KARUDALE PTY LTD Director of Company: MR D GARDNER v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2026] SASC 25

On Appeal from MAGISTRATES COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (MAGISTRATE SCHULZ) MCCRM-24-026055 Appellant: KARUDALE PTY LTD Director of Company: MR D GARDNER Respondent: COMMISSIONER OF POLICE Counsel: MS V RAJARAMANAN - Solicitor: CROWN SOLICITORS OFFICE (CSO) Hearing Date/s: 13/11/2025 File No/s: SCCRM-25-031264 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Appeal to a Single Judge) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. KARUDALE PTY LTD v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2026] SASC 25 Judgment of the Honourable Justice McIntyre 5 March 2026 MAGISTRATES - APPEAL AND REVIEW - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - APPEAL TO SUPREME COURT TRAFFIC LAW - OFFENCES - PARTICULAR OFFENCES - EXCEEDING PRESCRIBED SPEED LIMITS - GENERALLY TRAFFIC LAW - OFFENCES - EVIDENCE - PROOF OF SPEED This is an appeal against conviction. The appellant is charged with being the owner of a vehicle that was driven at a speed 10 – 19 kilometres per hour over the speed limit contrary to r 20 of the Australian Road Rules and s 79B of the Road Traffic Act 1981 (SA). At commencement of trial, the appellant sought leave for an employee to appear on its behalf. The trial Magistrate declined to grant leave. Subsequently, the appellant made applications for recusal of the trial Magistrate and for adjournment of the trial. Ex tempore rulings were delivered, dismissing the applications. Those rulings are also subject of this appeal. The appellant appeals on several interrelated grounds. In relation to the interlocutory rulings, the appellant contends that the trial Magistrate gave inadequate reasons and had regard to irrelevant considerations. It is said that this amounted to procedural unfairness. In relation to the conviction, the appellant contends that the Magistrate erroneously applied legal principles or, in the alternative, that the verdict as unreasonable, as it was not supported by the evidence. The respondent contends that the appellant has demonstrated no error in the Magistrate’s approach or findings and that the verdict was available on the evidence. It is said that the evidence before the Court was admitted correctly and disclosed in accordance with the respondent’s obligations. -- 1 of 17 -- Held, dismissing the appeal: 1. Under r 26.1(4)(b) of the Joint Criminal Rules 2022 (SA), where the party is a company, the representative must be a director of that company. “An officer” is only permitted to appear for “other” legal entities. 2. In relation to the interlocutory rulings, there was no procedural unfairness and the Magistrate gave adequate reasons for dismissal. 3. The final verdict was available on the evidence and there is no demonstratable error in the Magistrate’s approach. Australian Road Rules (SA) r 20; Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) ss 79B, 175(3); Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) s 140; Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 42; Road Traffic (Miscellaneous) Regulations 2014 (SA) regs 29(1)(c)(ia), 30(2)(c); Joint Criminal Rules 2022 (SA) rr 26.1, 46, 47, Part 11; Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) s 26, 177; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 9AD, referred to. Robinson Helicopter Company Inc v McDermott (2016) 331 ALR 550; Grange Legal Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police [2025] SASC 14; Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 273 CLR 289; Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337; Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181; DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1; Police v Butcher (2014) 119 SASR 509; Coleman v Police [2024] SASCA 30; Police v Karudale Pty Ltd [2025] SAMC 116; Edwards v The Queen (2021) 273 CLR 585; Di Fede v Police [2023] SASC 30, considered. -- 2 of 17 -- KARUDALE PTY LTD v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE [2026] SASC 25 Single Judge Appeal: Criminal 1 The appellant, Karudale Pty Ltd, was charged with being the owner of a vehicle that was driven at a speed that was 10 – 19 kilometres per hour over the speed limit contrary to r 20 of the Australian Road Rules (‘ARR’) and s 79B of the Road Traffic Act 1961 (SA) (‘RTA’). 2 A trial proceeded in the Magistrate’s Court of South Australia. The prosecution relied solely upon documentary evidence. The appellant was represented by its director, Mr Darren Gardner (‘Mr Gardner’), who was the only witness for the appellant. The learned Magistrate found that the charge was proven beyond reasonable doubt and convicted the appellant on 18 July 2025. The appellant appeals both the decision and interlocutory rulings of the learned Magistrate on the grounds set out in revision one of its amended appeal grounds. 