R v BRENTON EDWARD TAYLOR [2026] SASC 36

Applicant: R Counsel: MS K DRAPER WITH MR M FEBER - Solicitor: DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (SA) Respondent: BRENTON EDWARD TAYLOR Counsel: MS C SMYTH - Solicitor: ANDREW HILL & CO Hearing Date/s: 06/03/2026 File No/s: SCCRM-26-009574 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Criminal: Application) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. R v TAYLOR [2026] SASC 36 Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice McDonald (ex tempore) 11 March 2026 CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - BAIL - RECOGNISANCES - GENERALLY CRIMINAL LAW - PROCEDURE - BAIL - REVOCATION, VARIATION, REVIEW AND APPEAL This is an application by the Director of Public Prosecutions to review a decision of a District Court Judge to grant bail with home detention and electronic monitoring conditions. The respondent was apprehended and detained under s 77 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) for 47 alleged breaches of his home detention conditions. A Judge of the District Court granted the respondent bail, although it was not expressly stated on what basis the respondent was eligible for bail. The applicant contended that, given the absence of any provisions within the Bail Act 1985 (SA) that specifically address a bail application in the context of alleged breaches of home detention, the answer can be found in s 4(1)(d) of the Bail Act. The scope of s 4(1)(d) turns on the meaning of ‘recognizance’. The applicant submitted that s 4(1)(d) was relevant to the respondent as he had signed his home detention order and acknowledgement, thus acknowledging its conditions and consequences of disobedience. Held: 1. The respondent is a person appearing before the court for allegedly failing to observe a condition or conditions of his home detention agreement, being his ‘recognizance’, and therefore falls within s 4(1)(d) of the Bail Act and is eligible for bail. 2. The respondent is not an appropriate candidate for bail. 3. The Director’s application is allowed. 4. The respondent’s bail that was granted in the District Court be revoked. -- 1 of 9 -- Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) ss 73, 73(1), 73(2), 73(4a)(a)(i), 73(8), 77; Bail Act 1985 (SA) ss 4(1)(d), 5(1)(ea), 10(2); Legislation Interpretation Act 2021 (SA), referred to. Webster v State of South Australia (2003) 87 SASR 17; Panagiotidis v Jakacic (1986) 41 SASR 591, discussed. -- 2 of 9 -- R v TAYLOR [2026] SASC 36 Criminal: Application 1 McDONALD J (ex tempore): This is an application by the Director of Public Prosecutions to review a decision by a District Court Judge to grant bail with home detention and electronic monitoring conditions. 2 There are some unusual features to this application so it is necessary to set out the background in some detail. 3 On 7 March 2025, Mr Taylor was sentenced to three years, five months and 24 days imprisonment for the offence of aggravated robbery. A non-parole period of one year, one month and 24 days was fixed. The sentencing judge ordered the sentence be served on home detention. In arriving at that decision, his Honour was influenced by Mr Taylor’s prospects for rehabilitation, which were anchored to his ability to abstain from drug and alcohol use. 4 The sentencing approach adopted by the judge was merciful. The offence for which Mr Taylor was sentenced was very serious. It involved Mr Taylor, in the company of three others, assaulting a person unknown to them. Mr Taylor was armed with a wooden baseball bat. Closed-circuit television footage captured Mr Taylor chasing the victim with the baseball bat. The victim somehow ended up on the ground, curled up in a ball. Mr Taylor could be seen to repeatedly strike him with a baseball bat before rummaging through his pockets, stealing cash and a mobile telephone. Mr Taylor then told his co-offenders ‘I fucked him, he’s fucked’, before fleeing the scene. 5 It was a case of mistaken identity. Mr Taylor erroneously believed that his partner had been cheating on him with the victim, as a consequence of which the victim was hospitalised for four days, having sustained bruising and swelling to his left eye, a laceration to his left eye, a 6 cm laceration to the right side of his scalp, a crush fracture to the left cheekbone and a fracture to the nose. 6 Mr Taylor was granted home detention to live with his partner and four children whilst serving his sentence. The conditions included supervision and electronic monitoring. 7 On 11 May 2025, two months after his release, Mr Taylor breached a condition of the order by being absent from his residence without approval. Mr Taylor’s Community Corrections officer determined to deal with the breach by way of a caution and also arranged for some additional support for him by liaising with OARS Community Transition, in order to access the Home Detention Integrated Support Services Program. 8 On 23 May 2025, Mr Taylor again breached a condition of the order by leaving his residence without approval. GPS tracking records showed that he -- 3 of 9 -- [2026] SASC 36 McDonald J 2 walked to the vicinity of the Thirsty Camel bottle shop and Hungry Jack’s at Colonnades. During the time that he was absent without leave, Mr Taylor failed to answer two telephone calls from a monitoring compliance officer. 