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ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) In Person v AWL In Person [2026] SASC 58

Case law · South Australia
Applicant: ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) In Person Counsel: MS E DIBDEN - Solicitor: CROWN SOLICITOR (SA) Respondent: AWL In Person Counsel: MR T BLAKE - Solicitor: LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSION (SA) Hearing Date/s: 26/03/2026, 08/04/2026 File No/s: SCCRM-26-008590; SCCRM-26-008594 B SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA (Criminal: Application) DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court in which it was generated. ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v AWL [2026] SASC 58 Judgment of the Honourable Justice Gray (ex tempore) 26 March 2026 CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS - OTHER TYPES OF POST-CUSTODIAL ORDERS The Attorney-General seeks that the respondent, AWL, remain in custody pending determination as to whether the respondent is to be detained until further order. In the alternative, the Attorney-General seeks that the respondent be subject to an Interim Supervision Order (‘ISO’). The respondent was sentenced on 19 August 2003 to 10 years imprisonment following convictions for unlawful sexual intercourse, precuring an act of gross indecency, and gross indecency. The victim was the respondent’s then 12-year-old daughter. There was also one count of offending against his daughter’s friend. On 25 July 2017, the respondent was sentenced to a term of imprisonment for aggravated possession of child exploitation material. On 16 March 2023, the respondent was again sentenced to imprisonment of four years, one month and 16 days for aggravated possession of child exploitation material and basic possession of child exploitation material. The Attorney-General submits that the evidence discloses a substantial question to be tried as to whether the respondent is unwilling to control his sexual instincts and contends that the risk posed to the safety of the community justifies the respondent’s interim detention pending the final determination of the substantive application. The respondent submits that an interim detention order will deny him his personal liberty after the service of his sentence of imprisonment, that he has completed the sexual behaviours rehabilitation program for participants with mental health needs and that the imposition of an ISO on stringent conditions can successfully ameliorate any concerns about the respondent’s risk to the safety of the community. Held, declining to make an interim detention order: (1) The power conferred by s 57(5) of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA), to order the interim detention of a respondent pending the determination of an application for a continuing detention order, is to be exercised with the protection for the safety of the community as the paramount consideration. The determination involves the consideration of: -- 1 of 11 -- (a) Whether there is, or will be, a real question to be tried as to the making of a continuing detention order. This includes consideration of whether a respondent is incapable of controlling, or unwilling to control, their sexual instincts, and whether the risk is such that it is appropriate for the protection of the community that the respondent be detained; and (b) Whether the discretion to be exercised, pursuant to s 57(5), indicates that it would be appropriate to make an interim detention order. This evaluation includes the apparent strength of the case, the practical consequences of interim relief, and the interests of justice. [31] (2) Having regard to all of the matters before the Court, including the respondent’s personal circumstances, his history of offending, the risk assessments conducted on him, the treatment undertaken, and his limited insight into offending, there is a real question to be tried as to whether the respondent is incapable of controlling, or unwilling to control, his sexual instincts. [34] (3) Whilst there is a possibility of a failure to exercise appropriate control of sexual instincts, the material before the Court does not establish that there is significant or substantial risk of re- offending such that detention is required. The respondent has engaged in programs designed to reduce the risk of him re-offending and 56 hours of individual counselling. The respondent has also provided evidence as to the supports that would be available to him on home detention from the Services to Youth Council. The Court considers that risk that the respondent poses may be adequately addressed by strict ISO conditions. [36]-[38] Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 49, 58(a), 58(1)(b), 63(a), 63A; Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) ss 7, 9; Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) ss 53, 57, 57(1), 57(3), 57(5), 57(7), referred to. Attorney-General (SA) v Colangelo [2025] SASC 2; Hore v The Queen, Wichen v The Queen (2022) 273 CLR 153; R v Hoare [2017] SASC 7, applied. -- 2 of 11 -- ATTORNEY-GENERAL (SA) v AWL [2026] SASC 