MORGAN -v- ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF PERTH [2026] WASCA 62

[2026] WASCA 62 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA) CITATION : MORGAN -v- ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF PERTH [2026] WASCA 62 CORAM : THOMSON P VAUGHAN JA SEAWARD JA HEARD : 20 APRIL 2026 DELIVERED : 5 MAY 2026 FILE NO/S : CACV 58 of 2025 BETWEEN : NICHOLAS JOHN MORGAN Appellant AND ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF PERTH First Respondent CATHOLIC EDUCATION WESTERN AUSTRALIA LIMITED Second Respondent ON APPEAL FROM: Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Coram : CURWOOD DCJ Citation : MORGAN -v- ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF PERTH [2025] WADC 38 File Number : APP 18 of 2024 -- 1 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 62 Page 2 Catchwords: Appeals - Appeal requires error of law - Appeal from Arbitrator to District Court and then to Court of Appeal - Circumstances in which leave to appeal to Court of Appeal will be granted Statutes - Statutory construction - Primacy of text - Choice between active and passive constructions Workers' compensation - Stress related injury - Whether caused by a 'demotion' - Meaning of 'demotion' - Action of demoting or result of being demoted - Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA), s 5 Legislation: Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA), s 5(1), s 5(4) Result: Leave to appeal refused Appeal dismissed Category: A Representation: Counsel: Appellant : B L Nugawela First Respondent : R D McCabe Second Respondent : R D McCabe Solicitors: Appellant : Greenland Legal Pty Ltd First Respondent : Crisp Legal WA Second Respondent : Crisp Legal WA -- 2 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 62 Page 3 Case(s) referred to in decision(s): ADCO Constructions Pty Ltd v Goudappel [2014] HCA 18; (2014) 254 CLR 1 Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27 Australian Postal Corporation v Sinnaiah [2013] FCAFC 98; (2013) 213 FCR 449 Bird v The Commonwealth [1988] HCA 23; (1988) 165 CLR 1 Buck v Comcare [1996] FCA 388; (1996) 66 FCR 359 FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (De-Registered) v Goulding [2004] WASCA 167 Palmanova Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] HCA 35; (2025) 99 ALJR 1362 Zamora v OCS Services Pty Ltd [2025] WASCA 117 -- 3 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 62 THOMSON P Page 4 THOMSON P: 1 The appellant is a teacher. At the end of 2020, he was employed by the second respondent, Catholic Education Western Australia Ltd, as the Deputy Principal of Pastoral Care at Lumen Christi College (College). This was an executive leadership position within the College. He was first appointed to this position commencing on 1 January 2011.1 2 He was employed under a fixed-term executive contract which expired on 31 December 2020. The term of this contract was for one year, between 1 January and 31 December 2020.2 In effect, this was the third and final contract extension since 1 January 2011.3 The contract also provided that if at the conclusion of the third extension the appellant was unable to secure appointment in a school owned or operated by the second respondent, then the appellant would be appointed to a teaching position at the College, or any other school owned or conducted by the second respondent.4 3 In 2020, a restructure of the Executive Leadership Team at the College was announced, following the appointment of a new principal for the College in 2019. This meant that the appellant's executive contract would not be extended beyond the end of 2020.5 The appellant knew this, and that he would need to apply for other executive level positions if he wanted an executive level contract. For a considerable period throughout 2020, he took steps to secure alternative employment at a similar or higher level at other schools.6 4 The appellant was unsuccessful in being appointed to another executive position elsewhere and was not appointed to the Executive Leadership Team at the College in 2021.7 From the beginning of 2021, he assumed a classroom teaching position at the College. This meant he received significantly reduced salary and status.8 5 On 9 March 2021, the appellant ceased work at the College due to a stress-related psychiatric disorder. Subsequently, the appellant applied to WorkCover WA for workers' compensation under the 1 Morgan v Roman Catholic Archbishop of Perth [2025] WADC 38 (DC Reasons) [2], [17] - [18]. 2 GAB 19 (Item 2, Schedule 1 of the Contract of Employment). 3 BAB 52 - 53 (Arbitrator's Reasons [15] - [16]). 4 GAB 8 (Contract of Employment, cl 2(f)). 5 BAB 53 (Arbitrator's Reasons [18] - [20]). 6 BAB 53, 102 - 103 (Arbitrator's Reasons [20], [188] - [189]). 7 BAB 53 - 54 (Arbitrator's Reasons [20] - [24]). 