 2021 (JW1) Jasmine ‘was diagnosed with autism by two different paediatricians’, notes and letters from those paediatricians show that neither diagnosed autism [SR75, MD7.8, p61]. Jasmine was noted by a psychologist to be ‘affectionate and sociable’ as an infant [SR145]. It may seem presumptuous to contradict the opinion of an expert who has seen the child (albeit briefly) but I can be confident from the wide range of collateral information that Jasmine did not have ASD or RAD. Jasmine was diagnosed by a speech pathologist as having a mild language disorder [SR74]. Ms Wilmott described her as clumsy, at odds with observations at school [SR16] but consistent with an OT assessment [SR88]. Jasmine achieved adequately on NAPLAN testing [MD5.4], and teachers had positive impressions of her intellect, making it unlikely that she had significant learning problems beyond the challenges created by frequent absences and changing schools. 37 Professor Jureidini further elaborated on this aspect of his affidavit when he gave evidence on the voir dire. He raised a particular concern about the approach of Dr Curran in taking what Ms Wilmott told her at face value, without carrying out much by way of an independent assessment with, for example, teachers from Jasmine’s schools. 38 It was Professor Jureidini’s evidence that:15 … to make four diagnoses on a child without providing any kind of diagnostic formulation, any kind of attempt to understand why the child presents in the way that the child has presented, falls short of appropriate practice for a child psychiatrist. 39 When asked what he meant by “no appropriate diagnostic formulation”, Professor Jureidini replied:16 Well, it’s not enough just to list diagnoses that you think the criteria have been met for. So we wouldn’t accept - a doctor, physician, wouldn’t accept in a child that they had four different medical conditions that were unrelated to each other without making a very careful attempt to understand why is this child subject to having four medical conditions. Yet, in this case, Dr Curran has made four diagnoses without making any comment about why a child would develop all four of those diagnoses, or whether there’s some other supervening explanation that has greater merit than that list of apparent diagnoses. 15 T417. 16 T417–418. -- 9 of 16 -- [2026] SASC 14 McDonald J 8 40 Professor Jureidini explained that given the overlap of some of the symptoms of these diagnoses:17 … a good psychiatrist wouldn’t say ‘This person meets diagnostic criteria for two disorders, therefore, we’ll give them both diagnoses’. They would try to be critical about which of those diagnoses is supervening over the other and which diagnosis best determines the management plan. He further elaborated:18 We make the diagnosis partly on the presence of symptoms, but you also make it based on an overall understanding, that’s what I mean by ‘diagnostic formulation’, an overall understanding of all of the factors playing a part in the child’s life. Now, Dr Curran didn’t document any concerns about the parenting that was Jasmine’s experience, so, by that alone, it was a deficient assessment. 41 In addition to this, Professor Jureidini was critical of Dr Curran’s failure to delve into past consultations with, and diagnoses of, previous experts who had been engaged in Jasmine’s case. When asked about the extent to which he would expect that such an enquiry would be made, he responded:19 A. Exhaustively. So it’s a really important part of an assessment to know what’s gone before. … A. Well, I mean, if you’re going - like, it’s a big thing to make four diagnoses in a child. If you’re going to do that, then you really need to be on very sure ground. So there could be multiple letters to be written to other specialists or asking the mother to bring in reports from other specialties and other assessments. And I wouldn’t make a conclusion about the child’s diagnosis until I had all of that information. The application to exclude the evidence 42 There were three planks to Ms Wilmott’s argument as to why Professor Jureidini’s evidence on this topic should not be admitted. These were Professor Jureidini’s expertise (or lack thereof) to comment on the diagnoses of Dr Curran, when he himself acknowledges that she is an expert on ASD, and he is not. 43 The second is the factual basis upon which Professor Jureidini relies to support his opinion. In arriving at his view about the legitimacy of Dr Curran’s diagnoses, Professor Jureidini relies on the inconsistencies between Dr Curran’s opinion and what he refers to as “collateral information”, that is, affidavits and evidence from other witnesses. It was submitted that to permit Professor Jureidini to embark on this exercise was inconsistent with my earlier ruling which does not permit Professor Jureidini to engage in a fact-finding exercise based on the evidence and observations of other prosecution witnesses. 