DEAN COSENZA v PAUL DENISOFF [2026] SASC 18

On Appeal from MAGISTRATES COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (HER HONOUR MAGISTRATE VOZZO) CIV-23-010090 Appellant: DEAN COSENZA Counsel: MR A LAZAREVICH - Solicitor: NICK XENOPHON & CO LAWYERS First Respondent: PAUL DENISOFF Counsel: MR M DOUGLAS - Solicitor: JANINE CARROL LEGAL Second Respondent: @REALITY PTY LTD Counsel: MR M DOUGLAS - Solicitor: JANINE CARROL LEGAL Hearing Date/s: 06/06/2025 File No/s: CIV-25-001274 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Appeal to a Single Judge) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. COSENZA v DENISOFF & @REALTY PTY LTD [2026] SASC 18 Judgment of the Honourable Justice McIntyre 18 February 2026 MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT TORTS - INTERFERENCE WITH PROPERTY - TRESPASS TO LAND The appellant (‘Mr Cosenza’) seeks damages for trespass by the first respondent (‘Mr Denisoff’) on 6 November 2019. Mr Denisoff entered the appellant’s residential property in the course of his employment as a real estate agent. The second respondent (‘@Realty’) was Mr Denisoff’s employer at the time. The appellant contends that the implied licence to enter had been revoked by way of signage displayed at entry points to the property. The claim proceeded to trial in the Magistrates Court of South Australia and was subsequently dismissed. This is an appeal from that decision. The appellant appeals on five interrelated grounds. Broadly, the appellant contends that the elements of trespass are made out and that the trial Magistrate did not provide adequate reasons or, alternatively, erred in preferring the evidence of Mr Denisoff to that of Mr Cosenza. Further, the appellant says that effective revocation of the licence does not require that Mr Denisoff read the sign, or signs, prior to entering the property. The appellant also made a claim under Australian Consumer Law, which he contends should not have been dismissed. The respondents contend that there was no effective revocation of the licence and that the trial Magistrate did not fall into error. In the alternative, the respondents say that it was open to the Magistrate to dismiss the claim as an abuse of process. Held: Appeal dismissed. -- 1 of 14 -- Cosenza v Paul Denisoff, @Realty Pty Ltd [2025] SAMC 3; Martin v Department of Transport, Energy and Infrastructure (2010) 269 LSJS 403; Pol v City of Port Adelaide Enfield [2017] SASC 116; Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott (2016) 90 ALJR 679; Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1; Cosenza v Origin Energy Limited [2017] SASC 145; Currie v Dempsey [1967] 2 NSWR 532; Coshott v Sakic (1998) 44 NSWLR 667; Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181; DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1; Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129, considered. -- 2 of 14 -- COSENZA v DENISOFF & @REALTY PTY LTD [2026] SASC 18 Single Judge Appeal: Civil Introduction 1 In a statement of claim filed on 1 September 2023, the appellant, Dean Cosenza (‘Mr Cosenza’) sought damages in the Minor Civil Jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court of South Australia for an alleged trespass by the first respondent, Paul Denisoff (‘Mr Denisoff’) on 6 November 2019. Mr Cosenza claimed against the second respondent, @Realty Pty Ltd (‘@Realty’) on the basis that it is vicariously liable for the actions of its employee, the first respondent. 2 Her Honour Magistrate Vozzo conducted a trial in this matter and delivered a decision dated 15 January 2025 in which she dismissed the appellant’s claim. 3 The appellant lodged a Notice of Appeal against that decision on 3 February 2025. For the reasons that follow I dismiss that appeal. Background 4 Mr Cosenza has lived at 39 Glen Eira Street, Woodville South (‘Glen Eira residence’) for about 50 years. It was his family home. Mr Cosenza has developed what the trial Magistrate called a “strong interest” in the law of trespass which she described as follows:1 Mr Cosenza conducts a business called ‘Law in Action’ and has a website www.lawinaction.com.au. Among other things, the website provides information about the law of trespass to land and the occupant’s right to refuse entry to residential properties. The website currently promotes and sells a kit which includes a 68-page handbook prepared by Mr Cosenza about the law and two trespass signs. The website also references door to door salespeople. Mr Cosenza said he does not make a lot of money from the Law in Action business and does it as a matter of public service. Since