9 On 26 May 2025, Mr Taylor was warned about his conduct and he provided the explanation that ‘He needed to get food and had to get money off his partner, who was out’. 10 Subsequent to this, between 26 May 2025 and 17 February 2026, Mr Taylor has contravened the conditions of his home detention sentence on a further 45 occasions. 11 Given the number, I will not descend into the details of each. However, the nature of the breaches have been failing to attend Community Corrections as directed, absenting himself from his residence without approval and testing positive for alcohol and drugs. 12 Interspersed amongst the breaches have been numerous warnings from Mr Taylor’s Community Corrections officer. 13 The situation appears to have escalated on 13 February 2026, when, after yet another failure to attend for supervision, the decision was made to suspend Mr Taylor’s work passes until he attended a further appointment with his Community Corrections officer on 16 February 2026. 14 The following day, on 14 February 2026, Mr Taylor ignored the direction he had been given and attended at his workplace without permission. He also went to the Westfield shopping centre without approval. Attempts were made to contact him, however, his mobile telephone was turned off. 15 Later that day, Intensive Corrections Officers attended at Mr Taylor’s home address and he tested positive to a breath test for alcohol. 16 The following day, 15 February 2026, Mr Taylor left his premises for a short period without approval. He told his Community Corrections officer that he and his partner had been in an argument. 17 On 16 February 2026, Mr Taylor left his home address without approval, at 12.34 am, and then again at 12.59 am. On the latter occasion, GPS tracking showed that he had attended at a service station. 18 That day, Mr Taylor had a pass out for between 8.00 am and 10.00 am, to enable him to attend at an 8.45 am appointment with his Community Corrections officer. GPS tracking showed that he deviated from that pass out by attending in the vicinity of the Thirsty Camel bottle shop at Colonnades. 19 Following his appointment for supervision, Mr Taylor was given a pass out to attend at his place of employment. He deviated from that pass out by first -- 4 of 9 -- [2026] SASC 36 McDonald J 3 attending an unapproved private address. Later in the day, he deviated by attending at the Hurley Cellars SipnSave and that evening, GPS tracking recorded that he had loitered for about an hour in the vicinity of the Colonnades Thirsty Camel. He returned home at about 8.48 pm, which was nearly three hours late. 20 Mr Taylor again left his residence without permission between 11.13 pm and 11.39 pm and attended a private address. Attempts were made to contact Mr Taylor. However, the phone calls went through to voicemail. 21 Mr Taylor spoke with the monitoring compliance officer when he returned to his residence at 11.38 pm and he reported that he had to get away because of an argument. 22 Despite this, Mr Taylor again left without permission at 4.03 am the following morning and attended at a private residence. Again, a monitoring compliance officer was unable to make telephone contact with Mr Taylor. Upon his return at 4.35 am, he spoke with the compliance officer and claimed that he had left to attempt to get a lift to work. 23 On 18 February 2026, Mr Taylor was apprehended and detained under s 77 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) (‘Sentencing Act’) as a consequence of the 47 alleged breaches of his home detention conditions. 24 Section 77 of the Sentencing Act provides: (1) If the CE suspects on reasonable grounds that a person subject to a home detention order has breached a condition of the order, the person may be apprehended, without warrant, by a police officer or home detention officer and detained in custody for the purposes of proceedings relating to the suspected breach under section 73 before the court that imposed the order. (2) Section 73(8) to (10) (inclusive) apply to a person apprehended under this section as if the person were arrested pursuant to a warrant issued under section 73. 25 Section 73(8) relevantly provides: … (8) If a person is arrested pursuant to a warrant issued under this section, the person must be brought before the court or the Magistrates Court not later than the next working day and may be remanded in custody pending determination of the proceedings. … (Emphasis added) 26 Mr Taylor first appeared that same day in the District Court. On that occasion, he appeared unrepresented and the matter was adjourned until 26 February 2026, to enable Mr Taylor to obtain legal advice. -- 5 of 9 -- [2026] SASC 36 McDonald J 4 27 On 26 February 2026, the matter came back before the court and Ms Smyth, who appeared for Mr Taylor, made an application for bail. That application was adjourned in order to await a home detention bail suitability report. Submissions on the application resumed on 5 March 2026, at the end of which the Judge determined to grant bail to Mr Taylor, although the Judge did not expressly state the basis on which he found that Mr Taylor was eligible for bail. 28 During the course of those submissions, Mr Feber, who appeared for the Director, raised that there appeared to be no explicit provision under the Bail Act 1985 (SA) (‘Bail Act’) or the Sentencing Act which allows for a person to be released on bail pending determination of a breach of the conditions of a home detention sentence. 