CONTE -v- CITY OF COCKBURN [2026] WASC 155

[2026] WASC 155 Page 1 JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA IN CRIMINAL CITATION : CONTE -v- CITY OF COCKBURN [2026] WASC 155 CORAM : FORRESTER J HEARD : 6 MARCH 2026 DELIVERED : 4 MAY 2026 FILE NO/S : SJA 1080 of 2024 BETWEEN : MARIA LUIGIA CONTE Appellant AND CITY OF COCKBURN (ABN 27 471 341 209) Respondent ON APPEAL FROM: Jurisdiction : MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA Coram : MAGISTRATE HILLS-WRIGHT File Number : FR 9658/2023 -- 1 of 18 -- [2026] WASC 155 Page 2 Catchwords: Criminal law - Single judge appeal - Appeal against conviction - Appeal against sentence - Practice and procedure - Procedural accommodations - Miscarriage of justice - Whether appellant committed the offence - Failure to comply with building order - Whether circumstances in s 113(2) of the Building Act 2011 (WA) operated to prevent issuing of building order - Turns on own facts Legislation: Building Act 2011 (WA) Building Services (Complaint Resolution and Administration) Act 2011 (WA) Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA) Result: Application dismissed Category: B Representation: Counsel: Appellant : In Person Respondent : Mr P Gillett Solicitors: Appellant : In Person Respondent : McLeods Lawyers Case(s) referred to in decision(s): CD and EF v Chief Executive Officer, Department of Child Protection and Family Support [2017] WASC 126 Hunt v Russell [2019] WASC 284 Neil v Nott [1994] HCA 23; (1994) 121 ALR 148 Sethi v Bhavsar [2020] WASCA 52 -- 2 of 18 -- [2026] WASC 155 FORRESTER J Page 3 FORRESTER J: Introduction 1 On 11 December 2023, the appellant was convicted of an offence that, between 14 September 2023 and 7 November 2023, within the district of the City of Cockburn (City), having been served with a building order, she failed without reasonable excuse to comply with that order, contrary to s 115 of the Building Act 2011 (WA) (Building Act). 2 The appellant was convicted in her absence, pursuant to s 55 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA). However, the learned Magistrate adjourned the sentencing proceedings to enable the appellant to be heard as to sentence. 3 The appellant sought to set aside the conviction, but on 9 April 2024, that application was dismissed. 4 The appellant was eventually sentenced, on 12 September 2024, to a fine of $6,000, with costs awarded against her in the sum of $4,000. 5 The appellant lodged an appeal against her conviction and sentence on 20 November 2024, 40 days out of time. The appellant, therefore, requires an extension of time in which to appeal. Factual basis of charge 6 The appellant had access to an interpreter at the sentencing hearing. She was asked if she wanted the facts interpreted to her word for word, but she declined.1 7 The facts were stated by the prosecutor.2 It is unnecessary to recite them all for the purposes of this matter. 8 In summary, the appellant was, at all material times, the owner of a property in Spearwood. The property is a residential property, and there is a brick and tile dwelling on the property. Over the years, the appellant made a number of unauthorised additions and alterations to the property. 1 Transcript, City of Cockburn v Conte, Magistrates Court of Western Australia, 12 September 2024, 6 - 7 (ts (12 September 2024)). 2 ts (12 September 2024) 7 - 13. -- 3 of 18 -- [2026] WASC 155 FORRESTER J Page 4 9 On 29 November 2022, the City carried out a full inspection of the dwelling and the property to ascertain the extent of the alterations and unauthorised structures. That inspection revealed a number of different unauthorised works, including: (a) the alteration and extension of the existing ground-floor double garage and storeroom to create a habitable space, comprising two living rooms, a kitchen, a bathroom and a bedroom with ensuite; (b) the enclosing and alteration of the terrace at the rear of the dwelling to create a kitchen area within the dwelling; (c) the stairway and terrace at the entrance to the dwelling were in a dangerous state because the stairs had been partially demolished, and there was no balustrade or barrier to the stairs or the terrace; and (d) construction of a brick outbuilding on the property, comprising a shared and habitable room with a toilet, which the inspection revealed was unfit for human occupation because of its dilapidated condition. 10 In view of the extent of the unauthorised works and the appellant's failure to rectify or seek approval for the works, on 14 August 2023, the City gave her a formal building order, requiring her to apply for retrospective building approval in the form of a building approval certificate for the alterations and extensions to the dwelling within 30 days. 11 The appellant was required to alter the stairway and terrace at the entrance to the dwelling within 60 days to ensure that the stairs complied with the Building Code of Australia (BCA) and that barriers were installed in accordance with the BCA. She was also required to demolish and remove the brick outbuilding within 60 days. 12 The appellant did not comply with any part of the building order. When asked by officers of the City why she had not complied with the building order, the appellant said she had engaged a building surveyor and wanted to meet with the City. However, officers advised her that two meetings had previously been arranged but that the appellant had cancelled those meetings shortly before they were due to start. -- 4 of 18 -- [2026] WASC 155 FORRESTER J Page 5 13 The appellant also claimed she had applied for a building permit to make the stairs and entrance compliant. However, the officers advised her that the City had requested additional information in relation to that application. She had failed to provide the information within 21 days and, as a result, that application had been cancelled. 