around 2012, Mr Cosenza has placed trespassing signage at entrances to the Property. He has pursued claims for damages for trespass to the Property including six legal actions, which have generated gross payments (by alleged trespassers) to him of around $100,000. (Footnote omitted) 5 Mr Cosenza says that, on 6 November 2019, signs were located on the left and right side of the driveway to the Glen Eira residence and on a pedestrian gate. There was a dispute at trial as to whether there was in fact a sign on the right hand side of the driveway but it was uncontentious that there were at least two signs on the property. The signs read: 1 Cosenza v Paul Denisoff, @Realty Pty Ltd [2025] SAMC 3 at [22]–[24] (‘Cosenza’). -- 3 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 18 McIntyre J 2 High Court Decision: Plenty v Dillon [1991] HCA 5 WARNING ENTRY IS FORBIDDEN ENTER BY EXPRESS INVITATION ONLY 6 Mr Cosenza alleged that on 6 November 2019: • Mr Denisoff entered the Glen Eira residence contrary to the instruction on his signs. • Mr Denisoff refused to leave the property when advised that he was trespassing and also failed to immediately identify himself when requested to do so. • @Realty employed Mr Denisoff as a real estate representative. 7 It was uncontroversial that Mr Denisoff attended the Glen Eira residence that day for the purpose of introducing himself as a real estate sales person and that he knocked on the door. He gave uncontested evidence that he entered the premises via the driveway and exited via the pedestrian gate. There was no dispute that Mr Denisoff was employed by @Realty. The learned Magistrate set out the following further matters as uncontentious:2 The elements of the cause of action of trespass to land were not matters in dispute in this action. It was also agreed that: • the gates at the driveway were left unlocked and wide open; • the driveway entrance and path leading to the front door of the house on the Property were left unobstructed; and • there was a sign forbidding entry affixed on a column of the front wall near the letterbox at the pedestrian gate – but the parties did not agree on the exact location or as to whether the gate was locked. (Footnote omitted) 8 Her Honour identified the following factual matters as contentious: The primary issue to be determined on the trespass claim is whether the implied licence to enter the Property was revoked. Determination of this issue requires me to make factual findings about what happened on 6 November 2019, including in respect of: 1. What signage was in place at the entrances to the Property on 6 November 2019? 2. Did Mr Denisoff see any sign forbidding entry before entering? 2 Ibid at [15]. -- 4 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 18 McIntyre J 3 3. Would a reasonable person in the position of Mr Denisoff have seen any signage before entering the Property? 4. Did Mr Cosenza verbally communicate to Mr Denisoff the revocation of an implied licence to enter the Property? The decision 9 Mr Cosenza and Mr Denisoff were the only witnesses at trial. The learned Magistrate considered each version of events and preferred the evidence of Mr Denisoff to that of Mr Cosenza wherever there was a conflict. In relation to the contentious factual matters, the learned Magistrate found that: • Mr Denisoff’s attendance at the property was for the legitimate purpose of identifying himself as a real estate sales person and to invite Mr Cosenza to contact him if he wished to speak to him about selling the property.3 • Mr Denisoff’s behaviour was not unreasonable and was within the “social norms” accepted by the general community.4 • There was an implied licence for Mr Denisoff to enter the property. • There was a warning sign located to the left of the driveway (‘Left Sign’). Her Honour was not satisfied that there was a sign in place on the right side of the driveway (‘Right Sign’) when Mr Denisoff entered the Glen Eira residence. • Mr Denisoff entered the Glen Eira residence without seeing the Left Sign or other indication forbidding entry. • Even if Her Honour was wrong in finding that there was no Right Sign, having regard to the dimensions, location, visibility, design and wording of the signs, Her Honour was not satisfied that a reasonable person in the position of Mr Denisoff would have seen the signs. Accordingly, they did not amount to effective communication of the revocation of the implied licence to enter the property. • Mr Cosenza did not verbally communicate the revocation of an implied licence to enter the Glen Eira residence to Mr Denisoff. General principles 10 The appellant’s right of appeal arises under s 42 of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) and is by way of rehearing. It is not an appeal de novo. Such appeals usually proceed on the documents albeit with power to receive further evidence. 