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PRATT -v- WA POLICE [2026] WASC 175

Case law · Western Australia · 2026
[2026] WASC 175 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CRIMINAL CITATION : PRATT -v- WA POLICE [2026] WASC 175 CORAM : LUNDBERG J HEARD : 5 MAY 2026 DELIVERED : 8 MAY 2026 FILE NO/S : SJA 1034 of 2025 BETWEEN : TAMMY LYNETTE PRATT Appellant AND WA POLICE Respondent ON APPEAL FROM: For File No : SJA 1034 of 2025 Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Coram : MAGISTRATE R YOUNG File Number : PE 38755-38756/2024 - PE 63942-63943/2024 Catchwords: Criminal law - Appeal against convictions and sentence - Offence of driving without authority contrary to the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) - Offence of providing false or misleading personal details contrary to the Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 (WA) - Offence of failing to provide personal details -- 1 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 Page 2 contrary to the Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 (WA) Criminal law - Operation of the Fines, Penalties and Infringement Notices Enforcement Act 1994 (WA) - Where absence of authority to drive founded on licence suspension orders made on the basis of non-payment of fines in infringement notices and non-payment of fines imposed by Magistrates Court - Whether licence suspension orders made by Registrar under the Fines, Penalties and Infringement Notices Enforcement Act 1994 (WA) invalid as impermissible exercise of judicial power or infringing presumption of innocence - Reliance on certificates issued under s 101C of the Fines, Penalties and Infringement Notices Enforcement Act 1994 (WA) and s 110 of the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) Criminal law - Entitlement to a procedurally fair trial - Turns on own facts Criminal law - Whether police officers held the reasonable suspicion required by s 32(2) of the Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 (WA) - Whether arrest unlawful - Whether evidence unlawfully or improperly obtained - Turns on own facts Legislation: Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 39, s 40 Fines, Penalties and Infringement Notices Enforcement Act 1994 (WA), s 7, s 11, s 14, s 15, s 17, s 19, s 20, s 20A, s 21, s 42, s 43, s 101C, s 103 Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA), s 30 Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 (WA), s 7, s 32, s 110 Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA), s 49 Result: Applications to adduce additional evidence dismissed. Leave to appeal on each ground refused and appeal dismissed. Category: B Representation: Counsel: Appellant : In Person Respondent : E A Heywood -- 2 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 Page 3 Solicitors: Appellant : In Person Respondent : State Solicitor's Office Case(s) referred to in decision(s): Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd [1999] HCA 9; (1999) 198 CLR 334 Dietrich v The Queen [1992] HCA 57; (1992) 177 CLR 292 El-Mouelhy v WA Police [2025] WASC 521 Fencott v Muller (1982) 152 CLR 570 Magaming v The Queen [2013] HCA 40; (2013) 252 CLR 381 McInnes v The Queen [1979] HCA 65; (1979) 143 CLR 575 Porter v Kelly [2024] WASC 282 R v Mullen [1938] HCA 12; (1938) 59 CLR 124 Scott v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2022] WASC 172 Topic v Director of Public Prosecutions [2024] ACTSC 398 VJS v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 172 Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462 -- 3 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 Page 4 Table of Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 5 Relevant charges ......................................................................................................................... 6 Factual background................................................................................................................... 10 Events on 8 June 2024 .......................................................................................................... 10 Events on 2 November 2024 ................................................................................................ 11 The proceedings in the Magistrates Court ................................................................................ 11 The grounds of appeal .............................................................................................................. 15 The application to adduce additional evidence......................................................................... 16 Disposition of the appeal .......................................................................................................... 18 Issue 1 – the lawfulness of the appellant's licence disqualification .......................................... 19 The offence provision ........................................................................................................... 20 The certificate relied upon by the prosecution ..................................................................... 20 The power to make a licence suspension order .................................................................... 22 The appellant's arguments .................................................................................................... 24 Disposition ............................................................................................................................ 25 Issue 2 – entitlement to a procedurally fair trial ....................................................................... 33 Issue 3 – whether the officers held a reasonable suspicion ...................................................... 33 Issue 4 – the lawfulness of the appellant's arrest ...................................................................... 36 Issue 5 – the presumption of innocence ................................................................................... 36 Issue 6 – the challenge to the sentences imposed ..................................................................... 37 Conclusion and orders .............................................................................................................. 38 -- 4 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 5 LUNDBERG J: Introduction 1 The appeal arises from two road traffic incidents involving the appellant. Both incidents began as benign interactions between police officers and the appellant. The conduct of the appellant on both occasions, which was far from cooperative and which was apparently driven by her adherence to 'pseudo-law' concepts, caused an escalation in matters and led to the appellant's subsequent arrest and brief detention. Those outcomes were wholly avoidable. 2 The events in question occurred on 8 June 2024 and 2 November 2024, with the appellant being charged with four traffic-related offences under the Road Traffic Act 1974 (WA) (RTA) and the Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008 (WA) (RTAA). Specifically, the appellant was charged with providing false or misleading personal details to police officers on one occasion (contrary to s 32(4)(b) RTAA), with failing to provide her personal details on another occasion (contrary to s 34(4)(a) of the RTAA), and with driving a motor vehicle without authorisation on both occasions (contrary to s 49(1)(a) and s 49(3)(b) RTA). 3 The appellant pleaded not guilty to all charges. The appellant was convicted on each charge following a trial in the Magistrates Court in May 2025. 4 The appellant's conduct, the avoidable escalation, and her arrest on both occasions were recorded on body-worn cameras utilised by the arresting officers. The footage, which I have reviewed, was tendered at trial. There can be no real doubt in this case as to the factual events which transpired. 5 On appeal, however, the appellant seeks to portray the events as involving an over-reach of authority by the officers. The appellant asserts the conduct of the officers was unlawful such that certain evidence should not have been admitted at trial. Further, the appellant challenges the validity of the administrative processes by which her driver's licence had been suspended. The basis on which it was alleged the appellant did not have authority to drive was that she had been disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence under several licence suspension orders made by the Registrar of the Fines Enforcement Registry pursuant to the regime established by the Fines, -- 5 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 6 Penalties and Infringement Notices Enforcement Act 1994 (WA) (the FPINE Act). 6 None of the appellant's arguments have any merit, in my view, and for the following reasons, the appeal must be dismissed. Relevant charges 7 The details of the charges laid against the appellant, and the sentences imposed by the Magistrate, are summarised in the table below. Charge No. and Offence Date Offence Description Sentence PE 38755/2024 8 June 2024 Having been directed by a police officer, under the provisions of s 32(2) or (3) RTAA, to give the police officer then and there any or all of her personal details, gave details that was false or misleading in a material particular in purported compliance with the direction, contrary to s 32(4)(b) of the RTAA. Fine of $500. Costs of $300.50. PE 38756/2024 8 June 2024 Drove a motor vehicle, on a road, whilst not being a person authorised by Part 2 of the RTAA and whilst no longer authorised to drive having been disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence under a licence suspension order made under s 19 or s 43 of the FPINE Act, contrary to s 49(1)(a) and (3)(d) of the RTA. Fine of $500. PE 63942/2024 2 Nov 2024 Drove a motor vehicle, on a road, whilst not being a person authorised by Part 2 of the RTAA and whilst no longer authorised to drive having been disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence under a licence suspension order made under s 19 or s 43 of the FPINE Act, contrary to s 49(1)(a) and (3)(d) of the RTA. Fine of $600. Costs of $300.50. -- 6 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 7 Charge No. and Offence Date Offence Description Sentence PE 63943/2024 2 Nov 2024 Having been directed by a police officer, under the provisions of s 32(2) or (3) of the RTAA, to give the police officer then and there any or all of her personal details, failed to comply with the direction, contrary to s 32(4)(a) of the RTAA. Fine of $600. 