14 In relation to the outbuilding, the appellant said she did not think it needed to be demolished. 15 As at the date of sentencing on 12 September 2024, none of the building alterations had been completed as required. Submissions made by the appellant as to sentence 16 The appellant told the Magistrate that from the moment she put in her first application, she was supported and given additional information from the City. She considered the works to still be in progress, but the City had told her it was 'penalty work'.3 She was asking for information from the City and asked if she was permitted to go ahead with the renovations. She claimed she had two building licence numbers and had completed the work under the first one as required. She submitted that the engineer was then required to certify the works, following which the City would be notified. She claimed she did not need approval first. 17 The appellant submitted that the outbuilding had not been demolished because the building had been certified by an engineer before she moved in, and she had applied for a change of use, but the City had never responded. She also claimed that the rooms in the garage had been certified. 18 The appellant submitted that she was part of a charitable association which gave assistance to certain vulnerable people, and provided information as to her financial situation, which she described as 'disastrous'.4 Prosecution submissions as to sentence 19 The maximum penalty for the offence is a fine of $50,000. 3 ts (12 September 2024) 18. 4 ts (12 September 2024) 24. -- 5 of 18 -- [2026] WASC 155 FORRESTER J Page 6 20 The prosecutor submitted that, while the offence was not at the top end of the range of seriousness, it was 'nowhere near the bottom either'.5 That was due to the continued failure to comply. 21 The prosecutor submitted that the penalty needed to include an element for general deterrence. He said that the City was unable to ascertain the extent of the non-compliance and was not able to say whether the alterations were safe. Sentence 22 The appellant was sentenced to a $6,000 fine and ordered to pay costs of $4,000. Use of interpreters 23 The appellant had access to an Italian interpreter during the directions hearings during these proceedings, as well as the hearing of the appeal before me. The appellant's spoken English is quite understandable, and she professes to understand spoken English very well. Accordingly, on many occasions before me, she effectively dispensed with the use of the interpreter. 24 Notwithstanding this, and her request on occasion that no interpreter be used, I have had concerns regarding the appellant's comprehension of the proceedings. Accordingly, I caused some of the preliminary proceedings to be fully interpreted for the appellant in order to ensure that she completely understood court orders and the case against her. 25 However, at the appeal, I allowed the appellant to proceed as she wished, which meant she did not substantively utilise the interpreter, although the interpreter remained available to her at all times. The appellant's written correspondence 26 The appellant has sent at least 160 emails to the court during the course of the proceedings. The emails were either directed to the court or some other party, including the City. In some cases, they were copied to many other parties. Sometimes they were copied to the City's legal representatives, and sometimes they were not. As much as possible, if they were not copied to the City's legal representatives, they were forwarded on by my associate. 5 ts (12 September 2024) 14. -- 6 of 18 -- [2026] WASC 155 FORRESTER J Page 7 27 In almost every case, the emails were, with no disrespect to the appellant, entirely incomprehensible. While the appellant's spoken English is admirably good, her written English cannot be understood. 28 Despite the appellant being asked to cease sending emails to the court, then directed to cease sending emails to the court, and repeatedly being told that her emails could not be understood and would not be actioned, the appellant continued to send emails to the court without cessation. On 19 November 2025, the appellant was informed that further emails would not be read or responded to. 29 Despite this, the appellant continued to write emails to the court. Some, which, as best as could be ascertained, included an application for an adjournment, were responded to by requesting that the appellant raise the matters at the next directions hearing, or make a formal application. The remainder of the appellant's prolific correspondence was filed without response. 30 Even after the appeal hearing took place, the appellant has continued to email the court. 