29 It would appear that his Honour found that the power to grant bail in these circumstances can be found in s 4(1)(d) of the Bail Act. Pursuant to that power, he determined to release Mr Taylor on bail pending the finalisation of the proceedings before him. The power to release a person on bail pending the determination of alleged breaches of a home detention sentence 30 When the matter came before this Court, the issue of the power by which Mr Taylor may be released was again raised by the Director. It was contended that, given the absence of any provisions specifically addressing a bail application in the context of alleged breaches of a home detention sentence, the answer must lie in s 4(1)(d) of the Bail Act. 31 I agree with the position taken by the Director and I set out my reasons. 32 Section 73 of the Sentencing Act creates a legislative regime to deal with orders that a court may make on a breach of a condition of a home detention order. 33 Section 73(1) provides that if the court is satisfied that a person has breached a condition of a home detention order, the court must revoke the home detention order and order that the balance of the sentence the person was serving on home detention be served in custody. This is subject to s 73(2) which potentially ameliorates the consequences arising from s 73(1) and allows for a finding that the breach was trivial or that there are proper grounds on which the failure should be excused. 34 Section 73(4a)(a)(i) requires a court to take into account: ‘any period spent by the person on home detention after the day on which the breach was committed pending determination of the proceedings for the breach’. That is, the period between the commencement of the breach proceedings and the final determination of those proceedings. 35 It follows that it was within the contemplation of the legislature that a person may spend that period in the community under home detention conditions. The -- 6 of 9 -- [2026] SASC 36 McDonald J 5 only mechanism by which this may occur is through entering into a bail agreement.1 36 The Bail Act is a code on the topic of bail in this State.2 As Doyle CJ observed in Webster v State of South Australia:3 … a conclusion that the Act is a code is a conclusion that it governs exclusively the topic or subject matter that it regulates, and relevantly that the only remedies to be permitted in relation to that matter are the remedies provided by the Act. 37 The Bail Act codifies the power to grant bail, the terms on which bail is to be granted and the enforcement and termination of bail. 38 Section 4 of the Bail Act sets out those who are eligible for release on bail. This section relevantly includes s (4)(1)(d): ‘a person who is appearing before a court for allegedly failing to observe a condition of a recognizance’. 39 The scope of this subsection turns on the meaning of ‘recognizance’. The term ‘recognizance’, once commonly used in the criminal law, has fallen out of favour and is not found elsewhere in the Bail Act4 or in the Sentencing Act and is not defined in the Legislation Interpretation Act 2021 (SA). 40 The legal definition of ‘recognizance’ includes:5 A bond or obligation, made in court, by which a person promises to perform some act or observe some condition, such as to appear when called, to pay a debt, or to keep the peace… …Most commonly, a recognizance takes the form of a bail bond that guarantees an unjailed criminal defendant’s return for a court date. Or:6 an obligation of record entered into before a court or magistrate requiring performance of an act (such as appearance in court) usually under the penalty of a money forfeiture. Or:7 An obligation or bond acknowledged before a court of record or authorized magistrate and later enrolled in a court of record, whereby the person bound (cognizer or conusor) is bound to secure the performance of some act such as to pay a debt, keep the peace and be of good behaviour, appear to stand trial, or otherwise. A recognizance is usually enforced by an estreat. 1 There is no power under the Sentencing Act for the reinstatement of home detention pending the outcome of the application that had been made by the Director. 2 Webster v State of South Australia (2003) 87 SASR 17 at [73], citing with approval Panagiotidis v Jakacic (1986) 41 SASR 591 at 592. 3 (2003) 87 SASR 17 at [49]. 4 Aside from in s 5(1)(ea) in reference to bail authorities. 5 Recognizance, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). 