8 DC Reasons [2]. -- 4 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 62 THOMSON P Page 5 Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) (1981 Act) for a stress injury sustained in the course of his employment.9 6 The arbitrator held that the appellant had sustained an 'injury' within the meaning of the 1981 Act on 9 March 2021.10 He also found that the predominant cause of the appellant's stress was his loss of status or demotion from the College's Executive Leadership Team to a classroom position, and the appellant's mistaken belief that this was attributable to a design of the new principal of the College.11 This finding concerns the stress that was generated by the change in the appellant's role, and the loss of status and privileges in the new classroom role, rather than the injury being the product of stress related to the appellant undertaking the new duties of a teacher in a classroom. 7 The arbitrator considered that the appellant's injury was not compensable because stress which wholly or predominantly arose from a 'demotion' was excluded from what constituted a compensable injury, due to the definition of 'injury' in s 5(1), and the exclusions in s 5(4)(a), of the 1981 Act.12 On 22 February 2024, the arbitrator therefore dismissed the appellant's claim for workers' compensation. 8 The appellant sought leave to appeal to a judge of the District Court of Western Australia, on various grounds, including whether the appellant's stress wholly or predominantly arose from a 'demotion'. Leave to appeal can only be granted by a judge of the District Court if a question of law is involved.13 9 The appellant mounted an argument about the proper construction of the word 'demotion' in order to demonstrate that the appeal on this ground involved a question of law. He argued that there had to be some active conduct by an employer to bring about an employee's lower status or reduced privileges, in order for there to be a 'demotion'. He argued that there was no 'demotion' where an employment contract ended due to effluxion of time and was replaced by a new employment contract for a lesser role. 9 DC Reasons [3]. 10 DC Reasons [34]; BAB 71 (Arbitrator’s Reasons [92]); See Workers’ Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) s 5(1) (1981 Act). 11 DC Reasons [34]; BAB 99 - 100 (Arbitrator's Reasons [177] - [179]). 12 BAB 100 (Arbitrator's Reasons [178] - [179]). 13 1981 Act s 247(2); Workers Compensation and Injury Management Act 2023 (WA) s 391(2) (2023 Act). -- 5 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 62 THOMSON P Page 6 10 Curwood DCJ refused leave to appeal. His Honour did not consider that the arbitrator had made any error of law in his interpretation of the word 'demotion' contained in the 1981 Act.14 11 The appellant now seeks leave to appeal to this court from the decision of Curwood DCJ, essentially to reventilate the argument about the proper construction and meaning of 'demotion'. An appeal to this court in respect of a judgment, order or determination in proceedings in the District Court under Part XIII of the 1981 Act must also relate to a question of law, and requires leave to appeal to be granted by this court.15 Relevant legislative provisions 12 The 1981 Act was replaced with the Workers Compensation and Injury Management Act 2023 (WA) (2023 Act) with effect from October 2023. However, the events in the present case occurred prior to 2023. All parties have accepted that the substantive provisions of the 1981 Act apply. The relevant leave provisions relating to appeals contained in the 1981 and 2023 Acts are materially identical. There is no need to determine which of the 1981 or 2023 Acts apply insofar as the appellant seeks to appeal, although this court has previously found that the better view is that the 2023 Act applies. Whichever Act applies it remains the position that the appellant requires leave to appeal and the appeal must relate to a question of law.16 13 Section 18(1) of the 1981 Act provided that if an 'injury' of a worker occurs, the employer shall, subject to the 1981 Act, be liable to pay compensation in accordance with Schedule 1 of the 1981 Act. Schedule 1 sets out applicable compensation entitlements. 14 Section 5(1) of the 1981 Act relevantly defined 'injury' in the following terms: injury means - … (c) a disease contracted by a worker in the course of his employment at or away from his place of employment and to which the employment was a contributing factor and contributed to a significant degree; or 14 DC Reasons [133]. 15 1981 Act s 254; 2023 Act s 393. 16 Zamora v OCS Services Pty Ltd [2025] WASCA 117 [38] - [39]. -- 6 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 62 THOMSON P Page 7 (d) the recurrence, aggravation, or acceleration of any pre-existing disease where the employment was a contributing factor to that recurrence, aggravation, or acceleration and contributed to a significant degree; or … but does not include a disease caused by stress if the stress wholly or predominantly arises from a matter mentioned in subsection (4) unless the matter is mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b) of that subsection and is unreasonable and harsh on the part of the employer; 15 Section 5(4) of the 1981 Act provided: For purposes of the definition of injury, the matters are as follows - (a) the worker's dismissal, retrenchment, demotion, discipline, transfer or redeployment; and (b) the worker's not being promoted, reclassified, transferred or granted leave of absence or any other benefit in relation to the employment; and (c) the worker's expectation of - (i) a matter; or (ii) a decision by the employer in relation to a matter, referred to in paragraph (a) or (b). Ground of appeal 16 The appellant relies upon a single ground of appeal in the following terms: His Honour Judge Curwood's decision, at [125], that 'demotion' in section 5(4) of the Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 means 'simply a reduction to a lower rank or class' and does not require unilateral employer action, was wrong in law. His Honour should have found that the expiry of the appellant's executive contract, with his consequent appointment as a teacher, was not a demotion for the purposes of section 5(4) of the Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981. 