3 Ibid at [71]–[72]. 4 Ibid at [73]. -- 5 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 18 McIntyre J 4 In this case no additional evidence was called; the matter proceeded by way of oral and written submissions concerning the transcript and the exhibits. 11 The court hearing the appeal is required to conduct a real and independent review of the evidence put before the Magistrate and come to its own conclusions.5 The court however must make due allowance for the advantage of the Magistrate in seeing and hearing the evidence given at trial. The court should bear in mind that it did not hear or see the witnesses, and it should not interfere with a Magistrate’s findings of fact unless they are demonstrated to be wrong by “‘incontrovertible facts or uncontested testimony’, or they are ‘glaringly improbable’ or ‘contrary to compelling inferences’”.6 The appellant’s grounds of appeal 12 The appellant’s notice of appeal raises five interrelated grounds of appeal as follows: • Whether the admitted facts alone justified a finding in favour of the appellant that the elements of trespass had been made out (Ground 1). • Whether there were adequate reasons for preferring the evidence of Mr Denisoff over that of Mr Cosenza about the third sign, or alternatively whether that finding should be set aside on appeal as being contrary to the evidence as a whole or glaringly improbable (Ground 2). • Whether Mr Denisoff should have been believed when he gave evidence that he did not read the sign or interact with Mr Cosenza (Grounds 2 and 3). • Whether, in light of the admissions and the content of the signs, it could be said the revocation of the implied licence had not been communicated to Mr Denisoff (Ground 4). • Whether it was necessary, in order for the implied licence to be revoked, for Mr Denisoff to have actually read the sign (Ground 4). • Whether the Australian Consumer Law (‘ACL’) claim should have been dismissed (Ground 5). 13 The respondents contend that the Magistrate did not fall into error and that the findings were open to her on the evidence. In the alternative, the respondents contend that the appellant’s conduct is contrary to the policy underlying the tort of trespass rendering his action an abuse of process. It is said that the learned 5 Martin v Department of Transport, Energy and Infrastructure (2010) 269 LSJS 403; [2010] SASC 141 at [38]–[39] (White J); Pol v City of Port Adelaide Enfield [2017] SASC 116 at [15] (Nicholson J). 6 Robinson Helicopter Co Inc v McDermott (2016) 90 ALJR 679 at 687 (French CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ); Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118 at 128, [29] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ). -- 6 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 18 McIntyre J 5 Magistrate ought to have dismissed his action on that basis or, in the further alternative, even if the appellant did have a valid cause of action, he was ineligible for a remedy or more than nominal damages. Trespass and the onus of proof 14 Underlying several of the grounds of appeal is a contention by the appellant that it was immaterial whether Mr Denisoff saw or read the signs forbidding entry. The appellant submits that trespass operates under strict liability and, as such, the question is whether there was a sign at the front of the property, not whether that sign was read by Mr Denisoff. The appellant also contends7 that the respondents bore the onus of proving that there were no signs. These propositions are misconceived. 15 The trial Magistrate’s statement of the law was in accordance with long- standing authority.8 As set out in her reasons for decision:9 Trespass to land occurs when the applicant is the person who was in exclusive possession of the land at the time the respondent intentionally or negligently enters onto the land, or otherwise directly interferes with the applicant’s possession of the land, without the applicant’s consent. It is not necessary for the applicant to prove any damage. (Footnotes omitted) 16 There are a number of defences to an action in trespass. The defence that is relevant for present purposes is the “licence defence”. A licence can be express or implied and the law is also clear that:10 1. the occupier of an ordinary housing property in a city or town ordinarily grants an implied licence to persons to enter onto the land and approach the house for legitimate purposes; 2. if an occupier erects a sign at the entrance to such land which would be seen by a reasonable person in the position of the defendant, no implied licence will arise. 