PANOS PANAYIOTOU In Person v SOUTH AUSTRALIA POLICE - [2026] SASC 28
On Appeal from SOUTH AUSTRALIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL (TRIBUNAL
MEMBER) 2025/SA001716
Appellant: PANOS PANAYIOTOU In Person
Respondent: SOUTH AUSTRALIA POLICE - Solicitor: CROWN SOLICITORS OFFICE (CSO)
Hearing Date/s: 27/11/2026
File No/s: CIV-25-009395
B
SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Appeal to a Single Judge)
DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply
to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach
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PANAYIOTOU v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
[2026] SASC 28
Judgment of the Honourable Justice McIntyre
17 March 2026
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS - SOUTH
AUSTRALIAN CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - FREEDOM OF INFORMATION - REVIEW OF
DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - FREEDOM OF INFORMATION - EXEMPT
DOCUMENTS
This is an application for permission to appeal a decision of the South Australian Civil and
Administrative Tribunal (‘SACAT’).
The appellant made an application to the respondent under the Freedom of Information Act 1991
(SA) (‘FOI Act’) for access to a document of the Department of Home Affairs. The respondent
determined not to release the document on the basis that it is exempt under the FOI Act. The appellant
sought internal review of that determination which the respondent refused, in part, because the
application was made out of time. Subsequently, the appellant lodged an application with SACAT
for review of the internal review decision. SACAT dismissed the application for want of jurisdiction.
The appellant contends that the SACAT order, dismissing the application, is invalid as it fails to the
name the Tribunal member issuing the order and counsel for the respondent. The appellant further
contends that SACAT has jurisdiction to hear the review and that the Tribunal did not consider
relevant evidence in its reasons.
The respondent contends that the appellant has not demonstrated any error and that SACAT correctly
determined that it lacked jurisdiction. It is said that evidence adduced by the appellant was irrelevant
to the question of jurisdiction. The respondent further contends that SACAT validly omitted to
disclose information pursuant to s 60 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act
2013 (SA).
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Held, refusing the application for leave to appeal:
1. The appellant’s notice of appeal does not disclose error on the part of SACAT, nor does it
raise a question of legal significance or a potential miscarriage of justice.
South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) ss 31, 33, 34, 60, 71; Freedom of
Information Act 1991 (SA) ss 18(8), 19, 20, 29(2), 40(2) sch 1, s 3, referred to.
Varricchio v Wentzel (2016) 125 SASR 191; Aldridge v The Registrar of Firearms [2022] SASC 5;
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Draoui v Le [2021] SASCA 33; El Shafei v Central Adelaide
Local Health Network [2017] SACAT 5, considered.
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PANAYIOTOU v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
[2026] SASC 28
Single Judge Appeal: Civil
1 This is an application for permission to appeal under s 71 of the South
Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) (‘SACAT Act’)
against a decision by a member of the South Australian Civil and Administrative
Tribunal (‘SACAT’). That decision concluded that SACAT did not have
jurisdiction to hear the appellant’s application, which concerned an application to
the respondent under the Freedom of Information Act 1991 (SA) (‘FOI Act’).
2 For the reasons that follow, I decline to grant permission to appeal.
Background
3 The appellant made an application to the respondent under the FOI Act for
access to the following information:
… copy of reports completed by Senior Border Force Officer pertaining to the interview
that evidently occurred on 29 April 2021 with Senior Border Force Officer. These reports
were emailed to three SAPOL officers on 20 May 2021.
4 In response, the respondent’s Freedom of Information Unit located a
document comprising seven pages relating to the application. On 23 September
2024, the respondent determined not to release that document on the basis that it
was exempt under cl 3, sch 1 of the FOI Act (‘the Initial Determination’).
5 On 14 November 2024, the appellant made an application for an internal
review of the respondent’s Initial Determination. On the same day, and confirmed
again to the appellant on 15 November 2024, the respondent refused to conduct an
internal review of the Initial Determination (‘the Respondent’s Determination’) on
the basis that:
1. The appellant’s internal review application was lodged 23 days outside
the legislated time frame for review set out in s 29(2)(e) of the FOI Act;
2. The appellant’s reason for the late application was not a ‘good reason’
to accept the late application; and
3. The review requested concerned a search and determination undertaken
by the Commonwealth Department of Home Affairs, and not by the
respondent.
6 On 26 May 2025, the appellant lodged an application with SACAT
contending that he was aggrieved by the Respondent’s Determination under s
40(2)(a) of the FOI Act.
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7 On 18 July 2025, SACAT determined that it did not have jurisdiction to hear
the appellant’s application for review of the Respondent’s Determination and,
accordingly, dismissed the application (‘the Tribunal’s Determination’).