3 For the reasons that follow, I dismiss the appeal. Background 4 The Information filed on 10 July 2024 charged the appellant under r 20 of the ARR and s 79B of the RTA. The particulars of the charge allege that, on 7 April 2024 at Meadows, the appellant company was the owner of a vehicle with South Australian registration number YY571N (‘the vehicle’) and that the vehicle was captured on a photographic detection device driving at about 61 kilometres per hour on a length of Battunga Road where the speed limit was 50 kilometres per hour. The charge also alleged that the photographic detection device complied with the requirements of the RTA. 5 Following some procedural hearings, the matter was listed for trial on 20 June 2025. Prior to the commencement of the trial, a person who identified himself as the Corporate Services Officer of the appellant sought leave to appear on behalf of the appellant. The Magistrate delivered ex tempore reasons declining leave. This is, in part, the subject of the appeal. The director of the appellant, Mr Gardner then represented the company. He contended that the Magistrate ought to recuse herself on the basis of her involvement in previous hearings. He also sought an adjournment of the trial given what he described as “the change in circumstances”. The Magistrate delivered ex tempore reasons declining those two applications. Again, these rulings are the subject of the appeal. 6 The matter proceeded to trial. The prosecutor relied on documentary evidence, which were statutory aids to proof contained in the RTA and the Motor Vehicles Act 1959 (SA) (‘MVA’). The documents tendered were exhibits P1 to P7 as follows: • P1: Certified extract from the entry in the registrar of motor vehicles. -- 3 of 17 -- [2026] SASC 25 McIntyre J 2 • P2: Certificate signed by Chief Inspector Krystina Koza certifying that before the prosecution was commenced the appellant was given an expiation notice and an opportunity to expiate the offence. • P3: Certificate of Inspector Jaimi Burns certifying that a REDFLEXradarcam mobile dual radar digital camera system, device number 522 (‘the device’), formed part of a traffic speed analyser used at Battunga Road, Meadows during the relevant period on 7 April 2024. • P4: Certificate of accuracy of speedometer of Inspector Jaimi Burns dated 11 June 2024 certifying that a speedometer attached to a South Australian vehicle with registration S588CCP was tested on 9 February 2024. When the speedometer was registering 50 kilometres per hour it indicated that the actual speed was 48 kilometres per hour. • P5: Certificate of accuracy of traffic speed analyser indicated that the device was tested on 7 April 2024 by comparison with the speedometer attached to South Australian vehicle registration number S558CCP and was shown to be accurate to the extent that the device registered 47 kilometres per hour when the speedometer registered 50 kilometres per hour. • P6: Photograph of the vehicle approaching the camera location and containing the date, location code, time and vehicle speed. • P7: Photograph of the vehicle travelling away from the camera location containing the date, location code, time and vehicle speed. 7 The appellant sought to tender documents in response that purport to be “procedural forensic analysis reports” by an assessor Mr Roy Brownson, each of which is dated 19 June 2025. These reports challenge the information in the certificates and photographs tendered on the prosecution case. The Magistrate found that the documents were inadmissible as expert reports but marked them for identification as D8 to D12 inclusive and treated them as written submissions. 8 The appellant’s director, Mr Gardner, gave oral evidence. He said that he was interstate on the date of the offence and did know who was driving the vehicle. He asserted that the photographic detection device was not operated properly, that the certificates tendered on the prosecution case did not comply with the legislation and that complete disclosure had not occurred. 9 On 23 July 2025, the learned Magistrate delivered reasons for her finding that the offence was proven beyond reasonable doubt. As outlined in her reasons for decision at paragraph 26, her Honour made the following findings: Based on the uncontradicted evidence relied upon by prosecution, I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that at 10:14:34 on 7 April 2024: -- 4 of 17 -- [2026] SASC 25 McIntyre J 3 • A photographic detection device was located on Battunga Road, Meadows. • The speed limit for vehicles travelling on the length of Battunga Road where the photographic detection device was located was 50 km/h. • The photographic detection device was designed and set to operate and did operate in accordance with the provisions of the RTA and relevant regulations. • The photographic detection device accurately recorded the speed of vehicles travelling Battunga Road to the extent that the device registered 47 km/h when the speedometer attached to vehicle registration S558CCP registered 50 km/h. • The speedometer attached to vehicle registration S558CCP registered a speed of 50km/h when the actual speed of that vehicle was 48 km/h. • The defendant was the owner of a black BMW station wagon with vehicle registration YY571N. • That vehicle was photographed by the photographic detection device travelling at a speed of 61 km/h and this photograph is in evidence as exhibit P6. • The information recorded in the data block on exhibit P6 is accurate. • The vehicle was being driven at a speed of about 61 km/h which exceeded the speed limit applicable to that stretch of road by 10 to 19 km/h. The appeal 10 This appeal was lodged on 5 August 2025, and the grounds of appeal were amended on 5 November 2025. 