58 Criminal: Application 1 GRAY J (ex tempore): This matter concerns an application by the Attorney-General (SA) (‘the applicant’) that AWL (‘the respondent’) remain in custody pending determination by the Court as to whether the respondent be detained in custody until further order.1 2 An alternative order is sought that the respondent be subject to an interim supervision order (‘ISO’).2 The alternative application for an ISO is not opposed and therefore the issue joined between the parties, and the issue that I must decide, is whether the respondent should remain in custody, or whether the respondent should be the subject of an ISO.3 3 The applicant contends that the materials before the Court indicate that there is a real question to be tried as to whether the respondent is unwilling to control his sexual instincts. The applicant contends that the risk the respondent poses to the safety of the community makes his interim detention pending determination of the substantive application appropriate. The applicant contends that the paramount consideration is the safety of the community and that the evidence weighs in favour of the Court exercising its discretion to make an interim detention order (‘IDO’),4 as an ISO is said not to afford adequate protection to the community. 4 The respondent submits that an IDO will deny the respondent his personal liberty after the service by him of his sentence of imprisonment. The respondent submits that AWL has completed the sexual behaviours rehabilitation program for participants with mental health needs and that the imposition of an ISO on stringent conditions can successfully ameliorate any concerns about the respondent’s risk to the safety of the community. Background and legal principles 5 This application is brought pursuant to s 57 of the Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) (‘Sentencing Act’). Section 57(3) of the Sentencing Act provides, to the effect, that if a person has been convicted of a relevant offence the Attorney-General may, whilst the person remains in prison serving a sentence of imprisonment, apply to the Court for their continuing detention. 1 Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 57(3); Applicant, ‘Originating Application Uncontrolled Sexual Instincts-Extended Detention Order’, Submission in Attorney-General (SA) v [AWL], SCCRM-26- 008590, 27 February 2026 (FDN 1). 2 Criminal Law (High Risk Offenders) Act 2015 (SA) s 9 (‘HRO Act’); Applicant, ‘Originating Application – High Risk Offenders – Extended Supervision Order’, Submission in Attorney-General (SA) v [AWL], SCCRM-26-008594, 27 February 2026 (FDN 1). 3 Pending the determination by this Court of whether the respondent should be the subject of a Continuing Detention Order (‘CDO’). 4 Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 57(5). -- 3 of 11 -- [2026] SASC 58 Gray J 2 6 A “relevant” offence is defined in s 57(1) of the Sentencing Act. There is no dispute between the parties that the respondent has been convicted of relevant offences. The respondent has convictions for the following offences: 1. Unlawful Sexual Intercourse contrary to s 49 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) (‘CLCA’) (four counts); 2. Procuring an act of Gross Indecency contrary to section 58A of the CLCA (as it then was, which is substantially similar to present section 58(1)(b) of the CLCA) (one count); 3. Gross Indecency contrary to section 58 of the CLCA (one count); and 4. Aggravated and Basic Possession of Child Exploitation Material (‘CEM’) contrary to section 63A of the CLCA (three counts – two counts aggravated and one count basic – across 2017 and 2023). 7 Section 57(5) of the Sentencing Act confers upon the Court a broad discretion as to whether to make an IDO. The section provides: The Supreme Court may, if the Attorney-General has made an application under subsection (3) in respect of the person who is in prison serving a sentence of imprisonment, make an interim order that the person is to remain in custody pending determination by the Supreme Court as to whether to make an order under this section that the person be detained in custody until further order. 8 The respondent is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment for two counts relating to child exploitation material. The respondent will be imprisoned until 17 April 2026. I find that the application was brought in the relevant period such that the jurisdiction of the Court to make a detention order on an interim basis has been enlivened. 9 In Attorney-General (SA) v Colangelo,5 McDonald J held that the discretion conferred by s 57(5) is broad and should be exercised having regard to the purpose of s 57 of the Sentencing Act.6 The paramount consideration in exercising the discretion is to protect the safety of the community.7 The purpose and object of an order under s 57(7) of the Sentencing Act which concerns the indefinite detention of a person is protective and not punitive. As Hinton J held in R v Hoare,8 the purpose of such an order is:9 …to protect the community from sexual offenders where the risk posed by such a person is such that it is inappropriate that they be released, even when they have completed what 5 [2025] SASC 2. 