8 Section 32 of the RTAA relevantly provides as follows: 32. Giving name, address etc. (1) In this section - personal details, in relation to a person, means - (a) the person's full name; and (b) the person's date of birth; and (c) the address of where the person is living; and (d) the address of where the person usually lives; and (e) the person's business address. (2) A police officer may direct a person to give the officer then and there any or all of the person's personal details if those personal details are unknown to the officer and the officer reasonably suspects that the person - (a) is or may be the driver or a person in charge of a vehicle that has been or may have been involved in an incident involving death or bodily harm or damage to property; or (b) has committed or is committing or is about to commit an offence under a road law; or (c) is or may be an involved person; or (d) may be able to assist in the investigation of an offence, or a suspected offence, under a road law; or (e) may be able to give information or evidence in relation to an incident that involved a vehicle and at the scene of which the person was present. -- 7 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 8 (3) If a police officer reasonably suspects that a personal detail given by a person in response to a direction under subsection (2) is false or misleading, the officer may direct the person to produce evidence then and there of the correctness of the detail. (4) A person to whom a direction is given under subsection (2) or (3) must not - (a) without reasonable excuse, fail to comply with the direction; or (b) give any detail or produce any evidence that is false or misleading in a material particular in purported compliance with the direction. Penalty for this subsection: a fine of 50 PU.1 (5) In a prosecution for an offence under subsection (4)(a), it is a defence for the person charged to prove that the officer did not warn the person that failure to comply with the direction is an offence. … 9 Section 49 of the RTA relevantly provides as follows, noting that the applicable penalty for the offences in question is found in par (b) of the penalty provision in sub-section (1): 49. Driving while unlicensed or disqualified (1) A person who - (a) drives a motor vehicle on a road while not authorised under the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 Part 2 to do so; or (b) employs or permits another person to drive a motor vehicle as described in paragraph (a), commits an offence. Penalty for this subsection: (a) unless subsection (3) applies - (i) for a first offence, 6 PU; (ii) for a subsequent offence, 12 PU; 1 Being 50 times the stated amount: see the definition of 'PU' in s 7 of the RTAA. -- 8 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 9 (b) if subsection (3)(d), but no other paragraph of subsection (3), applies - (i) a fine of not less than 4 PU or more than 30 PU; and (ii) imprisonment for not more than 12 months, and the court may order that the offender be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for a period of not more than 3 years; … (2) It is a defence to a charge of an offence under subsection (1) to prove that the motor vehicle was driven in accordance with - (a) regulations referred to in the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 section 11(1); or (b) a necessity permit under section 49A. (3) If an offence under subsection (1)(a) is committed by a person - … (d) who is no longer authorised to drive because of penalty enforcement laws, as described in subsection (9), a police officer may, without a warrant, arrest the person. … (6) An offence under subsection (1) is a subsequent offence if the offender has previously been convicted of any offence under that subsection as in force at any time, except that, if subsection (3)(a), (b), (ca) or (c) applies to an offence under subsection (1)(a), the offence is a subsequent offence only if the person has previously been convicted of a relevant offence. … (9) When subsection (3)(d) refers to a person who is no longer authorised to drive because of penalty enforcement laws, it means that the person — (a) has been disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence under section 19 or 43 of the Fines, Penalties and Infringement Notices Enforcement Act 1994; or -- 9 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 10 (b) is the subject of any disqualification or suspension under a law of another jurisdiction that is prescribed to be a corresponding law for the purposes of this subsection. Factual background 10 The broad factual setting in which the charges came to be brought against the appellant can be summarised as follows, drawing on the findings made by the Magistrate. Events on 8 June 2024 11 On Saturday, 8 June 2024, approaching 11.00pm, police officers had established a 'Breath and Drug Testing' operation (or 'Booze Bus', as it is more commonly known) on Victoria Park Drive in Burswood, not far from the Crown Casino. The appellant was observed by a police officer, Constable Sarah Koreman, driving a white Hyundai vehicle. The appellant was then seen pulling into a parking bay immediately prior to the police stop. 12 Conduct of that nature was likely to raise suspicions with the officers and sure enough the young Constable approached the vehicle, observed the appellant was the only occupant, and requested a sample of the appellant's breath using a breathalyser. The appellant complied. The officer administered a preliminary breath test, which returned a negative result. The BAC reading was '0.00'. 13 As it turns out, the appellant was probably more concerned at that point with her authority to drive the vehicle than with her BAC level. The appellant had been disqualified from holding a driver's licence due to multiple licence suspension orders, flowing from her failure to pay fines. When the Constable asked for her personal details, the appellant became evasive and had far more difficulty than one might expect attempting to give her name and address. Giving those details to the officer would, of course, reveal that the appellant was not authorised to drive a vehicle. The appellant's strategy at this point was to give the officer a false name. 14 The appellant was then permitted by the officer to walk away from the scene, but she was subsequently located after Constable Koreman sought advice from a senior officer, Senior Constable Stephen Clark. The appellant was again asked to provide her details. She repeatedly refused. The appellant was duly arrested. Only then did the appellant -- 10 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 11 provide the name 'Tammy Braithwaite' which was identified as an alias for her legal name. Events on 2 November 2024 15 Some five months later, in the early hours of Saturday, 2 November 2024, just a little after midnight, the appellant again came into contact with police officers. The officers on that occasion were Sergeant Shawn Vieceli and Sergeant Alexander Wright. The officers were patrolling on St Georges Terrace in a vehicle equipped with Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR). The ANPR system alerted the officers that a passing vehicle, a black Suzuki Vitara, was registered to a person with a suspended driver's licence. That person was the appellant. 16 The vehicle was stopped by the officers on Milligan Street, just near The Melbourne Hotel. The officers asked for her personal details. One of the officers identified the driver as matching the registered owner's description and observed paperwork in the car bearing the appellant's name. The appellant asserted she was 'not under arrest' and was not required to abide by police laws, stating she was 'travelling' rather than 'driving'. 17 As a result of the appellant's persistent refusal to provide details, she was forcibly removed from the vehicle and arrested. The appellant eventually confirmed her identity but maintained that her license was 'illegally suspended'. 18 On 29 August 2024, the appellant pleaded not guilty to the two charges concerning the events on 8 June 2024. On 19 December 2024, the appellant pleaded not guilty to the two charges concerning the appellant's conduct on 2 November 2024. The charges proceeded to a trial on 6 May 2025. The proceedings in the Magistrates Court 19 At the outset of the trial in the Magistrates Court, the appellant was asked whether she was ready to proceed with the trial. The appellant indicated she was. The appellant made no application for an adjournment or a stay of the proceedings. The appellant did not raise any concerns about her status as an unrepresented accused.2 The 2 ts 2 - 3 (6 May 2025). -- 11 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 12 Magistrate proceeded with the trial thereafter, giving the appellant an overview of the process at the outset.3 20 The trial ran for some hours. Only Constable Koreman gave evidence as to the events on 8 June 2024.4 The more senior officer who was present on 8 June 2024, being Constable Clarke, had sadly passed away prior to the trial.5 Both Sergeants Vieceli and Wright gave evidence as to the incident on 2 November 2024.6 All of the officers were cross-examined by the appellant. The appellant also gave evidence at trial and was cross-examined.7 The trial process was somewhat turbulent given the appellant was legally unrepresented and (as one might expect) unfamiliar with both the limits on proper cross- examination and the divide between evidence and legal submissions. The appellant was reminded by the Magistrate on several occasions of these matters.8 21 The appellant displayed an attitude of disobedience during the trial, as appears from the transcript, which verged on the disrespectful. Despite that, the Magistrate dealt with the appellant in a patient manner, as can be seen at various occasions from the transcript.9 22 The Magistrate delivered ex tempore reasons at the conclusion of the trial in which he indicated he was satisfied that all of the charges had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.10 The appellant was convicted of all four charges. The Magistrate imposed sentences of $500 on each of charge PE 38755/2024 and charge PE 38756/2024, with an order to pay costs of $300.50, and fines of $600 on each of charge PE 63942/2024 and charge PE 63943/2024, with an order to pay costs of $300.50. 