11 The appellant’s right of appeal arises under s 42 of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA). It is governed by Chapter 9 Part 3 of the Joint Criminal Rules 2022 (SA) (‘JCR’). It is by way of rehearing. It is not an appeal de novo and usually proceeds on the documents, albeit with the power to receive additional evidence. In this case, no additional evidence was called. 12 A court hearing an appeal is required to conduct real and independent review of the evidence before the trial Magistrate and to come to its own conclusions. The court must, however, make due allowance for the advantage of the Magistrate in seeing and hearing the evidence given at trial.1 13 In this matter there was very limited contest as to facts. The prosecution case proceeded on the documents and the appellant called only one witness, Mr Gardner, who was not in a position to give evidence as to the facts. The issue rests primarily upon the appropriate application of the law, some procedural matters and the correct application of the statutory presumptions contained in s 140 of the MVA and s 79B(9) of the RTA. 1 Robinson Helicopter Company Inc v McDermott (2016) 331 ALR 550 at 687. -- 5 of 17 -- [2026] SASC 25 McIntyre J 4 Legislation & statutory presumptions 14 The charge was laid, inter alia, under r 20 of the ARR which provides as follows: 20—Obeying the speed limit A driver must not drive at a speed over the speed limit applying to the driver for the length of road where the driver is driving. ……… 15 Rule 20 of the ARR relates to a driver of the vehicle but s 79B(2) of the RTA relevantly provides as follows: 79B—Provisions applying where certain offences are detected by photographic detention devices (2) If a vehicle appears from evidence obtained through the operation of a photographic detection device to have been involved in the commission of a prescribed offence, the owner of the vehicle is guilty of an offence against this section unless it is proved— ……… 16 Rule 20 of the ARR is a prescribed offence under reg 30(2)(c) of the Road Traffic (Miscellaneous) Regulations 2014 (SA) (‘Miscellaneous Regulations’). The balance of s 79B(2) of the RTA deals with the bases upon which the owner of a vehicle might contest a charge. Relevantly for this matter, where the appellant has not sought to nominate a driver or to challenge the identification of the vehicle. The basis upon which the charge was contested appears to be s 79B(2)(a) of the RTA which provides as follows: (a) that although the vehicle appears to have been involved in the commission of a prescribed offence, no such offence was in fact committed; or ……… 17 To prove the charge, the prosecution relied upon a number of statutory presumptions in its favour. These presumptions permit the tender of material which, in the absence of proof, is taken as evidence of that information. 18 Section 140 of the MVA enables a document purporting to be an extract from or a copy of a certified entry contained in any register pursuant to the MVA to be tendered. On this basis the prosecution tendered exhibit P1, a certified extract of an entry contained in the register of motor vehicles, which indicated that the vehicle was registered to the appellant at the relevant time. 19 Section 79B(9) of the RTA deals with the tender of a document certifying that the appellant was provided with an expiation notice under the Expiation of Offences Act 1996 (SA) in respect of the offence and allowed the opportunity to -- 6 of 17 -- [2026] SASC 25 McIntyre J 5 expiate the offence. This is the basis upon which the prosecution tendered exhibit P2. 20 These two matters are not disputed by the appellant. The appellant was the owner of the vehicle and received an expiation notice. The remaining presumptions are however contentious. 21 Regulation 29(1)(c)(ia) of the Miscellaneous Regulations provides that a REDFLEXradarcam mobile dual radar digital camera system device is an approved photographic detection device for the purposes of the RTA in relation to a speeding offence. Section 79B(10)(b) of the RTA provides that: (b) a document produced by the prosecution and purporting to be signed by the Commissioner of Police, or any other police officer of or above the rank of inspector, and purporting to certify— (i) that a specified device used at a specified location during a specified period was a photographic detection device; and (ii) that the requirements of this Act and the regulations as to the operation and texting of photographic detection devices were complied with in connection with the use of that device during that period, will be accepted as proof, in the absence of proof to the contrary, of the facts so certified; and …………… 22 This was the basis upon which the prosecution tendered exhibit P3, a certificate signed by Inspector Jaimi Burns that indicated that a REDFLEXradarcam mobile dual radar digital camera system formed part of the traffic speed analyser at Battunga Road at the relevant time and that the requirements for the testing and operation of that device were complied with. Section 175(3)(b) of the RTA provides for the tender of a certificate purporting to certify that a specified speedometer had been tested on a specified day and was shown by the test to be accurate. It was on this basis that exhibit P4, a certificate by Inspector Jaimi Burns certifying the results of tests of vehicle registration number S558CCP on 9 February 2024, was tendered. Section 175(3)(ba) of the RTA permitted the tender of exhibit P5, a document signed by Inspector Jaimi Burns, which certified that the REDFLEXradarcam mobile dual radar digital camera system in this matter had been tested on a 7 April 2024 by comparison with the speedometer on vehicle registration number S558CCP and was shown by the test to be accurate to the extent indicated in the document. This constitutes, in the absence of proof to the contrary, proof of the facts certified. 