6 [2025] SASC 2, 15 [94]. 7 Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 57(8). 8 [2017] SASC 7. 9 [2017] SASC 7, 14 [64], cited in Driver v Attorney-General (SA) (2022) 140 SASR 282, 290 [28]; [2022] SASCA 13 (Kourakis CJ, Doyle and Bleby JJA). -- 4 of 11 -- [2026] SASC 58 Gray J 3 would otherwise be their period of imprisonment for the offences that they have committed. 10 The making of an IDO denies a person’s right to liberty and will only be made where there is cogent and acceptable evidence justifying an order.10 11 In considering the protection to the safety of the community, a question that I must consider, in the circumstances of this case, is whether the protection of the community requires the detention of the respondent or whether any risk that the respondent poses can be adequately addressed by the making of an ISO. 12 The central submission of the Attorney-General is that the respondent is unwilling to control his sexual instincts. That is, the Attorney-General contends, to use the language of s 57(1), that there is a significant risk that the respondent would, given an opportunity, commit a relevant offence and fail to exercise appropriate control of his sexual instincts.11 I have considered this matter by reference to the decision in Hore v The Queen, Wichen v The Queen in which the High Court held:12 … a person’s willingness to control his or her sexual instincts may fall somewhere on a spectrum of states of volition, at some point on which the community is at “significant risk” of harm for reasons other than a want of capability on behalf of the person to control his or her sexual instincts. 13 In this context, it is said that a mere possibility of a failure to exercise appropriate control of sexual instincts is not sufficient; rather, the Court must be satisfied that there is a “good chance” that the risk will eventuate.13 The assessment that is relevant is an assessment of whether the person is likely to have a reliable commitment to control the person’s sexual instinct at a time when any occasion for the exercise of control arises.14 14 In considering whether or not an IDO should be made pursuant to s 57(5), I have had regard to all of the submissions advanced by the parties both in the written submissions at the previous hearing and in Court today. I have also had regard to the material filed by the parties. Whilst I have had regard to all these matters. I set out below the central matters relevant to my findings. 10 Attorney-General (SA) v GS [2025] SASC 29, [28] (Stein J); R v Stevens [2015] SASC 79, 2 [11] (Bampton J); R v England [2004] SASC 20; (2004) 87 SASR 411, 423–4 (Bleby J); R v Ainsworth [2008] SASC 67; (2008) 100 SASR 238, 253-4 [56] (White J), referring to the previous, but equivalent, provisions under the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Act 1988 (SA) (as it then stood). 11 Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 57(1) (definition of ‘unwilling’). 12 (2022) 273 CLR 153; [2022] HCA 22 at [49] (Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward and Gleeson JJ). 13 R v Whyte [2006] SASC 56, 9 [30] (White J); Attorney-General v Kelly [2017] SASC 164, 6-8 [21] (Nicholson J) (considering former s 23 of the Sentencing Act). See also Hore v The Queen, Wichen v The Queen (2022) 273 CLR 153; [2022] HCA 22 at [49] (Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson JJ). 14 Hore v The Queen, Wichen v The Queen (2022) 273 CLR 153; [2022] HCA 22 at [50] (Keane, Gordon, Edelman, Steward, Gleeson JJ) (discussing s 59(1a)(a) of the Sentencing Act). -- 5 of 11 -- [2026] SASC 58 Gray J 4 The respondent’s personal circumstances and offending history 15 The respondent is a 61-year-old Caucasian male. The respondent has three children from a previous marriage. He is, by reason of his offending, a serious repeat offender within the meaning as defined in s 53 of the Sentencing Act. 16 The respondent has a history of childhood sexual abuse which commenced when he was approximately 12 years old.15 He left home at age 17 to live with and look after his grandparents. The respondent has been reported as being a “concrete thinker” with self-identified poor short-term memory.16 He has been assessed having a learning disability specifically in relation to verbal skills and is functionally illiterate with poor numeracy skills.17 17 In relation to his offender history, the respondent was sentenced on 19 August 2003 in the District Court of South Australia to a term of imprisonment of 10 years back dated to 15 March 2003, following convictions for unlawful sexual intercourse,18 precuring an act of gross indecency,19 and gross indecency20 contrary to sections 49, 58(a) (as it then was) and 58 of the CLCA respectively. The victim of the offending was the respondent’s then 12-year-old daughter. There was a significant number of offences involving vaginal sex, fellatio and cunnilingus.21 There was also one count of offending against his daughter’s friend which involved the respondent placing his erect penis against the child