31 None of the correspondence constitutes material which is to be taken into account in this appeal. Applications to adduce additional evidence 32 I have treated the filing of the following affidavits as applications by the appellant to adduce additional evidence. Affidavit sworn 14 July 2025 33 The appellant submitted an affidavit sworn on 14 July 2025, in which the appellant deposed that she applied for a set of plans (presumably, a building permit) which was rejected in 2012. She said she liaised with the City, and she put in a further application, and was told that she could continue with a building licence for internal works. She took out a loan to finish the works but the money was stolen from her. She advised the City that she could not complete the works in the required time, but would do so as she had funds. She claims the City told her 'they would pause my second building number'.6 34 The appellant deposed that, when she came into funds, she contacted the City and was told she needed to 'purchase a 2nd building 6 Affidavit of Maria Luigia Conte sworn 14 July 2025, 2 (Affidavit sworn 14 July 2025). -- 7 of 18 -- [2026] WASC 155 FORRESTER J Page 8 licence number from the front desk'.7 When she went to purchase it, she was told there was no licence to pay for. She kept going back to the City but she could not get a resolution. 35 Ultimately, the appellant deposed that she believed she had a building licence (but could not produce a copy of any such licence) and had a Structural Assessment Report showing that the building was sound. 36 Annexed to the affidavit are a number of copies of an Application for Building Approval Certificate (Unauthorised Buildings) dated 13 January 2012. The form is not fully completed. Also annexed is a largely illegible copy of a document headed 'Owner-Builder's Statutory Declaration'.8 37 The appellant also attached a document entitled 'Building Services (Complaint Resolution and Administration) Act 2011 - Referral'.9 It does not advance the appellant's appeal in any way. 38 Also annexed to the affidavit are pages of correspondence between the appellant and the City from July 2025 in which the appellant makes a number of allegations against the City. They also do not advance the appellant's appeal. 39 A letter dated 3 May 2012 from David Wills and Associates to the City indicated that a number of alterations made by the appellant as at that date were, subject to one modification related to the stairs, structurally adequate. However, the letter expressly stated that it did not verify compliance with the BCA or the City's building requirements.10 40 Finally, annexed to the affidavit was a Structural Assessment Report of Saddam Mansour, dated 11 September 2024, which stated that, in the opinion of the author, the alterations made to the outbuilding, alfresco area, garage and storeroom were structurally satisfactory.11 It also stated: 7 Affidavit sworn 14 July 2025, 2. 8 Affidavit sworn 14 July 2025, 5. 9 Affidavit sworn 14 July 2025, 6. 10 Affidavit sworn 14 July 2025, 43 - 44. 11 Affidavit sworn 14 July 2025, 50 - 55. -- 8 of 18 -- [2026] WASC 155 FORRESTER J Page 9 In regard to the stairway and terrace modification, the client has asked about my assistance in providing a design for these areas, and I am happy to help should the project move forward.12 Affidavit sworn 21 August 2025 41 In a further document purporting to be an affidavit sworn on 21 August 2025, the appellant claimed she was innocent of the offence, and that she had properly issued permits and approvals.13 The annexures to that affidavit were almost entirely the same documents which had been annexed to the affidavit sworn on 14 July 2025. Further opportunities to apply to adduce additional evidence 42 On 27 August 2025, at a directions hearing before me, I explained to the appellant that none of her affidavit material suggested that she did comply with the building order. Further, her grounds of appeal did not disclose a valid ground of appeal.14 43 The appellant indicated she had further material which she sought to lodge and was given an opportunity to do so. She did not lodge any further affidavit material, although as I have already recounted, the appellant continued to send lengthy and incomprehensible emails to the court. 44 At a directions hearing on 18 November 2025, the appellant's submissions suggested that she had erroneously proceeded on the assumption that material she had put before the Magistrates Court in the sentencing proceedings had been received as part of her appeal. No such material had been received, and it is not clear that it was ever lodged at first instance. To ensure that the appellant had had every opportunity to have all relevant information before the court, she was given a further opportunity to file any additional affidavit containing additional evidence which she sought to adduce.15 45 Again, the appellant did not file any further affidavit, but sent numerous emails to the court, which did not relate to the material before the learned magistrate at the time of sentencing. 12 Affidavit sworn 14 July 2025, 12. 13 Affidavit of Maria Luigia Conte sworn 21 August 2025. 14 Transcript, Conte v City of Cockburn, Supreme Court of Western Australia, 27 August 2025, 60. 15 Transcript, Conte v City of Cockburn, Supreme Court of Western Australia, 18 November 2025, 81 - 94. -- 9 of 18 -- [2026] WASC 155 FORRESTER J Page 10 Application by the respondent to adduce additional evidence 46 The respondent adduced two affidavits, which were said to have been before the learned magistrate at the time of the sentencing: (a) affidavit of Giancarlo Righetti sworn on 27 March 2024; and (b) affidavit of Natalie East sworn on 27 March 2024. 