17 As a general rule, the onus of proof lies on an applicant to prove each element of this cause of action and the onus of proof lies on a respondent to establish a defence.11 However, as Blue J stated in Cosenza v Origin Energy Limited (‘Origin’):12 By reference to principle and authority, the ultimate onus of proof at trial lies on a defendant to prove the existence of an implied licence including where applicable to prove that no notice was given forbidding entry. However, if the defendant proves at trial that he or she entered an ordinary housing property in a city or town without seeing any sign or other 7 Appellant’s written submissions (FDN 11) at [9]. 8 Plenty v Dillon (1991) 171 CLR 635; Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1 (‘Halliday’). 9 Cosenza at [9]. 10 Cosenza v Origin Energy Limited [2017] SASC 145 at [38] (‘Origin’). 11 Currie v Dempsey [1967] 2 NSWR 532 at 539 per Walsh JA; Coshott v Sakic (1998) 44 NSWLR 667 at 670-672 per Spigelman CJ (with whom Mason P and Handley JA agreed). 12 Origin at [48]. -- 7 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 18 McIntyre J 6 indication forbidding entry, it ordinarily creates an evidentiary onus on the plaintiff to adduce some evidence that there was a sign forbidding entry or other indication that the occupier was not granting an implied licence. 18 This statement of principle was quoted and applied by the trial Magistrate. Accordingly, the appellant’s contention that it was immaterial whether Mr Denisoff saw the signs is incorrect. There was a shifting evidentiary onus depending on the factual findings made by the trial Magistrate. The trial Magistrate accepted Mr Denisoff’s evidence that he did not see any signs when he entered the property via the driveway. In those circumstances the appellant bore the evidentiary onus of establishing that there were warning signs revoking the implied licence. Adequacy of reasons 19 Ground 2 of the appeal contends, inter alia, that the Magistrate gave inadequate reasons for her findings. It is not clear whether this complaint relates only to the Magistrate’s treatment of the subject matter of ground 2 and her acceptance of the first respondent’s evidence or whether it is a more general complaint. In either case, I do not consider that the complaint is made out. 20 It is well established that the content and detail of reasons “will vary according to the nature of the jurisdiction which the court is exercising and the particular matter the subject of the decision”.13 They must enable this Court to discharge its statutory duty on an appeal and enable the parties to understand the basis for the decision.14 The trial Magistrate’s reasons identified the relevant issues, the law that was being applied and exposed the reasoning process leading to the decision on each issue. The reasons were not inadequate. Ground 1: Did the respondents make admissions that justified a finding in favour of the appellant? 21 The appellant contends that the “admitted facts alone” justified a finding in his favour and that, in the light of the admissions and the content of his warning signs, it could not be said that the revocation of the implied licence had not been communicated to Mr Denisoff. 22 The admissions relied upon are said to be contained in the respondents’ defences, a statement of agreed facts and issues and correspondence between the parties following the incident. The document filed in the Magistrates’ Court and entitled “Statement of Facts and Issues”15 is not a document agreed by the respondents. Rather it represents a statement of the appellant’s position and his submissions. Accordingly, no reliance can be placed on that document for the purpose of ascertaining what admissions have been made by the respondents. 13 Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181 at [56]. 14 DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1 at [32]. 