23 At the outset of his Honour's reasons, he expressly recognised that the prosecution must prove the elements of the offences beyond a reasonable doubt and the appellant had no onus to prove anything on her own behalf, and is indeed, presumed innocent.11 3 ts 2 - 3 (6 May 2025). 4 ts 10 - 35 (6 May 2025). 5 ts 18 (6 May 2025). The witness statement of Senior Constable Clarke was not tendered at trial: ts 34 - 36 (6 May 2025). 6 ts 36 - 51 and ts 51 - 60 (6 May 2025). 7 ts 61 - 77 (6 May 2025). 8 See, for example, ts 20, ts 23, ts 26, ts 31,ts 46, ts 48. 9 ts 5, 7, 17, 21, 23, 47, 57, 62, 73, 75, 100 (6 May 2025). 10 ts 89 - 99 (6 May 2025). 11 ts 89 (6 May 2025). -- 12 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 13 24 As to the offence on 8 June 2024 of driving without authority, his Honour found the appellant was the driver of the vehicle at the time and indicated there was 'no issue with that'. His Honour noted the spurious argument raised by the appellant that she was 'travelling' rather than 'driving', and promptly (and properly) rejected that.12 25 As to whether the appellant was subject to a licence disqualification by reason of unpaid fines, his Honour noted that was a 'simple yes or no' question, in the sense that the appellant had not relied on any other defences in this regard.13 His Honour referred to the legislative regime applicable to licence disqualifications where persons are subject to fines, and noted the prosecution was entitled by s 101C(1) of the FPINE Act to prove certain matters by way of the production of certificates. His Honour found that the statutory regime had been followed in this case, and was satisfied it had been demonstrated by the prosecution that the appellant had her licence disqualified at the relevant time.14 26 His Honour rejected the legal arguments raised by the appellant concerning the lawfulness or validity of the statutory regime by which licences are disqualified by reason of unpaid fines.15 27 His Honour was ultimately satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, on 8 June 2024, the appellant was subject to a lawful fine suspension order, the effect of which was that the appellant was not authorised to drive a motor vehicle.16 28 As to the further offence alleged to have been committed on 8 June 2024, of providing false or misleading personal details, his Honour explained the elements of the offence were that there must have been a direction given by a police officer to provide details, and that direction could only be given if the requirements in s 32 of the RTAA were met. That is to say, there must be a reasonable suspicion as to various matters and it must be then proven that the details that were provided were false.17 29 His Honour was satisfied that a false name was initially given by the appellant, and noted the appellant's contention that she was not 12 ts 89 (6 May 2025). 13 ts 90 (6 May 2025). 14 ts 91 (6 May 2025). 15 ts 91 (6 May 2025). 16 ts 91 - 93 (6 May 2025). 17 ts 94 (6 May 2025). -- 13 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 14 obliged to give the police her details. As to the arguments raised by the appellant, his Honour found these were all misconceived. His Honour referred to the evidence that the appellant had parked her vehicle just prior to a 'Booze Bus' stop, and noted the officer gave evidence (which his Honour accepted) that this gave rise to a suspicion as to one or both of two things. First, that the person had been drink driving, or the person had some other concern with the presence of the police, such as being unlicensed. His Honour held:18 And the officer said that that often relates to the person being unlicensed. And, indeed, it was those suspicions which prompted the officer to approach Ms Pratt in the first place. If the behaviour hadn't been suspicious, then she would have presumably remained (indistinct) the booze bus, continued those duties. And it was the very fact that the vehicle pulled up short of the booze bus that led her to approach Ms Pratt in the first place. Now, the suspicion would have been – it might have been further accentuated by the fact that when the officer asked if the accused had her driver's licence on her, Ms Pratt said, "No". In my view, there was enough suspicion at that point to ask for the accused's name. The accused queried why her name was required. The answer was, "To make sure your driver's licence is good." Then, in my view in the circumstances, it was appropriate…and, indeed, the sort of request routinely made in such circumstances. 30 The officer concerned sought advice from a senior officer, which was to speak further with the appellant, who was by then a short distance away. The Magistrate found the officer asked the appellant her name, and the appellant replied 'Sheree'. The appellant was warned that giving false details was an offence. The evidence at trial was that the appellant continued to fail to give her correct details and was then placed under arrest.19 31 His Honour found the offence of giving false details had been proven beyond reasonable doubt.20 32 As to the events on 2 November 2024, and the offence of failing to provide personal details when requested, the requisite reasonable suspicion was grounded in the fact the police officers had used number plate recognition technology, which alerted the officers to the fact that the registered owner of the vehicle they apprehended did not have a valid driver's licence, or had a licence under suspension. This formed 18 ts 95 (6 May 2025). 19 ts 95 - 96 (6 May 2025). 20 ts 96 (6 May 2025). -- 14 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 15 the basis of their suspicion. The officers then pulled the vehicle over. His Honour found there no 'emergency' at the time, dealing in that regard with a spurious argument raised by the appellant, and found that was largely irrelevant to the determination of the appellant's guilt.21 33 His Honour found the officers made multiple requests to the appellant to provide her name and details, which she 'flatly refused to do'. His Honour held:22 So the suspicion plainly existed in that case, and the police made multiple requests [for] Ms Pratt to give her name and other personal details, and in this case, she flatly refused to do so, insisting to the police that she had to be placed under arrest before she was required to say anything. That's simply a misunderstanding of the law. … So there was an argument back and forth. Ms Pratt kept on insisting she had no obligation to give her details to the police. The police kept insisting that she did. In my view, they were quite patient with her. And after a number of times, [they] gave her a number of chances to explain, Ms Pratt cited various Victorian legislation or Supreme Court decisions that – at least which have no bearing upon this whatsoever, as she was told by the police and continued to say that the police had no right to get her details, and she wasn't under arrest. 34 His Honour noted that the discussion between the appellant and the officers continued, and the appellant declined to give her details throughout. The offence was complete at this point, and the appellant was thereafter arrested. Shortly thereafter, but belatedly as his Honour found, the appellant provided her correct details.23 35 His Honour was also satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that, on 2 November 2024, the appellant was subject to a lawful fine suspension order the effect of which was that the appellant was not authorised to drive a motor vehicle.24 The grounds of appeal 36 The appellant has appealed to this court against the convictions and against the sentences imposed, pursuant to the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) (CAA).25 The legislative framework which controls 21 ts 97 (6 May 2025). 22 ts 97 (6 May 2025). 23 ts 97 - 98 (6 May 2025). 24 ts 94 (6 May 2025). 25 Notice of Appeal dated 22 May 2025. -- 15 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 16 this appeal is set out in numerous decisions of this court and it is unnecessary to repeat it here.26 The appeal is opposed by the respondent. 37 The appellant's grounds of appeal, as drafted by her, are as follows: 1. Lack of procedural fairness pursuant to Dietrich v The Queen [1992] HCA 57; 177 CLR 292. 2. Proper judicial process and procedures were not applied and evidence was overlooked. 3. Unlawful suspension of driver's licence. 4. Decisions were made relating to the unlawful driver's license suspension that breaches our Separation of Powers. 5. Breaches of our inalienable Human Rights pursuant to Federal Human Rights Laws and Legislation, namely the Human Rights Commission Act of 1986, inclusive of the ICCPR in its entirety. Specifically relating to Article 14 (paragraph 2) of the International Covenant of Civil on Political Rights – everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law. 38 At least initially, the appellant sought a delay or adjournment of the appeal hearing, but at the commencement of the hearing itself on 5 May 2026 the appellant indicated she was prepared to proceed. 