17 The statement in the second paragraph of this ground about what the primary judge should have found is conclusionary. It does not state the construction for which the appellant contends. Rather, it states that, -- 7 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 62 THOMSON P Page 8 in the particular factual circumstances, the primary judge should have found that there was no 'demotion'. 18 In these circumstances, at the oral hearing of the appeal the court requested the appellant's counsel to state precisely the alternative construction which he advanced and gave him leave to submit a memorandum of this to the court after the hearing.17 By correspondence following the hearing, the appellant's legal representatives advised the court that: the appellant says the primary judge should have found that the word 'demotion' in section 5(4) of the Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 as amended, means a positive act on the part of the employer which diminishes a workers' employment status or employment conditions. The respondent advised the court that nothing further arose from this alternative construction provided to the court by the appellant after the conclusion of the oral hearing. 19 The parties have proceeded upon the basis that the proper construction of the word 'demotion' in s 5(4)(a) of the 1981 Act involves a question of law. 20 If there was a 'demotion' in the present case, the appellant did not contend that this demotion was 'unreasonable and harsh' for the purposes of the last paragraph of the definition of 'injury' in s 5(1). This has the consequence that if there was a 'demotion', there was no compensable 'injury'. That is because the appellant's stress injury would wholly or predominantly arise from stress arising from the demotion, which would take it outside the definition of 'injury' contained in s 5(1) of the 1981 Act. Primary judge's reasons 21 The primary judge (Curwood DCJ) analysed the legislation and arguments in a helpful way. I have benefited significantly from considering his reasons. However, the proper construction of a piece of legislation attracts the correctness standard. There is only one right interpretation. If I am satisfied that the primary judge reached the correct conclusion, it is unnecessary to consider whether the primary judge committed any error in the reasoning process which he adopted. Therefore, it is unnecessary for me to analyse the primary judge's 17 ts 57. -- 8 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 62 THOMSON P Page 9 reasons to any significant extent. I do not intend any discourtesy by not referring to his reasons more extensively. The competing constructions 22 The appellant claims that there are competing constructions of the word 'demotion' as it appears in s 5(4)(a) of the 1981 Act. The appellant's ground of appeal (as supplemented by the memorandum containing the alternative construction) effectively distinguishes between the following two meanings of 'demotion': (a) a positive act of the employer which diminishes a workers' employment status or employment conditions (ie which reduces a worker's role to a lower rank or class of employment); and (b) the change in a worker's role which occurs where there is a reduction of a worker's role to a lower rank or class of employment. 23 The first construction focuses upon the action of the employer which brings about a result, whereas the second construction concerns the result of action taken by an employer. The appellant described the first construction as active or transitive, whereas the appellant described the second construction as passive or intransitive. 24 The description of the competing constructions as intransitive or transitive is not strictly correct, as 'demotion' is used as a noun and not a verb in s 5(4) of the 1981 Act. The grammatical description of something as intransitive or transitive relates only to verbs. However, it is apparent that the appellant seeks to distinguish between a change in position, where the new role of a worker may be described as a 'demotion' compared to the previous role, and the action of demoting someone, which may also be described as a 'demotion'. In other words, this is the difference between 'You will receive a demotion' and 'I am demoting you'. 25 The appellant contended that 'demotion' in s 5(4)(a) of the 1981 Act had the active meaning, and was confined to describing the action of demoting a person. 