and photographing it. The offending was considered to involve grooming and sexual priming by the respondent of his daughter to maintain her compliance and to minimise the prospect of disclosure.22 18 On 25 July 2017, the respondent was sentenced by the District Court of South Australia to a term of imprisonment of two years, nine months and 14 days,23 following the respondent pleading guilty to and being convicted of aggravated possession of child exploitation material contrary to s 63(a) of the CLCA. The sentence related to the offending was ascertained on 25 August 2016, when police attended at the respondent’s residence and seized his electronic items. The examination of the respondent’s items disclosed 550 items comprising of 541 images and 9 videos. Approximately 94% per cent of the material depicted children under the age of 14. The remainder was of children over the age of 14 but under the age of 17. 15 Applicant, ‘Affidavit of Eloise Ruth Dibden’, Submission in Attorney-General (SA) v [AWL], SCCRM- 26-008590, 27 February 2026, 43 (Exhibit ERD-8) (‘First Dibden Affidavit’); Applicant, ‘Affidavit of Eloise Ruth Dibden’, Submission in Attorney-General (SA) v [AWL], SCCRM-26-008590, 18 March 2026, 6 (Exhibit ERD-15) (‘Second Dibden Affidavit’). 16 Second Dibden Affidavit (n 15) 5 (Exhibit ERD-15). 17 Second Dibden Affidavit (n 15)14-15 (Exhibit ERD-15). 18 Four Counts. 19 One Count. 20 One Count. 21 First Dibden Affidavit (n 15) 5, 7 (Exhibit ERD-1). 22 First Dibden Affidavit (n 15) 31 (Exhibit ERD-6). 23 Backdated to 25 August 2016; First Dibden Affidavit (n 15) 11-12. -- 6 of 11 -- [2026] SASC 58 Gray J 5 19 The images were mostly of young girls and in one instance there was an image showing penetration of a baby. Judge Beasley in sentencing the respondent did not accept that the respondent was at low risk of re-offending. His Honour described the respondent’s focus on young children as “most troubling” and that the respondent had an unaddressed, deep seated sexual problem which, absent treatment, meant that the respondent was at serious risk of becoming a repeat offender.24 Concern was expressed about the respondent’s prospects of rehabilitation and the importance of him receiving treatment.25 20 On 16 March 2023, the respondent was again sentenced by the District Court of South Australia to a sentence of imprisonment of four years, one month and 16 days backdated to 2 March 2022. That sentence followed the respondent pleading guilty to and being convicted of aggravated possession of child exploitation material (one count) and basic possession of child exploitation material (one count) contrary to s 63(a) of the CLCA. That is the sentence of imprisonment that the respondent is currently serving. 21 The offending involved the respondent’s possession of 2,742 images and 15 videos located across three mobile phones. Most of the images and two thirds of the videos were in the form of aggravated child exploitation material. Each image located represented the sexual abuse of a child. Auxiliary Judge Barrett stressed the importance of the respondent receiving treatment for his sexual problems, noting otherwise it was possible that the respondent would re-offend.26 There was further offending in June and July 2024, when the respondent failed to notify of a change of address and did not report for an annual review as he was required to, pursuant to his reporting obligations under the Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA). In respect of this offending, the respondent was convicted and fined $200 for both counts on 8 October 2024. Risk assessments treatment and insight into offending 22 It is not in dispute that the respondent has, at various times, been assessed as a moderate to high risk of sexual re-offending despite having completed sexual offender programs. 23 Whilst on parole, following the service of his non-parole period for the 2003 convictions for unlawful sexual intercourse and gross indecency offending, the respondent successfully completed a rehabilitation program at Owenia House.27 In December 2017, a psychologist assessed the respondent’s cognitive function as being somewhat compromised such that it was recommended he was more suited to a modified program to address his sexual offending.28 24 First Dibden Affidavit (n 15) 11 (Exhibit ERD-2). 25 First Dibden Affidavit (n 15)11-12 (Exhibit ERD-2). 26 First Dibden Affidavit (n 15) 14 (Exhibit ERD-3). 27 First Dibden Affidavit (n 15) 42 (Exhibit ERD-8), 49-50 (Exhibit ERD-9), 67 (Exhibit ERD-11). 28 Second Dibden Affidavit (n 15) 16, 24-25 (Exhibit ERD-16). -- 7 of 11 -- [2026] SASC 58 Gray J 6 24 The more recent evidence concerning the respondent’s assessments and engagement in programs includes, on 21 June 2023, an interview conducted by the Department of Correctional Services with the respondent for the development of an individual plan during the course of which the respondent was assessed as being at moderate risk of sexual re-offending and suitable for inclusion in the modified sexual behaviour clinic program.29 The respondent completed the sexual behaviour clinic program and was assessed as being at moderate to high risk of sexual re-offending.30 25 Between 1 May 2024 and 19 June 2025, the respondent completed a further sexual behaviour clinic program at Mount Gambier Prison. He attended 99 per cent of group sessions and received 56 hours of individual counselling. Subsequent to that program, the respondent was re-assessed as being at moderate to high risk of sexual re-offending but with some reduction in his sexual recidivism rate due to positive shifts in dynamic treatment targets. 