15 FDN 73 on file CIV-23-010090. -- 8 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 18 McIntyre J 7 23 It is convenient to set out the relevant pleadings which refer, in turn, to the relevant correspondence. Paragraphs 9 to 12 of the Statement of Claim provide as follows: 1. There was at all material times, at the entrance to both the gate and the driveway at the property no trespassing signs (more significantly the first respondent admits the signs at his point of entry) which clearly communicates the revocation of any implied licence to enter the property: High Court Decision: Plenty v Dillon [1991] HCA 5 WARNING: ENTRY IS FORBIDDEN ENTER BY EXPRESS INVITATION ONLY 2. On 6 November 2019, the first respondent entered the property in defiance of no trespassing signs clearly visible at the entry to the property communicating that entry is forbidden. The first respondent in further defiance refused to leave the property when advised he was trespassing on the property. 3. By way of email communication from the first respondent to the applicant dated 11 November 2019, the first respondent admits: (i) to entering the property on 6 November 2019; (ii) to trespass signs being located at the entry points to the property; (iii) that he entered in defiance of the signs as he did not see them until leaving the property; and (iv) there was no lawful purpose or Court order permitting such entry. 4. By way of letter to the applicant dated 5 December 2019, Mr. James Taylor, CEO for the second respondent following an investigation into the matter admits: (i) that Mr. Denisoff entered the property on 6 November 2019; (ii) that no trespassing signs were located at the point of entry to the property; (iii) that the first respondent did not see the signs until after the fact of entry; (iv) that measures would be taken to improve training of individuals when conducting unsolicited door to door sales; (v) that there was no lawful purpose or Court order permitting such entry. 24 Paragraph 14 of the Statement of Claim contends that both respondents admitted that there was “no lawful purpose” for entry to the property. 25 Whilst separate defences were filed by the respondents, they are in essentially the same terms. The respondents relevantly admitted that there was a sign (‘the Left Sign’) containing the wording pleaded by paragraph 9 of the claim on the left hand side of the driveway but did not admit that there was a sign on the right hand side. The respondents contended that there was an implied licence to enter the -- 9 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 18 McIntyre J 8 property that was not revoked by the Left Sign. The respondents denied the allegations in paragraphs 10 and 11, asserting that these were “untrue” and contending that: • Mr Denisoff entered the property without having seen the Left Sign; • Mr Denisoff did not have any interaction with Mr Cosenza at the time; and • The correspondence admitted that Mr Denisoff entered the property but did not make the further admissions contended for. 26 The respondents further denied that there was any admission as pleaded in paragraph 14 of the Statement of Claim. 27 This ground is in part, reliant upon the notion that the question of whether Mr Denisoff saw the sign or signs was irrelevant to the question of liability. This is, as I have said, misconceived. Whether the trial Magistrate was correct to accept Mr Denisoff’s evidence on that topic is a separate issue, but it is plain that none of the admissions made by the respondents justified a finding in favour of the appellant. I dismiss this ground of appeal. Grounds 2 & 3: Did the Magistrate err in her approach to the evidence? 28 It is convenient to deal with grounds 2 and 3 together as they raise similar issues. The appellant challenges three key findings of the trial Magistrate specifically the findings that: • The respondents were not liable in trespass to the appellant because the first respondent had an implied licence to enter the property. • The implied licence had not been revoked. • No-one answered the door when the first respondent knocked and there was no interaction between the appellant and the first respondent on 6 November 2019. 29 The two grounds, as set out in the Notice of Appeal, read as follows: 2. The learned Magistrate erred in preferring the evidence of Mr Denisoff over that of the appellant as to the absence of a third sign, whether he saw the sign, and whether the appellant spoke to Mr Denisoff. The learned Magistrate gave inadequate reasons for her findings, or alternatively the findings were contrary to the evidence as a whole or alternatively were glaringly improbable. 3. The learned Magistrate erred by failing to take into account the second respondent’s letter of 5 December 2019, which was to the effect that Mr Denisoff had received training sessions about not trespassing and accordingly ought to have been on the lookout for signage before entering the property. If he had been on the lookout for -- 10 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 18 McIntyre J 9 signage there was no reasonable possibility that he could have failed to have seen the signs prohibiting entry. 