26 The appellant then contended that there was no action by the College which led to the demotion of the appellant, because the term of the appellant's contract expired from the effluxion of time. The appellant argued that the managerial decisions which led to the position -- 9 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 62 THOMSON P Page 10 occupied by the appellant being removed from the Executive Leadership Team at the College were not relevant actions of the College which led to the demotion of the appellant. Apparently, that is because they were 'ex contractu' (to use the phrase of the appellant's counsel in oral argument).18 27 Following this through, the appellant's counsel maintained that there was no 'demotion' of the appellant which had occurred for the purposes of s 5(4)(a) of the 1981 Act. On this view, the appellant's stress did not wholly or predominantly arise from a matter mentioned in s 5(4)(a), and the appellant could recover for the stress injury which he suffered. Approach to statutory construction 28 In Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ said:19 This Court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the text itself. Historical considerations and extrinsic materials cannot be relied on to displace the clear meaning of the text. The language which has actually been employed in the text of legislation is the surest guide to legislative intention. The meaning of the text may require consideration of the context, which includes the general purpose and policy of a provision, in particular the mischief it is seeking to remedy. (foonotes omitted) 29 More recently, in Palmanova Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia, Gageler CJ, Gordon, Jagot and Beech-Jones JJ said much the same thing:20 Statutory construction is the process of attributing meaning to statutory text. The construction of a statutory provision begins and ends with the statutory text understood in context and in light of the statutory purpose - being what the provision is designed to achieve in fact - insofar as that purpose is discernible from the statutory text and context. In the construction of a provision of a Commonwealth statute, the meaning that would best achieve the statutory purpose so discerned is to be preferred to each alternative meaning. (footnotes omitted) 30 The last sentence of this quote refers to s 15AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth). However, the principle applies equally 18 ts 10, 11. 19 Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27 [47]. 20 Palmanova Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia [2025] HCA 35; (2025) 99 ALJR 1362 [4]. -- 10 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 62 THOMSON P Page 11 to Western Australian statutes as well, due to s 18 of the Interpretation Act 1984 (WA). 31 Both passages set out above place primary emphasis on the text of legislation in the process of interpretation, albeit interpreted having regard to context and purpose. However, the primacy of the text is an essential anchor in the process of statutory interpretation. It marks the difference between a court interpreting the will of Parliament, and writing its own legislative solution. In other words, giving primacy to the text in any exercise of legislative construction is essential as a reflection of the constitutional separation of the different functions of the legislature and judiciary. Ordinary meaning of 'demotion' 32 The appellant accepted that the starting point in his argument should be the ordinary meaning of the word 'demotion'. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines 'demotion' as a noun with the following meanings: The action of demoting; reduction to a lower rank or class. 33 The appellant says that these two definitions reflect the difference between the active and passive constructions of the word 'demotion', which I have set out above. A 'demotion' may refer to the act or event of imposing a reduction to a lower rank or class on a worker (active construction); or it may refer to the change in position of a worker from one role to a new, reduced role of a worker (passive construction). In effect, the primary judge selected the second meaning as the proper construction of the word 'demotion'. 34 As the ordinary meaning of 'demotion' may be one or other of the competing meanings in this case, the appellant claims that it is necessary to choose which of the meanings applies by resort to statutory context and purpose, including extrinsic material. 35 However, this way of framing the question implicitly confines the possible constructions of 'demotion'. It is entirely possible that 'demotion' could bear both meanings. It might encompass both the act of demoting a worker to a position of a lower rank or class, as well as describe the outcome of that act, which is the worker's movement from a higher position to a lower position. The appellant only succeeds if he excludes the possibility of the word 'demotion' meaning exclusively a change in the worker's position to one of a lower rank or status. -- 11 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 62 THOMSON P Page 12 Matters informing the constructional choice 36 The appellant relies upon various matters to support his position that the active construction of 'demotion' should be adopted as the exclusive meaning of this word. For reasons which I will develop, I do not accept any of these arguments. 