6 Recognizance, Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary. 7 Recognizance, The Oxford Companion to Law at 1042. -- 7 of 9 -- [2026] SASC 36 McDonald J 6 41 The essential features of a recognisance appear to be that it is a legally binding promise or undertaking to the court requiring a person to perform an act or acts. 42 Mr Taylor signed a home detention order and acknowledgement.8 In doing so, he acknowledged that he had received a copy of the home detention order, understood its conditions and understood the consequences if he failed to obey the conditions. In doing so, it was implicit that he agreed to abide by those conditions. He was, therefore, a person appearing before the court for allegedly failing to observe a condition or conditions of his home detention agreement (conditions of his recognizance) and, therefore, falls within s 4(1)(d) of the Bail Act as eligible for bail. Consideration 43 Although Mr Taylor is eligible for bail, the question, however, remains as to whether he is an appropriate or suitable candidate for bail. 44 Section 10(2) of the Bail Act provides that: If the applicant has been convicted of the offence in respect of which he or she has been taken into custody, the bail authority has, subject to this Act, an unfettered discretion as to whether the applicant should be released on bail. 45 Mr Taylor falls within this category, having been convicted of the offence of aggravated robbery. That means that he has no presumption for or against bail and the decision must be made upon consideration of all of the relevant circumstances. 46 Mr Taylor has an appalling history of failing to adhere to his home detention conditions. In attempting to contextualise those breaches, his counsel put to the Court that a number of them were minor transgressions involving him leaving the house for short periods of time and travelling short distances to, for example, collect his children from a family member’s house. 47 That submission, to some extent, misses the point. Explanations such as these serve to highlight that, throughout the period during which Mr Taylor has received the benefit of serving his sentence on home detention, he has done what he wanted when he wanted. After receiving an extraordinary number of warnings, chances and opportunities, his breaching behaviour has continued unabated. In fact, it would appear to have escalated. 48 This conduct sits against a backdrop of Mr Taylor’s history of prior offending and breaching court orders. 49 Mr Taylor commenced offending as a juvenile. In October 2002, he was convicted of two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and was sentenced to a suspended period of detention. Although his offending since that 8 DCCRM-23-035086, FDN 66. -- 8 of 9 -- [2026] SASC 36 McDonald J 7 time is not the most serious to come before the courts, it demonstrates a protracted pattern of wilful disregard of the law and court orders. Mr Taylor has 22 convictions for failing to comply with a bail agreement and on three occasions he’s been found to have breached a condition of a good behaviour bond. 50 In support of the application for bail, Mr Taylor relied upon his partner’s need for his assistance with the household and their four children, and also his employment working on the Torrens to Darlington Project. It was said that the family is reliant upon his income. I note, however, there has been no evidence to suggest that this employment would still be open to him in the event that he is granted bail. 51 It was also submitted that, since Mr Taylor’s release from custody on the home detention sentence, he has made significant efforts towards his rehabilitation. In addition, that the positive drug tests have to be considered in the context of an addiction that he has been struggling with since he was a young man. He is now 37 years of age. No details were however provided about what these ‘significant efforts towards rehabilitation’ have been. 52 The difficulty with most of these submissions is that, putting aside his employment, there is nothing new in what’s been put to the court. As I have said, Mr Taylor was given the opportunity to prove himself with a very merciful sentence permitting him to serve his sentence in his home. To date, he appears to have wasted that opportunity. His Community Corrections officer gave him 47 opportunities to prove that he was prepared to do the right thing and abide by his conditions. He did not. He was given countless warnings and considerable support which appears to have made no difference. 53 The conditions in the home detention agreement were designed to minimise Mr Taylor’s risk factors and with his disregard of them he is at high risk of reoffending. 54 There is nothing that has been put to me that provides me with any reassurance that, if granted bail, Mr Taylor will do anything other than revert to his prior noncompliant poor behaviour. 55 I also note that this is not a matter in which there needs to be any lengthy delay before the application in the District Court is finalised. Unlike other bail applicants who are awaiting trial, the application made by the Director can be dealt with relatively expeditiously, with many of the submissions to be made on that application already having been made on this application for bail. 56 In all of the circumstances, I have determined that Mr Taylor is not an appropriate candidate for bail. 57 I allow the Director’s application and I revoke the bail that was granted in the District Court. -- 9 of 9 --