30 Mr Denisoff gave evidence that he entered the Glen Eira property through the open gates on the driveway. He said that he did not see any signs forbidding entry until he exited the property through the pedestrian gate. He denied any conversation with Mr Cosenza saying that he knocked on the door, there was no reply and so he left his card inviting the homeowner to contact him if they were interested in selling property. The trial Magistrate accepted Mr Denisoff’s evidence. Mr Denisoff did not give evidence about seeing any sign on the driveway. The respondents’ admission that there was a sign on the left hand side of the driveway appears, as indicated in the trial Magistrate’s judgment, to have been based on a Google street view image of the Glen Eira residence dated November 2015.16 The respondents sought to withdraw that admission at trial but the trial Magistrate, properly in my view, declined to permit them to do so. 31 The appellant submits that the Magistrate erred in preferring the evidence of Mr Denisoff over his evidence on the topic of whether the appellant spoke to Mr Denisoff. He also contends that the Magistrate erred in accepting Mr Denisoff’s evidence that he did not see the signs. The appellant produced evidence in the form of photographs to support his contention that there were signs on each side of his driveway and gave evidence of a conversation with Mr Denisoff at his front door. He further says that any reasonable person would have noticed the signs on the columns of the driveway particularly in view of the fact that the second respondent had provided training to the first respondent about trespass. 32 Her Honour gave careful consideration to the evidence of the appellant and Mr Denisoff noting that neither were “entirely reliable or satisfactory”.17 The trial Magistrate also dealt with the photographs in some detail. She provided clear and cogent reasons for preferring the evidence of Mr Denisoff to that of the appellant and for accepting Mr Denisoff’s evidence that he did not see a sign on the driveway. 33 Given the acceptance of Mr Denisoff’s evidence that he did not see the signs prior to entry onto the premises, the appellant bore an evidentiary onus to establish that signs sufficient to communicate a revocation of the implied licence to enter were present on the driveway. The learned trial Magistrate gave detailed and careful consideration to this question and to the evidence given by the appellant, including the photographs.18 The photographs provided by Mr Cosenza were undated and the metadata he relied upon was forensically unsupported.19 She concluded that it was more likely than not that the Left Sign was in situ but was 16 Cosenza at [92]–[94]. 17 Ibid at [44]. 18 Ibid at [74]–[108]. 19 Ibid at [91]–[108]. -- 11 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 18 McIntyre J 10 not satisfied that the Right Sign was in place. The rejection of the second sign was not against the weight of evidence and involved no legal error. 34 Likewise, the trial Magistrate gave careful consideration to the appellant’s evidence about a conversation at the front door in the light of all the evidence, including the contents of an email exchange between the parties, before accepting Mr Denisoff’s evidence that there was no such conversation. The appellant alleged a verbal exchange between himself and Mr Denisoff but made no reference to it in contemporaneous documents. The trial Magistrate disbelieved the appellant’s account and gave detailed reasons for doing so.20 The trial Magistrate’s approach was an orthodox assessment of the credit of two witnesses giving diametrically opposed accounts. I see no basis upon which I ought to interfere with that assessment.21 35 In summary, the trial Magistrate’s evaluation of the issues was factual and open on the evidence. The appellant has not demonstrated that the Magistrate’s findings of fact were wrong, improbable or contrary to compelling inferences. No error has been established in relation to any of these factual findings. I dismiss grounds 2 and 3 of the appeal. Ground 4: Was there effective communication of the revocation of licence 36 The appellant contends that the trial Magistrate erred in finding that there was not an effective communication of a notice to revoke an implied licence to enter the property. This ground is largely addressed by the fact that the Magistrate accepted Mr Denisoff’s evidence that he did not see the sign. However, the appellant further says that findings by the Magistrate about the dimensions, location, visibility, design and wording of the signage were incorrect. He maintains that the wording on the signage was prominent and clearly communicated a revocation of any implied licence to enter the property. He says that any reasonable person would have noticed the signs on the columns of the driveway. 