26 Whilst the completion of these programs is positive, there remain a number of concerning features of the respondent’s presentation. In particular, despite the respondent at times accepting responsibility for his actions, his insight to his offending is inconsistent and he has continued, including in recent years, to rationalise his abuse. 27 In 2024, the respondent is reported to have told the Department of Correctional Services that whilst he took responsibility for his offending against his daughter, his daughter was sexually active before he abused her and he did not acknowledge that such sexual activity would also constitute abuse.31 In addition, he referred to the photographing of his penis next to his daughter’s friend as a joke.32 These matters reflect disregard for and a lack of understanding about the inappropriateness of this behaviour. The respondent also made comments concerning his sexual abuse of his daughter being to “get revenge” on his wife for her infidelity and his frustration at his inability to meet women.33 28 It is also concerning that as recently as 25 November 2025, upon being interviewed by the Department of Correctional Service, the respondent also indicated that he couldn’t promise that he would not re-offend as if things got hard, he would want to come back to prison.34 29 These matters need to be considered in the context of the respondent’s completion of programs designed to reduce the risk of his re-offending, his level of participation in those programs, and the steps that the respondent has taken to 29 First Dibden Affidavit (n 15) 45 (Exhibit ERD-8). See also p48 (Exhibit ERD-9). 30 First Dibden Affidavit (n 15) 49 (Exhibit ERD-9). 31 First Dibden Affidavit (n 15) 50 (Exhibit ERD-9). 32 First Dibden Affidavit (n 15) 50 (Exhibit ERD-9). 33 First Dibden Affidavit (n 15) 50 (Exhibit ERD-9), 75 (Exhibit ERD-14). 34 First Dibden Affidavit (n 15) 75 (Exhibit ERD-14). -- 8 of 11 -- [2026] SASC 58 Gray J 7 engage with services that will be available to him in the community should he be subject to an ISO. Consideration 30 The question that I must consider in determining whether to make an IDO under s 57(5) of the Sentencing Act is whether on the evidence before this Court it is appropriate to make an order that the respondent be detained until determination of the application for an extended detention order. As McDonald J held in Attorney-General (SA) v Colangelo:35 The Act does not provide a threshold test or criteria for the making of such an interim order. It follows that the discretion is broad and should be exercised having regard to the purposes of s 57, which is that the paramount consideration is to protect the safety of the community. It is a further relevant consideration that the order is only an interim order which must necessarily be made when the Court has not yet received all of the information needed to make a final determination. 31 The question of whether it is appropriate to make an interim order pursuant to s 57(5) detaining the respondent in custody pending determination of the application for a continuing detention order, involves the consideration of: 1. whether there is, or will be, a real question to be tried as to the making of an extended detention order. This includes consideration of whether the respondent is incapable of controlling, or unwilling to control, his sexual instincts, and whether the nature of the risk the respondent poses is such that it is appropriate for the protection of the safety of the community that he be detained until further order; and 2. whether the discretion to be exercised pursuant to s 57(5) indicates that it would be appropriate to make an interim detention order. Matters relevant to the evaluative exercise to be undertaken include the apparent strength of the case, the practical consequences of interim relief,36 and the interests of justice. These matters direct attention to the question of whether the protection of the community requires the detention of the respondent or whether any risk the respondent poses can be adequately addressed by the making of an interim supervision order. 32 Having regard to the scheme of the Act, the paramount consideration in determining the question of whether the IDO should be made is the protection of the safety of the community. 37 33 I consider that determining whether it is appropriate that the respondent be detained, will be informed by the particular risk that the respondent poses, and whether an order of interim detention under section 57(5) is apt to protect the safety of the community. This requires a consideration of the gravity of the risk, the 35 [2025] SASC 2, 15 [94]. 