23 Exhibits P6 and P7 were tendered under s 79B(10)(a) of the RTA. These photographs were produced from exposures taken or electronic records made by the relevant REDFLEXradarcam mobile dual radar digital camera system. Section 79B(10)(a) provides that denotation as to date, time and location that appears in -- 7 of 17 -- [2026] SASC 25 McIntyre J 6 such photographs will be accepted as proof in the absence of proof to the contrary of the date, time and location at which the exposures were taken or the electronic records made by the device. The appellant’s interlocutory application 24 Prior to the hearing of the appeal, the appellant issued an interlocutory application seeking orders that: 1. that the appellant company’s appointed representative appear for and on behalf of the appellant in these proceedings; 2. that should the Court refuse the application for leave to appear, that the Court determine the matter ‘on the papers’ only without any further oral arguments or address; and 3. that costs be in the cause of the substantive appeal itself. 25 The application was supported by an affidavit from Mr Gardner, the director of the appellant company, annexing a letter. In summary, Mr Gardner contended that the appellant company had appointed “Induna Rana” as its representative in these matters. The letter reads as follows: To whom it may concern, Appointment of Company Representative This document is confirmation that Karudale Pty Ltd has appointed, as the company’s Corporate Services Manager, 'Ro' (iNduna Rana), as spokesperson and representative for the administration and resolution of the matter relating to Case Numbers, MCCRM-24- 026055 and now SCCRM-25-031264. Ro is authorized to represent and bind the company in all matters related to this matter. This appointment continues until it is revoked in writing. For Darren Gardner Karudale Pty Ltd Dated 12th November 2025 26 This is much the same application that was made orally to the trial Magistrate. The name in the correspondence provided to the learned trial Magistrate identified the representative as the company’s Corporate Services Manager (‘Ro’) but appears to be the same person as Mr Induna Rana. For consistency I will refer to him as “Mr Rana”. I declined to grant leave for Mr Rana to appear for the company on that interlocutory application. I adjourned the application to a date when -- 8 of 17 -- [2026] SASC 25 McIntyre J 7 Mr Gardner was available. Mr Gardner attended on the next occasion and pressed the application for Mr Rana to represent the company on the appeal. 27 The application for Mr Rana to represent the appellant was opposed on the basis that one of the grounds of appeal relates to whether Mr Rana ought to have been permitted to appear in the Magistrates’ Court. It was further contended that there was insufficient evidence before the Court to be satisfied of the criteria in the JCR r 26.1. The respondent did not, however, object to the second portion of the application, that the appeal be dealt with on the papers. Following argument, I dismissed the application insofar as it related to Mr Rana appearing on behalf of the appellant in the proceedings, but I granted the application to determine the matter on the papers without further oral arguments or address. Right to represent a company in criminal proceedings 28 It convenient to deal with both the appeal in relation to the Magistrate’s decision declining to permit Mr Rana to appear and my reasons for making the same decision in respect of the appeal. The Magistrate gave ex tempore reasons for her decision.2 The application before the learned Magistrate purported to rely on s 26 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1921 (SA) (‘CPA’) which, as her Honour pointed out, has been repealed. The Magistrate, correctly in my view, proceeded to consider the application under r 26.1 of the JCR. In particular, r 26.1(4) which provides as follows: (4) The Court may give leave for a person other than a law firm or lawyer to represent or appear for a party in a proceeding or appellate proceeding on such terms as the Court thinks fit if— (a) the party is a company or other legal entity not being an individual; (b) the representative is a director of the company or officer of the other legal entity; (c) the representative has power to bind the party in the proceeding; and (d) the Court considers that it is in the interests of justice to give such leave. 