47 The affidavits detailed the service of the building order on the appellant and the service of the prosecution notice. A copy of the building order was annexed. Statutory framework 48 The application for leave to appeal is made under div 2 of pt 2 of the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) (CA Act). A decision to convict an accused after a trial is a decision which may be appealed.16 So too is a sentence imposed as a result of a conviction.17 49 Leave to appeal must not be granted on a ground of appeal unless the court is satisfied that the ground has a reasonable prospect of succeeding,18 meaning that the ground is required to have a rational and logical prospect of succeeding.19 Unless leave to appeal is granted on at least one ground, the appeal is taken to have been dismissed.20 50 Even if a ground of appeal might be decided in favour of the appellant, the court may dismiss the appeal if it considers that no substantial miscarriage of justice has occurred.21 51 Under the Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), an appeal court must decide an appeal on the evidence and material that was before the lower court.22 However, the court has a wide discretion to permit evidence, other than that adduced in the lower court, to be relied upon.23 52 In CD and EF v Chief Executive Officer, Department of Child Protection and Family Support, Pritchard J observed: 16 CA Act s 6(c) and s 7(1). 17 CA Act s 6(f) and s 7(1). 18 CA Act s 9(2). 19 Samuels v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 193; (2005) 30 WAR 473 [56]. 20 CA Act s 9(3). 21 CA Act s 14(2). 22 Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA) (CA Act) s 39. 23 CA Act s 40(1)(e). -- 10 of 18 -- [2026] WASC 155 FORRESTER J Page 11 The exercise of the statutory discretion to admit new evidence will be informed (although not necessarily determined) by the principles concerning new and fresh evidence. In the context of a criminal trial, where an appellant seeks to rely on new evidence - that is, evidence which was available at the time of the trial, or could, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered - no miscarriage of justice will arise simply because the new evidence was not adduced. Rather, new evidence will only give rise to a miscarriage of justice if the appellate court is either satisfied that the accused is innocent or concludes that the accused should not have been convicted, and it is not sufficient that the new evidence reveals only a likelihood that the court below would have returned a verdict of not guilty. An appellant thus faces a high hurdle in overturning a finding of guilt based on new evidence.24 Application for an extension of time in which to appeal 53 The affidavit sworn by the appellant on 20 November 2024 in support of her application for an extension of time in which to appeal states: (a) the building order was incorrect; (b) the appellant did not have the opportunity to present relevant information because it was refused; (c) the appellant was not allowed 'of previewed [sic] desitions [sic] in order to try to annull [sic] invalidate Shaire Presiquence [sic]'; and (d) the appellant could not challenge Tribunal decisions at the last hearing since there was no communication at the last hearing. 54 Ms Conte also deposed that the 'Magistrate get speeding since time allowed [sic]', which appears to be an allegation that the Magistrate proceeded too quickly. As far as can otherwise be discerned, the appellant alleged that the Magistrate refused to accept documents from the appellant, took words out of context, denied access to hearing the CCTV and audio, and there may have been mistakes in the transcription.25 55 None of the matters raised in the appellant's affidavit explains, in any way, her delay in lodging an appeal. However, given her clear difficulties expressing herself in writing and the relatively short delay, I 24 CD and EF v Chief Executive Officer, Department of Child Protection and Family Support [2017] WASC 126 [119]; see also Hunt v Russell [2019] WASC 284 [11] (Smith J). 25 Affidavit of Maria Luigia Conte sworn 20 November 2024. -- 11 of 18 -- [2026] WASC 155 FORRESTER J Page 12 will consider the merits of the appeal before returning to the question of an extension of time. Grounds of appeal 56 The appellant's grounds of appeal, as contained in the notice of appeal are as follows: 1. Request the register cancel the order on medical, job search enploiment [sic], family personal responsibilt [sic] grounds; Election to the Court to dispute infringement notes to have court order cancelled. 2. Stop obtaine [sic] income on professional responsibility a Founder over President Pilote [sic] Project. 3. Personal responsibility 4. Running arround [sic] as a volunteer to support Project initiative help with Domestic Violence Platforms and sreams [sic] of Comunity [sic] Projects (ideation, projectations [sic], opera). 57 The grounds as stated disclose no proper ground of appeal against conviction. 