37 The trial Magistrate found that Mr Denisoff’s evidence, that he did not see any signs, was plausible:22 ….by reason of the sign’s postcard dimensions, location, design, wording and visibility based on the general angle of his approach. 38 The trial Magistrate then proceeded to consider whether a reasonable person in Mr Denisoff’s position would have seen the sign, noting that there must be effective communication of a decision to revoke an implied licence to enter a 20 Ibid at [46]–[70]. 21 Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; Lee v Lee (2019) 266 CLR 129. 22 Cosenza at [112]. -- 12 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 18 McIntyre J 11 residential property. Her Honour correctly stated the legal considerations as follows:23 The adequacy of the communication is dependent on the facts of the case, the category of the individuals to be excluded, the means of the communication and to whom the communication was made. (Footnote omitted) 39 In view of the trial Magistrate’s rejection of the appellant’s evidence about a conversation at the door, the only issue for determination was whether the signage constituted effective communication of the revocation of the implied licence. Her Honour considered this in the context of two scenarios.24 The first, if only the Left Sign was present and, the second, if there were two signs on the driveway entrance. Her Honour did not consider that there was a material difference between the two scenarios and in neither case did she consider that the signage constituted effective revocation of the implied licence. The trial Magistrate’s reasoning was thorough, factual and open on the evidence. The appellant has not demonstrated that the Magistrate’s findings were wrong, improbable or contrary to compelling inferences. I dismiss this ground of appeal. Ground 5: Did the Magistrate err in dismissing the claim under Australian Consumer Law? 40 The appellant refers to ss 74 and 75 of the ACL. Those sections relevantly provide that:25 74 Disclosing purpose and identity A dealer who calls on a person for the purpose of negotiating an unsolicited consumer agreement, or for an incidental or related purpose, must, as soon as practicable and in any event before starting to negotiate: (a) Clearly advise the person that the dealer’s purpose is to seek the person’s agreement to a supply of the goods and serves concerned; and (b) Clearly advise the person that the dealer is obliged to leave the premises immediately on request; and (c) Provide to the person such information relating to the dealer’s identity as is prescribed by the regulations ………………………… 75 Ceasing to negotiate on request 23 Ibid at [122]–[123]. 24 Ibid at [120]–[146]. 25 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (SA) sch 2, ss 74–75. -- 13 of 14 -- [2026] SASC 18 McIntyre J 12 (1) A dealer who calls on a person at any premises for the purpose of negotiating an unsolicited consumer agreement, or for an incidental or related purpose, must leave the premises immediately on the request of: (a) The occupier of the premises, or any person acting with the actual or apparent authority of the occupier; or (b) The person (the prospective consumer) with whom the negotiations are being conducted. ………………………… The appellant contends that the signage constituted a request to leave and that existence of the signage means that ss 74 and 75 were contravened by Mr Denisoff. Sections 74 and 75 of the ACL concern unsolicited consumer approaches. These require engagement or a refusal to leave after being asked. The trial Magistrate found no such engagement or refusal occurred when she rejected the appellant’s evidence concerning a conversation at the door. Those findings turned on credit. No error has been demonstrated in the Magistrate’s approach. The ACL claim failed on threshold elements and was correctly dismissed. I dismiss ground five of the appeal. Respondent’s alternative contention 41 In view of my dismissal of the appellant’s grounds of appeal, I do not need to deal with the respondent’s alternative contention that the Magistrate ought to have dismissed the proceeding as an abuse of process or denied relief on public policy grounds. -- 14 of 14 --