39 As to this, I note the appeal had been entered for hearing on 17 April 2026, following orders made by Forrester J on 4 March 2026. A specific order was made that the appeal be listed as soon as possible after 10 April 2026. The order for a speedy listing was sought by the appellant. The application to adduce additional evidence 40 The appellant filed two interlocutory applications in these proceedings. 41 One of the applications, being an application pursuant to s 12 of the CAA to stay enforcement action arising from fines unconnected to the matters under appeal,27 was heard and dismissed by 26 For example, El-Mouelhy v WA Police [2025] WASC 521 [36] - [45]. 27 Folio 24. -- 16 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 17 Forrester J before the substantive appeal hearing.28 The appellant sought to re-agitate that issue at the appeal hearing but I explained that I considered the matter was not capable of being re-opened. 42 The appellant also applied to adduce additional evidence on the appeal, and filed two affidavits in support thereof, both dated 12 February 2026. I will refer collectively to these affidavits as the February Affidavits. At the hearing of the appeal, and without prior notice, the appellant sought to rely on a further affidavit sworn on 28 April 2026 (the April Affidavit). 43 The application to adduce additional evidence was opposed by the respondent. 44 The court has power to admit further evidence and that power is wide.29 The court must otherwise decide an appeal on the evidence that was before the lower court.30 45 The first affidavit, being Folio 16, is an affidavit of the appellant sworn on 12 February 2026. The affidavit sets out the appellant's evidence as to the events which occurred on 8 June 2024. It is a three page affidavit, containing 43 paragraphs. The second affidavit, being Folio 17, is an affidavit of the appellant also sworn on 12 February 2026. The affidavit sets out the appellant's evidence as to the events which occurred on 2 November 2024. It is a three page affidavit, containing 29 paragraphs. Both affidavits attach photographs of the injuries sustained by the appellant during the arrests. 46 The February Affidavits do not contain any new or fresh evidence. It is apparent that the matters set out in the February Affidavits were all known by the appellant at the time of trial, or were available to her when she gave evidence. As noted earlier, the appellant elected to testify at trial. 47 There is no basis for the reception of the February Affidavits, in my view. Generally speaking, the power to admit further evidence on appeal under the CAA is not a power to permit an accused party to re- state their evidence at trial in a different manner, or in a way which the party might consider better states their position. To allow evidence of this nature on appeal would undermine the role and purpose of the trial at first instance. Further, there is nothing contained within the two 28 Orders made by Forrester J on 4 March 2026. 29 CAA, s 40(1)(e). 30 CAA, s 39. -- 17 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 18 affidavits which raises a doubt as to the convictions entered at first instance, or which suggests there has been some miscarriage of justice. 48 As to the April Affidavit, the respondent's opposition to that material was less forceful than in relation to the February Affidavits. The April Affidavit incorporates various communications between the appellant, the Fines Enforcement Registry and the Magistrates Court, concerning the status of the licence suspension orders. There is no legitimate basis for permitting this material to be adduced on appeal, given it could have been adduced at trial and, in any event, I consider it is of no evidentiary assistance to the resolution of the appeal grounds. 49 I will therefore dismiss the application to adduce additional evidence, in respect of the February Affidavits and the April Affidavit, and will proceed to determine the grounds of appeal on the materials which were before the Magistrate at first instance. Disposition of the appeal 50 The appellant's grounds of appeal are not easy to follow and overlap to a large extent. Certainly, the boundaries between each of the grounds is far from crisp. The appellant filed several documents in the course of the appeal proceedings which raise issues which provide some broad explanation of the grounds of appeal, although they were not organised in a coherent manner.31 51 Recognising the appellant is not legally represented, some allowance must be given to the appellant in this regard, and a broad reading of the appeal grounds should be adopted, rather than a narrow or pedantic one. 52 Consistent with this, the approach taken by the respondent in its submissions, in opposing the appeal, was to examine the elements of the offences with which the appellant was charged, review the evidence at trial, and then review the findings and detailed reasons of the Magistrate. Having undertaken the review, the respondent submits that no error has been identified by the appellant.32 53 Having regard to the written material filed by the appellant and her oral submissions at the appeal hearing, it seems to me the contentions advanced by the appellant may usefully be organised under six 31 Folios 18, 19, and 20. 32 RS [32] - [40]. -- 18 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 19 headings, each addressing a thematic issue raised by the appellant. I have addressed these issues at [58] to [131] below. 54 Before I address these issues, I should observe that the appellant's first appeal ground is drafted in rather general terms, asserting a lack of procedural fairness by reference to the principles expressed by the High Court in Dietrich v The Queen.33 That ground was clarified by the appellant on appeal as being directed to the disqualification point, with the appellant pointing to the absence of any conviction as a precursor to her licence suspension and disqualification.34 55 Prior to the appeal hearing, the respondent had addressed appeal ground 1 in its written submissions by reference to the appellant's lack of legal representation at trial.35 That is how I had understood the ground, as well. For the avoidance of doubt, had this appeal ground been directed to a lack of legal representation at trial, the challenge would not have been arguable, in my view. 56 I would have reached that view because a person cannot be said to be deprived of a fair trial by reason of lack of representation if he or she refuses to take reasonable steps that are necessary to obtain legal representation.36 Where an accused person wishes to be legally represented at trial, the onus is on that person to seek a stay and to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that he or she is indigent and that he or she has been unable to obtain legal representation, and that any such inability is not due to his or her fault.37 57 At first instance, the appellant did not apply for an adjournment of the trial, or a stay of the charges, in order to obtain legal representation. Further, she has not demonstrated that she is indigent. Nor would I describe the present offences as being 'serious criminal offences' as identified in Dietrich v The Queen. Issue 1 – the lawfulness of the appellant's licence disqualification 58 I understand the appellant challenges the finding made by the Magistrate, for the purposes of the two offences of driving without authority, that the appellant had been lawfully disqualified from 33 Dietrich v The Queen [1992] HCA 57; (1992) 177 CLR 292. 34 ts 68 (appeal hearing on 5 May 2026). 35 RS [27] - [31]. 36 McInnes v The Queen [1979] HCA 65; (1979) 143 CLR 575, 579 (Barwick CJ); Dietrich v The Queen (297 - 298), (311) (Mason CJ and McHugh J); VJS v The State of Western Australia [2017] WASCA 172 [157] (Mazza JA); and Scott v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2022] WASC 172 [34] (McGrath J). 37 VJS v The State of Western Australia [158]. -- 19 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 20 holding or obtaining a driver's licence by reason of licence suspension orders. 59 This challenge forms the basis of the appellant's appeal grounds 1, 3, 4 and 5. Indeed, appeal grounds 3 and 4 specifically refer to the suspension of the appellant's driver's licence. The offence provision 60 To address this aspect of the appellant's challenge, it is convenient to return to the offence provision and the basis on which the charges were laid. Section 49(1)(a) of the RTA establishes the offence of driving a motor vehicle on a road while not authorised under the provisions of the RTAA. In the present case, in respect of both offence dates, the prosecution alleged that the appellant had been disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence under a licence suspension order made under s 19 or s 43 of the FPINE Act. 61 As outlined earlier in these reasons, the prosecution relied on certificates issued under s 110(1) of the RTA and s 101C(1) of the FPINE Act in order to establish that the appellant had been disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence, and had no authority to drive on the relevant dates. The certificates described at [62] to [68] below were tendered at trial. The certificate relied upon by the prosecution 62 In respect of the offence on 8 June 2024, the prosecution relied on a certificate under s 110(1) of the RTA, which had been issued by an officer delegated by the Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Transport, dated 9 September 2024.38 63 This certificate was relied upon to establish that the appellant was disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence as at 8 June 2024, as a result of multiple licence suspension orders. The certificate relevantly states: I Michelle Aikin, being a person delegated by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Department of Transport to issue certificate evidence under Section 110 Road Traffic (Administration) Act 2008, certify that the driver's licence register maintained in accordance with Section 4(1)(a)(ii) of the Road Traffic (Authorisation to Drive) Act 2008 records that: 38 Exhibit 1. -- 20 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 21 … It is recorded that [the appellant] was disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence at the offence date; 08 June 2024 due to multiple licence suspension orders (LSO's) issued by the Department of Justice (Fines Enforcement Registry). It is recorded that the LSO's were in effect at the offence date and are still in effect at the date of this certificate. 