8 On 8 August 2025, the appellant lodged a notice of appeal in this Court
identifying two grounds of appeal in respect of the Tribunal’s Determination:1
1. The order issued by the Tribunal is invalid. The order issued fails the reasonable
accountability test. There is no name of the Member issuing the order and no name of
the respondent who appeared at the hearing.
2. The Tribunal has jurisdiction and the reasoning which describes why there is no
jurisdiction does not mention any of the relevant evidence supplied by the applicant
prior to the hearing.
9 At the hearing of the appeal, the appellant abandoned ground one.
General principles
10 Section 71 of the SACAT Act provides for appeals from SACAT to the
Supreme Court. The appellant requires leave to appeal. The respondent opposes
the application for leave.
11 The SACAT Act provides processes and procedures for the timely and cost-
efficient disposition of reviews such as those under the FOI Act. Accordingly,
consistent with the authorities, this Court ought not readily grant leave to appeal.
As Doyle J (as he then was) said in Varricchio v Wentzel:2
As the decisions of Pix v South Australian Housing Trust and Jackson v Lepp Investments
illustrate, this Court will not routinely grant leave to appeal in cases such as the present. To
my mind, the Court should not readily grant leave to appeal in cases where to do so would
tend to undermine the legislative intention of the South Australian Civil and Administrative
Tribunal Act that tenancy disputes be dealt with by a specialist tribunal which is better
equipped to deal with such disputes in a timely and cost efficient way. Granting leave to
appeal too readily would tend to undermine this objective, and serve only to add a further
layer of expense and delay.
[Citations omitted]
12 In determining the issue of whether it is appropriate to grant leave, it is
necessary to consider whether the subject matter is of sufficient substance, or
whether there is a potential injustice to the appellant, sufficient to justify the grant
of leave. In Aldridge v The Registrar of Firearms,3 Parker J reiterated the principle
that leave to appeal will not readily be granted:
1 FDN 1.
2 (2016) 125 SASR 191 at [37].
3 [2022] SASC 5 at [33].
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That principle is intended to screen out cases where the disputed question has little or no
practical or legal significance and there is no issue of principle nor a potential miscarriage
of justice.
13 If leave is granted, the appeal is by way of rehearing. The Court may draw
inferences of fact from evidence or material that was before SACAT and may, as
it thinks fit, allow further evidence or materials to be presented to it. The Court
may affirm, vary or set aside the decision appealed against and, if it thinks fit, may
remit the matter back to SACAT with any directions that the Court considers
appropriate.
14 In deciding whether an appealable error is established for the purpose of s 71
of the SACAT Act, the Court must determine whether the decision was infected
by a process error or an outcome error of the kind identified in House v The King.4
Error will be established if the Tribunal Member acted on a wrong principle, took
into account irrelevant matters, mistook the facts or failed to take into account
relevant matters. The Court should exercise appellate restraint with respect to the
factual findings. These findings should not be interfered with unless glaringly
improbable or contrary to compelling inferences.
15 Accordingly, the principles relevant to the question of leave to appeal and
House v King restrictions are similar. The appellant needs to demonstrate not only
that an error occurred, but also that there was a specific or process error. I will
consider both the question of leave to appeal and the appeal grounds with these
principles in mind.
The contentions
16 The appellant says that there is both an error of law and a process error
apparent from the SACAT reasons. The error of law relates to the Tribunal
Member’s application of ss 18(8) and 40(2)(a) of the FOI Act and her ultimate
finding that the appellant was not entitled to apply to SACAT for a review of the
respondent’s Determination under s 34 of the SACAT Act. The process error is
outlined at page two of the appellant’s written submissions5 in which he sets out a
sequence of events that he contends were not considered or commented upon by
the Tribunal Member. In particular, the Tribunal Member did not comment upon
his application for an extension of time in respect of an internal review.
17 In further written submissions filed after the hearing, the appellant makes two
propositions. First, he invites me to consider:6
… that there is a possible correlation between the Tribunal’s error and the lack of name of
the decision of the Tribunal’s decision document (which had not occurred for any other
decisions issued from the Tribunal to the applicant). In other words, because of the error
articulated, there was/is no ownership from the Tribunal to account for that error. This is
4 (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 505; Draoui v Le [2021] SASCA 33.
5 FDN 28.
6 FDN 31.
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to shield the connection between the document under contest and the failed abuse of
INTERPOL systems with malice/greedy intentions with respect to the applicant.
18 This submission appears to reagitate ground one of the appeal which the
appellant abandoned at the hearing. I do not consider that the omission of the
Tribunal Member’s name constitutes a valid ground of review. The name was
omitted under s 60 of the SACAT Act which permits the Tribunal to direct that
certain information is not disclosed to any party to the proceedings. The absence
of the name does not affect the adequacy of the reasons provided for the decision.