37 The primary contextual and linguistic point on which the appellant relies is that the last paragraph of the definition of 'injury' contemplates that a matter mentioned in s 5(4)(a) or (b) may be 'unreasonable and harsh on the part of the employer'. The appellant says that a matter can only be unreasonable and harsh on the part of the employer if it involves action by the employer which is unreasonable and harsh. Hence, the appellant contends that this necessarily means that the active construction of 'demotion' must be adopted. The appellant claims that there would be no scope to describe a 'demotion' as unreasonable and harsh if it does not involve action by the employer, as it is the employers' action which will determine if a demotion is unreasonable or harsh. 38 In my view, the logic underlying this contextual and linguistic argument does not necessarily require the active construction to be adopted. It is perfectly possible that, using the passive construction of 'demotion', the objective result of reducing the rank or class of a worker may be described as unreasonable and harsh, either because the result is disproportionately unfair having regard to the reason for the demotion, or because the process of deciding to take the action to demote the worker is unreasonable and harsh. In either of these instances, the demotion might be described as unreasonable and harsh, even though the passive construction of the concept of 'demotion' is adopted. 39 The appellant says that the purpose of excluding the stress caused by a demotion (or the other matters mentioned in s 5(4)(a) or (b)) from being a compensable injury, is consistent only with the active construction. However, I do not see why this is so. There is no good policy reason why the stress caused to a worker by being placed in a role of reduced rank or class, compared to the worker's previous role, should not be excluded from the definition of 'injury' if stress caused by the action of demoting a person does not attract compensation. It is easy to imagine that a worker may be at least equally as stressed by a reduction to a lower rank and class (and losing pay and privileges), as in circumstances where that reduction has occurred as a result of an active management decision to demote them. -- 12 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 62 THOMSON P Page 13 40 Nothing in the exposition of the purpose of s 5(4)(a) mentioned in the explanation of this provision by Steytler J in FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (De-Registered) v Goulding suggests that only stress caused to a worker by the action of being demoted should be excluded from compensation:21 The obvious purpose underlying the exclusion is to prevent the bringing of claims for compensation as a consequence of stress-related diseases that wholly or predominantly arise out of specified incidents of the employment relationship which, by their very nature, are particularly stressful, but which are not harsh and unreasonable on the part of the employer. 41 The appellant also says that considering the other matters in s 5(4)(a) ejusdem generis leads to the active construction of 'demotion'. The appellant contends that each of the other five 'matters' mentioned in s 5(4)(a) (ie dismissal, retrenchment, discipline, transfer or redeployment) depends upon some action being taken by the employer. Consequently, the reference to a 'demotion' should be interpreted to mean the active construction which refers to the action of the employer in demoting a worker. 42 The difficulty about this argument is that each of the other five matters mentioned in s 5(4)(a) seem to me capable of generating the same issue as arises for the term 'demotion'. A 'dismissal' might refer to the act of dismissing an employee, but equally might mean the result of that action, ie the termination of the workers' employment. So too with retrenchment, discipline, transfer or redeployment. Consequently, I do not regard the appeal to the principle of ejusdem generis to be of assistance here. 43 The appellant also relies upon various passages from parliamentary debate recorded in Hansard, when s 5(4)(a) was introduced in the 1981 Act.22 The passages referred to by the appellant are from the debate which occurred when the terms of the Workers' Compensation and Rehabilitation Amendment Bill23 was considered in Committee. The appellant places reliance upon various comments made by the relevant Minister to the effect that s 5(4)(a) would mean that compensation would still be payable for stress-related injuries if an employer's actions are unreasonable and harsh. The appellant argues 21 FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (De-Registered) v Goulding [2004] WASCA 167 [39]. 22 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 3 November 1993, 6168, 6215 - 6217. 23 Which resulted in Act No 48/1993. -- 13 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 62 THOMSON P Page 14 that the reference to 'actions' in the debates confirms that an active construction of 'demotion' should be adopted. 