64 The certificate concluded with a statement that the facts specified in the certificate 'appear or were derived from the driver's licence register or another record maintained by the CEO'. 65 Further, also in respect of the offence on 8 June 2024, the prosecution tendered five certificates which had been issued under s 101C(1) of the FPINE Act.39 The certificates were all issued on 5 September 2024. Each of the certificates is headed 'Certificate as to Licence Suspension Order'. Four of the certificates state that the appellant had been issued with an infringement notice for a traffic or parking offence, under pt 3 of the FPINE Act. One of the certificates stated that a Magistrate sitting in Armadale had imposed a fine on the appellant for an offence of no authority to drive a motor vehicle on the basis of unpaid fines, under pt 4 of the FPINE Act. 66 In each case, the certificate stated that: (a) the infringement notice or fine had had been registered under pt 3 of the FPINE Act (and under pt 4 in the case of the court fine); (b) an order to pay or elect had been issued by the Fines Enforcement Registry under s 17 of the FPINE Act in respect of the infringement notices, which had then been posted to the appellant; (c) a notice of intention to enforce had been issued under s 18 of the FPINE Act, which had then been posted to the appellant (and under s 42 in the case of the court fine); (d) a licence suspension order had been made suspending the appellant's driver's licence under s 19 of the FPINE Act (and under s 43 in the case of the court fine); 39 Exhibit 2. -- 21 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 22 (e) a notice confirming the licence suspension order had been issued under s 19 of the FPINE Act and posted to the appellant (and under s 43 in the case of the court fine); and (f) at the time of issuing the certificate, the licence suspension order had not been cancelled. 67 In respect of the offence committed on 2 November 2024, a certificate issued under s 110(3) of the RTAA was tendered by the prosecution, which evidenced that the Suzuki Vitara was registered to the appellant.40 68 Further, the prosecution tendered eight separate certificates issued on 13 January 2025 in order to establish the disqualification element of the offence committed on 2 November 2024,41 although this included the five certificates forming Exhibit 2 referred to above. Of the three additional certificates, one stated that the appellant had been issued with an infringement notice for a traffic offence under pt 3 of the FPINE Act, and the two other certificates stated that the appellant had been the subject of fines imposed by a Magistrate (sitting in Narrogin) for one offence of no authority to drive a motor vehicle on the basis of unpaid fines and one offence of speeding under pt 4 of the FPINE Act. The power to make a licence suspension order 69 Licence suspension orders may be made under either s 19 or s 43 of the FPINE Act. It is sufficient to set out the relevant terms of s 19 at this point, which applies in relation to an 'alleged offender' under pt 3: 19. Licence suspension order (1) The Registrar may make a licence suspension order in respect of an alleged offender to whom an infringement notice is issued - (a) if - (i) an order to pay or elect and notice of intention to enforce are issued in relation to the infringement notice; and (ii) the due date specified in the notice of intention to enforce has passed; and 40 Exhibit 5. 41 Exhibit 6. -- 22 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 23 (iii) the unpaid infringement amount in respect of the infringement notice has not been paid to the Registry; and (iv) the alleged offender has not made an election under section 21; or (b) if - (i) a balance payment order and notice of intention to enforce are issued in relation to the infringement notice; and (ii) the due date specified in the notice of intention to enforce has passed; and (iii) the unpaid infringement amount in respect of the infringement notice has not been paid to the Registry. (1A) Subsection (1) applies whether or not an enforcement warrant issued under section 21A is in force. (2) A licence suspension order is an order as to such of the matters in subsections (3) and (4) as the Registrar thinks fit. (2A) The Registrar cannot make a licence suspension order in respect of an alleged offender who is an individual if - (a) the alleged offender’s last known address is in a remote area; or (b) the alleged offender has given the Registrar information about the alleged offender’s personal circumstances that gives the Registrar reasonable grounds to believe that section 20A(3) would apply to the alleged offender if the licence suspension order were made. (3) If the alleged offender is an individual a licence suspension order may disqualify the alleged offender from one of the following: (a) from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence; or (b) from holding or obtaining a vehicle licence in respect of those vehicles specified in the order; or (c) from holding or obtaining a vehicle licence in respect of any vehicle. -- 23 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 24 … (5) A licence suspension order has effect on the date and at the time specified in the order, but the date and time must not be earlier than the date and time stated in the notice of intention to enforce and must not be earlier than when the order is made. (6) If the Registrar makes a licence suspension order, the Registrar must - (a) issue a notice confirming licence suspension; and (b) advise the Director General of the terms of the order forthwith. (7) A notice confirming licence suspension must be served on the alleged offender. (8) A notice confirming licence suspension must - (a) state that a licence suspension order has been made and explain the terms of the order; and (b) state the date and time when the licence suspension order has effect; and (c) explain that an alleged offender who is an individual can request that the order be cancelled under section 20A(1). (9) For the purposes of this Act and a road law, a licence suspension order - (a) takes effect on the date and at the time specified in the order; and (b) is in force from the time it takes effect to the time when it is cancelled; and (c) is concurrent with any other period for which the alleged offender is disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver’s licence. The appellant's arguments 70 The appellant submits, as I understand her arguments on appeal, that the two convictions recorded by the Magistrate for offences contrary to s 49(1)(a) of the RTA should be set aside on the basis that: (a) the licence suspension orders relied upon by the prosecution (and accepted by the Magistrate) are of no legal effect because -- 24 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 25 the appellant was denied procedural fairness before those orders were made; (b) the licence suspension orders relied upon by the prosecution (and accepted by the Magistrate) are of no legal effect because those orders were made through an invalid exercise of judicial power; (c) the licence suspension orders relied upon by the prosecution (and accepted by the Magistrate) are of no legal effect as being contrary to the presumption of innocence applicable to charges which allege that a person has committed a criminal offence; and (d) even if the foregoing arguments are not accepted, the certificates did not have the effect for which the prosecution contended and which the Magistrate accepted. Disposition 71 I do not accept the above arguments. They cannot be sustained on orthodox legal principles. The Magistrate correctly concluded, with respect, that the licence suspension orders were validly imposed and the certificates may be relied upon as evidence of the facts stated therein.42 In order to explain why, I will briefly describe the structure of the legislative regime, and then explain how it operates within those principles. 72 The FPINE Act is an Act that provides for the enforcement of the payment of fines and other penalties and for the enforcement of infringement notices and for related purposes.43 There are similar regimes in each State and Territory. The Second Reading Speech of the Fines, Penalties and Infringement Notice Enforcement Bill 1994 (WA) explained the context of the then proposed legislation as follows:44 This Bill … addresses critical problems experienced in the enforcement of fines and infringement notices in Western Australia. The Bill reflects the Government's stated commitment in its law and order policy to implementing a new approach to imprisonment by providing alternative sentencing options for offenders who do not represent a 42 ts 5, 90, 92 (6 May 2025) 43 FPINE Act, long title. 