36 See B Doyle J in Attorney-General v Anderson [2026] SASC 29, at [38]. 37 [2025] SASC 2, 15 [94]. -- 9 of 11 -- [2026] SASC 58 Gray J 8 likelihood of it manifesting, and whether other mechanisms with less impact on the respondent’s liberty, such as an ISO, can adequately protect the community form any risk. 34 Having regard to all of these matters before me, including the respondent’s personal circumstances, his history of offending, the risk assessments conducted on him, the treatment undertaken, and his limited insight into offending, I find there is a real question to be tried as to whether the respondent is incapable of controlling, or unwilling to control, his sexual instincts. 35 I accept that there is limited evidence before me by which to consider whether any risk that the respondent poses means that it is appropriate for the protection of the safety of the community that he be detained until determination of the extended detention order.38 This is relevant both to the question of the making of an extended detention order, and to the discretion concerning the making of an interim detention order. This Court in determining whether to make an extended supervision order, that is an order that the respondent be detained in custody until further order, will have further information including a report of at least two legally qualified medical practitioners who have inquired into the mental condition of the respondent and reported to the Court on whether the respondent is incapable of controlling or unwilling to control his sexual instincts.39 That material is not currently available to me, given the time at which this application is brought. 36 Assessing this matter as I must on the information currently before me, whilst I am satisfied that there is a possibility of a failure to exercise appropriate control of sexual instincts, the information before me does not establish that there is significant risk. I am not satisfied on the material before me that there is a good chance or substantial risk of re-offending such that detention is required. The respondent has engaged in programs designed to reduce the risk of him re- offending. The respondent has engaged in 56 hours of individual counselling. The respondent has also put before this Court on this application material as to the supports that would be available to him on home detention from the Services to Youth Council. I am told these supports will be in addition to the supports to be provided by his Community Corrections Officer appointed pursuant to the proposed terms of the ISO order. These supports include: • GP and Mental Health Care Plan. • Employment Opportunities and upskilling. • Community Connection and Social Participation. • Referrals to specialist supports such as a psychologist. 38 See Stein J in Attorney-General (SA) v GS [2025] SASC 29, at [40]. 39 Sentencing Act 2017 (SA) s 57(6). -- 10 of 11 -- [2026] SASC 58 Gray J 9 • Centrelink requirements. • Referrals to Counselling and Therapeutic Supports. • Community Corrections Appointments. • Long term sustainable housing opportunities. 37 The Services to Youth Council has indicated that support will be provided for up to six months post release to assist with the respondent’s reintegration, access to services and ongoing wellbeing.40 Information was also provided at this hearing which indicates that the forensic psychologist from the Mount Gambier Prison has indicated a willingness to remain in contact with the respondent and his community corrections officers to ascertain how he is progressing in the community and to offer a handover where the respondent’s progress and plans and self-management can be discussed. The forensic psychologist has also indicated a willingness, whilst in the role of forensic psychologist at Mount Gambier Prison, to continue to engage with the respondent in the community. Deprivation of the respondent’s liberty by further detention for a period of six months is not justified on the material before me. 38 Rather, I consider the risk that the respondent poses may be adequately addressed by strict conditions of an ISO, including intensive electronic monitoring (home detention) and specific conditions limiting the respondent’s access to the internet and allowing police and the Department of Correctional Services to enter and inspect his home at any time for the presence of child exploitation material. I accept that the safety of the community is the paramount consideration; however, I consider that any risk that the respondent poses can be appropriately addressed by the imposition of strict home detention conditions and limiting the access to the internet. These are matters contemplated by the proposed ISO conditions. Conclusion 39 It follows that I would exercise my discretion not to make an Interim Detention Order. 40 I will hear from the parties further as to the terms of the ISO order. 40 See Letter of Service to Youth Council dated 1 April 2026 attached to ‘Written Submissions of Respondent’, Submission in Attorney-General (SA) v [AWL], SCCRM-26-008590, 7 April 2026, 6 (FDN 19). -- 11 of 11 --