19 The second proposition relates to the argument advanced by the appellant at
the hearing concerning s 18(8) of the FOI Act and contends that it is not
unreasonable to correlate the terms “access application” with “internal review
request” for the reasons set out in his submissions.
20 The respondent contends that the appellant has not demonstrated any error in
SACAT’s approach and that the Tribunal correctly determined that it lacked
jurisdiction. In doing so, the respondent contends that SACAT was not required
to consider evidence relating to the merits of the decision as such evidence is
irrelevant to the jurisdictional question in this case.
Legislation and consideration
21 SACAT is a creature of statute. It does not have an inherent jurisdiction
whereby it can review any decision brought before it.
22 Section 31 of the SACAT Act is as follows:
31—Sources of jurisdiction
(1) The Tribunal will have the jurisdiction conferred on it by or under this or any other
Act.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), if a provision of an Act enables an application,
referral or appeal to be made to the Tribunal, or a claim to be brought before the
Tribunal, the Act will be taken to confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal to deal with the
matter concerned.
23 This is not a matter falling within the original jurisdiction of SACAT as
defined in s 33 of the SACAT Act. Accordingly, it is necessary to consider the
Tribunal’s review jurisdiction as set out in div 3 of the SACAT Act.
24 Section 34 of the SACAT Act relevantly provides as follows:
34—Decisions within review jurisdiction
(1) If the matter that a relevant Act gives the Tribunal jurisdiction to deal with is a matter
that expressly or necessarily involves a review of a decision (a reviewable decision),
the matter comes within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction.
………………..
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25 The balance of div 3 sets out the procedure to be undertaken by SACAT and
the obligations of the decisionmaker, once a valid review is before the Tribunal.
To ascertain whether there is a valid review before the Tribunal, it is necessary to
consider the provisions of the FOI Act.
26 Section 40(2) of the FOI Act confers review jurisdiction on SACAT in
relation to determinations where a person, not being an agency, is dissatisfied, in
the following circumstances:
40—Reviews by SACAT
………………..
(2) A person (other than an agency)—
(a) who is aggrieved by a determination of an agency following an internal
review; or
(b) who is aggrieved by a determination that is not subject to internal review; or
(c) who is aggrieved by a determination made on a review under Division 1,
may apply for a review under section 34 of the South Australian Civil and
Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 of the determination by SACAT.
………………..
27 Accordingly, s 40(2) of the FOI Act provides that a person such as the
appellant may only seek a review of a determination of an agency. A
“determination” is a decision of the kind identified in ss 19 and 20 of the FOI Act,
relevantly a determination, to give or to refuse access to a document requested in
the application.
28 The meaning of the term “determination” in the FOI Act was considered by
SACAT in El Shafei v Central Adelaide Local Health Network7 in the context of
an objection that SACAT did not have power to review an agency’s claim that it
did not hold a document. SACAT stated, correctly in my view, that the FOI Act
refers to a determination in “a very precise manner”8 and that Parliament was “at
pains to identify what decisions are ‘determinations’ which are subject to review”.9
In that case, it was held that an agency claiming to not hold a document was not a
determination for the purposes of the Act.
29 The term “determination” carries a specific and limited meaning under the
FOI Act. The FOI Act does not confer any general supervisory jurisdiction on
SACAT to review other steps or procedural actions taken by an agency in dealing
with an application. Jurisdiction is confined to determinations as defined by the
FOI Act. Further, SACAT may only review determinations that are subject to
7 [2017] SACAT 5.
8 Ibid at [19].
9 Ibid at [25].
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internal review, once an internal review has been conducted.10 Otherwise, SACAT
does not have jurisdiction. There is no provision in the FOI Act that creates a right
of review where an agency refuses to conduct an internal review because the
application was made out of time. A refusal by an agency to exercise its discretion
to grant an extension of time, or to dismiss the matter on that basis, is not a
“determination” within the meaning of the FOI Act. It is not a refusal of access
under s 19 of the FOI Act.
30 The appellant places reliance upon s 18(8) of the FOI Act which provides as
follows:
18—Agencies may refuse to deal with certain applications
………………..
(8) A refusal to deal with, or to continue to deal with, an application under this section
is a determination for the purposes of this Act.
31 This reliance is misconceived. SACAT found, correctly in my view, that s
18(8) only applied to applications for access to documents under pt 3 of the FOI
Act and not to applications for internal review under s 29.
32 Accordingly, the appellant’s notice of appeal does not disclose error on the
part of SACAT, nor does it raise a question of legal significance or a potential
miscarriage of justice. In those circumstances, I decline to grant leave to appeal.
10 South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SA) s 40(2).
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