44 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 23 November 1994, 7498 - 7499, 7500 and 7501 (Mrs C L Edwardes AO, Attorney General). -- 25 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 26 danger to society, with imprisonment being a last option in those cases; and reducing the number of imprisoned offenders. The present system of fine and infringement notice enforcement allows, in fact encourages, people who do not satisfy their fines to serve default in prison. This system, which has evolved over the past decade, no longer serves the community of Western Australia well. As a consequence, a new, coordinated approach has been developed. The greatest [feature - sic] of the new system is that it will provide the option of suspending an offender's motor driver's or motor vehicle licence as a sanction for non-payment of fines imposed either by a court or under the current infringement notice provisions. With limited exceptions, this means that people who do not pay fines will no longer go to prison or serve time in a police lockup. … The new system has two separate parts. The first relates to fines imposed by the courts and the second to infringement notices. The court fine system recognises that enforcement is best managed administratively. Consequently, administrative officers will be empowered to consider and grant time to pay. This will reduce the time needed by judicial officers to deal with the administrative aspects of criminal matters in court. Judicial officers will retain the function of deciding whether a fine is appropriate and determining the amount of the fine. The Bill will also enhance sentencing flexibility by allowing stipendiary magistrates to order serious offenders convicted of indictable offences to remain in custody until the fine is paid. One such example might be where the magistrate considers that there is a likelihood that the offender may leave the country. After the imposition of a fine, the offender will be required to report to the managing registrar. The registrar will determine a time-to-pay arrangement based on an examination of the offender's income, expenditure and assets. In addition, the managing registrar will provide information relating to methods of payment and the consequences of the new enforcement mechanisms. … Safeguards: The infringement notice system allows the offender ample opportunity to pay the penalty and gives considerable notice before any suspension is effected. In addition, the offender will always have the option of referring the matter to the Court of Petty Sessions for determination. In the court system the offender may apply to the court for a rehearing should the notice of suspension not come to his or her attention and if the offender was not present at the hearing. 73 Pursuant to pt 2 of the FPINE Act, the Fines Enforcement Registry was established, as part of the Magistrates Court, with a Registrar to be appointed to the Registry. The legislation provides that any notice, -- 26 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 27 order or warrant issued by the Registrar is to be taken to be a notice, order or warrant issued by the Magistrates Court: s 7(3). 74 I can then turn to the 'two separate parts' to the legislation referred to in the second reading speech, which are found in pt 3 and pt 4. 75 Part 3 of the FPINE Act is headed 'Infringement Notices', and establishes a regime by which 'infringement notices' may be issued to an 'alleged offender' by a 'prosecuting authority' under a written law. The regime provides for the notices to be made the subject of final demands, to be registered with the Fines Enforcement Registry, to be made the subject of orders to pay or elect issued by the Registrar, for notices of intention to enforce to be issued by the Registrar, for licence suspensions orders to be made by the Registrar, and to allow for processes by which an 'alleged offender' may request cancellation of a 'licence suspension order'. Additionally, 'time to pay orders' may be sought from the Registrar by an 'alleged offender'. 76 Part 4 of the FPINE Act is headed 'Fines' and establishes a regime for the payment, registration and enforcement of 'fines', being monetary penalties imposed on an offender by a court in criminal proceedings for an offence, with some inclusions and some exceptions stated within the legislation. As with pt 3 of the legislation, this part incorporates provisions which allow an offender to seek a 'time to pay order', authorise the Registrar to issue a notice of intention to enforce a 'registered fine', permit the Registrar to make 'licence suspension orders', and allow for processes by which an 'offender' may request cancellation of a 'licence suspension order'. The regime includes various enforcement mechanisms including 'work and development permits', 'work and development orders', 'fine expiation orders', and 'warrants of commitment'. 77 While the broad structures in pt 3 and pt 4 are similar, the regime in pt 3 has a significant difference to the regime in pt 4. The former is concerned with 'alleged offenders' who have not been the subject of any determination by a court in criminal proceedings, and which thus involve no court sanction or admission of guilt. The latter is concerned with 'offenders' who have been the subject of fines imposed by a court in criminal proceedings. 78 As defined in s 11, the term 'infringement notice' for the purposes of pt 3 means a notice issued under a written law to a person 'alleging the commission of an offence and offering the person an opportunity, -- 27 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 28 by paying an amount of money prescribed under the written law or specified in the notice, to have the matter dealt with out of court'. The regime consistently refers to an 'alleged offence' and to an 'alleged offender'. The regime allows such a person the opportunity to pay the modified penalty stated within the infringement notice or subsequent demand, but it does not compel them to do so. 79 It is central to the regime in pt 3 that an 'alleged offender' who is issued with an infringement notice that has been registered under s 15 (following a final demand having been issued under s 14), and subject to certain time constraints, may make the election contemplated by s 21 of the FPINE Act (as may the 'prosecuting authority' who issued the infringement notice). If such an election is made, the Registrar is required to lodge with a court of summary jurisdiction (that has jurisdiction to deal with the 'alleged offence' and the 'alleged offender') a prosecution notice in relation to the alleged offence: s 21(4)(a). In effect, the election triggers the process by which the alleged offence will be dealt with by the Magistrates Court, in the usual way. 80 As to the appellant's contention that she was denied procedural fairness prior to the various licence suspension orders being made by the Registrar, this point is answered by s 103 of the FPINE Act. Section 103 provides as follows: 103. Exclusion of rules of natural justice The rules known as the rules of natural justice (including any duty of procedural fairness) do not apply to or in relation to the doing or omission of any act, matter or thing under this Act by the Registrar, the CEO (fines enforcement) or the CEO (corrections). 81 It is understandable that the requirements of procedural fairness have been excluded, given the structure and purpose of the regime, and the enormous administrative burden which would be created if those rules had their usual application. 82 The appellant further contends that the making of licence suspension orders by the Registrar under pt 3 of the FPINE Act involves an invalid exercise of judicial power. That is not correct. The detailed regime in pt 3 affords persons who are impacted by it the opportunity to comply with an infringement notice once it has been issued, or to contest the notice. The infringement notice does not establish the liability of the person in respect of the underlying -- 28 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 29 allegation. Rather, it affords the person an opportunity to elect under s 21 to contest the allegation in question. 83 However, where there has been no election by the 'alleged offender' under s 21, the power in s 19 may be exercised by the Registrar by making a 'licence suspension order'. Such an order is administrative in nature. The effect of this process, and such an order, is that an 'alleged offender' may have their entitlement to drive a motor vehicle suspended by an administrative act, as in the present case. 84 The process by which a 'licence suspension order' is issued under pt 3 of the FPINE Act is submitted by the appellant to involve an exercise of judicial power with respect to the conduct alleged against the person. This argument first requires one to clarify what is meant by an exercise of judicial power. 85 The 'unique and essential function' of the judicial power is the quelling of a controversy between persons, or between the sovereign authority and persons, by ascertaining the facts, by application of the law and by the exercise, where appropriate, of judicial discretion.45 Put another way, and recognising that judicial power cannot be exhaustively defined, the exercise of the judicial power 'involves the application of the relevant law to facts as found in proceedings conducted in accordance with the judicial process', which 'requires that the parties be given an opportunity to present their evidence and [at least ordinarily] to challenge the evidence led against them'.46 Further, it has been held that these standard non-exhaustive descriptions of the nature of judicial power and the incidents of its exercise apply to the determination of criminal punishment no less than to the determination of criminal guilt.47 86 The appellant's arguments on appeal in this regard proceed on the basis that the separation of powers principle precludes an officer holder such as the Registrar appointed under pt 2 of the FPINE Act, from exercising judicial power. Implicit in the appellant's arguments is that only the judiciary in this State may exercise judicial power. The appellant's contention is pregnant with a number of unstated steps in its reasoning, bearing in mind the separation of powers principle operates differently at Federal and State level. For present purposes, it is 45 Fencott v Muller (1982) 152 CLR 570, 608 (Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane JJ). 46 Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd [1999] HCA 9; (1999) 198 CLR 334 [56] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ). 47 Magaming v The Queen [2013] HCA 40; (2013) 252 CLR 381 [66] (Gageler J, as his Honour then was). -- 29 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 30 sufficient to assume without deciding that a characterisation of the powers of the Registrar as judicial in nature would render the exercise of those powers impermissible. 