17 T418. 18 T418. 19 T420. -- 10 of 16 -- [2026] SASC 14 McDonald J 9 44 The third complaint raised by Ms Wilmott is that in leading this evidence from Professor Jureidini the prosecution is in breach of s 27 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) (‘Evidence Act’), by impeaching the character of their own witness. Because Dr Curran is being called by the prosecution it is said that it is not open to undermine her account by eliciting contradictory evidence from another prosecution witness. 1. Professor Jureidini’s expertise re ASD and RAD 45 In his evidence on the voir dire Professor Jureidini was asked about his experience with ASD, he responded:20 I've never been somebody who's worked where the, you know, primary problem is autism spectrum disorder. That's never been my responsibility to assess or care for people in that area. 46 He went on to explain that it is however an aspect of the work that he has been involved in. He said:21 Yeah, so inevitably you come across people who have a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder or, if they don't have it, would get the diagnosis if they sought it. 47 Similarly, in relation to RAD, Professor Jureidini said:22 I've seen patients, usually later in life, who probably would meet that diagnosis but it's not - I've not been part of a clinical service that's directly dealt with that. 48 Professor Jureidini discussed the correlation or overlap between the symptoms of ASD and RAD. The following exchange took place:23 Q. And what is the overlap. A. Well, the social isolation, some of the - you could get patterns of repetitive behaviours or getting caught on a single track of thinking in people with the reactive attachment disorder diagnosis that would characterise the ASD diagnosis. Q. Can you explain how the pattern of behaviour manifesting on account of reactive attachment disorder, why that occurs in that particular disorder. What the cause of that is, I should say. A. Well, I mean, I guess I can say that if somebody has a very deprived and damaging infant experience then you wouldn't be surprised about any range of psychiatric symptoms that might be displayed later on, because there's been fundamental damage to the emerging identity of the child and so they'll latch on to coping mechanisms that ameliorate their - at least go some way towards ameliorating their distress. That might be through repetitive behaviours, it might be through self- destructive behaviours, whatever lessens the distress, I guess. 20 T217. 21 T217. 22 T218. 23 T218–219. -- 11 of 16 -- [2026] SASC 14 McDonald J 10 Q. Repetitive behaviours ameliorating stress. A. Yeah, so, I mean, I think we can all - I think, likely to identify with that: that if you're feeling distressed you might engage in some kind of distracting, comforting behaviour and - so none of the - none of the symptoms that define ASD, if they're mild and occur in isolation, are pathological in and of themselves. Mostly what you see in ASD is an exaggeration of ordinary coping mechanisms that mightn't be particularly productive and when it's meaningful to talk about somebody as having ASD, then those patterns of behaviour have become so entrenched and so pervasive that it's really compromising the person's functioning. Q. Social functioning. A. Social and personal functioning. Q. And the difference between social and personal functioning is what. A. Well, personal functioning would be like academic, how you manage your own emotions, how you manage your desires and meet your needs. Social is - I mean, obviously there's a big overlap because you meet your personal needs through social functioning and your social functioning is determined by your personality, so. 49 He maintained that a diagnosis of RAD is very uncommon in Australia, however with RAD and ASD there has been a type of bracket creep with less and less severely impaired individuals being included in these categories. 50 In cross-examination Professor Jureidini agreed that he would not regard himself as an expert in ASD or RAD. He however went on to clarify:24 I regard myself as having expertise in the impact of deprivation on children. I don't have any practice, not been engaged in any practices targeted to that population so I think I'd count myself as having a reasonable level of expertise about reactive attachment disorder and expertise around attachment in general which is often a misunderstood concept. 51 When asked what he would do in assessing someone to determine whether or not they have ASD, if he is not an expert in ASD, Professor Jureidini responded:25 I'm an expert on doing basic, sound assessments in child psychiatry and part of that involves taking a thorough history, getting collateral information, making sure that, if there are any inconsistencies in that information, that those are thoroughly explored. 