44 In my view, the reference to 'actions' in these debates does not clearly distinguish between the taking of the action and the result of the action. Either, or both, of these alternatives might be intended. I do not regard the comments by the Minister as providing decisive support for the appellant's particular construction of 'demotion'. 45 The appellant also relies upon the principle that workers' compensation legislation is remedial and to be construed beneficially in favour of workers. So, if a person or case falls within the general spirit of such legislation, and two possible constructions of the legislation are available, the one favourable to the worker should be preferred.24 46 Not every provision within a generally remedial or beneficial Act has a remedial or beneficial purpose. It is necessary to focus upon the purpose of the particular provision. If the purpose of the particular provision is neither remedial nor beneficial, the principle invoked by the appellant does not apply.25 47 The purpose of s 5(4)(a) is to impose a limit upon compensation for stress related injuries. The imposition of a limit upon compensation is not underpinned by a remedial or beneficial purpose in favour of a worker. Consequently, the principle invoked by the appellant does not apply in choosing the proper construction of the statutory limit. 48 Nor does any principle of legality inform the constructional choice, contrary to the appellant's oral submissions.26 The principle of legality is a presumption that legislation will not be construed to interfere with common law rights, freedoms, immunities or principles in the absence of unmistakable and unambiguous language.27 There is no relevant common law right in the present case which could attract the operation of this principle. 49 It has been said that there may be certain statutory rights which have become so significant to an individual that clear words are required to abrogate those statutory rights, and courts should favour an 24 Citing Bird v The Commonwealth [1988] HCA 23; (1988) 165 CLR 1, 9 (Deane & Gaudron JJ). 25 ADCO Constructions Pty Ltd v Goudappel [2014] HCA 18; (2014) 254 CLR 1 [29] (French CJ, Crennan, Kiefel & Keane JJ); Herzfeld P & Prince T, Interpretation (3rd ed, 2024) [10.300]. 26 ts 20, 36. 27 Herzfeld P and Prince T, Interpretation (3rd ed, 2024) [9.120]. -- 14 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 62 THOMSON P VAUGHAN JA Page 15 interpretation which safeguards the individual.28 However, where the statutory right to be safeguarded is contained in the same statute as the provision which may interfere with that right, the issue must be treated as a matter of ordinary statutory construction, seeking to ascertain the legislative intention as a harmonious whole. There is no room for applying a presumption that Parliament intended to give priority to the right over a provision which may limit that right.29 Conclusion 50 As I have demonstrated, there is no good reason for construing 'demotion' in the particular and limited way advanced by the appellant. In my view, the ordinary meaning of 'demotion' should be adopted, which means that both the active and passive construction of this term may apply. 51 This means that stress caused by the manner or by the result of demoting a person will not be compensable. To adapt the language of Steytler J in FAI, stress which is caused by the manner of a demotion, and stress which is caused by the result of a demotion, both arise out of a specified incident of the employment relationship, namely a demotion, which, by its very nature, is particularly stressful.30 Unless the demotion was unreasonable and harsh, stress associated with a demotion is not compensable. 52 For these reasons, the term 'demotion' should be given its ordinary meaning in both senses identified above. As this conclusion requires the ordinary meaning of a word to be applied, I would refuse leave to appeal. I would also dismiss the appeal. 53 I have also had the advantage of reading the draft reasons of Vaughan JA. I respectfully endorse his comments about whether to grant leave to appeal to this court at [58] - [61]. VAUGHAN JA: 54 I have the considerable advantage of having read Thomson P's reasons for decision in draft. 28 Buck v Comcare [1996] FCA 388; (1996) 66 FCR 359, 364 - 365; Australian Postal Corporation v Sinnaiah [2013] FCAFC 98; (2013) 213 FCR 449 [33] - [34]. 29 Compare Herzfeld P and Prince T, Interpretation (3rd ed, 2024) [9.120]. 30 FAI General Insurance Co Ltd (De-Registered) v Goulding [39]. -- 15 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 62 VAUGHAN JA Page 16 55 I agree with Thomson P, essentially for the reasons that his Honour gives, that leave to appeal should be refused and the appeal should be dismissed. In my view, what Thomson P characterises as the 'second construction' encompasses and subsumes the 'first construction' (see Thomson P's reasons at [22] - [23]). A demotion of the kind falling within the first construction (being the appellant's preferred construction) necessarily results in a demotion of the kind falling within the second construction. In that respect, while Thomson P concludes that both the active and passive constructions may apply, I consider that it is strictly the second construction (being the ordinary and natural meaning of the word 'demotion') that is the proper construction of the term 'demotion' as found in s 5(4)(a) of the 1981 Act. 56 Put more colloquially, what engages the exception in the definition of 'injury' is the objective fact of a demotion rather than the way in which the demotion came about. 