87 The licence suspension orders made under pt 3 do not have the character asserted by the appellant. Such orders are administrative in nature, and do not determine the criminal liability of the person in respect of the conduct which is alleged. No finding is made by the Registrar as to the underlying facts. An order made by a Registrar under pt 3 of the FPINE Act by which a person is disqualified from holding a driver's licence operates to qualify that person's permission to drive a motor vehicle, in the terms indicated, which is subject to any cancellation of that order under s 20 or s 20A of the FPINE Act. It is to be remembered that persons in this State require an authority to drive a motor vehicle, which is subject to conditions. 88 The process in pt 3 does not determine the liability of the 'alleged offender' in respect of the 'alleged offence' – the question of liability remains undetermined. Instead, the legislation authorises the Registrar to impose an administrative consequence by issuing an order that the person be disqualified from holding or obtaining a driver's licence: s 19(3). That is a distinctly different step to a judicial determination of the person's guilt or innocence in respect of the underlying offence. 89 Proceeding on the assumption identified in the last sentence at [86] above, the analysis I have undertaken yields the strong conclusion that the exercise of the powers of the Registrar to make a licence suspension order under pt 3 of the FPINE Act involves no exercise or impermissible trespass onto judicial power. The appellant's submissions to the contrary represent a misunderstanding of the concept of judicial power and the manner in which the regime operates. The statutory power to make a licence suspension order under pt 3 is triggered by the non-payment of the fine stipulated within the infringement notice and by the failure by the 'alleged offender' to make the election which is permitted by s 21 of the FPINE Act. 90 Importantly, the regime in pt 3 of the FPINE Act accommodates an 'alleged offender' who maintains they have not committed any breach of the law, by permitting that person to make the election under s 21 to have the matter dealt with by a court. In that event, no licence suspension order can be made by the Registrar, given the terms of s 19(1)(a)(iv) of the FPINE Act. -- 30 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 31 91 In any event, it is important to recall in the present case that the appellant was disqualified from holding a driver's licence not only by reason of infringement notices issued under pt 3 of the FPINE Act, but also, in each case, for fines imposed by a Magistrate in the exercise of the criminal jurisdiction, and through the operation of pt 4 of the FPINE Act. So, even if the appellant was correct in her challenge to the operation of pt 3 of the FPINE Act and it were found that the licence suspension orders made under s 19 were invalid (and I have rejected that argument), the appellant had also been disqualified from holding a driver's licence pursuant to licence suspension orders made under pt 4 of the FPINE Act (specifically, s 43) as at both offence dates. Those licence suspension orders were made as a consequence of criminal convictions recorded, and fines imposed, by a Magistrate.48 92 Given the foregoing analysis, no question arises within the context of the operation of pt 3 of the FPINE Act as to the preservation of the innocence of the 'alleged offender'. The important principle referred to by the appellant in appeal ground 5, that it is for the prosecution to prove each element of an offence beyond reasonable doubt,49 is not infringed by this legislative regime because the criminal liability of the 'alleged offender' is not determined through that regime. 93 Further, the operation of s 101C(1) of the FPINE Act does not infringe the presumption of innocence. The provision does not operate to shift the legal onus or standard of proof in a prosecution. This section provides a means for the prosecution to meet its onus and the standard of proof, by proving through the production of a certificate that a licence suspension order was duly made under the legislation, among other matters. Section 101C(1) operates as an evidentiary facilitative provision which assists in proving various matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 94 Additionally, s 101C(2) and (3) operate to establish a presumption that any preconditions to taking action under the legislation were done (and were done in accordance with the law), and that the certificate relied upon was duly signed. 48 A fine was imposed by a Magistrate on 12 October 2023, leading to a licence suspension order made on 13 December 2023 (see part of Exhibit 2). Fines were imposed by a Magistrate on 23 July 2024, leading to a licence suspension order made on 24 September 2024 (see part of Exhibit 5). 49 See Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462 and R v Mullen [1938] HCA 12; (1938) 59 CLR 124. Further, the presumption of innocence forms part of Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a treaty to which Australia is a signatory. -- 31 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 32 95 The certificates issued under s 101C of the FPINE Act, and under s 110(1) of the RTA, are not expressed to be prima facie evidence or conclusive evidence of the matters stated within the certificates. As the Magistrate correctly apprehended, the provisions operate to treat the facts stated in the certificates as admissible evidence of those facts.50 96 Once the validity of licence suspension orders made under pt 3 of the FPINE Act is accepted, there is no viable argument that the certificates tendered by the prosecution in this case, and relied upon by the Magistrate, did not have the effect which he found. The certificates relied upon in respect of the offence on 8 June 2024 (being Exhibits 1 and 2), and the certificates relied upon in respect of the offence on 2 November 2024 (being Exhibits 5 and 6), demonstrated that the appellant had no authority to drive a motor vehicle on those occasions. There was no evidence to the contrary. 97 As to the validity of licence suspension orders made under pt 4 of the FPINE Act, the concerns raised by the appellant may similarly be rejected. Those orders are made in the context of fines imposed by a court in criminal proceedings, following the judicial determination of the person's criminal liability. That this may occur in the absence of the offender, such as through the operation of the process in s 55 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), does not weaken this conclusion. 98 I should record that similar arguments to those raised by the appellant were considered by McWilliam J in Topic v Director of Public Prosecutions,51 in the context of the infringement notice regime which operates in the Australian Capital Territory under the Road Transport (Driver Licensing) Act 1999 (ACT). Her Honour addressed, and rejected, the challenges in that case to the validity of the infringement notice regime, at [42] to [48] and [86] to [90]. I respectfully agree with the observations of, and the conclusions reached by, her Honour as stated in those paragraphs. 99 For the foregoing reasons, the appellant's challenge to the validity of the licence suspension orders, and her challenge to the prosecution's reliance on the certificates tendered under s 101C of the FPINE Act and under s 110 of the RTA, which challenges I have summarised at [70] above, must be rejected. 50 Porter v Kelly [2024] WASC 282 [38] – [40] (Musikanth J). 51 Topic v Director of Public Prosecutions [2024] ACTSC 398. -- 32 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 33 Issue 2 – entitlement to a procedurally fair trial 100 I understand the appellant challenges the fairness of the trial process in a general sense. This is evident from her appeal ground 2, which is drafted in broad terms. 101 An accused is entitled to a fair trial in accordance with law. An accused's right to a fair trial in accordance with law is ensured, and informed, by the rules of law and of practice designed to regulate the course of the trial. One of the requirements of a fair trial is that the accused be afforded procedural fairness. 102 I accept it is necessary to have regard to the entire trial record to determine whether the appellant received a fair trial.52 Having undertaken that review, it can be said that the Magistrate adopted a patient approach to the appellant's presentation of her defence and, in my view, properly ensured that the appellant received a fair trial. 103 In particular, in the present case, the Magistrate gave the appellant, as he was obliged to do given she was unrepresented, such information and advice as was necessary to ensure a fair trial.53 His Honour also explained, as required by s 30 of the Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA), the rule in Browne v Dunn concerning the cross- examination of witnesses.54 104 There is no merit to this aspect of the appellant's challenge. Issue 3 – whether the officers held a reasonable suspicion 105 The appellant challenges the finding of the Magistrate, in both incidents, that the police officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion in order to provide the necessary basis for the directions they gave, requiring the appellant to provide her personal details. This forms part of her appeal ground 2. 106 The appellant submits that, without such a suspicion the officers were not entitled to direct her to provide the personal details described in s 32(1) of the RTAA. 107 The respondent submits the Magistrate was entitled to find, on the available evidence, that the officers held the reasonable suspicion on both occasions, and there is no basis to criticise the ultimate conclusion 52 Scott v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [42]. 53 ts 2 -3 (6 May 2025). 