52 When asked about whether, if he was attempting to make a diagnosis in a case of this nature, he would send a child off to be considered by other experts, he replied:26 No, I'm pretty good at getting all-round pictures. It would only be if there was some - like, for example, if I thought it was important to have a measure of the child's intellect, then I 24 T280. 25 T417. 26 T420. -- 12 of 16 -- [2026] SASC 14 McDonald J 11 might make a referral to a clinical psychologist to carry that out because I'm not qualified to do that. 53 When, however, it was directly suggested by Mrs Shaw KC that he could not speak to what someone who specialises in ASD might or should do, Professor Jureidini disagreed. He said that he could speak to what a child psychiatrist should do:27 Well, a specialist in autism spectrum disorder is still a child psychiatrist and, you know, somebody who is a specialist in autism spectrum disorder has to be expert at conditions and presentations that overlap with that diagnosis. It's not enough just to know the symptoms of a condition and be able to identify those symptoms. You have to be able to put it into context. 54 In my view, although Professor Jureidini does not purport to be an expert in ASD or RAD, his expertise as a highly qualified and experienced paediatric psychiatrist equips him to provide expert opinion evidence about the diagnoses and symptomology of ASD and RAD. It also enables him to provide a critique of the methodology employed by Dr Curran in arriving at multiple diagnoses for Jasmine. 55 I propose to admit this aspect of Professor Jureidini’s evidence. 2. The factual basis upon which Professor Jureidini relies to arrive at his opinions 56 There are two aspects to this complaint. The first is the basis upon which Professor Jureidini arrives at his criticisms of Dr Curran. The second is the assessment of the collateral evidence and findings of fact upon which Professor Jureidini relies in order to come to a conclusion that Jasmine did not have ASD or RAD. 57 Much of Mrs Shaw KC’s submissions on this topic were focussed on answering the various criticisms made by Professor Jureidini of the approach adopted by Dr Curran. By way of example, Mrs Shaw KC challenged Professor Jureidini’s observation that Dr Curran’s examination of Jasmine was “cursory”. It was submitted that to come to such a conclusion overlooks the evidence that there is a gap in the records that remain in existence and are available to establish how long Dr Curran spent with Jasmine. In addition, it was submitted that Professor Jureidini has overlooked that the diagnostic approach adopted by Dr Curran involved multiple practitioners, who had also met with Jasmine. It was Mrs Shaw KC’s submission that:28 … these are matters that have got a long documented history involving more than one expert, as well as Nurse Rye, and more than one referral, that is ongoing. And so it is in that respect we submit the basis for his criticisms is not present, … 27 T420–421. 28 T4371. -- 13 of 16 -- [2026] SASC 14 McDonald J 12 58 That may be so, however, these are all matters that can be raised in the cross- examination of Professor Jureidini. If the evidence is that Dr Curran had available to her additional information by which she arrived at her diagnoses, that is a matter that can be the subject of cross-examination of both Dr Curran and Professor Jureidini. It is not a basis upon which to exclude the evidence of Professor Jureidini’s criticisms of the methodology employed by Dr Curran. 59 The second aspect of this complaint is more problematic and has the potential to raise some of the issues that were the basis of my ruling in R v Wilmott (No 2).29 60 As Mrs Shaw KC highlighted in her submissions, the only aspects of the evidence that Professor Jureidini appears to rely upon in arriving at the view that Jasmine did not have ASD or RAD were Jasmine’s sociability and intellectual function. It was Mrs Shaw KC’s submission that there is an unfairness to Ms Wilmott in allowing the prosecution to trawl through the evidence of the various experts and non-expert witnesses (many of whom contradict each other) to come up with a series of assumptions to form the basis of an opinion as to whether Jasmine did or did not have ASD or RAD. 61 For that reason, I propose to limit the evidence of Professor Jureidini to observations and criticisms of the methodology that was used to arrive at a diagnosis of ASD and RAD, the correct methodology to be used in making such a diagnosis, and the symptoms or traits that a psychiatrist would look for before making such a diagnosis. 