29 There was no sworn evidence supporting the application for leave. However, some documents were provided to the learned Magistrate in support of the application including a letter from the appellant appointing Mr Rana as a representative and authorising him to bind the appellant in relation to the matter. Further, there was a screenshot of the current details for the Trustee for Gardner Super Fund which had no apparent relevance to the application. Mr Rana informed the Court that he was the Corporate Services Officer for the appellant and had been employed in that position for some three years. He said he was employed on a casual basis and had no written contract of employment with the appellant. 2 Police v Karudale Pty Ltd (Magistrates Court of South Australia, Magistrate Schulz, 20 June 2025); Appeal Book at 109 – 110. -- 9 of 17 -- [2026] SASC 25 McIntyre J 8 30 I do not consider that the appellant has demonstrated any error in the learned Magistrates reasoning process as set out in paragraph 3 of her ex tempore reasons. Her Honour took an expansive view of r 26.1(4) by considering whether an officer of a company is permitted to appear for a party in proceedings. Arguably in the case of a company, the representative must be a director of the company and “an officer” is only permitted to appear for “other legal entit[ies]” such as a partnership. The appellant is the company and it is arguable that only a director such as Mr Gardner ought to be given leave to appear. Even if I am wrong about that, there was no information before the learned Magistrate which indicated that Mr Rana was an officer of a company as defined in the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Section 9AD of that Act defines an officer of a corporation relevantly as follows: 9AD Meaning of officer (1) An officer of a corporation (other than a CCIV) is: (a) a director or secretary of the corporation; or (b) a person: (i) who makes, or participates in making, decisions that affect the whole, or a substantial part, of the business of the corporation; or (ii) who has the capacity to affect significantly the corporation’s financial standing; or (iii) in accordance with whose instructions or wishes the directors of the corporation are accustomed to act (excluding advice given by the person in the proper performance of functions attaching to the person’s professional capacity or their business relationship with the directors or the corporation); or ………… 31 The situation was no different before me. The additional information supplied in relation to Mr Rana did not confirm that he made or participated in decisions affecting the appellant’s business. Nor was there any evidence suggesting that he had the capacity to significantly affect the appellant’s financial standing. Further, there was no evidence that the director(s) of the appellant, was accustomed to act in accordance with Mr Rana’s instructions or wishes. In those circumstances I declined to grant Mr Rana leave to appear for the company. 32 I therefore dismiss this ground of appeal. Magistrate’s refusal to grant an adjournment 33 Whilst not entirely clear, it appears that the appellant also challenges the Magistrate’s refusal to adjourn the trial following her denial of leave for Mr Rana to represent the appellant on the basis that this constituted a denial of procedural fairness on the part of the learned Magistrate. -- 10 of 17 -- [2026] SASC 25 McIntyre J 9 34 The appellant relies upon the decision in Grange Legal Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Police.3 In that matter, a denial of procedural fairness was found in circumstances where the Magistrate failed to afford the company the opportunity to obtain evidence of an appointment of a representative for the purpose of s 177 of the CPA and then proceeded ex parte. In this matter the appellant was afforded the opportunity to provide further information but failed to do so. Further, the proceedings did not proceed ex parte. Rather, Mr Gardner, as director, was permitted to appear as a representative of the appellant. 35 The learned Magistrate delivered ex tempore reasons for her decision.4 Her Honour set out the appropriate considerations applicable to such applications and proceeded to determine the application in accordance with those principles. In particular, the learned Magistrate noted that the adjournment application was an oral application on the day of the trial; that there had been nine previous hearings, in eight of which the appellant was represented by Mr Gardner; that the matter had previously been listed for trial and was adjourned for four months at the request of the appellant, then apparently represented by Mr Gardner. 36 There is no error demonstrated in the decision of the learned Magistrate nor is there any relevant procedural unfairness. I therefore dismiss this ground of appeal. Magistrate’s refusal to recuse herself 37 On a related topic is the ground of appeal relating to an interlocutory decision by the Magistrate refusing to recuse herself. The basis for that application was that the Magistrate had presided over a previous pre-trial hearing.5 That hearing was, as her Honour indicated, “a process type hearing”. It was one of nine hearings in this matter. There was no discussion of the merits or otherwise of the matter at that hearing.6 38 Whilst the basis of the application was not entirely clear it could only have been on the basis of apprehended bias. I note the principles set out in the High Court decision of Charisteas v Charisteas.7 Briefly stated, the apprehension of bias principle is that a judicial officer “is disqualified if a fair-minded lay observer might reasonably apprehend that the judge might not bring an impartial mind to the resolution of the question the judge is required to decide”.8 This principle requires a two-step process. The appellant has established neither. There is no identification of what is said might potentially have caused the learned Magistrate to decide the case other than on its legal or factual merits. Second, the appellant has not articulated a logical connection between that factor and the possibility of 3 [2025] SASC 14. 