54 ts 3 (6 May 2025). -- 33 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 34 reached by the Magistrate that the offences under s 32(4)(a) and (b) of the RTAA were established beyond reasonable doubt. 108 I will address this aspect of the appeal by first identifying the elements of the offences in question. The offence created by s 32(4)(a) RTAA, of failing to comply with a direction, requires the following matters to be established, speaking generally. 109 First, a police officer must have given the defendant a direction either pursuant to s 32(2) or s 32(3), to give the officer 'then and there any or all of the person's personal details', if those details are not known by the officer. 110 Second, the officer must have held one of the reasonable suspicions identified in s 32(2), such as that the person has committed an offence under a road law, or may be able to assist in the investigation of an offence under a road law. There are several matters identified in s 32(2) which might form the basis of the necessary reasonable suspicion. 111 Third, the officer must have warned the person that failure to comply with the direction is an offence. This is the defence established by s 32(5). 112 Fourth, it must be shown the person failed to comply with the direction, recognising that the defendant may rely upon a 'reasonable excuse' for failing to so comply. 113 The offence created by s 32(4)(b) RTAA, of giving false or misleading details in response to a direction, requires that the first and second matters referred to above be demonstrated. Additionally, it must be shown that the details provided by the person were false or misleading. 114 Turning to the evidence before the Magistrate, and the findings made at the conclusion of the trial, I can discern no error in relation to his Honour's satisfaction that the police officers gave directions to the appellant, on both occasions the subject of the two charges, to require that she provide her name and address. Indeed, there were numerous such requests on each occasion, made in clear terms. 115 Further, as to the offence contrary to s 32(4)(b) RTA found to have been committed on 8 June 2024, the Magistrate had evidence before him that the appellant provided a false name to Constable -- 34 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 35 Koreman. That was largely unchallenged and was recorded on the body-worn camera. As to the offence contrary to s 32(4)(a) RTA found to have been committed on 2 November 2024, the Magistrate had evidence before him that the appellant refused to provide her name and details to Sergeant Vieceli, and that the officer had provided the appellant with the prior warning required by s 32(5) RTA. That was also largely unchallenged and was recorded on the body-worn camera. 116 Both offences, as earlier noted, required that the prosecution establish on the evidence that the officers, on each of the two occasions, held one of the identified reasonable suspicions as a precursor to giving the direction. The Magistrate was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt in this regard and I cannot discern any factual error. It is this aspect of the offences which was squarely challenged by the appellant on appeal. 117 As to the offence found to have occurred on 8 June 2024, his Honour had evidence from Constable Koreman that she had observed the appellant pull her car into a parking bay immediately prior to a 'Booze Bus' stop. Such conduct, in the nature of avoidance, was sufficient to ground a reasonable suspicion on the part of the officer, which she testified that she held, that the driver of the vehicle may have committed an offence under a road law.55 Constable Koreman gave evidence during cross-examination that:56 So pulling into the parking bay, avoidance, being avoidant to my questions, not wanting to give your correct details, that led me to form the suspicion, and also with that prior history and dealings with other people, my experiences with traffic. 118 As to the events on 2 November 2024, the reasonable suspicion was founded on the ANPR alert, together with the observations made by the officers that the driver appeared to match the registered owner's appearance.57 Sergeant Vieceli testified that:58 I observed the driver to be of similar appearance. I advised the driver that we were stopping the vehicle for the purposes of checking the driver’s licence as the registered owner did not have a driver’s licence, a valid driver’s licence, and the driver has stated that she was not under – words to the effect of she was not under arrest and she does not have to abide by any of our laws. 55 ts 12, 19 - 20 (6 May 2025). 56 ts 20 (6 May 2025). 57 ts 37 (6 May 2025). 58 ts 37 (6 May 2025). -- 35 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 36 119 These matters provided an ample evidentiary foundation for the findings made by the Magistrate at first instance. Accordingly, there is no basis to impugn the Magistrate's findings in this regard. Issue 4 – the lawfulness of the appellant's arrest 120 The appellant challenges the lawfulness of her arrest and the admissibility of evidence obtained by the police officers which was tendered at trial. This forms part of her appeal ground 2. 121 This issue was addressed by the Magistrate in his reasons. His Honour concluded that the offences in question, on both occasions, were all complete by the time the appellant was arrested.59 His Honour described the manner of the appellant's arrest as 'unremarkable' and he could not discern any 'application of excessive force'.60 122 Speaking for myself at least, I recognise that Magistrates sitting in the criminal jurisdiction would have a relatively deeper experience than this court in reviewing police arrest cases, and assessing the use of force in such cases. Even so, I am in the position that I have reviewed the arrest footage myself and can say from that review that there is no basis to interfere with the findings made by the Magistrate. 123 But the critical point is, in any event, the arrest of the appellant in each circumstance occurred after the offences had been committed and, further, there was no relevant evidence collected after her arrest which was relied upon by the prosecution in support of the charges. Accordingly, the appellant's general challenge to the admissibility of evidence on the basis it was unlawfully or improperly obtained goes nowhere. Issue 5 – the presumption of innocence 124 The appellant challenges her convictions on the basis of a failure to observe the presumption of innocence, which appears to form part of the appellant's appeal ground 5. I have referred to the presumption earlier in these reasons in the context of the challenge to the validity of the appellant's licence suspension. The Magistrate expressly recognised this principle in his oral reasons, and properly had regard to this principle. There is no doubt in this regard. 125 Leave to appeal on this basis will be refused. 59 ts 98 (6 May 2025). 60 ts 98 (6 May 2025). -- 36 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 37 Issue 6 – the challenge to the sentences imposed 126 The respondent notes that the grounds of appeal as drafted by the appellant each concern challenges to the convictions, but recognises that the appeal notice itself also refers to an appeal against sentence. Relatedly, the appellant filed an application in an appeal on 12 February 2026 which appears to challenge the sentences imposed.61 127 I have proceeded on the basis that there is a broad challenge by the appellant to the sentences imposed by the Magistrate and note the appellant made some reference to her sentence during the appeal hearing. 128 For my part, to the extent there is any challenge to the sentences, I cannot discern any error in the approach of the Magistrate at first instance. The Magistrate heard from the prosecution and from the appellant on the issue of sentence, although it is evident from the transcript the appellant remained confrontational at that point.62 129 The Magistrate gave consideration to making an order to disqualify the appellant from obtaining a driver's licence for a certain period, as a personal deterrent, but ultimately decided that such an order should not be made.63 130 The Magistrate referred to the appellant's prior convictions and lack of remorse, and noted there was no discount for any plea of guilty.64 The Magistrate expressly enquired as to the appellant's employment situation.65 The Magistrate then proceeded to impose fines for each of the offences. The available sentences included imprisonment for not more than 12 months for the offences under s 49(1) of the RTA, but determined that such a disposition would not be appropriate. 131 The fines imposed by the Magistrate for the four offences were consistent with the statutory penalties provided for in the RTA and the RTAA. On their face, the quantum of the fines reflected the conduct of the appellant which formed the basis for the offences, her prior convictions, and her lack of remorse. There is no discernible error in 61 Folio 15. 62 ts 100 - 106 (6 May 2025). 63 ts 99 - 102 (6 May 2025). The Magistrate had the discretion to impose a disqualification from holding or obtaining a driver's licence for a period of not more than three years. 64 ts 105 - 106 (6 May 2025). 65 ts 100 (6 May 2025). -- 37 of 38 -- [2026] WASC 175 LUNDBERG J Page 38 imposing monetary penalties in respect of these charges, as opposed to some other disposition. Conclusion and orders 132 For the foregoing reasons, I will dismiss the appellant's application to adduce further evidence on the appeal, and refuse leave to appeal on each of the grounds of appeal advanced by the appellant, which I have in effect addressed at [58] to [131] above. The appeal itself will therefore be dismissed. 133 I will hear from the parties in due course as to the cost orders which should now be made. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. IR Associate to the Hon Justice Lundberg 8 MAY 2026 -- 38 of 38 --
Official source: https://ecourts.justice.wa.gov.au/eCourtsPortal/Decisions/ViewDecision?id=8dd8cfb6-ce09-462a-8e7d-142b4985d968