58 It is possible to discern a complaint as to the amount of the fine on the basis of the appellant's personal character and income. Self-represented appellant 59 I am mindful that the appellant is a litigant in person, and as such is entitled to some leniency in relation to compliance with the court rules. The court is required to approach the documents in which she articulates her appeal with some flexibility. Further, the court needs to be astute to ensure that, in a poorly expressed or unstructured document in which she sets out her appeal, there is no viable case which, with appropriate amendment or permissible assistance from the court, could be put into proper form. A 'frequent consequence of self-representation is that the court must assume the burden of endeavouring to ascertain the rights of parties which are obfuscated by their own advocacy'.26 60 Given the manner in which the appellant had made submissions during directions hearings, it was apparent that the appellant was in fact appealing her conviction. 26 Neil v Nott [1994] HCA 23; (1994) 121 ALR 148, 150; See also Sethi v Bhavsar [2020] WASCA 52 [27]. -- 12 of 18 -- [2026] WASC 155 FORRESTER J Page 13 61 At the commencement of the appeal, I clarified with counsel for the City that it was understood that the appeal was one against conviction and that that appeal was, in effect, based on the ground that there was a miscarriage of justice on the basis that the appellant did not commit the offence of which she was convicted. I amended the ground of appeal accordingly.27 62 As to the appeal against sentence, the appellant confirmed that her ground of appeal as to sentence was, in effect, that she should not have been sentenced because she should not have been convicted.28 She did not pursue a submission that the fine was too severe a penalty. 63 I have proceeded on this basis. Appellant's submissions 64 The appellant submitted that she believed she had done everything possible to show the real situation. She claimed to have reports that did not reflect her property, and described problems she had with a builder, and her communications with the City. She referred to an engineer's report which concluded the unauthorised works were structurally sound. 65 As best as can be understood, the appellant alleges that at one point during her discussions with the City, she saw her file, and at that time it included what she called 'certification', which I took to mean an approval, or at least a provisional approval. 66 After this, she said, she was permitted to continue with her renovations, but she took out a loan and the money was stolen from her, so she could not continue. The City told her she could pause the works. Later, when she had funds, she went back to the City and she claims they told her she could proceed, but then there were problems. The City came and inspected the property and told her there were problems with the alterations and additions. She had them certified by an engineer. She submitted a further application, but she claims the City never responded. There were significant communication issues with the City, and she was unable to resolve the issues. 27 Transcript, Conte v City of Cockburn, Supreme Court of Western Australia, 6 March 2026, 104 - 106 (ts (6 March 2026)). 28 ts (6 March 2026) 105. -- 13 of 18 -- [2026] WASC 155 FORRESTER J Page 14 Respondent's submissions 67 The respondent submitted that there was no evidence that the appellant had received any building approval prior to being issued with the Building Order, and there was also no evidence that she had attempted to comply with the Building Order during the relevant period. Any application she had made had been rejected. The engineer's report to which the appellant referred was obtained well after the period of the offence. Accordingly, she had no reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the Building Order. Disposition 68 Section 115 of the Building Act relevantly provides: A person who is served with a copy of a building order must not without reasonable excuse fail to comply with the order. Penalty: (a) for a first offence, a fine of $50 000; 69 A building order may require a person to whom the order is directed to do any one or more of the things specified in s 112(2) of the Building Act. However, pursuant to s 113(2) of the Building Act, a building order is not to be made under s 112(2)(b), (c) or (d) for a building or incidental structure in respect of which unauthorised work has been done if: (a) an occupancy permit or a building approval certificate for the building or incidental structure has been granted; or (b) an application for an occupancy permit or a building approval certificate for the building or incidental structure has been made but not decided by the permit authority; or (c) the period in which to apply for a review under section 121 has not expired; or (d) an application for a review under section 121 has been made but not decided by the State Administrative Tribunal. 70 Two of the five actions required of the appellant by the building order were subject to s 113(2).29 The remaining three were not. 29 Affidavit of Giancarlo Righetti sworn on 27 March 2024, Annexure GR1. -- 14 of 18 -- [2026] WASC 155 FORRESTER J Page 15 71 The only application for a building approval certificate which the appellant has put before the court is dated 13 January 2012.30 It was not fully completed. The appellant acknowledged in her affidavit, sworn on 14 July 2025, that her 'plans' were rejected, and, thereafter she paid for the applications on 13 April 2012. 