4 Police v Karudale Pty Ltd (Magistrates Court of South Australia, Magistrate Schulz, 20 June 2025); Appeal Book at 111–113. 5 Transcript (Magistrates Court, 20 June 2025) T9–10; Appeal Book at 55. 6 Transcript (Magistrates Court, 20 June 2025) T13; Appeal Book at 59. 7 (2021) 273 CLR 289 [11]–[12]. 8 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 at [6]. -- 11 of 17 -- [2026] SASC 25 McIntyre J 10 the Magistrate deciding the case on anything other than its legal and factual basis. I dismiss ground of appeal; the Magistrate correctly refused to recuse herself. The remaining grounds of appeal 39 What I apprehend to be the appellant’s primary grounds of appeal were set out at length in the first notice of appeal. These were couched in general terms and somewhat difficult to follow. Revision one of the grounds of appeal did not delete those grounds but set out a more cogent statement of the grounds of appeal as follows: A. erroneous admission of impugned prosecution material; B. denial of cross examination; C. procedural fairness and disclosure; D. failure to determine recusal and representation issues; E. inadequate reasons; F. misapplication of legal principle; and G. unreasonable verdict. 40 The appellant has categorised these grounds under the headings “approach to evidence” and “final verdict”. I will adopt the same categorisation, but I will first deal with the topic of the adequacy of the reasons. Adequacy of reasons 41 The appellant contends, in ground E of revision one of the grounds of appeal, that the learned Magistrate failed to expose the reasoning process on key issues (including admissibility rulings, treatment of contested evidence, and resolution of critical factual issues). It is said that this amounts to an appealable error. I assume that this complaint relates to both the written reasons for verdict and the ex tempore reasons on procedural matters that I have referred to above. 42 It is well established that the content and detail of reasons “will vary according to the nature of the jurisdiction which the court is exercising and the particular matter the subject of the decision”.9 They must enable this Court to 9 Wainohu v New South Wales (2011) 243 CLR 181 at 215. -- 12 of 17 -- [2026] SASC 25 McIntyre J 11 discharge its statutory duty on an appeal and enable the parties to understand the basis for the decision.10 43 The Magistrate’s reasons for verdict and the ex tempore reasons identified the issues, the law that was being applied and exposed the reasoning process leading to the decision on each issue. In no sense were they inadequate. I dismiss this ground of appeal. The Magistrate’s approach to the evidence The appellant in the first written submissions poses the question:11 …whether the Magistrate misapplied the statutory aids to proof and erred by accepting certificates/photographs without proving statutory preconditions (operational/testing compliance) and continuity/integrity once put in issue. The appellant also raises an issue concerning disclosure and fairness: …whether targeted disclosure sought (operator/deployment logs, device audit trail, image integrity/originals, site approvals, secondary check) was withheld… 44 The appellant’s submissions contend that the prosecution certificates were incorrectly admitted into evidence on three bases. First, because they were challenged by the appellant. Second, because the appellant was unable to cross examine the authors of the certificates and third, because the appellant was unable to obtain further material by way of disclosure. 45 The appellant’s submissions are predicated upon a misunderstanding of the statutory scheme as set out above. There was nothing before the Magistrate, nor produced to me, that indicates that the certificates did not comply with the relevant statutory presumptions or that they should not have been admitted. The evidence tendered on the prosecution case contains the relevant information required by the various statutory provisions. It is therefore to be accepted as proof in the absence of proof to the contrary. This is similar to the position in Police v Butcher12 where Stanley J (as he then was) dealt with a similar argument in respect of s 175(3)(ba) of the RTA. In dismissing the argument, his Honour observed: It provides that a document produced by the prosecution and purporting to be signed by a relevant police officer and purporting to certify that a specified traffic speed analyser had been tested on a specified day, and was shown by the test to be accurate to the extent indicated in the document, constitutes proof of the facts certified and that the traffic speed analyser was accurate to the extent indicated in the document on that day unless the person charged proves to the contrary. A submission that the police officer could not, as a matter of fact, have been satisfied of the matters certified in the document misunderstands the very intent and purpose of the statutory provision. The purpose of the certificate is to establish a statutory presumption without regard to the facts. In effect, it reverses the onus of proof. It shifts the onus to the person charged to discharge the evidentiary burden of disproving 10 DL v The Queen (2018) 266 CLR 1 at [32]. 