57 In arriving at that construction, while I otherwise agree with and adopt Thomson P's reasons for rejecting the appellant's preferred construction in favour of the construction accepted by the primary appeal judge in the District Court, I also take into account the context provided by s 5(4)(b) and s 5(4)(c) of the 1981 Act. Section 5(4), which must be read into the s 5(1) definition of 'injury' when it is being construed, is not only concerned with the six matters in s 5(4)(a). Section 5(4) also includes the 'matters' (the word used in the definition of injury) as described in s 5(4)(b) and s 5(4)(c). Those matters are all self-evidently concerned with a particular thing, event or outcome (ie an objective state of affairs) rather than some process, conduct or action leading to that state of affairs. So too, in my opinion, in referring to a 'demotion' as a 'matter', the 1981 Act is concerned with the objective fact of a demotion. 58 There is a separate reason why I would refuse leave to appeal and dismiss the appeal. This concerns the question of leave to appeal and is independent of the construction that has been arrived at following consideration of the point raised by the appellant on its merits after full argument at an appeal hearing. In seeking leave to appeal the appellant essentially sought to reagitate a point about the proper construction of the word 'demotion'. The very same point had been advanced and rejected by the primary appeal judge. See DC Reasons [5](3), [6](3), [97] - [134]. -- 16 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 62 VAUGHAN JA Page 17 59 The primary appeal judge gave careful and comprehensive reasons for the construction that the appellant sought to impugn by a further appeal to this court. There was nothing in the primary appeal judge's reasons, or the construction itself, that signified a reasonable prospect of the appellant succeeding in demonstrating error. To the contrary, the construction accepted by the primary appeal judge was consistent with the ordinary and natural meaning of the word 'demotion'. No question of general public importance arose. Strictly speaking, the proposed appeal raised a question of principle (ie the proper construction of a term in a written law). However, the resolution of that question of principle was of limited application. Its utility was confined to the very unusual factual scenario that arose in the appellant's case. Also, as the appellant acknowledged, in repealing the 1981 Act and providing for the workers' compensation legislation now found in the 2023 Act, there is now a different legislative treatment of the exclusion. See 2023 Act, s 7. Accordingly, the case for leave to appeal was necessarily grounded in supposed substantial injustice to the appellant rather than any wider considerations. 60 In the circumstances I have mentioned it is not in the interests of justice that there be leave to appeal. The recent observations made by this court in Zamora v OCS Services Pty Ltd are apposite: The case for leave to appeal must be grounded in supposed substantial injustice to the appellant himself. In such circumstances a litigant who has failed before both the arbitrator and the District Court will ordinarily have difficulties in establishing that the interests of justice warrant leave to appeal to this court to reventilate arguments which failed in the primary appeal to the District Court. Leave to appeal to do no more than reagitate arguments rejected in the District Court ought not to be forthcoming as a matter of course. Even if, as in this case, substantive rights are involved, it is material that a litigant has already availed himself or herself of one appeal right. This court will require a reasonably clear case of alleged legal error if it is to be satisfied that the decision is attended with sufficient doubt to justify leave. That is all the more so where, as in this case, the primary judge has identified the applicable legal principles in orthodox terms to which no exception is taken, meaning that any error could only be one of application of those legal principles to the facts of the case.31 61 The constructional point advanced by the appellant does not, on its face, establish that the primary appeal judge's decision was attended with sufficient doubt to justify leave to appeal. At no time did the appellant demonstrate a reasonably clear case of alleged legal error. It 31 Zamora v OCS Services Pty Ltd [2025] WASCA 117 [50] (see also at [48] - [49]). -- 17 of 18 -- [2026] WASCA 62 VAUGHAN JA SEAWARD JA Page 18 follows that, irrespective of the determination that has been made on the merits, leave to appeal ought to be refused and the appeal should be dismissed. SEAWARD JA: 62 I agree with Thomson P. I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. LH Associate to the Hon President Thomson 5 MAY 2026 -- 18 of 18 --