72 As set out above, as part of the facts placed before the learned magistrate at the appellant's sentencing, the prosecutor said that, in November 2023 the appellant claimed to officers of the City that she had applied for a building permit, but that the officers advised her that the City had requested additional information in relation to that application and that she had failed to provide the information within 21 days and, as a result, that application had been cancelled. 73 There is no evidence that the appellant made any second application for a building approval certificate. Further, even if she did so, there is no evidence that it remains on foot, and all of the stated facts were to the contrary. 74 Annexed to the appellant's affidavit sworn on 14 July 2025 is also an application to the State Administrative Tribunal pursuant to s 84 of the Building Services (Complaint Resolution and Administration) Act 2011 (WA) (Building Services Act).31 An application under s 84 of the Building Services Act is an application for a review by the State Administrative Tribunal, made by a person aggrieved by a decision to give a remediation notice or a decision of the Building Commissioner under s 83 of that Act. 75 Such an application is, by definition, not an application pursuant to s 121 of the Building Act. Further, the application was made on 20 September 2024, well past the date of non-compliance by the appellant with the building order. 76 Further, and in any event, the application to the State Administrative Tribunal refers only to an application for building approval dated 13 January 2012. The appellant acknowledged that that application was rejected in 2012. The appellant was therefore at all material times well outside the time within which a review of the decision of the City could be sought. 30 Affidavit sworn 14 July 2025, 4. 31 Affidavit sworn 14 July 2025, 6 - 9. -- 15 of 18 -- [2026] WASC 155 FORRESTER J Page 16 77 In those circumstances, I am satisfied that the evidence establishes that none of the circumstances in s 113(2) of the Building Act operated to prevent the issuing of the building order by the City. 78 The appellant's claim to innocence, which in substance was an argument that she had a reasonable excuse for failing to comply with the Building Order, was predicated upon her claims that: (a) she had building approval for the alterations and construction; (b) despite the City's assertions, she had (in 2024) established that the structures were structurally sound; and (c) the City should not have issued the Building Order. 79 As I have indicated, the evidence does not establish that the appellant ever had a building approval from the City or applied for a further building approval certificate after the rejection in 2012. 80 The fact that the appellant had established the structures were structurally sound in 2024 could have no bearing on the fact that she committed an offence in 2023. Further, there is no basis, on the available evidence, for her criticism of the City for issuing the building order. 81 Ultimately, the appellant did not adduce any evidence that she complied with any part of the building order, which was issued on 14 August 2023, or that she had a reasonable excuse for failing to do so. 82 It appears that the appellant may have initially proceeded with her property development on the basis of a misunderstanding on her part as to the City's requirements for approvals. At some point, a personnel change at the City resulted in the appellant dealing with a person who was unaware of her history, but who required her to remedy the situation. 83 The appellant appears to have become confused and frustrated with the approval process, and was either unable or unwilling to obtain expert or other assistance to help her liaise with the City to remedy the defects in a reasonable time. She was then issued with the building order and failed to comply with it. Since then, the appellant has been somewhat fixated on establishing that she had approval from the City. -- 16 of 18 -- [2026] WASC 155 FORRESTER J Page 17 84 However, the appellant has adduced no evidence which demonstrates that she could not have been properly convicted of the offence of which she was convicted. Indeed, I am satisfied that she had no arguable defence to the charge. 85 There was no miscarriage of justice. The ground of appeal has no merit. 86 The applications to adduce additional evidence and the application for an extension of time should be refused. 87 The application for leave to appeal must be refused, and the appeal dismissed. 88 The outcome of the sentence appeal was dependent on the outcome of the conviction appeal. It follows that leave to appeal the sentence is also refused and the appeal dismissed. 89 I will hear from the parties as to costs. Orders 1. The appellant's application to adduce additional evidence is refused. 2. The respondent's application to adduce additional evidence is refused. 3. The application for an extension of time in which to appeal is refused. 4. Leave to appeal against conviction is refused. 5. The appeal against conviction is dismissed. 6. Leave to appeal against sentence is refused. 7. The appeal against sentence is dismissed. -- 17 of 18 -- [2026] WASC 155 FORRESTER J Page 18 I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the Supreme Court of Western Australia. CA Associate to the Hon Justice Forrester 4 MAY 2026 -- 18 of 18 --