11 FDN 13. 12 (2014) 119 SASR 509. -- 13 of 17 -- [2026] SASC 25 McIntyre J 12 the facts certified in the document. That is not achieved by pointing to the absence of sufficient evidence of the facts certified before the relevant police officer. The operation of s 175(3)(ba) requires the accused person, if he is to discharge the evidentiary burden that the provision has shifted to him, to prove on the balance of probabilities the contrary of the facts certified. But the shifting of the onus only occurs once the certificate has been admitted into evidence. There can be no issue as to its admissibility on the basis that there is evidence to the contrary of the facts certified in the document. 46 As I have indicated above, exhibits P1 and P2 are uncontentious. Exhibits P3, P4 and P5 were certified by Inspector Jamie Burns in compliance with the statutory presumptions. They each contained the information required by ss 79B(10) and 175(b)(ba) respectively. Likewise exhibits P6 and P7 were, in my view, appropriately tendered under s 79B(10)(a) of the RTA and may be accepted in proof in the absence of proof to the contrary of the date, time and location appearing on the face of those documents. I see no error in the approach taken by the learned Magistrate. 47 As observed by Stanley J, the certificates tendered on the prosecution case establish the relevant statutory presumption without regard to the facts. This effectively reverses the onus of proof and requires the appellant to discharge the persuasive burden of disproving the facts certified in each of the documents. Accordingly, the onus was on the appellant to positively demonstrate proof to the contrary. 48 The appellant appears to contend that the prosecution was obliged to call the authors of the tendered document in order to make out its case. This is not correct. There is no requirement that the authors of certificates give evidence, indeed the point of the statutory provisions appears to be to avoid this. It is also challenging to ascertain what purpose would have been served in this case by permitting cross examination of the authors. This is particularly so in view of that fact that the police officers undertaking the certification are not required to hold a reasonable belief that what he or she was certifying was accurate.13 The prosecution was not required to make the certifying officers available for cross examination and, as the learned Magistrate indicated in her decision,14 it was open to the appellant to issue subpoenas to the relevant police officers if it was thought necessary to do so. However, the absence of this evidence or inability of a police officer to justify certification is insufficient to discharge the onus of proof borne by the appellant.15 49 The appellant further alleges that there has been procedural unfairness due to lack of further disclosure. There is no question that the prosecution has an ongoing duty of disclosure.16 The appellant has not, however, identified the asserted failure to comply with that obligation with any particularity. At trial Mr Gardner told the learned Magistrate that he had “continually asked for more disclosure since the 13 Coleman v Police [2024] SASCA 30 at [39]–[40] (‘Coleman’). 14 Police v Karudale Pty Ltd [2025] SAMC 116 at [13] (‘Karudale Pty Ltd’). 15 Coleman (n 14) at [41]. 16 Edwards v The Queen (2021) 273 CLR 585 at [48]. -- 14 of 17 -- [2026] SASC 25 McIntyre J 13 start of this case and … they’ve not provided it”.17 He also suggested there was insufficient disclosure in relation to “all the photographs” but did not explain what photographs were alleged to be missing nor how they would be relevant to an issue in the case. The only particulars provided as to the asserted lack of disclosure is set out in the appellant’s written submissions dated 11 November 2025 on this appeal which states as follows:18 The defence sought targeted materials directly probative of Section 79B(10) compliance and photograph integrity (operator/deployment logs, device audit trail, site approval/set- up, secondary-check method/result, image integrity/originals and hashes, accreditation/training). With those materials withheld, the certificates-only case was not amenable to fair testing. (Emphasis in original) 50 There was no evidence before the Magistrate, nor before me, indicating that requests were made for such information nor has any explanation been provided as to how this material would be relevant to an issue in the case. As Nicholson J said in Di Fede v Police,19 there is no right to: …make general and unspecified allegations and then seek far-reaching disclosure in the hope that material may turn up to make them good. 51 The learned Magistrate dealt with these issues at paras 23 and 24 of her decision. These reasons reveal no error with relation to the issue of disclosure. There is nothing to suggest that the prosecution failed to comply with its obligations of disclosure and no suggestion that the appellant, despite numerous opportunities, sought further information which was not provided. 