3. Section 27 of the Evidence Act 1929 (SA) 62 Section 27 of the Evidence Act provides: A party producing a witness shall not be allowed to impeach his credit by general evidence of bad character; but if the judge is of opinion that the witness is adverse, the party may— (a) contradict the witness by other evidence; or (b) with the permission of the judge, prove that the witness has made, at any other time, a statement inconsistent with his present testimony: Provided that, before giving such last-mentioned proof, the circumstances of the supposed statement sufficient to designate the particular occasion, must be mentioned to the witness, and he must be asked whether or not he has made the statement. 63 It was Mrs Shaw KC’s submission that by calling Professor Jureidini to give evidence that is critical of Dr Curran, the prosecution is in breach of s 27 of the Evidence Act which results in them impugning their own witness. 64 I do not accept that submission. 65 Section 27 of the Evidence Act creates a prohibition against a party calling a witness, from impeaching that witness’ credit by leading evidence of general “bad 29 [2025] SASC 54. -- 14 of 16 -- [2026] SASC 14 McDonald J 13 character”. That is not what the prosecution is proposing to do here. There is no suggestion that Dr Curran is of bad character or is not a well-qualified, honest, expert witness. It is my understanding that putting the prosecution case at its highest, the submission will be that on this occasion, for whatever reason, Dr Curran simply got it wrong in her diagnosis of Jasmine. Effectively inviting the Court to prefer the evidence of Professor Jureidini over that of Dr Curran. 66 The prosecution is required to call all admissible evidence relevant to the determination of the issues at trial; that is, all reliable and credible witnesses relevant to the unfolding of the narrative. It is not open to the prosecution to be selective, to pick and choose the witnesses to be called, based on a preference for the evidence of one witness over another. 67 It is therefore inevitable that on occasions the evidence of witnesses will be inconsistent or at odds. It may therefore be necessary for a prosecutor to invite a trier of fact to prefer the evidence of one witness over another.30 As Bray CJ observed in The Queen v Welden:31 A party who calls a witness cannot, with irrelevant exceptions, call other evidence to show that the witness is a person unworthy of credit, but he can call other evidence to show that he has made a mistake. 68 Bright J took a similar view and explained:32 It is clear that a party, having called a witness as to a fact, is not entitled to call another witness to discredit the first witness. But that rule does not prevent a party from calling two witnesses who give inconsistent accounts of a series of events or even of a fact. Nor does it prevent that party from submitting that the Court should prefer the account of one witness to that of the other. I respectfully follow Bray C.J. in Wells v. South Australian Railways Commissioner. The second witness may be called even if, incidentally, his evidence tends to diminish the credit of the first witness: Litton v. Thornton. (Footnotes omitted) 69 In Goncalves v The Queen,33 the Western Australian Court of Appeal cited The Queen v Welden with approval. Wheeler J (with whom Malcolm CJ and Heenan J agreed) said:34 Concerning the complaint that the Crown in effect “impeached” the evidence of Mrs Jeffery, there is no rule which prevents a party from calling witnesses who give inconsistent accounts of a series of events. Nor is it the case that a party is prohibited from submitting that the court should prefer the account of one of its witnesses to the account given by another: Welden (1977) 16 SASR 421 at 427, 435 and 443. Examination of the Crown case does not, in my view, demonstrate that Mrs Jeffery was impeached in the true sense by the calling of evidence to suggest that she should not be believed upon her oath. 30 R v Colquhoun [2009] SASC 138. 31 (1977) 16 SASR 421 at 427. 32 Ibid at 435. 33 (1997) 99 A Crim R 193. 34 Ibid at 216. -- 15 of 16 -- [2026] SASC 14 McDonald J 14 70 I agree with the observation made by Gray J in Graham v Police35 that: It is now settled that in the criminal court the Crown may call witnesses who give inconsistent accounts of a series of events. The Crown may submit that the court should prefer the account of one witness to that of another. The court can draw conclusions as to credit. … 71 For these reasons I do not accept that the prosecution, in calling Professor Jureidini and eliciting the evidence that I have set out, is in breach of s 27 of the Evidence Act. Conclusion 72 The prosecution is permitted to lead the following evidence from Professor Jureidini: 1. Professor Jureidini’s experience in psychological autopsies and root cause analyses; 2. The means by which to diagnose and the symptoms and signs of ASD and RAD; and 3. Professor Jureidini’s critique of the means by which Dr Curran arrived at her various diagnoses in relation to Jasmine. 35 (2001) 122 A Crim R 152 at [44]. -- 16 of 16 --