52 The material having been correctly received in evidence, the onus was on the appellant to establish on the balance of probability that the facts certified in the various exhibits were incorrect. Mr Gardner gave evidence but, as he was not in South Australia at the time of the alleged offence, he could give no evidence about facts. Whilst not entirely clear, it seems that the basis of the appeal is a contention that the learned Magistrate was incorrect in failing to admit items MFI D8, MFI D9, MFI D10, MFI D11 and MFI D12 into evidence. These documents are as follows: • MFI D8: Described as a “procedural forensic analysis report” apparently prepared by Mr Roy Brownson (‘Mr Brownson’) who is described as an “assessor”. It is a critique dated 19 June 2025 of exhibit P3 and concludes that the certificate ‘fails to fully comply with legislation’, has significant shortcomings, is an abuse of process, and satisfies only 19 percent of the legislative criteria. 17 Transcript (Magistrates Court, 20 June 2025) T30; Appeal Book at 76. 18 FDN 13 at 3. 19 [2023] SASC 30 at [15]. -- 15 of 17 -- [2026] SASC 25 McIntyre J 14 • MFI D9: Written by Mr Brownson on 19 June 2025 and is directed to exhibit P4. The report states that only 64 percent of the legislative criteria have been complied with. • MFI D10: Likewise prepared by Mr Brownson on 19 June 2025. It is a critique of exhibit P5 and suggests only 55 percent the legislative criteria have been complied with. • MFI D11: Written by Mr Brownson on 19 June 2025, directed to exhibit P6. The report states that 0 percent of the legislative criteria have been complied with. • MFI D12: Written by Mr Brownson on 19 June 2025, directed to exhibit P7. The report states that 0 percent of the legislative criteria have been complied with. 53 Each of these documents suggest that the certificates in exhibit P3, P4 and P5 have been based on “fictitious, unsafe and unsatisfactory information” and that the makers of the certificates should be called to give evidence. I have already dealt with the suggestion that the onus was on the prosecution to call the authors of the certificates. Mr Gardner did not suggest that he was going to call Mr Brownson to give evidence. 54 The learned Magistrate considered each of the reports to be expert reports that were on their face inadmissible. Her Honour, correctly in my view, referred to rr 46 and 47 of the JCR and drew the appellant’s attention to a number of matters that were not addressed by the purported reports including the lack of information about Mr Brownson’s “expertise or qualifications”; the lack of acknowledgement of the requirements of Part 11 of the JCR and the failure to identify the basis upon which Mr Brownson advanced his opinions. Mr Gardner conceded that he did not know what Mr Brownson’s credentials were.20 In view of these matters her Honour determined not to receive the reports as evidence. Her Honour, notwithstanding this, accepted the material as written submissions on behalf of the appellant and dealt with them in her reasons on that basis.21 The Magistrate noted that much of the detail asserted to be required in the certificates was not in fact required by the relevant legislation and that a number of the criticisms made by Mr Brownson were not made on any proper foundation. 55 The Magistrate was correct to decline to receive MFI D8 to MFI D12 into evidence as expert reports. The appellant has demonstrated no error in her approach. On any view, they did not meet the basic requirements of such reports. Notwithstanding this, the learned Magistrate received and considered the reports as written submissions critiquing the prosecution evidence. I dismiss this ground of appeal. 20 Transcript (Magistrates Court, 20 June 2025) T55; Appeal Book at 101. 21 Karudale Pty Ltd (n 15) at [13], [15], [17], [21]. -- 16 of 17 -- [2026] SASC 25 McIntyre J 15 Verdict grounds 56 Two grounds of appeal are raised in relation to the verdict. 57 Ground F contends that the learned Magistrate applied the wrong legal principles and/or took into account or considered irrelevant considerations (including on admissibility and elements) resulting in error affecting the outcome. In the alternative, Ground G contends the verdict was unreasonable or cannot be supported having regard to whole of the evidence. 58 These grounds are expanded upon in the appellant’s written submissions.22 In effect these reiterate the submission made in respect of the prosecution case contending that the certificates were not capable of proving the offence beyond reasonable doubt. In view of my findings as to the admissibility of evidence, I reject that proposition. There is no basis to interfere with the verdict. The final verdict was available on the evidence and there is no error demonstrated in the Magistrate’s approach. 22 FND 13; FDN 15. -- 17 of 17 --